The end of gunpoint conservation: forest disturbance after the Colombian peace agreement

A total of 2517, level 1 terrain-corrected Landsat surface reflectance images (Collection 1) corresponding to 10 WRS-2 tiles during 2000–2018 were used for this analysis. Near-real-time disturbances were captured using BFAST Monitor method (Verbesselt et al 2010). We used the Tasseled Cap wetness index, which combined all Landsat spectral bands and provided a consistent disturbance detection performance across different forest types in tropical regions (Schultz et al 2016). The time-series was separated into a historical period (2000–2009), and a monitoring period (2010–2018). The monitoring period was selected to identify disturbances before the beginning of the negotiation stage (2013–2016). Forest disturbance patches were accumulated for each conflict stage to calculate patch metrics, rate, and extent. More details about sampling, accuracy assessment and implementation in SP.

To interpret the patterns of spatiotemporal forest disturbance in territories firmly held by FARC, we drew on ethnographic research exclusively in Putumayo municipalities of: Puerto Guzmán, Puerto Leguízamo and Puerto Asís. We supplemented ethnographic data with information from previous studies, government and non-government reports on five PAs–Cordillera de Los Picachos, Tinigua, Sierra de la Macarena, Chiribiquete, and La Paya. In-depth, semi-structured interviews and participant observation were conducted in a two-year ethnographic study on the interactions between forest disturbance and post-peace agreement in Putumayo (Van Dexter and Visseren-Hamakers 2019). Ethnographic data were collected during participant observation with rural farmers in Putumayo between 2016 and 2018. Interviewees were selected through a purposive sampling given their engagement in agricultural, administrative activities, and local projects that influence land use. Semi-structured interviews (n = 80) were implemented with farmers and community leaders (54), government officials (6), rural social organizations (13), and agricultural producer associations (7). Interviews included questions focused on shifting institutions, land access and land use in forests during the post-peace agreement. The data were then classified to identify direct causes of forest disturbance.

Forest disturbance detection in the AATB through the full study period of 2000–2018 determined that 12 484 630 ± 189 160 ha (95% confidence interval) of forest remained stable and 735 678 ± 190 088 ha of forest were disturbed, corresponding to 74% and 4.4% of the AATB, respectively (table SP1). Across conflict stages, during wartime (2000–2012) we detected 181 622 ± 5384 ha (1% of the AATB) of forest disturbance, during negotiations (2013–2016) 316 505 ± 123261 ha (1.9%), and during post-peace agreement (2017–2018) 237 954 ± 61443 ha (1.4%). Forest disturbance was more evident in 2014 and 2016–2018. The monthly pattern of disturbance is bimodal, with most loss in August and January-March, which coincides with the dry season and favorable conditions for logging and forest clearing by setting fires (figure 2). User’s accuracy for each forest disturbance year ranged from 79% to 99% and producer’s accuracies from 69% to 99%. Temporally, sub-annual disturbance detection dates were accurate in 69% of observed change using a window of 3 months, while the rest of the observations coincided between 3–12 months (figure 3). Please visit the website: https://murillop.users.earthengine.app/view/amazoncol.

Zoom In Zoom Out Reset image size

Zoom In Zoom Out Reset image size

The increase in forest disturbance during the post-peace agreement is more evident in PAs than within Putumayo. First, PAs under FARC control experienced more disturbance within their boundaries compared to the 5 km buffer region surrounding them (figure 4). This is evident in Tinigua and Picachos national parks, which had, respectively, 50% and 19% more disturbance within them than outside their borders. Within PAs, the mean disturbance patch size increased from 2.6 ha (σ = 3.2 ha) during wartime to 4.5 ha (σ = 9.9 ha) during negotiations and 7.5 ha (σ = 16 ha) during the post-peace agreement. Second, disturbance expanded deeper into the Amazon forests and municipalities in Putumayo. For instance, Puerto Guzmán has seen the most disturbed area with the largest patches 4.8 ha, (σ = 11.56 ha) followed by Puerto Leguízamo 4.3 ha (σ = 11.39 ha). On the other hand, Puerto Asís patch sizes remain stable 1.56 ha, (σ = 2.2 ha) across conflict stages; this is highly associated with coca cultivation. More detail about patch size metrics is available in SP (table SP2).

Zoom In Zoom Out Reset image size

FARC’s demobilization triggered processes of agricultural substitution from coca to cattle and incidents of land grabbing. In Putumayo, interviewees reported an increase of coca, cattle ranching and land grabbing during the post-peace agreement (table 1). In general, changes resulted from shifting governance. The end of gunpoint conservation process is evident, according to a social leader from Puerto Guzman, ‘Nobody entered the jungle because the guerrilla existed, they did not let people enter because the jungle was useful for them, but as the guerrillas left the campesinos are entering the jungle—which is owned by no one—knocking down trees to make farms for cattle ranching.’ The absence of either state or FARC authorities has permitted people to acquire and deforest land undeterred. ‘Here is no authority, there is no guerrilla control, there is no control of anyone, whoever desires can go and knock down 100 hectares and nobody says anything.’ In this context, coca remains as a source of income and cattle ranching is the most common option to establish agricultural ‘licit’ projects. As told by one informant: ‘Cattle ranching begins when people leave the coca. After coca they start with the cattle and see it as a good line of economy. Every day more and more forest is being lost; it’s worrying.’ In addition, land grabs go unreported as threats and bribes are used to buy silence.

Our findings corroborate preliminary concerns that the peace agreement would generate an increase of forest disturbance in areas formerly under FARC control (Clerici et al 2016, Baptiste et al 2017). The end-of-conflict provided new socioeconomic opportunities for different actors about how land could be used in the future. During the post-peace agreement stage, the entire AATB experienced an increase of forest disturbance, but with different disturbance rates across PAs, Putumayo municipalities and deeper into Amazon watershed. The overall impact during the post-peace agreement stage on forests across AATB is negative (figure 5).

Zoom In Zoom Out Reset image size

Some factors contribute to the different disturbance rates between PAs and Putumayo. In PAs, the governance vacuum left after FARC’s official withdrawal from strongholds (Picachos-Tinigua-Macarena) has been filled by dissidents and non-state actors who have intensified disturbance. In Putumayo and deeper into the Amazon watershed, campesinos and non-state actors moved into areas that were previously off-limits by FARC mandate and cleared forests to start farms (e.g. cattle ranching) and speculatively acquire land. This process is not new; campesinos are constantly displaced from their lands through legal or violent mechanisms, pushing them towards the agricultural frontier (Gómez et al 2015). What differs now is that many different actors are simultaneously moving more aggressively in this expansion than during previous stages of the conflict. This expansion is also fueled by a broader narco-economy chain remaining in the AATB. The frequent transition forest-coca-cattle ranching is followed by processes of land accumulation in which the land provides economic incentives for different non-state actors.

These findings have broad implications for current policies associated with forest conservation in Colombia’s new agricultural frontier. Colombia’s National Development Plan 2018–2022 reinforces the need for State presence (Government of Colombia 2018a). It states that the transition to ‘licit’ agricultural production will be enforced through police and military interventions, resulting in the ‘militarization’ of forests through the creation of ‘Strategic Zones of Comprehensive Intervention’ (Government of Colombia 2018b). For example, the military campaign ‘Artemisa’ has focused on PAs, but not in the agricultural frontier limits in which large deforested patches are mostly occurring. Artemisa criminalizes small farmers within PAs rather than addressing the fact that larger deforested patches are outside of PAs and that behind these forest clearings are often outsider investors and non-state actors. These recent plans, the slow process for land distribution, and poor agricultural assistance for campesinos and ex-combatants, as well as the potential changes in transitional justice laws have motivated some FARC leaders to go back to war. Hence, a new unstable stage of the Colombian conflict has arrived with the potential for unforeseen consequences to people and forests in the coming years.

The rate of forest disturbance in PAs was relatively low historically (Etter et al 2008). Deforestation pressure increased in the 2000s (Achard et al 2002) with two peaks of deforestation within PAs in 2004 and 2007 (Hansen et al 2013, Murillo-Sandoval et al 2017). After FARC’s withdrawal in 2017, a large peak of disturbance was evident in 2018 (figure 5). The retreat of FARC drove a shift in the institutional framework for governing forests. Actors have ceased following forest conservation rules imposed and enforced by FARC. Although FARC withdrawal represents the biggest institutional change, other points in the agreement are also connected with this increase in disturbance.

The agreement incorporated aspects such as the distribution and legalization of land and the construction of roads (Government of Colombia 2016). These aspects generated expectations about new access to land and resources, especially in campesino reserve zones adjacent to PAs, which prompted people to expand forest clearing. While this expansion is illegal (De Pourcq et al 2018) and it is impossible to obtain legal land titles within PAs (MADR 1977), why were they deforesting there? Disturbances within PAs could be explained by a protracted, iterative dispute between different actors about historical occupation and land tenure rights, exacerbated after the peace agreement was signed (Gómez et al 2015, Morales 2017).

First, land distribution inequality has long been a cause of the Colombian conflict (Escobar 2006), but delivering legal titles through the agreement has opened opportunities for resolving this problem by; helping campesinos and ex-combatants to obtain land legally. Nevertheless, outside investors also see opportunities to obtain and capitalize land (Marx 1991). Investors in illegal land markets expect rent or profits on the capital they used for forest clearing, in which formal land tenure is never intended (Richani 2012). Formal tenure is less important than the rules and mechanisms used to manage and obtain economic benefits from land (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). Since FARC withdrawal, the illegal land markets have boosted, similarly as peace processes with paramilitaries (Nussio and Howe 2012) in which actors recover their initial forest clearing investment by raising cattle or growing coca within a few years.

Second, the construction of roads, a well-known driver of deforestation worldwide (Barber et al 2014), is stipulated within the agreement to connect former FARC territories with central markets. Opening access to the areas also increases speculation for commercializing land and motives actors to expand the agricultural frontier established in 2018 (see roads map in the SP) (Salgar and Cárdenas 2017, UNOCDC 2017). Land speculation has been a key feature of the capitalism accumulation model in Colombia (Richani 2012), but what differs now is the magnitude of speculation and the collective impact of FARC withdrawal with the unstable initial implementation of the peace agreement. The deeply rooted history of land grabbing and poor institutional protections on forests generate a disturbance pattern inside PAs with patches that are on average three times larger than during the wartime stage.

An outcome of the land speculation is the alarming forest fragmentation in Picachos, Tinigua, and Macarena. Campesinos claim they have been living within PAs before their creation, which gives them the right to live there. This generates constant disagreements with local environmental agencies for controlling human encroachment. Picachos’ foothills have been mostly transformed into pastures (Murillo-Sandoval et al 2018), the south of Macarena—vital for connecting the Andes-Amazon biomes—is fragmented, and Tinigua is divided into two blocks, a north block (intact forest) and south block (highly fragmented) (figure 6). Macarena and Tinigua are still a refuge of FARC’s dissidents (Alvarez Vanegas et al 2018). The north part of Tinigua remains highly preserved given that it is a constant mobility corridor for them. However, in the southern, new human encroachment has been encouraged by dissidents and other actors with money for clearing thousands of hectares.

Zoom In Zoom Out Reset image size

Forest disturbance within PAs is affecting the inner buffer zones of historically preserved PAs such as Chiribiquete and La Paya. This indicates the existence of non-state actors clearing large portions of forests. While this abrupt expansion has operated in plain view of authorities responsible for enforcing the law (or under their indulgence), the high fragmentation in certain places will likely result in PAs’ future de facto zoning as mixed-land use or private land tenure. The shift in the institutional framework for forest governance is aggressively promoting forest disturbance, which is corroborated by larger patch sizes during the post-peace agreement stage.

In contrast to the abrupt increase of disturbance within PAs after the peace agreement, municipalities in Putumayo showed peaks of disturbance since as early as the negotiation stage (figure 7). In Putumayo, land grabbing is linked to coca cultivation and cattle ranching as a mean of land accumulation (Van Dexter and Visseren-Hamakers 2019). These processes are linked with agreement points such as coca eradication and land distribution. First, the peace agreement incorporated the end of illicit crops through mechanisms of crop substitution and coca eradication (PNIS) and the provision of technical assistance to farmers for developing agricultural production (Ramírez 2019). Given delays in PNIS’ implementation and the technical assistance, some farmers continue to cultivate coca until a viable alternative is realized. Simultaneously, armed groups, including FARC dissidents and non-state actors (e.g. paramilitary and drug trafficking structures), are threatening farmers to continue cultivation and are killing social leaders (International Crisis Group 2017). The constant intimidation and violence exerted by these groups also have limited community organization and participation. The spatial repercussion of these processes on forest disturbance is found in Puerto Asís and in the southeast border area between Puerto Leguízamo and Ecuador. Puerto Asís is the third municipality in Colombia with the largest coca cultivated area. While the number of disturbed patches has increased across conflict stages, in Puerto Asís patch sizes remained stable, having this area prone to be extended into patches associated with coca cultivation (figure 8(a)).

Zoom In Zoom Out Reset image size

Zoom In Zoom Out Reset image size

Second, the expectation of land distribution has accelerated land grabs through coca cultivation and conversion to cattle ranching as a strategy of land accumulation and money laundering by non-state actors (Van Dexter and Visseren-Hamakers 2019). Cattle ranching is the most viable transition after coca, particularly in areas with low accessibility and the absence of markets for other agricultural products. This process is connected to farmers from within the municipality and neighboring departments, but also to those with access to capital who are paying farmers to work on their behalf. As a consequence, Puerto Guzman and Puerto Leguízamo recorded new larger patches consistent with this conversion pattern far away from the agricultural frontier (figures 8(b) and (c)). This process is reinforced by the recent completion of roads in Puerto Guzman and by some farmers that used payments received for the eradication of coca to begin cattle ranching.

Some limitations need mentioning. First, our intention is not to outline a statistical test for the concept of institutional framework shift leading forest disturbance, which is going more beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we point out that it is a concept useful to explain the current state of forest using a suitable spatiotemporal scale and ethnographic data. Quantitative methods such as matching (Baumann et al 2012), event coincidence analysis (Schleussner et al 2016) and panel regression (Yin et al 2019) have shown potential to identify specific mechanisms in other conflict-related areas. Second, our analysis focuses exclusively on disturbance (deforestation or degradation), rather than specific land cover or agents of forest change. However, the spatial detail presented here could be used to infer the presence of large-scale changes (i.e. pasture expansion) and small patches associated with coca cultivation. Furthermore, a longer reconstruction of annual land use maps (1988–2018) has been created and a manuscript is currently under preparation.