Abstract
From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form ‘x is probable’ only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis’s idea, calling it “a remnant of rationalism”. The last move in this debate was a challenge by Lewis, defying Reichenbach to produce a regress of probability values that yields a number other than zero. Reichenbach never took up the challenge, but we will meet it on his behalf, as it were. By presenting a series converging to a limit, we demonstrate that x can have a definite and computable probability, even if its justification consists of an infinite number of steps. Next we show the invalidity of a recent riposte of foundationalists that this limit of the series can be the ground of justification. Finally we discuss the question where justification can come from if not from a ground.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Peijnenburg, J., Atkinson, D. Grounds and limits: Reichenbach and foundationalist epistemology. Synthese 181, 113–124 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9586-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9586-9