The Welfare of Syrian Households after a Decade of Conflict

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CBS   Central Bureau of Statistics

GDP   Gross Domestic Product

GER   Gross Enrolment Ratio

HIES   Household Income and Expenditure Surveys

HNAP   Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme

IDP   Internally Displaced Person

IDMC   International Displacement Monitoring Center

ISIS   Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

LMIC   Lower Middle-Income Country

MENA   Middle East and North Africa

MICS   Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey

MVI   Multidimensional Vulnerability Index

NSAG   Non-State Armed Group

OCHA   United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR   United Nations Human Rights Office

PPP   Purchasing Power Parity

SDF   Syrian Democratic Forces

SOHR   Syrian Observatory for Human Rights

TVET   Technical and Vocational Education and Training

UIS   UNESCO Institute for Statistics

UNDP   United Nations Development Programme

UNDESA   United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNESCO   United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UCDP GED   Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset

WASH   Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WDI   World Development Indicators

Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

The consequences of conflict on a country's development are profound. The direct impact of conflict in terms of lives lost, populations forced to leave their homes, and the destruction of property and infrastructure is often the most visible manifestation of its wrath. However, the indirect consequences of conflict are often even larger, dramatically affecting a country's economy, people's livelihoods, and a wide range of development outcomes.

The human toll from the Syrian conflict has been staggering. According to estimates based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the conflict in Syria claimed the lives of 421,000 individuals between March 2011 and December 2021, corresponding to half of the conflict-related deaths worldwide over the same period. The initial years of the conflict were marked by the highest incidence of violence and triggered one of the largest episodes of displacement witnessed since World War II. While the governorates of Aleppo, Hama, and Rural Damascus paid a relatively higher toll in terms of war-related deaths, conflict was widespread throughout the country's territory, and virtually no region was left unscarred. In more recent years, after 2018, the scale of conflict has significantly abated, mostly affecting areas in the northern part of the country that remain outside of the Syrian Government's control. Nonetheless, more than 6 million Syrians remain internationally displaced, mostly in neighboring countries, and an even larger number are displaced within Syria's borders.

The impact of conflict is highly visible in terms of Syria's population count and demographic structure. The direct and indirect impact of the conflict on Syria's population might be quantified in a 20 percent contraction, with the population estimates for 2022 being short of 5 million individuals compared with pre-conflict estimates. In addition, conflict has dramatically affected the gender structure of the population, with a substantial male deficit concentrated in the 20 to 40 age group. In 2022, as many as 30 percent of Syrian households reported having an absent member as a result of the conflict, with the primary cause of absence among prime-age men being international displacement, followed by war-related deaths. Between 2018 and 2022, the number of young Syrian males leaving the country and their families behind has increased, reflecting the compounding effect of conflict and the need to cope with conflict-induced economic hardship.

The Syrian economy has also been profoundly affected by conflict. Prior to the conflict, Syria was a fast-growing Lower Middle-Income Country (LMIC). Over a decade of conflict has substantially curtailed the country's industrial and agricultural production capacity and increased its reliance on imports and its exposure to international shocks. After losing half of its GDP between 2010 and 2020, the current economic profile of Syria is that of a low-income country in which households increasingly struggle to make ends meet, leveraging the only asset that remains at their disposal:

labor. Compared with the pre-conflict period, labor force participation has increased significantly, particularly among women, who have been increasingly called upon to contribute toward their households' livelihoods. However, with few job opportunities generated by the country's struggling economy, a larger share of workers is currently employed informally and in the services sector. Not surprisingly, given the challenging labor market conditions in present-day Syria and the sizable share of households with male members displaced abroad, the share of total household income from international remittances has increased fourfold, from a national average of about 3 percent in 2009 to 12 percent in 2022.

The impact of conflict on children's educational outcomes has also been far-reaching. During the decade prior to the conflict's onset, Syria had made remarkable progress in improving educational outcomes, being one of the best performers among its development peers. Such progress halted in the following decade, with the initial years of conflict marked by a dramatic increase in the share of out-of-school children. In more recent years, the share of out-of-school children has declined, broadly returning to its pre-conflict levels. The conflict has been further reinforcing pre-existing inequalities in educational outcomes between governorates and creating new vulnerabilities among displaced children. On average, households' economic circumstances, the availability of school facilities, and residence in areas still affected by conflict and outside government control in the northern parts of Syria are among the main determinants of children being out of school.

Monetary poverty dynamics and the current welfare profile of Syria's population provide the most striking evidence of how conflict has dramatically affected the country's development. Extreme poverty, as measured by the share of the population living below the international poverty line of US$2.15 (2017 PPP) per capita per day, was virtually nonexistent prior to the conflict. As of 2022, it affects more than one in four Syrians (about 5.7 million individuals). When considering the US$3.65 (2017 PPP) international poverty line of LMICs, poverty affects 69 percent of the population—equivalent to about 14.5 million Syrians. Extreme poverty in Syria has a strong spatial connotation, with more than 50 percent of the extreme poor living in just three governorates—Aleppo, Hama, and Deir-ez-Zor—with governorates in the northeastern part of the country showing the highest poverty incidence. Syrians living in female-headed households and the internally displaced are at higher risk of poverty, while receiving international remittances significantly reduces the risk of poverty. Despite conflict intensity subsiding in more recent years, the incidence of monetary poverty has dramatically increased post-2019, reflecting the compounding impact of international shocks that affected the Syrian economy, starting from the financial crisis in Lebanon in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and, most recently, the war on Ukraine.

Beyond monetary poverty, the vulnerability of the Syrian population along the livelihoods and living conditions dimensions is pervasive and, based on a multidimensional index, deteriorated between 2021 and 2022. Multidimensional vulnerability is particularly severe due to the lack of

income opportunities and has been deteriorating with regard to access to water. Similar to the observations made in monetary poverty and educational outcomes, multidimensional vulnerability has a strong spatial connotation, with the northeastern and southern governorates showing the worst outcomes.

The analysis presented in this report shows that the crisis in Syria is far from over and that, lacking drivers of poverty reduction, the welfare challenges facing Syrian households are likely to persist, if not worsen, in the face of shocks. In this context, having reliable data to monitor the evolution of welfare outcomes and to inform actions along the humanitarian-development nexus remains a priority. In the absence of official statistics, continuing the collaboration on the design and analysis of data collected by humanitarian agencies could significantly contribute to filling knowledge gaps moving forward.

ملخّص تنفيذي

لا شكّ أن للصراع في أيّ بلد تداعيات عميقة على فرصه الإنمائية. وغالباً ما تكون آثاره المباشرة من حيث الخسائر في الأرواح، ومغادرة السكان منازلهم بطريقة قسرية، وتدمير الممتلكات والبنية التحتية، أبرز مظاهر احتدامه. غير أن العواقب غير المباشرة كثيراً ما تكون أوسع نطاقاً، وتؤثّر بشكل كبير على اقتصاد البلد، وسبل عيش سكانه كما على جوانب واسعة من نواتجه الإنمائية.

إن الخسائر البشرية الناجمة عن الصراع في سوريا صادمة. وفقاً للتقديرات المستندة إلى برنامج أوبسالا لبيانات الصراعات ((UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program، أودى الصراع في سوريا بحياة 421 ألف شخص بين آذار/مارس 2011 وكانون الأول/ديسمبر 2021، أي ما يعادل نصف الوفيات المرتبطة بالصراعات في جميع أنحاء العالم خلال الفترة ذاتها. اتّسمت السنوات الأولى من الصراع بأعلى معدل من حوادث العنف وتسبّبت في واحدة من أكبر موجات النزوح في العالم منذ الحرب العالمية الثانية. وقد دفعت محافظات حلب وحماة وريف دمشق حصيلة أعلى نسبياً من حيث الوفيات المرتبطة بالحرب، لكن الصراع كان منتشراً على نطاق واسع في جميع أنحاء البلاد، ولم تسلم أيّ منطقة تقريباً من جراحه. وبالرغم من تراجع حجم الصراع بشكل كبير بعد عام 2018، كانت عواقبه واضحة في المناطق الشمالية من البلاد والتي لا تزال خارج سيطرة الحكومة السورية. وهناك حالياً أكثر من 6 ملايين سوري من النازحين في الخارج، معظمهم في البلدان المجاورة، وما يفوقهم عدداً في داخل البلاد.

ويبرز تأثير الصراع بشكل واضح من حيث عدد السكان والبنية الديموغرافية في سوريا. ويمكن قياس التأثير المباشر وغير المباشر للصراع على سكان سوريا من حيث تقليص عددهم بنسبة 20 في المائة، فالتقديرات السكانية لعام 2022 أقل بمقدار 5 ملايين نسمة مقارنة بتقديرات ما قبل الصراع. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، كان للصراع أثر كبير على البنية الجندرية للسكان، حيث تركّز النقص الكبير في الذكور في الفئة العمرية 20 إلى 40 سنة. في عام 2022، أبلغت نسبة حوالي 30 في المائة من الأسر السورية عن غياب أحد أفرادها نتيجة للنزاع، وكان النزوح الى الخارج السبب الرئيسي للغياب بين الرجال في سنٍّ مبكرة، تليه الوفيات المرتبطة بالحرب. بين عامي 2018 و2022، تضاعف عدد الشباب السورين الذكور الذين غادروا البلاد مع أسرهم، مما يعكس التأثير المتفاقم للصراع والحاجة إلى التعامل مع الصعوبات الاقتصادية الناجمة عنه.

كما تأثّر الاقتصاد السوري بشدّة بالصراع. فقد كانت سوريا ما قبل الصراع تُعتبر من الدول ذات الدخل المتوسط المنخفض والسريعة النمو. غير أن أكثر من عقد من الصراع المستمر أدّى إلى تقليص قدرة البلد على الإنتاج الصناعي والزراعي بشكل كبير، والى زيادة اعتماده على الواردات وتعرّضه للصدمات الدولية. وبعد خسارة نصف ناتجها المحلي الإجمالي بين عامي 2010 و2020، يتمثل الوضع الاقتصادي الحالي لسوريا كبلد منخفض الدخل تكافح فيه الأسر باستمرار لتغطية نفقاتها، معتمدة على المصدر الوحيد المتبقي لدعمها: القوى العاملة. وبالمقارنة مع فترة ما قبل الصراع، ارتفع معدّل المشاركة في القوى العاملة بشكل ملحوظ، لا سيما بين النساء، اللواتي يُطلب منهنّ بشكل متزايد المساهمة في تأمين سبل عيش أسرهنّ. ومع ذلك، مع محدودية فرص العمل التي يوفّرها الاقتصاد المتعثّر في البلاد، تعمل حالياً نسبة أكبر من العمال والعاملات بشكل غير رسمي وفي قطاع الخدمات. ونظراً لظروف سوق العمل الصعبة في سوريا اليوم والعدد الكبير من الأسر التي نزح منها أفراد ذكور الى الخارج، فمن غير المستغرب أن تكون حصّة إجمالي دخل الأسرة من التحويلات الدولية قد تضاعفت أربع مرّات، من متوسط وطني بلغ حوالي 3 في المائة في عام 2009 إلى 12 في المائة في عام 2022.

وكان تأثير الصراع على النتائج التعليمية للأطفال بعيد المدى أيضاً. خلال العقد الذي سبق بداية الصراع، أحرزت سوريا تقدّماً ملحوظاً في تحسين النتائج التعليمية، باعتبارها واحدة من أفضل البلدان النامية بين أقرانها. هذا التقدّم توقّف في العقد التالي، حيث اتّسمت السنوات الأولى من الصراع بزيادة كبيرة في نسبة الأطفال غير الملتحقين بالمدارس. هذه النسبة تراجعت في السنوات الأخيرة، وعادت إلى مستواها العام لما قبل الصراع، الذي ضاعف أيضاً عدم المساواة الموجودة سابقاً في النتائج التعليمية بين المحافظات، مما خلق مواطن ضعف جديدة بين الأطفال النازحين. بشكل عام تعدّ الظروف الاقتصادية للأسر، وتوافر المرافق المدرسية، والإقامة في المناطق التي لا تزال عرضة للنزاع وخارج سيطرة الحكومة في الأجزاء الشمالية من سوريا، من بين المحدّدات الرئيسة لعدم التحاق الأطفال بالمدارس.

تشكّل ديناميات الفقر النقدي ومستوى الرفاهية الاجتماعية الحالية لسكان سوريا الأدلّة الأكثر وضوحاً على التأثير الدراماتيكي للصراع على فرص التنمية في البلاد. كان الفقر المدقع، الذي يُقاس معدّله نسبة الى السكان الذين يعيشون تحت خط الفقر الدولي والبالغ 2.15 دولار أميركي للفرد يومياً (ما يعادل القوّة الشرائية لعام 2017)، معدوم الوجود تقريباً قبل النزاع. لكنّه واعتباراً من عام 2022، أصبح واحد من كلّ أربعة سوريين (حوالي 5.7 مليون نسمة) في فقر مدقع. وإذا تم الأخذ في الاعتبار خط الفقر الدولي في البلدان المنخفضة والمتوسّطة الدخل والبالغ 3.65 دولار أميركي (ما يعادل القوة الشرائية لعام 2017) ، فإن الفقر في سوريا يؤثّر على نسبة 69 في المائة من السكان – أي حوالي 14.5 مليون سوري.

وللفقر المدقع في سوريا دلالة مكانية قوية، حيث يعيش أكثر من 50 في المائة من الفقراء المدقعين في ثلاث محافظات فقط هي حلب وحماة ودير الزور، فتعاني المحافظات الواقعة في الجزء الشمالي الشرقي من البلاد أعلى معدلات الفقر. وتعتبر الأسر التي ترأسها نساء والنازحون داخلياً أكثر عرضة للفقر، في حين أن تلقي التحويلات الدولية يحد بدرجة كبيرة من خطره. وعلى الرغم من تراجع حدّة الصراع في السنوات الأخيرة، زاد معدّل الفقر النقدي بشكل كبير بعد عام 2019، مما يعكس التأثير التراكمي للصدمات الدولية على الاقتصاد السوري، بدءًا من الأزمة المالية في لبنان عام 2019، وجائحة كوفيد19- في عام 2020، ومؤخراً الحرب على أوكرانيا.

الى جانب الفقر النقدي، فإن وضع السكان السوريين عرضة للضعف والهشاشة بسبب قلّة سبل كسب العيش وتدهور الظروف المعيشية. واستناداً إلى المؤشّر المتعدّد الأبعاد، تدهور هذا الوضع بين عامي 2021 و2022. وتعتبر الهشاشة المتعدّدة الأبعاد حادة بشكل خاص بسبب الافتقار الى فرص الدخل، لكنها ازدادت حدّة بسبب شبه انعدام الحصول على المياه. وعلى غرار الملاحظات المتعلقة بالفقر النقدي والنتائج التعليمية، فإن الهشاشة المتعدّدة الأبعاد لها دلالة مكانية قوية، حيث تسجل المحافظات الشمالية الشرقية والجنوبية أسوأ النتائج.

يبيّن التحليل الوارد في هذا التقرير أن الأزمة في سوريا لم تنته بعد، وأنه في غياب محرّكات الحد من الفقر، من المرجح أن تستمر، إن لم تتفاقم، تحدّيات حالة الرفاهية الاجتماعية التي تواجه الأسر السورية في محاولتها التصدي للصدمات. وفي هذا السياق، من الأولويات الحصول على بيانات موثوقة لرصد تطوّر نواتج مستوى الرفاهية الاجتماعية والاسترشاد بها في الإجراءات المتّخذة في سياق العمل الإنساني والتنمية. وفي ظل غياب الإحصاءات الرسمية، إن الاستمرار في التعاون بين الوكالات الإنسانية في جمع وتحليل البيانات يمكن أن يسهم بشكل كبير في التقدم باتجاه سد الفجوات المعرفية.

Introduction

Over the past decade, violent conflict has dramatically increased globally. By 2030, it is estimated that countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence will be home to up to two-thirds of the world's extreme poor. The consequences of conflict on a country's development are profound, affecting a wide range of outcomes both directly and indirectly. Several studies have shown how conflict affects a country's growth, exacerbates poverty and hunger, and disrupts service delivery, ultimately leading to a deterioration of health and education outcomes. Assessing the impact of conflict is often hindered by data constraints. Information on the profile and welfare of populations in fragile and conflict-affected countries is severely constrained by data availability, as is the understanding of the immediate and long-term welfare consequences of conflict.

The report aims to provide an assessment of some of the welfare consequences of the conflict in Syria. To the extent possible, given existing data limitations, the analysis presented in this report tries to highlight changes in selected welfare outcomes between the pre-conflict period (2000–10), and the summer of 2022, when the latest nationally representative survey was conducted under the *Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme* (HNAP).[1] The analysis presented in this report further highlights the important role that humanitarian agencies play not only in providing vital assistance to populations in emergency situations, but also in collecting data in challenging environments. Beside informing humanitarian operations, data collected by humanitarian actors can effectively be used to generate knowledge public goods along the humanitarian-development nexus.

This report is structured as follows: Section 1 provides an overview of the Syrian conflict, aimed at providing the background context for the analysis presented in Sections 2, 3, and 4, which assess the impact of conflict on the demographic profile of the Syrian population, and on its labor market and human capital outcomes. Section 5 provides an assessment and profile of Syrian population welfare, both in terms of monetary poverty and non-monetary (multidimensional) outcomes, while Section 6 builds on the findings of the report to provide concluding remarks.

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[1]   See Annex 1 for details.

1

The Conflict in Syria

The current conflict has ravaged the Arab Republic of Syria and its people for the past 12 years. The conflict in Syria started in March 2011. Protests first erupted in the southern governorate of Dar'a and soon spread nationwide. As the violence escalated, various opposition groups emerged to challenge the government and eventually achieve control of various parts of Syria's territory. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which at its time of maximum expansion in 2015 controlled about 43 percent of Syria's territory (Figure 1), led to the intervention of international powers supporting different parties to the conflict, and to a further escalation of hostilities. Beginning in 2017, political negotiation efforts to establish de-escalation zones and ceasefires, as well as advancement in the fight against ISIS, led to a marked decline in the geographical spread of the conflict, which currently remains mostly concentrated in areas outside of the Syrian Government's control in the northeastern and northwestern parts of the country.

FIGURE 1
Areas of control by different parties to the conflict, 2015, 2018, 2020, and 2022

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the data by the Carter Center.

The human toll of the Syrian conflict has been devastating. Estimates of the total death toll of the Syrian war vary depending on the methodology and reporting agency. In 2021, the United Nations' Human Rights Office (OHCHR) released a tally during the first 10 years of the conflict of 350,200 deaths, including both civilians and combatants.[2] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) estimates an overall death toll of 610,000 people over 11 years of conflict, of which 160,681 are represented by civilians (120,158 men, 15,237 women, and 25,286 children).[3] According to geo-referenced conflict-related data compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset (UCDP GED, Box 1), the estimated death toll between March 2011 and December 2021 was 407,000 people, with civilians accounting for around one-quarter of the total fatalities in the conflict (Figure 2). Putting these somber statistics into perspective, it is worth noting that, worldwide, close to one in two conflict-related deaths that occurred over the period were due to the conflict in Syria.

FIGURE 2
Conflict-related fatalities in Syria between 2011 and 2021, cumulative distribution

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UCDP data.

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[2]   The count is based on a strict methodology requiring the deceased full name, date of death and location of the body and should therefore be interpreted as an under-estimation of the actual number of was related deaths. See OHCHR.
[3]   See SOHR.

BOX 1
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Georeferenced Event (UCDP GED)

The UCDP GED is a comprehensive geo-referenced dataset that documents violent events and conflicts worldwide. It is the oldest ongoing data-collection project on conflict, with a temporal span of almost 40 years. The UCDP provides detailed information on the locations, dates, types of violent incidents, and the number of casualties involved. The dataset covers various conflict-related events, including battles, bombings, and other forms of violence.

The unit of analysis in the UCDP GED is the "event," which refers to a specific instance of fatal organized violence. An event is defined as the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor or civilians, resulting in at least one direct death, occurring at a specific location and within a specific time frame. Each instance meeting these criteria is recorded as a single observation in the dataset and serves as the unit of analysis. The data-collection process involves utilizing search strings through the Dow Jones Factiva aggregator to retrieve news reports containing information about individuals killed or injured due to conflict. The search encompasses global sources, and additional local, specialized news sources, and social media outlets are incorporated to enhance coverage. Non-media sources, such as reports from NGOs, international organizations, historical archives, and case studies also contribute to the data collection process.

The intensity of conflict in Syria is marked by significant temporal and spatial dynamics. The initial three years of conflict were characterized by widespread violence, as indicated by the number of conflict-related events and the incidence of conflict-related casualties, including among the civilian population (Figure 3). Since peaking in 2014, the incidence of conflict-related deaths has progressively declined, reflecting the change in the military profile of the conflict (from state-based events to non-state-based events), and the progressive reduction of its geographical spread, possibly due to the large-scale population displacement from the areas most affected by the conflict. In absolute terms, the concentration of violence has been particularly pronounced in the densely populated areas of Aleppo and Rural Damascus (Figure 4). These regions collectively account for 40 percent of all recorded violent events during the conflict. Similarly, in terms of casualties, Aleppo and Rural Damascus are responsible for a significant portion of the recorded deaths, making up 40 percent of the overall toll. However, the province of Hama stands out, with only 9 percent of recorded violent events but a substantial 30 percent share of all conflict-related deaths. As expected, given that densely populated urban areas have consistently been among the most fiercely contested sites throughout the war, and combined with the indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry, the conflict's civilian death toll is also concentrated around Aleppo and Rural Damascus (41 percent of all civilian deaths).

FIGURE 3
Conflict trends, 2011–2022

Conflict-related incidents (Thousands)

Conflict-related deaths (Thousands)

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UCDP data.

FIGURE 4
Total conflict-related events and deaths 2011–2022, by governorate

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UCDP data.

While major population centers account for the largest share of conflict-related deaths, virtually no region was left unscarred by violence. Regions with lower population density have witnessed a disproportionately high level of violence relative to their resident numbers. As shown in Figure 5, when normalizing conflict statistics to pre-conflict population estimates by governorate, the southern governorates of Quneitra and Dar'a gain prominence, registering 1,104 and 825 fatal incidents per 100,000 individuals, respectively, way surpassing the national average of 424 incidents per 100,000 people. Similarly, when analyzing the death toll, Hama stands out once again for its exceptionally high level of conflict-related deaths, at 7,900 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.

The Syrian conflict set into motion one of the largest episodes of international displacement since World War II. As of October 31, 2023, 5.2 million Syrian refugees are currently hosted in neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2023), with an additional 1 million residing in Europe, mostly in Germany and Sweden (Table 1). While staggering, these figures represent less than half of the current toll of Syria's forcibly displaced population. As of August 2022, as many as 6.6 million people were living in displacement within Syria's borders, meaning that one in three people living in Syria were internally displaced. As shown in Table 2, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are mostly concentrated in the governorates of Idleb, Aleppo and Rural Damascus. The majority of IDPs (52 percent of

FIGURE 5
Conflict-related incidents and deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, by governorate

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UCDP data.
Note: Population figures refer to 2011 (pre-conflict).

the total), as well as the totality of those accommodated in camps, live in areas outside of govern-ment control and are still affected by conflict in the northwestern and northeastern governorates.[4]

TABLE 1
Internationally displaced Syrians, by host country

Location name	Population of concern
Türkiye	3,274,059
Lebanon	789,842
Jordan	652,842
Iraq	270,479
Egypt	151,721
Other (North Africa)	45,003
Total	**5,183,946**
Germany	692,734
Sweden	105,617
Other (Europe)	394,028
Total	**1,192,379**

Source: UNHCR (as of October 31, 2023).

TABLE 2
Internally displaced people, by governorate

Location name	IDPs	Share of IDPs in the total population
Idleb	1,801,804	0.64
Aleppo	1,261,700	0.30
Rural Damascus	1,089,978	0.36
Damascus	597,979	0.33
Lattakia	447,447	0.35
Al-Hasakeh	305,178	0.26
Homs	298,800	0.20
Hama	211,882	0.16
Tartous	180,365	0.19
Deir-ez-Zor	152,701	0.20
Ar-Raqqa	144,919	0.20
As-Sweida	71,251	0.19
Dar'a	68,742	0.07
Quneitra	3,418	0.03
Total	**6,636,164**	**0.32**

Source: HNAP – Monthly Mobility and Needs Monitoring (MNM) August 2022.

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4   IDP camps are present in Al-Hasakeh, Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and Idleb.

The temporal pattern of displacement closely overlaps with the temporal evolution of conflict intensity. As shown in Figure 6, internal displacement movements were particularly severe during the initial years of conflict in 2012 and 2013, when widespread violence erupted, and then again in 2016 and 2017, when international players entered the conflict arena in the fight against ISIS and other non-state actors. On the other hand, international displacement and the arrival of refugees in neighboring countries were mostly concentrated between 2014 and 2016, possibly suggesting a continuum in displacement trajectories, with IDPs eventually deciding to leave Syria when unable to find safety or availed of the opportunity.[5] According to a recent assessment conducted by the International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDCM) on displaced populations in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, Niger, South Sudan, and Yemen, more than half of the refugees and returning refugees surveyed were internally displaced before leaving their country of origin.

Conflict and conflict-induced displacement have determined a substantial change in the distribution of the Syrian population across governorates. Comparing the subnational distribution of the Syrian population between 2011, on the eve of the conflict, and 2022, Aleppo, Deir-ez-Zor, Homs and Hama emerge as the governorates with the largest population loss (Figure 7). On the other hand, the population of the northwestern governorate of Idleb, which currently remains outside of the Syrian Government's control, almost doubled over the period, with 60 percent of its population as of 2022 being constituted by displaced Syrians.

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[5] In Lebanon, at the Government of Syria's request, UNHCR stopped registering refugees in 2015. Similarly, Jordan and Türkiye enforced stricter border controls to limit population movements after 2016.

FIGURE 6
Internal and international displacement, stocks and flows

Source: UNHCR, OCHA.

FIGURE 7
Distribution of population by governorate, 2011 and 2022

Source: HNAP – Monthly Mobility and Needs Monitoring (MNM) August 2022.

2

Demographic Impact of the Conflict

The demographic profile of a country affected by war can be a good indicator of the scale of human losses brought about by conflict. Epidemiologists distinguish between direct and indirect effects of conflict. Direct effects include higher mortality associated with war-related casualties and international displacement leading to substantial losses in population. Indirect effects can be even larger. Massive destruction brought about by conflict over time involves services, infrastructure, and productive systems that are critical for people's survival, leading to increases in malnutrition, morbidity and, ultimately, higher mortality. The destruction of health facilities, the collapse of health systems, and damage to agricultural production and food systems, as well as the destruction of houses, and water and sanitation infrastructure, are among the most harmful indirect effects of conflicts, with implications often enduring well beyond the termination of hostilities.

The interplay of conflict and international displacement has severely affected the size of Syria's population. The last population Census conducted in 2004 estimated Syria's population at 17.9 million. Since then, population estimates for Syria have been revised multiple times (Figure 8). Pre-conflict estimates based on medium fertility scenarios projected Syria's population to be 27.2 million in 2022, about 5 million higher compared with the most recent estimates reported in the 2022 World Population Prospects, which were informed by data-collection efforts on the ground

**FIGURE 8
Population estimates for Syria**

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on World Population Prospects (UNDESA), HNAP and CBS.
Note: Population projections based on medium fertility scenario.

under HNAP. According to these estimates, if using pre-conflict projections as a counterfactual, it might be possible to say that, as of 2022, the country's population has suffered a 20 percent contraction as a direct and indirect consequence of the conflict.

Not only has conflict affected Syria's population size, but it has also affected its demographic profile. As shown in Figure 9, Syria's population structure in 2022—as estimated using the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP) household survey data collected in May–June 2022[6]—is significantly different from the one observed in 2010, before the onset of conflict. In 2010, the gender composition of Syria's population was relatively balanced across age groups and children in the 0–4 age category, in line with the profile of a growing population, were the largest demographic group. These features have not persisted after more than a decade of conflict. The demographic structure of Syria in 2022 is the one typical of a conflict-stricken country. Similar to other countries affected by conflict,[7] the current shape of Syria's population pyramid clearly shows

FIGURE 9
Syria population pyramids, 2010 and 2022

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospect 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).

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6   From mid-May to mid-June 2022, HNAP conducted a nationwide demographic household survey across all 14 governorates of Syria. The survey, with a total sample of 26,171 households, collected data on key demographic and socioeconomic indicators, and it is representative at the country, governorate and sub-district level.

7   A demographic deficit of prime-age men has been for example documented in Rwanda, Cambodia and Darfur (Guha-Sapir and D'Aoust, 2010).

a substantial male deficit concentrated in people aged 20 to 40 (Figure 10). Moreover, compared with its pre-conflict level, estimates indicate a decline in the share of children in the 0–4 age category, consistent with evidence indicating an increase in the under-5 mortality rate related to conflict (Figure 11). A compounding driver for this change might be a decline in fertility, spurred by the progressive deterioration of living conditions and high levels of maternal mortality.[8] Overall, despite these changes, the demographic dependency rate has remained stable at its pre-conflict level.

International displacement and war-related deaths have been the two main driving forces behind observed gender imbalances in Syria's prime-age adult population. According to HNAP 2022 data, about 30 percent of households currently living in Syria report at least one household member who is absent because of conflict. As shown in Figure 12, "absent" household members in 2022 are predominantly male who have either left Syria or have died as a result of conflict: about 988,000 individuals, 93 percent of whom are men, have fled Syria leaving their households behind, while another 344,000 individuals, 89 percent of whom are men, have died as a direct

FIGURE 10
Masculinity ratio in 2022, by age group

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).

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8   In low-income countries, conflict has been found to associate with increases in maternal mortality due to the decline access to reproductive health services, decline in female education and social insecurity (Urdal and Che, 2013).

FIGURE 11
Trends in under-5 mortality rate

Source: UNICEF – https://data.unicef.org/country/syr/.

FIGURE 12
Number of absent members for households currently residing in Syria, by reason of absence

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).

consequence of the war.[9] International displacement of prime-age men could have been jointly driven by efforts to escape mandatory conscription, as well as to support families in Syria through international remittances.[10] Not surprisingly, the gendered impact of war-related deaths and international displacement have contributed to the increase in the share of female-headed households in the Syrian population, from 4.4 percent in 2009 to 9.6 percent in 2022.

In recent years, the number of young male Syrians leaving the country has increased, reflecting the compounding effect of conflict and the need to cope with conflict-induced economic hardship. As shown in Figure 13, the share of households with an absent male household member living abroad and the absolute numbers of male Syrians leaving the country increased substantially between 2018 and 2022. Looking at the most recent data from 2022, two in three males who have left the country, leaving their households behind, are 20 to 29 years old. The majority of them live in Türkiye (40 percent), followed by Germany (17 percent), other European countries (12 percent), and Lebanon (10.6 percent). As further discussed in the next section, challenging labor market conditions in present day Syria may have pushed an increasing number of young males to flee the country, not only to escape conscription and conflict, but also to try to support their households economically.

FIGURE 13
Households with male absent members living abroad, 2018–2022

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).

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9   These estimates are based on reports of households currently living in Syria and should therefore not be interpreted as indicative of the total displacement or death toll of the Syrian conflict. In fact, international displacement often entails all household members moving together across borders; some of these internationally displaced households might have suffered casualties among their members, and entire households might have lost their lives due to conflict.

10   See Box 4: International remittances.

3

Labor Market Impact of the Conflict

Large-scale destruction brought about by more than a decade of conflict has profoundly affected Syria's economy and its labor market. In addition to the immensurable suffering associated with displacement and war-related deaths, the conflict has inflicted significant damage on the country's capital stock and economic activities. It is estimated that Syria's GDP halved between 2010 and 2020 (World Bank, 2023). Conflict has led to a collapse in domestic industrial output and agricultural production, increasing Syria's reliance on imported goods, including food staples (see Box 2). Syria's exports saw a tenfold decline from US$18.4 billion in 2010 to US$1.8 billion in 2021, primarily driven by the collapse in oil and tourism receipts. While still sizable, the decline in imports was less pronounced, contracting from US$22.7 billion in 2010 to US$6.5 billion in 2021. The collapse in domestic production and domestic demand brought about by the conflict can be fully appreciated looking at dynamics on the labor market.

BOX 2
Wheat production and trade in Syria, 2000–2020

Agriculture has historically been a major contributor to the Syrian economy. In the 2000s, agriculture production contributed on average 22 percent of Syria's GDP, and accounted for almost one-quarter of total employment (WDI Database, 2022). The importance of agriculture in rural areas was even greater, with 80 percent of rural dwellers sustained by income from agricultural work as of 2010 (FAO, 2021). During this period, wheat production contributed 17.3 percent of total agricultural production, and accounted for 85 percent of all cereals produced by the country. Of Syria's total cultivable land, about 62 percent is located in the three northeastern governorates of Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, and Al-Hasakeh, with the latter being the largest wheat-producing governorate.

Between 2001 and 2007, Syrian domestic wheat production averaged about 4 million tonnes, prior to declining precipitously to 2.1 million tonnes in 2008, due to severe drought conditions. Prior to the drought, Syria was a net exporter of wheat. The country turned into a net wheat importer in 2009, when 1.7 million tonnes were imported.

Between 2012 and 2020, wheat production declined to an average of 2.5 million tonnes annually, with production dropping to below 2 million tonnes between 2016 and 2018, due to the intertwined impact of drought conditions and conflict. During the same period, wheat imports averaged 415,000 tonnes, although there was wide annual variation, with imports as high as 1.5 million tonnes in 2013, and as low as 50,000 tonnes in 2018.

Trends in wheat production and official imports, '000 metric tonnes

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on FAOSTAT.

Syrian households have coped with the impact of conflict by leveraging their only asset: labor. The increase in labor force participation has compensated for the demographic shock induced by conflict. Compared with its pre-conflict levels, Syria's working age population has shrunk significantly, particularly in its male component (Figure 14). However, the impact of this demographic shock has been compensated by an increase in labor force participation, leaving the overall number of employed Syrians almost unchanged, at around 6.3 million.[11] The increase in the level of economic activity has been particularly dramatic for Syrian women, with female labor force participation more than doubling from 13 percent in 2010 to 31 percent in 2022, against a more modest increase in male participation from 72 to 79 percent over the same period (Figure 15). With deteriorating economic conditions in the country, more Syrian women have been pushed to enter the labor market to support their households to make ends meet and, possibly, to compensate for the absence of male adult household members. In fact, as shown in Figure 16, the increase in female labor force participation has been particularly strong in governorates more affected by the conflict-induced male demographic deficits, possibly suggesting the substituting role that women are playing in the Syrian labor market.[12]

FIGURE 14
Changes in working age population, 2010–2022

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospect 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).

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[11] Between 2010 and 2022, labor force participation in Syria increased from 43 to 51 percent.

[12] Similar positive relation between conflict and female labor force participation, often times referred to as "additional worker effect", has been found in other conflict episodes, such those in Peru, Nepal and Vietnam (see Gallegos [2012], Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers [2015] and Kreibaum and Klasen [2015]).

FIGURE 15
Trends in labor force participation, employment to population and unemployment rates, by gender

Participation rate (%)   Unemployment rate (%)   Employment to WAP ratio (%)

■ Male   ■ Female   ■ Both sexes

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospect 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).

FIGURE 16
Relationship between female labor force participation and the masculinity ratio at the governorate level, 2022

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).
Note: Population figures refer to 2011 (pre-conflict).

Poor labor market opportunities are reflected in a high level of unemployment and by an increased reliance on remittances from abroad. According to the most recent HNAP surveys, the current level of unemployment in Syria's labor market is as high as its pre-conflict base. The unemployment challenge is particularly severe for Syrian women. In 2022, the female unemployment rate stood as high as 24 percent, 15 percentage points higher than the male unemployment rate (see Box 3). Not surprisingly, given the challenging labor market conditions in present day Syria and the sizable share of households with male members displaced abroad, the share of total household income from international remittances has substantially increased, from a national average of about 3 percent in 2009 to 12 percent in 2022 (see Box 4).

Compared with the pre-conflict period, the employment profile of Syrians has dramatically changed, with a growing number of workers employed informally and in the services sector. The destruction of Syria's socio-economic infrastructure due to more than 10 years of conflict has resulted in a dramatic change in the job profile of Syrian workers. Prior to the conflict, Syrian households, through family businesses, employed less than 10 percent of workers. Ten years later, the share had more than quadrupled, possibly reflecting the lack of labor demand and a progressive informalization of the Syrian labor market (Figure 17).[13] Consistent trends also emerge when looking at changes in the sectoral composition of employment. As shown in Figure 18, the share of industry in total employment roughly halved between 2010 and 2022, and there was a corresponding increase in the share of employment in the services sector, which in 2022 accounted for 64 percent of male employment (48 percent in 2010) and 86 percent of female employment (68 percent in 2010).

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[13] Unfortunately, lacking access to the microdata of the Labor Force Surveys conducted prior to the conflict, the analysis of trends is constrained to the indicators tabulated on the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) website that are common to those available through the HNAP demographic and WASH surveys conducted between 2018 and 2022. Due to these data limitations, it is not possible to construct a precise measure of informality encompassing both self-employment and casual labor.

BOX 3
Labor market challenges of Syrian women

Despite the observed increase in labor force participation, other factors associated to the conflict have been limiting women's opportunities for socio-economic inclusion. Similar to other countries in the region, gender norms and legal barriers limit Syrian women's engagement in the public sphere. Conflict has further exacerbated these constraints. Lack of access to government-issued civil documentation, particularly in areas more affected by conflict, represents a major challenge for women, particularly for widowed and divorced women, as it limits their ability to inherit property, their assets' tenure security, and it possibly exposes them to the risk of violence.

Moreover, safety and security concerns have heightened because of conflict, further limiting physical mobility and employment opportunities of Syrian women, and adding additional risks for those entering the labor market by force of necessity. According to most recent reports, the prevalence of gender-based violence (GBV) remains a prominent concern, with one in five households indicating that women and girls feel unsafe in their respective locations, mainly when crossing checkpoints, at markets, and on public transportation.

Source: OCHA "2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic." February 2022.

BOX 4
International remittances

International evidence has documented the critical role played by remittance flows to home countries and how they can contribute toward smoothing consumption of receiving households following economic shocks, including those originating from conflict (Vargas-Silva, 2016).

According to estimates based on the HNAP survey data, 37 percent of Syrian households (1.54 million households) received remittances in 2022. Among recipient households, remittances average about US$57 per month and account for more than one-third of their total income. Based on these estimates, in 2022, the total value of remittances received by Syrian households reached about US$1.05 billion, up by 39 percent compared with 2021.

The share of households receiving remittances varies by governorate (Figure B4.1). Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor and Homs are the governorates where the share of households receiving remittances is the highest. Overall, receiving remittances is relatively more common among households residing in areas that are under the Syrian Government's control (40 percent) and among formerly displaced households (60 percent).

Share of households receiving remittances in 2022, by governorate

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).

FIGURE 17
Trends in employment composition, by job type

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Labor Force Surveys and HNAP household survey data.

FIGURE 18
Trends in sectoral distribution of employment

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Labor Force Survey 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022).

4

Human Capital Impact of the Conflict

In the decade leading up to the conflict onset, Syria made remarkable strides in improving educational outcomes. Between 2000 and 2010, the country witnessed a noteworthy surge in gross enrolment ratios (GERs) across all educational levels for both boys and girls (Box 5). Progress was notable at the lower and upper secondary levels, with the former increasing from 66 percent in 2000 to 92 percent in 2010, while the latter rose from 23 to 35 percent in the same period. Compared with other countries at similar levels of development, by 2010, Syria was the best performer in terms of primary and lower secondary education, and among the best performers on tertiary education (Figure 19).

Progress in enrolment translated into a marked increase in the educational attainment of the adult population, particularly of younger cohorts. Notably, data on school attainment reveal that the average Syrian citizen aged 25 or above had about 1.7 more years of schooling in 2010 than he or she did in 2000. This increase was particularly pronounced among the younger age cohorts, with individuals aged 25–29 and 30–34 gaining an average of 2.3 and 2.0 additional years of schooling, respectively (Figure 20). Once again, this trend positioned Syria in 2010 among the top-performing nations in terms of educational attainment, when compared with countries at similar income levels (Figure 21).

BOX 5
Education system in Syria

In 2010, Syria's education system was structured as follows: Voluntary pre-primary education was available for children aged 4 to 5, followed by compulsory basic education consisting of primary school for children aged 6 to 11 (grades 1–6) and preparatory school or lower secondary for those aged 12–15 (grades 7–9). Upon successful completion of a nationally standardized written examination, a three-year upper secondary education program (grades 10–12) was undertaken by youths aged 15 to 18 years, with upper secondary consisting of two types of schools offering different curricular orientations—general-oriented tracks and vocational-oriented tracks (technical and vocational education and training, or TVET). Similarly, tertiary education followed a binary structure, including vocational-oriented institutes of one- or two-year duration and more academically oriented universities lasting four to five years.

Structure of the Syrian national education system

Level name	Entry age	Duration (years)	ISCED level
Pre-primary	3	3	0-Pre-primary education
Primary: 1st stage of basic education	6	4	1-Primary education
Preparatory: 2nd stage of basic education	12	3	2-Lower secondary education
General secondary education	15	3	3-Upper secondary education
Technical secondary education	15	3	
Vocational training	15	3	
Technical institutes programs	18	2	4-Post-secondary non-tertiary education
Bachelor programs	18	4	5-First stage of tertiary education
Master programs	22	2	
Doctorate programs	24	2–4	6-Second stage of tertiary education

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).

FIGURE 19
Gross enrolment ratios LMICs, 2010

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and WDI.

FIGURE 20
Average years of total schooling, population ages 25+, Syria, 2000–2010

Source: Barro and Lee, 2013.

FIGURE 21
Average years of total schooling, population ages 25+, LMIC, 2010

Source: Barro and Lee, 2013 and WDI.

The impact of the conflict in Syria on educational outcomes has been far reaching, as evidenced by the dramatic increase in the population of out-of-school children. According to data from the Institute for Statistics (UIS) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), about 1.6 million individuals between the ages of 6 and 17 were not attending school in the 2013 school year. This amounted to 28 percent of primary school-age children, 38 percent of lower secondary-aged adolescents, and a staggering 66 percent of upper secondary-aged youth out of school. These figures represented a significant rise from their respective values in 2010, which were only 1, 12, and 59 percent, respectively. In more recent years, data from HNAP program indicate a progressive reduction in the share of school-age children across all age groups, broadly returning to pre-conflict levels. While this could be an encouraging sign, a decade was lost and no information is available to analyze trends in net enrolment nor to assess the current quality of education and learning outcomes.[14]

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[14] Evidence from other conflict-affected countries indicates that the most long-lasting impact of conflict on the education system is on quality rather than access. The impact of conflict on education quality materializes from the dispersion of qualified teachers, the lack of learning materials, and, often time, the reduction in the length of school days to accommodate multiple shifts per day. In many conflict and post-conflict settings, the legacy of dropout and repetition, disrupted attendance, and overage students greatly outlasts the frequent rapid recovery of enrollment rates (World Bank, 2005).

The conflict in Syria has reinforced pre-existing inequalities in educational outcomes between governorates, with areas outside of government control showing the highest incidence of out-of-school children. Data from the Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted by UNICEF in 2006 indicate that governorates of the northeastern part of the country had significantly lower attendance rates for both primary and secondary education, as well as significantly lower levels of attainment among the population aged 15 and above (Figure 22 and Figure 23). In 2022, Northeastern governorates show the highest incidence of out-of-school children, reflecting both their relative disadvantage prior to the conflict, as well as the heightened and still ongoing incidence of violence in these areas. The share of out-of-school children is particularly high in Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor, including among children of primary school age, 40 percent of which were out of school as of 2022 (Figure 24). Overall, areas and governorates that are outside Syrian Government control, including parts of Aleppo, Idleb, Al-Hasakeh and Quneitra, have the highest incidence of out-of-school children.

FIGURE 22
Net attendance rates by governorate, 2006

Source: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2005/06.

FIGURE 23
Educational attainment, % of population 15+ by governorate, 2006

Source: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2005/06.

FIGURE 24
Out-of-school children by age group and governorate, 2022

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP Demographic and WASH survey (Summer 2022).

Conflict-induced displacement has further negatively impacted educational outcomes.
Displacement significantly impacts children's access to education, often leading to interruptions in
schooling that can span extended periods of time, possibly leading to permanent dropouts. Data
from the 2022 HNAP evidence that children currently displaced, or who have recently returned to

their community of origin after a period of internal or international displacement, are at higher risk of being out of school (Figure 25). Particularly concerning are the statistics for adolescents in higher secondary school age (age 15–17), possibly reflecting dropouts at earlier ages during the heightened phases of conflict, as well as harsher economic conditions of their households.[15] Among this age group, 39 percent of IDP youths and 29 percent of returnee youths are out of school, compared with 21 percent among youths from resident ("host") households.

Households' economic circumstances, the availability of school facilities, and differences between territories controlled by different parties to the conflict are among the main determinants of children being out of school. Multivariate regression analysis was conducted to better understand factors affecting the probability of being out of school in 2022.[16] As shown in Figure 26, factors associated to the welfare of the household, such as whether children are working, education of the household head, and whether the household reports having sufficient income to satisfy needs are important correlates of the probability of children being out of school.[17] Residing in areas outside of Syrian Government control is associated with a higher likelihood of children being out of school, even after controlling for individual and household characteristics (including displacement status), accessibility of schools in the community of residence, and the current level of conflict, as well as governorate of residence.

FIGURE 25
Out-of-school children by age and displacement status

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP Demographic and WASH survey (Summer 2022).
Note: Returnees refer to individuals in formerly internally or internationally displaced households, who have returned to their community of origin in the 6 months preceding the survey.

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[15] See the next section for a welfare profile of the displaced population.

[16] See Table A1 for a full detail of regression analysis results.

[17] Ceteris paribus, primary school-age children who need to work to support the livelihood of their households are 33 percentage points more likely to be out of school compared with a non-working peer, a probability that increases to 66 and 48 percentage points for lower and upper secondary school-aged children, respectively.

FIGURE 26
Probability of being out of school by children age groups, multivariate analysis, 2022

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP Demographic and WASH survey (Summer 2022).

5

Welfare of Syrian Households

Before the conflict started, Syria was a fast-growing, lower middle-income country (LMIC), and extreme poverty was virtually nonexistent. The Syrian economy had expanded since the turn of the century, albeit starting from a low base. The transition of power, which occurred when Bashar al-Assad took over the reins of government upon his father's death in July 2000, accelerated the process of economic liberalization initiated since the late 1980s. From 2000 to 2010, Syria's real gross domestic product (GDP) rose at an average annual rate of 4.3 percent, mostly driven by non-oil sectors, and inflation averaged at a reasonable annual 4.9 percent (World Bank, 2017). Despite several international crises,[18] the value of Syrian trade (imports and exports) reached 76.5 percent of GDP just before the global financial crisis, about 6 percentage points above the average for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).[19] Before the conflict, extreme poverty in Syria—as measured by the US$2.15 daily per capita international poverty line (2017 PPP)—was virtually nonexistent. In 2009, when the Central Bureau of Statistics conducted the last Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 16.25 percent of Syria's population was living below US$3.65 per capita per day, the international poverty line for LMICs in 2017 PPP.

Despite economic growth, poverty reduction remained elusive during the decade prior to the conflict and regional welfare differences widened. The decade leading to the eruption of conflict was lost in the progress toward poverty reduction. The poorest segments of the population benefited the least from the economic growth that characterized the period, with poverty increasing between 2003 and 2006, and then remaining substantially stable between 2006 and 2009 (Table 3). The severe drought that affected Syria between 2007 and 2009 accentuated the decline of the agrarian sector, already weakened by the dismantling of former socialist structures and the reform of agrarian work relations, and possibly contributed to widening welfare differences across governorates.[20] The northeastern governorates of Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Hasakeh, which together accounted for 80 percent of the country's total irrigated wheat acreage, were the most affected and, together with Idleb, ranked among the poorest in 2009 (Figure 27).

TABLE 3
Poverty at international poverty lines, pre-conflict

International poverty line (2017 PPP)	2003–04	2006–07	2009–10
US$2.15	0.93	2.83	2.44
US$3.65	10.89	16.36	16.02

Source: World Bank staff estimates.

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[18]   These include Syria's international isolation after the Iraq war, Syria's expulsion from Lebanon and Israeli wars against Syrian allies Hezbollah and Hamas.

[19]   MENA average excludes oil-exporting high-income countries in the region.

[20]   Promulgated on December 29, 2004, Law 56 allowed landowners to terminate, after three years, all tenancy contract and to replace them with temporary contracts. This law, applied in December 2007, resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of tenants and workers (Ababsa, 2015).

FIGURE 27
Poverty by governorate at US$3.65 poverty line in 2009

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on CBS.

More than a decade of conflict has led to a dramatic deterioration in the welfare of Syrian households, as captured by the incidence of extreme poverty. According to estimates based on the HNAP 2022 household survey, 27 percent of Syrians—about 5.7 million individuals—live in extreme poverty, i.e., consume below the LIC international poverty line set at US$2.15 (2017 PPP) per capita per day. While this measure of monetary poverty is not strictly comparable to pre-conflict monetary poverty estimates due to differences in questionnaire design, it is worth noting that extreme monetary poverty was virtually nonexistent in Syria before the conflict whereas, as of the summer of 2022, it affects more than one in four of its inhabitants.[21] When considering the US$3.65 (2017 PPP) international poverty line of LMICs, poverty affects 69 percent of the population, or about 14.5 million Syrians.[22] Compared with other countries at similar per capita GDP levels, poverty in Syria is aligned with that of best-performing LICs and the worst-performing LMICs (Figure 28).

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[21] See Redaelli et al. (2023) for a description of the methodology for poverty measurement using HNAP 2022 data.

[22] Prior to conflict, Syria was classified as a LMIC and the (lower) national poverty line was aligned with LMIC international poverty set at US$3.65 (2017 PPP) per capita per day. Syria was reclassified as a LIC in 2018.

FIGURE 28
Poverty incidence among LICs and LMICs, circa 2022

$2.15,2017 PPP

$3.65,2017 PPP

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022 and WDI.
Note: Yellow dots correspond to LICs while blue dots to LMICs.

Despite conflict intensity subsiding in more recent years, the incidence of monetary poverty has dramatically increased post-2019, reflecting the impact of economic shocks. The analysis of monetary poverty trends since the start of the conflict is limited by the lack of suitable household surveys prior to the 2022 and by the lack of comparability between poverty estimates based on the 2009 HIES and the 2022 HNAP survey. Still, while imperfect, trends analysis based on the interpolation of distribution neutral growth estimates can provide some important insights.[23] In particular, estimates indicate that the pace of poverty increase post-2019 might have been as severe as the one observed during the initial years of the conflict, when incidence of deaths, displacement and destruction was at its peak (Figure 29). This finding underscores the likely severe impact on household welfare brought about by the compounding impact of international shocks that affected the Syrian economy starting from the financial crisis in Lebanon in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine.

Extreme poverty in Syria has a strong spatial connotation, with more than 50 percent of the extreme poor living in just three governorates. Poverty varies significantly across governorates (Figure 30). Against a national average of 27 percent, extreme poverty is dramatically higher in Deir-ez-Zor (72 percent), Hama and Ar-Raqqa (61 percent), Al-Hasakeh (49 percent), Dar'a (48 percent), Quneitra (43 percent) and Aleppo (34 percent). In all remaining governorates, extreme poverty inci-

FIGURE 29
Poverty trends 2009–2022

US$2.15, 2017 PPP

(continued on next page)

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[23] Poverty trends over the period 2009–2022 are reconstructed by interpolating poverty estimates obtained by backcasting poverty estimates based on the HNAP 2022 survey and those obtained by nowcasting 2009 poverty estimates, with both projections based on the growth rate of per capita GDP in current prices, deflated by CPI and a passthrough of 0.7 (see (Redaelli, Infanzon Guadarrama, & Moreno Herrera, 2024)).

FIGURE 29
Poverty trends 2009–2022 *(continued)*

US$3.65,2017 PPP

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on CBS and HNAP 2022.

dence is well below the national average. Substantial spatial inequalities also emerge when looking at the incidence of poverty at the LMIC poverty line. At this higher welfare threshold, however, poverty incidence is above 90 percent in seven out of the 14 governorates of Syria, and below 50 percent only in Damascus (44 percent) and As-Sweida (23 percent). Looking at the geographical distribution of the extreme poor, Aleppo, Hama and Deir-ez-Zor are home to 51 percent of the population living below the US$2.15 poverty line, against only 30 percent of the country's population (Figure 31).

FIGURE 30
Incidence of poverty in 2022, by governorate

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022.

FIGURE 31
Distribution of poor population in 2022, by governorate

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022.

Female-headed and displaced households are at higher risk of poverty, while receiving international remittances sizably reduces the risk of poverty. Figure 32 shows the results of a multivariate analysis of poverty correlates at the US$2.15 and US$3.65 (2017 PPP) per capita per day international poverty lines. In addition to the governorate of residence, controls in the regression include the gender of the household head, his/her age and level of education, the size and the income/livelihood potential of the household (number of working-age males, number of household members employed, remittances and assistance receipt), as well as a dichotomous indicator for current IDPs, or recent past displacement. The strong spatial connotation of poverty in Syria is confirmed by regression results, even when controlling for household level characteristics. Among the latter, female-headed and displaced households face a significantly higher risk of poverty, while receiving remittances from abroad is the single most important factor contributing to reducing the risk of poverty, both when considering extreme poverty (a 12-percentage-point reduction) and poverty at the LMIC international poverty line (an 8-percentage-point reduction). Compared with assistance, the contribution of international remittances to reducing the risk of extreme poverty is almost six times as large, while twice as large when considering the risk of falling below the LMIC

FIGURE 32
Correlates of poverty, results of multivariate linear regression

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022.

international poverty line. As discussed in Section 3, Syrian households mobilized extra labor to make ends meet in response to the challenges brought about by the conflict and economic shocks. Regression results provide further evidence of these labor market challenges. In fact, having more household members working—once controlling for household size and the number of working-age male members—connotes a higher likelihood of poverty, as poorer households mobilize extra labor among marginal workers (women and children).

More than a decade of conflict has had a serious impact on the welfare of Syrian households well beyond purely monetary poverty. Following the literature on multidimensional poverty measurement, a Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) was developed to corroborate the profile emerging from the monetary poverty analysis and explore the welfare of Syrian

households beyond a purely monetary metric. The index combines six household level indicators equally split to capture vulnerabilities along the dimension of livelihoods and living conditions (see Box 6). The results of this analysis indicate the pervasiveness of deprivation in the Syrian population (Table 4). In 2022, more than nine in ten Syrians were multidimensionally vulnerable (H) in more than half of the weighted sum of indicators (A). The overall MVI, calculated as the product of the percentage of the vulnerable population, and the average share of deprivations experienced by the vulnerable population is 0.53, up from 0.50 in the previous year.

BOX 6
Multidimensional Vulnerability Index for Syria

The Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) developed for Syria, while differing in the choice of indicators, builds on the Alkire-Foster methodology used to compute the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).

The MVI is built on data from the 2022 and 2021 summer rounds of the HNAP Demographic and WASH survey.

The MVI combines six indicators measured at the household level. Three indicators capture deprivations along the *livelihood dimension* and can be broadly interpreted as proxying for the risk of monetary deprivation. The remaining three indicators capture deprivations along the *living conditions* dimension which, as with livelihoods, has been severely affected by conflict and might not be fully encompassed when considering a monetary welfare metric. Each indicator is given an equal weight in the composition of the index. The Table below provides the list of the indicators considered in the MVI.

Dimensions, indicators and weights in the MVI

Dimension	Indicator	Definition	Weight
Livelihoods	*Unemployment*	Any member aged 15 or older is unemployed	1/6
	Precarious income	Household reports income insufficient to satisfy needs AND engages in at least one extreme negative coping strategy (e.g., taking up socially degrading jobs, high-risk/exploitative jobs, child labor, child marriage, reduction of expenditure on essential items)	1/6
	Remittances	Household does not receive international remittances	1/6
Living conditions	*Electricity access*	Household has no access to electricity (in any form)	1/6
	Water access	Household has no regular access to any source of water	1/6
	Housing access	Household lives in unfinished house/apt, OR moderately/severely damaged house/apt OR tent, OR makeshift shelter, OR container	1/6

The MVI is calculated as a product of the percentage of the population that is multidimensionally vulnerable (the incidence, H) and the average share of deprivations that vulnerable people experience (the intensity, A). A household and all its members are identified as multidimensionally vulnerable if they are deprived in more than one-third of the weighted dimensions (vulnerability cut-off or k = 33 percent).

TABLE 4
Incidence (H), intensity (A) and Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI), 2021 and 2022

	2021		2022	
	Value	**Confidence interval (95%)**	**Value**	**Confidence interval (95%)**
MVI	0.503	[0.494–0.511]	0.527	[0.518–0.536]
Incidence (H, %)	91.5%	[0.902–0.929]	93.7%	[0.927–0.947]
Intensity (A, %)	54.9%	[0.543–0.555]	56.2%	[0.554–0.571]

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022.

Analysis of multidimensional vulnerability underscores the severity of welfare deprivation associated to the lack of income opportunities and growing vulnerability in terms of water access. Figure 33 shows the indicators in which the vulnerable population faces the highest level of deprivation (censored headcount ratios).[24] Results indicate that an overwhelmingly high share of the population is multidimensionally vulnerable and deprived along the indicators in the livelihood dimension, particularly regarding unemployment. Compared with 2021, the increase in the share of the multidimensionally vulnerable population with precarious incomes and lacking access to water is noteworthy, as also evidenced by the analysis of the relative contribution of each indicator to the MVI (Figure 34).

FIGURE 33
Population multidimensionally poor and deprived in each of the indicators (censored headcount), 2021 and 2022

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022.

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[24] The censored headcount ratios measure the percentage of the population who is both multidimensionally vulnerable and also deprived in each of the indicators.

FIGURE 34
Percentage contribution of indicators to the MVI, 2021 and 2022

| | Unemployment | Precarious income | No remittances |
| | No electricity access | No water access | No housing access |

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022.

IDPs living in camps and recently returned displaced Syrians have higher levels of multidimensional vulnerability. In 2022, 30 percent of the Syrian population was either internally displaced or had recently returned to their places of origin after being displaced. Contrary to expectations, the displaced population, when considered as a whole, has a similar incidence and intensity of multidimensional vulnerability compared with hosts. This finding underscores once again the pervasiveness of vulnerability within the Syrian population. Nonetheless, important differences emerge between different displacement types. As shown in Table 5, IDPs living in camps emerge as the most vulnerable segment of the Syrian population, both in terms of the incidence of multidimensional vulnerability and the intensity of overlapping deprivations. Syrians who have recently returned, either from international or internal displacement, have heightened intensity of overlapping deprivations compared with the resident (host) population, reflecting the challenges of reintegration, given the country's current challenging economic circumstances. Both IDPs living in camps and returnees have heightened levels of vulnerability along the living conditions dimension, with returnees facing particular challenges in term of access to water and electricity.

TABLE 5
Incidence (H), intensity (A) and Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI), by displacement status

	Household type				
	Host	**Displaced population**	Returnee	IDP residential areas	IDP camps
MVI	**53%**	**52%**	56%	50%	63%
Incidence (H, %)	**94%**	**93%**	91%	93%	97%
Intensity (A, %)	**57%**	**56%**	61%	54%	65%

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022.

The analysis of multidimensional vulnerability further underscores the existence of substantial inequalities across Syria's governorates. In 2022, MVI is the highest in Al-Hasakeh (0.76) but sizably above the national average in Dar'a (0.68), As-Sweida (0.63), Rural Damascus (0.62), Tartous (0.60) and Ar-Raqqa (0.57). Compared with the previous year, governorates that saw the largest increase in MVI are Damascus, Ar-Raqqa and Tartous (Figure 35). As shown in Figure 36, the incidence of multidimensional vulnerability is pervasively high across all governorates and, with the sole exception of Deir-ez-Zor, it increased between 2021 and 2022. Compared with 2021, the higher incidence of multidimensional vulnerability in 2022 was accompanied by a deterioration in the intensity of vulnerability, particularly in the governorates of Ar-Raqqa and Tartous. As shown in Figure 37, deprivations across the livelihood dimensions contribute the most to multidimensional vulnerability in Hama and Homs (more than 80 percent), while deprivations along the living conditions dimensions are more determinant in Al-Hasakeh and Dar'a.

FIGURE 35
MVI by governorate, 2021 and 2022

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022.

FIGURE 36
Incidence (H) and intensity (A) of Multidimensional Vulnerability Poverty, by governorate, 2021 and 2022

2021

2022

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022.

FIGURE 37
Percentage contribution of each indicator, by governorate, 2022

Governorate	Unemployment	Precarious income	No remittances	No electricity access	No water access	No housing access
Rural Damascus	24	19	15	14	24	4
Tartous	21	28	23	4	24	
Quneitra	24	19	25		30	
Lattakia	24	28	23	6	19	
Idleb	26	19	27	11	10	8
Homs	31	29	19	9	8	
Hama	35	31	23	6	6	
Deir-ez-Zor	25	21	14	19	15	6
Dar'a	19	21	14	18	22	6
Damascus	28	19	12	19	19	
As-Sweida	21	22	23	5	26	
Ar-Raqqa	23	23	17	13	13	11
Aleppo	32	19	26	11	6	7
Al-Hasakah	19	21	15	21	21	4

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022.

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
Concluding Remarks

The availability of data on population welfare is of paramount importance, particularly in highly volatile and conflict-affected countries. While not exhaustive, the analysis presented in this report, which is largely based on survey data collected by humanitarian actors, provides important insights into the impact of more than a decade of conflict on the welfare of Syrian households and the challenges moving forward.

Conflict can be characterized as "development in reverse", and Syria is no exception.

In the summer of 2022, extreme poverty affected more than one in four Syrians, while it had been virtually nonexistent in 2009. The incidence of extreme poverty is even higher in many of the areas that remain outside of the Syrian Government's control and continue to be affected by conflict. In February 2023, these same areas also bore the brunt of the impact of the devastating Türkiye-Syria earthquakes, further exacerbating the precarious welfare conditions of their inhabitants.

Despite conflict intensity subsiding in recent years, the welfare of Syrian households remains on a steep declining path, reflecting the vulnerability of the country's economy to international shocks and the inability of Syrian people to make ends meet due to the lack of good quality jobs. Not surprisingly, the progressive deterioration of economic conditions within Syria has gone hand in hand with an increase in the share of households "sending" prime-age male labor abroad as a coping strategy. International remittances are proving to be a critical lifeline to Syrian households, significantly contributing to reducing the risk of poverty. Despite this, however, the proliferation of global and regional crises limits the sustainability of coping strategies based on international mobility moving forward, even more so when neighboring countries face heightened pressures for Syrian refugees to return to their country of origin.

As complex emergencies and conflicts dramatically increase in the Middle East and worldwide, the analysis presented in this report shows that the crisis in Syria is far from over and that, lacking drivers of poverty reduction, the welfare challenges of Syrian households are likely to persist, if not worsen, in the face of shocks. In this context, having reliable data to monitor the evolution of welfare outcomes and to inform actions along the humanitarian-development nexus remains a priority. In the absence of official statistics, continuing the collaboration on the design and analysis of data collected by humanitarian agencies could significantly contribute to filling knowledge gaps moving forward.

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Annex 1: The Humanitarian Needs Assessment Program

The scale of Syria's humanitarian crisis and the necessity to inform operations on the ground have prompted UN agencies to develop an articulated system of welfare monitoring: the *Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme* (HNAP). The HNAP is joint UN program established in April 2018 with the objective of tracking displacement and return movements, conduct multi-sectoral assessments, and monitor humanitarian needs inside the country.[25] In addition to collecting data at the community level through key informant interviews, the HNAP also implemented sample-based household surveys whose frame relies on community level population data (Table A1).[26]

The HNAP Demographic and WASH survey is a large-scale survey aimed at providing national and subnational-level estimates of demographic and basic socio-economic conditions of the population living inside Syria (resident, IDPs and returnees). The survey is primarily used to inform the programming of assistance of various UN agencies and humanitarian actors. The questionnaires of this survey have evolved over time.[27] In 2021, in order to assess the monetary deprivation of Syrian households, a module on household income and household expenditures was included in the survey. In the summer of 2022 survey round, the module on income and expenditure was further revised in collaboration with the World Bank team in order to improve the monetary aggregates for welfare measurement.[28]

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[25] The HNAP network presently consists of more than 30,000 community focal points and 475 full time staff on the ground in Syria. HNAP is implemented through local Syrian NGOs, with technical support from UN agencies. Information is collected across all regions inside Syria through face-to-face consultations and direct field observations.

[26] Stratified random sampling is used to draw a 95% confidence/10% margin of error sample at the subdistrict level and the number of household interviews per community (p-coded location) within a subdistrict was obtained by randomly sampling locations proportionate to population size, with replacement.

[27] The main survey modules include questions on demographic characteristics of current household members and of members who have left the household, individual level basic information on labor market engagement (adult population) and school attendance (children below age 18); household level information on shelter, WASH, access to assistance, sources of income, coping strategies and priority needs.

[28] In particular, changes aimed at collecting information on in-kind assistance and own-production (particularly for food); using an annual recall period for items consumed infrequently, and expanding (to the extent possible) the list of non-food items. See Redaelli, Infanzon-Guadarrama (2023).

TABLE A1
HNAP sample-based household surveys

	Representative	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Demographic and WASH survey (about 25,000 obs.)	Syria population / subdistrict level	May	May	January, May	January, June	January, June
IDP demographic and Intentions (about 18,000 obs.)	IDP population/ subdistrict level	August	October	October	October	October
Returnee demographic and socio-economic survey (about 5,000– 8,000 obs.)	Returnee population previous 12 months** / district level	—	January, September	—	January, December	—

Annex 2: Regression Results

TABLE A2
OLS regressions results – probability of being out of school

Variables | Age group	Model 1: Only 2022			Model 2: 2018–2022		
	6–11	12–14	15–17	6–11	12–14	15–17
Individual is male	0.014*** (0.000)	−0.015*** (0.000)	−0.053*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.000)	−0.029*** (0.000)	−0.054*** (0.000)
Individual's age in years	−0.008*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)	−0.002*** (0.000)	−0.018*** (0.000)	0.037*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)
Individual has a disability	0.048*** (0.000)	0.025*** (0.000)	0.032*** (0.001)		0.154*** (0.000)	0.166*** (0.000)
Individual is working	0.334*** (0.002)	0.665*** (0.001)	0.487*** (0.001)	0.559*** (0.001)	0.602*** (0.001)	0.632*** (0.000)
Household head is male	0.019*** (0.000)	0.018*** (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)	−0.033*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	−0.005*** (0.000)
Household head's education (base: no education)						
Primary education	−0.004*** (0.001)	−0.075*** (0.001)	−0.081*** (0.002)			
Secondary education	−0.053*** (0.001)	−0.129*** (0.001)	−0.134*** (0.002)			
Tertiary education	−0.052*** (0.001)	−0.130*** (0.001)	−0.149*** (0.002)			
Household type (base: host)						
Returnee	−0.002 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.048*** (0.003)	0.046*** (0.000)	0.040*** (0.001)	0.086*** (0.001)
IDP	0.035*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.026*** (0.001)	0.085*** (0.000)	0.050*** (0.000)	0.064*** (0.000)
Household income is sufficient	−0.006*** (0.000)	−0.021*** (0.001)	−0.017*** (0.001)			
School access	−0.054*** (0.000)	−0.038*** (0.001)	−0.134*** (0.001)			
Log(1+Deaths/100 k in Subdistrict)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)
Governorate (base: Damascus)						
Aleppo	−0.022*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)	0.025*** (0.002)	0.068*** (0.000)	0.092*** (0.000)	0.245*** (0.001)
Rural Damascus	−0.033*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.029*** (0.000)	0.027*** (0.000)	0.067*** (0.001)
Homs	−0.020*** (0.001)	0.030*** (0.001)	0.046*** (0.002)	−0.005*** (0.000)	−0.027*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)
Hama	0.006*** (0.001)	0.053*** (0.001)	0.170*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.077*** (0.001)

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TABLE A2
OLS regressions results – probability of being out of school *(continued)*

Variables | Age group	Model 1: Only 2022			Model 2: 2018–2022		
	6–11	12–14	15–17	6–11	12–14	15–17
Lattakia	–0.049***	–0.016***	0.024***	–0.030***	0.009***	0.045***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Idleb	–0.030***	–0.004**	–0.088***	0.065***	0.091***	0.302***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Al-Hasakeh	0.003***	0.036***	0.122***	0.115***	0.105***	0.231***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Deir-ez-Zor	0.029***	0.093***	0.210***	0.093***	0.168***	0.277***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Tartous	–0.050***	–0.009***	–0.013***	–0.018***	–0.017***	0.054***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ar-Raqqa	0.006***	0.056***	0.182***	0.169***	0.194***	0.445***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Dar'a	–0.030***	0.044***	0.110***	–0.024***	0.020***	0.063***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
As-Sweida	0.009***	0.045***	0.024***	0.011***	0.008***	0.096***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Quneitra	–0.053***	0.021***	0.089***	0.008***	0.100***	0.253***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Area of control (base GoS)						
NSAG	0.048***	0.106***	0.270***			
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)			
SDF	0.058***	0.076***	0.219***			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)			
TGF	0.001	0.096***	0.260***			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)			
Year (base 2022)						
2021				0.053***	0.119***	0.062***
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2020				0.025***	0.038***	0.064***
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2019				0.044***	0.168***	0.152***
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2018				0.096***	0.121***	0.133***
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Constant	**0.125*** **	**–0.105*** **	**0.199*** **	0.148***	–0.570***	–0.328***
	(0.001)	**(0.003)**	**(0.006)**	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Observations	20,617	8,420	5,971	100,635	41,550	38,520
Weighted observation	3,279,160	1,447,762	928,971	15,331,246	6,600,660	6,063,964
R-squared	0.082	0.361	0.432	0.095	0.237	0.395

TABLE A3
Correlates of poverty, results of multivariate linear regression

	(1)	(2)
Variable	**$2.15 LIC**	**$3.65 LMIC**
Female household head	0.064***	0.062***
	(0.009)	(0.010)
Household head age	0.000	−0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household head's education (base: none)		
Primary	0.041***	0.042***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Secondary	0.025**	0.051***
	(0.012)	(0.013)
Graduate	−0.004	−0.006
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Household size	0.049***	0.061***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
No. of household members employed	0.008**	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)
No. of working age males	−0.029***	0.020***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Household is displaced	0.037***	0.059***
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Received remittances over the past year	−0.120***	−0.077***
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Received assistance and/or free services over the past year	−0.023***	−0.042***
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Governorate (base: Damascus)		
Aleppo	0.265***	0.213***
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Rural Damascus	0.097***	0.123***
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Homs	0.118***	0.329***
	(0.012)	(0.013)
Hama	0.566***	0.546***
	(0.012)	(0.013)
Lattakia	0.042***	0.354***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Idleb	−0.029***	0.027**
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Al-Hasakeh	0.444***	0.524***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Deir-ez-Zor	0.629***	0.454***
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Tartous	0.046***	0.560***
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Ar-Raqqa	0.515***	0.473***
	(0.014)	(0.015)

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TABLE A3
Correlates of poverty, results of multivariate linear regression *(continued)*

Variable	(1) $2.15 LIC	(2) $3.65 LMIC
Dar'a	0.442*** (0.014)	0.506*** (0.015)
As-Sweida	−0.024 (0.021)	−0.184*** (0.022)
Quneitra	0.377*** (0.035)	0.535*** (0.037)
Constant	−0.150*** (0.022)	0.333*** (0.023)
Observations	26,059	26,059
Weighted observation	19,630,924	19,630,924
R-squared	0.262	0.262