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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2127, A/2226, A/C.1/L.30, A/C.1/L.31 and A/C.1/L.32) (*continued*)

[Item 17]*

1. Mr. MONTT (Chile) said that his country had contributed to the work on the question of disarmament by supporting all peace proposals designed to ensure the security and well-being of humanity regardless of their origin.

2. Chile did not manufacture any major armaments and did not produce any atomic weapons. Moreover, its armed forces were small considering the length of its coast along the Pacific and in the establishment of its military budget it did not sacrifice cultural and progressive works. His delegation approached the problem without any prejudice or secondary interests. It wished to study the problem on the basis of the following two facts. First, the major Powers possessed important armaments for mass destruction and the jurisdiction of some of those Powers extended to possessions in other countries. Accordingly, their field of action, protection and security exceeded the metropolitan frontiers and required vast forces. Secondly, the small countries, such as Chile, possessed small armed forces which were exclusively defensive in character, and so any attempt to apply mathematical formulæ might lead to dangerous absurdities. In the circumstances, it would seem difficult for the major Powers and the small Powers to find a common denominator which would apply to both situations. But once disarmament had been achieved between the major Powers, the military requirements of the smaller countries would automatically decrease; their armaments and forces would, however, have to remain in proportion to their own defence and their continental undertakings, such as the pact of Rio de Janeiro. The Disarmament Commission should, therefore, continue to examine first the problem of the armaments of the major Powers and, following the

results obtained and the principles that might be adopted, pass on to the consideration of the problem of the armaments of the small countries.

3. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) said that his delegation considered that the activities of the Disarmament Commission and the development of discussions in the United Nations on the question of disarmament, the reduction of armaments, and the prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction could not be gauged except in close connexion with a study of the foreign policies of the countries submitting certain proposals concerning the question of disarmament.

4. It was due to the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, which had, in 1946, raised the question of the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military ends, that the United Nations was dealing with the problem. At the third, fourth, fifth and sixth sessions of the General Assembly the USSR had presented concrete proposals to the effect that all the armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council should be reduced by one-third within a year. It had also proposed the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the setting up of a rigorous international control. It had proposed the convocation of a world conference to consider the question of the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments, of practical measures to be taken for the prohibition of atomic weapons and of the establishment of effective international control. Those proposals were the natural and logical fruits of the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, which was engaged in an active fight for the maintenance of international peace and the elimination of the danger of war.

5. In striking contrast to that systematic peaceful policy was the policy followed by the Western Powers, particularly the United States of America. That policy was characterized by the fact that they had undertaken large-scale armament programmes and placed their entire economy on a wartime basis. They had, for instance, undertaken the production of atomic and

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

hydrogen bombs for aggressive purposes. The excessive and increasing production of armaments in the United States demonstrated the lack of sincerity in that country's disarmament proposals. Moreover, the bad faith of the representative of the United States was shown in the increasingly large expenditures devoted by the United States Government to the production of armaments, a production which covered 73 per cent of the 1953-54 budget. It was equally shown in the policy of establishing aggressive blocs such as that of the countries included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the military bases which the United States was setting up on foreign soil. Mr. Nosek quoted from an article entitled "U. S. Sinks Billions in Bases" in the *U. S. News & World Report* of 27 February 1953 to support those contentions. Bad faith was demonstrated by the remilitarization of West Germany, whose territory had served as an armaments arsenal for Hitlerite aggression. *The New York Times* had said on 15 December 1952 that the United States Government was building up, in West Germany, military and naval forces as well as armaments, chemical and bacterial weapons, and that preparations were being made for the production of atomic weapons. Therefore, in order to camouflage its armaments programme, the United States Government had decided at the sixth session of the General Assembly to submit its so-called disarmament proposals. It was interesting to note the comments of the United States Press itself upon the United States peace offensive. *The Wall Street Journal*, for instance, in an article "Disarmament Chimera", had said that in the United States plans reality was subordinated to propaganda aims. The Western Press itself had been unable to conceal the fact that the proposals made by France, the United Kingdom and the United States hardly deserved any serious consideration. Indeed, those proposals—which were reproduced in part IV, section B, of the second report of the Disarmament Commission (DC/20), addressed to the Secretary-General under the symbol A/2226—provided neither for the prohibition of atomic weapons nor for the reduction of armaments. On the contrary, they substituted for those two fundamental questions the disclosure and verification of armaments and armed forces. The only difference was that up to the sixth session, disclosure and verification were limited to conventional armaments. As soon as it became evident that the Soviet Union could produce atomic energy, the Western Powers had hastened to include atomic weapons.

6. The United States, which wished to preserve as long as possible its secrets concerning reserves of atomic weapons, had proposed that the disclosure of armaments should proceed by stages beginning with the simpler and least dangerous ones and passing on to the more complex; the final stage of disclosure and verification would relate to atomic weapons. Thus, the passage from one stage to another would depend on the degree of confidence achieved, which would be determined by an international control organ composed of a majority subservient to the United States. In the past few years, the Western Powers had, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, subordinated the question of the reduction of armaments to the fulfilment of various other conditions. Now they maintained that a reduction in armaments would not be possible

so long as the current international tension existed and essential political problems remained unsolved. It followed that the three-Power proposals made the question of disarmament and the prohibition of atomic weapons primarily dependent upon the question of disclosure and verification. Once that had been concluded, a series of other conditions had to be fulfilled. The reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons would, therefore, never take place.

7. The United States had suggested that the criteria for different countries would have to be established not on the basis of defined principles but in a purely arbitrary manner. The establishment of criteria would be entrusted to a control commission, which would decide by mechanical majority, favouring the United States.

8. The report of the Disarmament Commission showed that not the slightest progress had been made in the field of disarmament and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The United States was still pursuing its policy of preventing the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. The working paper which it had presented to Committee 2 of the Disarmament Commission (DC/20, part III, section A) had nothing to do with the prohibition of atomic weapons or the reduction of armaments, leading even the representative of Chile in the Commission to admit that the Soviet Union had been entitled to fear that the Commission would limit itself to obtaining information.

9. Mr. Nosek then gave a detailed account of the position and proposals of the Soviet Union in the Disarmament Commission from March to August 1952. He recalled that the Soviet Union had proposed that the Commission should examine immediately the question of the violation of the agreement concerning the prohibition of bacterial warfare by the United States armed forces in Korea and that the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc had prevented the Commission from examining that issue. He recalled the proposal made by France, the United Kingdom and the United States concerning ceilings of armed forces, avoiding the questions of disarmament and of the prohibition of atomic and bacterial weapons; when the representative of the Soviet Union had requested some clarification, the representatives of the Western Powers had sought refuge in point III of the supplement (DC/20, part IV, section C) to their original proposals. He concluded that the conduct of the United States in the disarmament discussions had not contributed to the solution of the existing problems or to the reduction of international tension. Indeed, the proposals of the Western Powers were diametrically opposed to what they had been endeavouring to assert. He asked what value the United States proposals could have when the United States possessed a war machine in full swing and with unprecedented potentialities.

10. Diametrically opposed to the warlike efforts of the Anglo-American bloc was the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, which, in the struggle for disarmament, gave first importance to the prohibition of barbarous means of mass extermination, particularly atomic and bacterial weapons. The Soviet Union had always held the view that those weapons should be prohibited unconditionally. That position was borne

out by international law. The Hague Convention of 1907 as well as the Geneva Convention of 1949 had prohibited the attacking and bombing of peaceful civilian populations. The Geneva Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in 1932 and the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal had expressed the same principle. The reluctance of the United States to sign a treaty prohibiting the use of atomic weapons showed that it was intending to make use of that barbarous weapon. The United States had always requested the setting up of a system of international control of atomic energy, but when that question had arisen, it had proposed the famous Baruch-Lilienthal-Acheson plan which entrusted control to United States super-monopolies, and tended to conceal United States production of atomic weapons. The Soviet Union had on many occasions proposed concrete measures to make prohibition and control possible. Nevertheless, the Anglo-American majority had always rejected the USSR proposals.

11. Such proposals had again been made by the Soviet Union at the sixth session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/698). Nevertheless, they had been rejected by the Anglo-American bloc and obstructed in the Disarmament Commission. The United States had never given up its famous Baruch Plan, which would entrust the production of atomic weapons and energy to American trusts, thereby maintaining its production. Thus it was clear that the Baruch Plan would infringe the sovereignty of States. For its part, the USSR had proposed the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the simultaneous setting up of control, thereby excluding any interference in the affairs of States. The United States proposal did not constitute a basis upon which agreement could be reached. The Czechoslovak delegation opposed the United States proposal but accepted the proposals of the Soviet Union, which made it possible to bring about disarmament and the prohibition and control of atomic weapons.

12. The representative of Czechoslovakia then examined in detail the United States proposal for the progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments which had been submitted to Committee 2 of the Disarmament Commission (DC/20, part III, section A). He could not see how the plan for disclosure and verification of information concerning the armed forces and armaments could be effective without a simultaneous prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armed forces and armaments. It was obvious, for instance, that if certain States had refused to adhere to the agreement involving the prohibition of atomic weapons, other States, which were equally concerned with their independence, would not consent to admitting to their territory inspectors from those States. Moreover, the procedure envisaged by the United States concerning disclosure and verification by stages would enable States having no interest in accelerating the development of such a procedure to obtain, under certain pretexts, the total stoppage of the procedure of disclosure. The essential condition for an effective system of verification was that the entry into force of the agreements for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armed forces and armaments had to be simultaneous with the establishment of the system of verification. The programme submitted by the Soviet Union to the Disarmament

Commission envisaged such international control by means of continuing inspection without interference in the internal affairs of States. The supplement submitted by the United States to the Disarmament Commission systematically avoided the use of the word "prohibition". Instead, it used the term "elimination", asserting that that term had a wider meaning than the word "prohibition".

13. The deep contradiction which existed between the proposals made by the representative of the United States in the Disarmament Commission and the acts of the United States Government led the Czechoslovak delegation to have no faith in the United States disarmament proposals. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.31) described appropriately the activity of the Disarmament Commission and recommended the adoption of measures which would indicate the road to be followed by the Commission if it wished to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it.

14. Accordingly, his delegation unreservedly supported that draft resolution.

15. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) said that the item under debate was of tremendous importance to the masses throughout the world. If the question of disarmament, which was one of the pillars on which the Charter rested, were not properly solved, the very existence of the earth might be endangered. It was in that spirit that his delegation had, in the course of the sixth session of the General Assembly, joined with the representatives of Iraq and Pakistan in proposing that the major Powers should meet under the chairmanship of the President of the General Assembly with a view to comparing their respective proposals and agreeing on a common text which would take into consideration their respective views (A/C.1/670). The sub-committee set up had not fully achieved the objectives which the sponsors of the resolution had had in view, but it had made some procedural progress which had resulted in the creation of the Disarmament Commission. The work of that Commission did constitute some progress in comparison with the results achieved by previous commissions.

16. The major Powers were divided into two camps, and the mass of humanity thirsting for peace was waiting for agreement between them. Unfortunately, while the General Assembly was discussing plans for disarmament, others were discussing figures and plans for rearming. To rearm would mean to diminish the productive capacities of the countries, to reduce the masses to misery, and to prevent them from attaining their legitimate aspirations. The masses were bent on attaining peace because they no longer believed that wars served any useful purpose. In the past, wars might, despite their horrors, have contributed in some way to the progress of mankind. But things had changed and humanity was faced with the choice of putting its greatest scientific discovery, atomic energy, to use either for progress or for ultimate annihilation. In the circumstances, humanity could make only one choice, survival. Atomic energy had to be used for peaceful purposes rather than for destruction. In that respect, he wished to endorse the views expressed by the representative of Iraq at the 454th meeting of the First Committee to the effect that the use of atomic bombs and the aerial bombing of civilian populations

should be assimilated to the crime of genocide, and outlawed. His delegation felt that the Disarmament Commission should continue its work and consider all ideas with a view to submitting to the Assembly at its next session a report that would constitute a solid foundation for the peace and security of mankind. Accordingly, his delegation had joined with those of Egypt, Iraq and Yemen in submitting two amendments (A/C.1/L.32) to the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.30). The purpose of those amendments was to prevent one of the parties concerned from being discredited. Universal efforts had to be applied to solve the problem of disarmament.

17. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) deplored the fact that the prolonged discussion within the Disarmament Commission had not produced any agreement. When the General Assembly, by its resolution 502 (VI), had dissolved the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments and had established a single Disarmament Commission, the hopes of millions of human beings, which had often been disappointed, had received a fresh impetus; they had welcomed the fact that the major Powers had made a new effort to resolve their differences by means of negotiation and reciprocal concessions. It was, therefore, all the more regrettable to find that the reports of the Commission were nothing but a record of difficulties, disagreements and mutual recriminations.

18. Whereas one side proposed, but without adequate guarantees, the prohibition and immediate control of all atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the other side insisted that there should be a disclosure and verification of the armaments of the major Powers; whereas the sponsors of that plan affirmed that their sole purpose was to establish, in an unquestionable manner, a numerical basis on which to start the reduction of the military potential of the most powerful Members of the United Nations, the adversaries of that plan did not wish to see in it anything more than a scheme for prying into their military secrets. Moreover, one side advocated the reduction of armed forces and armaments by one-third in one year, whereas the other side argued, with a plenitude of arguments, in favour of the gradual, balanced and effectively guaranteed reduction of the armed forces of all those States whose failure to participate in the system might imperil it.

19. In the field of atomic energy, the disagreement was no less apparent. New accusations were made to the effect that one of the principal Powers had been, in fact, trying to gain control of all raw materials and installations for the production of atomic energy throughout the world. The quiet and reflective words of the representative of a third Power, which had raised its voice to refute such accusations, had served no purpose. It was in such an atmosphere of obscurity and disquietude that the Disarmament Commission had brought its fruitless session to a close on 1 October 1952. So long as mistrust and fear continued, it would not be possible to check the reckless armaments race. His delegation, however, did not abandon the hope that the deep divergencies, which had put the entire world under a shadow, would disappear.

20. Accordingly, his delegation was in favour of the fourteen-Power draft resolution, by which the Dis-

armament Commission was requested to continue its work. Nevertheless, it would study with attention any other proposal that might constitute a new effort at conciliation which would lead to a strong and lasting peace.

21. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) stated that his Government regarded the question of disarmament primarily and essentially as a responsibility of the major Powers. One reason for that view was that only the major Powers possessed and could produce the large and costly stocks of armaments required in modern wars, and only they could decide what form disarmament should take in order to be effective. His country, though small, was nevertheless greatly interested in the establishment of peaceful conditions in the world. His Government's national preparedness programme was not of its own choosing; it was rather caused by the fear of a new world war, flowing from the tensions between the major Powers, the aggression in Korea and hostile activities elsewhere in the world. South Africa would infinitely prefer to utilize its wealth for the development of the country, rather than for armaments.

22. The establishment of the Disarmament Commission had proved to be a source of hope. A solution, however, was no nearer than it had been a year before.

23. The delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States had prepared constructive working papers which could have served as a basis for an effective and workable programme of disarmament. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union had flatly rejected those proposals. On the other hand, the working paper submitted by the Soviet Union merely contained the same proposals which the General Assembly had repeatedly rejected at previous sessions, on the grounds that the proposed safeguards and controls were inadequate. Therefore the dead-lock continued.

24. Undoubtedly, the maintenance of large armaments undermined confidence that Member States would carry out their Charter obligations to refrain from the use or threat of force against another State. At the same time, the threat or use of force could not be eliminated by unilateral disarmament; that could mean national suicide. Of necessity all States had to co-operate. The Disarmament Commission had not been able to recommend a disarmament programme, and obviously it would be futile to do so as long as the Soviet Union refused to co-operate. In the meantime, rearmament would continue and nations would have to provide for national preparedness. The consequences of an armaments race could be disastrous. Further efforts to prepare proposals on disarmament acceptable to all had to be made. He hoped that the Soviet Union would find it possible to co-operate to that end. If it failed to do so, it would bear a tremendous responsibility.

25. In conclusion, Mr. Jordaan expressed his confidence that the other major Powers were ready to consider any alternative proposals with a view to breaking the existing dead-lock. The South African delegation would support the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

26. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that in submitting its proposals for the general reduction of armaments to the General

Assembly at its first session,¹ the USSR Government had been motivated by the wish to strengthen peace, in line with the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. For the past seven years, the representatives of the USSR and of the other peoples' democracies had been striving to strengthen peace and avert a new world war and had promoted measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The efforts of the Disarmament Commission had ended in failure and the United Nations had failed to take positive measures to achieve those ends. Some representatives had resorted to slanderous, artificial explanations, blaming the failure of the Disarmament Commission on the obdurate and irreconcilable position of the USSR delegation. The truth was that the United States desired to foist upon the Soviet Union a disarmament plan which mirrored the proposal made by France, the United Kingdom and the United States at the sixth session of the General Assembly. That plan aimed not at the reduction of armaments or the prohibition of the atomic weapon, but at the so-called disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments. Moreover, the plan of the three Western delegations subjected to disclosure and verification not the mightiest modern weapons of destruction, but conventional armaments, relegating the disclosure and verification of modern weapons, including the atomic weapon, to a remote last stage. The idea was to furnish the United States and its supporters gratis with intelligence information concerning the armed forces and armaments of all countries, such information to be used for the preparation of war. Naturally the Soviet Union had rejected the United States plan, which was designed to cover up the latter's accelerated rearmament and growing military might.

27. The United States plan had failed even to mention the atomic weapon. Instead of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, it had a slightly modified version of the Baruch-Lilienthal Plan for the so-called international control of atomic energy. It did not deal with the prohibition of the atomic weapon or with the institution of effective international control. The purpose of the Baruch Plan in essence was to give the American monopolies total ownership and world control of atomic materials, fuels and development. Since that would mean United States domination of other sovereign States, it was unacceptable to any self-respecting country. Mr. Baranovsky quoted from an article by Hanson Baldwin in the *New York Times*, to show that the Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch plan for atomic energy control had been dead for a long time and that international control, the principle of ownership and reliable inspection appeared to be outside the realm of possibility. In order to delude the peoples of the world about their true intentions France, the United Kingdom and the United States still clung to that dead formula and refused to accept proposals that would bring about the prohibition of the atomic weapon. By insisting upon the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, not in words, but in deeds, the Soviet Union had demonstrated that it stood steadfastly against all attempts to deceive public opinion and championed the cause of peace.

28. Furthermore, it was understood that the adoption of the Soviet Union proposal for the prohibition of the atomic weapon would entail the presentation to the United Nations of full and authentic information concerning all armaments and armed forces. Finally, the Soviet Union plan called for the drawing up of provisions to institute within the framework of the Security Council an international control organ to supervise the enforcement of those decisions. If that plan were implemented in good faith, it could truly bring about the solution of the whole problem of disarmament.

29. The representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States had rejected the Soviet Union plan outright without advancing any valid arguments. They had imposed the United States plan on the Commission, thereby steering the Commission away from its real task. It was not the USSR but the United States and its allies which had thwarted the adoption of any practical decisions, thus dooming the Disarmament Commission to fruitless work. Nor could the Soviet Union be blamed for repeating its previously rejected proposals, since those proposals had actually become more necessary than ever. The serious error the Assembly had committed in failing to adopt those proposals should not be repeated. The proposals were supported by tens of millions of people, who had emblazoned them on the banner of their struggle for peace. The Soviet Union proposals still constituted an acceptable basis on which the structure of agreement could be erected for genuine, rather than spurious disarmament. The armaments race conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the other North Atlantic bloc countries could be explained by the numerous public statements of United States officials. Those statements showed that the United States intended to persevere in building its relations with other States not on foundations of agreements and treaties, but on armed might, which would clearly result in the intensification of the armaments race. The Soviet Union's struggle for disarmament, on the other hand, had created a serious obstacle in the path of the United States in the pursuit of its policy, which was designed to create a smoke-screen over the armaments race and preparations for a new war.

30. It was difficult to imagine anything more incongruous than an attempt to synthesize within the policy of one State two such mutually exclusive principles as the intensification of the armaments race and the reduction of armaments. That two-sided game in the discussion of the disarmament question had been the main feature of the United States policy. Statistics clearly proved that it was the United States which profited from the armaments race. Citing figures from the United States budget and comments from the American Press, Mr. Baranovsky asked how it was possible to take seriously the assurances of United States Government circles to the effect that the United States would undertake to refrain from the use of force in any form, especially since the United States had been waging war in Korea, forcing other countries into aggressive blocs, inciting them to intensify the armaments race, favouring the suppression of national liberation movements, intervening in the internal affairs of other countries, and overtly organizing subversive activities on foreign territories aimed at overthrowing legitimate governments. Clearly, the United

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second part of First Session, First Committee*, annexes 9 and 9e.

States plan could not bring about a solution of the problems of disarmament and of the prohibition of atomic weapons. He was convinced that the solution of the controversial questions which had arisen in the Disarmament Commission between the Soviet Union and the Western countries was possible, if all States sought, by deeds, to bring about the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction.

31. Mr. Baranovsky described the proposal set forth in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.31) and in conclusion declared that his delegation considered it as an acceptable basis for resumption of the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission and attainment of the necessary decisions. For these reasons, he would vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution and against the joint draft resolution of the fourteen Powers.

32. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) recalled that there had been hope among the peoples in various countries when the Disarmament Commission was established, at the sixth session of the General Assembly, that its work would lead to substantial progress. The debate at that session, which had brought out the importance of the disarmament problem, had at the same time marked the resumption of contact and of some profound discussion among the major Powers in the well-known Sub-Committee of Four. The interruption of the six-Power negotiations in January 1950 had been the prelude to an increase in international tension; therefore the resumption of negotiations gave some promise of the relaxation of tension. That hope was further strengthened by the proposal of the USSR to institute control over atomic energy on the basis of continuing inspection. The notion of continuing inspection, as opposed to the vague Soviet Union proposal for periodic inspection, advocated previously, had given some promise of happier development in the field of disarmament. Although that new notion was also expressed in indefinite terms, the French Government had taken it as an indication of the intention on the part of the USSR to enter into a fruitful discussion with the other Powers. The French Government had envisaged that the discussions would primarily cover the safeguards and guarantees of disarmament, since the new element in the Soviet Union proposal entered the field of control. It had been the fundamental divergency in the conception of control which had barred the road to all understanding in that matter. The French delegation had hoped that in the serenity of the working committees, preferably meeting in private, new Soviet Union conceptions on control would develop gradually. That hope, however, had soon been dashed. In answer to reiterated questions by various representatives, who were trying to elucidate an important matter, the Soviet Union had merely repeated its previous proposals of 11 June 1947². Finally, the Soviet Union representative had asked that the sterile game of questions and answers should be abandoned and the existing control plan, approved by the United Nations almost unanimously, should be discarded.

33. All efforts to elaborate a common plan to obtain answers about the Soviet Union's concept of inspection had proved to be entirely fruitless. The Commission

was anxious to learn how, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, satisfactory control could be based on continuing inspection. The work of the Commission did not yield anything new.

34. It should be added that the representative of the USSR had, at the 578th meeting, explicitly referred the Committee to the Soviet Union proposals of 1947 although those proposals had been found completely inadequate by the General Assembly many times before.

35. Nor had the Disarmament Commission been any more successful when it tried to find out what the Soviet Union meant by simultaneity of entry into force of the prohibition and control of the atomic weapon, apparently another novel element in the Soviet Union proposal of January 1952. All efforts on the part of the Western delegations, including the French, to ascertain the intentions of the Soviet Union in the discussions on the problem of disclosure and verification had been confronted by the reiterated accusation that those countries wanted to spy on Soviet Union territory and armaments. The principle of disclosure and verification had been endorsed by the General Assembly and recognized even in the Soviet Union proposals. The French delegation sought to encourage the study of processes. The Soviet Union representative only drew the picture of a fantastic trap set to catch him. The Commission had run into the stone wall of insuperable mistrust. The Soviet Union representative refused to understand that the exchange of information would be mutual and reciprocal, and not a pretext to obtain data concerning Soviet Union armaments.

36. The proposals submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, which had been submitted in the Disarmament Commission on 28 May 1952, as supplemented by the proposals of 12 August 1952, constituted the most realistic, concrete and precise proposals ever offered in the matter of disarmament since the end of the Second World War, and left wide room for negotiations. The sponsors of the proposals were aware that no disarmament programme could be dictated by a majority to a minority or by the major Powers to the smaller Powers; it had to be agreed to by all concerned. They had made it clear that decisions as to the distribution of armed forces among categories of services and the allocation of various types of armaments had to be based on an agreement, first, among the permanent members of the Security Council and, subsequently, among countries which had substantial armed forces in various regions of the world. It was in that way that decisions would have to be adopted for subsequent submission to the world conference, which was also envisaged in the proposals. The proposals were, nevertheless, rejected even though they had called for a larger reduction of armed forces and armaments than the one-third reduction called for by the USSR. In that connexion, it would be useful to explain that the three-Power proposals actually provided for reduction of air and naval, as well as land forces, despite the claims of the USSR representatives to the contrary. The Soviet Union representative had alleged some sort of subterfuge to maintain the superiority of the Western Powers, in air and naval forces, while curtailing the land forces of the Soviet Union. Paragraphs 520 and 568 of the Commission's second report (DC/20) showed clearly

² See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, No. 2.*

that the proposals included all types of armed forces, including naval and air, thereby refuting the Soviet Union allegation.

37. Contrary to another allegation by the Soviet Union representative, the questions asked by the Soviet Union in the Disarmament Commission had been answered as clearly and categorically as possible. The Soviet Union representative had acted as if such answers had never been given.

38. Mr. Hoppenot then recalled a proposal made by Mr. Moch, the French representative at the 16th meeting of the Disarmament Commission on 24 June 1952. It was an attempt to tackle the problem from another angle, a compromise between the views of those who wanted limitation or prohibition to commence only when disclosure operations had been completed and the views of those who advocated the reverse. It was a proposal that the sequence of implementation and dovetailing of decisions and achievements should be interdependent. It attempted to meet the Soviet Union objections to the effect that there should be simultaneity and no waiting for the completion of one stage before passing on to another. The French proposal had also been rejected.

39. Moreover none of those proposals was immutable or definitive; they constituted, not final achievements but a starting-point, to be examined in good faith.

40. The Disarmament Commission had weighed all possibilities for a solution and had done its best to dispel all misgivings and obstacles to an understanding. If no good results were achieved, it was due to the lack of the minimum of indispensable good will on the part of the USSR, which persevered in pressing for the adoption of proposals already rejected by the United Nations, such as the prohibition of the atomic weapon prior to the institution of control and the reduction of the armaments of the major Powers by one-third. Moreover, the Soviet Union had not made any new proposals on control.

41. While there was no immediate prospect of agreement, the political situation was in a state of flux and there was hope of conciliation. Moreover, there was no contradiction between the current rearmament of certain Powers and the efforts which were being made to reach agreement on a general disarmament scheme. The situation, nevertheless, required speedy action, particularly in the atomic field, lest it become virtually impossible to discover stockpiles of fissionable materials that had been concealed. Further delay meant a further increase in the stockpiles of arms and greater technical and political difficulty in effecting disarmament.

42. Since disarmament was the primordial condition for the restoration of confidence among peoples as well as the consolidation of peace, every effort at conciliation should be made on both sides.

43. Mr. Hoppenot felt that the recent words of the Soviet Premier, Mr. Malenkov, were meaningful and he hoped that when the Disarmament Commission resumed its meetings, the Soviet Union representative would take a conciliatory step and help the Commission to make some progress in its work.

44. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that the task of the Disarmament Commission was to prepare proposals for the reduction

of armed forces and armaments and for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, it was entrusted with the task of working out measures for the institution of effective international control over atomic energy to ensure the observance of the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

45. However, the Disarmament Commission had failed to achieve concrete results because it had followed the false path advocated by the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, who had managed to bury the concrete proposals of the Soviet Union. The records of the Commission demonstrated that the efforts had been focused on legalizing and justifying the continuing growth of armament levels, while enabling the United States to increase its stockpile of atomic weapons.

46. The United States proposals in essence constituted an attempt to substitute for the solution of the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments empty proposals for the collection of information on armaments. The United States proposals were similar to those made previously, containing no measures for the prohibition of the atomic weapon. That was evident from the recent speech of the United States representative, Mr. Gross (577th meeting), which was designed merely to delude world public opinion and shift the blame for the failure of the Disarmament Commission to the USSR. Similar invalid statements had been made by the other members of the Committee reiterating that point. Nor did the French plan, defended by the French representative a few moments previously as a compromise plan, differ from the United States proposal. It also focused attention on the question of the disclosure and verification of information on armaments. Both plans were designed to replace the fundamental question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments by the question of supplying information on armaments. Neither called for the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

47. In contrast, the USSR proposal sought to bring about an effective solution of those important problems, in accordance with the idea that the Disarmament Commission should begin with the reduction of armaments of the five major Powers in addition to the prohibition of the atomic weapons, the reduction of armaments and the submission of information on armaments. The USSR proposal called for the consideration of the question of the violation of the prohibition of germ warfare and the impermissibility of the use of bacterial weapons or germ warfare, the elaboration of measures for the implementation of the decisions taken, the creation of an international organ within the framework of the Security Council and the institution of inspection on a continuing basis without the right of intervention in the internal affairs of States.

48. The Soviet Union policy, as evidenced also by a statement made by Generalissimo Stalin to the correspondent of *Pravda* on 7 October 1951, was clearly bent on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of armaments.

49. Feverishly girding for war, the United States was unwilling to consider those real measures for the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Rather it was in-

creasing its stockpile of atomic bombs and creating new forms of nuclear weapons to be utilized in a new world war.

50. In seeking to represent his country as a champion of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the representative of the United States was really spreading a verbal smoke-screen to hoodwink the peoples of the world, in order to sabotage the adoption of any concrete decision for the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Numerous articles in the American Press, as well as declarations by statesmen of the United States confirmed that the United States was piling up atomic weapons. The fact was also confirmed by the American budget. At the same time the United States was doing everything in its power to prevent, through its automatic majority in the Commission, any prohibition of the atomic weapon. That was understandable because the tremendous atomic industry meant profits for the United States monopolies.

51. Furthermore, a proposal contained in the so-called working paper presented by the representative of the United Kingdom on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and France suggested the institution of numerical limitations on the armed forces of the five major Powers. In that proposal the question of the level of armaments was viewed as a question of increasing, rather than decreasing, the armaments of the Western Powers, on the grounds that their armed forces and armaments had not reached the maximum level or ceiling. The proposed numerical limitations were in reality designed to maintain the inflated levels of their armaments and armed forces.

52. The Soviet Union representative, Mr. Malik, on 10 June 1952³, had pressed the point that the ceilings proposed by the Western Powers had been set arbitrarily in disregard of factors of population and territory. The criteria had constituted a double standard for the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, on the one hand, and the three Western Powers on the other. Moreover, there was no reference to the number of naval and air forces and to the liquidation of military bases of the Western Powers in foreign territories. The position of the three Western Powers was not at all altered by the supplementary proposal submitted by the representative of the United States, Mr. Cohen, on 12 August 1952⁴. Citing additional figures, demonstrating the military preparations of the United States, Mr. Kiselyov asserted that the representatives of the USSR had already unmasked the true purposes of United States diplomacy. The truth of the matter was that the United States proposal contained nothing new and merely insisted on submission of information on armaments by stages, starting with the most inconsequential information relating to the least important and least secret types of weapons and ending up with the most important and secret categories of armaments.

³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 14th and 15th meetings.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18th meeting.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 24th meeting

53. Furthermore, the transition from one stage to another with respect to the submission of information had been made dependent on the arbitrary whim of a number of States. The United States and the other members of the aggressive military blocs which constituted a majority in the United Nations, were evidently capable of preventing the transition from one stage to another, if their interests so required. Moreover, since atomic and other weapons of mass destruction were the most significant and secret weapons, their consideration might be prevented by a decision of the automatic majority. It was that same majority, for example, which had rejected the USSR proposals in the Disarmament Commission on 27 August 1952⁵ to consider the questions of the violation of the prohibition of germ warfare, the inadmissibility of the utilization of bacterial weapons and the calling to account of violators of the agreement to prohibit germ warfare. The position of those delegations in the Commission was tantamount to preventing the prohibition of the bacterial weapons. Three members of the Commission, in an effort to cover up their refusal to adopt the Soviet Union proposal, had submitted an amendment to the work plan of the Disarmament Commission which made a reference to bacterial weapons.⁵ Moreover, the amendment aimed at covering up the refusal of the United States Government to ratify the Geneva Protocol and to abide by the international standards which banned the use of germ weapons.

54. The Soviet Union proposal constituted a shining contrast to such attitudes and provided for a successful solution of the pending problems. The people of the Soviet Union were engaged in peaceful constructive labour. They had never threatened anybody, nor did they intend to do so. The tremendous economic projects taken up in the Soviet Union meant the investing of great sums in peaceful development. If the Soviet Union had been preparing for war, as the Western Powers slanderously alleged, how would it be able to carry out those gigantic peaceful construction projects? It was not possible to carry out those projects and at the same time to expand military industry and increase the armed forces without incurring the risk of bankruptcy. The purpose of the monstrous slander against the Soviet Union was to delude the people of the whole world in order to drag them into war.

55. Quoting from the speech made by the Premier of the USSR, Mr. Malenkov, on 9 March 1953, stating the peaceful intentions of the USSR, Mr. Kiselyov declared that his delegation had persistently supported all sincere and genuine proposals for peace and security. He endorsed whole-heartedly the USSR draft resolution, which would enable the First Committee to discharge its responsibilities and to meet the aspirations and the yearnings of the peoples of the whole world for peace and security. Since, on the other hand, the fourteen-Power draft resolution did not meet the needs of the situation, he would vote against it.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.