



C O N T E N T S

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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2127, A/2226 and A/C.1/L.30)

[Item 17]*

1. The CHAIRMAN wished to remind the Committee, before it went on to consider item 17 of its agenda, that the General Assembly had established the Disarmament Commission by its resolution 502 (VI), of 11 January 1952. On 29 May 1952, the Commission had submitted an interim report (DC/11) to the Security Council, addressed to the Secretary-General under the symbol A/2127, which had been followed by a second, comprehensive report (DC/20), addressed to the Secretary-General under the symbol A/2226. That second report had been submitted to the First Committee for consideration.

2. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) said that living in a world where armed aggression was being employed as an instrument of national policy, the problem of first priority was to deal vigorously with the aggression in Korea. That issue, involving the life and death of men on the battlefield, cast black shadows on all other pressing problems. The purpose of the United States, in the face of all that, was to continue its determined efforts to preserve and expand free institutions and individual liberties. It might seem foolish to some to continue to work for disarmament at a time when the free world was compelled to devote a major part of its energies and resources to building up strength to protect freedom. The United States delegation was unable to share that view, because it felt that as the means of waging war became more and more deadly, disarmament became a vital condition of peace. Moreover, the efforts made towards that end constituted proof that the American people desired peace.

3. The Soviet Union obstruction to the Disarmament Commission's work revealed conflicting attitudes towards peace and a fundamental difference in the

interpretation given to the word "peace". The USSR Government, under its past and current leadership, had talked a good deal about peace. The United States hoped that the word "peace" was used in Mr. Malenkov's recent address as it was understood in the rest of the world. That could be tested by deeds in many ways, among which disarmament was one of the clearest.

4. In the circumstances, it seemed proper to ask the representative of the Soviet Union two questions, on which the considered reply of his Government would be preferred: first, whether the time had come when the USSR was ready for a constructive discussion of the disarmament question, which the Charter recognized as so important for the attainment of conditions of peace; and secondly, whether the USSR representative was prepared to negotiate with his colleagues in the United Nations forum in order to give tangible form to what the rulers of the Soviet Union claimed to be their tried and tested policy of peace. That was a challenge which the Soviet Union should recognize as a renewed suggestion to it to mediate in good faith with respect to disarmament. An effective system of disarmament would provide the best insurance against aggression anywhere by anyone since it would remove the armed strength which made aggression possible.

5. A review of the essential principles underlying the honest and practical proposals of the United States showed that considerable progress could be made in the field of disarmament if agreement could be reached on the basic factors in a programme of action. Some of those essential factors had been approved by the General Assembly, which had decided, in its resolution 502 (VI), that plans for disarmament should be worked out with a view to the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. Those plans were to make possible the elimination of all major weapons of mass destruction and provide for effective international regulation and control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes. In addition, a genuine system of disarmament had to include all types of armed

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

forces and armaments. Such a system had to be accepted by all nations whose military resources were such that their failure to accept might endanger its application, and it would have to include safeguards by all such nations to ensure compliance.

6. Although the adoption of those principles was a good start, there were certain additional principles which, it was felt, had to underlie any programme. Those had been introduced in the Disarmament Commission on 24 April 1952. The United States delegation had pointed out that the goal of disarmament was not merely to regulate armaments, but to prevent war. All nations, and most particularly aggressive States, had to be divested of the temptation afforded by the material means of waging war; that could be accomplished only as a result of the co-operation of all nations in establishing an open and substantially disarmed world in which armed forces and armaments would be so low as to be insufficient to start a war, and in which no State could prepare for war without the knowledge of others.

7. Furthermore, the kind of international agreements required to achieve disarmament should be kept in mind. The Soviet Union had a certain superiority both of arms and of armaments in many fields, which in itself was dangerous to international peace and security. Any disarmament programme should take account of that fact if it was to avoid, at any of its stages, an unequal balance of strength which would jeopardize peace. That was one of the concerns of the United States delegation, whose programme nevertheless called for a drastic reduction of national armaments and the total elimination of mass armies and other instruments of mass destruction, including atomic and bacterial weapons. Such a full and co-ordinated programme, balanced throughout in order to avoid tilting the scales against peace, was essential. The United States insisted that any programme had to be fair to all countries, to the free world as well as to the Soviet Union. In contrast, the USSR representative was insisting on a programme which would have the effect of upsetting the balance of armed strength and of leaving the free world helpless to resist Soviet aggression while the programme was being carried out. Such a plan would actually constitute an incentive to aggression rather than a deterrent.

8. The General Assembly's resolution had instructed the Disarmament Commission to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification concerning all armed forces and armaments. The Assembly had recognized that as an essential first step. It simply meant telling the truth and furnishing proof that it was the truth. On 5 April 1952, the United States had submitted specific proposals on that matter. Such disclosure and verification of information was not a substitute for disarmament, but only a first step. It should be progressive because, given the prevailing world tension, it would not be possible for States to disclose their most secret weapons and military installations at the outset. For that reason, the United States delegation had considered it wiser, in order to expedite matters, to proceed from the less secret to the more secret, pending the development of a more favourable spirit of co-operation and because less secret information was easier to verify.

9. Notwithstanding that line of reasoning, the United States delegation had not hesitated from the outset to suggest a very sizeable disclosure in the first stage so that governments should be enabled to have a clear, though general, indication of the existing atomic strength of all other States as well as the strength of armed forces and non-atomic armaments. Completion of that stage would inspire international confidence and contribute much to international peace and security. In making those proposals, the United States had emphasized that they were not final or unchangeable, but merely intended as a starting point for discussions in good faith and would be fair to all States, without risk to their safety or security.

10. In May 1952, the United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, had submitted proposals, reproduced in part IV, section B of the report, for the fixing of numerical ceilings on the armed forces of all States. The three Powers had emphasized that limiting the numbers of armed forces was only part of the task and that it was essential, for example, also to limit the types and quantities of armaments to be authorized for whatever armed forces were permitted. At the same time, even a tentative agreement on numerical ceilings would greatly facilitate agreement on other fundamental points. The proposals were for equal maximum ceilings for the United States, the USSR, and China, of between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000; for the United Kingdom and France, equally, between 700,000 and 800,000. For all other States with substantial armed forces, a maximum related to that to be agreed upon by the five major Powers and normally less than 1 per cent of the population, and less than current levels. The system suggested differed substantially from the plan of the Soviet Union, which provided for an arbitrary reduction by one-third as compared with unknown existing levels. It would mean, in practice, a reduction of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union considerably more drastic than that called for by the USSR Government. It should be added that the United States system proposed balanced ceilings which would eliminate the fear on the part of any of the five major Powers of attack by others. It would be applicable to all States with appreciable numbers of armed forces, while the USSR proposals would affect only the five major Powers.

11. In connexion with the control of atomic energy, the General Assembly had suggested, in its resolution 502 (VI), that, unless a better or no less effective system were devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as a basis for such international control, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and for ensuring the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. In the light of that resolution, the United States delegation had continued to support the United Nations plan drawn up by the Atomic Energy Commission, reaffirming its willingness to examine seriously any other proposals which might be submitted in that connexion.

12. The United States proposals for the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments, which expressly provided for the disclosure of atomic armaments, had been a new element. The disclosure and verification system was not enough in itself to protect the world against the danger of violation of agreements

to eliminate atomic weapons. But it was impossible to contemplate an effective system for controlling atomic energy which did not include the disclosure and verification of the installations and weapons concerned.

13. The Government of the Soviet Union had so far rejected proposals submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom and France for an effective system of disclosure and verification. It had refused to clarify the meaning and scope of its own proposals. It had been silent about the kind of international inspection which would not be subject to veto by the Soviet Union in its application. As long as such an attitude persisted, there seemed to be little point in pursuing the discussion on control measures.

14. The United States delegation had submitted proposals the purposes of which were to eliminate bacterial weapons from national armaments, which would also bring that particular item within the context of the broader problem of disarmament.

15. To put it briefly, it should be noted that the United States proposals had covered the topics essential to an effective disarmament programme. Those suggestions did not represent a detailed programme but they had nevertheless constituted sincere and constructive efforts to remove the causes of international tension. All members of the Disarmament Commission, with the exception of the Soviet Union, had welcomed them. They had not endorsed them in their entirety; some of their aspects had been criticized; suggestions had been made to improve them. Yet all the members had recognized the genuine effort to break the vicious circle which involved a constant increase in all armed establishments.

16. The Soviet Union alone, among all the members of the Commission, had rejected those efforts to secure sincere international co-operation in effecting disarmament. Bringing up irrelevancies, the USSR delegation had sought by every means to prevent the Disarmament Commission from carrying out its duties. There had been nothing new in that procedure. The Commission to investigate conditions for free elections in Germany had suffered the consequences of similar obstructionist tactics, which had been repeated in connexion with the Austrian peace treaty. Nor had the Soviet Union stopped there. As a response to the sincere proposal for disarmament, the USSR representative, at the same meeting, had invented a new and false charge against the United States, namely that it was waging bacterial warfare in Korea. All the members of the Commission had immediately protested against the charge which, in their view, was intended merely to poison the atmosphere of the Commission and to prevent progress.

17. Another example of the tactics of the Soviet Union had occurred when, as if boasting of its contempt for the Commission, the USSR delegation had proposed the so-called plan of work which contained the same old proposals it had already submitted on many past occasions and which had always been rejected by the General Assembly. Far from being a plan of work, it had been an ultimatum, because, had the suggestions made by the Soviet Union been accepted, the Disarmament Commission would have been able to consider only the Soviet Union's proposals.

18. The plan had been presented in slightly different words, but the members of the Commission had vainly

tried to understand what the representative of the Soviet Union meant by proposing, for example, inspection on a continuing basis without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States. When asked repeatedly to clarify its proposal, the USSR delegation had replied that it was a little game of questions and answers of no interest and had added that, unless the United Nations plan for controlling atomic energy was withdrawn, there was no need for it to give any details about its own plan.

19. Despite that attitude the efforts must be continued. The free world must understand the issues involved and establish, by its moral unity and assembled might, the best foundation for peace. The United States delegation had therefore joined with a number of other States in submitting to the First Committee a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.30) recommending that the Disarmament Commission should continue its work and submit, to the General Assembly, a report before 1 September 1953. It was for the General Assembly to reaffirm its wish that constructive proposals should be submitted to the Disarmament Commission.

20. Under the Charter all the States of the world had undertaken to refrain, in their international relations, from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of other States. The United States reaffirmed the promise not to use force except in the general interest. Such a promise was a commitment not merely to avoid the use of specific weapons but to refrain from the use of force in any form contrary to the Charter. The United States delegation therefore intended loyally to support the Disarmament Commission's work and hopefully awaited the day when the blind forces which prevented the Commission from working would realize their mistake.

21. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) said that the Disarmament Commission's report was not a synthetic description of the results of the Commission's work and that it would therefore be useful to take stock of them summarily.

22. The General Assembly, in its resolution 502 (VI), had directed the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals concerning the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. The proposals were to provide for the international control of atomic energy with a view to ensuring the prohibition of atomic weapons. In the same resolution, the General Assembly had made plans for a system of guaranteed disarmament which was to include progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic weapons. Such verification, in addition, was to be based on international inspection to ensure the accuracy of the information. It had recognized that implementation of the disclosure and verification was a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme. In working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces, the Commission was directed to determine over-all limits and restrictions. It was to consider methods according to which States could agree upon the limits and the allocation within their respective military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments. There was to be an adequate system

of safeguards, so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations of the disarmament programme, while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country.

23. In accordance with those terms of reference, four proposals had been submitted to the Commission, either individually or jointly, by the United States, France and the United Kingdom. The United States had submitted a proposal concerning the progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of armed forces and armaments. The proposal had suggested a detailed plan in five stages and had stated the object of each stage. A second United States proposal had been designed to determine the essential principles of a disarmament programme. A third proposal had been submitted jointly by the three delegations, which had provided for the numerical limitation of all armed forces and their division into broad categories (air, land and naval forces). Lastly, the French representative had submitted a proposal outlining a preliminary draft treaty, which was to dovetail, according to a pre-established sequence, the operations relating to disclosure on the one hand and, on the other, operations relating to the limitation of armaments and armed forces and to the prohibition of atomic weapons. It had thus represented a compromise between those wishing to give priority to the former and those wishing to give priority to the latter.

24. The USSR delegation, on the other hand, had confined itself to maintaining, unchanged, its old proposal which called, essentially, for the absolute prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction by one-third, within one year, of the armaments and armed forces of the five major Powers. That summary formula had been submitted by the USSR every year and rejected each time by the Assembly, which considered it inadequate. It was true that the Soviet Union had admitted that international control of the prohibition of the atomic weapon should enter into force at the same time as the prohibition and should be carried out by means of inspection on a continuing basis. However, it had abstained from giving the necessary explanations concerning inspection on a continuing basis and had confined itself to repeating that the inspection authority would not have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of States, which was tantamount to rendering the control illusory. It was perhaps worth recalling in that connexion that General Assembly resolution 502 (VI), in recommending that the interference in the internal life of each country should be restricted to a minimum, necessarily implied a certain degree of interference.

25. While failing to make any positive contribution to the Commission's proceedings, the USSR delegation had raised objections to the proposals of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. To the United States proposal concerning the disclosure and verification of armaments and armed forces according to a five-phase plan, the Soviet Union had objected that it would defer to the end of the programme the disclosure of information on atomic weapons. According to the USSR delegation, that would have enabled the United States to refrain from disclosing its atomic secrets while obtaining information on the armaments of other States. Answering that objection, the United States delegation had made it clear that the disclosure

and verification would have to be completed within approximately two years. It had also stated that no priority would be given to the disclosure of conventional armaments as against that of atomic and other secret weapons. The information disclosed on atomic weapons during a given stage was to be commensurate with the information furnished on conventional armaments. The representative of France, for his part, in an effort to reach a compromise, suggested that the five stages proposed in the United States plan should be reduced to three.

26. Those statements had not weakened the opposition of the Soviet Union delegation, which had raised another objection, alleging that the effect of the United States plan would be to delay the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. In order to meet that objection, the United States, in its proposal on the essential principles of a disarmament programme, had included the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, in their joint proposals the United States, French and United Kingdom delegations had made concrete statements on the nature of the reduction of armed forces, by indicating the maximum permitted figure for armed forces. Lastly, the French proposal for dovetailing the disclosure and limitation or prohibition of armaments provided that each phase of disclosure would be followed by a concrete measure of limitation, reduction and prohibition. Thus it seemed clear that the basic objections of the Soviet Union to the plan for disclosure and verification had largely been taken into consideration in subsequent proposals.

27. The USSR delegation had objected to the essential principles of the disarmament programme presented by the United States delegation on the ground that they were no more than paper decisions. That objection had been refuted by the concrete three-Power proposal concerning the numerical limitation of armed forces. According to that proposal, the United States, the USSR and China were to have forces of 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men, France and the United Kingdom having between 700,000 and 800,000; the strengths of the other States would normally be less than 1 per cent of their population. Those figures had been established in such a way as to avoid any unequal distribution of power.

28. The Soviet Union delegation had alleged that the proposed ceilings would have relieved France and the United Kingdom of the obligation to reduce their armed forces. That objection was not valid for the United Kingdom because, on the basis of the evaluations made by the Soviet Union itself, the reduction would be of one-third. Moreover, if the claim made by the Soviet Union that the forces of the three Western Powers should be considered as a whole were taken into account, the objection did not hold, because the reduction which would have been obtained by adopting the proposed limits would have been greater than that which would have resulted from the adoption of the Soviet Union proposal to reduce armaments by one-third.

29. The USSR had further contended that the proposed ceilings, being applied to the armed forces as a whole, would leave States free to augment their air and naval forces. The three delegations had replied to

that objection by submitting an important addition to their initial proposals to the effect that the distribution of armed forces between the three main categories (air, land and naval forces) should be the subject of negotiation between the five major Powers.

30. Lastly, the USSR delegation had held that the setting of numerical ceilings would be an incomplete measure unless accompanied by a decision concerning the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The three delegations, in their supplementary proposals, had replied to that objection by indicating that the initial limitations and reductions of their armed forces would have to be carried on *pari passu* with those of permitted armaments and with measures for the elimination of non-permitted armaments. Subsequent limitations and reductions would be synchronized with the stages reached in the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

31. From the foregoing appraisal it was clear that useful contributions had been made to the study of the disarmament problem by the delegations of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Those contributions were, first, the proposals concerning the progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of armed forces and armaments which, in accordance with the directions given to the Commission, were to be the first and indispensable stage, and secondly, the proposals concerning the numerical limitation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Those proposals, which provided a concrete and reasonable basis for negotiation, were based on the principle of balanced forces, which, in the existing circumstances, was the only way of reconciling the reduction of armaments with security requirements.

32. While the Commission had made some progress with regard to the study of the essential elements of the disarmament problem, its discussions had not revealed any prospect of agreement. The USSR delegation had obstinately maintained its summary proposal according to which disarmament was to take the form of a simple one-third reduction of armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons. It was almost incredible that that should be the only contribution it was prepared to make to the study of disarmament, for the inevitable conclusion was that the only disarmament it accepted was that which would secure its own preponderance. In any case, the work of the Commission would not have been in vain, for even if in the future it were to achieve nothing, its proceedings would at least have shown where the responsibility lay.

33. Mr. DE SOUZA GOMES (Brazil) recalled that the General Assembly had established the general principles of disarmament by its resolutions 1 (I) of 24 January 1946 and 41 (I) of 14 December of the same year. The first of those resolutions, relating to atomic weapons, had established the principle of the need for the control of atomic energy, the elimination of atomic weapons and the establishment of a system of effective safeguards. The second resolution, relating to the regulation and reduction of armaments, had recommended a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces, stressing the need for a system of practical and effective safeguards with the aim of promoting international peace within the framework

of collective security. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments established under those resolutions had carried out technical studies and achieved some progress in the matter, but had not been able to reach conclusions acceptable to the five permanent members of the Security Council.

34. Nevertheless, by its resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948 the General Assembly had approved the general findings of the Atomic Energy Commission relating to the establishment of an effective system for the international control of atomic energy. Unfortunately, that plan, which had become the United Nations plan, had not succeeded in gaining the acceptance of the USSR, which had demanded an immediate decision on the unconditional prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and had not put forward any workable system of guarantees.

35. With regard to conventional armaments, the General Assembly, in its resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948, had noted that it was impossible to reach agreement so long as there was a lack of exact and authenticated information on the current state of the armed forces of all countries.

36. In view of the dead-lock reached in the work of the two Commissions, the General Assembly, by its resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, had established the Disarmament Commission to discharge the task formerly assigned to the two Commissions.

37. The Brazilian delegation had had the opportunity to take part in the work of various bodies responsible for dealing with the disarmament question. On all occasions, and particularly as a member of the Disarmament Commission, it had displayed a spirit of loyal co-operation. Disarmament could obviously not be obtained without a minimum of agreement on essential points among the major Powers. Clearly, however, disarmament affected the other States also. The Brazilian delegation had therefore supported every effort made in the Disarmament Commission to bring about the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces.

38. Unfortunately, the Commission's report showed that it was not ready to reach agreement. It contained no recommendation and merely described the discussions that had taken place. The USSR delegation had opposed all the constructive proposals that had been made, using the Commission as a sounding-board for its propaganda and attempting to secure the acceptance of its own disarmament plan without making any concession and without providing any satisfactory explanation of its own inspection system. The USSR representative had not shown any spirit of conciliation. On the contrary, he had made all agreement impossible, both on specific questions and on general principles. Thus, the Brazilian representative had been led to state in the Disarmament Commission that, while the Western Powers had placed the discussion of disarmament on a relative basis, the USSR delegation had aimed immediately at absolute goals, perhaps in the knowledge that such goals were not attainable. Furthermore, the Soviet Union delegation had introduced into the discussion matters which were outside the Commission's terms of reference, and had made slanderous charges against the Unified Command in

Korea regarding the alleged use of bacterial weapons by the United Nations forces.

39. The Brazilian delegation was of the opinion that in spite of the discouraging results obtained by the Commission, the General Assembly should urge it to continue its work. Progress in that matter was obviously connected with non-technical factors outside the Commission's control. The armaments race was the result of international mistrust and insecurity. The increased military effort which it had entailed, however, was likely still further to increase that mistrust and insecurity. If the vicious circle was to be broken, the causes and symptoms of the current world crisis would have to be attacked simultaneously. The General Assembly should concern itself with the general principles of co-operation in political affairs. So far as disarmament was concerned, it should take note of the constructive proposals that had been put forward by various delegations to the Disarmament Commission and request the Commission to continue its efforts to reach at least some measure of agreement before the next session of the Assembly.

40. The Brazilian delegation had therefore joined other delegations in submitting the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.30). It did not seem that a protracted debate on the proposals made in the Disarmament Commission would serve any useful purpose. It might be hoped, on the other hand, that the Commission's third report would represent a step forward on the path which would eventually lead to a world genuinely disarmed within the framework of collective security.

41. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) recalled that the Disarmament Commission had been established by resolution 502 (VI). Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of that resolution defined the Commission's terms of reference. The Commission was to prepare proposals for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and for effective international control of atomic energy. In entrusting that task to the Commission, the United Nations had been attempting to translate into deeds obligations assumed under the Charter—the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and the obligation to study the general principles of disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

42. The fourteen-Power draft resolution merely asked that the Assembly should take note of the Disarmament Commission's report, commend the initiative of members of the Commission who had submitted constructive proposals, reaffirm resolution 502 (VI) and request the Disarmament Commission to continue its work. The draft resolution emphasized in appropriate terms the determination of the United Nations to reduce armaments to such levels as to avert the threat of war.

43. The Disarmament Commission had held twenty-six meetings in 1952. At its eighth meeting it had adopted a programme of work providing for the disclosure and verification of armaments and armed forces, including atomic armaments, the regulation of armaments and armed forces, and a procedure and timetable for giving effect to the disarmament programme. Subsequently, the Commission had discussed the pro-

posals of the United States of America on the progressive and continuing verification of armaments and armed forces and on essential principles for a disarmament programme. Although the great majority of the members of the Commission had supported those proposals, it had unfortunately been impossible to reach unanimous agreement. Lastly, the Commission had discussed the proposals submitted jointly by the delegations of the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom concerning numerical limits on the armaments and armed forces of the various States. In that connexion, he read paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the proposals (DC/10) in order to demonstrate their essential nature.

44. The authors of the proposals had pointed out that they did not regard them as final and perfect. During the discussions, questions had been raised and numerous explanations provided. Subsequently, the three Powers had even submitted a supplement to their proposals. Nevertheless, the USSR delegation had maintained the attitude it had adopted at the sixth session of the General Assembly and had presented to the Commission a plan providing for a one-third reduction in the armed forces of the major Powers and the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons. The reduction of all armed forces by one-third would be of no significance, for it would tend to perpetuate the existing lack of balance between the armed forces of the various countries. The principle of the immediate destruction of atomic weapons, on the other hand, took no account of the necessity for genuine and complete international control at the various stages in the process of manufacturing atomic energy.

45. The Turkish delegation, which was anxious to avoid the repetition in the First Committee of the discussions that had taken place in the Disarmament Commission, did not think anything could be gained by more detailed consideration of the Commission's report. The importance of the task assigned to the Disarmament Commission was obvious to everyone. It was also clear that the difficulties involved were very great. The First Committee should therefore acknowledge that sincere efforts had been made, and allow the Disarmament Commission to continue its work with a view to the submission to the next session of the Assembly of a report recording, it was to be hoped, some degree of progress. The Turkish delegation would therefore support the draft resolution submitted by the fourteen Powers.

46. Mr. DONS (Norway) recalled that at its sixth session, the General Assembly, acting under Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, had decided to merge the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments into a single body, the Disarmament Commission. That decision had been adopted after exhaustive discussion. The Norwegian delegation, which had taken an active part in the debate, had voted for resolution 502 (VI).

47. Actually, the reports of the Disarmament Commission currently before the First Committee could be regarded only as preliminary reports for the information of the General Assembly. They did not contain any proposals emanating from the Commission as such and they took the form, particularly the second report, of a mere record of meetings. The reports

provided difficult and discouraging reading. They indicated that, in spite of the twenty-six meetings that had been held, little or no progress had been made.

48. The representative of the Soviet Union in the Disarmament Commission had merely repeated declarations of a general nature, avoiding all discussion of concrete proposals and practical measures. He had not even given any clear explanation of his proposals such as would have enabled their precise implications to be established. Furthermore, the USSR representative had not displayed any willingness to engage in a serious consideration of the proposals made by other States. It could, however, be maintained that the incorporation of the various proposals within a general plan would make it easier for the USSR representative to grasp their general purport.

49. Although the second report was rather discouraging to read, the Norwegian delegation was of the opinion that there was no other course than to ask the Disarmament Commission to continue its work. Under its existing terms of reference, that body was perfectly competent to consider any new proposal likely to serve as the basis for an agreement. In the circumstances, it did not seem necessary to adopt at the current session any detailed resolution on the problem of disarmament. The Norwegian delegation would therefore vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.