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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (continued)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) was under consideration, the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 having been temporarily adjourned.
2. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) said that his delegation was strongly in favour of an immediate cessation of nuclear tests, and believed that the great Powers should solemnly undertake to ban such tests for ever. A General Assembly resolution calling upon them to do so would have great moral force as an expression of the sentiment of mankind, but it would not be sufficient to stop them from violating a voluntary moratorium whenever they felt such action to be necessary in the interests of national and collective security. What was essential, therefore, was a treaty establishing an international legal obligation. It was the desire of all peoples that there should be an immediate suspension of tests, and that that suspension should be given permanent form by the conclusion of a treaty providing for effective international control.
3. The recent nuclear test explosions had destroyed the trust which had existed between States. Unless that trust was re-established, no confidence could be placed in a cessation of tests, for any State which was prepared to violate a voluntary moratorium might also violate a contractual obligation.
4. The fact that its resolutions were not heeded did not relieve the Assembly of the duty to condemn acts which jeopardized the physical and mental well-being of others. If the nuclear Powers were able to confine

the dangerous effects of nuclear tests within their own frontiers, they would be responsible only to their nationals. But in fact such tests did not fall exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the State responsible, since they harmed the inhabitants of other countries also. They should be condemned by the international community, just as similar acts were punishable under the national law of all civilized countries. Indeed, the injured countries ought to have the right to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice. Article 36, paragraph 2 c, of the Court's Statute related to breaches of international obligations, and nuclear tests were a violation of the United Nations Charter which would not be justified by reference to the balance of military power or the requirements of national security. The danger of fall-out was the same whoever exploded the bomb which produced it.

5. The world stood at the threshold of a new era offering immense opportunities for good or evil. The production, stockpiling and testing of nuclear weapons must be stopped if they were not to destroy mankind. It was the duty of the General Assembly to give voice to the world-wide opposition to nuclear tests. Unfortunately, it lacked the material means to enforce its decisions, but it could and should proclaim the moral and legal standards by which the international conduct of States should be governed. In any event, negotiations on general disarmament would be inconceivable against the background of a nuclear test race. Clearly, such negotiations presupposed the prior suspension of tests, with guarantees against their renewal in the form of a treaty providing for adequate international control.

6. For those reasons, his delegation would vote in favour of the six-Power draft resolution, and in favour of the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294). It would also support the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.280).

7. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India), exercising his right of reply, said that he wished to refer to some of the comments made during the debate on the six-Power draft resolution, of which his delegation was a sponsor. It had been stated several times that all that India wanted was another uncontrolled moratorium; but such statements indicated a complete misunderstanding of his country's position. India stood for the complete cessation and prohibition of all kinds of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests by all Powers, whether carried out underground, under water, in the atmosphere or in outer space. That had been its position ever since the first atomic bombs had been dropped, and more particularly since 1954, when India had taken the initiative in the United Nations in seeking a clear expression of views against nuclear weapons tests. India had welcomed the voluntary moratorium, and had deplored the resumption of tests by the Soviet Union and the United States. The Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, had described the Soviet Union's explosion of a 50-megaton bomb as indefensible. Thus it was quite wrong

to accuse India of taking sides in the matter. The Indian Government represented 430 million people, whose interest it must safeguard; it was therefore gravely concerned about tests, whoever conducted them. It was for that reason that his delegation had voted in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1), even though it had objected to its being given priority.

8. It had been said that the tests were justified on the ground that a State was obliged to protect its own security. But the great Powers had an equal obligation not to endanger the rest of mankind. The only purpose of nuclear tests was to perfect weapons of war, and if a nuclear war took place, the earth might well become uninhabitable. Even if there was no war, the tests themselves, if continued indefinitely, would endanger the lives and well-being of millions of people. The argument that their purpose was to promote the security of mankind, therefore, could hardly be sustained.

9. The Soviet Union had regrettably not responded to the Assembly's appeal, in its resolution 1632 (XVI), not to conduct a 50-megaton test, and it had been said that in those circumstances it was not likely to heed another appeal, such as that in the six-Power draft resolution. But the Assembly could not remain silent in the face of the present drift towards disaster. More than one delegation had referred to the Indian Prime Minister's statement that the latest explosion had shaken confidence in the value of a moratorium. While that was so, it did not mean that no effort should be made to restore confidence by bringing about an immediate suspension of tests. There was little chance of concluding a treaty unless a truce was first established.

10. Doubt had been expressed about India's views concerning inspection and control. He therefore wished to state categorically that his country was in favour of an internationally binding agreement under effective international control; he recalled in that connexion that his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions 1252 (XIII), 1402 (XIV) and 1578 (XV). But any system of inspection and control would have to form part of a treaty, and could only be negotiated by the great Powers; it could not be imposed by the Assembly. There was therefore no place for detailed provisions on such a system in the draft resolution. Nevertheless, his delegation recognized the concern of some Latin American delegations that the need for control should be accepted as a principle in the draft resolution, and it would therefore support the seven-Power amendment, although it would prefer the proposed text to appear as the fourth rather than the third operative paragraph.

11. Several delegations had been dubious about the implications of the phrase "or general and complete disarmament" in operative paragraph 2 of the six-Power draft resolution, fearing that, since a treaty on general and complete disarmament might take years to negotiate, the effect of the draft resolution might be a perpetual uncontrolled moratorium. It was sufficient to read the draft resolution, however, to realize that its tone throughout was one of urgency. Operative paragraph 2 meant only that the sponsors did not mind whether an agreement banning tests was reached separately or as part of a treaty on disarmament, provided that it was concluded expeditiously and that tests were meanwhile suspended. The intention of the sponsors was that negotiations on the ces-

sation of tests, whatever form they took, should be treated as a matter of the highest priority.

12. As to the amendment submitted by Afghanistan (A/C.1/L.289/Rev.1), everyone shared that delegation's concern over the circumstances that had led to the resumption of tests; but however grave those circumstances might be, nothing could justify the resumption of tests, particularly since both the Soviet Union and the United States had stated that they already had sufficient stockpiles of weapons to destroy the world many times over. He hoped, therefore, that the Afghan representative would withdraw his amendment. If he did not, the Indian delegation would be obliged to vote against it.

13. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan), exercising his right of reply, observed that at the Committee's 1181st meeting the United Kingdom representative had said that he could not support the Afghan amendment because it might be interpreted as justifying the allegations made by some speakers about the circumstances which had led the Soviet Union to resume test explosions. The amendment, however, was not intended to put the blame for international tension on any one side: it merely expressed concern at the existence of such tension. If, moreover, the Western Powers were confident that they were not responsible, they should be able to support the amendment whole-heartedly. At the 1182nd meeting, the representative of Thailand had opposed the amendment on similar grounds. But no small country, such as Afghanistan, should or could provide justification for the actions of the great Powers. Afghanistan was entirely impartial. Objections of the same kind had been made by the United States representative at the 1183rd meeting; but again, the Afghan amendment had been misinterpreted. If there was no reason for deep concern over the circumstances prevailing in international relations, on what grounds did the United States Government reserve its right to resume tests in the atmosphere?

14. In reply to the Indian representative, he wished to point out that the Afghan amendment related to the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1). It must be considered in that context, and no intention should be attributed to it which was not implied in the draft resolution itself. He was surprised at the reactions it had evoked from various delegations, and was grateful to the representative of Cuba for his support, which he hoped would not be affected by the explanation just given that the amendment was not intended to be either in favour of or against any particular Power. In order to avoid any possibility of further misunderstanding, his delegation had revised the amendment to read:

"Deeply concerned over the international tension that has led the nuclear Powers to resume nuclear test explosions".

He hoped that in that form it would obtain the support at least of the small countries. If it was not adopted, his delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on the six-Power draft resolution.

15. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand), replying to the representative of Afghanistan, said that the Afghan amendment would not promote the attainment of the objective sought in the six-Power draft resolution. It was not force of circumstances but a deliberate decision which had led one of the parties to resume nuclear testing in violation of the moratorium.

16. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), replying to the representative of Afghanistan, said that the latest revision of the Afghan amendment made it even more objectionable to his delegation. Its expression of concern over the international tension that had led the nuclear Powers to resume nuclear test explosions represented precisely the Soviet position. It was in fact the Soviet Union which had created tension over the question of Berlin. On 30 August, when the Soviet Union had announced its intention to resume testing, the United States had been negotiating in good faith at Geneva. It was not "the nuclear Powers" but the Soviet Union alone which had resumed nuclear testing.

17. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) said that all the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution had shared the hope expressed by the Indian representative that the Afghan representative would withdraw his amendment. They found the second revision of that amendment which had just been submitted still unacceptable, and wished to submit a sub-amendment which would read:

"Deeply concerned over the decisions of the nuclear Powers to resume test explosions".

The sponsors of the draft resolution did not feel that "circumstances" or "tension" of any kind could justify the resumption of nuclear explosions.

18. The CHAIRMAN said that in accordance with precedent and with his powers under rule 129 of the rules of procedure, he would permit representatives to explain their votes before the voting on the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) was begun. He would limit statements to three minutes.

19. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that the six-Power draft resolution reflected his delegation's position that a moratorium should be established immediately and that while it was in effect the nuclear Powers should negotiate a treaty banning tests under an adequate system of control. He would therefore vote for the draft resolution, although he was dubious about the likelihood that it would be heeded.

20. He wished to express his delegation's regret that the Soviet Union had exploded a 50-megaton bomb despite the appeal addressed to it by the General Assembly.

21. Mr. AUGUSTE (Haiti) said that the Soviet Union's explosion of a 50-megaton bomb in defiance of the General Assembly proved that a mere moratorium was not an adequate answer to the problem of nuclear testing. His delegation supported the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280), since only a treaty embodying international control could provide the necessary safeguards for a ban on testing. The Haitian delegation would abstain in the vote on other draft resolutions which failed to place emphasis on the need for a treaty.

22. Mr. IFEAGWU (Nigeria) said that his delegation would vote for the six-Power draft resolution and for the seven-Power amendment. The argument that there could be no suspension of testing until the conclusion of a formal treaty was the counsel of despair, for the continuance of the nuclear arms race would inevitably lead to the destruction of all that humanity had created over the centuries. At the same time, the suspension of testing was only the first essential step, and must be followed by a treaty banning tests under effective international control. His delegation recognized that

the ultimate goal must be general and complete disarmament; but if a solution of the problem of testing was delayed until that goal was achieved, the result would be the indefinite continuance of the nuclear arms race.

23. He wished to emphasize that, in the view of his delegation, the appeal to be ultimately adopted by the Committee should be regarded as directed to all the nuclear Powers, including France.

24. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) said that his delegation preferred the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution to the six-Power draft resolution, since there could be no solution of the problem of nuclear testing without a formal treaty embodying controls; a voluntary, uninspected moratorium would no longer be adequate to meet the situation. However, his delegation would abstain from the vote on the six-Power draft resolution, rather than vote against it, since it did not wish to suggest that a voluntary suspension of testing would make no contribution whatever to halting the nuclear arms race. It would vote for the seven-Power amendment and would vote against both the Afghan amendment and the Ghanaian sub-amendment to it.

25. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that his delegation would vote against the six-Power draft resolution, since now that the Soviet Union had resumed testing the other two major nuclear Powers could not be barred from taking necessary measures in their own defence. It was to be hoped that any future tests would be conducted underground or, if they were conducted in the atmosphere, on the smallest possible scale and only when absolutely necessary. The Soviet Union's explosion of a 50-megaton bomb, in disregard of the General Assembly, indicated that it could not be expected to observe such restrictions; however, recent statements by representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom indicated that those countries would do so. The early cessation of nuclear testing could best be achieved by means of an instrument embodying effective controls, rather than by a voluntary moratorium.

26. Mr. MARTINO (Italy) said that his delegation, while appreciating the motives which had prompted the introduction of the six-Power draft resolution, was unable to support it. Nuclear testing could be effectively halted only by an internationally controlled ban. An uncontrolled moratorium would merely force those nuclear Powers which had observed the earlier moratorium to accept unilaterally an obligation which would not be binding on all. It should also be noted, firstly, that the draft resolution made no reference to the fact that the original moratorium had been broken by one particular nuclear Power, and secondly, that it made no distinction between underground tests and the highly dangerous tests conducted in the atmosphere.

27. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) said that the six-Power draft resolution failed to take account of the changes which had occurred in the international situation since the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV), to which reference was made in its preamble. On the one hand, the Soviet Union had unilaterally resumed nuclear testing, in violation of the existing moratorium, and had said that it would refuse to continue negotiations on a test ban except within the larger context of general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom were prepared to resume

negotiations immediately for the conclusion of a treaty banning tests. His delegation could not support a moratorium which contained no safeguards to prevent a new violation by one of the nuclear Powers, to the grave detriment of the security interests of the Powers which carried out their undertakings. The Soviet Union's defiance of numerous General Assembly recommendations showed that the time for appeals was past and that the present grave situation could be dealt with only by means of a treaty banning nuclear tests under effective international control. For those reasons, his delegation could not support the six-Power draft resolution.

28. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) said that his delegation would abstain in the vote on the six-Power draft resolution, since only a legally binding treaty embodying effective controls could halt the testing of nuclear weapons. The resumption of testing by the Soviet Union, and, in particular, that country's explosion of a 50-megaton bomb despite the solemn appeal directed to it by the General Assembly, made it more apparent than ever that a moratorium could not provide an adequate solution to the problem. Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was weakened by the absence of any specific reference to a system of control and inspection. Furthermore, the reference to the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament had the effect of minimizing the urgent need for a separate test-ban treaty. The seven-Power amendment would serve to make the draft resolution more precise in that respect.

29. He wished to emphasize that his delegation's abstention from the vote should not be taken to indicate any lack of concern on the part of his Government and people at the danger presented by the biophysical and genetic effects of radio-active fall-out.

30. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) said that his delegation would vote for the six-Power draft resolution, since it was essential to halt nuclear tests notwithstanding the various considerations which had been cited to justify them. It would also vote for the seven-Power amendment, which would strengthen the draft resolution by emphasizing the need for a controlled test-ban treaty. It would, however, vote against both the Afghan amendment and the Ghanaian sub-amendment to it, since nothing could justify the resumption of nuclear testing.

31. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that his delegation would vote for the six-Power draft resolution, since it supported any measure which would help to bring about the cessation of nuclear testing. It would also vote for the seven-Power amendment, but not for the other amendments, which in its view would reduce the effectiveness of the draft resolution.

32. Mr. COLLIER (Sierra Leone) said that his delegation would vote for the six-Power draft resolution, since although Sierra Leone condemned the Soviet Union for resuming nuclear tests, it felt that action must be taken to halt testing by all countries. It had been argued that the Soviet Union had flouted General Assembly resolutions by resuming nuclear tests and that there was no guarantee that another moratorium would not also be violated. However, the Soviet Union's action was not the first case in which a General Assembly resolution had been disregarded, and it did not justify the Committee's refraining from taking a stand on the issue before it. While his delegation would be prepared to vote at some future time for the conclusion of a test-ban treaty, it felt that the most

urgent problem at present was that of suspending nuclear tests.

33. Mr. POPPER (United States of America) said that his delegation would vote against the six-Power draft resolution, and in particular against operative paragraph 2, since experience had shown that an uncontrolled moratorium on testing was not effective. It would also vote against the Afghan amendment and against the Ghanaian sub-amendment to it, but would vote for the seven-Power amendment, which substantially improved the draft resolution.

34. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation would be unable to support the six-Power draft resolution. It would vote for the Afghan amendment, which offered an objective assessment of the present situation. It would vote against the Ghanaian sub-amendment, whose effect was to destroy the meaning of the Afghan amendment. It would also vote against the seven-Power amendment, which would transform the draft resolution into an instrument of Western policy. If either the seven-Power amendment or the Ghanaian sub-amendment was adopted, or if the Afghan amendment was rejected, his delegation would vote against the draft resolution; otherwise, it would abstain from the vote.

35. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) appealed to the representative of Ghana to withdraw his sub-amendment to the Afghan amendment, and to the representative of Afghanistan to withdraw his revised amendment. If they pressed their texts, he would invoke rule 80 of the rules of procedure, which required that amendments should be introduced in writing and circulated to delegations before a vote was taken on them.

36. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) urged the representative of Liberia not to press his request. The effect of the Ghanaian sub-amendment to the Afghan amendment, as orally revised, was to remove an element to which certain representatives had objected, and, by its use of the word "decisions", to place the six-Power appeal once again on a purely humanitarian basis.

37. The CHAIRMAN, drawing attention to the third sentence of rule 80, ruled that the Ghanaian sub-amendment was in order.

38. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom) asked for a separate vote on the preamble as a whole and on each operative paragraph of the six-Power draft resolution.

39. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) asked for a roll-call vote on the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294) and for a separate vote on the phrase "or general and complete disarmament" in operative paragraph 2 of the six-Power draft resolution.

40. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) and the amendments to it. He put to the vote the Ghanaian oral amendment to the Afghan amendment, as orally revised.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

South Africa, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Sierra Leone.

Against: South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet