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**Chairman:** Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

*In the absence of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Enckell (Finland), Rapporteur, took the Chair.*

AGENDA ITEM 19

Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856, A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) (continued)

1. Mr. FERNANDEZ (Argentina) said that, despite the tension prevailing in the world, some recent events were encouraging: the parties principally concerned had repeatedly indicated their willingness to settle their differences by negotiation, the United States and the USSR had reached agreement on general principles for disarmament, and it had been decided to resume the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. The joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879) was of particular importance, and the General Assembly could endorse the principles enunciated in it.

2. The United Nations should urge the two sides to lose no time in resuming disarmament negotiations, which had unfortunately been interrupted. The first problem requiring solution was that of the composition of the negotiating body; the Committee had adopted a draft resolution dealing with that matter (A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1), which his delegation had unconditionally supported. It seemed to be acknowledged that the uncommitted countries must take part in the disarmament talks. The United States and the Soviet Union could reach agreement on those countries whose impartiality was beyond dispute and invite them to join them at the negotiating table. A solution of that type would have the advantage of being based on an agreement between the two great Powers. The United Kingdom representative had urged (1197th meeting) that the earliest possible start should be made, in an atmosphere free from propaganda, on practical negotiations which would produce a generally acceptable text. It was to be hoped that such a document would be brought before the Assembly; that would be one of the most tangible achievements of the present session. However, even if the Assembly should endorse the principles agreed upon by the United States and the USSR and if a body should be set up to consider them, it was essential to beware of easy optimism. Efforts to achieve disarmament had proved futile at a time when the great Powers had possessed only conventional weapons, and the task was even more difficult in the era of the hydrogen bomb.

3. The emergence of new weapons had transformed the traditional concept of defence. Today, States sought to deter a potential aggressor by threatening retaliation. In order to succeed in that effort, however, they had to engage in an endless arms race, since any technological lag might leave them at the mercy of the enemy. Thus, the destructive capacity of the nuclear Powers was increasing inexorably, with the result that a war might lead to the disappearance of the human race.

4. Only general and complete disarmament could put an end to that situation and bring international peace. However, there was wide disagreement on the question of control. The technical problems of disarmament were complicated by the fact that the opportunities for cheating had increased. One party would have only to succeed in hiding half a dozen nuclear bombs, together with the necessary means of delivering them, in order to secure a decisive military advantage. Hence, the problem of control could not be isolated from the objective sought at each stage of disarmament.

5. Disarmament must be a single, continuing process, and, if control was carried out on the basis of absolute equality, no State would have any reason to fear for its security. Under those circumstances, no one could reasonably oppose the application of control not only to disarmament measures but also to the armed forces and armaments available to the parties. To provide the proper safeguards, controls must be unconditional. However, an adamant attitude on that question might doom the negotiations to failure. The General Assembly should therefore urge the parties concerned to reach agreement on that decisive matter. Such agreement would require a minimum of mutual trust; hence, support should be given to any measure calculated to restore confidence. Stress should be laid in that connexion on the importance attaching to the resumption of talks on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

6. Disarmament was not an end in itself; it was only a means of ensuring peace among States and the well-being of peoples. In order to achieve those objectives, it would be necessary to establish international relations on new foundations, to abandon all policies of domination, to respect the legitimate interests of all countries, to wipe out the last vestiges of the colonial system and, above all, to promote world economic development. That was a tremendous but not an impossible task. As the President of the Argentine Republic had stated before the General Assembly on 27 September 1961 (1018th plenary meeting), it would be possible to achieve general, controlled disarmament only when tension and distrust between the great Powers had disappeared. The financial resources released as a result of the halting of the arms race could contribute to the economic expansion of the under-developed countries, and, if the international community took that path, the ideals of democracy and freedom would surely triumph.

7. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) was gratified that the United States and the Soviet Union had reached agreement on the principles to serve as the basis for disarmament negotiations. His delegation welcomed those principles and, in particular, the new ideas contained in the joint statement of the two great Powers (A/4879). The authors of the statement had done a great service to the cause of disarmament by stressing, in paragraph 7, the principle that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. There was a close connexion between the state of armaments and the state of international relations. Progress made in the solution of international problems would enhance the prospects for disarmament, while advance in the field of disarmament might make hitherto unmanageable political problems soluble.

8. Hence, as armaments were destroyed, machinery must be created for the peaceful settlement of disputes. For that the first requirement was to take advantage of existing provisions relating to the maintenance of peace, particularly Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, for there would be no purpose in adding new machinery if States were unwilling to utilize the machinery which already existed. It was therefore the primary duty of States to observe the Charter and, consequently, to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The calamitous risks which the resort to force entailed in the nuclear era made that an imperative necessity. That statement applied to local conflicts as well, for no one could be certain that such outbreaks would not spread and involve the nuclear Powers. In that connexion, an important means of promoting the rule of law was to support the valuable work undertaken by the International Law Commission in the codification of international law. Moreover, it would be worth while to re-examine all the United Nations machinery for the maintenance of peace and the pacific settlement of disputes. For that purpose, it might be useful to appoint a special committee which would submit proposals to the Disarmament Commission and to the negotiating body. The perfection of existing machinery was the best way in which to achieve peaceful international co-operation. That goal had been well defined in the statement transmitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR with his letter dated 22 September 1961 (A/4887). A new era should be initiated, with simultaneous advances in the fields of disarmament, peaceful settlement and international co-operation.

9. While making every effort towards the speediest possible establishment of conditions for the abolition of nuclear weapons, all precautions should be taken, so long as those arms existed, to prevent a nuclear war from breaking out by accidental or other means. An initial attempt had been made to find means of preventing surprise attack. Urgent steps should also be taken to prevent retaliatory action in the event of an accidental nuclear explosion. The nuclear Powers might agree to station on their territory international nuclear-accident inspection teams to investigate immediately the circumstances of such an explosion.

10. Some of the existing international situations were a source of dangerous tensions in that they accelerated the armaments race. For that reason the Foreign Minister of Israel had proposed in the General Assembly (1030th plenary meeting) that agreement should be sought on disarmament, with appropriate control, for specific zones of tension, particularly

the Middle East. An agreement of that kind could, for instance, save Africa from the armaments race and protect it from intervention by the great Powers. The Israel delegation would suggest that the proposal should be thoroughly studied by the negotiating body or by the special committees whose establishment had been proposed by the representative of Canada (1202nd meeting).

11. The eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) likewise provided for precautionary measures, since it was designed to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The application of those measures would require a closely-knit system of inspection and verification, as well as absolute reciprocity between all the non-nuclear Powers. The Israel Government would give that proposal the most careful consideration.

12. So far as the negotiating body was concerned, he stressed that it would be principally required to solve technical problems of control and must on no account be used for political manoeuvring. If the great Powers agreed to an expansion of the Ten-Nation Committee, the new members would have to be chosen for their achievements in the promotion of peace and pacific settlement. Those new members should have a long-standing tradition of spiritual and human values and be selected not only by virtue of their geographical situation, but also of their capacity to make a positive contribution to the negotiations. In any case, he hoped that mankind's awareness of its vulnerability and its longing to live in a peaceful world would spur on the disarmament negotiators to bring about a speedy solution.

13. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) noted with satisfaction that the great Powers had decided to resume negotiations on the suspension of nuclear tests. Although the question was part of the broader field of general and complete disarmament, it none the less presented special features which required that it should be considered with absolute priority and urgency. Nuclear tests represented not merely a potential but an immediate danger, by reason of the harmful effects of fall-out. That was why the unilateral breaking of the moratorium had provoked universal indignation. For that reason too, it was necessary to reach a speedy agreement on the prohibition and effective control of nuclear weapons tests. Furthermore, in the matter of nuclear tests the question of control must be viewed somewhat differently than in connexion with other aspects of disarmament, since nuclear tests required such large installations and produced such powerful effects that their control was considerably simplified. Thus the technical procedures had already been established and did not require the presence of numerous teams on foreign soil. In that respect it would be as well to establish an international control system which would permit the participation of countries other than the States directly concerned and which would therefore offer the best guarantees of efficiency and impartiality. He accordingly hoped that the negotiations which had just been resumed at Geneva would lead to the early conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests under effective control.

14. It was encouraging to note that the two main Powers had undertaken to consider jointly the question of the composition of the negotiating body. The Greek delegation hoped that the United States and the Soviet Union would soon reach agreement and that they would

take account of the wish expressed by the non-aligned countries to be represented on the negotiating body.

15. Control should apply not only to disarmament measures but also to existing armaments and the production of nuclear weapons; otherwise military potential might continue to grow since, although certain weapons might be destroyed, greater quantities might still be manufactured. It had been said that control over existing armaments would constitute legalized espionage and would consequently increase the dangers of war by enabling any one Power to make sure of its own military superiority. However, military superiority was not necessarily a decisive factor in aggression. During the years which had immediately followed the last world war, for example, the United States had enjoyed military superiority but had not committed aggression. Another Power which had, since that time, redressed the balance, need not fear an aggression which had not previously occurred. At all events, military inequality alone had never sufficed to set off a war, for war usually resulted from a political decision inspired either by fear or by the desire for conquest.

16. In accepting the principle of controlled disarmament, both sides would offer proof that fear had given way to trust and that neither harboured any thought of aggression. The risk of war, far from being increased, would thus be virtually eliminated. Moreover, the joint United States-Soviet Union statement (A/4879) recognized that disarmament should at no stage place any power in a specially advantageous position. That principle obviously could not be applied unless the means which might be used by any Power to obtain for itself some special advantage were subject to a control system.

17. The most effective guarantee against the fears that would inevitably arise, even under the most perfect disarmament plan, at various stages of implementation, especially in the matter of control, would be the parallel strengthening of the international bodies responsible for the maintenance of peace. The United States and the Soviet Union had already expressed the view that measures would be needed to safeguard the strengthening of peace during the various phases of disarmament. Those measures must include the establishment of a United Nations peace force, within an international system, for safeguarding every country's security. In that connexion, his delegation also agreed that it would be desirable to request the Secretary-General to submit his own ideas on the manner in which the United Nations should face up to its new responsibilities for, in a disarmed world, the Organization must obviously, by the express wish of its Members, gradually assume the responsibility for collective security. Various problems of procedure would necessarily have to be solved. For instance, the question was bound to arise whether the United Nations would be in a position, under the present system of prerogatives enjoyed by the permanent members of the Security Council, to take decisions with the requisite speed and impartiality to prevent a violation of the peace or to suppress aggression. Some safeguard would also perhaps be needed against the possibility that a United Nations action might be undertaken as a result of a decision by a narrow majority, desirous of promoting special interests.

18. In answer to the claim made by the Byelorussian representative at the preceding meeting that the countries allied to the United States were an American

reservoir of cannon-fodder and that the cost of maintaining a Greek soldier was only one-tenth that of maintaining an American soldier, he pointed out that the Byelorussian representative was placing too much reliance on the credulity of the Committee's members. However it might be, the Greek people had one advantage over the Byelorussian people: they could freely choose their allies, freely determine what the purposes of their alliances should be, and, in the last resort, freely break off those alliances if they so desired.

19. Mr. ZEA (Colombia) expressed satisfaction that negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests had been resumed. Success in those negotiations would be a significant step towards general and complete disarmament. The United States and the Soviet Union had also reached agreement on general principles for disarmament but differed widely in their views on how those principles should be applied. There was particular controversy about the composition of the negotiating body and the question of control.

20. Both parties had submitted plans for general and complete disarmament by stages (A/4891 and A/C.1/856); the measures the Soviet Union was advocating, however, were seemingly designed to wreck any chance of agreement. Moreover, the USSR Government drew a somewhat peculiar distinction between control of disarmament properly so called and control of retained armaments, which meant that the inspection bodies would have no means of verifying the military resources remaining at the disposal of States. Control over retained armaments was indispensable if disarmament was to be carried out in conditions of strict equality; otherwise, mankind would be deceived.

21. As some aspects of the disarmament plans submitted by the great Powers were extremely technical, a specialized body alone could judge their value. Neither the First Committee nor the General Assembly was in a position to give exact guidance in the matter and the Colombian delegation would therefore merely express the hope that the text finally adopted would be in conformity with the essential purpose.

22. In the event of a war involving the use of arms now in existence, civilization would be wiped from the face of the earth. War had, of course, always existed, despite the influence of religion, philosophy and science. Science, which could have done much to improve the lot of man, had become the most effective instrument of destruction. Disarmament was accordingly more imperative than ever. In the past, all wars had been subject to certain limitations, but a present-day conflict would be generalized. The issue was whether there would be room in the world of tomorrow for freedom, free expression of opinion and free cultural development or whether tyranny and State dictatorship would prevail, to be served blindly in line with preconceived ideas.

23. Fortunately there existed free States, with democratic institutions, which observed the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and gave their citizens freedom of expression. Other States, however, had suppressed all freedom, kept millions of human beings in bondage and sought to impose their system on the rest of the world. In those circumstances, the free world would not lightly deprive itself of its means of defence. Accordingly the Colombian delegation, in full independence, supported the United States and United Kingdom views on disarmament. A choice had to be made between freedom

and tyranny and that was the basic consideration on which the Colombian delegation's attitude was founded. He hoped that mankind would come to its senses in view of the magnitude of the present danger and that the means now being applied to perfecting vehicles of destruction would be used to eliminate the wide disparities in economic conditions and bring prosperity to the under-privileged countries.

24. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) remarked that the two great Powers, despite having adopted a joint statement of general principles, were still in disagreement on a range of questions relating to disarmament. The negotiations therefore called for much patience and an atmosphere of trust that was unfortunately lacking. Accordingly, it was not enough to consider the technical aspects of national and regional security. Both sides must try in addition to meet each other's needs and allay each other's fears. He hoped that all the countries concerned were prepared to approach the problem from a radically changed angle.

25. It had been proposed that the Ten-Nation Committee should be enlarged by the addition of five or ten members. The Pakistan delegation, although having no marked preference, was inclined to support the suggestion that ten new members be added, to be elected by the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission on the basis of proportionate regional representation rather than on that of political policies or ideologies. Should that method not commend itself, the only way in which the composition of the negotiating body could be settled quickly would be for each side to nominate half the new members.

26. The major hurdle in the way of an agreement on disarmament was the question of control and inspection. One side held that control and inspection should be confined to ascertaining whether the agreed destruction of armaments and disbanding of forces had been effected, without going further by verifying the strength in armaments and military personnel left to States. The other side insisted on the imperative need to determine the military means retained by each. Since

the object was to render war impossible, action must not be limited to verifying that a certain number of weapons had been destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes, as the possibility of aggression would not thereby be excluded. It was therefore essential to ascertain that the strength in personnel and weapons still held by each side did not at each stage exceed the levels set by joint agreement, either because at the initial stage one side or the other had not disclosed its full strength or because there had been surreptitious manufacture and replacement of weapons of a particular type in the interval.

27. The argument that control and inspection for that purpose would amount to espionage was not convincing. If the country which was a victim of espionage had made an honest disclosure of its different categories of weapons, all the information that the other side could gather would already be in its possession. On the other hand, if the disclosure of its military strength had not been honest, the possibility of aggression by that country could be excluded only by verification of what was retained at each stage. Besides, such verification would apply equally to both sides and, far from putting one or the other at a disadvantage, would serve to generate an atmosphere of trust. Unless initial agreement could be reached on that crucial element, no reasonable hope could be entertained of concluding a detailed agreement on disarmament.

28. The building up of a United Nations force would also have to be envisaged. In that connexion, he was in agreement with the recommendation made by the President of the United States in the General Assembly (1013th plenary meeting) that all Member States should earmark units in their armed forces which would be specially trained and quickly available to the United Nations, as needed for the maintenance of peace.

29. An awesome responsibility rested on the great Powers. They must therefore display patience, courage and imagination and accept calculated risks, in order to bring about general and complete disarmament.

The meeting rose at 10.30 p.m.