



*Friday, 14 December 1951, at 10.30 a.m.*

*Palais de Chaillot, Paris*

**C O N T E N T S**

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667/Rev.1, A/C.1/668/Rev.1, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/677 (continued) .....	} 71
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*Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).*

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667/Rev. 1, A/C.1/668/Rev. 1, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/667) (continued)**

[Item 66]\*

**International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (continued)**

[Item 16]\*

**CONSIDERATION OF THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) AND AMENDMENTS THERETO (continued)**

1. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said a study of the revised Soviet Union amendments (A/C.1/668/Rev.1) disclosed few changes, despite the discussions in Sub-Committee 18. The three Powers in their turn had submitted a revised draft resolution (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) with a view to widening the areas of agreement. It was quite apparent that fundamental differences existed on matters of principle and had to be recognized.
2. In discussing the revised joint draft resolution, Mr. Jessup said he believed he would be within the Chairman's ruling if he dealt with the related operative parts as well as with the preamble.
3. The first paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution remained unchanged in view of the agreement reached in the sub-committee.
4. A new second paragraph had been added to express the thought suggested by the Lebanese representative concerning the possibility of establishing a system of collective security.
5. In the third paragraph the reference to levels had been eliminated in view of the difficulties mentioned by a

number of delegations. However, the phrase had been designed to express ideas which surely were generally acceptable, namely, that no State could afford to neglect its defence and that no State should be armed in such a way as to make aggression possible. However, the three Powers had removed the phrase in order to dispose of a point of disagreement.

6. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble an attempt had been made to dispose of the ambiguity caused by the use of the phrase "having substantial armed forces" in the original draft. The three Powers had substituted the phrase "whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system". The formulation followed was believed to be within the area of agreement noted in the memorandum of the President of the General Assembly (A/C.1/677).

7. In the final paragraph of the preamble the three Powers had agreed to incorporate the Soviet Union amendment. They regarded the recommendation favouring the establishment of a new commission as the important point.

8. In the first operative paragraph an attempt had been made to meet the views of the Soviet Union representative in respect of the name of the proposed commission although the three Powers regarded it as rather unwieldy and less accurate than the name they originally had proposed.

9. The second operative paragraph remained unchanged.

10. At the end of the introductory sentence in paragraph 3, a phrase had been added to make specific reference to atomic energy questions. The three Powers had regarded this matter as being covered in the original formulation but were prepared to make their meaning perfectly clear. Nevertheless paragraph 3 was one in which fundamental points of disagreement were inevitable.

11. In view of the above change, sub-paragraph (a) of the original draft had been omitted with consequent drafting changes being required in the other sub-paragraphs. The text which had become sub-paragraph (a) of the revised text reflected no changes. To sub-paragraph (b) the final phrase regarding inspection being carried out in accordance with the decisions of an international control organ, was

\*Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

an addition designed to meet the views of the Soviet Union. Sub-paragraph (c) had a new introductory sentence, stating explicitly that the new commission should consider any proposals or plans for control that might be submitted in both the conventional armaments field and the atomic energy field. That had been the original intention, but at the same time it was the view of the three Powers that the new commission should take advantage of the work of the United Nations approved by the General Assembly during the past five years. However, it was to be hoped that the Soviet Union representatives, in view of their Government's attitude towards the United Nations plan, would submit new proposals. The changes in sub-paragraph (e) were of a clarifying nature and corresponded to a change made in the preamble making it clear that the States embarking on that programme could decide among themselves which of them have such military strength that they must become parties before the treaty enters into effect.

12. Paragraph 4 was an addition and contained the same ideas as those expressed in point 5 of the amendment submitted by the Soviet Union. The intention that an international control organ should be established had been implicit in the original draft but the three Powers were prepared to make it explicit.

13. Paragraph 5 (paragraph 4 of the original text) reflected no changes.

14. In paragraph 6 the reference to criteria had been omitted in view of the comments of various delegations. While the three Powers continued to believe that such criteria could be found, they wished to avoid the difficulty and also make it clear that the new commission should devise its own methods of work. The new sub-paragraph (a) simply directed the commission to determine how limits could be calculated.

15. In paragraph 7 a sentence had been added which would require the commission to submit its first report not later than 1 June 1952. That addition had been designed to meet the Soviet Union's desire for a specific date as well as to emphasize the urgent character which the three Powers attached to the work of the commission.

16. All the amendments submitted by the USSR had not been incorporated in the revised draft resolution. There were fundamental points of disagreement between those amendments and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over a period of several years. The three-Power draft resolution took those earlier resolutions as points of departure rather than casting them aside in order to start from the beginning again.

17. The agreement on the establishment of a new commission was important because progress was only likely after the details of the disarmament programme had been worked out. It was to be hoped that it would become clear to the Soviet Union that nothing in the proposed programme was inconsistent with its interests or security. The three Powers did not propose a one-sided programme but one in which their only advantage would be that of sharing in the general increase in security and the liberation of resources for positive development.

18. The work of negotiation should be continued in the new commission with a view to drawing up a treaty or treaties. The commission should consider all proposals and plans which might be submitted to it and the three Powers would enter the negotiations with the desire of reaching an agreement.

19. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that, although the work of the sub-committee had not led to any basic agreements either upon the nature of a control organ or the terms of reference of a proposed commission, there had been agreement upon the important point that a single commission should carry forward the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Although that decision might be described as relating to procedure, its real significance was a recognition of the fact that a decision in the field of atomic weapons could not be achieved without a corresponding decision in the field of conventional armaments. That represented a step forward and offered a basis for optimism.

20. The representative of the Soviet Union had drawn attention to the matters on which agreement had been reached in the sub-committee and had observed that although they were concerned with secondary questions they were of significance because they had reduced the points of disagreement. The three-Power revised draft resolution was therefore to be regarded as a valuable contribution since the Soviet Union representative regarded any concession, however minor, as being important. The Soviet Union representative had also been encouraging when he had expressed the necessity of seizing every opportunity of making progress in those problems.

21. Matters on which agreement had been reached included the unification of the two existing commissions; the objectives of the two bodies were thereby recognized to be the same. There had also been agreement on the composition and general framework of the new commission. The fact that the work of the commission would be indirectly circumscribed by the veto was not of enormous significance because any draft convention required unanimity if it was to be ratified by all the necessary powers. There was agreement also on the need for a convention or conventions. There might even be agreement on the matter of time limits for, if a date were set, one of the Soviet Union objections would be removed. It was reasonable to hope that when the commission was established it would be able to consolidate and extend the area of agreement.

22. The Committee could not overlook the areas of disagreement. Unfortunately the Soviet Union insisted upon the prohibition of atomic weapons to the exclusion of all other measures, while the three-Power resolution would provide also for the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction. In this connexion the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I) should be borne in mind. It was a paradox of the Soviet Union approach that they advocated that weapons of mass destruction other than atomic weapons should merely be reduced by one-third. That position took no account of the realities, namely, that the development of atomic weapons for tactical use against armies in the field rather than for the mass destruction of innocent civilians represented a trend in the opposite direction to that taken in the development of other weapons of mass destruction such as guided missiles. That paradox in the policy of the Soviet Union was bound to suggest to the average man that that Power wished to end its inferiority in atomic weapons by bringing about their prohibition while maintaining other armaments which were no less destructive.

23. The necessity for action rather than mere words had been brought out quite clearly. The Soviet Union had asserted that prohibition would be linked to the establishment of control, but in that case the prohibition could not be described as unconditional. However, it was necessary to reaffirm the principle that prohibition required the

establishment of control and, if it were to be effective, it should include inspection and verification. The Soviet Union should deal not merely with the progression from prohibition to the establishment of control, but also with the nature of the control system.

24. It was essential to ensure that there would be guarantees of the effectiveness of prohibition. The Soviet Union representative found it difficult to accept a plan which would impose limitations on national sovereignty. The Soviet Union representative was prepared to rely upon national honour but it was Mr. Belaúnde's view that undertakings by nations had to be based upon confidence which could not be restored by proclamation. Such confidence had existed at the time of San Francisco, but had been undermined by the Soviet Union. At the present time there was no chance of national honour being accepted as the guarantee of the prohibition of atomic weapons. They would be eliminated when a control system became operative.

25. The representative of the USSR had regarded the three-Power proposals as inimical to the Soviet Union and had maintained that they would involve the adoption of the Baruch plan which would lead to the dominance of the United States and afford no guarantee of acceptance by the United States. Those objections were groundless. The representative of the United States had made it clear that the new commission should consider any proposals or plans which might be put forward. The control organ which was envisaged would not be under the United States and the representative of the USSR in the commission would be in a position to ensure that that organ was truly international. As for the constitutional processes of the United States, they were quite normal and there would be no exceptions in the case of atomic energy in questions of ratification.

26. The Soviet Union representative called for a reduction of all armaments and armed forces by one-third and opposed the idea of levels and the theory of balance. While it might be true that wars had come about in the past when there had been a balance achieved, they had occurred for other reasons. On the other hand, a disequilibrium of armaments of itself had always led to war. They should therefore seek a balance of forces; that would offer guarantees to all.

27. Mr. Belaúnde stated that his hopes for peace rested upon the realism of the leaders of the Soviet Union who would understand that they were unable to stop the defensive efforts of the western world and that a realistic disarmament programme with appropriate controls was essential.

28. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) said that the revised three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) contained significant changes which merited serious study. The revised USSR amendments (A/C.1/668/Rev.1) also contained some important changes, but these amendments had been made with regard to the original text of the tripartite draft resolution. In the circumstance, it would be very important for the Committee to learn the reactions of the Soviet Union to the revised three-Power draft resolution.

29. Turning to the amendments which his delegation had submitted (A/C.1/678), he explained that point 3 of his amendment had been fully met by the second paragraph of the preamble of the revised tripartite draft resolution. He therefore was willing to withdraw that amendment. He urged, however, that the three remaining points of his

amendment be accepted. Since point 1 of the amendment indicated the fundamental cause for the present armaments race, he believed it should be accepted lest the propagandists claimed that rearmament was motivated by aggressive intentions. Point 2 of his amendment would require some consequential changes in case point 1 were to be accepted. Finally, as regards point 4 of the amendment he believed that the proposed name for the new commission was too lengthy and not sufficiently inspiring. The Lebanese amendment would make the title of the proposed commission less confusing to world public opinion.

30. The representative of Lebanon concluded that in the absence of fundamental international confidence, purely military disarmament could not prevent the possibility of a future world war.

31. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) recalled that his delegation had already declared that the three-Power draft resolution constituted a foundation and a proper framework for the solution of the disarmament problem.

32. He shared the general view that the work of Subcommittee 18 had indicated some progress, though modest in character, on the procedural questions, but there still existed substantial differences on fundamental questions.

33. Turning to the Soviet Union proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and a one-third reduction of armaments, the representative of Belgium said that it was well known that the Soviet Union enjoyed superiority in the field of conventional armaments, whereas the United States enjoyed superiority in the field of atomic weapons. It was only natural that these proposals should be rejected since their adoption would eliminate United States superiority, while enhancing that of the Soviet Union.

34. Moreover, the Soviet Union amendment requested the General Assembly to proclaim the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over that prohibition. Such a proposal was misleading since it would place on the same level two entirely different notions: on the one hand, a decision would be taken which would result in an immediate prohibition, while on the other hand, there would simply be a statement of the intention of setting up control which would become effective only after the treaty had come into force and the proposed control had been fully organized.

35. At this stage, Mr. van Langenhove considered it superfluous to repeat the criticisms of the draft amendment for the reduction of armaments and armed forces by one-third and to point out how lacking in commonsense it would be to propose the reduction of unknown quantities, while offering to determine such quantities only when the reduction had been accepted.

36. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil) said his delegation considered the revised joint draft resolution to be a significant gesture of conciliation, incorporating as it did some of the points raised by the Soviet Union representative. Moreover, the revised text was important not only from the viewpoint of conciliation, but also because it represented a definite improvement on the original draft, thus proving that the discussions held in the sub-committee were profitable.

37. One could only hope that the conciliatory step taken by the three Powers would be met by a corresponding one on the part of the USSR delegation, thereby paving the way for general agreement on the approach to the disarmament problem.



38. The second paragraph of the preamble to the revised draft resolution showed that the disarmament problem was closely connected with an effective system of collective security for the maintenance of peace. Without collective security, States would have to rely on armaments, thereby creating an armaments race. The two concepts were, thus, interdependent. An orderly world community presupposed the existence of well-established machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes and an agreement for collective security ready to come into force as soon as a breach of the peace or an act of aggression occurred. The general limitation of armaments was part and parcel of that set-up.

39. Mr. KOSANOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that the prohibition of the atomic bomb did not constitute the crux of the problem. However, Mr. Vyshinsky wanted the people of the world who were unfamiliar with the real problem, to believe that the prohibition of atomic weapons would, as if by magic, bring an end to the existing international tension. The question of war and peace did not depend upon the use of atomic weapons. Aggression in Korea was carried out by conventional weapons; it nevertheless brought the world to the brink of war.

40. Moreover, the Soviet Union representative insisted on a one-third mechanical reduction of the armed forces of the big Powers. Such a proposal was merely a catchword designed to create the impression of a will to disarm; indeed, such a proposal might increase aggressive appetites towards the small and weak nations.

41. Mr. Vyshinsky had contended that the principle of the balance of power had brought disaster upon the League of Nations and advised the United Nations not to follow that path. However, when the people of the world had, at the end of the Second World War, sincerely believed that that principle had been done away with, they were disappointed to see the Soviet Union championing the principle of the division of the world into spheres of influence, thereby recreating the balance of power. Mr. Vyshinsky would, even now, be only too glad to see that principle effected. This explained his anxiety to have an agreement limited to the great Powers although he himself contended that such an action would mean the end of the United Nations.

42. As regards the second paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/667), the delegation of Yugoslavia understood that paragraph to provide that prohibition of the atomic weapon and control of atomic energy should be simultaneous.

43. The delegation of Yugoslavia would, therefore, vote for that paragraph and against point 1 of the USSR amendment.

44. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) said that the authors of the three-Power draft resolution had made great efforts to keep the draft as compact as necessary to give clear expression to the principles and procedures which should guide the new commission.

45. Many important ideas had already been expressed as to the underlying reasons for the present international tension. To enumerate all those reasons in the preamble would neither serve a useful purpose nor promote the common objective. To single out one reason alone would do no justice to the realities of the situation.

46. In the circumstances, the representative of Israel suggested that the first paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States and agreed to by the USSR should stand as drafted.

47. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) wished to ask the representatives of the four Powers to explain the objective of their proposals and amendments.

48. It seemed to the representative of Iraq that there existed two objectives: either a practical and agreed solution which would lead to unanimous agreement, or, exposition of principles and ideals. In the first instance, the Committee would have to agree on a draft resolution acceptable to all. Otherwise, the Committee should continue the discussion of the various proposals and adopt what would seem to be the fairest plan.

49. Faris EL-KHOURY Bey (Syria) said that though the report of Sub-Committee 18 had been gladly received by the Committee, it did not make any fundamental change in the respective positions of the two parties. He had hoped that instead of submitting a report, the Chairman of the sub-committee would submit a draft resolution containing the points upon which the four representatives were in agreement, and referring the points of disagreement to the proposed commission, the terms of reference of which should not be restrictive but should allow freedom of action.

50. Some representatives might contend that if the commission were to deal with those points of disagreement, nothing new would come out of it. But if the three-Power proposals were to be accepted without the concurrence of the Soviet Union, the result would not be different.

51. The representative of Syria suggested that, at the present stage of the debate, the whole matter might be referred again to the sub-committee where would be formulated a draft resolution embodying all the points on which agreement had already been reached.

52. The CHAIRMAN declared closed the general discussion on the preamble of the joint draft resolution.

53. He announced that the Committee would proceed at the afternoon meeting to the consideration of the different paragraphs of the preamble and the amendments thereto.

54. Mr. MOCH (France) said that many delegations might not be able to attend an afternoon meeting in view of the plenary meeting of the General Assembly which was scheduled, at the same time. He therefore thought that it might be wise to cancel the afternoon meeting.

55. The CHAIRMAN explained that it had been the custom for the First Committee to meet whenever the General Assembly was considering an item which was not on the agenda of the First Committee.

56. The representatives of IRAQ, TURKEY and EGYPT agreed with the views of the representative of France.

57. In addition, the representative of EGYPT requested the Chairman to allow him to speak briefly on the preamble of the revised draft resolution submitted by the three Powers.

58. The CHAIRMAN did not believe it necessary to cancel the meeting scheduled for the afternoon. He hoped that delegations could appoint other members to attend the First Committee meeting.

59. Mr. MACDONNELL (Canada) agreed with the views expressed by the Chairman.

60. Mr. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia) agreed with the representatives of France and Egypt.

61. He requested the Chairman to allow him to express briefly the views of his delegation on the preamble of the revised three-Power draft resolution.

62. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion of the

French representative to the effect that the afternoon meeting should be cancelled.

*The motion was adopted by 29 votes to 16, with 10 abstentions.*

63. In view of the requests made by the representatives of Egypt and Bolivia, the CHAIRMAN requested the Committee to vote on the proposal to re-open the general debate on the preamble of the revised three-Power draft resolution.

*That proposal was adopted by 30 votes to 4, with 12 abstentions.*

64. The CHAIRMAN announced that the list of speakers would be closed on the 14th of December 1951 at 6 p.m.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.