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NOTE

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament taking place each year, together with a brief history of the major issues. The series began with the 1976 edition. *The Yearbook* makes no claim to present fully the views of Member States of the Organization. For further information on the official positions of States, readers should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly* and other sources.

General Assembly resolutions and decisions are quoted in *The Yearbook* in the form in which they were adopted by the General Assembly. For the edited texts of these documents for 1993, readers should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/48/49)*.

For an overview of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, readers may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: A Short History* (United Nations, 1988). For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization, they may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (E.76.IX.1) and previous volumes of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, referred to in footnotes throughout the text simply as *The Yearbook*, together with the appropriate volume number.

With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union on 1 November 1993, the European Community was redesignated the European Union. The designations "European Community" and "European Union" are used as appropriate throughout this volume according to the period referred to.

At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat was renamed the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. The names "Office for Disarmament Affairs" and "Centre for Disarmament Affairs" are used as appropriate throughout this volume according to the period referred to.

INTRODUCTION

DURING 1993, although threats to international peace were posed by ethnic strife and militant nationalism and fundamentalism, they did not prevent further progress towards disarmament. This was true particularly with respect to weapons of mass destruction. In that area, 1993 was a year of both achievement and promise, and this contributed to the further strengthening of international security.

Weapons of mass destruction

The achievements in the field of weapons of mass destruction included: substantial progress towards nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Russian Federation; the wider observance of a de facto moratorium on nuclear testing and the collective decision of the Conference on Disarmament to commence substantive negotiations, early in 1994, aimed at the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; widening acceptance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and ever-increasing support for the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and the opening of the process for the signature and ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

All these developments significantly assisted the members of the international community in facing the challenges of a rapidly changing world, which offers new, but fleeting, opportunities at both the national and the international level.

At the beginning of the year, the Convention on chemical weapons—the first multilaterally negotiated treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction—was opened for signature in Paris. On that occasion, a total of 130 States became signatories. By the end of the year, the number of signatories had risen to 154. It is hoped that the requisite number of ratifications will be deposited

in due course, making it possible for the Convention to enter into force within two years of its signature. It is also hoped that the countries with chemical-weapon capabilities that have not yet signed will, in the meantime, become parties.

On 3 January, President Bush of the United States and President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation signed in Moscow the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), negotiated by the two countries between September 1991 and December 1992. Given the kaleidoscopic changes in the international environment with the end of the cold war, START II took only fifteen months to negotiate, compared with the nine-year negotiating period of START I. The main question now is to ensure speedy implementation of the two START Treaties, beginning of course with START I, pursuant to the Lisbon Protocol of 1992 signed by the United States and by the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as four successor States of the former USSR. By article V of the Protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine undertook to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in the shortest possible time.¹

In May, the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty began their preparatory work for the 1995 Conference to review the operation of the Treaty and to decide on its extension, conscious of the fact that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the extension of the Treaty, the cornerstone of international stability and security, is a primary goal of the international community. It is encouraging to note that, by the end of the year, there were 162 parties to the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States.

In support of these vital endeavours, President Clinton, addressing the General Assembly, referred to non-proliferation—whether nuclear, chemical or biological—as one of the highest and most urgent priorities. Thus, it was the intention of the United States to weave non-proliferation more deeply into the fabric of its relationships with the world's nations and institutions. In this context, the United States would press for an

¹ On 22 July 1993, Belarus acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. On 13 December 1993 the Supreme Council of Kazakhstan approved that State's accession to the Treaty, and its instrument of ratification was deposited on 14 February 1994.

international agreement that would ban for ever the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes.

Two situations of critical importance to nuclear non-proliferation came to light early in 1993 and had repercussions on developments throughout the year.

By the end of 1993, intensive efforts were under way between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to re-open the nuclear sites of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to international inspection, following the announcement by that Government in March that it was withdrawing from the non-proliferation Treaty, a withdrawal which was later "suspended". A final breakthrough has not yet been achieved in the international crisis which erupted after the March announcement.

On 24 March, the State President of South Africa provided an official account of South Africa's past nuclear-weapon programme, prior to its accession to the non-proliferation Treaty. He stated that, at one stage, South Africa had developed a limited nuclear fission deterrent capability; by the end of the 1980s, however, a nuclear deterrent had become, not only superfluous, but an obstacle to the development of South Africa's international relations, and early in 1990, final effect had been given to the decision that the deterrent should be dismantled and destroyed. The President confirmed that South Africa had never conducted a clandestine nuclear test, and at no time had it acquired nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, provided any to any other country, or cooperated with another country in that regard.

Documentation related to the denuclearization of Africa at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly indicated that substantive progress had been made in the course of the year on a draft treaty on the subject. The Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution welcoming that progress and calling for the submission of a final text of a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone at its next session. This bodes well for early achievement of this long-sought goal.

In the Middle East, as a result of the mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, a crucial initial step was taken towards the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict after many decades of deadlock.

In Iraq, significant progress was made in 1993 on the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. As stated by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, Iraq had acknowledged its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder; it had declared its earlier declarations in relation to future monitoring to have been made under and in conformity with that resolution and the related plans; and it had undertaken to cooperate with the Special Commission in the implementation of the plans in order to arrive as soon as possible at the stage where both the Commission and IAEA would be in a position to report that Iraq was meeting all the requirements laid down by the Council.

On 10 August, the Conference on Disarmament took the historic decision to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and requested the Chairman of the Committee to make the necessary arrangements to conduct consultations on the specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiation. The consultations were successful. By the end of the year, a draft mandate was ready for consideration by the Conference, upon its reconvening at Geneva on 25 January 1994. By it the Conference would direct the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which would contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security. The mandate would also provide for at least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and institutional issues, to be established in the initial stage of the negotiation.

In his report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General referred to this decision of the Conference on Disarmament as the culmination of the efforts of the international community to achieve a breakthrough in one of the most vital areas of international security—a breakthrough made possible by the crucial commitment of nuclear-weapon States to a continuing moratorium on nuclear testing. To be viable, a comprehensive test ban should be universal, verifiable and of indefinite duration, the Secretary-General stated. At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution, sponsored by 157 member States, urging the Conference

on Disarmament to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of such a treaty.

Conventional weapons and confidence-building measures

While the global threat posed by the possible use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has receded with the end of the cold war, there has been a resurgence and even an expansion of regional and subregional conflicts as the stability of political blocs—East, West and non-aligned—has given way to political fragmentation and, consequently, to ethnic and domestic strife. This situation increases the urgency of regulating and reducing conventional weapons and using to the full the potential of confidence-building measures. The President of the General Assembly, speaking on the occasion of Disarmament Week, noted that conventional weapons, traditionally set aside from the disarmament process because they are regarded as a means of defending territorial integrity and national independence, are increasingly becoming the focus of measures to secure openness and transparency, restrictions or outright prohibition.

In a world in which there is no shortage of weapons, arms regulation and reduction are posing great challenges for the international community and the United Nations. In its resolutions (47/120 A and B) dealing with the Secretary-General's report *An Agenda for Peace*,² the General Assembly emphasized the need for all organs and bodies of the Organization to intensify their efforts to strengthen the United Nations role in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building, and it provided guidelines for the implementation of the concepts and proposals contained in the report of the Secretary-General. In fact, a number of far-reaching measures to promote this goal may be found in the resolutions on confidence-building, international security, transparency in armaments, and regional arms control and disarmament adopted on the recommendation of the First Committee in recent sessions.

On the question of transparency, a most important development took place in 1993: the issuance of the first report on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, making public, on an unprecedented

² A/47/277-S/24111. Subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (DPI/1247).

scale, official governmental data on arms transfers. The Register in its present form records data on seven major categories—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers—considered to be the most destabilizing weapons systems. The Governments of 83 States submitted replies. Although the number of countries reporting represents fewer than half of the United Nations membership, the actual coverage of arms transfers is much more comprehensive than that number would indicate. As almost all of the major exporters have reported to the Register, it is estimated that most of the world's trade in major conventional arms in 1992 is now transparent. During the year there was considerable discussion regarding a possible expansion of the scope of the Register—to include data on other categories and types of weapons and on military holdings and procurement through national production—in view of the meeting of governmental experts scheduled for 1994, which is to examine the Register's continuing operation and further development.

It remains to be seen, at this point, whether transparency will lead to restraint and, ultimately, reductions. As the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters stated in its report of 22 September, "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms could make an even greater contribution to the strengthening of security if eventually it led to actual reductions. In this connection, the Conference on Disarmament could also contribute to the process of arms reductions by developing general guidelines on the reduction or control of conventional arms within the regional context."

Disarmament at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly

There was a large area of consensus on arms control and disarmament at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly and this resulted in some important achievements.

For the first time in recent memory, a resolution was unanimously adopted calling on all States to support multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This resolution provides the multilateral negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament, with strong political support as it begins priority negotiations on such a treaty and,

at the same time, makes an important contribution to the goal of the 1995 Conference of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

In a complementary action, the General Assembly, convinced that a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation, recommended the negotiation of such a treaty in the most appropriate international forum.

Thus, a positive outlook is emerging for the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. The prospect for an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty is enhanced by the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to carry out negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and by the unanimous support of the General Assembly for that initiative, as well as by its recommendation concerning the negotiation of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the question of effectively assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons remains for the time being a negative factor, owing to lack of progress on that sensitive and urgent issue. The relevant General Assembly resolution, although limited to an appeal to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively on a common approach, that is, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character, met with the abstention of three nuclear-weapon Powers—France, the United Kingdom and the United States, which insisted on a balance between rights and responsibilities on the part of non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States.

A divergence of views between developed and developing countries with respect to export-control regimes, which are regarded by the latter as discriminatory and aimed at limiting technological progress in their own countries, could create additional problems at the 1995 extension Conference. The draft resolution on chemical weapons, which has traditionally been adopted without a vote, was a casualty this year of such tensions. Although it was co-sponsored by more than one hundred Member States from all regional groups, it was not pressed to the vote after underlying differences in approach to the implementation of article XI of the chemical weapons Convention, dealing with economic and technological development, were brought to the fore with the submission of an amendment to one of the preambular paragraphs of the

draft. In addition, differing views between developed and developing countries on how to deal at the multilateral level with scientific and technological developments affecting international security prevented the merger of two resolutions (one by Germany and the other by India) traditionally presented on the subject.

The General Assembly, reaffirming that transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters, welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on the first year of operation of the Register; reaffirmed its determination to ensure the effective operation of the Register; and renewed its request to the Secretary-General to report on its continuing operation and further development.

The General Assembly also paid considerable attention to the need to tailor confidence-building, arms limitation and disarmament measures to the security needs of specific regions and subregions. The entire session confirmed the growing interest among States in developing regional approaches to arms limitation and confidence-building as practical means of strengthening regional peace and security and promoting the process of global arms reduction. In particular, by resolution 48/77 A, the General Assembly endorsed the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of international security that the Disarmament Commission had elaborated and adopted earlier in the year. Moreover, by its resolution 47/120 B, mentioned above, the Assembly recognized that regional organizations could, in their field of competence and in accordance with the Charter, make important contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building.

In general, it was felt that urgent consideration should be given to the issues involved in conventional arms limitation at the regional and subregional levels.

The expanding relevance of disarmament and arms regulation

At the request of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament transmitted to the First Committee, at its reconvened meetings

in March, its views³ on the direction disarmament was taking in the post-cold war era.

It was the view of the Conference that the new international environment reinforces the relevance of disarmament and arms regulation and calls for a new approach to international security. The very concept of disarmament and arms regulation as a key element in the pursuit of overall international security, the Conference stated, is being expanded and enriched by many new factors: it can now even more readily be translated into concrete actions in keeping with the expectations of the international community; it now entails even more deep and verified reductions in the nuclear armaments of the two major Powers; it implies more and more the negotiation also of multilateral agreements; it now embraces all weapons of mass destruction; it also embraces conventional armaments; it includes more and more clearly the need, recognized by all, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as of their delivery systems; it also includes the recognized need to seek equal or better security and stability at lower levels of conventional armaments; it covers an increasingly broad spectrum of means of achieving security such as the implementation of confidence-building and transparency measures, as well as international verification; it addresses the production, stockpiling and transfers of military equipment and technology, as well as the conversion of military capacities to peaceful uses; it also implies recognition of the fact that nuclear disarmament remains a priority task of our times. Thus, the Conference concluded, disarmament and arms regulation—a collective responsibility—can now fulfil its real task as a major instrument of international security.

All this is, of course, embedded in the purposes and principles of the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, the non-use of force in inter-State relations, and the fulfilment of the obligation by Member States to assist the United Nations in any action it takes for maintaining international peace and security.

As the Secretary-General of the United Nations has put it in his report *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the*

³ CD/1183.

Post-Cold War Era,⁴ in today's world, societies can no longer afford to solve problems by the use of force; in inter-State relations, one of the most important means of reducing violence is disarmament; disarmament should be seen as part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour designed to safeguard the security of all nations, thus constituting an integral part of efforts to strengthen international peace and security.

⁴ A/C.1/47/7. Subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.93.IX.8).

CHAPTER I

Non-proliferation

Introduction

EFFORTS TO CURB THE PROLIFERATION of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have been made, in parallel with disarmament efforts, since 1945. It has been said that the best way of preventing the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would be through their complete elimination from the arsenals of States. However, faced with difficulties in its efforts to reach the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts, namely general and complete disarmament, the international community has undertaken a number of measures to prevent the spread of various categories of weapons and weapons systems, together with measures to achieve their reduction and elimination. These efforts have led to the establishment of a number of control regimes with regard to different categories of weapons.

In the nuclear field, the major breakthrough was made with the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,¹ commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, which entered into force on 5 March 1970. On the basis of the Treaty, a global non-proliferation regime has been established, supported by the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear material to military or other prohibited activities. Under article VIII of the Treaty, four conferences have been held to review its operation: in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990, respectively. Under article X, a conference is to be held 25 years after

¹ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex; the text is also reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX)(hereinafter referred to as *Status*), vol. 1.

the Treaty's entry into force, that is, in 1995, to decide whether it shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

By 31 December 1993, 162 States were parties to the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Security Council. However, following the disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991, the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are now under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation (which has been accepted as the successor State of the former Soviet Union in regard to the non-proliferation Treaty) and three other States—Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine—all of which undertook, under the Lisbon Protocol of May 1992,² to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Belarus ratified the non-proliferation Treaty on 22 July 1993; Kazakhstan and Ukraine had not done so by the end of the year (see page 17).

In addition, several other States not parties to the Treaty, among them Argentina, Brazil, India,³ and Pakistan, have extensive nuclear programmes and facilities, most of which, are, however, subject to non-treaty safeguards agreements with IAEA and with States supplying them with material and technology.

For years, the nuclear capability of Israel has been the subject of controversy in international forums, which have called upon that State to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to sign the corresponding safeguards agreement. The question of the nuclear capability of South Africa, which had also been the subject of controversy, has been resolved. In 1991 South Africa acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA. On 24 March 1993, the Prime Minister of South Africa provided full information on South Africa's past nuclear programme (see page 21).

² The text of the Lisbon Protocol is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, appendix II.

³ The Minister of External Affairs of India announced on 21 May 1974, after his country had carried out a nuclear explosion, that it had no intention of developing nuclear weapons and that, in performing its peaceful scientific test, it had not violated any international obligations; India has reaffirmed that position several times. See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/425.

In addition, the nuclear programmes of two States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty have been a focus of concern. With respect to Iraq's programme, efforts continued with a view to dismantling it and to ensuring that Iraq should not in the future acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material, as stipulated by Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), adopted following the war in the Persian Gulf. With respect to the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, negotiations have continued between that State and IAEA regarding implementation of safeguards on its nuclear activities. (See below.)

Since the very beginning of its operation, there has been criticism of the Treaty on the grounds that it provides for two categories of parties—nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States—each with specific obligations. The most difficult area of operation, as demonstrated at the four Review Conferences held so far, relates to differences in the assessment of the implementation of article VI, which calls for negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and especially to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Two other questions have also given rise to different views: security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the adequacy of technical and other assistance to them for research purposes and for the development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

As the question of security assurances⁴ was not resolved by the Treaty itself, the Security Council, on 9 June 1968, adopted resolution 255 (1968) by which it welcomed the expressed intention of certain States, particularly the three nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Council and parties to the Treaty, to provide or support immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty that was a victim of an act or a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons. In addition, all nuclear-weapon States have made unilateral declarations giving assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them; however, only the assurance of China is considered unconditional. The question of

⁴ Under a "positive" assurance, nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves, in specific circumstances, to come to the defence of non-nuclear-weapon States, as envisaged, for example, in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). Under a "negative" assurance, nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

security assurances has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and its relevant subsidiary body since 1979, and the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions on the subject.

At the regional level there are two nuclear non-proliferation regimes: one established in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the other in the South Pacific by the Treaty of Rarotonga (see chapter V). In these two cases, security assurances have been incorporated in internationally binding legal instruments, namely, Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco⁵ and Protocol 2 to the Treaty of Rarotonga, respectively.⁶ These assurances thus benefit the non-nuclear-weapon States of the respective regions: on the one hand, Latin America and the Caribbean and, on the other, the South Pacific. Not all nuclear-weapon States have ratified the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, however, and some of them have done so with reservations.

The growing concern over the transfer of high technology for military purposes and of dual-use material has led to the establishment of a number of control regimes.

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group, also known as the London Club, was established in 1975 with a view to adopting common standards concerning safeguards and related controls associated with nuclear exports. In 1977, this Group adopted export policy guidelines concerning so-called "sensitive technology" that would trigger the application of IAEA safeguards. The regime established by this Group of States has been further elaborated at their regular meetings.⁷

⁵ The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is registered with the United Nations (*Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068). For the status of adherence to the Treaty as of 31 December 1993, see appendix I of this volume. The text of the Treaty and its Protocols is reproduced in *Status*, vol. 1.

⁶ The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) is registered with the United Nations (Treaty No. 24592). For the status of adherence to the Treaty as of 31 December 1993, see appendix I. The text of the Treaty and its Protocols is reproduced in *Status*, vol. 1, and in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII.

⁷ For details, see: *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. IX. At the time of its 1993 plenary meeting (30 March-1 April), the following States were members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, ./.
.1.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in 1987 by seven countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States),⁸ drew up guidelines for limiting the export of ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, with a range of at least 300 kilometres and a payload of at least 500 kilograms, and related technology. In 1992 the regime was extended to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons as well.

Questions related to the further proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction were highlighted by the war in the Persian Gulf. The proliferation aspect of chemical weapons is dealt with in the Convention on chemical weapons; it has been kept under review by the Australia Group,⁹ which had initiated informal consultations among producers on harmonizing export control policies in the absence of a global agreement on this subject. The strengthening of the verification mechanism of the biological weapons Convention was discussed at the Second and Third Review Conferences of parties to the Convention, and the confidence-building measures adopted subsequently are intended to diminish the risk of proliferation of biological weapons and components for their production. During 1992 and 1993, potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint were the subject of discussion by an Ad Hoc Group of Experts in Geneva (for more details see page 23).

As far as conventional weapons are concerned, it is expected that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1991,

Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Argentina and the Commission of the European Community attended as observers.

⁸ In addition to the seven original members, the following States are members of the MTCR regime (as of 31 December 1993): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Other States, though not members, have, through unilateral action, declared their adherence to the guidelines.

⁹ The following States are members of the Australia Group: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Commission of the European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

will, by increasing transparency and openness in the military arsenals of States, contribute to curbing the conventional arms race and especially the export and import of weapons in situations of tension or conflict. (For details see chapter III and VI respectively.)

Developments and trends, 1993

In 1993 the question of non-proliferation continued to be one of the most prominent disarmament issues at the bilateral, regional and global levels. Although efforts on the part of the international community to curb proliferation have led to the establishment of control regimes embracing different categories of weapons and weapons systems (nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional) as well as science and technology, it is difficult to classify the developments and trends of 1993 according to the weapons in question, because actions taken by some regimes pertained to more than one category of weapons. In the course of the year a variety of actions were taken with a view to strengthening the regimes through expanding their membership and extending their scope.

In a statement in the First Committee, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs stated that the 1995 Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty provided an opportunity for an internationally agreed response to the concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He mentioned the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention, referring to it as the first multilateral instrument with comprehensive provisions for its implementation which would apply equally to all parties, and he also noted recent commitments to negotiate a workable verification system for the biological weapons Convention. With respect to the proliferation of conventional weapons—which he termed one of the most ghastly legacies of the cold war—he stated that concerted action, primarily by Governments in their own territories, was needed to mop up the huge quantities of weapons which were in the hands of political groups or private individuals.¹⁰

Issues related to the non-proliferation Treaty

With regard to the non-proliferation Treaty, the year was marked by both positive and negative developments. Satisfaction was expressed

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, First Committee, 3rd meeting, paras. 4, 5 and 7.*

at the growing number of parties to the Treaty, which reached 162 by the end of the year. Many States expressed their readiness to seek the broadest possible consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and to strive for the extension of the Treaty for an unlimited period. Other States, however, emphasized that the future of the regime depended on several factors, such as further reduction of existing nuclear arsenals leading to their complete elimination, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Some concerns were also expressed regarding the nuclear weapons under the jurisdiction of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, since the two States are not yet parties to the Treaty. Also, the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty was seen by many States as a disturbing development.

Belarus acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty on 22 July. Some steps were taken in this regard by the two other States having part of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal on their territory: Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Kazakhstan's Supreme Council ratified the Treaty on 13 December, but the accession procedure, which requires the deposit of the instrument of ratification with one of the depositary States, had not been completed by the end of the year.¹¹ In a resolution¹² ratifying the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, adopted by its parliament on 18 November, Ukraine made several reservations with respect to, *inter alia*, guarantees of its national security and accession to the non-proliferation Treaty (see chapter V, page 135). Referring specifically to the non-proliferation Treaty, it stated that it did not consider article V of the Protocol—by which it undertook to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State in the shortest possible time—as binding upon it and stated, *inter alia*:

The entry into force of the Treaty [START I] and its implementation will open the way for a decision by the Verkhovna Rada on the issue of the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968.

Efforts to ensure implementation of START I and to expedite the accession of Ukraine to the non-proliferation Treaty continued and led, early

¹¹ See the statement of Kazakhstan concerning the approval of the Supreme Council of its accession to the non-proliferation Treaty (A/49/73). Kazakhstan acceded to the Treaty on 14 February 1994.

¹² See A/48/620-S/26770, annex.

in 1994, to a trilateral agreement,¹³ in which, on the one hand, Ukraine reaffirmed its commitment to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty in the shortest possible time, and, on the other, the Russian Federation and the United States expressed their commitment to provide security assurances to Ukraine.

Bilateral arrangements were also entered into to reduce the risks of proliferation involved in the process of destroying different categories of weapons pursuant to various arms control measures. In 1992 the Russian Federation and the United States had undertaken a number of such arrangements, and in 1993 they signed a new contract by which the United States would buy the low-grade uranium resulting from the mixing of natural uranium with the highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Russian plants. By virtue of the fact that this agreement entailed the conversion of weapons-grade uranium into uranium which could be used only for peaceful purposes, the parties considered it a major step forward in fulfilling their mutual non-proliferation objectives.

Preparations for the 1995 Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty got under way in 1993. (The first session of the Preparatory Committee is discussed on page 30.)

IAEA safeguards

The safeguards system of IAEA is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and of the whole non-proliferation regime. The steps taken in 1991 to strengthen the safeguards system—following the detection of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme—continued. In December the Board of Governors approved a programme (called Programme "93 + 2") by which a more effective and efficient safeguards system prior to the 1995 Conference will be implemented. Key elements of the programme entail the achievement of greater transparency at all levels of the system and the accessibility necessary to verify the information provided by States. In addition, the Board reaffirmed the Agency's right to perform special inspections when there was reason to believe that installations or material which should have been declared had not been so declared. Safeguards agreements between the Agency and the follow-

¹³ See "Text of the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America issued on 14 January 1994" (A/49/66-S/1994/91), annex.

ing parties to the non-proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1993: Latvia, Solomon Islands and Tonga.

On 1 December, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council a joint report¹⁴ on talks between the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA, on the one hand, and UNSCOM and the Government of Iraq, on the other, held in New York between 15 and 30 November. In the report, the Commission and IAEA welcomed, *inter alia*, the formal acceptance by Iraq¹⁵ of the obligations under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), enabling the Commission to initiate immediately full-scope monitoring and verification. As far as IAEA was concerned, it was concluded that the requirement under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) to the effect that Iraq accept the Agency's plan had been met.

In his report¹⁶ submitted at the end of the year, the Executive Chairman set out the priorities for the Special Commission as follows: (a) verification and supplementation of Iraq's declarations to the level at which the Commission can accept them as fulfilling the requirements of the relevant resolutions; (b) initiation of monitoring inspections; (c) development of the mechanism for import and export monitoring; (d) establishment of practice and precedent in the exercise of the Commission's privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for effective and efficient implementation of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification; (e) completion of the destruction activities, essentially in relation to Iraq's former chemical weapons programme.

One of the most disturbing events since the non-proliferation Treaty entered into force was the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 12 March, to withdraw from the Treaty (as provided for in article X),¹⁷ following controversy over IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. IAEA verification activities in that State had

¹⁴ S/26825, annex.

¹⁵ Stated in a letter dated 26 November addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq (S/26811), annex. The President of the Security Council acknowledged receipt of the letter in a letter addressed to the Permanent Representative of Iraq, dated 5 December (S/26841).

¹⁶ S/26910, annex.

¹⁷ S/25405.

suggested that some nuclear material existed which had not been reported to the Agency.

Owing to the serious implications of this situation, the matter was addressed in various bodies. On 8 April, the President of the Security Council issued a statement expressing the Council's concerns and reaffirming the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty and of adherence to it by the parties. Furthermore, the Council welcomed "all efforts aimed at resolving this situation and, in particular, encouraging the IAEA to continue its consultations with the DPRK and its constructive endeavours for a proper settlement of the nuclear verification issue".¹⁸ On 11 May the Security Council adopted—by a vote of 13 to none, with 2 abstentions (China and Pakistan)—resolution 825 (1993), in which it called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty and to comply with its safeguards agreement with IAEA. On 11 June, one day before the withdrawal would have taken effect, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States issued a joint statement in which the former stated its decision "unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal".¹⁹ The joint statement set out three principles in the context of which the two sides agreed to continue their dialogue: (a) assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; (b) peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, including impartial application of full-scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and (c) support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

Efforts continued with respect to implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA. The General Conference of IAEA adopted, on 1 October, a resolution²⁰ by which, *inter alia*, it expressed "its grave concern that the DPRK has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance by not accepting scheduled Agency ad hoc and routine inspections as required by its safeguards agreement with the Agency" and urged it "to cooperate immediately with the

¹⁸ S/25562.

¹⁹ *United States Department of State Dispatch*, 14 June 1993, vol. 4, No. 24.

²⁰ GC(XXXVII)/RES/624.

Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement". The Democratic People's Republic of Korea termed the resolution "unreasonable", charged the Agency with partiality and stated that "the 'nuclear issue' on the Korean peninsula is a question to be solved between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America".²¹ Further bilateral consultations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States also did not lead to the provision of additional information or to visits to additional locations. In spite of continuing efforts on the part of the international community, no progress in resolving the question of inspection was evident as of the end of the year, and consequently doubts remained concerning the nature of the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Agency continued to carry out safeguards missions in South Africa; it had undertaken 22 such missions since the conclusion of the comprehensive safeguards agreement with that State in 1991. However, a new dimension was added when President de Klerk declared,²² on 24 March, that South Africa had, in the past, developed a limited nuclear deterrent capability and had completed six nuclear fission devices, but that it had voluntarily dismantled and destroyed all of them before acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty. He stated, furthermore, that South Africa had never conducted a clandestine nuclear test and that at no time had it acquired nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, nor had it provided any to any other country, nor had it cooperated with another country in that regard. The Agency was invited, on the basis of the safeguards agreement, to verify that the programme had in fact been terminated and that all the nuclear material had been placed under safeguards. In a report on the denuclearization of Africa,²³ the Director General of IAEA stated that a team visiting those installations in April had found that the dismantling and destruction of weapons components and the destruction of the technical documentation was already nearly complete. Further, the team found no indication

²¹ A/48/548. A fuller account of the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 15 November, was circulated as document A/48/594-S/26733 and Corr.1.

²² A/48/126, annex.

²³ See the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, (A/48/339), annex II.

that there remained any sensitive components of the nuclear weapons programme which had not been either rendered useless or converted to commercial non-nuclear applications or peaceful nuclear usage. By a resolution²⁴ adopted on 1 October, the General Conference took note of the report of the Director General and requested South Africa to continue its stated policy of full transparency.

Other weapons of mass destruction

Between 13 and 15 January, the chemical weapons Convention was signed by 130 States in Paris. On 8 February, the Secretary-General convened, in The Hague, the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). During the year it worked, with the assistance of the Provisional Technical Secretariat, on the detailed procedures for the implementation of the Convention. A priority was the development, in cooperation with member States, of the mechanisms required to verify compliance; training modules for future inspectors were being prepared and training programmes were launched by a number of member States. The Provisional Technical Secretariat also assisted members in the establishment of national authorities and the preparation of national databases. By the end of 1993, 154 States had signed and 4 States had ratified the Convention.

Further strengthening of the biological weapons Convention was carried out on the basis of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference,²⁵ in which the States parties agreed to expand the confidence-building measures they had agreed to at the Second Review Conference. Among the measures decided upon under article V is the requirement that parties declare what legislation and other regulations they have enacted both to implement the provisions of the Convention and to control the export or import of pathogenic micro-organisms. By the end of 1993, 40 States parties had submitted reports to the United

²⁴ GC(XXXVII)/RES/625. The resolution is reproduced in A/48/339, annex I.

²⁵ *Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC/CONF.III/23)*. The text of the Declaration is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chapter XIII, annex.

Nations, including reports concerning their export and import of certain biological-weapons-related materials.

In addition, the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint; established by the Third Review Conference, finalized its deliberations and submitted a report to the States parties.²⁶ The Group succeeded in identifying, examining and evaluating 21 potential measures, which were categorized as follows: *off-site*: information monitoring, data exchange, remote sensing and inspections; and *on-site*: exchange visits, inspections and continuous monitoring. The Group concluded that potential verification measures as identified and evaluated could be useful to varying degrees in enhancing confidence, through increased transparency, that States parties were fulfilling their obligations, thereby strengthening the biological weapons Convention. As of the end of the year, consultations among the States parties as to whether to convene a special conference in order to consider the final report of the Ad Hoc Group were continuing, as the Third Review Conference had provided for such a conference if so requested by a majority of States parties, and it seemed that a majority of parties would indeed do so.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

At the regional level, the process of consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Caribbean through the amendments adopted in 1992 continued, and Mexico became the first State to deposit its instrument of ratification. In addition, Argentina, Brazil and Chile issued a joint declaration to the effect that the entry into force of the Treaty for those countries was imminent,²⁷ while Cuba reaffirmed that it would be ready to sign the Treaty once all the States of the region had assumed the undertakings of that Treaty.

As for the denuclearization of Africa, positive developments on the continent, especially in South Africa, enabled a group of experts to draw up a draft treaty on the denuclearization of Africa, which, it is expected, will be finalized in 1994. As far as the Middle East is

²⁶ BWC/CONF.III/VEREX.9.

²⁷ On 18 January 1994, Argentina and Chile deposited their instruments of ratification and became full parties to the Treaty.

concerned, the signing of the agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as the ongoing peace process, may have a positive impact on efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The General Conference of IAEA adopted a resolution²⁸ on 1 October entitled "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East", by which it, *inter alia*,

2. *Affirms* the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ);

3. *Calls upon* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region, and invites the countries concerned to adhere to international non-proliferation regimes, particularly the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as a means of complementing participation in a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and of strengthening peace and security in the region.

(For further details on developments in nuclear-weapon-free zones, see chapter V.)

Other control regimes

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group, meeting in Lucerne between 30 March and 1 April, reaffirmed the importance to the nuclear non-proliferation regime of the Group's guidelines on trade in nuclear-related goods and technology, and it endorsed a proposal for an amendment to those guidelines that would require IAEA safeguards on all current and future nuclear activities as a condition for any significant new supply commitments to non-nuclear-weapon States. It called again on nuclear supplier countries which had not yet adopted such a policy to do so as soon as possible. Members pledged their full cooperation to ensure the successful implementation of the comprehensive arrangement to control the export of nuclear-related dual-use goods and technology that they had adopted in 1992 in Warsaw and that had come into effect on 1 January 1993.

The Australia Group, meeting in Paris in June and December, consolidated its export control lists covering biological agents, chemical-

²⁸ GC(XXXVII)/RES/627.

weapon dual-use equipment and precursors. It reaffirmed its wish to encourage non-proliferation measures in support of relevant conventions and enhanced international trade. Nevertheless, the regime continued to be the focus of criticism on the part of developing countries that felt that restrictions on the export of chemical material perceived as having a dual use should be limited to those agreed to in the Convention. On 10 August, in the Conference on Disarmament, Australia, on behalf of the Group, reiterated its statement of 20 August 1992 to the effect that the Group was willing, upon entry into force of the Convention, to review the operation of its activities with a view to removing restrictions on transfers to States parties in good standing with regard to the Convention.

The MTCR partner countries held two plenary meetings: in Canberra in March and in Interlaken in November. They noted that their decision taken in 1992 to extend the regime's guidelines to include missiles capable of delivering *all* weapons of mass destruction was fully implemented by January 1993. They also observed that a number of countries outside the regime had declared their intention to adhere to the guidelines; appealed to others to do likewise; and urged potential exporters outside the regime to act more responsibly. On 27 September, the President Clinton stated in the General Assembly that his Government would "seek to strengthen the principles of the Missile Technology Control Regime by transforming it from an agreement on technology transfer among just 23 nations²⁹ into a set of rules that can command universal adherence". This statement was welcomed by many States.

In the light of the end of the cold war, there have been efforts to relax the restrictions of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).³⁰ At the G-7 Summit held in Tokyo in July, the United States proposed the modification of COCOM restrictions and the shifting of its focus to the Middle East and South Asia, but

²⁹ As of the end of the year there were 25 members. See footnote 8.

³⁰ COCOM, whose members now include all NATO States (except Iceland), Australia and Japan, was created in 1949 to prevent the transfer of military-useful technology to the Eastern European States by restricting the transfer of items in three categories: the industrial list (dual-use items with both civilian and military applications, including nuclear-relevant, dual-use items), the international atomic energy list (items for nuclear-weapon design and testing), and the international munition list (conventional arms).

this was not supported by all States at the meeting. However, the United States President continued to call for an easing of export controls against the Russian Federation and other States of the former Soviet Union.

There were also a number of multilateral and unilateral declarations by States on their policies regarding the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and science and technology with military applications.³¹

Consideration in disarmament forums

Although no specific item concerning non-proliferation in all its aspects appeared on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission and on that of the Conference on Disarmament, the issue was addressed in the debate in both bodies in the context of a number of agenda items.

In the Disarmament Commission many States referred to the question of non-proliferation, but differences of approach continued. These differences came to the fore especially during the consideration of the questions related to nuclear disarmament and the role of science and technology. Most industrialized countries, on the one hand, maintained that assurance of non-proliferation was essential to development of any technical cooperation among States, and the developing countries, on the other, viewed the various control regimes as discriminatory and pointed out that they had not been negotiated multilaterally.

The Conference on Disarmament continued to debate the scope, substance, form and nature of security assurances; however, owing to differing perceptions of security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, no substantive progress was made during the 1993 session. The fact that some States linked this issue with the forthcoming 1995 Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty lent urgency to efforts to reach a solution to this question prior to that Conference.

At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the danger of further proliferation of weapons and weapons technology and the

³¹ Some examples of such statements are: Joint Declaration of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems, of 25 August 1993 (A/C.1/48/8, annex); a statement of 15 December by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany on its non-proliferation policy; and the text of a decision by Romania (CD/1178, attachment).

consequent need for immediate, concerted action to curb this trend was the most prominent concern of the vast majority of States. It was mainly Western and Eastern European countries that favoured a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation, including universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty and its extension for an indefinite period. The decision of the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, agreement to negotiate, in an appropriate forum, the prohibition of production of fissile material for military purposes, and further reductions of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States were seen as developments which would facilitate efforts to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regimes. Developing countries, while sharing the general concern about non-proliferation, continued to link the question of extension of the non-proliferation Treaty to progress in nuclear disarmament and, as mentioned above, to agreement on negative security assurances. A further area of tension between a group of mainly industrialized countries, on the one hand, and developing countries, on the other, became very evident with respect to the question of export control regimes.

There was a sharp division of views on this subject during consideration of a draft resolution on chemical weapons. Controversy arose over differing approaches to implementing the provisions of the Convention on economic and technological development (article XI), alluded to in one of the preambular paragraphs, with one group contending that all restrictions would be removed among parties once the Convention entered into force, and the other group contending that that was not necessarily the case. The debate ended only with the withdrawal of the draft resolution. (For a full account of the debate, see pages 33 to 35.)

The general dialogue on technology transfers also encountered difficulties. The industrialized countries, on the one hand, called for further strengthening and broadening of the existing control regimes, while many developing countries, on the other, argued against such regimes, characterizing them—as they have done in other forums—as discriminatory in nature and aimed at limiting their technological growth.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1993

Although the question of non-proliferation was not considered as a separate item in the Disarmament Commission, it was referred to in many

statements made in the general debate as well as in the working groups, especially under two agenda items: "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" and "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields".

In a working paper by the Chairman on draft guidelines and recommendations regarding the role of science and technology, it was recommended, *inter alia*, that:

11. Commitment to, and fulfilment of, comprehensive and balanced objectives of non-proliferation in all its aspects pertaining to the acquisition or transfer of high technology relevant to weapons of mass destruction are essential for the maintenance of international security and for the promotion of transfers of such technologies for peaceful purposes.

(For more details concerning the Commission's work on this item, which is scheduled to be completed in 1994, see chapter VI, pages 180 to 182.)

In addition, at its organizational session on 9 and 14 December, the Disarmament Commission referred to the proposal made by Sweden in 1992 to include an item entitled "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction" as a new agenda item of the Commission, but no agreement was reached to include it in the agenda for 1994.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1993

Although the question of non-proliferation was not considered as a separate item in the Conference on Disarmament, it was referred to in many statements made in plenary as well as in informal meetings. However, no action was taken specifically in connection with the question.

As regards security assurances, the Conference decided on 21 January to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. On 2 February it appointed Mr. Romulus Neagu of Romania as its Chairman. The question was also referred to in plenary meetings throughout the session.

During the very intensive discussions various delegations raised the following issues: (a) the question of negative security assurances

corresponding to the interests of the entire international community and contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and to the reinforcement of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; (b) the appropriateness of a confirmation by nuclear-weapon States of positive assurances, together with negative assurances, as a follow-up to Security Council resolution 255 (1968); (c) the conclusion of negative security assurances in the form of a multilaterally negotiated treaty; (d) an agreement on a single common formula of negative security assurances as a contribution to the conclusion of such a treaty; (e) the question of exemptions in a common formula for negative security assurances; (f) a structure of a future treaty on negative security assurances; (g) verification of a future treaty on negative security assurances; and (h) the relationship between security assurances and non-proliferation commitments.

Although the formal debate and informal consultations revealed that all delegations continued to attach importance to this subject and were ready to continue to search for a mutually acceptable solution, there was no discernible change in the positions of States. However, during the session, more attention was paid to the question in the context of preparations for the 1995 Conference of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. Thus, in general, the Group of 21 stressed the urgency of achieving a multilateral agreement on negative security assurances, as progress on this issue would decisively influence the outcome of the 1995 Conference, while some other States stressed that making the outcome of that Conference the hostage of any other development would endanger the whole Treaty.

In its report,³² the Ad Hoc Committee noted that the complex nature of the issues involved, as well as, *inter alia*, differing perceptions of security interests continued to impede the work on the substance of the effective arrangements and the search for a common formula. Recognizing the importance of the question and feeling that, in the light of recent transformations in the international political climate and other positive developments, there was a need to step up efforts to agree on a common approach and to proceed to negotiations with a view to reaching agreement as soon as possible, the Committee recommended that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session of the Conference.

³² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/48/27)*, paras. 38-39.

Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty

At its forty-seventh session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 47/52 A of 9 December 1992, took note of the decision of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, following appropriate consultations, to form a preparatory committee for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and to decide on its extension, as called for in article X, paragraph 2, and also as provided in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty. The Assembly also noted that the Preparatory Committee would be open to all the parties to the Treaty.

The first session of the Preparatory Committee³³ took place at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 10 to 14 May, under the chairmanship of Mr. Jan Hoekema of the Netherlands; 128³⁴ States parties participated in its work. It was also decided that Mr. André Erdős of Hungary would serve as Chairman of the second session, and a representative of Nigeria as Chairman of a future session.

³³ See *Progress Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.I/2)*.

³⁴ The following States parties participated: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Two candidates were put forward for the presidency of the 1995 Conference: Poland was endorsed by the Group of Eastern European States, and Sri Lanka by the States members of the Non-Aligned Movement that are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

The Committee took several organizational decisions, some of which departed from previous practice. Thus, in order to ensure the largest possible participation of the parties in the Conference, the Committee decided to hold the Conference in New York instead of Geneva, from 17 April to 12 May 1995. It also decided that subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee should take place as follows: the second from 17 to 21 January 1994 in New York; the third from 12 to 16 September 1994 in Geneva; and the fourth from 23 to 27 January 1995 in New York. In addition, the Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 1995 Conference, a nomination which would later be confirmed by the Conference itself.

No decisions were, however, possible on a number of items. With respect to organizational matters pertaining to the Committee, decisions were deferred with regard to decision-making and to participation in its meetings. With respect to organization of the Conference itself, the Committee held preliminary discussions, and decided to defer decisions with regard to the draft rules of procedure, the agenda, the final document(s) and background documentation.

Under the item "Other business", the Committee heard a number of general statements concerning substantive issues related to the non-proliferation Treaty and the Conference. In that context, concern was voiced by many delegations at the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its decision to withdraw from the Treaty. Appeals were made to that State to comply with Security Council resolution 825 (1993).

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly several resolutions pertaining to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were considered.

Mexico submitted a draft resolution entitled "*General and complete disarmament*", which was later sponsored by Bolivia and Rwanda.

In introducing it on 8 November, Mexico stated that the international community had already taken major steps regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery, as shown by the adoption of the chemical weapons Convention, and discussions concerning various aspects of the subject had taken place in the United Nations and other multilateral forums. Nevertheless, the international community had not yet been able to reach agreement on what steps to take to resolve that issue more broadly; the draft resolution was aimed at placing the First Committee in a better position to consider that topic.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 94 to 5 (France, Israel, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States), with 39 abstentions.

Several States explained their position in connection with the voting. Among those voting against, France stated that the draft, far from making a positive contribution to the problem of proliferation, ran the risk of confusing the issue. In its view no new study was needed on the question of proliferation. Moreover, the real objective of the draft, as the Committee had been given to understand, was to attempt to put the nuclear Powers on trial at the very time when they were demonstrating their commitment to non-proliferation, and to undermine the non-proliferation regime at a time when it was necessary to strengthen it. The United States, also voting against the draft, associated itself with the views expressed by France. The United Kingdom, too, did not believe that the draft would be helpful and, in its view, the proposed study would be a complete waste of time and money. The Russian Federation voted against the text because of its objections both to the content and to the context in which the draft resolution had been submitted. In addition, it felt that it was undesirable to distract Governments from preparations for the 1995 Conference on the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Ireland, abstaining, stated that in the context of the preparatory work for the 1995 Conference, a further study on non-proliferation would be confusing and unnecessary.

Among those voting in favour, two States explained their position. Canada stated that it supported the draft because it understood it as simply requesting a factual paper, to be drafted by the Secretariat, which would provide useful background to informal discussions in Geneva

on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and vehicles for their delivery. Mexico was concerned that some States opposed practical steps towards progress in the area of non-proliferation. As one of the first States to support the non-proliferation Treaty, it had no desire to undermine its effects. In its view, the real problem seemed to be that some States did not want to discuss substantive issues either in the First Committee or at Geneva.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 114 to 6, with 45 abstentions, as resolution 48/75 C. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/75 C
General and complete disarmament

The General Assembly,

Aware of its role in the field of disarmament,

Aware also of the interest of the international community in continuing and intensifying consideration of the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a short report containing a brief description of the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects and to transmit it, no later than 1 May 1994, to a representative intergovernmental group of experts for its consideration and suggestions regarding further study of the question by the international community in various multilateral disarmament forums;

2. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit his report, together with the suggestions of the representative intergovernmental group of experts, to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects".

A draft resolution entitled "*Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons*" was ultimately sponsored by 103 States.³⁵ In introducing it on 4 November, the Netherlands stated that the Convention was an

³⁵ Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, /.

unprecedented, global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable agreement, the first disarmament agreement negotiated in a multilateral framework which banned an entire category of existing weapons of mass destruction. The draft resolution had one overriding objective: to bring about the swift and effective implementation of the Convention, thereby ensuring the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

Subsequently, controversy arose concerning the eighth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, which read as follows:

Convinced also that the implementation of the Convention should promote expanded international trade, technological development and economic cooperation in the chemical sector, in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States parties,

On 12 November, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which felt that the paragraph in question touched upon article 11 of the Convention in a selective way, without any reference to the need for the removal of restrictions which lay at the heart of that article, submitted an amendment by which it proposed the insertion of the phrase "and should lead to the removal of all restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention" before the words "in order to enhance". On 18 November, it proposed that its amendment be reworded to read:

and that, upon the entry into force of the Convention, States parties shall not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention.

Believing that the draft resolution in its original form was purely procedural in nature and that the amendment was contrary to, and incompatible with, the provisions of the Convention, the Netherlands requested

Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.

that no action should be taken on the amendment. Following informal consultations, the sponsors requested that their draft resolution not be put to a vote and, consequently, on 19 November, it was withdrawn.

A draft resolution entitled "*Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction*" was submitted by 36 States, later joined by 11 additional States.³⁶ In introducing it, on 5 November, Hungary stated that the biological weapons Convention was the first multilateral agreement on the elimination of one category of weapons. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Possible Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Hungary introduced the report of the Group, which had been adopted by consensus, and recalled the decision of the Third Review Conference that a conference would be convened to examine the report if the majority of States parties submitted proposals along those lines to the depositary Governments. It was Hungary's understanding that almost 40 States had already requested the convening of such a conference, hence the request in the draft that the Secretary-General should provide the depositary Governments with the necessary assistance in that connection.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 48/65. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/65

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling, in particular, its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction,

³⁶ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

Recalling also its resolution 45/35 A, adopted without a vote on 6 December 1991, in which it welcomed, *inter alia*, the establishment, proceeding from the recommendations of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of an ad hoc group of governmental experts open to all States parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint,

Noting with satisfaction that there were more than one hundred and thirty States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, including all the permanent members of the Security Council,

Recalling its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the implementation of the recommendations of the Third Review Conference, including the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, and to provide such information and data in conformity with standardized procedure to the Secretary-General on an annual basis not later than 15 April,

Recalling also the provisions of the Convention related to scientific and technological cooperation and the related provisions of the Final Document of the Third Review Conference and the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint completed its work on 24 September 1993;

2. *Commends* to all States parties the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, agreed to by consensus at its last meeting in Geneva on 24 September 1993;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Powers of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and to provide such services as may be required for the convening of a special conference should the depositary Powers be requested by a majority of States parties to convene such a conference in order to consider the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts;

4. *Welcomes* the information and data provided to date and reiterates its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction;

6. *Calls upon* all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay and also calls upon those other States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.

Nine States, later joined by three more,³⁷ submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons*". In introducing it on 16 November, Pakistan stated that until nuclear weapons were completely eliminated, the non-nuclear-weapon States must be provided with legally binding assurances that such weapons would not be used against them. Noting that the draft was similar to the corresponding resolution in 1992, Pakistan appealed to all States to work actively towards a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 142 to none, with 3 abstentions (France, United Kingdom and United States).

Among those voting in favour, Romania (which had served as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances) stated that international arrangements should take the form of a binding international agreement providing both positive and negative security assurances; however, given the difficulty of devising a universally acceptable common formula, it would be useful to envisage several approaches, such as those put forward within the Conference on Disarmament. Australia, speaking also on behalf of Canada and New Zealand, stated that they had voted in favour because it was imperative to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. However, the question could not be considered in isolation from efforts to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. France and the United Kingdom abstained because the draft did not establish the necessary relationship between the assurances re-

³⁷ Bangladesh, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Madagascar, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Viet Nam.

quired of the nuclear Powers and a legally binding commitment on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted it, also by a recorded vote, of 166 to none, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 48/73. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/73

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Welcoming the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament,

Noting that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Determined to abide strictly by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States

against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament, submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as of the report of the Conference on its 1992 session,

Recalling also paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Taking note of the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note also of the decision adopted by the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communiqué of the Twentieth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Istanbul from 4 to 8 August 1991, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Taking note further of the unilateral declarations made by all nuclear-weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

Noting also the greater willingness to overcome the difficulties encountered in previous years,

Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4 December 1990, 46/32 of 6 December 1991 and 47/50 of 9 December 1992,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends also* that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Conclusion

The question of non-proliferation continued to be one of the most prominent disarmament issues at the bilateral, regional and global levels in 1993. As the threat of nuclear confrontation diminished with the end of the cold war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the transfer of military technology emerged as the dominant challenge to international security. A number of international treaties—the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention, the chemical weapons Convention, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga)—as well as several control regimes—the MTCR, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group—impose non-proliferation regimes with respect to various categories of weapons and weapons

systems. Issues related to the implementation or to the broadening of those regimes were a focus of attention in different disarmament forums throughout the year.

With regard to issues related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, there were a number of positive and negative developments. The accession of additional States—among them one having nuclear weapons on its territory—to the non-proliferation Treaty, implementation of safeguards agreements in the case of Iraq and South Africa, and the preparations for the 1995 Conference of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty were seen, by the vast majority of States, as contributing to a further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime; there was, however, growing concern over the continuing refusal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection and it was noted that neither Kazakhstan nor Ukraine had yet acceded to the Treaty. In addition, it was evident from the debate in the Disarmament Commission, the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament that different views among States regarding the future of the Treaty persisted. While many expressed their readiness to seek the broadest possible consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and to strive for the extension of the Treaty for an indefinite period, others emphasized that the future of the regime depended on several factors, such as further reductions in the existing nuclear arsenals, leading to their complete elimination; conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; and agreement on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The opening for signature of the chemical weapons Convention on 13 January marked a historic achievement in multilateral arms limitation and disarmament efforts, and by the end of the year 154 States had signed the Convention. Early in the year, the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons began to work out detailed procedures for the implementation of the Convention.

As far as the bacteriological (biological) weapons Convention was concerned, the submission of information by States parties on their relevant activities, in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, expanded transparency and built confidence among them. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts appointed to examine potential verification measures from a technical viewpoint concluded that the measures it had so identified and evaluated could

be useful in strengthening the Convention. The work of the experts was welcomed by the vast majority of States, and it appeared, by the end of the year, that a special conference of the States parties to examine the question would be convened in the near future.

At the regional level, the process of consolidation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco continued. Positive developments in Africa enabled a group of experts to draw up a draft treaty on the denuclearization of Africa, which, it is expected, they will finalize in 1994.

Controversy over the transfer of technology—an issue which divided States mainly along North-South lines—was very evident in debates in almost all forums. While States participating in the existing control regimes called for the further strengthening and broadening of their scope, many developing States argued against such restrictions, characterizing them as discriminatory. Therefore, the future of non-proliferation will depend upon striking a balance between curbing the transfer of dual-use technology and meeting the legitimate right of the developing States to enjoy the benefits of such technology for peaceful purposes.

There was no discernible progress regarding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although many States, especially members of the Conference on Disarmament, expressed their readiness to continue to search for a mutually acceptable solution. The question has gained urgency inasmuch as its solution could decisively influence the outcome of the 1995 Conference.

The General Assembly adopted three resolutions concerning non-proliferation in the broad sense, reflecting, on the one hand, a common view concerning the biological weapons Convention and negative security assurances and, on the other, divergent views concerning the appropriateness of undertaking a study on non-proliferation at this juncture. In spite of the fact that the General Assembly had, in 1992, adopted by consensus a resolution endorsing the chemical weapons Convention, the First Committee could not, in 1993, reach consensus on a corresponding draft resolution owing to differences in approach between industrialized and developing countries, and therefore the Assembly took no action on the matter.

CHAPTER II

Comprehensive test-ban treaty

Introduction

SINCE THE 1950s, the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been a prime objective of the United Nations. It has been a separate agenda item of the General Assembly each year since 1957. The General Assembly has adopted scores of resolutions calling for an end to nuclear-weapon testing—far more than on other issues of disarmament. In addition, the question has been dealt with in several other multilateral disarmament bodies and has been the object of bilateral (USSR and United States) and trilateral (USSR, United Kingdom and United States) negotiations.¹

A first step towards the goal of cessation of tests was the conclusion in 1963 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water² (the partial test-ban Treaty). The original parties to the Treaty, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, proclaim in the preamble of that Treaty

¹ For a detailed treatment of the subject up to 1980, see “Comprehensive nuclear test ban: report of the Secretary-General”, document CD/86 of the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament, later reproduced as a document of the General Assembly (A/35/257). See also the *Report of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water* (PTBT/CONF/13/Rev.1, document PTBT/CONF/5. The Conference was held at United Nations Headquarters in January 1991. See, in addition, *The Yearbook*, vols. 16: 1991 and 17: 1992.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964. The text is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11) (hereinafter referred to as *Status*), vol. 1.

that they seek to achieve “the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time” and will continue negotiations to that end. The other two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, have not become parties to it but, since 1974 and 1980 respectively, they have in fact conducted only underground tests. France, in 1974, and China, in 1986, stated formally that they would not conduct further atmospheric tests.

The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons³ recalls, in its preamble, the objective set out in the partial test-ban Treaty and, by its article VI, its parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. At the Fourth Review Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, in 1990,⁴ a comprehensive test ban was widely held to be an essential element in the implementation of that article. However, mainly because of differences of view over the urgency of negotiating such a ban, the Conference was unable to agree on a final declaration.

In 1974 the Soviet Union and the United States signed a bilateral Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,⁵ known as the threshold test-ban Treaty; and in 1976 they signed the complementary Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,⁶ known as the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The two Treaties entered into force in 1990, following years of negotiations on related verification measures.⁷

In 1977, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States began trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty. The last progress report on those negotiations,⁸ submitted

³ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text is also reproduced in *Status*, vol. 1.

⁴ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chap. VII.

⁵ Circulated in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/431.

⁶ Circulated as a document of the General Assembly (A/31/125). The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, appendix III.

⁷ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chap. VIII.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), document CD/130.

in 1980 to the multilateral negotiating body, the then Committee on Disarmament, indicated considerable areas of agreement, but the negotiations were never resumed.

The Geneva multilateral negotiating body has long been involved with the issue of a test ban. In 1976 its Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was established to address the seismic aspect of verification on the basis of a global network. It continues to meet.

In 1982 the negotiating body first established an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban with a limited mandate. It made no tangible progress, however, because of disagreement over that mandate. Agreement on a compromise mandate was finally achieved in 1990. That year, and again in 1991, the Ad Hoc Committee had discussions which touched upon the major issues of a nuclear-test ban in considerable detail. In 1992, the Ad Hoc Committee was not re-established because of new divergences of view on the subject of its mandate.

After several years of debate, it was decided in 1990, in accordance with article II of the partial test-ban Treaty, to convene a conference of the States parties to consider a proposed amendment: the conversion of the Treaty into a comprehensive legal instrument. The Conference, held at United Nations Headquarters from 7 to 18 January 1991, concluded that further work needed to be undertaken.⁹

Nuclear-weapon testing continued after the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty because the States concerned felt that, in the circumstances, their individual security interests were promoted by developing new nuclear weapons, further refining existing ones or confirming the effectiveness and safety of their stocks. The Soviet Union attempted to break the persistent pattern of continued testing when, on 6 August 1985, it unilaterally halted all of its nuclear explosive testing for a limited time and called upon the United States to do the same. The Soviet moratorium, subsequently renewed a number of times, was eventually maintained for a period totalling 18 months. The United States did not join in the moratorium. However, between 1988 and 1992, there was a progressive and considerable reduction in the total number of nuclear explosive tests conducted by all the nuclear-weapon States.

⁹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. VIII.

Specifically, in February 1991, the USSR indicated a willingness to move to increasingly lower numbers of tests—perhaps four per year—and to lower thresholds. In March, the United States said that the next steps were under study. In October, the USSR unilaterally declared an immediate one-year moratorium on testing. This led, in 1992, to the declaration of unilateral moratoriums by a number of States. (See page 47.)

Developments and trends, 1993

On 10 August, the Conference on Disarmament took a landmark decision, namely, to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It thereupon requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to conduct consultations in the intersessional period—between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994—on the specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiation. By the end of 1993, the draft mandate was ready for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament. It reads as follows:

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled “Nuclear Test Ban”, and to give priority to its work.

The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee to establish the necessary working groups in order to carry forward effectively this negotiating mandate: these should include at least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and institutional issues, which should be established in the initial stage of the negotiation, and any others which the Committee may subsequently decide upon.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1994 session.¹⁰

During the year, developments took place on the subject of moratoriums on testing, pending the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which were closely connected with steps taken the year before. In fact, in 1992, unilateral moratoriums on testing were declared or extended by three nuclear-weapon States, as follows. On 8 April, France decided to suspend its testing of nuclear weapons until the end of 1992. On 24 September, the United States Congress took a decision to the effect that no underground test of nuclear weapons might be conducted after 30 September 1992 and before 1 July 1993; the United States legislation, furthermore, placed limits on the number of tests to be permitted annually after 1 July 1993 and prohibited testing after 30 September 1996, unless a foreign State conducted a nuclear test after that date. In addition, the Russian Federation decided to extend its one-year unilateral moratorium, which had been declared on 5 October 1991,¹¹ to 1 July 1993.

On 2 July 1993, President Clinton decided to extend the United States moratorium on nuclear testing, at least until the end of September 1994, as long as no other nation tested, and called on the other nuclear Powers to do the same. If those nations were to join the United States in observing the moratorium, the President said, the five nuclear Powers would be in the strongest possible position to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and to discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals. If, however, the moratorium was broken by another nation, approval would be sought from Congress for additional tests.¹² Following this announcement, the other ongoing moratoriums were strengthened by statements indicating the intention to extend them.

On 5 August, Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, in a message on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, recalling that

¹⁰ The mandate was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament on 25 January 1994, without any change (CD/1238).

¹¹ The statement of President Gorbachev announcing the initial moratorium is reproduced in document A/46/592-S/23161, annex.

¹² CD/1205. Excerpts from the statement are reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XVI, number 2 (1993).

the 1991 Amendment Conference had empowered its President to consult with the States parties to the Treaty on the subject of a possible resumption of the work of the Conference, indicated that he, as President of that Conference, would convene a special meeting of the parties on 10 and 11 August in New York, expressly for the purpose of examining the feasibility of reconvening the Amendment Conference later in 1993.¹³

On 9 August, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher, wrote a letter to Foreign Minister Alatas, indicating that the United States looked favourably on the Conference on Disarmament as the forum for the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Global support for such a treaty would be more difficult to secure if the Conference on Disarmament—the recognized multilateral arms control negotiating body—were excluded. The Secretary of State held that the Amendment Conference would not be the most effective forum in which to accomplish that goal, both because of membership—China and France are not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty—and procedural constraints and because of the risk of opening the Treaty for other amendments. Later on, the Secretary of State concluded, there might be other helpful steps the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty could take to move the international community to join a comprehensive test-ban treaty.¹⁴

At the special meeting of the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty held on 10 August, there was a consensus that the work on a comprehensive test ban in the different forums, and especially the Amendment Conference and the Conference on Disarmament, should be mutually supportive and mutually complementary. There was also broad agreement that the President of the Amendment Conference should continue his consultations with the States parties as well as with States not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty and should hold another special meeting early in 1994 in order to review developments and assess the situation and to examine the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference later that year.¹⁵

¹³ A/48/297, annex.

¹⁴ Text provided to the United Nations by the Permanent Mission of Indonesia. Excerpts are reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XVI, number 2 (1993).

¹⁵ A/48/381, annex.

A meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session of the General Assembly was held at United Nations Headquarters on 4 October. In the communiqué of the meeting (covering some forty different items on the agenda of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly), the participants underscored the value of a *de facto* moratorium on nuclear tests and, at the same time, the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to work towards a comprehensive test ban. They endorsed the work of the Amendment Conference in seeking the discontinuance of all tests in all environments and for all time. They also endorsed the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate such a ban. They further affirmed that the pursuit of this objective under the auspices of the Amendment Conference and the Conference on Disarmament was mutually supportive and complementary. They stressed the importance of the expeditious conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, in view of the contribution it could make to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear non-proliferation.¹⁶

On 5 October, China conducted an underground nuclear test. In this connection, the Government of China made a statement¹⁷ to the effect (a) that it was entirely for the purpose of self-defence that China possessed a small number of nuclear weapons and (b) that China had all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban in that context. Proceeding from this basic position, the Government stated, China had always exercised utmost restraint in nuclear testing and the number of the nuclear tests it had conducted was extremely limited.

China fully understood, the statement went on, the sincere desire of the non-nuclear-weapon States for an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty through negotiations, and it believed that such a treaty would have positive significance. China would take an active part in the negotiating process and work together with other countries to conclude the treaty no later than 1996. After it had been concluded and had come into effect, China would abide by it and carry

¹⁶ A/48/484-S/26552, annex. See also, with regard to nuclear testing, document A/48/359 containing the communiqué of the Twenty-Fourth South Pacific Forum.

¹⁷ A/C.1/48/3, annex.

out no more nuclear tests. At the same time, China believed that a pledge by all nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons at all would be of even greater significance as it was a more effective step towards the non-proliferation goal underscored by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. To that end, China strongly called for a parallel negotiation by all nuclear-weapon States aimed at concluding an international convention on unconditional non-first-use and non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons' against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Several States, either at the time the text was announced or later in the First Committee, voiced disappointment that nuclear testing had been resumed by China. In particular, the United States deeply regretted the test and urged China to refrain from future tests. In addition, the President ordered the United States Department of Energy to take such actions as might be necessary to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests in 1994. France made it clear that it would consult with other nuclear-weapon States before announcing any policy changes with regard to the ongoing moratorium on tests. The United Kingdom also regretted the Chinese test, but did not see it as a set-back for the prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Government of the Russian Federation, in a statement issued on 21 October,¹⁸ expressed deep regret over the Chinese test. It declared its intention to continue to adhere to the nuclear-testing moratorium, of which it had been the initiator, while retaining the right to reconsider its decision in the event of a further unfavourable development of the situation in the nuclear-testing area. Mexico lamented the resumption of nuclear testing on the part of China as a step backwards and called on other nuclear-weapon States to continue to observe their unilateral moratoriums.¹⁹

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1993

The most important development in the Conference on Disarmament in 1993 was its decision, on 10 August, to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban—in the work of which France participated for

¹⁸ A/C.1/48/6, annex.

¹⁹ A/C.1/48/4.

the first time—a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The decision read as follows:

The Conference on Disarmament,

Taking note of initiatives regarding the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTB),

Convinced that, to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security, a CTB should be universal and internationally and effectively verifiable,

Convinced further that, in order to achieve this goal, it is important that a CTB be multilaterally negotiated,

Stressing that, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, it is the appropriate forum for negotiating a CTB,

Decides to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTB;

Requests the Chairman of its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to make the necessary arrangements to conduct consultations during the period between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994 on the specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiation.²⁰

The decision initiated a process of consultation, led by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for 1993, Mr. Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan, on the adoption of specific wording for a negotiating mandate and on organizing the negotiations, which would begin in January 1994. Consequently, the Chairman proposed that, for the period from the end of the 1993 session to the beginning of the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly (3 September–18 October), delegations carry out consultations among themselves on both the mandate and the organization of the negotiations. He also intended to hold open-ended consultations (to include non-members of the Conference) for a period no longer than three weeks starting immediately after the conclusion of the work of the First Committee.

Late in the session, the Ad Hoc Committee also discussed, in a general way, a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty proposed by

²⁰ CD/1212.

Sweden,²¹ for which verification protocols were yet to be prepared.

In addition to the intense activity that surrounded the adoption of the political decision itself to give the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate, a great deal of attention was devoted to questions related to verification—a crucial element of the future treaty.²² It was generally recognized that in order to ensure compliance with a future test ban, an effective, internationally applicable verification system would be required. The Committee did not consider the scope of or the requirements for a verification regime. A number of delegations noted that the amount of work to be done—which could be substantial—depended on future decisions on the scope of the prohibition and on requirements of the verification regime. At the same time, a number of delegations held that adequate verification technologies were already available. A view was also expressed that remaining difficulties might be more political than technical in nature. Some of the issues that preoccupied delegations during the session were: the substantial role that a global seismic monitoring network would have, especially in the underground test environment; the possible use of additional non-seismic verification technologies for the detection of nuclear tests in various environments, particularly in relation to evasion scenarios, and the possible use of such techniques for the detection of pre-testing preparations; the costs of a future verification system *vis-à-vis* its capabilities; the implementing agency, its powers and functions and costs; the close interrelationship of applicable verification techniques and the scope of obligations under the treaty; and a possible mix of national and international means of verification, taking into account cost effectiveness.

Continuing their work on the subject of verification, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events held its thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions in February and August, respectively.

²¹ CD/1202.

²² Two documents related to verification (CD/1199 and CD/1201) were submitted by Canada, and a large number of working papers were submitted by Australia, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.

During its first session, the Group completed a comprehensive seismological evaluation of its Second Technical Test (GSETT-2).²³ Taking into account that evaluation, it also focused on the reassessment of the initial concept of a global system for the exchange of seismic data worked out in 1989.²⁴ The experts considered that the main elements of the envisaged global system could be divided into three components: a global network of stations, national data centres and an international data centre, and that, in contrast to the situation prevailing only a few years ago, the technology to support the GSE high-speed communication needs was now available and could easily be implemented in the global system. Upon the invitation of the Conference on Disarmament, a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency made, for the first time, a presentation to the Group; the experts considered that their contact with IAEA should be maintained.

At its second session, the Ad Hoc Group continued its reassessment of the concept of a global system, focusing on the overall design and plans for future testing of the concept.²⁵ The Group discussed the schedule and plans for developing, testing and evaluating an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System. This effort, referred to as GSETT-3, is already under way and the Group intends to start full-scale testing on a global scale by 1 January 1995. The Group considered the cost of establishing and operating seismological systems and focused on the experimental system to be utilized during GSETT-3. It also studied a number of proposals for work in the areas of seismic event identification methods and for the expansion of its mandate to include the consideration of non-seismic methods of verification for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. No consensus was reached on these proposals, and the Chairman of the Group, Mr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden, is to consult on them before the Group's next session.

In introducing the progress report of the August session, Mr. Dahlman briefly traced the evolution of the Group, as established by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1976. He stated that

²³ Contained in document GSE/35/CRP.228 of 2 March 1993, a summary of which is annexed to its progress report (CD/1185).

²⁴ See the fifth report of the Ad Hoc Group (CD/903).

²⁵ A summary is annexed to the Group's Progress Report of 10 August 1993 (CD/1211).

GSETT-3 would provide valuable information and experience that would be made available to the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee while they were focusing their efforts on the conclusion of a test ban.

There was a widely held view that, while seismic monitoring should form the core of the verification system of the future comprehensive test-ban treaty, monitoring by seismic means alone might not give confidence in compliance. Hence in response to different proposals put forward by Australia and Germany, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to explore non-seismic technologies. Twenty expert presentations were delivered, covering a wide range of technologies, such as hydroacoustic monitoring, surveillance of atmospheric radioactivity, satellite and aerial monitoring, electromagnetic pulse measurement, infrasound measurement of the atmosphere, on-site observations, chemical detection techniques, static and time variant three-dimensional resistivity measurements and transparency measures.

Following the conclusion of the 1993 session, consultations concerning the mandate were conducted, as mentioned above. In addition, further documents related to a test ban were circulated.

On 1 December, Mexico, as the Coordinator of the Group of 21 on the item "Nuclear test ban", submitted a working paper by the Group entitled "Conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".²⁶ In the paper, the Group of 21 stated that:

(1) The treaty should define in general terms the prohibition of nuclear tests in all environments and forever. It should avoid a detailed definition of what is a nuclear test. The treaty, therefore, should eliminate any possibility of carrying out nuclear tests in any environment and it should be of unlimited duration.

(2) The CTBT to be developed must be non-discriminatory in character in the sense of providing equal rights and obligations to the States parties to the proposed treaty.

(3) An internationally supervised and effective verification [system] should be sought. The decision on the verification system to be incorporated in the treaty should not complicate the entry into force of the prohibition. It is generally accepted that seismic verification will constitute the central element of the future system and that it should be its point of departure.

²⁶ CD/1231.

(4) The verification regime should be capable of dissuading would-be violators. The treaty should also contemplate a series of sanctions.

(5) The treaty should not contain any provision that could be interpreted as restricting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

On 6 December, Sweden submitted a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty²⁷—a revision of the draft treaty text which it had submitted on 3 June. The revision incorporated several additional articles, the prohibition on the “preparing” of any nuclear explosion and a protocol on verification. Verification of compliance with the treaty would be entrusted to IAEA, and each State party would set up a national authority to serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Agency and with other States parties. The protocol obligates each State party to undertake to participate in the establishment and operation of an international monitoring system comprising seismological and non-seismological elements, and provides for procedures for on-site inspections and monitoring. (The text of the revised draft treaty is reproduced in appendix IV.)

On 9 December, during the intersessional consultations, Australia introduced a draft structural outline for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.²⁸ The structure was envisaged as follows: preamble, 16 articles covering: basic obligations, declarations, the Organization, national implementation measures and assistance, verification, settlement of disputes, non-compliance, privileges and immunities, status of protocols, entry into force, reservations, duration and withdrawal, review, amendments, depositary, and authentic texts. The outline also provided for three protocols to deal respectively with: the Organization, global monitoring and verification, and procedures for on-site inspections and monitoring. In addition, the paper suggested a division of labour between the two working groups provided for in the mandate and initial tasks that each might undertake as early as possible after the commencement of the session.

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

At its 1993 session, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the cessation of nuclear tests. At the time that it took up this question,

²⁷ CD/1232.

²⁸ CD/1235 and Corr.1.

it had before it a note²⁹ by the Secretary-General on the notification of tests.

On 10 November, a draft resolution entitled "*Comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty*" was submitted by 104 countries.³⁰ It was subsequently sponsored by 53 additional countries.³¹

The draft resolution was introduced on 8 November by the representative of Australia, who, speaking on behalf of the principal promoters of the draft—Australia, Mexico and New Zealand—stressed that they had made efforts to produce a text which could be supported by the entire international community. It was therefore to be hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted without a vote. Mexico added that, to that end, the promoters had introduced appropriate changes to the text of previous years. New Zealand further emphasized that the draft reflected a new climate prevailing as a result of the decision

²⁹ A/48/171 and Add.1 and 2.

³⁰ Afghanistan Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Congo, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

³¹ Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Niger, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United States, Venezuela and Zaire.

by the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

On 19 November, the draft resolution was approved by the First Committee without a vote. In this connection, several countries explained their position. The Czech Republic expressed regret over the Chinese test of 5 October which, as recorded by Czech seismological stations, appeared to have been of a high magnitude; the Czech Republic would continue to contribute its seismological know-how to efforts to ensure reliable detection of tests and achievement of a test ban. Australia stressed that the atmosphere for successful negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty had never been more propitious. Indonesia said that the members of the Non-Aligned Movement parties to the non-proliferation Treaty welcomed the consensus adoption of the draft resolution. They hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would conclude a test-ban treaty before the end of the 1994 session, since that would influence the outcome in 1995 of the review and extension Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty. The Philippines concurred with the statements of the representatives of Australia, Indonesia and the Czech Republic. Although the United Kingdom realized that the complexity of some of the issues related to the negotiation of a test ban might necessitate intersessional meetings, it hoped that any additional costs would be met by redeployment of existing resources.

China stated that it would play an active role in the negotiations on a test ban. It further believed that negotiations on the issue of no-first-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States should also be conducted and international agreements concluded.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that the elimination of nuclear weapons on a step-by-step basis was even more important than a test ban. For that reason, it wanted to raise the issue of nuclear weapons deployed in foreign countries and hoped that its support of the resolution would contribute to the reduction of all nuclear weapons.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 48/70. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/70
Comprehensive test-ban treaty

The General Assembly,

Recalling that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is one of the priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty that will attract the adherence of all States and will contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security,

Convinced also that the exercise of utmost restraint in respect of nuclear testing would be consistent with the objective of an international negotiation of a comprehensive test ban,

Noting the aspirations expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, which are recalled in the preamble to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the willingness of all nuclear-weapon States as well as the rest of the international community to pursue the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

Noting with satisfaction the initiation in 1993 by the Conference on Disarmament of work under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear Test Ban", and the programme of substantive work subsequently undertaken within its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban,

Noting also the ongoing activity of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,

1. *Welcomes* the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993 to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, and fully endorses the contents of that decision;

2. *Calls upon* participants in the Conference on Disarmament to approach the inter-sessional consultations mandated by that decision in a positive and constructive light;

3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament at the commencement of its 1994 session to re-establish, with an appropriate negotiating mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee on its agenda item entitled "Nuclear test ban";

4. *Calls upon* all States to support the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive test-ban treaty;

5. *Also urges* the Conference on Disarmament to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of such a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the provision to the Conference on Disarmament of additional administrative, substantive and conference support services for these negotiations;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Comprehensive test-ban treaty".

A draft resolution "*Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water*" was submitted by 21 countries.³² Subsequently, it was sponsored by five additional countries.³³

The draft was introduced by Mexico on 8 November, which stressed that both the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon States were determined to conclude a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests. It was to be hoped, therefore, that the draft resolution would receive the fullest support of the members of the First Committee.

On 16 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 99 to 3 (Israel, United Kingdom and United States), with 40 abstentions.

In connection with the vote, the United States said that it had voted against the draft resolution because it did not think that a conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty was the appropriate venue for negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Moreover, the fact that some of the provisions of the resolution implied a lack of confidence in the Conference on Disarmament as a forum for negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was not likely to promote the success of the exercise.

The Russian Federation said that it had abstained because it thought that it should have been possible to adopt a single consensus resolution on the question of nuclear-weapon tests. Now that the Confer-

³² Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela.

³³ Bolivia, Ecuador, Gabon, Rwanda and Sudan.

ence had reached agreement that negotiations on a test ban would take place in the Conference on Disarmament, there was no justification for the process of amending the partial test-ban Treaty, a process which would divert attention from the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament and give the impression that there was a realistic alternative to those negotiations. There was, in fact, no alternative, inasmuch as two nuclear Powers, China and France, were not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty and the three original parties were not in favour of amending it.

New Zealand, Canada and Australia felt deeply committed to the cause of nuclear disarmament and, therefore, had very much regretted having to abstain in the vote. However, the text of the draft resolution, in particular the preamble, did not faithfully reflect the substance of the discussions that had taken place and the conclusions that had been reached at the August meeting of the States parties to the Treaty.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 118 to 3, with 45 abstentions as resolution 48/69. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/69

Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 44/106 of 15 December 1989, 45/50 of 4 December 1990, 46/28 of 6 December 1991 and 47/46 of 9 December 1992,

Reiterating its conviction that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the highest-priority measure for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and for the achievement of the objective of nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the central role of the United Nations in the field of nuclear disarmament and in particular in the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, as well as the persistent efforts of non-governmental organizations in the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Conscious of the growing environmental concerns throughout the world and of the past and potential negative effects of nuclear testing on the environment,

Recalling its resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, in which it noted with approval the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed on 5 August 1963, and requested

the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble to the Treaty,

Recalling also that more than one third of the parties to the Treaty requested the Depositary Governments to convene a conference to consider an amendment that would convert the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

Recalling further that a substantive session of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was held in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991,

Reiterating its conviction that the Amendment Conference will facilitate the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Treaty and thus serve to strengthen it,

Noting with satisfaction the unilateral nuclear-test moratoria announced by several nuclear-weapon States,

Welcoming the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban,

Recalling its recommendation that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continue, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is achieved, and its call that all parties participate in, and contribute to the success of, the Amendment Conference,

Recalling also the decision adopted by the Amendment Conference to the effect that, since further work needed to be undertaken on certain aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, especially those with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, the President of the Conference should conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and to resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time,

Welcoming the ongoing consultations being conducted by the President of the Amendment Conference,

1. *Notes* the concluding statement made by the President of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water at the special meeting of the States parties held on 10 August 1993, in which broad agreement was found for:

(a) Pursuing work for a comprehensive test ban in the Amendment Conference and the Conference on Disarmament in a mutually supportive and mutually complementary manner;

(b) Holding another special meeting early in 1994 to review developments and assess the situation regarding a comprehensive test ban and to exam-

ine the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference later that year;

(c) Promoting universality of a comprehensive test ban by having the President of the Amendment Conference liaise closely with the Conference on Disarmament and the five nuclear-weapon States;

2. *Recommends* that arrangements be made to ensure the fullest possible participation of non-governmental organizations in the Amendment Conference;

3. *Reiterates its conviction* that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear-test explosions through an agreed moratorium or unilateral moratoria;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water".

Conclusion

In 1993, the most important development in the cessation of tests was the decision by the Conference on Disarmament, late in the session, to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

In endorsing that decision of the Conference on 16 December, the General Assembly adopted unanimously a resolution entitled "Comprehensive test-ban treaty". As the President of the General Assembly stated when the resolution was adopted, "it was surely a historic occasion". By its resolution, the General Assembly urged the Conference on Disarmament at the commencement of its 1994 session to re-establish, with an appropriate negotiating mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and "to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of such a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty".

Transparency and the Arms Register

Introduction

TRANSPARENCY, that is, the systematic provision of information under informal or formal international arrangements—like verification—was not until recently a concept closely associated with the rather secretive field of armaments. Advanced technology has, however, brought such changes in weaponry and altered the understanding of national security so greatly that what was valid yesterday is no longer the rule today. Indeed, in a world that has become much more integrated economically and politically, a world in which security in isolation is no longer possible, there are serious reasons for introducing a large measure of transparency (and the same is true of verification) in matters related to defence policies and armaments, with a view to reducing misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities and thereby contributing to the development of trust and more stable relations between States. For these reasons, the General Assembly has, in many ways, promoted transparency in armaments as part of the general process of confidence-building.¹

In 1988, the Assembly endorsed specific guidelines, as recommended by the Disarmament Commission, on the subject of confidence-building,² with a view to strengthening international peace and security and facilitating the process of arms limitation and disarmament. In the words of the guidelines:

¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, chap. IV.

² “Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level”. The guidelines were adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1988 and were endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 43/78 H. For the text of the guidelines, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 13: 1988, chap. III, annex.

2.3.5. Exchange or provision of relevant information on armed forces and armaments as well as on pertinent military activities plays an important role in the process of arms limitation and disarmament and of confidence-building. Such an exchange or provision could promote trust among States and reduce the occurrence of dangerous misconceptions about the intentions of States. Exchange of provision of information in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building should be appropriately verifiable as provided for in respective arrangements, agreements or treaties.

In 1988 the General Assembly mandated an expert study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis (resolution 43/75 I). The study, which was completed and transmitted to the Assembly through the Secretary-General in 1991,³ analysed and underscored the positive impact of transparency in that area. Its main recommendation was that a universal and non-discriminatory arms transfer register should be established by the United Nations as soon as possible. The register should be so designed and maintained as to provide meaningful information with regard to building confidence, promoting restraint in arms transfers on a unilateral, bilateral or multilateral basis, enhancing security at lower levels of armaments and allowing timely identification of trends in arms transfers.

By resolution 46/36 L of 1991, particularly its operative paragraphs 7, 10 and 18 and annex, the General Assembly welcomed the study submitted by the Secretary-General and requested him to establish and maintain at United Nations Headquarters a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include not only data on international arms transfers but also information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies. In brief, the General Assembly advocated a policy of *transparency in armaments*.

By resolution 46/36 L the General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to elaborate, with the assistance of a panel of governmental technical experts, technical procedures for the effective operation of the Register and to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of its scope. The Panel's report⁴ consists of three parts. Part I elaborates

³ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. XV. The study was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.93.IX.6).

⁴ A/47/342 and Corr. 1, annex.

the technical procedures for the standardized reporting of data on international transfers of seven categories of conventional arms identified in the annex to the resolution (see page 69). Furthermore, this part of the report describes the manner in which Member States wishing to do so may communicate to the United Nations available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies. Part II addresses modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register through, for example, the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Part III deals with the resource implications for the development, upgrading and maintenance of the Register by the United Nations, through the Centre for Disarmament Affairs.

In 1992, the Disarmament Commission adopted "Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters",⁵ which were endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 47/54 B. Among the recommendations made in the guidelines, the following touch upon the question of transparency in armaments:

12. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms should be operated and further developed on the basis of the relevant resolution of the General Assembly and the process set out therein, which is commended to the Member States;

13. States should, in the meantime, take practical measures, on the basis of existing agreements, where applicable, and within appropriate forums, to increase openness and transparency in military matters through the provision of objective information, including on nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the transfer of high technology with military applications, imports and exports of conventional arms, military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.

Developments and trends, 1993

In its resolution 47/52 L of 1992, the General Assembly declared its determination to ensure the effective operation of the Register of Conventional Arms and called upon all Member States to provide the

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/47/42)*. The *guidelines* are reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, chap. IV.

requested data and information to the Secretary-General by 30 April annually, beginning in 1993.⁶

On the question of the relationship of the Register to conventional disarmament, the point was raised, at the 1993 annual session of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, that the Register could make an even greater contribution to the strengthening of security if it eventually led to actual reductions of weapons. In this regard, the Conference on Disarmament could also contribute by developing general guidelines on the reduction or control of conventional arms within the regional context.⁷

Although the Register, which is dealt with in the following sections, was the focus of attention in discussions on transparency, there was movement in other areas as well.

Efforts were renewed to achieve wider participation in the United Nations voluntary system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, in which, in 1980, the General Assembly had recommended that Member States take part.⁸ In the light of recent progress achieved in arms limitation and disarmament, the general improvement in international relations and the adoption in 1992 of the guidelines on objective information on military matters, it was felt by many that an increased exchange of information on military expenditures would contribute to the predictability of military activities, thus strengthening international peace and security. (For a discussion of these efforts, see pages 86 and 88.)

Furthermore, as recent developments continued to underscore the importance of effective verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, the General Assembly, in its resolution 48/68, requested the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a new study on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, as a follow-up to the 1990 study on the subject.⁹ (For details concerning the new study, see pages 88 to 92.)

⁶ Resolution 47/52 L refers to the 1991 resolution 46/36 L; see also the Introduction above and *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. XV.

⁷ A/48/325, para. 7 (g).

⁸ See resolution 35/142 B.

⁹ United Nations publication (Sales No. E.91.IX.11).

Interest in verification was also evident in the context of specific agreements. With respect to the biological weapons Convention, the identification and examination of potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint continued during the year, and the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts charged with this task completed its work on 24 September. The report of the experts is discussed in chapter I, page 23. With respect to the inhumane weapons Convention, the lack of a verification mechanism, especially in connection with Protocol II, was a source of concern to States parties and was one of the issues discussed in connection with the forthcoming Review Conference of that Convention (see chapter VII).

Regional workshops on the Register

Between January and April the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs conducted four regional workshops on the Register: in Tokyo, for Asia and Oceania; in Buenos Aires, for Latin America; in Warsaw, for Eastern Europe; and in Florence, for the Mediterranean region. The aim of these workshops was to bring together officials responsible for their Governments' reporting to the Register—frequently drawn from Member States' Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence—in order to clarify the basic elements of the Register and to address questions and concerns of Member States with a view to facilitating broad participation.

The response to this initiative was very positive. The meetings were attended by a large number of officials from the regions addressed in the respective workshops, by members of the above-mentioned Panel of governmental technical experts, which in 1992 had devised the technical procedures for the effective operation of the Register, as well as by officials or experts from China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The workshops were conducted in an informal manner, generally consisting of (a) a presentation of the Register in its historical and operational aspects; (b) a presentation of current information, available to the public, on arms transfers specific to the region in question and discussion on ways of promoting further transparency; (c) a simulation exercise on the reporting requirements, allowing participants to work through theoretical examples of transfers in order to familiarize themselves with the reporting requirements; and (d) presentations by partici-

pants of their Governments' views on the Register and prospects for further elaboration of its scope.

There was wide recognition at the workshops that, although the Register was not a disarmament measure, its establishment placed the issue of internal or international procurement of arms in a multilateral context, thereby manifesting a clear collective international interest in the question; that the main focus of this international interest, as it emerged from the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly, was the challenge which excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms presented to international peace and security; that the Register, being a confidence-building measure, addressed this concern solely with the aim of promoting a readiness to exercise restraint in the process of accumulating arms; that being a low-key, incremental and long-term measure, the Register had the potential to be an effective instrument of preventive diplomacy, if fully supported and developed over a period of years.

It was also generally felt that the Register had a number of important potential effects: it could promote the establishment or further elaboration by States of legal instruments and administrative machinery for regulating and effectively monitoring their arms procurement processes; by highlighting known and legitimate transfers of weapons, it could allow for more focused attention on the issue of illicit arms transfers, which, by their nature, cannot be dealt with in the Register (see chapter VI for a discussion of illicit transfers); it could promote openness and internal debate on conventional arms in many countries where objective information on military matters was not fully available; and it could enhance the role and effectiveness of the United Nations in promoting arms limitation and disarmament.

The Register of Conventional Arms, 1993

On 11 October, the Secretary-General issued the first report on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms,¹⁰ containing the replies received from Member States and an index of the background information submitted by Governments in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 18 of resolution 46/36 L and paragraph 5 of resolution 47/52 L. The

¹⁰ A/48/344 and Add.1 and 2.

background information is available for consultation in the Centre for Disarmament Affairs.

The Register in its present form records data submitted voluntarily by States on seven major arms categories—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers—considered to be the most destabilizing weapons systems. The value of the Register may be measured by the extent of participation of Governments and the extent of the arms trade made transparent.¹¹

Participation

The Governments of 83 States submitted replies. More specifically, 24 countries reported exports and 38 Governments reported imports. Forty-four Governments submitted “nil” reports regarding exports, and 33 Governments submitted “nil” reports regarding imports.¹² In addition, 33 Governments provided background information on military holdings, procurement through national production, national arms import and export policies, legislation and administrative procedures. Although the number of countries reporting represents less than 50 per cent of the United Nations membership, the actual coverage of arms transfers, as defined in the Register, is much more comprehensive than that percentage would indicate.

Transparency

With almost all of the major exporters having reported to the Register, it is estimated that most of the world’s trade in major conventional arms in 1992 is now known. Export reports were submitted, among others, by the following States (listed in order of volume of trade, as reported): United States, Germany, Russian Federation, China, France,

¹¹ In view of the fact that the information contained in the Register was provided for the first time by Governments, no comparison of the official data is possible. However, if the information is compared with that available in the public domain, for instance data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an order of magnitude can be obtained.

¹² Member States that do not have anything to report file a “nil” report, clearly stating that no exports or imports took place in any of the seven categories during the reporting period.

United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia,¹³ Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Brazil, Poland and Canada. According to the data registered, only the United States and Germany exported weapons in each of the seven categories. The United States exported the most land combat systems (large calibre artillery systems, armoured combat vehicles, and battle tanks) and combat aircraft recorded in the Register. Germany exported the most weapons systems in the category of missiles and missile launchers.

Despite the fact that several known major arms-recipient States (particularly in the Middle East and Asia) did not report, the data recorded in the Register account for approximately two thirds of all imports. In 1992 the major weapon importers (in terms of numbers of weapons systems acquired) were: Finland, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Kingdom. A significant percentage of arms transfers in 1992 took place among NATO countries, owing to the redistribution of weapons or "cascading" resulting from the CFE Treaty. The countries which benefited mainly therefrom were Greece and Turkey. The Middle East also continued to be a major recipient region, particularly as regards deliveries of armoured combat vehicles and missiles and missile launchers.

While much was publicly known about arms transfers, the United Nations Register made available for the first time official data provided by Governments. The reports revealed additional information and produced more precise data on actual deliveries, in terms of both quantities and dates. Some previously unknown transfers, particularly by countries that had considered such transactions in general as highly classified, were thus made public.

The Register recorded a total of 193 arms transfers for 1992. The breakdown of the weapons systems transferred is as follows:

Battle tanks	1,733
Armoured combat vehicles	1,625
Large calibre artillery systems	1,682
Combat aircraft	270
Attack helicopters	40
Warships	40
Missiles and launchers	67,878

¹³ The Czech Republic and Slovakia submitted their respective forms containing aggregate data on transfers that occurred under the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

Consistency

The Register has a built-in self-checking mechanism inasmuch as it allows for cross-checking of the information submitted both by the exporter and the importer States. The level of consistency between exports and imports reported for the categories of tanks, large calibre systems and combat aircraft is rather high. For warships and missiles and missile launchers, exporters and importers did not produce matching data. In studying the data submitted, one should bear in mind that national control agencies vary greatly in their accounting practices, and that in some countries such agencies do not yet exist or are only just being established.

Future prospects

In spite of reservations regarding the initiation of a reporting system for international arms transfers in the seven specified categories of conventional arms, the results of the Register at the end of its first year were promising. Furthermore, given the response to the Register and its potential to reassure neighbouring States of each other's non-belligerent intentions, it has been proposed that regional arms registers be established as well (see chapter IV, page 100).

The question of the continued operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the views expressed by Member States, will be examined by a group of governmental experts to be established in 1994. (See page 84 for the text of the resolution on transparency in armaments adopted at the forty-eighth session.) Thus, one of the issues the experts will have to consider is the addition of further categories of equipment and the elaboration of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. In that connection, it should be noted that already in 1993, 20 States had provided background information for 1992 either on military holdings or on procurement through national production in the seven categories or on both. Such an expansion in scope would allow the Register to develop into a far-reaching international confidence-building mechanism which would create unprecedented transparency both in international arms transfers and in national production of arms, and which might lead to the reduction of conventional armaments to the lowest possible level consistent with the principle of the legitimate security needs of States.

Composite table of replies of Governments

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Argentina	nil	yes		no
Australia	yes	nil		yes
Austria		yes		yes
Belarus	nil	yes		no
Belgium	yes	nil	yes	yes
Bolivia	yes			no
Brazil	yes	yes		yes
Bulgaria	yes	yes		yes
Canada	yes	yes		yes
Chile	yes	nil		yes
China	yes	yes		no
Colombia	yes	nil	yes	no
Croatia	nil	nil	yes	no
Cuba	nil	nil	yes	no
Czech Republic	nil	yes		yes
Denmark	yes	nil		yes
Egypt	yes	yes	yes	no
Fiji	nil	nil	yes	no
Finland	yes	yes		yes
France	nil	yes		yes
Georgia	nil	nil	yes	no
Germany	yes	yes		yes
Greece	yes	yes	yes	yes
Grenada	nil	blank form		no
Hungary	nil	nil		yes
Iceland	nil	nil	yes	no
India	yes	yes		no
Ireland	nil	nil		no
Israel	yes	yes		yes
Italy	yes	yes		yes

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Japan	yes	nil		yes
Kazakhstan	nil	nil	yes	no
Lebanon	nil	nil	yes	no
Lesotho	nil	nil	yes	no
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	nil	nil	yes	no
Liechtenstein	nil	nil	yes	no
Lithuania	yes			no
Luxembourg	nil	nil		no
Malaysia	nil	nil	yes	no
Maldives	nil	nil		no
Malta	yes	nil		no
Mauritius		nil	yes	no
Mexico			yes	no
Mongolia	nil	nil	yes	no
Namibia	nil	nil		no
Nepal	yes			no
Netherlands	yes	yes	yes	yes
New Zealand	yes	nil		yes
Nicaragua			yes	yes
Niger	see note verbale	nil	yes	no
Nigeria			yes	no
Norway	yes	nil		yes
Oman			yes	no
Pakistan	yes	nil		no
Panama			yes	yes
Papua New Guinea	nil	nil		no
Paraguay			yes	no
Peru	yes	blank form		no
Philippines	yes	nil	yes	no

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Poland	yes	yes		yes
Portugal	yes	nil		yes
Qatar				yes
Republic of Korea	yes	nil		yes
Romania	yes	yes		no
Russian Federation	nil	yes		no
Senegal	nil	nil	yes	no
Seychelles	nil	nil		no
Singapore	yes	nil		no
Slovakia	nil	yes	yes	no
Slovenia	nil	nil	yes	no
Solomon Islands	nil	nil	yes	no
South Africa			yes	no
Spain	yes	nil		yes
Sri Lanka	yes		yes	no
Sweden	yes	yes		yes
Switzerland	nil	nil		yes
Tunisia			yes	no
Turkey	yes	nil		yes
Ukraine	nil	nil	no	no
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	yes	yes		yes
United States of America	yes	yes	yes	yes
Vanuatu	nil	nil	yes	no
Yugoslavia	nil	nil	yes	yes

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1993

The Conference on Disarmament, which had held informal consultations on transparency in armaments in 1992, decided at the beginning of its 1993 session to establish an ad hoc committee on the issue with a mandate under which it would continue to respond to the requests contained in paragraphs 12 to 15 of resolution 46/36 L of 1991 and reiterated in resolution 47/52 L of 1992. The Conference was called on to address, *inter alia* (a) the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production, and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in that field; and (b) the problems of, and the elaboration of practical means to increase, openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and to weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with existing legal instruments. Mr. Mounir Zahran of Egypt, who had chaired the informal meetings, was appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Many suggestions and 16 working papers were presented on a wide variety of topics, and several of them contained concrete proposals for practical measures to increase openness and transparency. Although agreement was not reached on any of them, it was felt that many of the issues contained therein were useful for future consideration and work with a view to promoting trust, confidence-building and stability. At the conclusion of its work, the Ad Hoc Committee therefore recommended that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session. The following paragraphs outline some of the points raised during the substantive exchange of views in the Ad Hoc Committee and contained in its report.¹⁴

Delegations agreed that an increased level of openness and transparency in the field of armaments might enhance trust and confidence among countries, help ease tensions and conflicts, promote stability and strengthen regional and international peace and security. Nevertheless, it was emphasized that transparency was not an end in itself. It was also agreed that transparency could contribute to restraint in the production and transfers of arms, thereby encouraging States not to

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/48/27)*, para. 43.

seek levels of armaments exceeding their legitimate security requirements, while taking due account of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Transparency coupled with restraint and responsible policies in arms transfers increased confidence among countries and therefore enhanced security and stability in the world. A gradual approach was advocated in the field of transparency in armaments as a means of contributing to confidence-building and security among countries.

A large number of countries expressed their views on the Register of Conventional Arms, stressing its importance and the fact that universal compliance with its requirements would be a confidence-building measure and would help identify irresponsible and destabilizing arms transfers. They considered resolution 46/36 L, which had been adopted by 150 votes to none, with 2 abstentions, as an important international instrument for transparency.

The United States submitted the text of a draft decision urging all members and non-members of the Conference to provide the requested data and information to the Secretary-General by 30 April annually, beginning in 1993, and inviting them to exchange, informally, copies of their national submissions. Many countries supported this draft decision as a timely proposal which fitted well with the responsibility the Conference on Disarmament had been given under resolution 46/36 L. The Group of 21, while not addressing the substance of the proposal, announced that they would need more time to consider it. China believed that the issue should be dealt with by the General Assembly.

Eleven non-aligned States (Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Venezuela) maintained that the mandate and programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee derived from resolution 46/36 L, which set clear boundaries to its time-frame and scope; any review of the present mandate would require a new decision of the General Assembly. They pointed out that there was a need to rationalize and streamline the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, which should be developed solely with the aim of gradually expanding the Register to include all categories and types of arms, including weapons of mass destruction, their stockpiles, indigenous production and weapons undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation. This would help to maintain the

delicate balance reached in setting up the Register, the future expansion of which to include other categories of arms had been a determining factor in the support given by some countries to resolution 46/36 L.

Other countries stressed that it was neither in the letter nor in the spirit of resolution 46/36 L to limit in time the mandate or to restrict the scope of the tasks to questions related solely to the Register. Australia, Japan and Sweden believed that transparency measures needed to be developed in such a manner as to encourage the widest possible participation. Moreover, they felt that if the scope of the Register was expanded too rapidly, it could result in technical difficulties in compiling data.

Algeria, China and India questioned whether the Register would: prevent transfers by suppliers which would destabilize a country; serve to reduce excessive military expenditures by recipients; restrain in any manner the arms industries of the major arms suppliers; or reduce the large amount of military exports by the largest arms supplier countries, particularly to regions where tensions and conflicts existed.

Excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms

Argentina and Italy expressed the view that the question regarding the limit beyond which weapons were excessive concealed a variety of local, regional, cultural and historical interpretations that it would not be possible to unify. A number of Western countries believed that the absence of precise definitions would not prevent the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in developing practical and concrete measures to increase openness and transparency. Italy felt that a gradual approach of successive approximations (including responses to the United Nations Register) might yield an acceptable definition of the security of a nation at the lowest possible level of weapons. Other such measures towards building confidence might include periodic exchanges of military information.

Algeria and Egypt believed that the Committee should attempt to identify a common understanding of the relevant terminology of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L. Egypt expressed the opinion that the defensive needs of each country within its regional context must be taken into account when considering the criteria for determining what constituted "excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms".

It also felt that weapons of mass destruction were, by their very nature, both excessive and destabilizing.

Various delegations agreed that although there was no definition of legitimate military power or of what constituted "excessive" and "destabilizing", Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter pointed to the proportionate use of armed force for defensive purposes. In this context, mention was also made of the 1991 London guidelines for conventional arms transfers¹⁵ and the results of agreements such as the CFE Treaty. Nigeria suggested a number of factors related to the issue, such as the ratio of offensive weapons to defensive weapons or percentages of military expenditures in national budgets, and Sweden thought that indicators such as yearly rates of increase in countries' military expenditures and the relation of such expenditures to countries' respective economic strength could be used.

China felt that although definitions were difficult, it was still possible to establish standards by using indices such as the percentage of annual gross national product devoted to military expenditure; military expenditure in terms of per unit area of a country's territory; number of soldiers per unit area of the territory; per capita annual military expenditure; and annual military cost for each soldier. Such indices, although not exhaustive, could help indicate excessive accumulations of arms without being detrimental to any country's security interests.

France and the United States, however, questioned the use and validity of such indices to determine what was excessive and destabilizing. The United States expressed the view that one possible approach was to consider the matter in relation to military holdings and procurement through national production. Germany also suggested that the subject could be approached by adding weapons not included in the Register, as well as by including more detail for those that were included, taking into account the confidence-building value and the administrative and political costs of such additions.

Military holdings and procurement through national production

Many countries believed that one way of addressing the threat to national, regional and international peace and security posed by the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of armaments was to highlight and

¹⁵ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. XV.

examine military holdings and procurement through national production; this would also help to ensure non-discriminatory treatment between countries dependent on importing foreign arms and those whose arms requirements were met from indigenous production.

Two proposals were made, by France and the United States, for the establishment of an international data exchange of seven major categories of military holdings and procurement through national production. The United States proposed an independent data exchange in which countries would provide annually information concerning their military forces in seven equipment categories: total equipment holdings by category and total equipment accepted into service in the past twelve months through national procurement. France proposed the expansion of the scope of the Register to cover military holdings and procurement through national production; the information to be supplied would relate to the number of items in the seven categories of conventional arms currently included in the Register. In addition, both France and the United States offered definitions of a number of pertinent terms.

Considerable debate and discussion followed the submission of these proposals, which were supported by many countries. Discussion revolved round definitions of various terms. There was also an exchange of views on the detail of information to be provided and the degree of disaggregation. Sweden suggested that the format for such a data exchange could be negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament as a politically binding agreement to be made globally applicable subsequently by either integrating it into the Register or by submitting it separately to the General Assembly for approval.

China and India were not able to support the establishment of such an international data exchange and believed that further analysis of the initial results of the Register as well as further study of practicable criteria for determining what constituted an "excessive" accumulation of arms would be advisable for the future. Algeria, Egypt, India and Pakistan stressed the voluntary nature of the United Nations Register, which would also extend to expansion of it or to another system of reporting. The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view that military holdings should include holdings in other territories as well as commitments of military support by other countries through bilateral or multi-lateral agreements. Pakistan believed that the definition of military holdings ought to include indigenous production, existing stockpiles, leased

equipment, improvement of functioning of existing equipment, and the next generation of military equipment.

Germany suggested broadening the framework for an international data exchange so as to include all weapons and equipment under the control of the reporting country and to focus on numbers of items per category rather than on aggregate value numbers. While Germany advocated a data exchange within the framework of the Register, it argued that the Ad Hoc Committee might leave the technical issue of format for the data exchange to the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts.

Russia believed that though the exchange of data on military holdings and procurement through national production was essential, the submission of relevant data at the first stage should be voluntary. The data should be provided according to the seven categories of the Register in terms of the number of items per category. Russia did not agree with the proposals to include armaments and military equipment that were undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation in the data exchange. In this context, Russia presented definitions of the terms "military holdings" and "procurement through national production".

A number of countries expressed the view that one of the most important interrelated aspects of the issue was information on armed forces personnel. Thus the United Kingdom submitted a working text of an annual declaration of the size and organization of armed forces. Finland considered that military holdings could be seen in a wider context of military capabilities together with such issues as troops, units and military structures. China, however, expressed the view that conditions were not ripe for discussing measures concerning the national possession and procurement of major weapons systems and the size, organization and deployment of armed forces. The eleven non-aligned States mentioned above—Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Venezuela—considered that such questions were not within the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. However, the United Kingdom, on behalf of the Western Group, countered that they were, and several Eastern European countries expressed their support for the latter view.

Japan analysed means to achieve non-discrimination and universality and discussed the relationship between the two concepts. It proposed that: categories of weapons to which transparency in armaments operation was applied for military holdings and procurement did not

necessarily have to be identical with those for arms transfers; supplemental transparency in armaments operations tailored to regional needs might be developed; and ways might be explored to utilize information made public by national Governments.

The importance of confidence-building and transparency measures at the regional level in defusing suspicion and misperceptions among countries was pointed out by Algeria, Argentina, Australia and Sweden. The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view that transparency in armaments was a confidence-building measure subject to the specific military and geographical conditions of different regions. China stated¹⁶ that, since different countries and regions faced different political, military and security conditions, it was not advisable to insist on superficially uniform transparency in armaments measures. Instead, countries should be allowed to opt for such measures as they deemed fit for their respective situation and conditions.

Arms transfers and transfer of high technology with military applications

Various countries discussed their relevant national legislation on controls of export, import and transit of weapons materials and products of advanced technology with military applications. In this connection, a number of proposals were made: to compile and compare such existing laws and regulations with a view to harmonizing them; to submit such material to the United Nations; to establish working groups or friends of the chairman to examine legal aspects and guidelines for national legislation; and to pool and analyse information on national legislation and regulations and on export control procedures in order to facilitate a dialogue between suppliers and recipients of dual-use technology. The United States made an expert presentation on export controls and submitted a working paper on its arms export system;¹⁷ it offered to assist others in creating a type of export control process and policy framework that would prevent destabilizing transfers of conventional arms. Brazil suggested that a large number of countries should participate in the elaboration of rules governing transfers and controls of dual-use technology. Argentina, Poland, Romania, Ireland and Senegal

¹⁶ See document CD/1191: "Position of the Chinese delegation on transparency in armaments".

¹⁷ CD/1206 and CD/1207.

suggested an international code of conduct to help control arms transfers and activities of weapons suppliers in accordance with universally applicable rules and standards. Romania proposed that the overall aspects of transparency in armaments could be regulated through an international treaty.

China and Nigeria felt that countries with the largest and most advanced arsenals had the major responsibility to reduce their weapons exports, especially those of high technology and sophisticated and advanced weapons, and to take the lead in releasing information on their arsenals and force deployment, production and transfer of arms.

Many members, among them China and India, expressed the view that restraints were being placed on access by developing countries to technology for peaceful purposes and that ad hoc control regimes imposed on the pretext of preventing proliferation impeded their economic and social development. India proposed, as a confidence-building measure, the elimination of the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the restrictions of the Australia Group. However, Western countries and Russia contended that export controls were a necessary complement to international agreements prohibiting transfers or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and were designed to prevent proliferation of those arms; they were in no way intended to prevent the transfer of technology for development. Germany maintained that the parameters of article XI of the chemical weapons Convention provided the solution to the problem, and suggested that the question how transfers of high technology with military applications could be made transparent should be addressed before more far-reaching measures were tackled.

Weapons of mass destruction

Argentina proposed a supplementary register consisting of a consolidated report of already existing, publicly available information on the degree of implementation of multilateral and bilateral agreements dealing with weapons of mass destruction which, by their very nature, often included provisions to be fulfilled in phases. The United States found this proposal discriminatory, as it would cover only data on Russian and United States nuclear armaments, which were already available to the public. However, the 11 non-aligned States mentioned above supported the Argentine proposal and expressed the view that the exclusion of certain categories or equipment could prejudice the work of

the Group of Governmental Experts, to be convened in 1994. Nigeria also believed that the Register should not be limited to conventional weapons, but must also include weapons of mass destruction.

Canada, France and Russia stated that there were already global instruments in place prohibiting transfers or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and they considered that the international community should continue to seek universal adherence to those instruments. The United Kingdom stressed the need to address the question of conventional weapons rather than focusing on weapons of mass destruction. Nigeria and Russia suggested establishing an exchange of data both on the quantity of fissionable materials resulting from the destruction of nuclear weapons as they were being reduced and on their storage facilities.

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on transparency—transparency in armaments and transparency in military expenditures—as well as one on verification and one on compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

The draft resolution entitled "*Transparency in armaments*" was sponsored by 53 States,¹⁸ and subsequently by 11 additional States.¹⁹ It was introduced on 5 November by the representative of the Netherlands, who stressed that the overall purpose of the draft was to sustain the momentum towards the political objective set by the General Assembly with regard to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. After highlighting some of the provisions of the draft and noting that in the general debate delegations across the political spectrum had

¹⁸ Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.

¹⁹ It was later also sponsored by Albania, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Chile, Estonia, Haiti, Lithuania, Malta, Nicaragua, Panama and Slovenia.

spoken positively about the Register and its continued development, the representative expressed the hope of the sponsors that the draft resolution would be adopted without a vote.

On 11 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. Five States that had joined in the consensus expressed their reservations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea believed that the Register had not helped to halt the export of arms or the transfer of sophisticated weapons technology and seemed to encourage the arms race instead of building confidence. Israel had reservations concerning further development of the Register. It believed that it was important to ascertain that the existing mechanism worked before developing it further. In any event, it stated, the decision on further development ought to be taken first at the regional level by consensus in order to protect the national security of all parties. China stressed that transparency in armaments must be practicable and formulated jointly by the countries concerned; the Group of Governmental Experts to meet in 1994 should give comprehensive consideration to the relevant work of the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament and to the views of all States. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Algeria also referred to the Group of Experts. The former, speaking with regard to operative paragraph 3, stated that it understood that the terms of reference of the Group were those set out in paragraph 11 of resolution 46/36 L. Algeria hoped that the Group would bear in mind the views of all countries and that the Conference on Disarmament would examine the question in greater depth at its session in 1994.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/75 E. On that occasion, the Syrian Arab Republic stated that the resolution did not take into account the special situation in the Middle East and that Israel's purported transparency in armaments revealed only the tip of the iceberg.

Resolution 48/75 E
Transparency in armaments

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991 and 47/52 L of 15 December 1992,

Continuing to take the view that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among

States and that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the first year of operation of the Register of Conventional Arms,

Encouraged by the response of Member States to the request contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of its resolution 46/36 L to provide data on their imports and exports of arms, as well as available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies,

Welcoming also the work of the Conference on Disarmament under its agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments",

Welcoming further the organization by Member States of initiatives and seminars intended to promote transparency in military matters through a widespread reporting of data to the Register of Conventional Arms,

1. *Reaffirms* its determination to ensure the effective operation of the Register of Conventional Arms as provided for in paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 of its resolution 46/36 L;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to provide the requested data and information for the Register to the Secretary-General by 30 April annually;

3. *Reaffirms also* its request to the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 1994 on the basis of equitable geographical representation, on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the views expressed by Member States, so that a decision may be taken by the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the United Nations Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register;

5. *Encourages* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work undertaken in response to the requests contained in paragraphs 12 to 15 of resolution 46/36 L;

6. *Reiterates* its call upon all Member States to cooperate at a regional and subregional level, taking fully into account the specific conditions prevailing in the region or subregion, with a view to enhancing and coordinating international efforts aimed at increased openness and transparency in armaments;

7. *Also Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session on progress made in implementing the present resolution;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments".

Germany and Romania submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Reduction of military budgets: transparency of military expenditures*". After revision, the text was sponsored by 25 States, later joined by 10 more.²⁰ At the time that the Committee was considering the draft resolution, it had before it a report of the Secretary-General containing standardized reports of military expenditures by 33 States.²¹

The draft was introduced by Germany on 4 November. Noting that the Committee had last dealt with the subject-matter in 1991, Germany pointed out that even though East-West confrontation had ended, transparency in military matters was still needed as a means of contributing to international peace and security. The United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures had not been revised since its establishment in 1980. Moreover, participation in it had been limited. Germany expressed the hope that as many Member States as possible would submit their views on how the system could be improved and modernized. Romania also drew attention to the importance of transparency in military matters and stressed the need to improve the reporting system to ensure more active participation in it.

On 11 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

In that connection, several States expressed reservations. Algeria did not agree with the reasoning behind the text and found it unbalanced. China stated that it would not have supported the resolution had it been put to a vote. In its view, measures should take into account differences between regions and should be carried out on a voluntary basis. If the resolution had been put to a vote, Egypt would have abstained

²⁰ Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

²¹ A/48/271 and Add.1 and 2. Replies were received from: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

because it believed that the standardized reporting system was of very limited value in its present form. Pakistan found the approach one-dimensional and stated that greater transparency would not by itself result in significant reductions of military budgets and might not even be possible unless causes of tension were removed. It was not right, in its opinion, to evaluate defence expenditures in terms of gross national product because military imbalances were not caused by defence expenditures in themselves but by the relative proportion of the personnel and weapons deployed by each party. Pakistan cautioned that the reduction of military budgets by specified percentages and according to arbitrary criteria was likely to perpetuate or even aggravate existing imbalances.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the resolution without a vote as resolution 48/62; it reads as follows:

Resolution 48/62

Reduction of military budgets: transparency of military expenditures

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, which introduced the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, 46/25 of 6 December 1991 and 47/54 B of 9 December 1992, dealing with the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters,

Noting that since then national reports on military expenditures have voluntarily been submitted by a number of Member States belonging to different geographic regions,

Expressing its appreciation to the Secretary-General for providing Member States with the reports on military expenditures,

Welcoming the decision of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as contained in the Vienna Document 1990 of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, to exchange information annually on their military budgets, on the basis of the categories of the United Nations standardized reporting system,

Welcoming also the recent progress achieved in arms limitations and disarmament, which, in the long term, will lead to significant reductions in military expenditures,

Convinced that the end of the East-West confrontation and the resulting improvement of international relations form a sound basis for promoting further openness and transparency on all military matters,

Emphasizing that an increased flow and exchange of information on military expenditures will contribute to the predictability of military activities, thus strengthening international peace and security on a global and regional level,

Recalling that the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters stated that the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures should continue in operation and could be further improved,

1. *Calls upon* all Member States to participate in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 47/54 B;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on ways and means to strengthen, and to broaden participation in, the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled “Transparency of military expenditures”.

The draft resolution entitled “*Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification*” was sponsored by 19 countries.²² In revised form it was also sponsored by Brazil, Panama and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, later, after the submission of an amendment, by India (see below). At the time that the Committee was considering the draft resolution, it had before it a report of the Secretary-General.²³

The revised draft resolution was introduced on 18 November by the representative of Canada, who stated that the draft called for a new study on verification as a follow-up to the expert study conducted in the final days of the cold war and submitted in 1990. The mandate of the proposed new study focused upon an examination of prominent international developments—relevant to verification—that had occurred since the 1990 report. One area in which important work could be done, the representative stated, was that of exploring the ways in which verification could contribute to conflict management and confidence-building by the United Nations. In recent years, more and more United Nations peace-keeping forces had been mandated to perform disarmament

²² Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia and Thailand.

²³ The report contained information on the subject transmitted by Bulgaria and Canada (A/48/227 and Add.1).

ment-related tasks, including verification. Moreover, new practical "hands-on" experience in weapons-related fact-finding and on-site inspections was being acquired in a variety of contexts. Thus, an examination of how the tools of verification could most usefully be employed in new contexts, what methods and approaches might be needed, and how verification and compliance monitoring could contribute to the broader goals of maintaining peace and security were among the questions, the representative of Canada stated, that a follow-on study could address.

On 19 November, before the draft resolution was put to a vote, the representative of Canada, on behalf of the sponsors, said that they had considered and accepted an amendment proposed by India calling for the deletion of the words "at the global, regional and local levels" in the third preambular paragraph and in operative paragraph 2 (a).

A separate vote on paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, as orally revised, was then requested. A separate vote was taken and paragraph 2, as orally revised, was approved by a recorded vote of 120 to 7 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and United States), with 14 abstentions. The First Committee then approved the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 127 to none, with 19 abstentions.

The United States abstained, feeling as it did that it was premature to launch a new study before the results of the 1990 study had been properly evaluated; it could not accept the proposal to examine the results of recent United Nations experience, particularly in the case of the Special Commission on Iraq, which, in its view, was at a critical stage of its work, and it questioned the advisability of launching a study that might entail a review of Security Council actions. Furthermore, in view of the the increasing financial burden of expanded peace-making and peace-keeping operations, any unnecessary expense should be avoided. The United States also questioned who would provide the group of experts with lessons on recent United Nations experience in verification and other international developments. Lastly, it doubted the relevance of experience gained in the very specific field of the Special Commission to the broad area of arms control and other United Nations activities. The representative of Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Union, explained their abstentions in similar terms. He also expressed their view that it was in-

appropriate to deal with verification matters in the abstract, without taking due account of specific treaties and regimes or appropriate forums already in existence. Lastly, with regard to the prevention of conflict and the handling of crises, the increasingly important role of regional arrangements must not be overlooked.

In responding to these comments, Canada stated that it failed to understand how it could be considered premature to update a study which had been carried out during, and largely based on the needs of, the cold war era. As to the remarks regarding the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, Canada reiterated that the purpose of the study was to examine the tools of verification and the practical lessons to be drawn, not the circumstances under which arms control obligations to be verified had come into effect. As the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs himself had observed, recent United Nations experience could provide useful input on the methodology of verification and monitoring activities. Canada hoped that the proposed study would provide a sound basis for constructive debate in other forums on the role the United Nations had to play in verification matters.

The representative of Brazil said that since the completion of the 1990 study, a number of significant events—including the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention and the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on potential verification measures for the biological weapons Convention—had highlighted the importance of verification and pointed to the need for a new and comprehensive study on the subject. He therefore applauded the initiative taken by the delegation of Canada and expressed the hope that the draft resolution would receive the broad support of the international community. The representative of Mexico endorsed the Canadian representative's remarks, and said that, in spite of many efforts, only modest progress had so far been achieved in strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of verification.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution as resolution 48/68 by a recorded vote on 16 December. Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by a vote of 140 to 8, with 17 abstentions, and the resolution

was then adopted as a whole by 145 votes to 0, with 22 abstentions. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/68

Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 O of 16 December 1985, 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986, 42/42 F of 30 November 1987, 43/81 B of 7 December 1988, 45/65 of 4 December 1990 and 47/45 of 9 December 1992,

Stressing that the critical importance of verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements is universally recognized, and that the issue of verification is a matter of concern to all nations,

Recognizing that the United Nations, in accordance with its role and responsibilities established under the Charter, can make a significant contribution in the field of verification, in particular of multilateral agreements, and taking into consideration its specific experience,

Affirming its continued support for the sixteen principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission,

Noting that recent developments in international relations continue to underscore the importance of effective verification of existing and future agreements to limit or eliminate arms, and that some of these developments have significant effects on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, which require careful and ongoing examination,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement of 31 January 1992 adopted at the conclusion of the first meeting held by the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government,

Taking note also of the report of the Secretary-General on the occasion of Disarmament Week,

Welcoming the final report, adopted by consensus, of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, submitted in accordance with its mandate to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint,

Welcoming also the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which contains an unprecedented regime of verification, and the ongoing work to bring this Convention into force,

Recalling that in its resolution 47/45 it requested the Secretary-General, as a follow-up to the 1990 study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification and in view of significant developments in international relations since that study, to seek the views of Member States on:

(a) Additional actions that might be taken to implement the recommendations contained in the study;

(b) How the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements can facilitate United Nations activities with respect to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building;

(c) Additional actions with respect to the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, including further studies by the United Nations on this subject;

and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the subject,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the views of Member States;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as a further follow-up action to the study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification and in view of significant developments in international relations since that study, to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study that would:

(a) Examine the lessons from recent United Nations verification experiences, as well as other relevant international developments, for future activities by the United Nations and by the Conference on Disarmament in the field of verification in all its aspects, taking into consideration its specific experience, and with particular attention to the ways verification can facilitate United Nations activities with respect to confidence-building and conflict management and disarmament;

(b) Explore the further development of guidelines and principles for the involvement of the United Nations in verification;

(c) Review the conclusions of the 1990 study group with particular attention to the ways that the United Nations might facilitate verification through relevant procedures, processes and bodies for acquiring, integrating and analysing verification information from a variety of sources;

3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".

The draft resolution entitled "*Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements*", which was ultimately co-sponsored by 55 States,²⁴ was introduced on behalf of the sponsors by the representative of the United States on 10 November. He said that in an interdependent world, global problems required cooperation on a global basis. While very similar to General Assembly resolution 46/26 of 1991, the text had been broadened to cover the need for compliance with obligations arising not only from agreements but also from other commitments assumed by States, including commitments under Security Council resolutions. Over the past few years, broad recognition had developed in the United Nations of the vital importance played by compliance in the arms control and disarmament process. The United States was gratified that compliance by States with their obligations, in particular under arms limitation and disarmament agreements, was now firmly established as a matter of concern to the community of nations; at the same time, it was important for each country to act to remove any doubts that others might have regarding its compliance. Confidence in existing agreements and obligations was an important foundation for future agreements.

On 15 November the draft resolution was approved by the First Committee, without a vote. On that occasion, Ukraine stated that although it had been willing to join the consensus, it believed that the words "other obligations", appearing in a number of paragraphs, should have been replaced by the phrase in the second preambular paragraph: "obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law".

On 16 December the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote as resolution 48/63. It reads as follows:

²⁴ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

Resolution 48/63

Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 46/26 of 6 December 1991 and other relevant resolutions on the question,

Recognizing the abiding concern of all Member States for maintaining respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful, in particular, of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements and other obligations on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements and other obligations not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements and other obligations,

Stressing also that any weakening of confidence in such agreements and other obligations diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Recognizing, in this context, that full compliance by parties with existing agreements and the resolving of compliance concerns effectively can, *inter alia*, facilitate the conclusion of additional arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

Believing that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is a matter of interest and concern to all members of the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations has played and should continue to play in that regard,

Convinced that resolution of non-compliance questions that have arisen with regard to arms limitations and disarmament obligations would contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security,

Welcoming the universal recognition of the critical importance of the question of compliance with and verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other obligations,

1. *Urges* all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the spirit and provisions of such agreements;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications that non-compliance with arms limitation and disarmament obligations has for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. *Also calls upon* all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. *Welcomes* the role that the United Nations has played in restoring the integrity of certain arms limitation and disarmament agreements and in the removal of threats to peace;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide assistance that may be necessary in restoring and protecting the integrity of arms limitation and disarmament agreements;

6. *Encourages* efforts by States parties to develop additional cooperative measures, as appropriate, that can increase confidence in compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament obligations and reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding;

7. *Notes* the contribution that verification experiments and research can make and already have made in confirming and improving verification procedures for arms limitation and disarmament agreements under study or negotiation, thereby providing an opportunity, from the time that such agreements enter into force, for enhancing confidence in the effectiveness of verification procedures as a basis for determining compliance;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session an item entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament obligations".

Conclusion

On 11 October, the Secretary-General issued the first report on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, containing replies received from Member States pursuant to resolution 47/52 L of 15 December 1992. As almost all of the major exporters have reported data for the Register, it is estimated that most of the world's trade in major conventional arms in 1992 is now transparent.

The continued operation of the Register and its further development will be examined by the Group of Governmental Experts, to be established in 1994. That Group will also have to consider the possible expansion of the scope of the Register to include further categories

of equipment and data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Such expansion would make it possible for the Register to be developed into a far-reaching international confidence-building mechanism, which would create unprecedented transparency both in international arms transfers and in national production of arms, and which might lead to the reduction of conventional armaments to the lowest possible level consistent with the principle of legitimate security needs of States.

Undoubtedly, the Register is a positive first step towards greater transparency in armaments. It is to be hoped that it will be a step towards restraint and general arms reduction.

CHAPTER IV

Regional approaches to disarmament and security

Introduction

AS STATED IN ARTICLE 52 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In the same Article it is stated that the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the States concerned or by reference from the Security Council. The General Assembly, for its part, in a great number of resolutions, has promoted regional approaches to disarmament and security. Over the years, regional organizations have been established in various parts of the world, supplementing the activities of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, providing means of coordinating regional political activity and, possibly, of resolving concerns of regional security.

The regional approach to disarmament has received increasing attention in recent years. The 1980 United Nations study on all aspects of regional disarmament¹ found that most States perceived threats to their security and the need for military preparedness as primarily related to conditions in their own region, and that there was full compatibility between the regional and the global approaches to disarmament. It is

¹ *Study on All Aspects of Regional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2).

also generally accepted that the goal of regional arms limitation and disarmament measures should be to increase stability and security within the region concerned; that the related initiatives should take full account of the specific conditions and problems of the region; and that a common approach to the problems to be solved should be developed by the States involved.

Thus, there has been a growing interest among States in developing regional approaches to arms limitation and confidence-building as practical means of strengthening regional peace and security and promoting the process of global arms reduction. Usually, initiatives have been taken at the regional level and have then been brought to the attention of the international community. It is in fact up to States, in a regional context, to consider, in the light of local conditions, what kind of arms limitation is required. To this end they can seek the help and support of regional and subregional organizations. These, for their part, can try to further the regional process on their own or together with the United Nations.

As the Secretary-General stated in his 1992 report *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*,² it is possible today for the reduction and regulation of armaments to take place without putting national security at risk, and such measures can be implemented on different levels—global, regional and subregional. He noted that on the regional level, for example, there was an evident need to devote major attention to the question of conventional arms races. For years, concern had been concentrated, and rightly so, he said, on the need to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, but too little had been done to address the highly destabilizing effect on regional and subregional security resulting from the transfers of conventional weapons which went far beyond the legitimate security needs of States. Moreover, the detrimental effect of those weapons transfers on regional security and stability continued to be felt today, particularly in connection with the transfer of weapons to volatile areas such as the Middle East.³

² A/C.1/47/7. Subsequently issued as United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8.

³ *Ibid.*, paras. 15-17.

In addition, in his 1992 report on preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building, known as *An Agenda for Peace*,⁴ the Secretary-General, considering mutual confidence and good faith as essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States, asked all regional organizations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas. In this connection, he indicated that he would undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional organizations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat could provide.⁵ The Secretary-General also emphasized that regional arrangements and organizations had an important role in early warning. To this end he invited regional organizations that had not yet sought observer status at the United Nations to do so and to be linked, through appropriate arrangements, with the security mechanisms of the Organization.⁶

Developments and trends, 1993

At its 1993 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security". (For the text of the document, see "Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1993", pages 108 to 115).

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters considered that the Conference on Disarmament could contribute to the process of arms reductions by developing general guidelines on the reduction or control of conventional arms within the regional context.⁷

At the Conference on Disarmament itself, Sweden suggested that it might be useful for the Conference to initiate deliberations on regional security arrangements, as most security problems at present were regional or local, and this seemed to be also the trend for the future. The Conference should respond to such developments, Sweden stated, and try to find ways to promote such arrangements.

⁴ A/47/277-S/24111. Subsequently issued also as a United Nations publication under the symbol DPI/1247.

⁵ Ibid., para. 24.

⁶ Ibid., para. 27.

⁷ A/48/325, para. 7 (g).

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report on the work of the Organization, issued on 10 September, stated that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (see chapter III, above) could be particularly helpful in regions and subregions where there were potential hostilities, as it could lead to gradual reductions in armaments, while allowing the legitimate defence concerns of the parties involved to be considered. The Secretary-General would, therefore, strongly urge Member States to make use of the Register, together with other measures of confidence-building, particularly within regional and subregional frameworks. This was one way in which disarmament and arms control could contribute to the Organization's efforts in the fields of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.⁸

Regional efforts relating to zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction continued, with significant progress being made with respect to Africa, primarily because of developments in South Africa. In a communication⁹ to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, South Africa expressed its desire to contribute to the establishment of Africa as a zone free of nuclear weapons. It further stated that, aware of the relationship between global and regional disarmament, while seeking to discharge its global disarmament obligations, it would also direct a significant portion of its contribution towards achieving peace, stability and socio-economic progress in southern Africa. The prospects for peace and stability improved substantially in the Middle East, thanks to the Israeli-Palestinian agreements¹⁰ of September, paving the way towards Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and the Jericho area. (For a discussion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, see chapter V, below.)

In its peace-keeping operations, the United Nations continued to rely on regional support whenever feasible. Moreover, some regional organizations and agencies played an increasing peace-keeping role in their own areas. As the Secretary-General explained in his report *An Agenda for Peace*, regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized whenever possible.

⁸ A/48/1, para. 478.

⁹ A/CN.10/181.

¹⁰ A/48/486-S/26560.

At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly granted observer status to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and to the Latin American Parliament. As a result, there are now more than a dozen intergovernmental organizations, most of them of a regional character, with such status, including the European Union and the CSCE, the Latin American Economic System and the Latin American Parliament, the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity. This trend seems likely to continue. At a meeting in Ashkhabad on 24 December, the heads of States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States decided to seek observer status for CIS in the General Assembly.¹¹

Regional situations were reviewed in various forums and at various levels throughout the year. The examination of such situations was reflected in documentation submitted to the General Assembly. For example, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, meeting at United Nations Headquarters in October, issued a communiqué¹² which dealt with many regional security questions, including Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Cambodia, Nicaragua and Cuba.

The deliberations of the twenty-first Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Karachi from 25 to 29 April, were covered in a document submitted by Pakistan to the General Assembly,¹³ which contained a political report and a number of resolutions related to many regional security questions and several questions of disarmament.

Specific regional situations

Under the item "Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States" a report was issued by the Secretary-General, following a meeting between the representatives of the Secretariats of the United Nations system and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States and its specialized organizations, held at Geneva on

¹¹ A/48/246.

¹² A/48/484-S/26552.

¹³ A/48/396-S/26440.

30 and 31 August.¹⁴ In a section of the document dealing with disarmament, the Arab States affirmed their readiness to associate themselves with all proposals relating to disarmament that were conducive to the achievement of quantitative and qualitative parity in terms of military capability among the States of the region, applying one standard to all of them. They also affirmed their readiness to cooperate, on the basis of the chemical weapons Convention, for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, provided that Israel responded to international requests to ratify the non-proliferation Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

With respect to relations between the United Nations and the CSCE, the Secretary-General submitted a report¹⁵ incorporating measures of cooperation between the two organizations, as well as replies received by him from States members of the CSCE conveying their views and suggestions on cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and the CSCE.

Developments in Europe in 1993 were related mainly to the implementation of decisions taken at the CSCE Helsinki summit meeting the year before, including the decision to establish a new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna, with a strengthened conflict-prevention centre.¹⁶ On 27 January, the Forum resumed its meetings in Vienna, focusing its attention on European armed conflicts, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Forum and its working groups were also able to consider a number of arms control questions, that is, harmonization of arms control obligations, code of conduct in military security matters, global exchange of military information, non-proliferation of weapons, conventional arms transfers, information exchange on defence planning and military contacts. Significant discussion also took place on the broad question of the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. A number of delegations participating in the work of the Forum held that compliance with, and the effectiveness of, confidence-

¹⁴ A/48/468/Add.1.

¹⁵ A/48/549.

¹⁶ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, chap. III, "General developments and trends, 1992".

and security-building measures at all times—especially in regional crisis situations—should be strengthened. The creation of a mechanism for collective action in cases of non-compliance with confidence- and security-building measures, it was felt, would significantly increase the pressure on States which were about to suspend the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures, or had already done so.

Following the entry into force of the CFE Treaty in 1992, States parties began an intensive programme of verification activities. Most inspections were designed to verify the accuracy of exchanged information at a representative sampling of military units or facilities where Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) was located, but some were designed to monitor the destruction of TLE. By mid-November 1993, States parties had completed the first phase, that is, 25 per cent, of their total reduction liability in each of the categories of TLE. (By the end of the second phase, in November 1994, 60 per cent, and by the end of the third phase, in November 1995, 100 per cent of their total liability will have been reduced.) In the first phase, over 17,000 pieces of equipment were destroyed or converted for non-military purposes under strict procedures and stringent verification measures. (See appendix III for documentation pertaining to the CFE Treaty.)

In August, pursuant to resolution 47/21 of 25 November 1992, the Secretary-General sent a mission to each of the Baltic States and to the Russian Federation for the purpose of holding consultations on how he might use his good offices most effectively to facilitate the complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Subsequently, in October, he reported to the Assembly¹⁷ that the last Russian combat unit had been withdrawn from Lithuania on 31 August but that further negotiation was needed on the withdrawal of the approximately 5,000 Russian troops from Estonia and the approximately 18,000 from Latvia. He urged Member States, the CSCE and the Council of Europe to continue to take all possible actions to help resolve the remaining questions. In that connection, he commended multilateral efforts to help the Russian Federation build the necessary housing for troops and their families returning from the Baltic States. On 15 November the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, resolution 48/18, by which, *inter alia*, it called upon the States concerned to conclude without delay appropriate agreements

¹⁷ A/48/501.

for the orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territories of Estonia and Latvia and urged the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices in this matter.

In 1993, cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU was the subject of a report by the Secretary-General, a part of which dealt with conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.¹⁸ The report noted that the two organizations had a long-standing relationship in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking in Africa. During the period under review, the United Nations and the OAU had cooperated in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking in South Africa, Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda, among other countries. In South Africa, the observer missions deployed by the two organizations were cooperating closely in efforts to facilitate the reduction of political violence and the democratization process.

As of the end of the year, the two organizations had intensified their cooperation in peacemaking and peace-keeping, especially in Liberia and Rwanda, in each of which the Secretary-General had appointed a special representative to oversee the peace process currently under way. A peace agreement that led to a cease-fire in Liberia had been brokered on 25 July in Cotonou under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Under that agreement, plans were undertaken for the formation of a provisional government that would organize elections in the course of 1994.

In June, the OAU adopted a Declaration¹⁹ establishing a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, the primary objective of which is to anticipate and prevent conflicts and, where they have broken out, to undertake peacemaking and peace-building functions. Within the context of the Mechanism, the OAU will closely coordinate its activities with African regional and subregional organizations and with the United Nations. The organizational meeting of the Mechanism was held at the level of Heads of State and Government in Cairo in December.

The Secretary-General continued his assistance in implementing the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee on Secur-

¹⁸ A/48/4/5/Add.1, sect. C.

¹⁹ Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution" (AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX)).

ity Questions in Central Africa, which he had established in 1992,²⁰ and reported to the General Assembly²¹ on two meetings held in 1993. The Committee's principal achievement had been the adoption of a non-aggression pact between the States members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Pending the establishment of a system to manage crises and conflicts in the subregion, the Committee recommended the adoption of a number of transitional measures, such as the establishment of national bodies for the management of crises; adoption of a protocol to the Treaty establishing ECCAS that would grant it powers in the field of security; and the organization of visits to strengthen relationships between officers of the various countries of the subregion. The States members of ECCAS expressed their readiness to reduce their military forces, equipment and budgets and to carry out a study on this subject.

The Foreign Ministers of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)²² at their annual meeting, held in Singapore on 23 and 24 July,²³ *inter alia* endorsed the establishment of an ASEAN Regional Forum for the discussion of ASEAN and Asia-Pacific security issues. The ASEAN Regional Forum will hold its first meeting in Bangkok in the summer of 1994. Participants will comprise, in addition to the six ASEAN countries, ASEAN's seven "dialogue partners" (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United States and the European Union) and China, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Papua New Guinea, the Russian Federation and Viet Nam.

The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed at their meeting ASEAN's commitment to the centrality of the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. They viewed the proposals in the Secretary-General's *An Agenda for Peace* as an innovative approach towards strengthening the role of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building.

The Organization of American States held a meeting of its General Assembly in Managua, Nicaragua, in June, during which the OAS

²⁰ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, chap. III.

²¹ A/48/412.

²² The six States members of ASEAN are: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

²³ See A/48/294, annex.

adopted a series of resolutions in the area of hemispheric security. It was agreed to continue and intensify work in the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, established in 1992, and to undertake a work programme that would include: the relationship between the OAS and the United Nations; global and regional disarmament and arms control; the relationship between development, environment, and disarmament and arms control; prevention of all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and controls on the export of dual-use goods and technologies; promotion of openness and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons, including provision of information to registers on conventional weapons and exchanges of information on national policies; consideration of measures for conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes, exchanges of information and consideration of measures to promote confidence and transparency; and examination of the special problems of small States, including drug trafficking, illicit arms trade and disaster management. In November, the Committee held its first meeting of governmental experts to permit an exchange of views on national perspectives regarding confidence-building measures and to prepare for a workshop in March 1994 in Buenos Aires.

Within the framework of peace enforcement, significant progress was made in 1993 towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent relevant resolutions on the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as documented in the sixth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission,²⁴ dated 21 December. In connection with this question and other regional matters, a document was submitted to the United Nations by the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council.²⁵

The pursuit of regional solutions to regional problems, which is being actively encouraged by the international community, is promoted by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations either through the Regional Centres or in cooperation with individual Governments through the organization of regional conferences, meetings and seminars. During 1993, four such meetings were convened in cooper-

²⁴ S/26910.

²⁵ A/49/56-S/26926.

ation with individual Governments and with the assistance of other institutions. (For details, see chapter X below).

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1993

The item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" was in its third year of consideration by the Disarmament Commission²⁶ and was, accordingly scheduled for completion by the end of the session. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, the relevant Working Group continued its examination under the following topics: (a) relationship between regional disarmament and global security and arms limitation and disarmament; (b) principles and guidelines; (c) ways and means; (d) machineries and modalities; and (e) role of the United Nations. It was agreed to concentrate on the last three topics, given the fact that the first two had been the focus of attention in 1992. The Group proceeded on the basis of a number of working papers prepared by the Chairman. In addition to documents submitted by members at previous sessions, three new documents were submitted by South Africa.²⁷

Most delegations were convinced that the regional approach to disarmament was essential to the strengthening of international peace and security on a regional and global level. In the course of their negotiations, they stressed that regional and global disarmament were complementary; that regional arrangements must be initiated, negotiated and, if necessary, verified by the States of the region; and that arrangements must take into account the specific characteristics of the region. Members worked to produce a text that would be generally applicable to all, yet reflect their own concerns. Their flexibility was not sufficient to reconcile fundamental differences over the appropriateness of including references to the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, on the one hand, and to the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the other, and this point of contention was finally dealt with by an agreement to omit both references in the final version. In an effort to provide some concrete

²⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42)*, para. 30.

²⁷ A/CN.10/179, A/CN.10/181 and A/CN.10/182. Each of the papers was submitted under two agenda items, the nuclear item and the regional item.

content that could assist States in developing regional approaches, it was decided, in the course of the discussion on ways and means, to annex to the guidelines an illustrative list of confidence- and security-building measures, comprising both measures and guidelines adopted by the General Assembly and those developed and implemented in some regions. Following intensive deliberations, the Working Group succeeded in arriving at a consensus text, which was annexed to the report of the Disarmament Commission.²⁸ The text is reproduced below.

Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security

I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGIONAL DISARMAMENT, ARMS LIMITATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY

1. Regional and global approaches to disarmament and arms limitation complement each other and both should be pursued simultaneously in order to promote regional and international peace and security.
2. The regional approach to disarmament and arms limitation is one of the essential elements in global efforts to strengthen international peace and security.
3. Effective measures for disarmament and arms limitation at the global level, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the field of conventional weapons, have a positive impact on regional disarmament and arms limitation efforts.
4. Regional measures on disarmament and arms limitation may take into account the relationship between security in the region and international security as a whole, bearing in mind that the scope and extent of such measures could be affected by extraregional factors.
5. Regional measures on disarmament and arms limitation should lead to the relaxation of tension in the region concerned, and may have a positive bearing outside the region.
6. Regional and interregional agreements on disarmament and arms limitation should enhance global security.
7. Global agreements on disarmament and arms limitation should enhance regional security.
8. Regional measures on disarmament and arms limitation contribute to the achievement of goals and principles for disarmament at the global level.

²⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42), annex II.*

II. PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES

9. Any regional arrangement for disarmament and arms limitation should be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.
10. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should be consistent, *inter alia*, with the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, which includes not only armed intervention, but also other forms of interference, as such arrangements have to be freely agreed upon by the States concerned.
11. Regional disarmament efforts should be pursued in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner.
12. The States participating in regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should define, as appropriate, the region to which the arrangements among them apply.
13. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should be open to the participation of all the States concerned and agreed freely among them on the basis of the principle of the sovereign equality of all States.
14. Any regional approach to disarmament and arms limitation has to take into account the specific conditions and characteristics of the region.
15. Regional approaches to disarmament and arms limitation should take into account the necessity to address broader, non-military factors which may affect security.
16. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation may also free resources of participating States for peaceful purposes, *inter alia*, the promotion of economic and social development of States.
17. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should have no harmful effects on the security of other States.
18. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should give priority to the elimination of the most destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances, including, where appropriate, in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
19. Regional approaches to disarmament and arms limitation can interact positively with other initiatives of a region to enhance its security.
20. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should contribute to increasing security and stability in the region at the lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces and on the basis of undiminished security for all the participating States.
21. With regard to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the establishment of regional arrangements to prevent proliferation in all its aspects contributes to regional and international peace and security.

22. Where appropriate, regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation with a view to eliminating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would contribute to regional and international peace and security.
23. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should, taking into account the specific conditions and characteristics of the region, address in all its aspects the question of the accumulation of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate self-defence requirements of States.
24. Regional approaches and arrangements should seek to address all aspects of disarmament and arms limitation considered to be necessary by all of the participating States in the region and relevant to the specific security situation of the region concerned, and should use step-by-step approaches whenever appropriate.
25. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should be pursued with particular urgency in regions where tensions and the accumulation of armaments are such as to pose serious threats and thus endanger regional and international peace and security.
26. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation can produce a favourable atmosphere conducive to political settlement of regional disputes or conflicts.
27. The peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and other concrete actions to ease regional tensions and build confidence among the States of the region can create a political environment conducive to promoting agreements on disarmament and arms limitation.
28. Regional approaches to disarmament and arms limitation should promote transparency and openness in military matters in order to build confidence among the States of the region concerned.
29. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should include appropriate verification measures, as agreed upon by the parties concerned, to ensure compliance.
30. Extraregional States should respect regional agreements on disarmament and arms limitation and, where appropriate, consider entering into binding undertakings to complement such regional agreements.
31. Regional approaches to disarmament and arms limitation should take into account the need to give due priority to eradicating the illicit trade in all kinds of weapons and military equipment, a most disturbing and dangerous phenomenon often associated with terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, mercenary and other destabilizing activities.

III. WAYS AND MEANS

A. *Confidence- and security-building measures*

32. Appropriate confidence- and security-building measures which foster mutual trust and understanding, as well as transparency and openness, can defuse tensions and promote friendly relations among States. Furthermore, such measures can facilitate the disarmament and arms limitation process and can improve the prospects for the peaceful settlement of disputes, thus contributing to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security.

33. For confidence- and security-building measures at the regional level, attention is drawn to the "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", as adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 43/78 H of 7 December 1988). Account could also be taken, as appropriate, of the experiences gained through the implementation of measures and guidelines designed for the global level, as adopted by the General Assembly, as well as of measures developed in some regions. An illustrative list of measures and guidelines is attached in the annex.

34. Bearing in mind the need to maintain and develop an integrated approach to international peace and security, regional arrangements aimed at building security and confidence need not be confined to the military field, but could, as appropriate, also extend to the political, economic, social, environmental and cultural fields.

35. If felt necessary, verification of confidence- and security-building measures could be considered, devised and adopted by the participating States.

36. In addition to regional confidence- and security-building measures, inter-regional ones could be adopted.

B. *Disarmament and arms limitation agreements*

37. Regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements should come from within the region, take into account the specific conditions and characteristics of the region, and be open to all States of the region.

38. Regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements should seek to ensure security and stability at the lowest level of armaments and armed forces on the basis of undiminished security of States and eliminate the capability for large-scale offensive action and surprise attacks. States should not seek an armament and military spending level that exceeds their legitimate self-defence requirements.

39. Regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements may include those aimed at facilitating the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of global efforts to this end, and at eliminating other weapons of mass destruc-

tion and, *inter alia*, their delivery systems, and should, as appropriate, complement such agreements at the global level.

40. States are encouraged to conclude regional agreements to regulate the acquisition of arms in order to prevent the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, without undermining the legitimate self-defence capability of the States concerned.

41. Regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements should aim to reduce armaments and military forces to the lowest possible level on the basis of undiminished security of States. Forces thus reduced should be demobilized and weapons, equipment and facilities above permitted levels within a region should be disposed of by means of destruction, or, where appropriate, conversion. Those weapons and facilities should neither be adapted to other weapons systems nor redeployed in other regions, nor lead to increased arms transfers to other regions.

42. Regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements should seek to include all types of armed forces, their installations and armaments present in the region, including those from States inside and outside the region, without prejudice to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence.

43. In support of efforts for disarmament and arms limitation, States within and outside the region should exercise effective control over their weapons and military equipment, their arms imports and exports, to prevent them from getting into the hands of individuals or groups engaged in the illicit arms trade.

44. The consensus text of recommendations on conventional disarmament which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1990 should serve as a general guideline for all States in their regional approach to arms limitation and disarmament.

45. Regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements should include appropriate verification measures devised by the parties to such agreements. The 16 principles of verification adopted by the General Assembly in 1988 should be observed by all States in their efforts in implementing regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements.

C. Zones of peace

46. The establishment of zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can, if appropriately defined and agreed upon by interested States, contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

D. Zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

47. The establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure. The process of establishing such zones, in appropriate parts of the world, should be encouraged to promote non-proliferation and to contribute to the attainment of the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

48. In order to contribute to the effectiveness of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, extraregional States should respect the status of such zones. Extraregional States that may have undertaken commitments to such zones should fully comply with them and, in the case of nuclear-weapon States, refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States in these zones.

E. Consultative and cooperative arrangements

49. The establishment of regional consultative fora on peace, security, cooperation and development may facilitate regional approaches to disarmament and arms limitation.

50. Regional and interregional arrangements for cooperation and exchange of information could be considered. In this context, the knowledge and understanding on the regional level about the most destabilizing weapons and military capabilities could assist in the conclusion of regional agreements on disarmament and arms limitation.

IV. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

51. In carrying out its role in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should seek to promote complementarity between regional and global processes of disarmament by establishing effective liaison and cooperation with relevant regional bodies. The United Nations can contribute to the regional disarmament and arms limitation process, *inter alia*, by:

- (a) Facilitating regional disarmament efforts in cooperation with other appropriate United Nations bodies and international organizations;
- (b) Collecting and disseminating information on disarmament and arms limitation, including the experience of the United Nations in carry-

ing out activities related to the maintenance of international peace and security;

- (c) Promoting greater openness in military matters through the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations standardized system of reporting on military expenditures;
- (d) Facilitating the functions of the existing United Nations Regional Centres;
- (e) Serving as a source of expertise in disarmament and arms limitation;
- (f) Organizing and, where appropriate, coordinating conferences on regional disarmament issues, including confidence- and security-building measures;
- (g) Assisting, where regional arrangements so provide, in verifying compliance.

52. The recommendations on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament which were adopted by the General Assembly in 1990 should serve as useful guidelines for enhancing the role of the United Nations with respect to regional approaches to disarmament and arms limitation.

Appendix

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

1. Measures and guidelines as adopted by the General Assembly

- (a) United Nations standardized system of reporting on military expenditures (1980);
- (b) United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (1991);
- (c) Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters (1992).

2. Measures developed and implemented in some regions

- (a) Confidence- and security-building measures in the political, economic, social, environmental and cultural fields;
- (b) Exchange of information on armed forces and military activities;
- (c) Dissemination of militarily relevant information, for example, on arms transfers and military budgets;
- (d) Inspections, observations and visits to military facilities and activities, including overflight regimes;

- (e) Regional seminars on security-related issues, such as military doctrines, confidence- and security-building measures, illegal arms traffic, transfers of conventional arms;
- (f) Establishment of effective communications between military and political authorities of different States;
- (g) Establishment of regional security institutions charged with a variety of tasks affecting the security of States in a region, such as conflict prevention, arms control, elimination of illegal arms traffic.

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted six resolutions on regional approaches to disarmament and security: three were strictly on regional disarmament; one was on regional confidence-building measures in Central Africa, one on the development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States; and one on strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.

While considering the question of conventional disarmament on a regional scale, the General Assembly had before it a report²⁹ of the Secretary-General by which he transmitted replies he had received from Member States on the subject pursuant to decision 47/420 of 1992. On 27 October, Peru submitted a draft decision which constituted a follow-up to the 1992 decision, by which Member States that had not yet done so were invited to convey to the Secretary-General their views on regional disarmament. On 11 November, the sponsor stated that it would not press for action on its proposal.

As noted above, three resolutions on regional disarmament were dealt with. By the first resolution, 48/75 G, submitted by Germany, the General Assembly endorsed the guidelines and recommendations agreed upon by the Disarmament Commission; the second, 48/75 I, followed very closely the text on regional disarmament submitted by Pakistan for a number of years; and the third, 48/75 J, was submitted by Pakistan as the sole sponsor in its original version.

²⁹ A/48/228. The report contained replies received from Belarus, Namibia and New Zealand.

Germany submitted the draft resolution entitled "*Regional disarmament*" on behalf of 28 States;³⁰ subsequently 12 additional States³¹ became sponsors. In introducing the text on 9 November, Germany said that the main purpose of the draft was to endorse the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament adopted by the Disarmament Commission. The guidelines were intended to assist efforts to find regional solutions to conflicts that endangered peace and security at both the regional and the global level. The sponsors had attempted to merge earlier resolutions and decisions on the same subject while ensuring that the text contained only language fully in accordance with the guidelines, in the hope of achieving a single resolution on regional disarmament. The text was intended to ensure future discussion of regional disarmament in the First Committee—discussion that might focus more on individual regional disarmament projects than on principles and guidelines.

Pakistan submitted its traditional draft resolution on *regional disarmament* on behalf, ultimately, of 60 countries.³² In introducing it on 18 November, Pakistan stressed that it largely followed the lines of resolution 47/52 J, which had received overwhelming support in the General Assembly in 1992. Pakistan stated that it had not been possible to assimilate, in a single text, essential concepts embodied in the German draft and in its draft.

³⁰ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

³¹ Cape Verde, Haiti, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Slovenia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.

³² Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Another draft resolution on regional disarmament, entitled "*Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels*", originally submitted by Pakistan, was resubmitted in revised form by Pakistan and the United Kingdom after they agreed on minor changes in the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2.³³ In introducing it on 18 November, Pakistan stated that it was clear that arms races and conflicts in various parts of the world were being fuelled not by global disputes but by regional discord and tensions between States, and that conventional arms control measures must therefore be vigorously pursued at the regional and subregional levels. In its view, the best way to encourage meaningful negotiations on regional arms control was to develop widely accepted principles on the basis of which talks might be held: the Conference on Disarmament was well suited to that task.

At the same meeting, on 18 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolutions as follows: the draft submitted by Germany was adopted without a vote; the draft submitted by Pakistan was adopted by a recorded vote of 139 to none, with 1 abstention (India); and the revised draft submitted by Pakistan and the United Kingdom was adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to none, with 15 abstentions. Several States explained their positions on the draft resolutions.

With regard to the draft resolutions introduced by Germany and by Pakistan, a number of States that had voted in favour of both—Brazil, Cuba and Germany—expressed regret that the two texts had not been merged and voiced some reservations. Germany maintained that the draft it had introduced represented a true merger of earlier relevant resolutions and that no additional resolution on the subject from a global perspective was needed. Brazil felt that the draft introduced by Germany did not fully reflect the Commission's agreed principles and that the draft introduced by Pakistan did not take recent developments fully into account. Cuba believed that the introduction of the Pakistan draft had been counterproductive and that the text itself was unbalanced since it failed to provide for initiatives and participation by all regional States in regional arrangements.

India, which had abstained on the Pakistan draft, stated that the text largely ignored the Commission's guidelines and recommendations

³³ The draft, in its final form, was sponsored by: Haiti, Pakistan, Panama, Swaziland and the United Kingdom.

and sought to address nuclear non-proliferation at both the regional and the subregional level. India believed that nuclear non-proliferation was a global issue, which could be dealt with effectively only at the global level.

With regard to the revised draft resolution submitted by Pakistan and the United Kingdom, several States, while voting in favour, expressed reservations. Germany had serious doubts concerning the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs and their compatibility with the Commission's guidelines. Therefore, if the two paragraphs had been voted on separately, it would have voted against the fifth and abstained on the sixth. Canada stated that, had separate votes been taken, it would have voted against both paragraphs. The Russian Federation voted in favour only on the understanding that the Conference on Disarmament would work within its assigned areas of competence and would not duplicate the work of the Disarmament Commission.

Among those abstaining on the draft resolution submitted by Pakistan and the United Kingdom, Brazil, Ecuador and India referred to the guidelines and recommendations of the Disarmament Commission. Brazil considered that the resolution ran directly counter to the guidelines. Ecuador stated that the text ignored the consensus achieved in the Commission and introduced concepts which were unclear. India too believed that it failed to take the guidelines into account; moreover, India did not agree that States with larger military capabilities had a special responsibility for promoting regional agreements and it could not accept the primacy of place in the disarmament agenda that the text appeared to give to conventional disarmament. Cuba abstained because it found the draft unbalanced; it failed to take into account the legitimate defence needs of States and, while emphasizing conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, it did not stress the need for global control of weapons of mass destruction.

Peru, speaking in connection with the three draft resolutions just discussed and the draft decision that it had introduced and withdrawn (see page 115), regretted that the texts had not been merged and reserved its right to promote the adoption of a draft resolution on regional conventional arms control based on a broad consensus the following year.

Subsequently the General Assembly adopted the three draft resolutions. The draft submitted by Germany was adopted without a vote as resolution 48/75 G and reads as follows:

Resolution 48/75 G
Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 47/52 G and 47/52 J of 9 December 1992,

Affirming the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and to international law in the conduct of their international relations,

Believing that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits,

Noting that regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation may also free resources of participating States for peaceful purposes, *inter alia*, the promotion of their economic and social development,

Reaffirming its firm conviction that the regional approach to disarmament is essential to strengthening international peace and security on a regional and global level,

Welcoming initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security, undertaken by some countries at the regional level,

Noting with satisfaction the important progress made in various regions of the world through the adoption of arms limitation, peace, security and cooperation agreements, including those related to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and encouraging States in the regions concerned to continue implementing these agreements,

Convinced that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments for all the participating States, would enhance the security of all States and would thus contribute to international peace and security,

Recognizing the useful role played by the United Nations regional centres,

Taking note of the report of the Disarmament Commission, containing the text, adopted by the Commission at its 1993 session, of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security,

Expressing its appreciation for the work accomplished by the Disarmament Commission in finalizing the text of these guidelines and recommendations,

1. *Endorses* the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security as adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session, and recommends them to all Member States for implementation;

2. *Affirms* that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

3. *Affirms also* that multifaceted cooperation among States of a region, especially encompassing the political, economic, social and cultural fields, can be conducive to the strengthening of regional security and stability;

4. *Encourages* States to reach, wherever possible, freely concluded agreements at the regional level on confidence- and security-building measures, disarmament and arms limitations, arrangements to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, zones of peace and zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as consultative and cooperative arrangements;

5. *Supports and encourages* efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional level in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at the regional level;

6. *Also encourages* States to address, in regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitations, the question of the accumulation of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate self-defence requirements of States;

7. *Encourages* States of a region to examine the possibility of creating, on their own initiative, regional mechanisms and/or institutions for the establishment of measures in the framework of an effort of regional disarmament or for the prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts with the assistance, if requested, of the United Nations;

8. *Invites* Member States and regions to bring to the attention of the General Assembly results achieved on regional disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session on the basis of the replies received;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Regional disarmament".

The draft resolution submitted by Pakistan was adopted by a recorded vote of 170 to none, with 1 abstention, as resolution 48/75 I; it reads as follows:

Resolution 48/75 I

Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 45/58 P of 4 December 1990, 46/36 I of 6 December 1991 and 47/52 J of 9 December 1992,

Believing that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits,

Affirming the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of their international relations,

Noting that essential guidelines for progress towards general and complete disarmament were adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly,

Noting also the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session;

Welcoming the prospects of genuine progress in the field of disarmament engendered in recent years as a result of negotiations between the two super-Powers,

Taking note of the recent proposals for disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels,

Recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, would enhance the security of smaller States and would thus contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts,

1. *Stresses* that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and under the umbrella of the United Nations, to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues;

2. *Affirms* that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

3. *Calls upon* States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels;

4. *Welcomes* the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels;

5. *Supports and encourages* efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at regional and subregional levels;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament".

The draft resolution submitted by Pakistan and the United Kingdom was adopted by a recorded vote of 156 to none, with 11 abstentions, as resolution 48/75 J; it reads as follows:

Resolution 48/75 J

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the crucial role of conventional arms control in promoting regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security in the post-cold war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion,

Aware that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be a prime objective of conventional arms control,

Desirous of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces,

Believing that militarily significant States, and States with larger military capabilities, have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security,

Believing also that one of the principal objectives of conventional arms control should be to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise,

1. *Decides* to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, as a first step, to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looks forward to a report of the Conference on this subject;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels".

A draft resolution on *regional confidence-building measures* in Central Africa, sponsored by 12 States in all,³⁴ was introduced on 5 November by the representative of Gabon, who called attention to the fact that the draft, except for operative paragraphs 4 and 5, which dealt with new questions, was very similar to General Assembly resolution 47/53 F of 1992. In presenting the draft, the members of ECCAS wished to reaffirm their commitment to promoting disarmament and non-proliferation in their subregion and their confidence in the benefits of preventive diplomacy.

On 19 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 141 to 1 (United States), with 1 abstention (United Kingdom). In connection with the vote, the United States explained that it had voted against the draft resolution on financial grounds, as the draft did not reflect the original intention of the sponsors to have the costs associated with their initiative funded through voluntary contributions and regional arrangements. If, in the future, funding could be achieved outside the regular United Nations budget, the United States would again be happy to support the draft resolution. For those same reasons, the United Kingdom had been obliged to abstain. The representative of Gabon, on behalf of the members of ECCAS, said that the sponsors understood that the substance of the draft resolution was not being rejected by those States which had been unable to vote in its favour.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 168 to 1, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 48/76 A. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/76 A

Regional confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

³⁴ The 11 original sponsors were: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zaire. Subsequently, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea became a co-sponsor.

Recalling the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the guidelines for general and complete disarmament adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling also its resolutions 43/78 H and 43/85 of 7 December 1988, 44/21 of 15 November 1989, 45/58 M of 4 December 1990, 46/37 B of 6 December 1991 and 47/53 F of 15 December 1992,

Considering the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all States concerned and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, in that they can contribute to regional disarmament and to international security, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced that the resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries,

Bearing in mind the establishment by the Secretary-General on 28 May 1992 of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the purpose of which is to encourage arms limitation, disarmament, non-proliferation and development in the subregion,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on regional confidence-building measures, which deals chiefly with the meetings of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held at Bujumbura in March 1993 and at Libreville in August and September 1993;

2. *Reaffirms* its support for efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful settlement of disputes in Central Africa;

3. *Also reaffirms* its support for the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee adopted at the organizational meeting of the Committee held at Yaoundé in July 1992;

4. *Welcomes* the results of the meetings of the Committee held at Bujumbura and at Libreville, particularly the adoption of the non-aggression pact between the States members of the Economic Community of Central African States, a pact which is likely to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to confidence-building in the subregion;

5. *Takes note* of the readiness of the States members of the Economic Community of Central African States to reduce the military forces, equipment and budgets in the subregion and to carry out a study on that subject;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide assistance to the Central African States in implementing the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Regional confidence-building measures".

In addition to the resolutions on regional disarmament, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on security items with reference to two regions: the Mediterranean and the Balkans.

When considering the item entitled "*Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region*", the First Committee had before it a report³⁵ of the Secretary-General containing the views of seven Governments on the subject. A draft resolution with the same title, which was submitted by 13 States, later joined by 2 others³⁶ was slightly revised and introduced by Algeria on 11 November. Algeria drew attention to the fact that five members of the European Community had, for the first time, joined the traditional sponsors of the resolution. By the draft text, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, noted the agreement of CSCE member States to widen their cooperation and to enlarge their dialogue with the non-participating Mediterranean States and encouraged the widespread support among countries of the subregion for the convening of a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, as well as the ongoing regional consultations to create the appropriate conditions for its convening.

The draft resolution, adopted without a vote in the First Committee, was subsequently similarly adopted in the General Assembly as resolution 48/81.

³⁵ A/48/514 and Add.1. Replies were received from: Algeria, Belgium (on behalf of the States members of the European Community), Cyprus, Germany, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco and Ukraine.

³⁶ Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. Subsequently, Croatia and Slovenia became sponsors of the revised text.

Resolution 48/81
Strengthening of security and cooperation in the
Mediterranean region

The General Assembly,

Recalling its relevant resolutions, including its resolution 47/58 of 9 December 1992,

Reaffirming the primary role of the Mediterranean countries in strengthening and promoting peace, security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region,

Recognizing the efforts realized so far and the determination of the Mediterranean countries to intensify the process of dialogue and consultations with a view to resolving the problems existing in the Mediterranean region and eliminating the causes of tension and the consequent threat to peace and security,

Recognizing also the indivisible character of security in the Mediterranean and that the enhancement of cooperation among Mediterranean countries with a view to promoting the economic and social development of all peoples of the region will contribute significantly to stability, peace and security in the region,

Recognizing further that prospects for closer Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in all spheres can be enhanced by positive developments worldwide, particularly in Europe and in the Middle East,

Aware of the recent positive developments in the Middle East peace process,

Expressing satisfaction at the growing awareness of the need for joint efforts by all Mediterranean countries so as to strengthen economic, social, cultural and environmental cooperation in the Mediterranean region,

Reaffirming the responsibility of all States to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region and their commitment to respect the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its concern at the persistent tension and continuing military activities in parts of the Mediterranean that hinder efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the region,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on this item,

1. *Reaffirms* that security in the Mediterranean is closely linked to European security as well as to international peace and security;
2. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the continuing efforts by Mediterranean countries to contribute actively to the elimination of all causes of tension in

the region and to the promotion of just and lasting solutions to the persistent problems of the region through peaceful means, thus ensuring the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and, respecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries of the Mediterranean and the right of peoples to self-determination, and therefore calls for full adherence to the principles of non-interference, non-intervention, non-use of force or threat of use of force and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, in accordance with the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

3. *Commends* the efforts by the Mediterranean countries in the continuation of initiatives and negotiations as well as the adoption of measures that will promote confidence- and security-building as well as disarmament in the Mediterranean region, and encourages them to pursue these efforts further;

4. *Recognizes* that the elimination of the economic and social disparities in levels of development as well as other obstacles in the Mediterranean area will contribute to enhancing peace, security and cooperation among Mediterranean countries;

5. *Encourages* the Mediterranean countries to strengthen further their cooperation in facing the terrorist activities, which pose a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the region and therefore to the improvement of the current political, economic and social situation;

6. *Takes note* of the conclusions of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, concerning the Mediterranean;

7. *Takes note also* of the "Helsinki Document 1992 – The Challenges of Change", adopted in July 1992, whereby the heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe agreed, *inter alia*, to widen their cooperation and enlarge their dialogue with the non-participating Mediterranean States as a means to promote social and economic development, thereby enhancing stability in the region, in order to narrow the prosperity gap between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours and protect the Mediterranean ecosystems;

8. *Takes note further* of the references concerning the Mediterranean region in paragraphs 37 and 38 in the communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Heads of Government of the countries of the Commonwealth, held at Limassol, Cyprus, from 21 to 25 October 1993;

9. *Recalls* the decisions taken by the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Western Mediterranean Countries, held at Algiers in October 1991, and the decision concerning the forthcoming summit meeting of the Western Mediterranean countries to be held at Tunis;

10. *Recalls also* the final declaration adopted at the first regular session of the Presidential Council of the Arab Maghreb Union, held at Tunis from 21 to 23 January 1990;

11. *Recalls further* the Declaration of the European Council of Ministers on relations between Europe and the Maghreb, issued at Lisbon on 25 June 1992, which underlines the views of the European Community and its member States on the principles and measures capable of strengthening stability and security and encouraging economic, social and cultural progress in the region;

12. *Takes note* of the final report of the international symposium on the future of the Mediterranean region, held at Tunis on 4 and 5 November 1992;

13. *Takes note also* of the seminar on the Mediterranean of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held at Valletta from 17 to 21 May 1993, as well as the two seminars held under the auspices of the Western European Union at Madrid in October 1992 and in Rome in March 1993, dealing respectively with security and cooperation in the Western Mediterranean and with the southern dimension of European security;

14. *Recalls* the conclusions and recommendations of the first Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, held at Malaga from 15 to 20 June 1992, which, *inter alia*, launched a pragmatic process of cooperation which would gradually gain in strength and coverage, generate a positive and irreversible momentum and facilitate the settlement of disputes;

15. *Encourages* the continued widespread support among Mediterranean countries for the convening of a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, as well as the ongoing regional consultations to create the appropriate conditions for its convening;

16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on means to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region;

17. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region".

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia sponsored a draft resolution entitled "*Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States*", which it revised a number of times. Referring to the draft text, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stated that it was very important from the standpoint of international security that Member States spare no effort to maintain at least a gleam of hope in the Balkans. By the draft text, the General Assembly would call upon the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on

the subject and on measures and preventive activities aimed at creation of a stable zone of peace and cooperation in the Balkans by the year 2000. The draft resolution, adopted without a vote in the First Committee, was subsequently adopted in the General Assembly, also without a vote, as resolution 48/84 B. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/84 B
Development of good-neighbourly relations
among Balkan States

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, the annex to which contains the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and 46/62 of 9 December 1991,

Affirming its determination that all nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,

Emphasizing the urgency of the consolidation of the Balkans as a region of peace, security, stability and good-neighbourliness, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and so enhancing the prospects for sustained development and prosperity for its peoples,

Noting the desire of the Balkan States to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and friendly relations with all nations in accordance with the Charter,

1. *Calls upon* all Balkan States to endeavour to promote good-neighbourly relations and continually to undertake unilateral and joint activities, particularly confidence-building measures as appropriate, in particular within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

2. *Emphasizes* the importance for all Balkan States to promote mutual cooperation in all fields and, *inter alia*, in trade and other forms of economic cooperation, transport and telecommunications, protection of the environment, advancement of democratic processes, promotion of human rights and development of cultural and sport relations;

3. *Stresses* that closer engagement of Balkan States in cooperation arrangements on the European continent will favourably influence the political and economic situation in the region, as well as the good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States, particularly those from the Balkan region, of international organizations, as well as of competent organs of the United Nations, on the development of good-neighbourly relations in the region and on measures and preventive activities

aimed at creation of a stable zone of peace and cooperation in the Balkans by the year 2000;

5. *Decides* to consider the report of the Secretary-General on the subject at its fiftieth regular session.

Conclusion

As evidenced in this chapter, in 1993, no less than in previous years, many initiatives were taken at the regional level with a view to strengthening regional peace and security and promoting the process of arms reduction.

In section VI of its resolution 47/120 B of 20 September 1993, entitled "Agenda for Peace", and considered only in plenary meetings, the General Assembly, recalling Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and taking into account the experience gained and the favourable results achieved by regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes in different parts of the world, recognized that regional organizations, arrangements and agencies could, in their fields of competence and in accordance with the Charter, make important contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. The Assembly encouraged such bodies to consider, as appropriate, ways and means for promoting closer cooperation and coordination with the United Nations with the objective of contributing to the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Charter and also encouraged the Secretary-General to continue his efforts at promoting such cooperation.

At its 1993 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission adopted "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security". The guidelines and recommendations were endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 48/75 G, adopted without a vote. The document emphasizes that regional and global approaches to disarmament and arms limitation complement each other and should be pursued simultaneously in order to promote regional and international peace and security, and that in carrying out its role in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should seek to promote complementarity between regional and global processes of disarmament by establishing effective liaison and cooperation with relevant regional bodies.

Undoubtedly, in a world threatened by a rising tide of conflict originating, in large measure, in ethnic rivalry, it is in the interest of the international community to seek the adoption, at the regional level, of arms limitation and disarmament measures as well as of confidence-building measures—measures likely also to contribute to global security.

CHAPTER V

Nuclear arms limitation, disarmament and related issues

Introduction

QUESTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS have been considered within and outside the United Nations since the very beginning of the nuclear age. As a result of these considerations, a number of bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements have been signed through which certain categories of weapons have been limited, reduced and eliminated.

Over the years, through long bilateral negotiations on nuclear-arms limitation and other related nuclear matters, the former Soviet Union and the United States reached a number of agreements.¹ The recent rounds of bilateral negotiations on strategic arms, the so-called Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), led to the signing, on 31 July 1991, of the START I Treaty,² which provides for significant reductions and imposes limits on all elements of the strategic nuclear forces of the two States. As a result of the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991, questions arose concerning the former Soviet Union's nuclear arms that had been deployed on the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. To address the new situation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States signed, on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon, a Protocol to the 1991 START Treaty,³ by which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine assumed the obligations of the former USSR under the Treaty.

¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, chap. V.

² For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, appendix II.

³ The text of the Protocol is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, appendix II.

Further negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States during 1992 led to the conclusion of a second strategic arms reduction treaty, START II, signed on 3 January 1993 (see appendix II).

Along with the consideration of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests (see chapter II), a number of other measures have been proposed to avert or reduce the risk of nuclear war and its devastating consequences. Some of these led to the establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (see chapter I), while others—concerning the prevention of nuclear war, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a nuclear-arms freeze, the cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the checking of the spread of missile technology and, more generally, the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems—are still being discussed. However, divergences of view have impeded significant progress in multilateral disarmament forums on these issues.

At the regional level, various proposals have been made for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones or demilitarized zones. In 1959 and 1967 agreement was reached on the demilitarization of the Antarctic⁴ and the denuclearization of outer space,⁵ respectively, and the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area was created by the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).⁶ In 1986 the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)⁷ entered into force. For many years, the setting up of such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia has been debated, and proposals for

⁴ The Antarctic Treaty (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778). The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition, 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11) (hereinafter referred to as *Status*), vol. 1.

⁵ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex). The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status*.

⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status*.

⁷ For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII, or *Status*.

other regions, including Northern and Central Europe and the Balkans, have been put forward. Some positive developments in the course of the last two years seem to have brought the establishment of such zones in Africa and the Middle East closer, with the prospect that such a treaty for Africa will be concluded in 1994. Efforts to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, however, have encountered many difficulties.

This chapter deals with cessation of the nuclear-arms race and prevention of nuclear war and, within that broad subject-area, with issues related to START, prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace.

Developments and trends, 1993

The major developments concerning nuclear-arms limitation, nuclear disarmament and related issues will be discussed in this section within the framework of: (a) issues related to START; (b) prohibition of the production of fissile material; (c) nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace; and (d) other nuclear and related issues.

Issues related to START

The major development in the nuclear field in 1993 was the signing, on 3 January, of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), by President Bush and President Yeltsin.⁸

The entry into force of START II is conditional upon the entry into force of START I and the Lisbon Protocol, under which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, "as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty". In connection with START I, a series of agreements were signed in 3 September between the Russian Federation and Ukraine concerning the dismantling and destruction of

⁸ The description of the main provisions of the Treaty may be found in *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, chapter V, while the text of the Treaty is reproduced in appendix II of this volume.

nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine.⁹ Among them was an agreement providing for the recycling of nuclear warheads and a statement of basic principles governing the recycling of nuclear warheads from strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine. As of the end of the year, the status of these agreements was not clear, given the difficulties arising from Ukraine's conditional ratification of START I, discussed below.

By the end of the year, all of the States concerned had ratified START I and the Lisbon Protocol. While Kazakhstan, the United States and the Russian Federation had done so in 1992, the two remaining States ratified them as follows in 1993: Belarus on 4 February and Ukraine¹⁰ on 18 November. Owing to the late date of Ukraine's ratification and and to the reservations that accompanied its ratification, no further action was taken on START II during 1993.

In resolving to ratify the documents, Ukraine made, *inter alia*, the following reservations: (a) that all assets of the strategic and tactical nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine, including their nuclear warheads, should be the State property of Ukraine; (b) that it would not consider itself bound by article V of the Lisbon Protocol, that is, the provision on accession to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State; however, it stated that the entry into force of START I and its implementation would open the way for a decision by its parliament on accession to the non-proliferation Treaty; (c) that it should exercise administrative control over the strategic nuclear forces deployed on its territory; (d) that it would strive to achieve non-nuclear status and gradually eliminate the nuclear weapons deployed in its territory provided that it received guarantees of its national security; (e) that the reduction and subsequent elimination of strategic offensive nuclear weapons should be carried out in accordance with corresponding articles of those documents; (f) that it would be able to fulfil the obligations undertaken only if sufficient international financial and technical assistance was provided; and (g) that the exchange of the instruments of ratification would take place only after the conditions specified in its act of ratification had been met.

⁹ CD/1225.

¹⁰ The relevant resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was circulated as a United Nations document (A/48/620-S/26770).

The text of a statement of the Government of the Russian Federation, dated 25 November, concerning the Ukrainian parliament's resolution of 18 November was transmitted to the United Nations in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General.¹¹ In its statement, the Russian Federation noted, *inter alia*, that in its view the resolution adopted by the Ukrainian parliament was a violation of an important international instrument, fundamental provisions of which had been rendered virtually null and void: it had, for example, proclaimed that the nuclear weapons were State property, that it would not accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, and that it was proposing to eliminate only 36 per cent of the missile launchers and 42 per cent of the nuclear warheads, while the entire remaining nuclear arsenal would belong to Ukraine. The Government of the Russian Federation considered that the resolution and reservations contained therein subverted the objectives of START I and were incompatible, *inter alia*, with article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Further, the unilateral actions by Ukraine, which affected the interests of all States, might call for measures on the part of the international community, including the United Nations Security Council, to prevent any act that undermined the nuclear-disarmament process, strategic stability and the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Efforts to address the reservations made by Ukraine in the process of ratifying START I continued, and in early 1994 a trilateral agreement¹² was signed between the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States which is expected to resolve remaining problems related to implementation of START I and to facilitate early ratification of START II.

The General Assembly again adopted without a vote a resolution, 48/75 B, on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, in which it encouraged the parties to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons, and further encouraged and supported the Russian Federation and the United States in their efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to continue to give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

¹¹ A/48/658-S/26803, annex.

¹² A/49/66-S/1994/91.

In the new international environment, the Russian Federation adopted,¹³ on 2 November, basic provisions of its military doctrine. The purpose of its policy in the field of nuclear weapons was stated to be the prevention of the danger of nuclear war by containment of aggression unleashed against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Russian Federation will not use its nuclear weapons against any State party to the non-proliferation Treaty that does not possess nuclear weapons except (a) in the case of armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces and other forces or its allies by that State in an alliance with a nuclear-weapon State; and (b) in the case of joint action by that State and a nuclear-weapon State in implementing or supporting invasion or armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces and other forces or its allies.

Prohibition of the production of fissile material

Another major development in the nuclear field was related to the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. For the first time, the General Assembly succeeded in adopting a resolution, without a vote, in which it recommended the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and requested IAEA to provide assistance for examination of verification arrangements for such a treaty, as required. This readiness to initiate multilateral negotiations on this subject was made possible by positive developments in the relationship between the two major nuclear-weapon States; by the unilateral decision, taken last year, of some of the nuclear-weapon States not to produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes; and by the increasing problems created by the piling up of fissile material following the elimination and reduction of nuclear weapons in the course of implementation of disarmament agreements.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace

Several positive developments took place in 1993 in regard to existing or future nuclear-weapon-free zones.

¹³ Presidential Decree No. 1833, extracts of which were reported in *Ros-syskie Vesti*, No. 224.

As far as the denuclearization of Africa is concerned, the conviction had been growing that the evolution of the international situation in general and of the continent in particular was conducive to implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. On the basis of General Assembly resolution 47/76, a third meeting of experts organized by the United Nations in cooperation with the OAU, took place in 1993 at Harare. Subsequently, the Group of Experts transmitted to the Secretary-General their report,¹⁴ to which was attached the draft text of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, together with four annexes and three protocols. The General Assembly welcomed the progress made at the third meeting and requested the Secretary-General to take appropriate action in order to finalize the drafting of a treaty. (The report is discussed more fully on page 155.)

It is hoped, as far as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is concerned, that the signing of the Declaration¹⁵ of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Government of Israel will contribute to security in the region, and thus facilitate efforts towards reaching the goal of a non-nuclear zone. Under the formula adopted at the Madrid Conference in 1991, along with the bilateral talks, multilateral efforts were to be pursued. As of May 1993, the United Nations was invited to participate in the multilateral-track talks and, specifically, in the Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.¹⁶ The fact that the resolution on Israeli nuclear armament was adopted by the General Assembly by a small margin speaks for itself of the changing circumstances in the region and the attitude of the international community towards the new peace process in the Middle East.

The process of consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Caribbean continued. The process of ratification of amendments to the Treaty was under way, and there was widespread expectation that the

¹⁴ A/48/371, annex.

¹⁵ At the request of the co-sponsors of the peace process, the United States and the Russian Federation, the text of the Declaration was circulated as a United Nations document (A/48/486-S/26560, annex).

¹⁶ A/48/399, paras. 5 and 6.

Treaty would enter fully into force for Argentina, Brazil and Chile early in 1994.¹⁷

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean continued consideration of new alternative approaches with a view to reaching early agreement to give impetus to the process of strengthening cooperation and ensuring peace, security and stability in the region of the Indian Ocean. In view of the new emphasis on identifying other approaches, no mention was made in its draft resolution to the General Assembly of the convening of a conference on the subject.

There were no discernible developments concerning other nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace.

Other nuclear and related issues

The remaining nuclear questions were less prominent in all disarmament forums in 1993. Owing in part to the widely perceived need of the Conference on Disarmament to focus on the item on a nuclear-test ban and on the item on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States (discussed in chapters II and I respectively), the Conference did not establish ad hoc committees on three other of its agenda items related to the nuclear-arms race and disarmament: cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; and new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

In the Disarmament Commission, consideration of the item "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" continued, and is scheduled for completion in 1994.

In view of the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, there was greater flexibility in the General Assembly on some nuclear issues that have been the subject of controversy. This was seen, for instance, in the agreement to take no action on two proposals before the First Committee, relating respectively to a nuclear freeze and to a request for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.

¹⁷ On 18 January 1994, Argentina and Chile deposited their instruments of ratification and became full parties to the Treaty.

The General Assembly adopted three resolutions concerning nuclear and related issues. By resolution 48/76 B it again requested the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; however, the differences of view continued. By resolution 48/61, adopted by consensus, it requested the Conference on Disarmament to keep under review the question of prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations. By resolution 48/75 D, concerning the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes, also adopted by consensus, the General Assembly expressed the continuing concern of the international community over the environmental dangers of dumping such material; however, differences among States persisted with regard to which forums were competent to deal with the matter.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1993

The Commission continued to consider the item entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons", which it had begun to consider in 1991. A number of new working papers were before the Group.¹⁸ The Commission decided to re-establish Working Group I to deal with the item. It met under the chairmanship of Mr. Victor Batiouk of Ukraine. In view of the Commission's decision to postpone conclusion of the item to 1994, the Group held only five meetings between 22 April and 6 May, and the Chairman conducted informal consultations during that period. The Group decided to base its work on the working papers and other relevant documents presented by member States at its sessions in 1991, 1992 and 1993. On the basis of the four subjects agreed upon at its 1992 session, the Chairman proposed the following general outline for "Guidelines and recommendations for nuclear disarmament": I. General overview: (a) the relationship between the process of nuclear disarmament and international peace and security; and (b) review and assessment of recent developments

¹⁸ A/CN.10/173, submitted at the end of the 1992 session (Ireland); A/CN.10/178 (Australia); A/CN.10/180 (Russian Federation); and A/CN.10/179, 181 and 182 submitted under two of the Commission's items: nuclear and regional (South Africa).

in the process of nuclear disarmament; II. Mechanisms for nuclear disarmament; III. The role of the United Nations system in the process of nuclear disarmament; and IV. Principles and recommendations: conditions and measures required for strengthening the process of nuclear disarmament. Subsequently, the Working Group decided to annex the general outline to its report.¹⁹

In the course of its deliberations, the Group reaffirmed the vital importance and urgency of disarmament in general and of nuclear disarmament in particular in the new political and security environment, with a view of achieving the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Following a discussion of the general outline, the Chairman proposed that he prepare a draft text and circulate it at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly to serve solely as a basis for beginning the substantive work on the item at the Commission's 1994 session. In addition, it was agreed that the Chairman would hold informal consultations during the intersessional period and convene a meeting of the Group for that purpose in the fall.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1993

In view of the agreement of members of the Conference on Disarmament to focus on four agenda items in 1993, the Conference dealt with a number of items only in plenary meetings. On the "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament" and on "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", it decided once again not to establish ad hoc committees. In addition, in the context of the item "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", it did not establish its traditional ad hoc committee on radiological weapons.

Delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions—as recorded in previous annual reports of the Conference—on these three items in the course of plenary meetings. Moreover, several new documents related to the agenda items "Cessation of the nuclear-

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42)*, para. 29 (report) and annex I (outline).

arms race and nuclear disarmament” and “Prevention of nuclear war” were submitted.²⁰

Action by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1993

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean held its session from 21 June to 2 July, at United Nations Headquarters in New York, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stanley Kalpage of Sri Lanka. At its 1993 session, 44 States and 2 Observers²¹ participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The Ad Hoc Committee dealt mainly with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 47/59, by which the Assembly had requested the Ad Hoc Committee, *inter alia*, “to consider new alternative approaches to the achievement of the goals contained in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” and to address “the complex ramifications of the issues involved and differing perceptions on those issues as well as the future role of the Ad Hoc Committee”. According to the Chairman’s summary of the discussion, annexed to the Committee’s report,²² the main subject areas discussed were: (a) the changing international situation and its impact on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace; (b) ramifications of the issues involved and differing perceptions on those issues; (c) new alternative approaches; and (d) future role of the Ad Hoc Committee.

²⁰ The following States or groups of States submitted documents: Belarus (CD/1182); Belarus, Russian Federation, Ukraine and United States (CD/1193); Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (CD/1198); Mexico (CD/1196); Russian Federation (CD/1213); Russian Federation and United States (CD/1192 and CD/1194); Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States (CD/1195); Turkey (CD/1197); and Ukraine (CD/1181 and CD/1221).

²¹ Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and, as Observer States, Nepal and Sweden.

²² *Official records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/48/29)*, annex.

The Committee recommended that it should continue consideration of new alternative approaches, building upon its deliberations at its 1993 session, with a view to reaching early agreement to give a new impetus to the process of strengthening cooperation and ensuring peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region. In this context, it recommended that the Assembly should invite views of Member States, including views on the new alternative approaches discussed at the 1993 session of the Committee.

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

As at previous sessions, the General Assembly had on its agenda several items related to nuclear weapons—such as bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, a nuclear-test ban, prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, a nuclear-arms freeze, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones and Israeli nuclear armament—and related to the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Indonesia, on behalf of the States that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled: “*Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament*”. It was subsequently revised twice and sponsored by an additional 17 States.²³ In introducing it on 9 November, Indonesia stated that although the sponsors welcomed the progress made in the field of nuclear disarmament, they recognized the need for greater efforts to ensure the entry into force of the relevant agreements without further delay.

On 16 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 48/75 B. It reads as follows:

²³ Australia, Bolivia, Finland, France, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Russian Federation, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom and United States.

Resolution 48/75 B

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Recognizing the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, which have permitted agreements on deep reductions in nuclear armaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such weapons,

Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Stressing the importance of strengthening international peace and security through disarmament,

Emphasizing that nuclear disarmament remains one of the principal tasks of our times,

Stressing also that it is the responsibility of all States to adopt and implement measures towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Appreciating a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the treaty that was concluded on 8 November 1987 between the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and the treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Noting that there are still significant nuclear arsenals and that the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, rests with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the largest stockpiles,

Welcoming the steps that have already been taken by those States to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons from a deployed status,

Noting also the new climate of relations between the United States of America and the States of the former Soviet Union, which permits them to intensify their cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons,

Urging the further intensification of such efforts to accelerate the implementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear-arms reduction,

Welcoming also the reductions made by other nuclear-weapon States in some of their nuclear-weapon programmes, and encouraging all nuclear-weapon States to consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament,

Affirming that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament should facilitate and complement each other,

1. *Welcomes* the actions taken towards the ratification of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and the protocol to that Treaty signed at Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the four parties thereto, and urges the parties to take the necessary steps to ensure its entry into force at the earliest possible date;

2. *Also welcomes* the signing of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, in Moscow on 3 January 1993, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring this Treaty into force at the earliest possible date;

3. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the continued implementation of the treaty between the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of all their declared missiles subject to elimination under the treaty;

4. *Encourages* the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making to such cooperation as well;

5. *Further encourages and supports* the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear armaments and to continue to give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;

6. *Invites* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arms agreements and unilateral decisions.

A draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes" was submitted by 19 States, later

joined by 11 additional States.²⁴ The title was subsequently revised to read "*Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices*". In introducing it on 16 November, Canada expressed its satisfaction that among the original sponsors were countries which in the past had been unable to support even a procedural text on the issue. It noted that the title of the text had been amended to reflect more accurately the subject-matter of the proposed treaty, and stated that the heart of the text was to be found in paragraph 1, in which the Assembly would recommend the negotiation, in the most appropriate international forum, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. A number of States commented on the text. Finland, India and the Russian Federation stated that the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum for conducting negotiations. Finland believed that an effective verification system, with responsibility entrusted to IAEA, ought to be the central element of the treaty. India and the Russian Federation both stressed the importance of early commencement of the negotiations. The Russian Federation stated that the phrase "the most appropriate international forum" was subject to misinterpretation and expressed the fear that it could lead to an unjustifiable delay in launching the negotiations. Israel noted that the specific modalities for the implementation of the resolution could not be addressed in isolation from the peace process in the Middle East in all its aspects or from global action to reduce tension and limit armaments.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/75 L. It reads as follows:

²⁴ Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United States and Uruguay.

Resolution 48/75 L

Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

The General Assembly,

Welcoming the significant progress in reducing nuclear-weapon arsenals as evidenced by the substantive bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and their respective unilateral undertakings regarding the disposition of fissile material,

Welcoming also the initiative by the United States of America for a multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Welcoming further the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993 to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, and fully endorsing the contents of that decision,

Convinced that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects,

1. *Recommends* the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

2. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide assistance for examination of verification arrangements for such a treaty as and when required;

3. *Calls* upon all States to demonstrate their commitment to the objectives of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

A draft resolution entitled "*Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament*" was

submitted by 16 States, later joined by 7 additional States.²⁵ In introducing it on 4 November, Belarus noted that the draft dealt with very sensitive matters and was important because it provided for a disarmament mechanism that would become operational as soon as a dangerous situation developed.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/61. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/61

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Taking note of paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Determined to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948,

Noting that in the course of its 1992 and 1993 sessions the Conference on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons",

Taking into account the sections of the reports of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question,

1. *Reaffirms* that effective measures should be undertaken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep under review, with expert assistance, as appropriate, the questions of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of

²⁵ Afghanistan, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Netherlands, Philippines, Russian Federation, Slovakia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons;

3. *Calls upon* all States, immediately following the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament, to give favourable consideration to these recommendations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

5. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue the practice of reporting the results of its consideration of these questions in its annual report to the General Assembly;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Speaking on 16 November with respect to a draft resolution entitled "*Nuclear-arms freeze*", which had ultimately been sponsored by nine States,²⁶ India stated that as the two major elements of the draft—a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and the complete cessation of the production of fissile material for military purposes—were satisfactorily covered by two separate draft resolutions, the sponsors would withdraw the draft.

Seventeen States, later joined by three additional States,²⁷ submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons*". On 2 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution and, on 5 November, a further revision. In introducing the text on 9 November, India stated that although many positive developments had taken place in the international arena, what had not changed was the idea that nuclear weapons were necessary for security. The overwhelming majority of mankind wanted complete nuclear disarmament. India believed that that objective was achievable and that one day the international community would negotiate such

²⁶ Bolivia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Myanmar, Panama and Sudan.

²⁷ Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Sudan and Viet Nam.

an agreement. It further stressed that the draft took into account recent positive developments in international security and the views expressed on the subject at the previous session.

On 16 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 102 to 21, with 23 abstentions.

China explained that although it believed that the text of the draft resolution could be further improved, it had voted in favour of it because the draft convention could be a useful basis for negotiations towards the attainment of a complete prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. Among those voting against, Finland stated that the text was too far removed from current realities; that the end of the cold war had reduced the risks of a generalized nuclear war; and that the efforts of the international community should be focused mainly on non-proliferation. Among those abstaining, Australia found that the proposed draft convention could have implications for the maintenance of strategic stability based on deterrence. It would, however, support a single no-first-use assurance by the nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand did not think that the proposed treaty would make a practical contribution to the nuclear disarmament process. It believed that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons could provide a satisfactory guarantee in that regard.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 120 to 23, with 24 abstentions, as resolution 48/76 B. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/76 B

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced also that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should strengthen international security and contribute to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the Treaty between and the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, signed at Moscow on 3 January 1993, aimed at reducing the strategic arsenals to an aggregate level not to exceed 3,500 deployed strategic warheads for each side no later than the year 2003,

Conscious that the recent steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Stressing that an international convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1993 session, was unable to undertake negotiations on this subject,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a possible basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

Annex

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced also that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this convention, opened for signature at _____ on the _____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____.

Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of*

nuclear weapons". Introducing the draft on 9 November, Indonesia said that every avenue should be explored with a view to the elimination of nuclear weapons. On 19 November, the sponsors stated that in view of recent developments, they would not press for final action on the draft resolution but would instead continue to monitor the situation in different forums, especially with respect to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban.

Algeria, on behalf of the Group of African States, submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes*", which was later also sponsored by Bolivia and Haiti. In introducing it on 8 November, Algeria noted that the draft resolution was based on earlier resolutions of the General Assembly on the subject, and expressed the hope that it would be approved by consensus.

On 15 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

While joining in the consensus, several States explained their position. Thus, the United Kingdom agreed that radioactive waste could be a source of radioactive material which could be used in radiological weapons, but said it was not willing to define the dumping of radioactive waste as radiological warfare. Dumping practices could not be regulated by arms control measures. Ocean dumping of radioactive waste was governed by the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, and the appropriate forum for considering the transboundary movement of radioactive waste was IAEA. The United States expressed similar reservations. It said it had not participated in the vote and urged that future resolutions under this agenda item should avoid reference to issues that were not within the Committee's competence. Australia, too, expressed some concerns about the appropriate forum for consideration of a legally binding instrument on the subject. Moreover, it stated that its support for the resolution should not be interpreted to mean that it opposed land disposal. Australia reaffirmed its unqualified opposition to the dumping of nuclear wastes by any State or organization, and its belief that such dumping would constitute radiological warfare. Canada associated itself with the explanation of position by Australia.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/75 D. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/75 D

Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind resolutions CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII) of 1988 and CM/Res.1225 (L) of 1989, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, concerning the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa,

Welcoming resolution GC(XXXIII)RES/509 on the dumping of nuclear wastes, adopted on 29 September 1989 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-third regular session,

Welcoming also resolution GC(XXXIV)RES/530 establishing a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, adopted on 21 September 1990 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-fourth regular session,

Considering its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, *inter alia*, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare,

Recalling resolution CM/RES.1356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa,

Aware of the potential hazards underlying any use of radioactive wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and its implications for regional and international security, in particular for the security of developing countries,

Recalling also its resolutions 43/75 Q of 7 December 1988, 44/116 R of 15 December 1989, 45/58 K of 4 December 1990, 46/36 K of 6 December 1991 and 47/52 D of 9 December 1992,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. *Takes note* of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to a future convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons;

2. *Expresses grave concern* regarding any use of nuclear wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States;

3. *Calls upon* all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, radioactive wastes as part of the scope of such a convention;

5. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of such a convention and to include in its report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session the progress recorded in the negotiations on this subject;

6. *Takes note* of resolution CM/Res.1356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of Africa Unity, on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa;

7. *Expresses the hope* that the effective implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste will enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories;

8. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue keeping the subject under active review, including the desirability of concluding a legally binding instrument in this field;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes".

The First Committee had on its agenda the following items related to nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace: (a) "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"; (b) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"; (c) "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"; and (d) "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean". In addition, a separate item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" was considered in the context of the zone in the Middle East.

During the debate on the agenda item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", the Assembly had before it a note submitted by the Secretary-General, pursuant to resolution 47/76 of 15 December 1992, transmitting the report of the third meeting of the Group of Experts appointed by him to draw up a draft treaty on the denuclearization of Africa.²⁸ At their meeting, the experts had succeeded in drafting most of the provisions of the future treaty as well as its three protocols, which are addressed to nuclear-weapon States and to States having responsibilities for territories situated

²⁸ A/48/371, annex.

within the zone, incorporating prohibitions on the use or threat of use of nuclear explosive devices against parties and territories within the zone and on the testing of such devices. Annexes to the treaty deal with the geographical parameters of the zone, IAEA safeguards, the establishment of an African Commission on Nuclear Energy, and complaints procedure. The draft treaty, annexes and protocols were annexed to the report of the Group of Experts. While substantive progress had been made during its meeting, the Group agreed to request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the OAU, to convene a further meeting in order to enable it to finalize the drafting of the treaty.

In addition, the Secretary-General submitted a report²⁹ on the progress made by the Director General of IAEA in ensuring full implementation of the safeguards agreement with South Africa. The report reproduced, in an annex, resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/625, entitled "An African nuclear-weapon-free zone", in which the General Conference of IAEA commended the African States in their efforts to establish such a zone in Africa, and a report of the Director General of IAEA on the denuclearization of Africa, which, in its appendix II, gave a brief account of the efforts of the Group of Experts.

Algeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa*". In introducing it on 8 November, Algeria expressed the hope that the draft would be adopted by consensus as had been the case in the past.

On 19 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. After the Committee took action, the United Kingdom stated that a carefully prepared and well-drafted treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, if accepted by all States in the region, would be an important contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to international peace and security. It was further pleased that the additional cost of the meeting involved was to be met by redeployment of existing resources.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/86. It reads as follows:

²⁹ A/48/339, annexes I and II.

Resolution 48/86

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, in which they solemnly declare their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire control of atomic weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 and 47/76 of 15 December 1992, its earliest and latest on the subject, as well as all its previous resolutions on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,

Desirous of ensuring the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Calling upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolutions CM/Res.1342 (LIV) and CM/Res.1395 (LVI) Rev.1 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its fifty-fourth and fifty-sixth ordinary sessions, held at Abuja from 27 May to 1 June 1991 and at Dakar from 22 to 28 June 1992, respectively,

Noting that the Government of South Africa acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁵ on 10 July 1991 and that it concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which entered into force on 16 September 1991, and committed itself to early and full implementation of that agreement,

Noting also the announcement by South Africa that it had voluntarily abandoned its nuclear deterrent capability before accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and its standing invitation to the Agency to inspect past nuclear-weapon-programme activities and facilities and to verify its disclosure,

Recalling resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/625 on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, adopted on 1 October 1993 by the General Conference of the Agency,

Stressing that the full disclosure of South Africa's nuclear installations and materials is essential to the peace and security of the region and to the

success of the commendable efforts exerted by the African States towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa,

Welcoming the progress made at the Third Meeting of the Group of Experts to Draw up a Draft Treaty or Convention on the Denuclearization of Africa, which was organized by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity and held at Harare from 5 to 8 April 1993,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Third Meeting of the Group of Experts to Draw up a Draft Treaty or Convention on the Denuclearization of Africa;

2. *Reaffirms* that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

3. *Strongly renews its call* upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

4. *Takes note* of the report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Agency's verification activities in South Africa;

5. *Calls upon* South Africa to continue to comply fully with the implementation of its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency;

6. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which he has rendered effective assistance to the Organization of African Unity in organizing the meetings of the above-mentioned Group of Experts;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to take appropriate action to enable the Group of Experts designated by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity to meet during 1994 at Windhoek and Addis Ababa, in order to finalize the drafting of a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to submit the text of the treaty to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session under an agenda item entitled "Final text of a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone";

8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session on the progress made by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in ensuring the full implementation of the safeguards agreement with South Africa.

During the consideration of the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the First Committee

had before it a report³⁰ of the Secretary-General on the subject, in which he pointed out two major developments of relevance for the assessment of the prospects for the establishment of such a zone: the changes in international relations pertinent to the consideration of security issues in the region; and the basic proposals advanced by States of the region. After elaborating on those two major developments, he concluded that the prospects for establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region were somewhat more promising now than they had been a few years ago and that key obstacles were being gradually reduced or even eliminated. Furthermore, direct negotiations between some States were now a reality. At the same time, the Secretary-General pointed out, such a zone could not be conceived of or implemented in a political vacuum, separated from the process of mutual reconciliation. Therefore, he urged all States in the region to take every opportunity in the ongoing peace process to build bridges of mutual cooperation on security and related matters.

Egypt submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East*"; it was later also sponsored by Honduras and the Philippines. In introducing it on 9 November, Egypt noted that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be an important contribution to the universal effort to curb nuclear proliferation both regionally and internationally. A turning-point in the region had been the signing of the agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had opened the way to the possibility of a lasting and comprehensive peace. It further noted that the Secretary-General's report on the subject offered a comprehensive review of current political developments and that the participation of the United Nations in the negotiating process was a positive step.

On 15 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. Israel, while joining in the consensus, reiterated its traditional reservations with respect to the modalities mentioned in the draft. It stressed that the nuclear issue should be dealt with in the full context of the peace process, as well as of all regional security problems. It believed that a step-by-step approach should be applied, beginning with confidence-building measures, leading to actual peace.

³⁰ A/48/399.

In due course, the process could be complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/71. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/71

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991 and 47/48 of 9 December 1992 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing also the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

Emphasizing further the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 47/48,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Takes note* of resolution GC(XXXVII)RES/627 of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;

4. *Invites* all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

5. *Also invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

6. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

7. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;

8. *Invites* all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

10. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

When considering the related item "Israeli nuclear armament", the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East,³¹ in which he stated that no information on the subject had been submitted to him in 1993 other than the text of the relevant resolution of IAEA, reproduced in the report.

A draft resolution entitled "*Israeli nuclear armament*" was submitted by 10 States, later joined by an additional 8 States.³² In introducing it on behalf of the Group of Arab States on 11 November, the Sudan stated that the draft referred to the positive aspects of the peace negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel. However, additional steps were required: establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. To attain that goal, Israel should renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. Speaking again at the time of the vote, the Sudan drew attention to the fact that the 1993 text called upon all the States of the region to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

On 16 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 55 to 39, with 47 abstentions. A large number of States explained their position before or after the voting.

³¹ A/48/494 The document contained the text of resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/627, entitled "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East".

³² Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

Statements were made by a number of delegations that had voted against the resolution. Israel thought the vote in the First Committee should reflect the position, favourable or otherwise, of the First Committee towards the Middle East peace process. It expressed its regret that certain States had sponsored the resolution or were voting for it. Belgium, speaking on behalf of the members of the European Union, noted that the submission of the draft was contrary to recent historic developments in the Middle East, that the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be dealt with in a global manner within the framework of the peace talks, not by singling out one country in the region. Norway, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, stated that they supported the thrust of the resolution but had voted against it because they believed that the singling out of a particular country was a practice that should be eschewed. In order to establish a climate of confidence, all the countries of the region should accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. Austria voted against the text because it considered that the substance of the draft was already covered by the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and that adoption of the resolution could have a negative effect on the peace process. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia fully agreed with the statement made by Austria. Romania voted against the draft resolution because it believed it was high time to adopt a new, more constructive approach, in accordance with the positive developments in the region and the ongoing peace process.

Among those abstaining, Australia, India, Myanmar, Turkey and Ukraine explained that, while they supported the thrust of the draft, they could not accept its discriminatory approach.

Among those voting in favour, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic reiterated that as long as Israeli nuclear weapons existed and Israel refused to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection, the draft resolution on the subject was needed.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 53 to 45, with 65 abstentions, as resolution 48/78. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/78

Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind relevant United Nations resolutions,

Taking note of relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is GC(XXXVII)/RES/627 of 1 October 1993,

Aware of the recent positive developments in the Middle East peace process,

1. *Calls upon* Israel to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
2. *Calls upon* the States of the region to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of the present resolution;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

While considering the agenda item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia", the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General by which he transmitted a reply received pursuant to resolution 47/49 of the General Assembly.³³

Bangladesh and Pakistan, later joined by the Philippines, submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia*". In introducing the draft resolution on 12 November, Pakistan stated that the sponsors considered that a regime similar to those established in Latin America and the South Pacific to exclude the nuclearization of those areas could and should be established in South Asia. The draft followed the lines of the previous year's resolution, except for the inclusion of a new operative paragraph welcoming the support of the five nuclear-weapon States for the proposal.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 125 to 3 (Bhutan, India and Mauritius), with 12 abstentions. Several States explained their position before or after the voting. India, in explaining its negative vote, reiterated its reservations on the concept, stressing that without a proper definition of the geographical extent, security needs and concerns of a region, endorsement of the concept would be inappropriate. Moreover, it maintained that nuclear disarmament was a global issue that required a global approach. While in favour of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, specific circumstances and considerations had made it unable, Mauritius explained, to support the resolution. Indonesia stated that, while it con-

³³ A/48/256, reproducing the reply from the United Kingdom.

tinued to promote a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, it had to abstain because efforts aimed at achieving an agreement had not yet come to a successful conclusion. While it believed in the principle underlying the resolution, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abstained because it considered that a nuclear-free zone must meet certain conditions, among which was agreement of all regional countries.

Among those voting in favour, the United States stated that its support for the resolution did not mean that it gave a blanket endorsement to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Japan expressed its belief that denuclearization of the region would promote peace and stability. In support of this effort, Japan had been holding bilateral consultations with a number of countries. Hungary noted that its vote in favour of the resolution was in line with its policy of supporting all efforts that could stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that nuclear-free zones were helpful to the cause of non-proliferation.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 153 to 3, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 48/72. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/72

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982, 38/65 of 15 December 1983, 39/55 of 12 December 1984, 40/83 of 12 December 1985, 41/49 of 3 December 1986, 42/29 of 30 November 1987, 43/66 of 7 December 1988, 44/109 of 15 December 1989, 45/53 of 4 December 1990, 46/31 of 6 December 1991 and 47/49 of 9 December 1992 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures that can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Taking note with appreciation of the declarations issued at the highest level by the Governments of South Asian States that are developing their peace-

ful nuclear programmes, reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Welcoming the recent proposal for the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia,

Taking note of the proposal to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia as soon as possible, with the participation of the regional and other concerned States,

Taking note also of the proposal to hold consultations among five nations with a view to ensuring nuclear non-proliferation in the region,

Considering that the eventual participation of other States, as appropriate, in this process could be useful,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective;

3. *Welcomes* the support of all the five nuclear-weapon States for this proposal, and calls upon them to extend the necessary cooperation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

The General Assembly again considered the item entitled "*Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlate-*

lolco)". On 3 November, 25 States, later joined by one additional State,³⁴ submitted a draft resolution with the same title as the item. In introducing it on 9 November, Mexico stated that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean welcomed the prospect of the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, of which 25 out of the 33 States in the region were now signatories.

On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. In connection with the adoption of the draft, two States made statements. Cuba noted that it had undertaken a commitment to become a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty when that Treaty went into force for all countries in the region. Japan stated that it had joined the consensus because it believed that denuclearization of the region would promote peace and stability in that region and in the world.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also by consensus, as resolution 48/85. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/85

Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America,

Recalling also that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would lend it their full cooperation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

Considering that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and those which do not possess such weapons,

Recalling that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967,

³⁴ Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Recalling also that in its preamble the Treaty of Tlatelolco states that military denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

Recalling further that in its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967 it welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty of Tlatelolco as an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is open for signature to all the sovereign States of Latin America and the Caribbean and that it contains two additional protocols that are open for signature, respectively, to the States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for territories located within the zone of application of the Treaty and to the nuclear-weapon States,

Bearing in mind also that, with the adherence in 1993 of Dominica, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in force for twenty-five sovereign States of the region,

Recalling that since 1992 Additional Protocol I has been in force for all the States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for territories located within the zone of application of the Treaty,

Recalling also that since 1974 Additional Protocol II has been in force for the five nuclear-weapon States,

Mindful that international conditions are more propitious for the consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

Recalling that in 1992 the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean approved and opened for signature a set of amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, submitted jointly by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, with the aim of enabling the full entry into force of that instrument,

Noting with satisfaction the holding of the thirteenth regular session of the General Conference at Mexico City on 27 and 28 May 1993,

Noting that the Government of Cuba has declared that, in pursuit of regional unity, it would be ready to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco once all the States of the region have assumed the undertakings of that Treaty,

Taking into account the declaration presented by the delegation of Brazil at the aforementioned meeting of the General Conference in which it was stated that the full entry into force of the Treaty for Argentina, Brazil and Chile is imminent,

Noting with satisfaction that on 1 September 1993 the Government of Mexico made that country the first State to deposit its instrument of ratification of the amendments to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference on 26 August 1992 in its resolution 290 (VII);

1. *Welcomes* the concrete steps taken by several countries of the region during the past year for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. *Notes with satisfaction* the joint declaration by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to the effect that the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for those three countries is imminent;

3. *Urges* the countries of the region which have not yet done so to deposit their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolutions 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1993, 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991 and 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

Sri Lanka, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, later joined by Panama and the Philippines, submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace*". In introducing the draft resolution on 9 November, the representative of Sri Lanka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, recalled resolution 47/59, by which the Assembly had requested the Ad Hoc Committee to consider new alternative approaches leading to the achievement of the goals of the Declaration and to examine the complex ramifications of the issues involved. The draft resolution was in line with those requests and reflected the new spirit of cooperation in international relations which the draft would like to promote. He expressed the hope that the draft would be adopted by consensus.

On 16 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 110 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 32 abstentions.

Two States explained their position in connection with the action of the Committee. The United States noted that in spite of positive changes introduced into the draft by the sponsors, some of the most important rights and freedoms with regard to navigation—such as freedom of overflight, the right of innocent passage through territorial seas

and the right of passage through archipelagic waters—had not been dealt with in the text. Australia voted in favour because the language and the tone of the draft had undergone a marked adjustment in the right direction. It noted, however, that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee gave no evidence that concrete results had been achieved in regard to developing new approaches to peace and security in the Indian Ocean region.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 130 to 4, with 36 abstentions, as resolution 48/82. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/82
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean
as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolution 47/59 of 9 December 1992 and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling also the report on the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean held in July 1979,

Recalling further paragraphs 15 and 16 of chapter III of the final documents adopted by the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,

Noting that great-Power rivalry is being replaced by a new and welcome phase of confidence, trust and cooperation, and that the improved international political environment following the end of the cold war has created favourable opportunities to renew comprehensive multilateral and regional efforts towards the realization of the goals of peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region,

Welcoming the positive developments in international political relations, which offer opportunities for enhancing peace, security and cooperation, and which have been reflected in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean,

Reaffirming the importance of the freedom of navigation in the high seas, including in the Indian Ocean, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

Convinced that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue its consideration of new alternative approaches,

Emphasizing the need for the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to cooperate with and partici-

pate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, particularly at a time when the Committee is actively engaged in the task of developing new alternative approaches,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean;

2. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to continue consideration of new alternative approaches building upon its deliberations at the session held in 1993, with a view to reaching early agreement to give new impetus to the process of strengthening cooperation and ensuring peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region;

3. *Calls upon* the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee;

4. *Invites* the Member States to submit to the Secretary-General, by 31 May 1994, their views on new alternative approaches, including those discussed at the 1993 session of the Ad Hoc Committee and contained in its report to the General Assembly;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit, by 30 June 1994, a report based on replies received from Member States;

6. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to hold a session during 1994, with a duration of not more than five working days;

7. *Also requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session a comprehensive report on the implementation of the present resolution;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace".

The General Assembly dealt also with three other items which, though not disarmament items, were closely related to the items on nuclear-weapon-free zones and on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: the items relating to Antarctica, Central America and the South Atlantic.

By its resolution 48/80, entitled "*Question of Antarctica*", the General Assembly reaffirmed, *inter alia*, that the management and use of Antarctica should be conducted in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and urged that all activities in the region

should be carried out exclusively for the purpose of peaceful scientific investigation.

By resolution 48/161, "*The situation in Central America, procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace and progress in fashioning a region of peace, freedom, democracy and development*", the General Assembly noted, *inter alia*, the proposals for the establishment of a new model of regional security based on a reasonable balance of forces and the eradication of trafficking in weapons.

By resolution 48/23, "*Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic*", the General Assembly reaffirmed the purpose and objective of the zone; welcomed recent initiatives aimed at the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and stressed its relevance for the region of the South Atlantic; noted the hope expressed by the countries of the zone to welcome in the near future a united non-racial democratic South Africa into the community of South Atlantic States; and requested the relevant organizations, organs and bodies of the United Nations system to render all appropriate assistance that States of the zone might seek in their efforts to implement the declaration of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic.

Conclusion

Nuclear-arms limitation, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and other questions related to nuclear weapons continued to be discussed at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. The most important event at the bilateral level was the signing of the START II Treaty on 3 January between the Russian Federation and the United States. On the basis of the Treaty, the two parties have undertaken to reduce their nuclear strategic arsenals by 70 per cent, and it is hoped that implementation of the Treaty will eventually open the way for the other nuclear-weapon States to join the process of nuclear disarmament. Conclusion of this agreement between the two major nuclear Powers enabled the General Assembly to adopt, at its forty-eighth session, a consensus resolution on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations.

Although the two remaining States³⁵—Belarus and Ukraine—ratified the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol in 1993, no further action was taken on START II owing to the reservations that accompanied Ukraine's ratification. However, in the process of implementing

the obligations undertaken under START I, and especially of resolving the problems involved in the destruction of the nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union, a series of agreements were signed between different parties to the Treaty. Moreover, for the purpose of addressing the reservations made by Ukraine in ratifying START I, a trilateral agreement was signed between the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States early in 1994.

Another major development in the nuclear field was the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution, without a vote, in which it recommended the negotiation, in the most appropriate international forum, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

As far as other nuclear-weapons-related issues are concerned, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions: on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes, and on a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. While the first two were supported by all States and were adopted without a vote, the third continued to be opposed by many Western and Eastern European countries. In view of positive developments in international relations in general and of the decisions taken to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and a complete cessation of the production of fissile material, the traditional draft resolution on a nuclear-arms freeze, supported mostly by developing countries, was for the first time not put to a vote.

Several positive developments took place in 1993 concerning existing or future nuclear-weapon-free zones. Developments in Africa, especially in South Africa, were reflected in the elaboration of a draft text of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty. The General Assembly welcomed the progress made in this regard, and it is expected that the text will be finalized in 1994. The changing situation in the region of the Middle East and the attitude of the international community towards the new peace process were reflected in the action of the General Assembly on the question of Israeli nuclear armament. It can be expected that

³⁵ Of the four successor States of the former Soviet Union in connection with START I, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation had ratified that Treaty in 1992.

recent developments will contribute to security in the region and facilitate efforts towards reaching the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. With respect to Latin America and the Caribbean, the process of consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco continued.

The majority of States still favoured the establishment of zones of peace in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. In the case of the former, intensive cooperation among countries of the region continued. In the case of the latter, the Ad Hoc Committee pursued its consideration of new alternative approaches, but, owing to changing circumstances in general and in the region in particular, there were increasing reservations regarding the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, and for the first time the relevant General Assembly resolution did not call for the convening of such a conference.

CHAPTER VI

Conventional weapons and advanced technologies

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS and armed forces has been on the disarmament agenda of the United Nations since the Organization was created, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis.¹ Efforts to regulate the build-up and transfer of such armaments were made as early as the mid-1960s² and continue to this day. In addition, efforts have been made at the regional level with varying degrees of success, the most notable achievement being the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990).

At the United Nations the discussion of the issues of conventional disarmament has focused on four elements: (a) conventional weapons *per se* and efforts to limit them; (b) international arms transfers and, recently, the export of modern military technology; (c) inhumane weapons and the Convention restricting their use; and (d) the regional approach. (The last two elements are discussed in chapters VII and IV respectively.) The economic repercussions of efforts to reduce or regulate conventional arms have attracted the attention of the international community, and led, in 1987, to the holding of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. This aspect of the issue is considered in this chapter.³

The need to address conventional and nuclear disarmament as concurrent requirements became increasingly recognized during the 1980s.

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XIX.

³ See earlier volumes of *The Yearbook*, in particular vol. 12: 1987, chap. XVIII; and vol. 17: 1992, chap. VIII.

In 1984 the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly an expert study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.⁴ The following year, the General Assembly decided, by consensus, to include in its agenda an item entitled "Conventional disarmament". At the 1988 special session, the conventional arms race in its various aspects and its importance *vis-à-vis* the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament were debated intensively. In 1990, the Disarmament Commission, pursuant to a request of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus a text on conventional disarmament⁵ in which it identified a number of issues and possible measures and which was endorsed by the Assembly. The trend towards relatively increased emphasis on the conventional aspect of the arms race and conventional disarmament has become even more evident during the last few years, especially after the conclusion of several important agreements concerning the reduction of nuclear weapons.

While it has long been recognized that arms transfers have considerable implications for conventional disarmament, the subject is complex and arouses many concerns, particularly among developing States that do not have indigenous arms production facilities and therefore feel the need to import arms to meet their legitimate needs for self-defence. In 1988 the General Assembly mandated a study on international arms transfers, including their security and disarmament implications and illicit transfer. The study was completed in 1991.⁶ In addition, more and more attention has been attached to the question of modern military technology and its impact on international security; in 1990 the Secretary-General submitted a report⁷ on the subject, and the following year an item on the role of science and technology in the context of international

⁴ *Study on Conventional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1). It is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chapter XXV.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/45/42)*, para. 34.

⁶ *Study on Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.6). It is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chapter XV.

⁷ A/45/568. For further details concerning the report and related activity, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chapter II.

and security, disarmament and related fields was placed on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission for the first time.

In recent years the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions and decisions on various aspects of the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament. In 1993 it adopted 13 resolutions: five of the resolutions relating to the questions dealt with in this chapter are considered below. The others, relating to regional approaches, to transparency, and to inhumane weapons, are covered in chapters IV, III and VII, respectively.

Developments and trends, 1993

Questions related to conventional weapons and armed forces and to military technology continued to be addressed in different disarmament forums and were dealt with in a number of reports.

Most States referred to conventional disarmament in the different disarmament forums in the context of regional disarmament, discussed in chapter IV, in the context of confidence-building measures, including transparency and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, discussed in chapter III, and in the context of exports and imports of conventional weapons and of science and technology, discussed in this chapter. Many States, referring to ongoing conflicts and to the exporting of superfluous conventional arms to regions of tension, expressed the belief that the availability of sophisticated weapons had exacerbated these conflicts and intensified human suffering.

Codes of conduct to address the problem of the excessive accumulation of conventional arms were suggested by the Russian Federation and Ireland. The former proposed, in the Disarmament Commission, the adoption of a code for parties to conflicts that would envisage, *inter alia*, restrictive measures: a ban on the use of military aircraft and missile and artillery systems and, in the future, armoury. The framework of this code of conduct could be: a moratorium on the transfer of such weapons to the parties to the conflict, a system of control of compliance with a regime of non-use of the latest weapons systems, and the exchange of information on violations. The latter proposed, in the First Committee, a code of conduct under which States would undertake to subscribe voluntarily to a set of principles and criteria in deciding on their arms imports and exports, and which would incorporate a mechanism de-

signed to encourage them to apply its provisions in a uniform manner. Since both arms-producing and arms-importing States have respective responsibilities in this matter and the dangers posed by excessive accumulations of conventional weapons are not confined to any one region, the code should be open to all States.

While the question of illicit traffic in arms has been dealt with primarily in the regional context, there is a growing tendency to address this topic in the global context as well. At the regional level, a technical subcommission of the Security Commission of the Central American States, assisted by the United Nations and the OAS, outlined a model for the taking of military inventories, defined the factors that would help establish a proportional balance of forces in the region and created a mechanism for verifying inventories that was suited to the Central American countries. At the end of 1992, the preliminary assistance, cooperation and coordination machinery for eliminating the illicit traffic in arms in Central America had entered into force. Action had been taken on mine clearance and a draft agreement on regional security had been adopted. In Africa, the gravity of the flow of small arms into the Sahelo-Saharan region, in particular, prompted efforts at the sub-regional level to address the problem and the assistance of the Secretary-General was sought by the Government of Mali.

At the global level, the question was raised by several countries, notably Afghanistan, at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. While there was wide support for the Afghan proposal to call upon Member States to take appropriate enforcement measures to halt the illegal export of conventional weapons and to request the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on effective ways and means of collecting illegally distributed weapons, a number of countries had reservations regarding the collection of such weapons (see pages 188 and 189). As a continuation of efforts to promote within the international community an exchange of information on the illicit arms trade, Colombia submitted, in a report⁸ of the Secretary-General, a statistical

⁸ Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 1991, in which the Assembly invited Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information on their national legislation and regulations as regards both authorization of arms transfers and prevention of the illicit arms trade, a report (A/47/314 and Add.1) containing replies of Member States was issued in 1992, and pursuant to decision 47/419 of 1992, a further report (A/48/324) was issued in 1993.

table of arms that had been destined for illicit and destabilizing activities and that had been confiscated by its military forces on its territory.

As regards the role of science and technology in the context of international security, differences of view persisted and may have, indeed, intensified. On the one hand, most industrialized countries maintained that there was a need to strengthen the existing control regimes in regard to the transfer of science and technology which could be used for military purposes, while, on the other, most developing countries considered that such regimes were discriminatory and adversely affected their economic development. Mention was also made of the danger of the possible dissemination of know-how relevant to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. (For a fuller discussion of the transfer of technology, its impact on the proliferation of weapons and efforts to regulate it, see chapter I and chapter III, page 81.)

The Disarmament Commission considered, for the third year, the item "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", and reported that considerable progress had been made in that regard (see following section). However, in spite of the fact that the item was scheduled for completion at the session, it did not prove possible to reach consensus on a text.

In the General Assembly, in each of two subject-areas—science and technology, and arms transfers—two draft resolutions were submitted. In spite of efforts to merge the two texts in each case, it was not possible to do so owing to persistent differences of view among States. In the area of disarmament and development, a great majority of States, particularly developing ones, continued to consider that there was a strong link between the two concepts and to insist that the United Nations play a more active role in this regard. The corresponding resolution was adopted without a vote; the United States, however, maintained its objection to such linkage.

The economic aspects of the disarmament process have gained prominence over the last decade, and lately there has been increasing support for governmental action in the area where disarmament and development meet, that is, in conversion. This matter was discussed in disarmament forums and at special conferences in 1993 and was the subject of a report

by the Secretary-General.⁹ One such conference, held in Hong Kong from 7 to 10 July, was organized by the China Association for Peaceful Use of Military and Industrial Technology and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development. The Conference, in which experts in defence and civilian industries, governmental leaders, economists and other academic researchers took part, adopted a declaration in which they noted, *inter alia*, that international cooperation, exchanges and research in support of military-to-civilian conversion should be expanded; that multilateral and private financial institutions should address the funding requirement of conversion on a priority basis; that training played an important role in conversion; and that information was a crucial resource in the conversion process. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that he had requested UNCTAD to coordinate the establishment of a United Nations interdepartmental task force on conversion and to prepare a preliminary proposal for its organization and programme of work.¹⁰

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1993

The Disarmament Commission established a working group to deal with the agenda item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". The Working Group, which met under the chairmanship of Mr. Luvsangiin Erdenechuluun of Mongolia, held 6 meetings between 21 April and 8 May. The Chairman conducted also a number of informal consultations. On 27 April, the Group decided to establish a drafting group, which held 13 meetings under the chairmanship of Ms. Peggy Mason of Canada.

The Working Group decided to base its deliberations on a working paper presented by the Chairman, which was prepared on the basis of the text contained in the report of the corresponding Working Group of 1992, and on working papers submitted during the current session. Thus the Group concentrated its deliberations, as at its previous session, on five main areas: (a) scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security; (b) science and technology for

⁹ The report is entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development" (A/48/400).

¹⁰ A/48/400, para. 3.

disarmament; (c) the transfer of high technology with military applications; (d) the role of science and technology in other related fields; and (e) the role of the United Nations. In addition to the eleven papers submitted in 1991 and 1992, three new papers were submitted: by Cuba,¹¹ by Brazil and Canada,¹² and by Australia.¹³

During extensive deliberations on proposed guidelines and recommendations, some reconciliation of views occurred, except in the area of the transfer of high technology with military applications. Particularly pronounced in that area were deep-seated differences pertaining to (a) references to existing non-proliferation instruments, including the non-proliferation Treaty and (b) the status of export-control measures for recipient States, which called for universally negotiated, legally binding norms of control.

The Group adopted its report¹⁴ by consensus on 8 May. In presenting it to the Commission, the Chairman stated that the Group had made progress in accommodating different positions because of the positive climate in which its deliberations had taken place, and that it recommended that the debate should be continued at the next session of the Commission. That recommendation was made on the understanding that the Chairman's working paper, in the version reproduced in the Commission's report,¹⁵ could serve as a basis for further work, without prejudice to the position of any State.

Speaking as Chairman of the Drafting Group, Canada stated that considerable progress had been made in advancing understanding of the difficult area of non-proliferation and cooperation for peaceful purposes. It seemed that, given the sensitivity, the complexity and above all the relevance of the issues discussed, that exercise was not one in which important differences could simply be papered over. In Canada's view, progress could be made and success achieved only if the Working Group managed genuinely to advance common understanding in concrete ways.

¹¹ A/CN.10/175.

¹² A/CN.10/176.

¹³ A/CN.10/177.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42)*, sect. IV, para. 31.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, annex III.

Subsequently, in the fall, when the General Assembly was in session, the Chairman of the Drafting Group held open-ended informal consultations to clarify outstanding differences and to reflect relevant developments since the spring in order to facilitate work on the item at the 1994 session of the Commission.

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

In the First Committee five draft resolutions were submitted with regard to different agenda items considered in this chapter. Two dealt with the issue of science and technology, two with arms transfers, and one with the relationship between disarmament and development. Relevant reports of the Secretary-General that were not mentioned in the section "Developments and trends, 1993" are noted in this section.

While considering the question of science and technology, the General Assembly had before it a report¹⁶ of the Secretary-General pursuant to its request that he continue to follow scientific and technological developments in order to make an assessment of emerging "new technologies" and report to it thereon. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that it would be premature for any further action to be taken at this stage because the corresponding item was being considered in the Disarmament Commission, with a view to its conclusion in 1994.

The first draft resolution on science and technology, entitled "*Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security*", was sponsored by eight States, later joined by three others.¹⁷ In introducing it on 9 November, India stated that the draft dealt with the qualitative aspect of disarmament, which, until recently, had tended to be ignored. The Secretary-General had been requested in successive General Assembly resolutions to follow scientific and technological developments and to provide a framework for technology assessment guided by the criteria suggested in his 1990 report,¹⁸ and the purpose of the draft was to encourage him in that direction. India stated that efforts to merge the two draft resolutions on science and technology had not succeeded because they dealt with different strands

¹⁶ A/48/360.

¹⁷ Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Panama, Sri Lanka and Venezuela.

¹⁸ A/45/568.

of the topic. India hoped that the Disarmament Commission would achieve consensus on the question at its next session, a development which would pave the way for a single resolution on the subject in 1994.

The second draft resolution, entitled "*The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields*", was sponsored by 18 States, later joined by 15 others.¹⁹ In introducing it on 9 November, Germany stated that the draft resolution was intended to contribute to the successful outcome of the discussion on the subject at the 1994 session of the Disarmament Commission. It further believed that progress in the application of science and technology for disarmament-related purposes would substantially contribute to the full implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. Brazil noted that the language of the draft resolution was the result of careful negotiation and compromise; it did not completely reflect the national position of any country as it was intended to establish common ground between all interested parties, including suppliers and recipients of high technology.

On 15 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by India by a recorded vote of 104 to 4 (France, Israel, United Kingdom and United States), with 29 abstentions (mostly European countries), and the draft resolution introduced by Germany by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 3 abstentions (France, United Kingdom and United States).

Several States explained their positions before or after the voting, most of them expressing regret that the two related draft resolutions had not been merged.

Among those voting in favour of the two draft resolutions, Australia, Cuba, India and the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed reservations on one or both of them. Speaking with respect to the Indian draft, Australia maintained that one should not assume that technological advances applied to military purposes would necessarily have a negative

¹⁹ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Uruguay.

impact on the security environment. Cuba and the Islamic Republic of Iran could not support any type of control regime that was not negotiated on a multilateral basis. India explained that, although it had voted in favour of the draft introduced by Germany, that text had at least three shortcomings: (a) it ignored the negative impact of science and technology on disarmament; (b) it ignored the need for the Secretary-General to keep the subject under review and (c) it lent support to ad hoc export control regimes—a position not acceptable to India.

The position of the United Kingdom and France, which had voted against the Indian draft and had abstained on the German draft, was voiced by the United Kingdom. It stated that after attempts to merge the two drafts had failed, the Indian draft had reverted to its traditional format, which was not acceptable to their delegations. The draft proposed by the German and Brazilian delegations, which was largely based on the Disarmament Commission's work, omitted certain elements of the Chairman's working paper. Pointing out that neither of the texts mentioned existing treaties that addressed the issue of the transfer of high technology in connection with weapons of mass destruction, the United Kingdom stated further that it was inconceivable that any conclusions on the role of science and technology could ignore such key non-proliferation instruments. It added that the two delegations had difficulty in accepting a text that failed to take into account the fact that many qualitative improvements could enhance international security. The United States, which abstained in the vote on the German draft although it had joined the consensus on the corresponding resolution in 1992, expressed the view that the present language of the text prejudged the outcome of the work of the Commission; the United States could not endorse a resolution that was unbalanced and threatened to supplant existing technology transfer mechanisms by advocating global norms for the transfer of technology.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted by India by a recorded vote of 126 to 4, with 35 abstentions, as resolution 48/66, and the draft resolution submitted by Germany by a recorded vote of 161 to none, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 48/67. The two resolutions read as follows:

Resolution 48/66

Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it unanimously stressed the importance of both qualitative and quantitative measures in the process of disarmament,

Recognizing that scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged,

Noting with concern the potential in technological advances for application to military purposes, which could lead to more sophisticated weapons and new weapons systems,

Stressing the interests of the international community in the subject and the need to follow closely the scientific and technological developments that may have a negative impact on the security environment and on the process of arms limitation and disarmament, and to channel scientific and technological developments for beneficial purposes,

Emphasizing that the proposal contained in its resolution 43/77 A of 7 December 1988 is without prejudice to research and development efforts being undertaken for peaceful purposes,

Noting the results of the United Nations Conference on New Trends in Science and Technology: Implications for International Peace and Security, held at Sendai, Japan, from 16 to 19 April 1990, and recognizing, in this regard, the need for the scientific and policy communities to work together in dealing with the complex implications of technological change,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security";

2. *Takes note also* of the interim report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of resolution 45/60 of 4 December 1990;

3. *Fully agrees* that:

(a) The international community needs to position itself better to follow the nature and direction of technological change;

(b) The United Nations can serve as a catalyst and a clearing-house for ideas to this purpose;

4. *Calls upon* the Disarmament Commission to conclude its work on the agenda item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" and to submit to the General Assembly, its recommendations in this regard;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to follow scientific and technological developments in order to make an assessment of emerging new technologies and to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session a framework for technology assessment guided, *inter alia*, by the criteria suggested in his report;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security".

Resolution 48/67

The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 47/44 of 9 December 1992,

Taking note of the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1993 substantive session, in particular on the work of Working Group III on agenda item 6, entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields",

Taking note also of the report of the Secretary-General of 28 September 1993 on Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security,

Recognizing that science and technology *per se* are deemed to be neutral, that scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged,

Noting that qualitative improvements in science and technology with military applications have implications for international security and that States, in this regard, should assess carefully the impact of the use of science and technology on international security,

Recognizing also that progress in the application of science and technology contributes substantially to the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements, *inter alia* in the fields of weapons disposal, military conversion and verification,

Recalling that norms and guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account legitimate requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that they do not deny access to high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing that commitment to, and the fulfilment of, comprehensive and balanced objectives of non-proliferation in all its aspects pertaining to the

acquisition or transfer of high technology relevant to weapons of mass destruction are essential for the maintenance of international security and international cooperation and for the promotion of transfers of such technologies for peaceful purposes,

Noting the interest of the international community in cooperation in the fields of disarmament-related science and technology and the transfer of high technology with military applications,

Mindful that international cooperation should be encouraged with respect to the production of disarmament-related technical equipment with the purpose, *inter alia*, of reducing the costs of implementing arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

1. *Calls upon* the Disarmament Commission to conclude its work on the agenda item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" in 1994 and to submit as soon as possible specific recommendations on this matter to the General Assembly;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to pursue constructively in response to resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991 its work on the agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments", which includes consideration of the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications;

3. *Invites* Member States to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States;

4. *Also invites* Member States to widen multilateral dialogue, bearing in mind the proposal for seeking universally acceptable norms or guidelines that would regulate international transfers of high technologies with military applications;

5. *Encourages* the United Nations to contribute, within existing mandates, to promoting the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields".

As mentioned above, two draft resolutions relating to arms transfers were introduced in the First Committee. Although efforts were made to merge the two texts, this did not prove possible.

The first draft resolution, entitled "*International arms transfers*", was sponsored by 24 States, later joined by 5 others.²⁰ Colombia introduced the draft on 8 November, stating that the text focused on the illicit traffic in conventional arms, which represented a serious problem for many States that were experiencing destabilizing situations. The main thrust of the draft was an appeal to the international community to become involved in the search for lasting solutions and thus to shoulder its responsibilities in that area. On 15 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution in which, in operative paragraph 4, the words "to consider including the issue of international arms transfers" were replaced by "to include the question of international arms transfers".

The second draft resolution, entitled "Measures to curb the transfer and use of illicit arms", was submitted by Afghanistan. The sponsor introduced it on 9 November, stressing the need for restriction on the export and sale of conventional weapons in the interest of national and regional security, as well as economic and social development. By the resolution the Assembly would invite Member States to take appropriate enforcement measures to halt the illegal export of such weapons from their territories and would request the Secretary-General to seek the views of Governments on an effective mechanism for the collection of such weapons. Subsequently, Afghanistan submitted two revisions in which minor changes were made in the second and third preambular paragraphs and the title was changed to "*Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms*".

On 18 November, Cuba submitted an amendment to the Afghan draft resolution proposing (a) that the word "developing" should be deleted from the fourth preambular paragraph and (b) that in operative paragraph 2, the phrase "many developing countries" would be replaced by "countries in the event that such countries so request".

The same day, the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by Colombia by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 1 abstention (United States). The United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf

²⁰ Australia, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Zimbabwe.

of France, stated that it found it illogical, in the fifth preambular paragraph, to connect the Register of Conventional Arms with illicit transfers, because the Register was intended to increase transparency regarding legitimate arms transfers. The United States explained that it would have voted in favour, but was obliged to abstain because the revision of operative paragraph 4 would prejudice the decision about adding a new item to the agenda of the Disarmament Commission; moreover, with reference to the fifth preambular paragraph, the United States did not agree that the Register should or could be expanded to include illicit traffic.

On 19 November the First Committee dealt with the Afghan draft resolution and the Cuban amendments thereto. It first adopted the amendment to the preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 105 to 1 (Afghanistan), with 34 abstentions, and the amendment to operative paragraph 2 by a recorded vote of 100 to 1 (Afghanistan), with 40 abstentions. It then approved the draft resolution, as amended, by a recorded vote of 108 to none, with 33 abstentions. Several States explained their positions on the vote. Brazil voted in favour of the Cuban amendments because they removed the somewhat discriminatory aspect of the original text, but abstained on the draft resolution because in some respects it duplicated the Colombian draft text. Ecuador took the same action for the same reasons as those given by Brazil. Canada, which abstained on both the amendments and the resolution, also associated itself with the explanation of Brazil. Venezuela too abstained on both the amendments and the resolution, stating that it had difficulty in understanding the purpose of the resolution.

On 16 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Colombia without a vote, and the draft resolution introduced by Afghanistan by a recorded vote of 146 to none, with 22 abstentions. The resolutions read as follows:

Resolution 48/75 F
International arms transfers

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 43/75 I of 7 December 1988, 46/36 H of 6 December 1991 and 47/54 A of 9 December 1992, and its decisions 45/415 of 4 December 1990 and 47/419 of 9 December 1992,

Realizing the urgent need to resolve underlying conflicts, to diminish tensions and to accelerate efforts towards general and complete disarmament with

a view to maintaining regional and international peace and security in a world free from the scourge of war and the burden of armaments,

Reaffirming the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the commitment of Member States to take concrete steps in order to strengthen that role,

Recognizing that in the context of international arms transfers, illicit arms traffic is a disturbing, dangerous and increasingly common phenomenon, and that with the technical sophistication and destructive capability of conventional weapons, the destabilizing effects of illicit arms traffic increase,

Considering that in the context of international arms transfers, illicit arms traffic, by its clandestine nature, defies transparency and until now has escaped inclusion within the Register of Conventional Arms,

Realizing that arms obtained through the illicit arms traffic are most likely to be used for violent purposes, and that even small arms so obtained, directly or indirectly, by underground organizations such as mercenary groups can pose a threat to the security and political stability of the States affected,

Stressing that effective control over the imports and exports of conventional weapons falls under the responsibility of Member States,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;
2. *Calls upon* all Member States to give priority to eradicating the illicit arms traffic associated with destabilizing activities, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and common criminal acts, and to take immediate action towards this end;
3. *Urges* Member States to monitor arms transfers effectively and to strengthen or adopt strict measures in an effort to prevent arms from falling into the hands of parties engaged in the illicit arms traffic;
4. *Notes* that the Disarmament Commission, at its organizational session in 1993, included the question of international arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H in the agenda of its substantive session in 1994, and requests the Commission to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;
5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "International illicit arms traffic".

Resolution 48/75 H

Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991 and its decision 47/419 of 9 December 1992 on international arms transfers,

Considering that the availability of massive quantities of conventional weapons is a contributory factor to armed conflicts around the world,

Stressing the need for measures that curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms,

Recognizing that the excessive quantity of conventional weapons in a number of countries constitutes a source of destabilization of their national and their regional security,

Convinced that peace and security are imperatives for economic development and reconstruction,

1. *Invites* Member States to take appropriate enforcement measures aimed at ending the illegal export of conventional weapons from their territories;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views of Governments on effective ways and means of collecting weapons illegally distributed in countries, in the event that such countries so request, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session.

Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Relationship between disarmament and development*", which was finally also sponsored by Bolivia, Haiti and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On 5 November, a revised draft resolution incorporating a minor change was submitted. In introducing it on 9 November, Indonesia, noting the increasing interdependence of disarmament and development, stated that the resolution was similar to the corresponding resolution of the 1992 session; in it the Secretary-General was requested to pursue efforts for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session.

On 15 November, the draft resolution was adopted without a vote. In connection with the adoption of the draft resolution, the United States said that it had not participated in the voting because it felt that disarmament and development were two distinct issues which could not be regarded as organically linked. For the same reasons, the United States had not participated in the 1987 Conference and did not consider itself bound by the provisions of its Final Document. Israel, while joining in the consensus, dissociated itself from the documents referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph since they contained provisions and references that did not reflect the recent favourable developments in

the Middle East peace process and could prejudice the outcome of future negotiations.

The draft resolution on the relationship between disarmament and development was adopted by the General Assembly, without a vote, as resolution 48/75 A. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 48/75 A

Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly concerning the relationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling also the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

Recalling further its resolution 47/52 F of 9 December 1992,

Bearing in mind the final documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,

Stressing the growing importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development in current international relations,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General⁴ and actions undertaken in accordance with the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference;

3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

In the context of international peace and security, the First Committee considered two items closely related to disarmament: (a) "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" and (b) "Maintenance of international security", on

which the Secretary-General submitted reports.²¹ Under these two agenda items, three resolutions were submitted and later adopted by the General Assembly; two of them are considered in this chapter. The two draft resolutions, one submitted by non-aligned States and the other by Western and Eastern European States, reflected two different approaches to the concept of international security. While the first focused on the broad role of the United Nations in this field and referred to the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, adopted by the General Assembly in 1970, and subsequent resolutions on the implementation of the Declaration, the second emphasized the primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted the first draft resolution, entitled "*Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security*", which was later also sponsored by The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Indonesia introduced it on 9 November. On 19 November, the First Committee approved it by a recorded vote of 100 to 1 (United States), with 41 abstentions (mainly Eastern European and Western countries), and on 16 December the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 122 to 1, with 45 abstentions, as resolution 48/83. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 48/83

Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2734 (XXV) of 16 December 1970 on the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, as well as all its previous resolutions on the review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,

Bearing in mind the final documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta in September 1992,

²¹ The report on the first item (A/48/316 and Add.1) contained the replies of Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Qatar and the Sudan. The report on the second item (A/48/390) contained the replies of Denmark and the Dominican Republic.

Expressing its firm belief that disarmament, the relaxation of international tension, respect for international law and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially the principles of sovereign equality of States and the peaceful settlement of disputes and the injunction to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in international relations, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, economic and social development, the eradication of all forms of domination, and respect for basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the need for preserving the environment, are closely related and provide the basis for an enduring and stable universal peace and security,

Welcoming the recent positive changes in the international landscape, characterized by the end of the cold war, the relaxation of tensions on the global level and the emergence of a new spirit governing relations among nations,

Welcoming also the continuing dialogue between the major Powers, with its positive effects on world developments, and expressing its hope that these developments will lead to the renunciation of strategic doctrines based on the use of nuclear weapons and to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, thereby making a real contribution to global security,

Expressing the hope that the positive trends that started in Europe, where a new system of security and cooperation is being built through the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, will succeed and be extended to the non-participating Mediterranean countries and encourage similar trends in other parts of the world,

Expressing its serious concern at the threat that could be posed to international peace and security by the resurgence of doctrines of racial superiority or exclusivity and the contemporary forms and manifestations of racism and xenophobia,

Stressing the need for the strengthening of international security through disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament leading up to the elimination of all nuclear weapons, and restraints on the qualitative and quantitative escalation of the arms race,

Recognizing that peace and security are dependent on socio-economic factors as well as on political and military elements,

Recognizing also that the right and responsibility for making the world safe for all should be shared by all,

Stressing also that the United Nations is the fundamental instrument for regulating international relations and resolving global problems for the maintenance and effective promotion of peace and security, disarmament and social and economic development,

1. *Reaffirms* the continuing validity of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, and calls upon all States to contribute effectively to its implementation;

2. *Also reaffirms* that all States must respect, in their international relations, the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Emphasizes* that, until an enduring and stable universal peace based on a comprehensive, viable and readily implementable structure of international security is established, peace, the achievement of disarmament and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means continue to be the first and foremost task of the international community;

4. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force, aggression, intervention, interference, all forms of terrorism, suppression, foreign occupation or measures of political and economic coercion that violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and security of other States, as well as the permanent sovereignty of peoples over their natural resources;

5. *Urges* all Governments to take immediate measures and to develop effective policies to prevent and combat all forms and manifestations of racism, xenophobia or related intolerance;

6. *Calls* for regional dialogues, where appropriate, to promote security and economic, environmental, social and cultural cooperation, taking into account the particular characteristics of each region;

7. *Stresses* the importance of global and regional approaches to disarmament, which should be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

8. *Reaffirms* the fundamental role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, and expresses the hope that it will continue to address all threats to international peace and security in accordance with the Charter;

9. *Urges* all States to take further immediate steps aimed at promoting and using effectively the system of collective security as envisaged in the Charter, as well as halting effectively the arms race with the aim of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

10. *Also stresses* the urgent need for more equitable development of the world economy and for redressing the current asymmetry and inequality in economic and technological development between the developed and developing countries, which are basic prerequisites for the strengthening of international peace and security;

11. *Considers* that respect for and promotion of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the recognition of the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination and independence, will strengthen international peace and security, and reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under

foreign occupation and their inalienable right to self-determination and independence;

12. *Also reaffirms* that the democratization of international relations is an imperative necessity, and stresses its belief that the United Nations offers the best framework for the promotion of this goal;

13. *Invites* Member States to submit their views on the question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, particularly in the light of recent positive developments in the global political and security climate, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session on the basis of the replies received;

14. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security".

On 4 November, 32 States submitted the second draft resolution, entitled "*Maintenance of international security*", which was introduced, on behalf of the sponsors, by the Russian Federation on 11 November. It was approved by the First Committee on 19 November, by a recorded vote of 67 to none, with 75 abstentions (mainly non-aligned countries), and adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 84 to none, with 83 abstentions, as resolution 48/84 A. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 48/84 A

Maintenance of international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 47/60 B of 9 December 1992 on maintenance of international security,

Recalling also its resolution 47/54 G of 8 April 1993 in which it, *inter alia*, decided that the First Committee of the General Assembly, in pursuing its efforts to respond to the new realities of international security, should continue to deal with questions of disarmament and related international security issues,

Welcoming the relaxation of global tensions and the emergence of a new spirit in relations among nations as a result of the end of the cold war and of bipolar confrontation,

Expressing its serious concern over new threats to international peace and security, the persistence of tensions in some regions and the emergence of new conflicts,

Recalling with appreciation the ideas and proposals of the Secretary-General aimed at the enhancement of the potential role of the United Nations

in the area of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building, as well as in multilateral disarmament, contained in his reports entitled "An Agenda for Peace" and "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era",

Reaffirming the importance of multilateral mechanisms in the areas of disarmament and international peace and security,

Bearing in mind the crucial contribution that progress in the field of disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation, transparency in arms transfers and confidence-building measures can make to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Emphasizing that international peace and security must be seen in an integrated manner and that the efforts of the international community to build peace, justice, stability and security must encompass not only military matters, but also relevant political, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental and developmental aspects,

Noting with satisfaction the progress achieved at the Conference on Disarmament towards negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Stressing the importance of global and regional approaches to disarmament, which should be pursued to promote regional and international peace and security,

Reaffirming the need to strengthen the mechanism for collective security provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Affirming its conviction that all Member States should endorse and support the role given by the Charter to the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. *Reaffirms* that, with the end of the cold war and of bipolar confrontation, the United Nations faces new tasks in the area of maintaining international peace and security;

2. *Recognizes* the need for effective, dynamic and flexible measures, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to prevent and remove threats to peace and to suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and in particular for measures to build, maintain or restore international peace and security;

3. *Emphasizes* its commitment to preventive diplomacy and the need to develop appropriate political mechanisms for the early solution of disputes and for the timely and peaceful resolution of any situation which might impair friendly relations among States, so as to preserve peace and strengthen international security;

4. *Stresses* the need for the full implementation of Security Council resolutions;

5. *Recognizes* that it has an important role to play in helping to address situations which might lead to international friction or dispute, in close cooperation and coordination with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in accordance with the Charter;

6. *Stresses* the great importance of the role of regional arrangements and organizations and recognizes the need to coordinate their efforts with those of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security;

7. *Urges* all States to strive for sustainable progress in the field of disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation, transparency in arms transfers and confidence-building measures, which can provide a crucial contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security;

8. *Recognizes* the importance of humanitarian concerns in conflict situations and welcomes the increasing role of the United Nations system in providing humanitarian assistance;

9. *Decides* to continue consideration of the question of maintenance of international security and invites Member States to provide their views on further consideration of this question;

10. *Also decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Maintenance of international security".

Also under the item "Maintenance of international security", the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/84 B, entitled "Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States", which is dealt with in chapter IV above (page 128).

Conclusion

Questions related to conventional weapons and armed forces and to military technology continued to be addressed in different disarmament forums. Most States referred to conventional disarmament in the context of regional disarmament, of confidence-building measures (including transparency), and of exports and imports of conventional weapons and of science and technology. With the conclusion of a number of agreements on significant reductions of nuclear weapons, there has been growing concern over the fact that conventional weapons are increasingly used in regions of tension. Although some progress has been made at the regional level in the reduction of conventional weapons, there has been no discernible progress at the global level. In the course of the last several years, the efforts of the international community have come to focus on ways to regulate exports and imports of arms, including

efforts to reduce illicit traffic, and especially to regulate the transfer of high technology with military applications.

The Disarmament Commission continued to consider the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and related fields. While there was some reconciliation of views on the proposed guidelines and recommendations, the area of high technology with military applications was the main stumbling-block to the achievement of consensus on a text. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the item had been scheduled for completion in 1993, its conclusion had to be postponed to 1994.

In the debate at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, differences of view persisted and perhaps even intensified regarding the role of science and technology in the context of international security. The Assembly adopted two resolutions on the subject, owing to continuing differences between, on the one hand, most industrialized countries—which maintained that it was necessary to strengthen the existing control regimes for transfers of science and technology with military applications—and, on the other, most developing countries—which considered that such regimes were discriminatory and adversely affected their economic development.

Efforts to curb the illicit traffic in conventional arms at the global level gained wide support. Two resolutions on this subject were adopted, reflecting differences among States on the subject. Further measures in this field may be taken in the near future.

On the question of disarmament and development, a great majority of States, particularly developing ones, continued to consider that there was a strong link between the two concepts and to insist that the United Nations play a more active role in this regard. Owing to increased support for governmental action in the area where disarmament and development meet, that is, in conversion, the Secretary-General requested UNCTAD to coordinate the establishment of a United Nations interdepartmental task force on conversion and to prepare a preliminary proposal for its organization and programme of work. The Assembly adopted, without a vote, its traditional resolution on the relationship between disarmament and development.

Inhumane Weapons Convention

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF PROHIBITING OR RESTRICTING THE USE of certain conventional weapons that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects has been considered by the international community in various forums since the second half of the nineteenth century.¹ In recent years, it has been dealt with under the aegis of the United Nations, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).²

The question was again brought to the attention of the international community when, in 1972, the United Nations expert report *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*³ indicated that that category of weapons was being used more and more in modern warfare, with increasingly cruel and destructive effects. A later study by experts, convened under the auspices of the ICRC, entitled *Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects*, concluded that all incendiary weapons, as well as a number of other specific conventional weapons, tended to fall into that category

¹ The first prohibition was contained in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 banning the use of weapons which aggravated the suffering of the disabled. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 confirmed and broadened this prohibition. See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6), pp. 132-134.

² For a brief review of early initiatives and considerations, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 and vol. 4: 1979.

³ A/8803/Rev.1. The report was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.73.I.3).

and should therefore be prohibited. The question of banning such weapons was also among matters considered by the Diplomatic Conference, mentioned above, which held several sessions at Geneva from 1974 to 1977.

In order to carry on the useful work which had been accomplished by the Diplomatic Conference, the General Assembly decided, by resolution 32/152, to convene a United Nations conference on excessively injurious conventional weapons. Thus the first major international conference on the prohibition or restriction of specific conventional weapons since the Hague Conferences was convened by the United Nations in Geneva in September 1979. In 1980, the Conference concluded its work, adopting unanimously the following instruments: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II and Technical Annex to the Protocol); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III). In addition, it adopted a resolution on small-calibre weapon systems. The Convention is an "umbrella" treaty under which additional specific agreements can be concluded in the form of protocols.

The Convention and the Protocols provide new rules for the protection of civilians and civilian objects and, in some cases, also military personnel. Protocol I prohibits the use of any weapon whose primary effect is to injure by fragments which, in the human body, escape detection by X-rays. Protocol II and its Technical Annex relate to the use on land of mines, booby-traps and other devices defined therein, such as those activated by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but do not apply to the use of anti-ship mines. Protocol III prohibits in all circumstances the making of the civilian population as such the object of attack by incendiary weapons, and restricts their use against military objectives. The rules range from a complete ban on the use of such weapons to restrictions on their indiscriminate use against civilians or civilian objects. The Convention entered into force on 2 December 1983. By the end of 1993, the Convention had been ratified by 41 States.

The Convention is kept under review in two contexts: that of wider adherence and that of broader scope, the latter either through the amendment of its existing Protocols to make them more stringent, or through the elaboration of additional protocols. Since conclusion of the Convention, the General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions and decisions that either call for wider ratification of the Convention and its Protocols or urge States not yet parties to join as early as possible.

The last few years have witnessed a growing number of instances in which weapons prohibited by the Convention have been used against civilians as weapons of terror in various conflicts, especially internal conflicts. As a result, some States have initiated a call for the investigation of such allegations as well as for the convening of a review or amendment conference as provided in article 8 of the Convention. In 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/56 by which, *inter alia*, it urged all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention, and stressed that, under article 8, conferences might be convened to consider amendments to the Convention.

Developments and trends, 1993

Questions related to the inhumane weapons Convention, particularly to mines, were addressed in different forums and dealt with in a number of reports.

In his report⁴ entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols during the period 1 September 1989 to 31 August 1993.

In his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General stated, *inter alia*, that "of all the tasks involved in setting a nation on a new road to peace and prosperity, perhaps none has the immediate urgency of mine clearance ... and no attempt to restore a sense of community and security can succeed without effective land-mine removal".⁵

On the initiative of Switzerland, an International Conference for the Protection of War Victims took place at Geneva from 30 August

⁴ A/48/389.

⁵ A/48/1, para. 459.

to 1 September, in which 160 States participated. In the Declaration adopted on 1 September, the participants urged all States to become parties to the Convention on inhumane weapons and its three Protocols and to take advantage of the forthcoming Review Conference, which would provide a platform for wider accession to these instruments, and to consider strengthening existing law with a view to finding effective solutions to the problem of the indiscriminate use of mines, the explosion of which maims civilians in different parts of the world.⁶

Although Protocol II to the Convention prohibits or restricts the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices, there are many tens of millions of mines scattered in present or former combat zones. Such widespread, indiscriminate use of mines, which cause intense suffering, especially for the civilian population, and the problems encountered in their removal have become a major preoccupation of the international community. As a result there were calls to strengthen the Convention in regard to mines, to provide for a verification mechanism and to ensure that mines are designed to be detectable and to self-destruct once hostilities cease. Furthermore, some countries undertook unilateral action. Thus, the United States extended its unilateral moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines, declared in 1992, for an additional three years.

It was increasingly recognized that, in addition to efforts aimed at strengthening the inhumane weapons Convention so as to reduce the incidence of the use of mines and to diminish their long-term effects, efforts were needed to remove the mines already in place (most notably in Afghanistan and Cambodia), which hinder peace-building and entail high economic, social and medical costs. The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Peace-keeping Operations undertook coordinated programmes for mine clearance, involving training, in an attempt to address this problem.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the European Community requested⁷ that an item entitled "Assistance in mine clearance" be inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session. In their request, they stressed their conviction that a comprehensive programme of assistance in mine clearance which took into account

⁶ A/48/742, annex, sect. II.

⁷ A/48/193 and annex.

all the aspects of economic and social reconstruction must be contemplated on a priority basis.

The ICRC organized a symposium on anti-personnel mines at Montreux between 21 and 23 April, in the course of which a number of governmental and non-governmental experts addressed the humanitarian concerns raised by the use of such mines. The Symposium concluded that there was a need to develop a coordinated strategy for tackling the medical, commercial, legal, technical, socio-economic and data-related aspects of the entire problem with a view to alleviating the sufferings of mine victims.⁸

By a letter dated 9 February, France requested that the Secretary-General convene—in conformity with article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on inhumane weapons—a conference to review the Convention and its Protocols, with priority to be given to anti-personnel mines. Consultations among the parties to the Convention led to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 48/79, by which the Assembly welcomed the request to the Secretary-General to convene, if possible in 1994, a review conference and encouraged the States parties to request him to establish as soon as possible a group of governmental experts to prepare for it. It is expected that the Group of Experts, acting as a preparatory committee, will meet three times in 1994.

The vast majority of States favoured the convening of the Conference, but there were differences of view with regard to its scope. Some States emphasized the aspect of broadening the existing prohibition on mines to include anti-personnel mines; others proposed that the review encompass naval mines and the risk of the development of conventional weapons based on laser technology.

The increasing concern over the use of anti-personnel mines and an initiative of the United States led to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 48/75 K, on a moratorium on the export of such weapons. Although the resolution was adopted without a vote, a number of States pointed out that it was very limited in scope, dealing only with the matter of export.

⁸ See International Committee of the Red Cross, *Final Report of the Symposium on Anti-Personnel Mines*, Montreux, April 1993.

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

In the First Committee two draft resolutions were submitted in connection with the two different agenda items considered in this chapter.

A draft resolution entitled "*Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects*" was submitted by 34 States, later joined by additional 9 States.⁹ On 9 November, Sweden, on behalf of the sponsors, introduced the draft, stating that in recent years it had become clear that the Convention was inadequate. It noted that the international community focused its attention on anti-personnel mines, which continued to cause suffering among civilians not only in times of war, but also after the cessation of hostilities. Mine clearance and destruction were made even more difficult by the fact that modern mines did not contain any metal parts. Sweden stated that the draft paved the way for a historic conference to address these issues, and it was grateful to the French Government for having proposed a review of the Convention. Speaking on its own behalf, Sweden went on to say that as sea mines had not been regulated by an international agreement since 1907, it was necessary that the Conference should address this question as well. Sweden also drew attention to the implications of laser technology for conventional weapons.

At the same meeting, Mexico proposed an amendment, later slightly revised, to the draft resolution by which a phrase referring to the wish of the parties to prohibit or restrict further the use of certain conventional weapons (see below) would be added to the fifth preambular paragraph. Furthermore, the sponsors of the draft resolution submitted a revision in which the introductory words of operative paragraph 6, which had read "*Also welcomes* the request by the States parties to the Secretary-General" were changed (see below).

⁹ Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine and United States.

On 19 November, France, speaking on behalf of a number of the sponsors,¹⁰ stated that if the draft amendment were approved, those States would be obliged to withdraw their sponsorship. They all attached great importance to strengthening the provisions of the Convention and its Protocols, particularly Protocol II, on mines and booby-traps, and to increasing the number of States parties; they did not believe that the amendment would serve that purpose. Given their interest in the matter, the States concerned would vote in favour of the draft resolution in any case.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the revised amendment by a recorded vote of 52 to 24, with 32 abstentions, and thereupon, by 57 votes to 4, with 55 abstentions, the fifth preambular paragraph, as amended. By 140 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Russian Federation and United States), it approved the draft resolution as a whole.

The two States that abstained on the draft resolution as a whole explained their position. The United States believed that the substantive question whether parties to the Convention did or did not wish to pursue the objectives proposed in the amendment was for them to decide in the appropriate forum; the United States found it unacceptable to use the Committee to influence the purpose and provisions of an existing treaty. The Russian Federation, for its part, could not support the resolution because the amendment of the fifth preambular paragraph introduced a question of substance into what had before been only a procedural matter.

Among the original sponsors of the draft resolution, Canada, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden explained that they had abstained in the vote on the amendment because they believed that it would result in an unbalanced text; nevertheless, because of the importance they attached to the matter, they maintained their sponsorship of the amended draft resolution. Likewise, Argentina (not a sponsor) explained that it had abstained on the separate vote but supported the draft resolution as a whole.

¹⁰ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia and United States. Subsequently, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Luxembourg and Ukraine also announced the withdrawal of their sponsorship of the draft resolution.

On 16 December, the General Assembly voted first on the fifth preambular paragraph, adopting it by a recorded vote of 85 to 2, with 62 abstentions, and then on the resolution as a whole, by a recorded vote of 162 to none, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 48/79. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/79

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 35/153 of 12 December 1980, 36/93 of 9 December 1981, 37/79 of 9 December 1982, 38/66 of 15 December 1983, 39/56 of 12 December 1984, 40/84 of 12 December 1985, 41/50 of 3 December 1986, 42/30 of 30 November 1987, 43/67 of 7 December 1988, 45/64 of 4 December 1990, 46/40 of 6 December 1991 and 47/56 of 9 December 1992,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Recalling the role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the elaboration of the aforementioned Convention and its Protocols,

Noting with satisfaction that, the conditions set forth in article 5 of the Convention having been met, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983,

Recalling the commitment by the States that are parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto to respect the objectives and the provisions thereof, especially those set forth in the ninth preambular paragraph of the Convention, relating to the wish to prohibit or restrict further the use of certain conventional weapons and believing that the positive results achieved in this area may facilitate the main talks on disarmament with a view to putting an end to the production, stockpiling and proliferation of such weapons,

Noting that, in conformity with article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to examine amendments to the Convention or to any of the Protocols annexed thereto, to examine additional protocols concerning other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols or

to review the scope and application of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to examine any proposed amendment or additional protocols,

Noting with satisfaction that a State party has asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene, in conformity with article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention, a Conference to review the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto, giving priority to the question of anti-personnel land mines,

Noting that international meetings have discussed possible restrictions of the use of other weapon categories presently not covered by the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto,

Reaffirming its conviction that a general and verifiable agreement on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilians and combatants,

Being desirous of reinforcing international cooperation in the area of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons, and particularly for the removal of minefields, mines and booby-traps,

Recalling in this respect resolution 48/7 of 19 October 1993 on assistance in mine clearance,

1. *Registers its satisfaction* with the report of the Secretary-General;
2. *Notes with satisfaction* that additional States have signed, ratified or accepted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981, or have acceded to the Convention;
3. *Urgently calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention and on successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to this instrument will be universal;
4. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto, to inform it periodically of accessions to the Convention and its Protocols;
5. *Welcomes* the request to the Secretary-General to convene at an appropriate time, if possible in 1994, in accordance with article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention of 10 October 1980, a conference to review the Convention;
6. *Encourages* the States parties to request the Secretary-General to establish as soon as possible a group of governmental experts to prepare the review conference and to furnish needed assistance and assure services, including the preparation of analytical reports that the review conference and the group of experts might need;

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7. *Calls upon* the maximum number of States to attend the Conference,

to which the States parties may invite interested non-governmental organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

Forty-one States, later joined by an additional 25 States,¹¹ submitted a draft resolution entitled "*Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines*". In introducing it on 11 November, the United States pointed out that millions of mines strewn over more than 60 countries had caused a medical, social, economic and environmental crisis of global proportions. Moreover, the proliferation of mines had tragic consequences long after a conflict had ended, and their economic consequences were devastating for the developing nations. It further stressed that, in the past, mines had been used only to impede an enemy's advance in times of war, while today they were being used as weapons of terror. Recalling that the United States had in 1992 proclaimed a one-year moratorium on exports of anti-personnel mines and that it had recently extended that moratorium for an additional three years, it stated that unilateral moratoriums were not a solution to the problem and that international action was needed. Therefore, the draft called for an international export moratorium as an important first step. The United States also supported efforts to strengthen Protocol II to the Convention on inhumane weapons.

On 18 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On that occasion, a number of States expressed reservations.

China stated that oversimplified measures limited to halting the export of mines could not solve the problem, and noted that States had

¹¹ Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, The Former Republic of Macedonia, Togo and United States.

a legitimate right to obtain weapons for self-defence. The United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France, observed that Protocol II of the inhumane weapons Convention permitted self-destructing or self-neutralizing anti-personnel mines if directed at military targets. Possession of those mines should not be restricted to countries with the capacity to manufacture them. The Russian Federation stated its understanding that the moratorium would not affect export contracts already concluded, deliveries of mines for use by Russian troops stationed in other countries with the consent of those countries, or deliveries to countries with which the Russian Federation had entered into treaties on collective security.

A number of States—Egypt, Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Mexico—expressed the view that the draft resolution was too limited; they would have preferred a more comprehensive approach, which would take into account other aspects: the production, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel mines. These States also stressed such matters as the legitimate concern of Governments to provide for self-defence. Mexico believed that the most effective way of dealing with the issue would be by the conclusion of a legal instrument of universal scope prohibiting the manufacture of mines and providing for the destruction of stockpiles. That objective would best be achieved by revising Protocol II to the inhumane weapons Convention.

Italy stated that its adoption of one of the world's strictest laws on arms transfers had resulted in a reduction by half of its arms exports. Italy believed that the forthcoming Review Conference of the Convention would provide the appropriate forum for further multilateral discussions regarding which types of arms should be subject to export restrictions. Ukraine, speaking of arms transfers in general, expressed the view that controversial issues relating to exports should be resolved through bilateral or multilateral consultations.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/75 K. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/75 K

Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines

The General Assembly,

Noting that there are as many as 85 million uncleared land mines throughout the world, particularly in rural areas,

Expressing deep concern that such mines kill or maim hundreds of people each week, mostly unarmed civilians, obstruct economic development and have other severe consequences, which include inhibiting the repatriation of refugees and the return of internally displaced persons,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption of resolution 48/7 of 28 October 1993, by which it, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the problems caused by mines and other unexploded devices,

Convinced that a moratorium by States exporting anti-personnel mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations would reduce substantially the human and economic costs resulting from the use of such devices and would complement the aforementioned initiatives,

Noting with satisfaction that several States have already declared moratoriums on the export, transfer or purchase of anti-personnel land-mines and related devices,

1. *Calls upon* States to agree to a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations;
2. *Urges* States to implement such a moratorium;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a report concerning progress on this initiative, including possible recommendations regarding further appropriate measures to limit the export of anti-personnel land-mines, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament".

The new item "*Assistance in mine clearance*", included in the agenda of the General Assembly at the request of the States members of the European Community, was considered in a plenary meeting on 19 October and a draft resolution of the same title was adopted on the same day, without a vote, as resolution 48/7.

By the resolution, the General Assembly welcomed, *inter alia*, the establishment, within the Secretariat, of a coordinated mine-clearance programme; deplored the adverse consequences of the failure to remove mines and other unexploded devices; requested the Secretary-General to submit to it a comprehensive report on the problems caused by the

increasing presence of mines resulting from armed conflicts; and also requested him to include in his report consideration of the financial aspects of activities related to mine clearance and, in that context, of the advisability of establishing a voluntary trust fund to finance, in particular, information and training programmes relating to mine clearance and to facilitate the launching of mine-clearance operations.

Conclusion

Throughout the year, there was renewed interest, in different international forums, in questions related to the prohibition of certain conventional weapons, particularly anti-personnel mines. While the Convention on inhumane weapons, together with its Protocols, has been kept under review with regard to the status of adherence ever since its conclusion in 1980, the question of broadening its scope either through amendment of its Protocols or through adoption of additional protocols has gained momentum in the last few years, as concerns have grown over the enormous quantity of mines sown on the territory of many countries and the consequent suffering of civilians, not only in time of war, but also after the cessation of hostilities.

At the forty-eighth session, the General Assembly considered three subjects related to the questions dealt with in this chapter: (a) the Convention on inhumane weapons and its Protocol II, (b) a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines and (c) assistance in mine clearance; it adopted a resolution on each of these. Under resolution 48/79 it welcomed the request to the Secretary-General to convene at an appropriate time, if possible in 1994, a conference to review the Convention on inhumane weapons and encouraged States parties to establish a group of governmental experts to prepare the Review Conference. By resolution 48/75 K, the Assembly called upon States to agree to a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations and urged them to implement such a moratorium. By resolution 48/7, the Assembly welcomed, *inter alia*, the establishment, within the Secretariat, of a coordinated mine-clearance programme, deplored the adverse consequences of the failure to remove mines and other unexploded devices, and requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the problems involved, including the financial aspects.

It can be expected that the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to prepare the Review Conference will contribute to a broadening of the scope of the Convention, particularly its Protocol II, or to the adoption of additional regulations concerning the activities of States in case of conflicts. The call for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines, in spite of the fact that it is rather limited in scope, was welcomed by many in the hope that it would constitute a first step towards a broader prohibition encompassing the production and stockpiling of these weapons.

Outer space issues

Introduction

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE SPACE AGE IN 1957, problems related to outer space have been discussed in the United Nations, particularly in the General Assembly, in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and its subsidiary bodies, and in the Conference on Disarmament. The discussions have contributed to the conclusion of a number of international agreements concerning both peaceful and military aspects of the use of outer space.¹

The growing importance of preventing the militarization of outer space was reflected in the 1978 Final Document, which called for international negotiations to be held on the issue.² Since 1982, the Conference on Disarmament has had on its agenda an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, because of differing views concerning the formulation of a mandate, it was not until 1985 that it was able to set up an ad hoc committee with a mandate to examine, as a first step, through substantive and general consideration, issues

¹ The multilateral treaties relevant to this chapter are: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967) (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex) and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975) (General Assembly resolution 3235 (XXIX), annex). The text of the outer space Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11), vol. 1. In 1972 the United States and the former USSR concluded the anti-ballistic missile Treaty (ABM Treaty). See earlier volumes of *The Yearbook* for information concerning these and other treaties relevant to activities in outer space.

² General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 80.

relevant to the subject. No substantive progress has been made in the work of the Committee owing to continuing differences of view among the members of the Conference.

In parallel with multilateral consideration of the subject, the United States and the former USSR initiated, in 1985, bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms "to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth".³ However, the "Defence and Space" negotiations, which continued between the Russian Federation and the United States, did not produce conclusive results in 1992, and they were not continued in 1993.

Developments and trends, 1993

During 1993 two important reports concerning activities of States in outer space were submitted by the Secretary-General: (a) *Study on the Application of Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space*⁴ and (b) *International Cooperation in Space Activities for Enhancing Security in the Post-Cold War Era*.⁵

In his foreword to the first report, the Secretary-General stated, *inter alia*, that the study was "a useful reference and a thought-provoking resource" and he expressed the hope that it would "help to harmonize views, and contribute to building a strong international consensus on outer space issues". He also commended it to the General Assembly and urged that it be given close consideration. The substance of the study is discussed in the following section (see page 218).

In his second report, the Secretary-General dealt with three broad areas: post-cold war challenges (conversion of military technology, commercialization and proliferation, environmental protection, and the new role of the United Nations); enhancing security through space technology (international space policy, arms control and disarmament, scientific and technical cooperation, and commercialization of space activities);

³ See "Joint United States-Soviet Statement on the Geneva Meeting of Their Foreign Ministers, 8 January 1985", reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. VIII, No. 1 (1985).

⁴ A/48/305 and Corr.1 (to be issued as a United Nations publication under the same title).

⁵ A/48/221 (subsequently issued as a United Nations publication under the same title).

and new approaches to space and security (confidence-building measures, and improving access to space technology). As far as the arms control and disarmament issues were concerned, the Secretary-General stated, *inter alia*:

Although many useful concepts and proposals for preventing an arms race in outer space have been considered in the Conference on Disarmament, no substantive agreements have been reached in over 10 years of deliberation on any specific proposal. This has been primarily a result of cold war tensions. Now, with the easing of those tensions and a greater degree of cooperation among the major space Powers, there is an opportunity to re-energize the discussions on those issues in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I therefore call on Member States to review the situation and take substantive and effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.⁶

Referring to the implementation of confidence-building measures in outer space, the Secretary-General stated, *inter alia*, that:

... international consensus is crucial for the implementation of any confidence-building measures in space. Member States are urged to explore these issues in the appropriate forums with a view to implementing measures that will contribute to increased transparency in space activities, cooperation among States in conducting those activities, and the enhancement of international security through the use of space technology.⁷

During 1993, the Conference on Disarmament continued to consider the question of an arms race in outer space, as discussed below. In addition, in its annual report,⁸ COPUOS dealt *inter alia* with the definition and delimitation of outer space, the character and utilization of geostationary orbit, and the benefits of space. Debate on the need for closer coordination between COPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament continued.

There were no formal bilateral negotiations in 1993 between the Russian Federation and the United States on ballistic missile defence. On 13 December, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency set out the position of the Clinton Administration

⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 43.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/48/20)*.

with regard to the ABM Treaty.⁹ Reaffirming that the Treaty was crucial to reductions under START I and START II and to longer-term strategic arms control opportunities, he stated that the Clinton Administration had repudiated unilateral reinterpretations of the ABM Treaty and, in the Treaty's Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), had withdrawn the broad revisions proposed by the previous Administration; clarification would be done by agreement, through the SCC, rather than by unilateral pronouncement. He noted that clarification of the Treaty was needed with respect to the line of demarcation between strategic defences, which were limited, and theatre defences, which were not, and he stressed that the spread of missile technology made it prudent to resolve this issue promptly.

Although the Conference on Disarmament discussed the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space under the same non-negotiating mandate as it had had in 1992, growing interest was evinced in negotiating confidence-building measures as an intermediate step towards the goal of achieving a safe and stable regime in outer space.

France proposed that the Conference negotiate a new international instrument providing for the prior notification of launches of space objects and ballistic missiles, believing that the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space could be gradually attained through a set of measures designed to ensure the security of space activities, to establish the illegal character of aggressive uses of outer space, and to increase confidence and transparency in space activities. A number of delegations supported this initiative, considering that it could offer a realistic solution to the deadlock in the Ad Hoc Committee. (For further information on the French proposal, see page 224.)

In spite of initial indications that the time might be ripe to reformulate the mandate of the Committee so that it could begin to negotiate an agreement on confidence-building measures, in the end this change did not take place because most members preferred a more comprehensive mandate, while a few continued to believe that there was no aspect of space activities that lent itself to negotiation at this time.

At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as at previous sessions, there was no extensive discussion of outer space questions. The General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the subject. The

⁹ The text of the Director was issued by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Information on 14 December 1993.

traditional resolution was adopted by a great majority of States, with the United States continuing to object to the reference to an arms race in outer space. The second resolution was of a procedural nature, endorsing the *Study on the Application of Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space*, a consensus report drafted by a Group of Governmental Experts pursuant to resolution 45/55 B. of 1990. Although its expert in the Group had not wished to block the consensus on the study, the United States addressed, in a letter to the Secretary-General,¹⁰ a number of reservations it had regarding the study. The substance of the study is discussed in the following section.

A discussion of confidence-building measures potentially applicable to space activities took place at a workshop on Earth-to-space tracking held at the Algonquin Space Complex in Ontario, Canada, from 12 to 18 September. The event was organized by UNIDIR and hosted by the Toronto-based Institute for Space and Terrestrial Science as part of the Canadian Government's verification research programme. Among the measures considered in the context of building confidence in the peaceful nature of a State's space activities and of assisting in the prevention of the weaponization of outer space were: international exchanges of information on planned and operational activities, such as rocket launches; international notification of launches, spacecraft functions, planned manoeuvres, spacecraft lifetimes and disposal plans and potential atmospheric re-entry; and specifics of Earth-to-space tracking, including the detection, recognition, description and identification of objects and manoeuvres in space.

Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space

The study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space¹¹ consists of an introduction, seven substantive chapters, three appendices and a select bibliography. The analytical parts of the report are summarized below, and the conclusions and recommendations are reproduced *in extenso* in the annex to this chapter. (For details concerning the arrangements under which the study was prepared, see chapter X, page 262.)

¹⁰ A/48/553.

¹¹ See footnote 4.

On the basis of resolution 45/55 B, which laid down the mandate of the Group, the objective of the study was to examine the specific aspects related to the application of different confidence-building measures in outer space, including the different technologies available, and possibilities for defining appropriate mechanisms of international cooperation in specific areas of interest.

Noting that outer space continues to assume growing importance for both military and civilian activities of States, the study examines the emerging trends with respect, not only to the space capabilities of the leading space countries, but also to those of other countries: the increasing number and capabilities of satellites, dual-use systems, and combat applications. It notes that a growing number of countries have or are planning to develop national space capabilities. While at present most of those programmes or plans do not envision a military component, military capabilities could be built upon them. It also stresses the fact that space technologies are to a large extent dual-use in their applications, as to a lesser degree are the systems themselves. While the technologies employed may be similar or identical, the purpose for which they are employed—military or civil—is normally identifiable, albeit sometimes with some difficulty. In addition, the study points out, it is clear that a considerable potential now exists for making use of data gathered by military or commercial means on a broader scale. Therefore, in the post bi-polar world of space technology, cooperative efforts must be developed in this field.

In analysing the existing legal framework for space activities, the study reviews a number of international instruments regulating both military and peaceful aspects of the exploration and use of outer space at the global, regional and bilateral levels and attempts to identify several confidence-building components in them. It also reviews a number of pertinent General Assembly resolutions or declarations of principles.

The study examines the concept of confidence-building measures in general and on the basis of United Nations documents¹² and existing

¹² See, for example, *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3) and "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level" (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*), paras. 38-41.

agreements in terms of common characteristics, criteria for their implementation and applicability, before determining the applicability of confidence-building measures in outer space. It finds that the process of confidence-building emerges from a belief in the cooperative predisposition of States; that this process evolves through step-by-step reduction and even elimination of the causes of mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation and that specific measures must be tailored to specific circumstances. It identifies three main ways of developing confidence: (a) through enhancing the quality and quantity of information exchanged on military activities and capabilities; (b) through expanding the scope of confidence-building measures; and (c) through increasing the degree of commitment to the process. The process of confidence-building requires clear criteria by which States may guide their own activities and may evaluate the activities of others. The requirement for clarity also implies that accepted criteria will be readily verified. The initiation of confidence-building measures requires the consensus of participating States, and specific measures must be applicable to specific military capabilities and relevant to the particular technological characteristics of military systems. The study finds that confidence-building measures are applicable to three categories of States: (a) those that are direct participants in activities that may be the source of mistrust; (b) other States that are affected by military or security policies of those in the first category; and (c) those that are involved in encouraging further development of the confidence-building process. Such measures may constitute positive responsibilities or negative constraints and may be divided into three broad categories, according to the activities to which they are applied: encouraged activities, permitted activities and prohibited activities.

The study, of course, devotes particular attention to the specific aspects of confidence-building measures in outer space. It notes features of the space environment that distinguish it from other environments in which confidence-building measures have been implemented. These environmental characteristics present unique technological problems to those who wish to reach and utilize the space environment, and the technical difficulties and financial burdens of entering and operating in space challenge even the most technically advanced and wealthiest countries and far exceed the capacity and resources of most States.

The technological implications of confidence-building measures in outer space are twofold. They concern those technologies that can be used in support of confidence-building in space and those that can be used for confidence-building from space. Technological considerations provide a number of opportunities for implementing confidence-building measures in outer space while also placing a number of limitations on space operations; such considerations pertain to both the nature of activities in space and the means of observing these activities. There is a wide range of systems for monitoring space activities, such as ground-based passive optical systems, ground-based active optical systems, ground-based radars, and systems for monitoring space weapons. While space systems may be the subject of monitoring and confidence-building, they can also contribute to this process. Satellites can be used to monitor other satellites as well as terrestrial developments, and there have been proposals for developing satellites specifically for this purpose. Among such proposals are: Canada's PAXSAT-A concept for verifying the stationing of weapons in space; satellites for monitoring terrestrial activities; establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA) for the verification of disarmament and arms control agreements; and the creation of an international space monitoring agency (ISpMA).

The study then reviews past and current proposals for specific confidence-building measures in outer space: those intended to increase the transparency of space operations in general; those intended specifically to increase the range of information concerning satellites in orbit; those that would establish "rules of the road" governing space operations; or those pertaining to the international transfer of space and rocket technology. Special attention is paid to proposals for different mechanisms for space activities in the global context as well as to those made in the bilateral context. On the basis of experience in other terrestrial arenas, the application of additional measures to increase the level of information concerning current and future space activities is considered to be highly appropriate. Two aspects, however, require further attention. The first aspect relates to the question whether such confidence-building measures have the character of voluntary steps or whether they constitute legal obligations incumbent on all States. The second aspect relates to the nature of activities that might be disclosed.

As regards examining possibilities for defining appropriate mechanisms of international cooperation in specific areas of interest, the study analyses the existing mechanisms and some proposals for creating new ones. Three categories of international mechanisms of international cooperation are reviewed: global, regional and bilateral. With regard to global mechanisms, special attention is paid to the role of the United Nations and that of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as to the roles of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) and the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT). Regional mechanisms in Europe, Africa and Latin America and among the Arab States and Asia-Pacific States are mentioned. In addition, the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union produced, of course, some fundamental agreements related to their military activities in outer space, almost all of which provide for commissions to deal with implementation and to establish confidence between the two States.

The study concludes that none of the existing mechanisms, even those of a global character, is an all-embracing organization covering all aspects of space activities. While acknowledging that any monitoring or verification mechanism of arms limitation and disarmament agreements will be a very complex matter involving a wide spectrum of procedures such as Earth-to-space, space-to-space, space-to-Earth, air-to-ground, and on-site monitoring, the study concludes that such an elaborate network would have to be designed to improve confidence-building. The study notes that the most widely discussed proposals are those submitted by France (1978) and the Soviet Union (1988) for creation of an ISMA and of an ISpMA, respectively, and the recent proposal by France (1993) for the establishment of an international notification centre (see page 224).

The experts' conclusions and recommendations are reproduced in the annex to this chapter.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1993

During the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament, a number of member and non-member States referred, in the course of their statements on all items in plenary meetings, to the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The Conference re-established its Ad Hoc Committee on the agenda item and requested it to examine and to identify relevant issues through substantive and general consideration

as mandated in 1992. On 28 January the Conference on Disarmament appointed Mr. Wolfgang Hoffman of Germany Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

As indicated in its report to the Conference,¹³ the Committee adopted the same programme of work as in 1992, which included the following three areas: examination and identification of relevant issues; existing agreements; and existing proposals and future initiatives relating to the subject. The programme also provided that, in carrying out its work with a view to finding and building upon areas of convergence, the Committee would take into account relevant proposals, initiatives and developments since 1985, including those presented or proposed at the 1992 session, and that it would continue to appoint Friends of the Chairman. The Committee agreed that it would give equal treatment to the subjects covered by its mandate and specified in its programme of work.

The following issues were dealt with in open-ended consultations conducted by Friends of the Chairman: (a) confidence-building measures in outer space (Col. G. Diachenko, later succeeded by Col. Y. Novosadov and Col. V. Sukharev, of the Russian Federation); and (b) terminology and other relevant legal aspects related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space (Mr. R. Grossi of Argentina). In addition, the Committee benefited from scientific and technical contributions by experts from various delegations.

The respective Friends of the Chairman analysed all proposals relevant to the elaboration of confidence-building measures in outer space that had been submitted over the years and presented their assessment of them. The issues covered primarily transparency, a "code of conduct" and "rules of the road", verification, and the establishment of different international organizations that would favour the actual implementation of such measures. The Friends of the Chairman believed, following their consultations, that the majority of the members of the Committee supported, in one way or another, the idea of using confidence-building measures as a first step towards finding a comprehensive solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The Friend of the Chairman dealing with terminology proposed leaving aside fundamental problems of the space debate, for example

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/48/27), sect. D., para. 37.*

the question of peaceful/non-peaceful uses of outer space or the scope of terms such as "militarization" in a space context, since they had been discussed for a number of years without any conclusion being reached. He also suggested establishing a link between the terminological exercise and the area of proposals and initiatives in the programme of work. Delegations thus agreed to concentrate initially on terminological and other relevant legal aspects directly related to proposals on confidence-building measures.

France proposed that a regime of prior notification of launches of space objects and ballistic missiles be established through a new international instrument, which could be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. Such a regime should be supplemented by the establishment of an international notification centre responsible for the centralization and redistribution of collected data, so as to increase the transparency of space activities. The centre would be set up under the auspices of the United Nations and attached to it, and could take the form of a division of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. The main function of the centre would be to receive notification of launches of ballistic missiles and space launches transmitted to it by States parties; it would also receive the information transmitted by States on launches actually carried out. States possessing detection capabilities would be invited to communicate to the centre, on a voluntary basis, data relating to launches they had detected, which would then be placed at the disposal of the international community through a data bank.

The question of confidence-building measures and the importance of transparency in outer space activities received considerable attention in the Conference and was discussed in conjunction with the possible formulation of a new mandate for the Committee. A number of countries, among them Argentina, Belgium, the Russian Federation and Sweden, referred to the area of confidence-building measures as one of the cornerstones of space stability and security. The Netherlands stated that, owing to changes in the international security environment, new possibilities had been created for the utilization of space technology for peaceful purposes. It further believed that the time had come for the Committee to engage in negotiating a set of confidence-building measures concerning: (a) reinforcement of existing legal instruments; (b) notification of launches of ballistic missiles; and (c) information concerning space activities.

The Group of 21 noted that the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security could facilitate negotiations as envisaged in the mandate of the Committee. It felt that many of the proposals before the Committee were ripe for implementation, and that some elements could form integral parts of a multilaterally negotiated agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. However, the Group reiterated that confidence-building measures were not an end in themselves.

China also emphasized that while confidence-building measures contributed to positive development in international relations, their role was limited and they could not by themselves eliminate the danger of weaponization of outer space. Moreover, China stated that the notification of launches of ballistic missiles was not directly related to the work of the Committee and that it exceeded the Committee's mandate.

India repeated its proposal for a ban on the testing, development and deployment of all anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). Since satellite technology generated enormous opportunities for economic growth and international security, it believed that the positive development of satellite technology should be safeguarded. In its view, confidence-building measures should be transparent and should not impede civilian national space programmes or international cooperation in space for peaceful purposes. Both India and Mexico cautioned that confidence-building measures were not a substitute for disarmament, though India acknowledged their contribution to the reduction of the risk of misperceptions.

The Chairman proposed that the Ad Hoc Committee be given a mandate to negotiate confidence-building measures. A number of Western and Eastern European delegations, as well as several members of the Group of 21, shared and supported his view that there was a need to make such a change in the mandate. The majority of the delegations, while agreeing that the Committee should be given a negotiating mandate, emphasized that the mandate should not be narrow but should rather encompass all relevant aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The United States and the United Kingdom continued to oppose a negotiating mandate of any kind.

In its report to the Conference, the Ad Hoc Committee noted the valuable and significant contribution to the discussion made by the experts from several delegations. In addition, the Committee expressed

its appreciation of the work done by the Friends of the Chairman and their organization of open-ended consultations on the issues of confidence-building measures, terminology and other relevant legal aspects related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was wide agreement that the conclusion of an international agreement, or agreements, to prevent an arms race in outer space remained the fundamental task of the Committee, and that the concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part of such agreements. It was recommended that the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee with an appropriate mandate at the beginning of the 1994 session, taking into account the work undertaken since 1985.

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, two draft resolutions on outer space were submitted.

The first resolution, entitled "*Prevention of an arms race in outer space*", was submitted by Egypt, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, later joined by 20 more sponsors.¹⁴ In introducing it on 9 November, Sri Lanka stated that the draft reflected the view widely held in the Conference that the conclusion of a relevant international agreement, or agreements, should remain the task of its Ad Hoc Committee on that item and that specific proposals on confidence-building measures should form an integral part of such agreements. The sponsors of the draft hoped that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee would be extended so that it could complete its work in 1994. On 16 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution in which minor changes were made.

On 18 November, the First Committee took a separate vote on the eighteenth preambular paragraph and on operative paragraphs 8 and 10. It decided, by 102 votes to none, with 32 abstentions, by 110 votes to 1 (United States), with 22 abstentions, and by 95 votes to none, with 35 abstentions, to retain those paragraphs. It then approved the draft as a whole by a recorded vote of 136 to none, with 2 abstentions (Federated States of Micronesia and United States). Three States explained their position after the voting. Germany said that it had abstained on

¹⁴ Algeria, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Sudan, Ukraine and Viet Nam.

the three separate votes and could not join the sponsors because paragraph 8 did not reflect the consensus reached in the Ad Hoc Committee and that the last paragraph of the preamble, if quoted from the report, was taken out of context. France also felt that the draft did not adequately reflect the situation in the Committee; it also explained that it had abstained in the voting on the eighteenth preambular paragraph and on operative paragraph 8 because those texts did not take into account the proposal that it had made. The United States stated that it had abstained for various reasons, especially because it did not believe that there was an arms race in outer space.

On 16 December, the General Assembly took action on the draft resolution. By a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 40 abstentions, it decided to retain the eighteenth preambular paragraph; and by a recorded vote of 138 to 1, with 30 abstentions, it decided to retain operative paragraph 8; by a recorded vote of 118 to none, with 47 abstentions, it decided to retain operative paragraph 10; and by a recorded vote of 169 to none, with 1 abstention it decided to adopt the draft resolution as a whole. Resolution 48/74 A reads as follows:

Resolution 48/74 A

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming also provisions of articles III and IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Recalling the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international relations, including in their space activities,

Reaffirming further paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling also its previous resolutions on this question and the Final Declaration adopted by the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, and taking note of the proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions, and of the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Recognizing the grave danger for international peace and security of an arms race in outer space and of developments contributing to it,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space,

Considering that wide participation in the legal regime applicable to outer space could contribute to enhancing its effectiveness,

Noting that bilateral negotiations, begun in 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, were conducted with the declared objective of working out effective agreements aimed, *inter alia*, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Welcoming the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral body on disarmament, to continue to examine and identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Noting also that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment in 1985 and seeking to enhance its functioning in qualitative terms, continued the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space, and hoping that concrete results will emerge from these efforts as soon as possible,

Convinced that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space,

Stressing that the growing use of outer space increases the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the international community,

Recalling in this context its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 45/55 B of 4 December 1990 and 47/51 of 9 December 1992, in which, *inter alia*, it reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Conscious of the benefits of confidence- and security-building measures in the military field,

Recognizing that there was wide agreement in the Ad Hoc Committee that the conclusion of an international agreement, or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remained the fundamental task of the Committee and that the concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part of the said agreements,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;

2. *Reaffirms its recognition*, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness, and that it is important strictly to comply with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

3. *Emphasizes* the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation;

5. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, building upon areas of convergence and taking into account

relevant proposals and initiatives, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee at the 1993 session of the Conference and at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly;

8. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1994 session and to continue building upon areas of convergence, taking into account the work undertaken since 1985, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

9. *Recognizes*, in this respect, the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space;

10. *Urges* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to resume their bilateral negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The second draft resolution, entitled "*Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space*", was submitted by Argentina, later joined by Bolivia. Introducing it on 11 November, the representative of Argentina noted that confidence-building was one of the cornerstones of stability and security in outer space and could contribute to the prevention of an arms race in that environment. As Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts which had drafted the study, he expressed the hope that the draft resolution would be adopted without a vote.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/74 B. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/74 B

Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, in which it requested the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of government

experts, a study on the specific aspects related to the application of different confidence-building measures in outer space, including the different technologies available, and possibilities for defining appropriate mechanisms of international cooperation in specific areas of interest,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General, the annex to which contains the study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;
3. *Commends* the study to the attention of all Member States.

Conclusion

Questions related to outer space continued to be considered within and outside the United Nations. Because of positive developments in international relations in general and between the two leading space Powers in particular, differences of view between the majority of States, on the one hand, and a small group of States, on the other, regarding the appropriateness of multilateral negotiations on the question of the prevention of an arms race in this environment were less pronounced than had been the case in the past.

Two important reports concerning activities of States in outer space, one on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space and the other on international cooperation in space activities for enhancing security in the post-cold war era, submitted by the Secretary-General in 1993, were welcomed by the majority of States as contributing to the further understanding of the issues involved.

In all forums dealing with the question, concern continued to be expressed about the danger of the militarization of outer space and the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in that environment. The relevance of confidence-building measures and of greater transparency and openness in space became more evident, especially in the light of the conclusions and recommendations of the study on the applicability of confidence-building measures in outer space. A number of delegations in the Conference on Disarmament felt that it would be appropriate to begin negotiations on this aspect of outer space issues, as a first step. However, the majority felt that the conclusion of an

international agreement, or agreements, to prevent an arms race in outer space remained the fundamental task of the Ad Hoc Committee.

There were no formal bilateral negotiations in 1993 between the Russian Federation and the United States on ballistic missile defence.

At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as at previous sessions, there was no extensive discussion of outer space questions. The Assembly adopted two resolutions on the subject. The traditional resolution (48/74 A) was adopted by a great majority of States, with the United States continuing to object to the reference to an arms race in outer space. The second resolution (48/74 B), adopted without a vote, commended the expert study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space to the attention of all Member States, thus opening the way for the Conference on Disarmament to build eventually upon its conclusions and recommendations.

ANNEX

Conclusions and Recommendations of the study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space

294. Since the adoption of resolution 45/55 B by the General Assembly, there has been substantial and rapid political change providing a new international context in which confidence-building measures in outer space have to be considered. New opportunities for global, regional and bilateral cooperation have arisen in space activities.

295. The Group of Experts therefore concludes that these changes, together with developments in technology, have not only preserved the relevance for confidence-building measures in space, but have also created an environment conducive to their implementation.

296. The Group of Experts believes that it has been demonstrated that space missions and operations have the potential to provide substantial scientific, environmental, economic, social, political and other benefits, and that the space environment should be used for the progress of humankind. Thus there is a clear tendency for a growing number of States to expand their activities related to outer space, some considering a military component important to their space activities. All space activities, though, should be conducted to enhance international peace and security.

297. It has been concluded by the Group that space applications are becoming more significant in terms of benefits in all respects and, accordingly, increasingly meaningful in both strategic and civilian aspects of life on earth. The use

of space also has the potential to increase, aggravate or, by contrast, mitigate tension between States.

298. The Group finds that a significant part of the main concerns among the vast majority of States is still related to the possibility of introducing weapons in outer space. Some other military activities are also subjects of concern. To the vast majority of States, the question of access to and benefits from space technology is also becoming a significant factor that may need to be addressed specifically by confidence-building measures.

299. The rights of all States to explore and use outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all humankind is a universally accepted legal principle. It is the concern and responsibility of all States to ensure that these rights are realized in accordance with international law in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation.

300. The Outer Space Treaty, the cornerstone of international space law, was adopted in 1967, an era prior to the wider use of space technology for telecommunications purposes, prior to the availability of remote sensing systems, and prior to the incorporation of space applications into much of the civil infrastructure and capabilities of States. The rapid advances in space technologies require keeping continuously under review the need for updating or supplementing the current international legal regime.

301. The Group therefore concludes that legal norms may have to be developed further, whenever appropriate, to address new developments in space technology and increasing universal interest in its application. In this context, the need to formulate a framework for the enhancement of cooperation and confidence-building among States was expressed in the Group.

302. The significant contribution of space activities to national and regional development, as well as to international understanding, is enhanced to the extent that such activities are conducted in a safe environment free from outside threats. It is also observed that concerns can arise from the fear of either a military or economic advantage provided through space, as well as from the difficulty of accessing the desired benefits of space applications in a cost-effective manner.

303. In addition to the status and capabilities of individual nations, the Group concludes that aspects of global and regional balance are to be taken into consideration. Given the complementary nature of space to military forces on the ground, some confidence-building measures may be contemplated with respect to neighbouring States or groups of States in cases of tension. The Group observes that advanced space technologies, providing a planetary perspective, have created a sense that any point on Earth could be reached from space. The Group therefore considers that all States can and should be involved at the global level in confidence-building regarding space.

304. The Group agrees that the application of space technologies is ambivalent in nature and that dual-purpose aspects of sensitive technologies should not be defined as harmful *per se*. It is the way in which they are utilized that determines whether they are harmful or not. Because the unilateral or rapid expansion of certain space capabilities by States can arouse suspicion in other States, the Group concludes that the extension of such capabilities should be accompanied, when appropriate, by a confidence-building framework designed to enhance transparency and openness. These space capabilities should also be developed in accordance with internationally agreed provisions ensuring their non-diversion for prohibited purposes.

305. There is potential concern, however, on both military and economic grounds that a State acquiring data revealing the weaknesses or other circumstances of another State could be exploited to the detriment of that State. Some countries fear that transparency measures regarding their space activities could affect their national security. Therefore transparency measures should be designed in such a way as to reconcile the need to build international confidence and the protection of national security interests.

306. The concerns are not only those that can be directly recognized, but also those related to the degree of commitment by others to confidence-building measures. Accordingly, the Group concludes that due consideration be given to the assessment of the implementation of confidence-building measures to ensure compliance, as well as making appropriate use of any verification provisions that may be included.

307. The Group has considered the span of technology and facilities required in a space mission, for the development of the spacecraft itself, the launch vehicle and launch operations, including tracking support as well as all other related operations during its lifetime. It is noted that many States have, as a matter of necessity or choice, specialized in specific fields, relying on others to complement these areas and fulfil their additional requirements. The Group believes that this is an important factor to be taken into account in addressing confidence-building measures.

308. The Group concludes that, in consideration of possible confidence-building measures in outer space, the differences in space capabilities among States should be taken into account. For the time being, only the United States and the Russian Federation have the full diversity of technology and available hardware to achieve self-sufficiency in the full diversity of space missions. Beyond this, there is a second, larger group of States that have achieved self-sufficiency within specific space missions. There is also a third substantial group of States that have space-related capabilities in specialized technologies or facilities, but lack autonomy in space. This includes those with direct space experi-

ence and ongoing programmes, as well as those with missile or other technologies that can be rapidly applied to space missions or portions thereof.

309. All States have legitimate interests in space and, in many cases, are benefiting from space activities. Some of them even own and operate space or space-associated assets, but are largely or totally dependent upon the commercial or political actions of others for their participation in space activities.

310. The disparities in levels of space capabilities among these groups, as well as among individual States, the inability to participate in space activities without the assistance of others, uncertainty concerning sufficient transfer of space technologies and the inability to acquire significant space-based information are factors in the lack of confidence among States. The existence of such factors may not be conducive to prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this context, the Group concludes that issues of access to and benefits from space should be addressed in order to promote cooperation and confidence-building among States.

311. The Group observes that full autonomous space capabilities in all States is neither technologically nor economically feasible in the foreseeable future. It therefore concludes that international cooperation is an important vehicle for promoting the right of each nation to achieve its legitimate objectives to benefit from space technology for its own development and welfare. Cooperation, with involvement of other nations, in the achievement of national objectives, requires confidence in the capabilities of others and in the policies providing access to these capabilities.

312. The Group concludes that some confidence-building measures in outer space could be considered as complementary to such measures applicable to terrestrial military activities and arrangements, thus constituting a wider body of mechanisms aimed at creating and maintaining confidence between States.

313. The Group observes that there are several causes of concerns in some States without military space capabilities regarding the application and use of such capabilities by other States. For example, certain space capabilities could serve as force multipliers in case of conflict, regional or otherwise. Satellites could be used to acquire data that could be exploited in a given military situation. Increased transparency can be instrumental in allaying mistrust and building confidence with regard to all space-related means and capabilities.

314. The Group concludes that appropriate confidence-building measures between States could address some of these current causes of concerns. Transparency could help allay suspicion and thus remove some of the factors constraining international cooperation. Causes of concerns about space capabilities may also need to be addressed by measures of arms control and disarmament, as well as adjustments of transfers of technology, without inhibiting the potential growth and development of peaceful space capabilities. Confidence-building

measures in space in relation to regional security arrangements may also be contemplated in this respect.

315. The Group has examined the ways in which a State can advance its space technology such as endogenous development, technology transfer, and technical assistance that allows the receiving State to move rapidly through different phases and bring its own skills to the desired levels. The Group concludes that international cooperation is important for the advancement of space technology.

316. The Group concludes that specific confidence-building measures addressing the dual-use nature of technologies related to space may help establish a better environment for international cooperation. It believes that use of such technologies should be encouraged and access to their benefits secured under appropriate national and internationally agreed provisions that ensure their non-diversion for prohibited purposes.

317. The Group has considered the possibility of concluding an international agreement on banning weapons in outer space and concludes that this question deserves further consideration. The Group concludes further that there are many States that believe that in view of the new political situation in the world, the time has come to begin full-scale negotiations to work out an international agreement on banning weapons in outer space. Those States believe that such an agreement could become one of the most effective confidence-building measures in itself.

318. The Group notes the growing importance of space systems in providing support for international diplomacy. The Group emphasizes the potential of these systems, which could promote the effectiveness of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy, crisis management, the settlement of international disputes and conflict resolution. The Group believes that this is an important aspect of the role of these systems in promoting confidence and stability in international relations.

319. The point of departure for the recommendations of the Group is the text of General Assembly resolution 45/55 B and the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, as well as concepts of transparency, predictability, aspects of conduct, and international cooperation, which are being considered mainly in the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

320. The Group recommends, first of all, that all States Parties strictly observe the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and other treaties on outer space concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, since these instruments include components establishing confidence among States. United Nations resolutions that enjoy universal support and that embody such principles on outer space can also contribute to confidence.

321. It is recommended by the Group that existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, particularly those multilateral mechanisms within the United Nations, should continue to play an important role in any further consideration and possible elaboration of specific confidence-building measures in the context of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is also suggested that the Conference on Disarmament be requested to continue considering further measures contributing to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this regard, should negotiations on further measures, including negotiations on outer space confidence-building measures, be required, the Conference on Disarmament should serve as an appropriate negotiating forum.

322. The Group of Experts recommends that the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, within its mandate concerning the international legal regime governing outer space, continue to keep under review, *inter alia*, the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space with respect to staying abreast of technological developments and possible transparency and predictability needs.

323. The Group recommends that the International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) and the International Space Monitoring Agency (ISpMA) proposals be re-examined in the light of current and future developments. The Group has considered the possibility of the establishment of an international registry of orbital and functional data on vehicles and missions, which would receive submissions from tracking centres of Member States, and finds that this question deserves further consideration in view of its potential relevance to confidence-building.

324. The Group recommends building upon existing mechanisms related to space activities for alert in case of accidents or vehicle failure and to consider a role the United Nations might play in this respect. The idea of an international alert system may be further explored.

325. The Group of Experts recommends that States operating remote sensing systems operate these systems in conformity with United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/65, so as to contribute and facilitate the broadest access possible by the international community to remote sensing data on a non-discriminatory basis and at a reasonable cost, taking into account the needs and circumstances of the developing countries and the countries in transition.

326. The Group recommends that the concepts and proposals on "rules of the road", as possible components of confidence-building measures in outer space, should be kept under review. Factors such as manoeuvrability of spacecraft, potential conflicting orbits and predictability of close approaches should be taken into consideration.

327. The Group recommends that institutional mechanisms to encourage international cooperation among States in respect of space technology, including

international transfer, should be evaluated, taking into account the legitimate concerns about dual-purpose technology. It is further recommended that measures be considered to enable all States to have access to space for peaceful purposes on a cost-recoverable or reasonable commercial basis, and that those States that need assistance in this respect could make use of appropriate forms of technical cooperation, duly taking into account the needs of the developing countries and the countries in transition.

328. The Group recommends that COPUOS explore mechanisms coordinating various international space activities, including interplanetary exploration, environmental monitoring, meteorological science, remote sensing, disaster relief and mitigation, search-and-rescue, training of personnel and spin-off. In this context, concepts involving universal participation such as a "World Space Organization" are possible useful points of reference for this exploratory work.

329. The Group notes the view expressed that, given the dual-use nature of some space technologies and the international character of the relevant issues discussed in the context of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and of the peaceful uses of outer space, the possibility of establishing working contacts between the Conference on Disarmament and COPUOS should be explored and appropriate actions considered by the General Assembly to encourage such contacts.

330. The Group of Experts concludes that appropriate confidence-building measures with respect to outer space activities are potentially important steps towards the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring the peaceful use of outer space by all States.

331. The Group hopes that the present study will be a useful reference for the continuing work of the Conference on Disarmament, in its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Outer Space, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as well as other international bodies interested in outer space and the questions dealt with in this study.

CHAPTER IX

Institutional aspects

Introduction

THE FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT, both within and outside the United Nations, has changed over the years in response to efforts to address more adequately the concerns of the international community. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the Security Council are the main organs dealing with matters of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. The existing disarmament machinery, as set out in the Final Document of the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament, in 1978,¹ has remained essentially the same. It consists of the General Assembly and its relevant subsidiary bodies, namely the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission, and the Conference on Disarmament—the “single multilateral negotiating forum” on disarmament of the international community. In addition, questions of disarmament are dealt with in other institutional frameworks established on the basis of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements.

At their Summit Meeting on 31 January 1992, the members of the Security Council called upon the Secretary-General to prepare an analysis of and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping. The Secretary-General responded to this

¹ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, part IV.

request in his report entitled *An Agenda for Peace*² and elaborated on the role of disarmament in a subsequent report, entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*.³

In *New Dimensions*, the Secretary-General suggested that the disarmament machinery should be reassessed in order to meet the new realities and priorities.⁴ Subsequently, by its decision 47/422 of 9 December 1992, the General Assembly decided to reconvene meetings of the First Committee in 1993 to carry out this reassessment with respect to the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament and their interrelationship (with the understanding that the primary responsibility for making recommendations for the Conference rested with the Conference itself) and with respect to the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The activities of disarmament bodies, including the outcome of the reconvened meetings, as they relate to organizational and institutional matters are discussed in this chapter, while the substance of the various items on the agendas of these bodies is discussed in the topical chapters of this volume.

Developments and trends, 1993

Throughout the year, in various forums and in documents submitted by Member States, the debate continued on disarmament machinery and on ways and means to enhance its functioning and efficiency.

A diversity of views was expressed, with mainly Western and Eastern European States tending to stress flexible use of the Charter in the pursuit of peace, preventive diplomacy and the need for full implementation of Security Council resolutions, and mainly developing States stressing the economic and social dimensions of security and the need for a strengthened role for the General Assembly in that regard.

² A/47/277-S/24111. The report was subsequently issued as a publication of the United Nations (DPI/1247).

³ A/C.1/47/7. The report was subsequently issued as a publication of the United Nations (Sales No. E.93.IX.8).

⁴ *Ibid.*, sect. IV B.

By resolution 47/120 B,⁵ adopted without a vote on 20 September 1993, just prior to the opening of the forty-eighth session, the General Assembly emphasized that it, together with the Security Council and the Secretary-General, had an important role to play in preventive diplomacy and it recognized the need to work in close cooperation and coordination with the Council and the Secretary-General in accordance with the Charter and their respective mandates and responsibilities.

At the reconvened meetings of the First Committee at the forty-seventh session, held from 8 to 12 March, the question of shaping the institutional aspects in such a way as to promote the practical integration of disarmament into the broader peace and security agenda—an approach that had been suggested by the Secretary-General in his report *New Dimensions*,⁶ but which gave rise to lively debate among all Member States—was intensively debated. Members examined the respective roles and interrelationship of the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, bearing in mind the need for these bodies to respond effectively to the recent changes in the international situation, and they expressed their concern that the Office for Disarmament Affairs should be strengthened so as to allow it to perform its mandated tasks.

The Conference on Disarmament contributed to the reconvened meetings through two reports. In the first report,⁷ the Conference expressed its collective consideration of the issues raised by the Secretary-General in *New Dimensions*, including its own role. After reviewing the implications for disarmament of the new international environment, the Conference stated that, together with unilateral measures and bilateral and regional agreements, disarmament needed more and more a multilateral approach and was a collective responsibility; thus the Conference had an increased role to play. It drew attention to its decision to intensify consultations on its improved and effective functioning, mentioning in particular consultations on issues of membership and agenda. The Conference stressed that, as a negotiating body, it main-

⁵ Resolution 47/120, entitled "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy and related matters", was adopted in two parts. Resolution A was adopted on 18 December 1992 and resolution B was adopted on 20 September 1993.

⁶ Op. cit., para. 4.

⁷ CD/1183.

tained its own special status with respect to the other multilateral disarmament forums, while taking into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly as well as proposals of member States. It had, according to its rules of procedure, to determine by consensus on which items there appeared to be readiness to negotiate. It was the sense of the Conference that, at this juncture, it could best serve the international community by preserving its role as the sole multilateral global negotiating body on disarmament. The second report⁸—the major portion of which was the statement made by the President of the Conference at informal open-ended consultations held on 8 December 1992—dealt with the status of the Conference's ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work.

Following consultations and deliberations at the reconvened meetings of the First Committee, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (47/54 G) stating its decision that the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission should retain their traditional roles, that is, that the former would continue to deal with the questions of disarmament and related international security issues and that the latter would remain as a specialized deliberative body within the United Nations disarmament machinery. By the resolution, the General Assembly requested that efforts be made, in the case of the First Committee, to further rationalize its work and, in the case of the Commission, to continue to enhance its working methods so as to enable it to give focused consideration to a limited number of priority issues. The Assembly also welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament was conducting a review of its composition, agenda and methods of work, and stressed the importance of enhancing dialogue and cooperation among the three bodies. In addition, the Secretary-General made a statement to the effect that the capabilities of the Secretariat were being strengthened to enable it to discharge its responsibilities effectively in the field of disarmament.

At the forty-eighth session, the First Committee devoted two meetings to discussion of the further rationalization of its work and reform of its agenda—a subject that had been included in the agenda at the

⁸ CD/1184. The statement of the President was also circulated as a document of the First Committee (A/JC.1/47/14) and is outlined in *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, chapter XI.

request of the European Community and its member States.⁹ Proposals concerning rationalization emphasized, *inter alia*, more detailed and focused discussion of specific agenda items, reduction of the number of draft resolutions, and the relationship between disarmament and security items. Proposals concerning reform of the agenda involved rearrangement of the agenda along thematic lines and the clustering of items under a limited number of "head items". The proposals generated a great deal of interest, and various papers were circulated.¹⁰ Reference was also made during the debate to resolutions 47/120 A and B, dealing with preventive diplomacy and related matters. Western countries, on the one hand, advocated fuller integration of the disarmament and security issues, setting the role of disarmament in the context of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building; non-aligned countries, on the other hand, characterized the relationship between disarmament and security as one of interaction, seeing disarmament *per se* as a key element of international security and concerned that the core issues of disarmament could be lost in the broader approach. Consequently, in the end, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, a resolution (48/87) which reflected the common agreement regarding the need to improve the interrelationship between disarmament and arms regulation issues and the broader international security context, the decision to adopt a thematic approach for the agenda, and a further decision to review the subject at the next session.

The year 1993 was one of transition for the Disarmament Commission. Owing to a widespread conviction of the need to focus on the three items already before it and listed below—especially those dealing with a regional approach to disarmament and the role of science and technology, which were scheduled for completion—the Commission decided not to add a new item in 1993, although the reform programme

⁹ A/48/194. In the explanatory memorandum annexed to the request, reference was made to a working paper on reform of the agenda that the European Community had submitted during the March meetings of the First Committee (A/C.1/47/15).

¹⁰ "Non-papers" by the Chairman, member States of the European Community, and members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries; an informal draft resolution drawn up by a small informal working group set up at the request of the Chairman to attempt to bridge differences between the positions of the EC and the non-aligned countries; a working paper by the Chairman (A/C.1/48/9); and a draft resolution submitted by the Chairman.

adopted in 1990 provided for a four-item agenda. Members recognized that a great deal of effort had to be devoted to an item in its last year of consideration if agreement on a set of recommendations was to be achieved; thus the Commission moved towards a three-item phased approach to its agenda. After intensive deliberations, the Commission did indeed reach agreement on a text on the regional item (see pages 108 to 115).

The Conference on Disarmament had been in the process of reviewing its agenda, composition and methods of work for a number of years. In the light of the successful conclusion of negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention at the end of its 1992 session and the prospects—as the 1993 session progressed—that the Conference would begin negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban in 1994, the Conference reaffirmed its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. There was broad agreement that membership in the Conference should be expanded substantially, while at the same time it should be limited in order to facilitate negotiation. Taking into account various factors presented by the end of the cold war and the emerging new international situation, it was widely felt that an increase in the number of members—which had been established at 40 in 1978—to about 60 would be appropriate.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1993

The Disarmament Commission held its substantive session from 19 April to 10 May under the chairmanship of Mr. Luiz Augusto de Araujo Castro of Brazil and submitted its report to the General Assembly at the conclusion of its session.¹¹ The agenda that the Commission adopted on 19 April comprised the following three substantive items:

1. Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;
2. Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security;
3. The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

It was agreed to concentrate efforts on the second and third items, in the hope that they might be completed at the current session, and

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42).*

to allow another year for completion of the nuclear item. Thus Working Group I, dealing with nuclear issues, adopted an outline of guidelines and recommendations that would be considered in detail in 1994 (see pages 140 to 141 for a discussion of this item). Working Group II succeeded in adopting by consensus the text entitled "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security", thereby completing its consideration of the item (see pages 108 to 115 for a discussion of this item). Working Group III was able to draft guidelines on almost all aspects of the item on the role of science and technology, but encountered difficulties in formulating a text regarding the transfer of high technology with military applications. Consequently, it was decided to allow another year for completion of this item as well (see pages 180 to 182 for a discussion of this item).

At its organizational session, held on 9 and 14 December, the Commission decided to schedule its items on nuclear disarmament and on the role of science and technology for conclusion in 1994 and it inscribed on the agenda a new item on international arms transfers. (The agenda for 1994 is set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution 48/77 A, reproduced on page 256.)

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1993

The Conference on Disarmament was in session from 19 January to 26 March, from 10 May to 25 June and from 26 July to 3 September, and submitted its annual report to the General Assembly at the conclusion of its session.¹² The following member States assumed the presidency successively: Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba and Egypt, the last-mentioned to serve also as president during the recess until the 1994 session. Within the framework of its permanent agenda covering 10 areas, the Conference adopted as its substantive agenda for 1993 the following items:

1. Nuclear test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

¹² *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/48/27)*.

5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
8. Transparency in armaments

The Conference agreed, "without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items", to begin work immediately on items 1, 4, 5 and 8,¹³ and for that purpose established corresponding ad hoc committees to deal with each of those items. At the plenary meeting at which this decision was taken, Nigeria, on behalf of the Group of 21, stated that the Group went along with the decision on the understanding that it in no way affected the established priorities in disarmament. (For the work of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with a nuclear-test ban, see pages 50 to 52; for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with outer space, see pages 222 to 226; for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with security assurances, see pages 28 to 29; and for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with transparency, see pages 75 to 83.) As no ad hoc committees were established for items 2, 3, 6 and 7, members reaffirmed or elaborated on their positions with respect to them in the course of plenary meetings; no changes in position were noted. In addition, interested members continued their ongoing open-ended informal consultations on non-proliferation in all its aspects. Chapters I, II and V of this volume deal with subject-matter pertinent to items 2, 3 and 6.

Under the chairmanship of Mr. Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan, the Conference continued its open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning. It dealt with such subjects as report writing, the rotation of the presidency and session dates. In addition, the question of computerization of Conference documents was discussed; there was a general feeling that the optical disk system of the United Nations Office at Geneva should be coordinated with UNDAIS (the United Nations Disarmament Affairs Information System) being developed by the Office for Disarmament Affairs in New York in order to ensure a rational use of existing resources.

¹³ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

Representatives of 37 member States of the Conference participated in its work.¹⁴ In addition, 50 States not members of the Conference¹⁵ were invited to participate, upon their request, in the discussion on substantive agenda items in plenary meetings and meetings of the Ad Hoc Committees.

The expansion of membership became a focus of attention in the third part of the session. Between 1982 and 1993, requests for membership had been received from 33 States,¹⁶ and, as indicated above, a large number were participating in the plenary and ad hoc committee meetings of the Conference. Following bilateral discussions with his colleagues and with each of the groups of members, Mr. Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, the Special Coordinator for this matter, submitted a list entitled "Recommended composition of the Conference on Disarmament following expansion",¹⁷ which consisted of all current members, 24 new members and provision for a successor to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which maintained a balance in representation between developed and developing countries. He noted that an expansion of the membership to about 60 members would repre-

¹⁴ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Zaire.

¹⁵ Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

¹⁶ In chronological order, the States requesting membership were: Norway, Finland, Austria, Turkey, Senegal, Bangladesh, Spain, Viet Nam, Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Cameroon, Greece, Zimbabwe, New Zealand, Chile, Switzerland, Republic of Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Croatia, Kuwait, Israel, Slovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iraq, South Africa, Colombia, Syrian Arab Republic, Portugal, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Malaysia.

¹⁷ CD/1214; see also *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/48/27)*, sect. E.

sent approximately one third of the Members of the United Nations and would create enough manoeuvrability to accommodate a wide variety of applicant countries. He believed that the expansion should be dynamic and part of a phased approach, and suggested that the Conference on Disarmament review its membership at regular intervals of five years or so. The Conference discussed the report of the Special Coordinator but was unable to reach a consensus on the matter. During the intersessional period the President of the Conference continued consultations, but they remained inconclusive.

The review of the agenda continued to be an issue before the Conference. The Special Coordinator for the question of the agenda, Mr. Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, reported that it had been agreed to continue consultations at the 1994 session, once the process of expansion of the membership was concluded.

Action by the General Assembly, 1993

At its forty-seventh session

Reconvened meetings of the First Committee took place from 8 to 12 March in New York. In response to General Assembly decision 47/422 of 9 December 1992, the Secretary-General submitted a compilation¹⁸ of replies received from Member States transmitting their views on his report *New Dimensions* for consideration at the reconvened meetings. At the last meeting, the Committee approved without a vote a draft resolution that had been submitted by the Chairman concerning enhancement of the functioning of the multilateral disarmament machinery. On 8 April the draft was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote, as resolution 47/54 G. It reads as follows:

¹⁸ A/47/887 and Corr.1 and Add. 1-6. Replies were received from: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

Resolution 47/54 G

Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision 47/422 of 9 December 1992, by which it decided to reconvene meetings of the First Committee from 8 to 12 March 1993 in order to reassess the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, in particular the respective roles of the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament and their interrelationship, as well as the role of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, including ways and means to enhance the functioning and efficiency of the said machinery,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era",

Taking note also of the views of Member States on that report,

Taking note further of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General, as well as its report on the ongoing review of the agenda, composition and methods of work of the Conference,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Having considered the views expressed by Member States at the resumed session of the First Committee on these questions,

Conscious that the new international situation has enhanced the prospects for disarmament and arms regulation, which is conducive to further multilateral efforts in disarmament,

Stressing the need for the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery to respond to the new multifaceted realities of international security,

Noting that a review is being undertaken regarding the allocation of agenda items to the Main Committees of the General Assembly,

Noting also the continuing review of the role and resources of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to strengthen its effective functioning,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's statement of 9 March 1993, that the Secretariat's capabilities are being strengthened to enable it to discharge its responsibilities effectively,

Desiring to enhance the effective functioning of the present multilateral disarmament machinery,

1. *Decides* that the First Committee of the General Assembly, in pursuit of its efforts to respond to the new realities of international security, should continue to deal with the questions of disarmament and related international security issues;

2. *Requests* the Chairman of the First Committee to continue his consultations on the further rationalization of the work and the effective functioning of the Committee, taking into account all the views and proposals presented to the First Committee, including those related to the thematic clustering of agenda items;

3. *Reaffirms* the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission as a specialized deliberative body within the United Nations disarmament machinery, and takes note of the progress achieved in its ongoing process of reform;

4. *Recommends* that every effort be made to continue to enhance the working methods of the United Nations Disarmament Commission so as to enable it to give focused consideration to a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament, and to that end welcomes the decision of the Commission to move its agenda towards a three-item phased approach;

5. *Takes note* of the fact that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single global disarmament negotiating forum, is a body of limited composition taking its decisions on the basis of consensus and maintains its special status in relationship with the United Nations disarmament machinery;

6. *Welcomes* the fact that the Conference on Disarmament, in addition to the review of its composition, has also intensified the review of its agenda and methods of work, with a view to reaching prompt decisions on these questions;

7. *Encourages* the Conference on Disarmament to reach early agreement on the expansion of its membership;

8. *Stresses* the importance of further enhancing the dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament;

9. *Urges* the Secretary-General to take concrete steps to strengthen the Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to ensure that it has the necessary means and resources to carry out its mandated tasks;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on those steps to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

11. *Decides* to review these questions at its forty-eighth session.

In connection with the item on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly, dealt with in plenary meetings, Members adopted resolution 47/233 on 17 August, whereby the First Committee, which had previously been called the "Political and Security Committee", was redesignated the "Disarmament and International Security Committee".

At its forty-eighth session

At its plenary meetings between 27 September and 13 October,¹⁹ the General Assembly held a general debate in the course of which a very large number of Member States addressed different aspects of disarmament and international security questions.

The First Committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Adolf von Wagner of Germany, held substantive meetings on the following disarmament and international security issues between 18 October and 24 November.²⁰

1. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament (57)
2. Reduction of military budgets (58)
 - (a) Reduction of military budgets
 - (b) Transparency of military expenditures
3. Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements (59)
4. Education and information for disarmament (60)
- 5.. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (61)
6. Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security (62)
7. The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields (63)
8. Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (64)
9. Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (65)
10. Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (66)
11. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (67)
12. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia (68)
13. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (69)

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 29th meetings.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 33rd meetings. (The numbers in parentheses after the titles of the items are those of the items on the agenda of the General Assembly.)

14. Prevention of an arms race in outer space (70)
15. General and complete disarmament (71)
 - (a) Notification of nuclear tests
 - (b) Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons
 - (c) Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes
 - (d) Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes
 - (e) Relationship between disarmament and development
 - (f) Regional disarmament
 - (g) Transparency in armaments
 - (h) International arms transfers
 - (i) Conventional disarmament on a regional scale
16. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly (72)
 - (a) United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme
 - (b) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
 - (c) United Nations Disarmament Information Programme
 - (d) Nuclear-arms freeze
 - (e) Regional confidence-building measures
 - (f) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
17. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session (73)
 - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission
 - (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament
 - (c) Status of multilateral disarmament agreements
 - (d) Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
 - (e) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
18. Israeli nuclear armament (74)
19. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (75)

- 20 Question of Antarctica (76)
21. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (77)
22. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (78)
23. Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (79)
24. Maintenance of international security (80)
25. Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (81)
26. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (82)
27. Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee (156)

In response to the request made of the Secretary-General in resolution 47/54 G, operative paragraphs 9 and 10, cited above, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the steps he was taking to strengthen the Office for Disarmament Affairs.²¹ Among the measures envisaged was the renaming of the Office as the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, to be headed by a Director, and the allocation of additional resources to activities connected with the Register of Conventional Arms.

Resolution on the work of the First Committee

On 19 November, the Chairman of the First Committee introduced a draft resolution, submitted by him, entitled "*Rationalization of the work of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee)*". With regard to the broad topic areas listed in operative paragraph 2 of the text, the Sudan, on behalf of the Group of Arab States, stated that they considered that the question of Israeli nuclear armament should be considered under "Regional disarmament and security". Ghana noted that the question of Antarctica would be addressed under "International security". The draft resolution was adopted without a vote at the same meeting.

Following the approval of the draft resolution, a number of States and the Chairman made statements. The Philippines commended the

²¹ A/48/358.

Chairman for his initiative in submitting the draft resolution. Belgium, speaking on behalf of the European Union, expressed the belief that the Committee now had the tool it needed to help the Chairman direct its work. It noted that approval of the draft resolution marked a first, but significant, step. Ireland, too, welcomed the draft, although it would have liked the Committee to go further. Ireland noted that the First Committee was hesitant about tackling the difficult domain of political questions.

The Chairman felt that the draft resolution was a step in the right direction. In the course of his consultations with many delegations, most had advocated a change in the organization of the Committee's work unrelated to the rationalization envisaged in the draft resolution just adopted, which related to the programme of work. He referred to his paper dated 19 November, circulated informally, which set forth a possible approach to the organization of the Committee's work and reproduced the wishes expressed by a large number of delegations that had thus far not given rise to objections. Those proposals would be considered during the consultations he was requested to hold under operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.

On 16 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 48/87. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/87

Rationalization of the work of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 47/54 G of 8 April 1993 particularly its paragraph 2 requesting the Chairman of the First Committee to continue consultations on the further rationalization of the work and the effective functioning of the Committee, taking into account all the views and proposals presented to the First Committee, including those related to the thematic clustering of agenda items,

Recalling further the ongoing efforts of the General Assembly aimed at revitalizing its work and noting its resolution 47/233 of 17 August 1993,

Mindful that the United Nations has a central role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and international security,

Recalling the Final Document of its tenth special session, the first devoted exclusively to disarmament, and the objectives and priorities set out therein

as well as the progress achieved in arms control and disarmament towards these ends,

Encouraged by the changed political climate in the post-cold war era, which is conducive to further bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts in disarmament and aware of the consequential need to adjust the work of the United Nations, including that concerned with disarmament and international security,

Desiring to enhance the effective functioning of the United Nations disarmament machinery,

Conscious of the need to improve the interrelationship between disarmament and arms regulation issues and the broader international security context,

Encouraged by the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General to strengthen the Secretariat's capabilities to enable it to discharge its tasks effectively,

1. *Decides* to enhance the effectiveness of the First Committee by:
 - addressing in a more systematic manner the issues of disarmament and related matters of international security,
 - streamlining its functioning and, as a first step towards that end, encouraging more detailed and focused discussion of the specific agenda-items,
 - reviewing annually the time and resources allotted to its work;
2. *Decides also*, in relation to the restructuring and reorganization of the annual agenda of the First Committee, to adopt, in order to promote the more detailed and focused discussions, a thematic approach whereby items presented by Member States are clustered in broad topic areas, such as:
 - Nuclear weapons
 - Other weapons of mass destruction
 - Conventional weapons
 - Regional disarmament and security
 - Confidence-building measures including Transparency in Armaments
 - Outer space (Disarmament aspects)
 - Disarmament machinery
 - Other disarmament measures
 - International security
 - Related matters of disarmament and international security;
3. *Requests* the Chairman of the First Committee to continue consultations on the further rationalization of the work of the Committee in terms of improving its effective functioning, taking into account relevant resolutions adopted by the Committee as well as views and proposals presented to it on this issue;

4. *Urges* the Secretary-General to provide the appropriate means and adequate resources to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs in order to ensure that it can carry out its mandated tasks, in particular those relating to deliberation and negotiation, taking into account existing resource constraints, and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

5. *Decides* to review the subject of further rationalization and improvement of the work of the First Committee at its forty-ninth session.

Resolutions on the report of the Disarmament Commission and the report of the Conference on Disarmament

A draft resolution entitled "*Report of the Disarmament Commission*" was submitted by 12 States,²² whereby the General Assembly would recommend, in the operative part, that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1993 organizational session, include an item on arms transfers in its agenda for 1994; and, at its 1994 organizational session, consider including an item on general guidelines for non-proliferation in its agenda for 1995. The draft was subsequently revised to delete the paragraph regarding an item on non-proliferation. The main points of the draft text were outlined in the First Committee by Brazil on 18 November. At the same meeting, the draft resolution was put to the vote. The First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 139 to none, with 1 abstention (United States). The United States, explaining its vote, said that the formulation of paragraph 12 tended to prejudice the position of the Disarmament Commission.

As the meeting of the General Assembly on 16 December, the draft resolution was orally amended to reflect, in its operative paragraphs 11 and 12, the decisions taken by the Commission at its organizational session earlier in December. The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution as orally amended without a vote. Resolution 48/77 A reads as follows:

Resolution 48/77 A

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the annual report of the Disarmament Commission,

Recalling its resolutions 47/54 A of 9 December 1992 and 47/54 G of 8 April 1993,

²² Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Ireland, Mauritius, Mongolia, Republic of Korea and Ukraine.

Recalling further the proposal to include a new item in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission entitled "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction",

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

1. *Takes note* of the annual report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Commends* the Disarmament Commission for its adoption by consensus of a set of guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security, which were recommended to the General Assembly for consideration, pursuant to the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission";
3. *Endorses* the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of international security as adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session;
4. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Disarmament Commission has made significant progress in achieving agreement on guidelines and recommendations under the agenda item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", which is to be concluded in 1994;
5. *Takes note* of the continuing consideration by the Disarmament Commission of the item entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons", which is to be concluded in 1994;
6. *Reaffirms* the importance of further enhancing the dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament;
7. *Recommends* that the Conference on Disarmament consider, within its competence, the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of international security;
8. *Reaffirms* the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;
9. *Encourages* the Disarmament Commission to continue to make every effort to enhance its working methods so as to enable it to give focused consideration to a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament, bearing in mind the decision it has taken to move its agenda towards a three-item phased approach;

10. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on the items on its agenda, taking into account the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission";

11. *Notes* that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1993 organizational session, adopted the following items for consideration and conclusion at its 1994 substantive session:

(1) Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;

(2) The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields;

12. *Also notes* that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1993 organizational session, inscribed on the agenda of its 1994 substantive session an item entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991";

13. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1994 and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

15. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages, and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services to this end;

16. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

A draft resolution entitled "*Report of the Conference on Disarmament*" was submitted by Egypt and later sponsored also by the Czech Republic. Introducing it on 9 November on behalf of the President of the Conference, the representative of Egypt first stressed the significance of the decision of the Conference to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. He then noted that the Conference occupied an important position as the single multilateral negotiating forum on

disarmament and he expressed the hope that agreement would soon be reached on the question of the expansion of its membership.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 19 November without a vote. On that occasion, four States made statements. Both the Czech Republic and Ukraine, which are not members of the Conference, expressed their interest in the question of an expansion of membership. Both the United Kingdom and the United States expressed the hope that all additional costs in support of the negotiations on the test ban would be met by redeployment of existing resources.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the text, also without a vote, as resolution 48/77 B. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 48/77 B

Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, has the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament,

Considering, in this respect, that the present international climate should give additional impetus to multilateral negotiations with the aim of reaching concrete agreements,

Welcoming the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give to its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate such a ban,

Noting with satisfaction the results achieved so far on the subject of improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the decision to carry out inter-sessional consultations with a view to achieving consensus on the issue of its membership during the inter-sessional period, and the decision to continue consultations on the issue of the agenda at its 1994 session,

1. *Reaffirms* the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;

2. *Welcomes* the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil that role in the light of the evolving international situation with a view to making early substantive progress on priority items of its agenda;

3. *Also welcomes* the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give to its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate such a ban;

4. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to reach a consensus which results in the expansion of its membership before the start of its 1994 session;
5. *Encourages* the ongoing review of the agenda, membership and methods of work of the Conference on Disarmament;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the provision, to the Conference on Disarmament, of additional administrative, substantive and conference support services for its negotiations;
7. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;
8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Conclusion

The institutional framework within which the international community can most effectively pursue the goal of the United Nations, namely the maintenance of international peace and security; the composition, working methods and agendas of the various bodies within that framework; and the relationship of those bodies to one another: these questions continued to attract intense interest throughout 1993. Debate went on in the First Committee, both at its reconvened meetings in the spring and at its regular meetings in the fall, in the Conference on Disarmament, in other forums and in national capitals. In particular, in the United Nations, Member States focused on how confidence-building and disarmament could contribute in the post-cold war world to the goals of the Organization and how such issues should be addressed within the broader context of international security. In the Conference on Disarmament, the focus of attention regarding institutional matters was on the question how to expand its membership so as to reflect adequately the political and regional diversity of the world while keeping it limited enough to allow for effective negotiation. Definitive answers could not be found to these questions, although the First Committee, and subsequently the General Assembly in its resolution 48/87, agreed upon some first steps towards enhancing the effectiveness of the First Committee—now designated the Disarmament and International Security Committee. These steps included the adoption of a thematic approach to its agenda items in order to promote more detailed and focused discussion. It may be expected that the process of review and rationalization of the various bodies constituting the international community's disarmament machinery will continue in 1994.

CHAPTER X

Studies; information and training; regional activities

Introduction

THE UNITED NATIONS HAS, OVER THE YEARS, undertaken a wide range of information and training activities in the field of disarmament. These activities have included: expert studies on various topics; an information programme; a fellowships, training and advisory services programme; and regional activities and activities of its three Regional Centres. In 1993, as in previous years, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs provided substantive and technical support to an expert study group; conducted various activities as part of its information programme; administered its fellowship programme and worked in close cooperation with the Regional Centres, which function under its auspices. Similarly, during the course of 1993, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), an autonomous institution which works closely with the Centre, carried out a programme consisting of research and publications. (For details on the publications of the Centre and of UNIDIR, see annexes III and IV, respectively.) The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters,¹ which advises him on the various aspects of disarmament studies, also serves as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR and advises the Secretary-General on the implementation of the information programme.

Disarmament studies programme

The General Assembly has regularly requested the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of groups of experts and consultants,

¹ See the report of the Secretary-General on the twenty-fourth session of the Advisory Board, held from 28 June to 2 July in New York (A/48/325). The members of the Board are listed in annex I to this chapter.

studies on specific disarmament issues and closely related subjects. Such studies may serve as guides for subsequent actions or negotiations or for the identification of areas which may be ripe for negotiation. Studies have also been used to clarify the views and positions held by Member States on various issues, thus facilitating a better understanding of the problems of the arms race and approaches to disarmament. The following sections provide organizational information concerning the work in this area completed in 1993. (The names of the experts for the study completed in the course of the year are given in annex II to this chapter.)

Study completed in 1993

STUDY ON THE APPLICATION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN OUTER SPACE

By resolution 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to carry out a study on the specific aspects related to the application of different confidence-building measures in outer space, including the different technologies available, and possibilities for defining appropriate mechanisms of international cooperation in specific areas of interest. The Secretary-General was also asked to report thereon to the Assembly at its forty-eighth session. (For a substantive discussion of the study, see chapter VIII, beginning on page 218.)

To assist him in preparing the study, the Secretary-General appointed 12 governmental experts. The Group of Experts, which met under the chairmanship of Mr. Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, held four sessions in New York: from 29 July to 2 August 1991; from 23 to 27 March 1992; from 1 to 12 March 1993; and from 6 to 16 July 1993. Following the Group's final meeting, on 16 July, the Chairman transmitted the report of the Group to the Secretary-General.²

At its forty-eighth session, by resolution 48/74 B (see page 230), the General Assembly took note of the Secretary-General's report and requested that he arrange for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and that it be given the widest possible distribution.

² A/48/305 and Corr. 1, annex. See also a letter dated 31 August from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the Secretary-General transmitting a paper concerning the study (A/48/553, annex).

Study initiated in 1993

VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, INCLUDING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF VERIFICATION

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/68, entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification". By the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study on the subject as a further follow-up action to the study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification that was completed in 1990.³ (An account of the proposal and of the adoption of resolution 48/68 is given in chapter III, beginning on page 88.)

Disarmament information programme

The 1993 activities of the information programme were carried out in the areas indicated below.⁴

Regional activities. The Centre for Disarmament Affairs maintained its active encouragement of the pursuit of regional solutions to regional problems. It did so by promoting this approach either through its Regional Centres or in cooperation with individual Governments through the organization of regional conferences, meetings and seminars, which foster the sharing of ideas and information between governmental and non-governmental sectors, as well as between governmental and other experts. In 1993, four such meetings were convened in cooperation with individual Governments (Austria, Italy, Japan and Ukraine) and with the assistance of other institutions (the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War). The Symposium on Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region was held in Florence, Italy, in cooperation with the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War, from 29 March to 1 April, with the aim of exploring the concepts of openness and

³ A/45/372. The study was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication: *The Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification* (Sales No. E.91.IX.11).

⁴ For further information concerning the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, refer to the relevant report of the Secretary-General (A/48/326).

transparency as they apply to the pursuit of peace, security and disarmament, in particular in the Mediterranean region. The Conference on Disarmament Issues, the third in a series held in Kyoto, Japan, took place from 13 to 16 April; the principal aim of the Conference was to review trends in the area of national security in the post-cold war era and to study the challenges to disarmament in an increasingly interdependent world. The Symposium on Regional Approaches to Confidence- and Security-building Measures, held in Graz, Austria, from 2 to 4 June, examined the main challenges that confront States in implementing confidence-building concepts and the evolution of confidence-building methodology in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe. The Symposium on Security, Disarmament and Confidence-building in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Context was held in Kiev, Ukraine, from 27 to 30 September, with the purpose of clarifying the security concerns of various member States of CIS in the light of ongoing political and strategic developments in the region and of exploring ways in which States and international organizations outside CIS could assist the newly independent States in promoting stability and cooperation in specific areas of concern. (The proceedings of the first three of these meetings were published as Topical Papers 15, 16 and 17, respectively, and are listed in annex III to this chapter. For information regarding other regional activities, see "Regional Centres", page 271.)

Information and education activities. The publications prepared and circulated during the year by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and listed in annex III cover the work of the multilateral deliberating and negotiating bodies in the field of disarmament, the status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements, an expert study and topical issues. During the year, the Centre maintained its involvement in a joint project with the International Association of University Presidents to develop prototype courses in arms control, disarmament and security for use at the undergraduate level and in professional schools worldwide. The staff of the Centre, in both New York and Geneva, also continued to carry out as many speaking engagements as possible for groups visiting the Organization, to participate in events organized by non-governmental organizations and to be available for lectures at various universities.

Training activities. A description of the 1993 activities of the disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme, the main training programme in disarmament of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, is given on page 268. In addition, through its internship programme, the Centre provided training for graduate students in the Organization's work in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. A similar programme is sponsored by the Geneva Branch of the Centre to familiarize graduate students with the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

Special events. Within its mandate to facilitate exchanges of views and information between governmental and non-governmental sectors, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs gave substantive and practical support to an international NGO conference held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 20 to 23 April. Sponsored by the NGO Committee on Disarmament (New York) and the Special NGO Committee on Disarmament (Geneva), the Conference dealt with the theme "New realities: disarmament, peace-building and global security".

The United Nations observed Disarmament Week in New York and Geneva from 25 to 29 October. At a special meeting of the First Committee to commemorate the Week, held on 29 October, opening statements were made by the Chairman of the First Committee, the President of the General Assembly and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Another feature of the Week was a symposium, held from 26 to 28 October under the auspices of the Department of Public Information, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and the NGO Committee on Disarmament. The topics discussed included: prospects for achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a ban on the production of weapons-grade fissionable material, and for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the discussion of transparency in armaments in the Conference on Disarmament; and progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and confidence-building measures in Central Africa.

The Eleventh Pledging Conference for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme was held in New York on 29 October under the chairmanship of Mr. Alvaro Zuniga of Chile. Forty-nine delegations participated, 23 of which made statements expressing general appreciation of and support for the activities of the Programme and

giving special recognition to the role of the Regional Centres and their confidence-building activities. Many delegations also expressed satisfaction at the fact that the General Assembly had decided last year to change the name of the programme from the "World Disarmament Campaign" to the "Disarmament Information Programme". Several observed that for the past three years the First Committee resolution on the programme had been adopted by consensus. The total amount pledged to the Disarmament Information Programme and the Regional Centres was \$223,464. (The comparable figure for the 1991 Pledging Conference was \$273,017 and for the 1992 Pledging Conference, \$516,376, excluding a pledge of \$450,000 which was made in 1992, but earmarked for use in 1994.) In addition, \$519,782 was pledged to UNIDIR, as compared with \$573,027 in 1992.⁵

On 9 November, a draft resolution sponsored by 12 States⁶ and entitled "*United Nations Disarmament Information Programme*" was introduced in the First Committee by Mexico. In its statement, Mexico noted that the change in name had in no way changed the original purpose of the programme, which remained that of the broadest possible dissemination of information and opinion on all questions relating to the arms race and war, particularly nuclear war. Mexico also noted the decrease in pledges made in 1993 compared with those made in 1992.

The draft resolution was adopted by the Committee without a vote on 11 November, and, similarly, by the General Assembly, on 16 December as resolution 48/76 D. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 48/76 D

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, by which the World Disarmament Campaign was launched,

⁵ Several countries which were expected to contribute did not make statements during the Pledging Conference since the decision-making process in their capitals had not yet been completed. A list of contributions pledged at the Pledging Conference and thereafter until 31 March 1994, at which time the list of pledges will be closed, will be issued as a document of the Conference.

⁶ Bangladesh, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mexico, Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine and Venezuela.

Bearing in mind its various resolutions on the subject, including resolution 47/53 D of 9 December 1992, in which it decided, *inter alia*, that the World Disarmament Campaign should be known thereafter as the "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme" and the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund as the "Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme",

Having examined the reports of the Secretary-General of 24 August 1993 on the implementation of the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, and of 22 September 1993 on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters relating to the implementation of the Disarmament Information Programme, as well as the Final Act of the Eleventh United Nations Pledging Conference for the Programme, held on 29 October 1993,

Noting with appreciation the contributions that Member States have already made to the Programme,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General of 24 August 1993 on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme;

2. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his efforts to make effective use of the resources available to him in disseminating as widely as possible information on arms limitation and disarmament to elected officials, the media, non-governmental organizations, educational communities and research institutes, and in carrying out an active seminar and conference programme;

3. *Notes with appreciation* the contributions to the efforts of the Programme by the United Nations information centres and the regional centres for disarmament;

4. *Recommends* that the Programme should further focus its efforts:

(a) To inform, to educate and to generate public understanding of the importance of and support for multilateral action, including action by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, in a factual, balanced and objective manner;

(b) To facilitate unimpeded access to and an exchange of information on ideas between the public sector and public interest groups and organizations, and to provide an independent source of balanced and factual information that takes into account a range of views to help further an informed debate on arms limitation, disarmament and security;

(c) To organize meetings to facilitate exchanges of views and information between governmental and non-governmental sectors and between governmental and other experts in order to facilitate the search for common ground;

5. *Invites* all Member States to contribute to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme;

6. *Commends* the Secretary-General for supporting the efforts of universities, other academic institutions and non-governmental organizations active

in the educational field in widening the world-wide availability of disarmament education, and invites him to continue to support and cooperate, without cost to the regular budget of the United Nations, with educational institutions and non-governmental organizations engaged in such efforts;

7. *Decides* that at its forty-ninth session there should be a twelfth United Nations Pledging Conference for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, and expresses the hope that on that occasion all those Member States that have not yet announced any voluntary contributions will do so, bearing in mind the objectives of the Third Disarmament Decade and the need to ensure its success;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session a report covering both the implementation of the activities of the Programme by the United Nations system during 1994 and the activities of the Programme contemplated by the system for 1995;

9. *Also decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme".

Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme

The emergence of new issues in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and security led to a corresponding broadening in the focus of the substantive content of the disarmament fellowship programme.⁷ In this context, the programme of lectures was revised to include such topics as regional approaches to disarmament, non-proliferation issues, openness and transparency, preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, United Nations peace-keeping operations, international humanitarian law in armed conflicts and human dimensions of international security. The 1993 programme of studies, which began on 9 August at Geneva and ended on 29 October at United Nations Headquarters, included a series of lectures; speaking, drafting and simulation exercises; the preparation of individual research papers on various disarmament and

⁷ See the report of the Secretary-General on the programme (A/48/469). Thirty fellowships were awarded. The nationals of the following 27 States participated (three fellows were unable to attend): Algeria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Russian Federation, Slovenia, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

security issues; attendance at the Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee of the General Assembly; and study visits to IAEA and to four Member States, at their invitation: Finland, Germany, Japan and Sweden.

On 5 November, Nigeria introduced, on behalf of the sponsors,⁸ a draft resolution entitled “*United Nations disarmament, fellowship, training and advisory services programme*”, noting that the changes which had taken place in the international arena over the past few years had opened up new opportunities for pursuing disarmament, but had at the same time presented new challenges for the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations. The programme had been extended to reflect these developments by including new topics for discussion and study.

On 11 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. On that occasion, Japan welcomed the consensus on the need to promote expertise in disarmament among public officials, particularly in developing countries.

On 16 December, the General Assembly similarly adopted the resolution without a vote as resolution 48/76 C. It reads as follows:

Resolution 48/76 C

United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second

⁸ Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, *inter alia*, to continue the programme,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained an appreciable number of public officials selected from geographical regions represented in the United Nations system, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries or Governments,

Recalling also its resolutions 37/100 G of 13 December 1982, 38/73 C of 15 December 1983, 39/63 B of 12 December 1984, 40/151 H of 16 December 1985, 41/60 H of 3 December 1986, 42/39 I of 30 November 1987, 43/76 F of 7 December 1988, 44/117 E of 15 December 1989, 45/59 A of 4 December 1990, 46/37 E of 6 December 1991 and 47/53 A of 9 December 1992,

Noting also with satisfaction that the programme, as designed, has enabled an increased number of public officials, particularly from the developing countries, to acquire more expertise in the sphere of disarmament,

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, particularly to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. *Reaffirms* its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of Finland, Germany, Japan and Sweden for inviting the 1993 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* that, within the framework of the programme, the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat organizes regional disarmament workshops for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean;

4. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the implementation of the Geneva-based programme within existing resources and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session.

United Nations Regional Centres

During the year, the financial situation of the three Regional Centres remained precarious owing to a continued decline in voluntary contributions to their respective trust funds. The programmes of the Centres had to be adjusted accordingly, with the result that activities were drastically curtailed. The Centres, nevertheless, continued to make every effort to promote cooperation among the States of their respective regions.⁹

Africa. The Centre's activities continued to focus on the dissemination of information relating to disarmament, peace and security within the African context. In cooperation with the Government of Namibia and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Namibia Office, the Centre organized an international seminar in Windhoek, from 24 to 26 February, dealing with confidence- and security-building measures in southern Africa. The seminar was attended by high-level military and civilian experts from the member States of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as by experts from the African National Congress and individual international researchers and experts. The main objective of the Seminar was to provide an opportunity for participants to explore the various ways and means of fostering mutual confidence and trust in inter-State relations among southern African States with a view to reinforcing development opportunities in the post-apartheid era. The Centre also provided substantive and organizational support to the two meetings of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held respectively in Burundi from 8 to 12 March and in Gabon from 30 August to 3 September. The Centre continued to publish its quarterly newsletter. The workshop proposed by the Government of Kenya on the issues of refugees and regional security in East Africa, which had been scheduled to be held at Nairobi during the second half of 1993, was postponed owing to insufficient funds.

Latin America and the Caribbean. In spite of the financial constraints, the Centre continued to expand its contacts and cooperation with governmental and non-governmental organizations, research centres, academic institutions and other United Nations bodies. As part of its programme for promoting awareness of regional security issues, the

⁹ See the relevant report of the Secretary-General (A/48/346). The report covers activities from August 1992 to July 1993.

Centre held a workshop, attended by Peruvian diplomats, researchers in the field and the military, at Lima, on 1 October 1992,¹⁰ on the topic of military expenditures in South America and their relation to overall government expenditures in general and to social expenditures in particular. In cooperation with the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, the Regional Centre organized a seminar on arms proliferation and confidence- and security-building measures in Latin America and the Caribbean, which was held from 18 to 20 January 1993 in Asunción, Paraguay; 40 experts from Governments, military and the academic community from within and outside the region participated in their personal capacity. The seminar was funded largely from voluntary contributions by the Government of Canada, with additional financial support from the Governments of Norway and Paraguay. On 23 June, a workshop on hemispheric strategic issues was held at the Centre for scholars, retired military officers and diplomats, and on 24 June the third annual seminar was held there for the members of the Association of Military Attachés accredited in Peru. The topic of the latter event was the role of the Latin American armed forces on the threshold of the twenty-first century, taking into account the current democratic wave and the prevailing peaceful conditions in the region. The Centre continued to publish its quarterly newsletter, and its reference library has continued to serve as a resource centre for students and researchers on issues of peace, security, disarmament and development in the region. The Centre also provided assistance to the Government of Chile in the organization of a workshop on chemical weapons, held in Santiago from 9 to 10 September, and to the Government of Ecuador and its Diplomatic Academy in organizing a seminar on disarmament and security in Latin America, held in Quito, from 15 to 17 September.

Asia and the Pacific. The Centre organized two major regional meetings. The first—which took place from 1 to 3 February and was the fourth in a series held at the Centre—focused on the theme of national security and confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific region. It was attended by 38 participants from Governments, research institutes, the mass media and non-governmental organizations. The second—which took place in Kyoto, Japan, from 13 to 16 April and was held in cooperation with the Government of Japan, as mentioned above in connection with the Disarmament Information Programme—focused on the theme

¹⁰ A/48/346, sect. B. The reporting period was August 1992 to July 1993.

of national security in an interdependent world. Eighty participants from Governments, the academic community, research institutes, non-governmental organizations and the media within and outside the Asia-Pacific region attended this event. In conjunction with the Kyoto Conference, the Centre cooperated with local authorities in organizing three one-day seminars on, respectively: "Early warning, preventive diplomacy and disarmament", held at Kyoto; "New disarmament agenda and international security in the interdependent world", held at Nagasaki; and "Building on dialogue and searching for common security in Asia and the Pacific", held at Hiroshima. The Centre's activities also included disseminating information on United Nations activities in the field of disarmament and answering inquiries from the general public, students and non-governmental organizations.

On 9 November, Peru introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution¹¹ entitled "*United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean*". In its statement, Peru observed that interest in revitalizing the Regional Centres had prompted the sponsors to submit a draft resolution introducing new elements which might contribute towards that goal. Paragraph 3 of the draft contained a new concept of the work of the Regional Centres which would permit them to address various topics of importance such as the relationship between regional disarmament, arms control and international security, their principles and guidelines, ways and means, and the role of the United Nations.

On 11 November the Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. At the time of the vote, the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that if the Centre for Asia and the Pacific was to be effective, it would have to give due attention to all of the subregions and have the support of all countries.

¹¹ The resolution was sponsored by Algeria (on behalf of the Group of African States), Bangladesh, China, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic (on behalf of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States), Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam.

On 16 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 48/76 E. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 48/76 E

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, 41/60 D of 3 December 1986, 42/39 J of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 D of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, 42/39 K of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 H of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, 42/39 D of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 G of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia, 44/117 F of 15 December 1989, 45/59 E of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 F of 9 December 1991 and its decision 47/421 of 9 December 1992 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Reaffirming its resolution 46/36 F of 6 December 1991 and 47/52 G of 9 December 1992 on regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures,

Mindful of the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulating that a function of the General Assembly is to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms limitation,

Bearing in mind that the changed international environment has created new opportunities for the pursuit of disarmament, as well as posed new challenges,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General containing the steps taken to strengthen the Office for Disarmament Affairs,

Convinced that the initiatives and activities mutually agreed upon by Member States of the respective regions aimed at fostering confidence, as well as the implementation and coordination of regional activities under the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, would encourage and facilitate

the development of effective measures of confidence-building, arms limitations and disarmament in these regions,

Welcoming the programme of activities carried out by the regional centres, which have contributed substantially to understanding and cooperation among the States in each particular region and 11 have thereby strengthened the role assigned to each regional centre in the areas of peace, disarmament and development,

Taking note of the views on the regional centres contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters,

Recognizing the need to provide the regional centres with financial viability and stability so as to facilitate the effective planning and implementation of their respective programmes of activities,

Expressing its gratitude to the Member States and international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations that have contributed to the trust funds of the three regional centres,

1. *Commends* the activities being carried out by the regional centres in identifying and broadening the understanding of pressing disarmament and security issues, and exploring optimum solutions under given specific conditions prevailing in each region, in accordance with their mandates;

2. *Encourages* the regional centres to continue intensifying their efforts in promoting cooperation among the States in their respective regions to facilitate the development of effective measures of confidence-building, arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to strengthening peace and security;

3. *Encourages also* further use of the potential of the regional centres to maintain the increased interest in and momentum for revitalization of the Organization to meet the challenges of a new phase of international relations in order to fulfil the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations related to peace, disarmament and development, taking into account the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security as adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session;

4. *Appeals once again* to Member States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the programmes and activities of the regional centres and their implementations;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide all necessary support to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities;

6. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament

in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean”.

Education and information for disarmament

In 1991, the General Assembly adopted resolution 46/27, entitled “Education and information for disarmament”, by which it invited Member States and international governmental and non-governmental organizations and educational institutions for peace and disarmament to submit to the Secretary-General a report on their relevant activities. In September 1993, pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly a report¹² containing replies received thus far from Governments, international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations and educational and research organizations.

On 3 November, a draft resolution, sponsored ultimately by 51 States,¹³ and entitled “*Education and information for disarmament*”, was introduced by Costa Rica in the First Committee. The draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 11 November. On that occasion, the United States noted that if a vote had been called on the text, it would have abstained because of reservations on the language used in several of the paragraphs. The United States did not believe that it was appropriate for States to implement programmes intended to mobilize world public opinion or for States or international organizations to dictate educational content.

¹² A/366 and Add.1. Replies were received as follows: from Governments: China, Cuba, New Zealand, Philippines, Tunisia, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates; from international governmental organizations: UNESCO; and from non-governmental organizations: Education International, Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, Global Education Associates, International Association of University Presidents, International School-to-School Experience, and Peace Education Resource Centre.

¹³ Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain, Suriname, Thailand, The Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, on 16 December as resolution 48/64. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 48/64

Education and information for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 44/123 of 15 December 1989 and 46/27 of 6 December 1991,

Taking into account the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, in particular paragraph 106 thereof, in which the Assembly urged Governments and international governmental and non-governmental organizations to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels,

Considering that paragraphs 99, 100 and 101 of the Final Document provide for the mechanisms of a programme to mobilize world public opinion to promote disarmament, including the dissemination of information and publicity to complement the educational work,

Also considering that the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme plays an important role in complementing the educational efforts for disarmament carried out by Member States within their own educational and cultural development systems,

Recognizing that the important changes that have taken place in the world aimed at promoting freedom, democracy, respect for and enjoyment of human rights, disarmament and social development contribute to the achievement of positive results in the promotion of education and information for disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction the efforts which the educational community is making in the preparation of curricula and activities to promote education for disarmament and peace, as a means of contributing to the implementation of resolutions 44/123 and 46/27,

1. *Expresses appreciation* to the Secretary-General for his reports submitted pursuant to resolutions 44/123 and 46/27;

2. *Also expresses appreciation* for the valuable information contained submitted by Member States, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and educational institutions for peace and disarmament and contained in the reports;

3. *Reaffirms* that, in order to achieve positive results, it is indispensable to carry out educational and advisory programmes that promote peace and disarmament at all levels and are aimed at changing basic attitudes with respect

to aggression, violence, armaments and war, and that support regional and international measures geared to peace, security and cooperation;

4. *Reiterates* that the efforts of Member States, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and educational institutions for peace and disarmament, in the promotion of activities under the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, will enhance not only education and information for disarmament, as described in the second and third preambular paragraphs above, but also the arms reduction and disarmament processes or agreements that are being carried out at the regional and international levels;

5. *Invites* Member States and international governmental and non-governmental organizations and educational institutions for peace and disarmament to redouble their efforts to respond to the appeal made in paragraph 106 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and to submit to the Secretary-General a report on their activities in this regard;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session, under the item entitled "Education and information for disarmament" and from within existing resources, the reports requested in paragraph 5 above.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly his report¹⁴ concerning the activities of the Institute for the period from July 1992 to June 1993 and its proposed annual budget and work programme for 1994.

A draft resolution entitled "*United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*" was submitted to the First Committee by Egypt and Poland. By the text, the General Assembly would have recommended that the Institute, in programming its activities, should assist the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission in fulfilling their respective mandates, while maintaining the autonomous status of the Institute.

On 11 November, the sponsors stated that they would not press for action on the draft resolution.

¹⁴ A/48/270, annex I (report of the Director of the Institute on activities), and annex II (report of the Advisory Board, in its capacity as Board of Trustees of the Institute, on budget and programme for 1994).

ANNEX I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters*

Ednan T. Agaev, Head, Foreign Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

A. Bolaji Akinyemi, Akinyemi & Associates, Lagos, Nigeria

Martin Chungong Ayafor, Minister and Director, Office of the Prime Minister, Cameroon

Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, Ambassador of Brazil to Argentina

Mitsuro Donowaki, Ambassador of Japan to Mexico

Muchkund Dubey, Former Foreign Secretary of India

Emmanuel A. Erskine, Lieutenant General (Rtd.), Ghana.

Curt Gasteyger, Professor, The Graduate Institute of International Studies and Director, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, Geneva, Switzerland

Henry J. van der Graaf., Brigadier General (Rtd.); Director, INSTEAD, Free University of Amsterdam, Center for Verification Technology

Josef Holik, Ambassador, Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany

François de La Gorce, Ambassador, France

James F. Leonard, Ambassador, United States of America

Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Canada

Rogelio Pfirter, Ambassador and Under-Secretary for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina

Mohamed I. Shaker, Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Kingdom

John Simpson, Director, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, United Kingdom

Siti Azizah Abod, Under-Secretary for Policy, Ministry of Defence of Malaysia

J. Soedjati Djwandono, Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia

Klaus Törnudd, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland

Sverre Lodgaard, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, is an *ex officio* member of the Advisory Board when it is acting in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the Institute.

* As of the twenty-fourth session of the Advisory Board, 28 June-2 July 1993.

ANNEX II

Composition of the Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Study on the Application of Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space

Mohamed Ezz El Din Abdel-Moneim, Egypt

Sergey D. Chuvakhin, Russian Federation

F. R. Cleminson, Canada

Radoslav Deyanov, Bulgaria

Roberto García Moritán, Argentina

P. Hobwani, Zimbabwe

Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado, Brazil

C. Raja Mohan, India

Pierre-Henri Pisani, France

Archelaus R. Turrentine, United States

Yu Mengjia, China*

Sikandar Zaman, Pakistan

* At the third session of the Group, Mr. Sha Zukang participated as the expert from China, and at the fourth session, Mr. Wu Chengjiang participated as the expert from China.

ANNEX III

Publications of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs

Books

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume 17: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No E. 93.IX.1)

Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, fourth edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No E. 93.IX.11), vols. 1 and 2

Periodical

Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, Volume XVI, Numbers 1 and 2

Studies

Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies, Study 26 (United Nations publication, Sales No E. 93.IX.12)

Topical Papers

National Security and Confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific Region, Topical Papers 13 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.9)

Confidence- and Security-building Measures in Southern Africa, Topical Papers 14 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.10)

Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region, Topical Papers 15 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.13)

Disarmament and National Security in an Interdependent World, Topical Papers 16 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.IX.3)

Regional Approaches to Confidence- and Security-building Measures, Topical Papers 17 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.IX.5)

Newsletter

Disarmament Newsletter, Volume 11, Numbers 1 and 2

Miscellaneous publications

New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8)

Workshop on the Role of Border Problems in African Peace and Security: A Research Project (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.IX.4)

New Realities: Disarmament, Peace-building and Global Security (a publication of the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc., assisted by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.14)

Chemical Weapons Convention: Questions and Answers (in cooperation with DPI) (DPI/1426)

ANNEX IV

Publications of UNIDIR

Research Reports

Economic Aspects of Disarmament: Disarmament as an Investment Process/ Aspects économiques du désarmement: le désarmement en tant qu'investissement, by Keith Hartley., 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. G.V.E/F.93.0.3)

The Chemistry of Regime Formation: Explaining International Cooperation for a Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons, by Thomas Bernauer, 1993. Published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot)

Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East, Proceedings of the Cairo Conference, 18-19 April 1993, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, ed., 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. G.V.E.93.0.7)

Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Research Institutes, Proceedings of the São Paulo Conference, 2-3 December 1991, Péricles Gasparini Alves, ed., 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.93.0.8)

Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990's, Serge Sur, ed., 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.93.0.16)

Research Papers

No. 16—*Regional Security and Confidence-Building Processes: The Case of Southern Africa in the 1990s*, by Solomon M. Nkiwane, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.93.0.6)

No. 17—*Technical Problems in the Verification of a Ban on Space Weapons*, by Stanislav Rodionov, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.93.0.12)

No. 18—*Index to the Chemical Weapons Convention*, by A. Walter Dorn, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.93.0.13)

No. 19—*Migration and Population Change in Europe*, by John Salt, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.93.0.14)

No. 20—*La sécurité européenne dans les années 90: la dimension écologique*, by Jean-Daniel Clavel, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.F.93.0.15)

No. 21—*Les minorités nationales et le défi de la sécurité en Europe*, by Dominique Rosenberg, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.F.93.0.21)

No. 22—*Crisis in the Balkans*, by Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.93.0.22)

No. 23—*La transition vers l'économie de marché des pays "ex de l'Est"*, by Louis Pilandon, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.F.94.0.3)

No. 24—*Le désarmement et la conversion de l'industrie militaire en Russie*, by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.F.94.0.4)

Newsletters

21—04.93, Institutes, Projects, Publications/Instituts, projets, publications

22-23—06.93, 09.93, START and Nuclear Disarmament/START et le désarmement nucléaire

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The data contained in this appendix have been furnished by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements concerned.

The Secretary-General is the depositary of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Canada and Hungary are depositaries of the Treaty on Open Skies.

France is the depositary of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Mexico is the depositary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

The Netherlands is the depositary of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America are depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The United States of America is the depositary of the Antarctic Treaty.

The Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat (formerly the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation) is the depositary for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositaries.

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 1993

The following list shows actions reported,^a if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 1993 with regard to the multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements for which full information is provided in the fourth edition of *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.^b

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification by the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES: Slovakia —22 September

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 130

^a Accession is indicated by (a), acceptance by (A) and succession by (s). In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters "O", "B", "M", "L", and "W" indicate where the reported action was completed: "O" for Ottawa, "B" for Budapest, "M" for Moscow, "L" for London, and "W" for Washington.

^b *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11), vols. 1 and 2.

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Czech Republic — 1 January (s)
 Slovakia — 1 January (s)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 42^c

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

SIGNED BY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES^d IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Czech Republic — 1 January (W) (s)
 — 5 April (L) (s)
 — 9 April (M) (s)
 Slovakia — 1 January (W) (s)
 —17 May (L) (s)
 —25 June (M) (s)
 Suriname — 6 January (L) (a)
 — 9 April (W) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 122

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

^c Consultative parties are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Spain Sweden, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Uruguay and United States.

^d The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Czech Republic — 1 January (W) (s)
—24 September (M) (s)
—29 September (L) (s)
Slovakia — 1 January (W) (s)
—17 May (M) (s)
—17 May (L) (s)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 93

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

NEW PARTIES: Dominica — 4 June
Amendments to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20^e
SIGNATURE: Peru — 9 February
Jamaica — 8 June
RATIFICATIONS: Mexico — 1 September
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 33^f

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Czech Republic — 1 January (W) (s)
— 5 April (L) (s)
— 9 April (M) (s)

^e Amendments adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.

^f Total includes Brazil and Chile, which have not waived the requirements set out in article 28, and the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols.

Slovakia	— 1 January (W) (s)
	—17 April (L) (s)
	—31 May (M) (s)
Belarus	— 9 February (M) (a)
	—22 July (W) (a)
	—23 July (L) (a)
Saint Kitts and Nevis	—22 March (W) (a)
Armenia	—21 June (M) (a)
	—15 July (W) (a)
Guyana	—19 October (W) (a)
Mauritania	—26 October (W) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 162

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:

11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES:	Czech Republic	— 1 January (W) (s)
		— 5 April (L) (s)
		— 9 April (M) (s)
	Slovakia	— 1 January (W) (s)
		—17 May (L) (s)
		—25 June (M) (s)
	Philippines	— 5 November (L) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 89

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES:	Czech Republic	— 1 January (W) (s)
		— 5 April (L) (s)
		— 9 April (M) (s)
	Slovakia	— 1 January (W) (s)
		—25 June (M) (s)
		—17 May (L) (s)
	Suriname	— 6 January (L) (a)
		— 9 April (W) (a)
	Estonia	— 1 July (M) (a)
	Maldives	— 2 August (M) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 130

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:	Niger	—17 February (a)
	Czech Republic	—22 February (s)
	Uzbekistan	—26 May (s)
	Saint Lucia	—27 May (s) ⁸
	Slovakia	—28 May (s)
	Uruguay	—16 September (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 62

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:	Morocco	—21 January
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TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 9

⁸ With effect from 22 February 1979, the date on which Saint Lucia assumed responsibility for its international relations.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: ^h	Latvia	— 4 January (a)
	Czech Republic	—22 February (s)
	Slovakia	—28 May (s)
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	—1 September (s)
	New Zealand	—18 October
	Croatia	— 2 December (s)
	Spain	—29 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 41

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat

NEW PARTIES: none

PROTOCOL 1 —SIGNATORIES: none

PROTOCOL 2 —NEW PARTIES: none

PROTOCOL 3 —NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 13ⁱ

^h Article 5, subparagraph 2, of the Convention states:

“For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

ⁱ Total includes the two nuclear-weapon States, China and the Russian Federation, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3.

Treaty on Conventional Armed Force in Europe (CFE Treaty)^j

SIGNED AT PARIS: 19 November 1990

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 9 November 1992

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: The Netherlands

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30^k

Treaty on Open Skies

SIGNED AT HELSINKI: 24 March 1992

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Canada and Hungary

RATIFICATIONS:	Denmark	—21 January (O)
		—22 January (B)
	Norway	—14 July (O), (B)
	France	—30 July ((O)
		— 6 August (B)
	Hungary	—11 August (O), (B)
	Greece	— 9 September (O)
		—30 September (B)
	Spain	—18 November (O), (B)
	United States	— 3 December (O), (B)
	United Kingdom	— 8 December (O)

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 11

^j For the text of the Final Document of the Joint Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties, held in Vienna on 5 February, see appendix III.

^k By a note dated 28 June 1993 the Embassy of Greece notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands of its objection with regard to the reservation made by Turkey upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification on 8 July 1992:

“The Greek Government expresses its objection to the reservation entered by Turkey concerning the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe insofar as this reservation deviates from the declaration made by Greece concerning the same Treaty with regard to both the instruments and international documents quoted in it and the substance of the matter.”

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stock-piling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

SIGNED AT Paris: 13 January 1993

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

SIGNATORIES:	Algeria	—13 January
	Argentina	—13 January
	Australia	—13 January
	Austria	—13 January
	Azerbaijan	—13 January
	Belgium	—13 January ^l
	Brunei Darussalam	—13 January
	Brazil	—13 January
	Bulgaria	—13 January
	Canada	—13 January
	China	—13 January ^m
	Colombia	—13 January
	Comoros	—13 January
	Côte d'Ivoire	—13 January
	Croatia	—13 January
	Cuba	—13 January

^l The Governments of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom made, *mutatis mutandis*, the following declaration:

“As a Member State of the European Community, [name of State] will implement the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in accordance with its obligations arising from the rules of the Treaties establishing the European Communities to the extent that such rules are applicable.”

^m With the following statement:

“I. China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities. The Convention constitutes the legal basis for the realization of this goal. China therefore supports the object and purpose and principles of the Convention.

“II. The object and purpose and principles of the Convention should be strictly abided by. The relevant provisions on challenge inspection should not be abused to the detriment of the security interests of States Parties unrelated to chemical weapons. Otherwise, the universality of the Convention is bound to be adversely affected.

./.

Cyprus	—13 January
Dominican Republic	—13 January
France	—13 January ¹
Gabon	—13 January
Gambia	—13 January
Germany	—13 January ¹
Greece	—13 January ¹
Honduras	—13 January
Hungary	—13 January
Iceland	—13 January
Indonesia	—13 January
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	—13 January
Israel	—13 January
Italy	—13 January ¹
Japan	—13 January
Lithuania	—13 January
Luxembourg	—13 January ¹
Malaysia	—13 January
Mali	—13 January
Malta	—13 January
Marshall Islands	—13 January
Mauritania	—13 January
Mexico	—13 January
Micronesia	—13 January
Monaco	—13 January
Morocco	—13 January
Namibia	—13 January
Nauru	—13 January
Nigeria	—13 January
Norway	—13 January
Pakistan	—13 January
Philippines	—13 January
Poland	—13 January

“III. States Parties that have abandoned chemical weapons on the territories of other States Parties should implement in earnest the relevant provisions of the Convention and undertake the obligation to destroy the abandoned chemical weapons.

“IV. The Convention should effectively facilitate trade, scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes. All export controls inconsistent with the Convention should be abolished.”

Portugal	—13 January ¹
Republic of Moldova	—13 January
Romania	—13 January
Russian Federation	—13 January
San Marino	—13 January
Senegal	—13 January
Spain	—13 January ¹
Togo	—13 January
Tunisia	—13 January
Ukraine	—13 January
United Kingdom	—13 January ¹
United States	—13 January
Viet Nam	—13 January
Zambia	—13 January
Zimbabwe	—13 January
Afghanistan	—14 January
Alblania	—14 January
Bangladesh	—14 January
Belarus	—14 January
Benin	—14 January
Bolivia	—14 January
Burkina Faso	—14 January
Cameroon	—14 January
Central African Republic	—14 January
Chile	—14 January
Cook Islands	—14 January
Costa Rica	—14 January
Czech Republic	—14 January
Denmark	—14 January ¹
Ecuador	—14 January
El Salvador	—14 January
Equatorial Guinea	—14 January
Estonia	—14 January
Ethiopia	—14 January
Finland	—14 January
Georgia	—14 January
Ghana	—14 January
Guatemala	—14 January
Guinea	—14 January
Guinea-Bissau	—14 January

Haiti	—14 January
Holy See	—14 January
India	—14 January
Ireland	—14 January ¹
Kazakhstan	—14 January
Malawi	—14 January
Mongolia	—14 January
Myanmar	—14 January
Netherlands	—14 January ¹
New Zealand	—14 January
Niger	—14 January
Papua New Guinea	—14 January
Paraguay	—14 January
Peru	—14 January
Republic of Korea	—14 January
Samoa	—14 January
Singapore	—14 January
Slovakia	—14 January
Slovenia	—14 January
South Africa	—14 January
Sri Lanka	—14 January
Switzerland	—14 January
Tajikistan	—14 January
Thailand	—14 January
Turkey	—14 January
Uganda	—14 January
Venezuela	—14 January
Zaire	—14 January
Burundi	—15 January
Cambodia	—15 January
Cape Verde	—15 January
Congo	—15 January
Kenya	—15 January
Liberia	—15 January
Madagascar	—15 January
Sierra Leone	—15 January
Uruguay	—15 January
Nepal	—19 January
Saudi Arabia	—20 January
Kuwait	—27 January
Qatar	— 1 February
Oman	— 2 February

United Arab Emirates	— 2 February
Yemen	— 8 February
Kyrgyzstan	—22 February
Bahrain	—24 February
Nicaragua	— 9 March
Armenia	—19 March
Saint Lucia	—29 March
Latvia	— 6 May
Lao People's Democratic Republic	—13 May
Rwanda	—17 May
Panama	—16 June
Liechtenstein	—21 July
Dominica	— 2 August
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	—20 September
Swaziland	—23 September
Djibouti	—28 September
Maldives	— 4 October
Guyana	— 6 October
Turkmenistan	—12 October
RATIFICATIONS: Fiji	—20 January
Mauritius	— 9 February
Seychelles	— 7 April
Sweden	—17 June

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 4

**Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1993,
as reported by depositaries**

(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT
Afghanistan	r		s r	s r		s r
Albania	r					r
Algeria	r		s	r		
Angola	r					
Antigua and Barbuda	r		r	r	s r	r
Argentina	r	s r	s r	s r	s	
Armenia						r
Australia	r	s r	s r	s r		s r
Austria	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Azerbaijan						r
Bahamas			r	r	s r	r
Bahrain	r					r
Bangladesh	r		r	r		r
Barbados	r			r	s r	s r
Belarus			s r	s r		r
Belgium	s r	s r	s r	s r		s r
Belize					s	r
Benin	r		s r	r		s r
Bhutan	r		r			r
Bolivia	r		s r	s	s r	s r
Bosnia and Herzegovina						
Botswana			r	s		s r
Brazil	s r	r	s r	s r	s r ^b	
Brunei Darussalam						r
Bulgaria	s r	r	s r	s r		s r

Sea- Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	Inhumane ^a Weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	CWC
s r	s r	r		s				s
	r							s
r		r						s
r		r						
s r	s r	r		s				s
						r		s
s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r			s
s r	s r	r	s r	s r				s
						r		s
r	r							
	r							s
	r	r						s
	s r							
s r	s r	s r		s r		r	s	s
s r	s r	s r		s		s r	s	s
	r							
s r	s r	s r		r (I & III)				s
	r							
s	s r	s						s
				r				
s r	s r							
s r	s r	s r						s
	r							s
s r	s r	s r		s r		s r	s	s

**Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1993,
as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT
Burkina Faso	r		s	s r		s r
Burundi			s	s		r
Cambodia	r					r
Cameroon	r		s	s		s r
Canada	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Cape Verde	r		r			r
Central African Republic	r		r	s		r
Chad			s r			s r
Chile	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r ^b	
China	r	r		r	s r (A.P.II) ^c	r
Colombia		r	s r	s	s r	s r
Comoros						
Congo						r
Cook Islands						
Costa Rica			s r		s r	s r
Côte d'Ivoire	r		s r			s r
Croatia			r			r
Cuba	r	r		r		
Cyprus	r		s r	s r		s r
Czech Republic		r	s r	s r		s r
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	r	r				r
Denmark	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Djibouti						
Dominica					s r	r
Dominican Republic	r		s r	s r	s r	s r

Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	Inhumane ^a Weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	CWC
	r							s
s	s							s
s	s r							s
s								s
s r	s r	s r		s		s r	s r	s
r	r	r						s
s r	s							s
	s r		s r					s
r	r			s r	s r (P2 & 3) ^d			s
s	s r							s
								s
r	r							s
					s r			s
s	s r							s
r	s							s
	r			r				s
r	s r	s r		s r				s
s r	s r	s r		r				s
s r	s r	s r		s r		s r	s r	s
	r	r						
s r	s r	s r		s r		s r	s r	s
								s
		r						s
s r	s r							s

**Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1993,
as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT
Ecuador	r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Egypt	s r		s r	s r		s r
El Salvador	s		s r	s r	s r	s r
Equatorial Guinea	r		r	r		r
Estonia	r					r
Ethiopia	s r		s	s		s r
Fiji	r		r	r		r
Finland	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
France	s r	s r		s r	s r (A.P.I & II)	r
Gabon			s r			r
Gambia	r		r	s		s r
Georgia						
Germany	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Ghana	r		s r	s		s r
Greece	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Grenada	r				s r	r
Guatemala	r	r	s r		s r	s r
Guinea						r
Guinea-Bissau	r		r	r		r
Guyana				s		r
Haiti			s	s	s r	s r
Holy See	r			s		r
Honduras			s r	s	s r	s r
Hungary	r	r	s r	s r		s r
Iceland	r		s r	s r		s r
India	s r	r	s r	s r		
Indonesia	r		s r	s		s r

Sea Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	Inhumane* Weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	CWC
	S r			S r				S
	S	r		S				
	S r							S
S	r							S
	r							S
S r	S r	S						S
	S r				S r			S r
S r	S r	S r		S r				S
	r		S	S r (I & II)		S r	S r	S
	S							S
S	S							S
						r	S	S
S r	S r	S r		S r		S r	S	S
S r	S r	S r						S
S r	S r	r		S r		S r	S r	S
	r							
S	S r	r	S	r				S
S								S
r	r							S
	S							S
	S							S
		S						S
S	S r							S
S r	S r	S r		S r		S r	S r	S
S r	S r	S		S		S r	S	S
r	S r	S r	S	S r				S
	S r							S

**Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1993,
as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	r		s r	s		s r
Iraq	r		s r	s r		s r
Ireland	r		s r	s r		s r
Israel	r		s r	s r		
Italy	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Jamaica	r		s r	s r	s r	s r
Japan	s r	s r	s r	s r		s r
Jordan	r		s r	s		s r
Kazakhstan						
Kenya	r		r	r		s r
Kiribati						r
Kuwait	r		s r	r		s r
Kyrgyzstan						
Lao People's Democratic Republic	r		s r	s r		s r
Latvia	r					r
Lebanon	r		s r	s r		s r
Lesotho	r			s		s r
Liberia	r		s r			s r
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	r		s r	r		s r
Liechtenstein	r					r
Lithuania	r					r
Luxembourg	s r		s r	s		s r
Madagascar	r		s r	r		s r
Malawi	r		r			r
Malaysia	r		s r	s		s r
Maldives	r					s r
Mali			s	r		s r

Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	Inhumane* Weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	CWC
s r	s r	s						s
s r	s r	s						
s r	s r	s r		s				s
								s
s r	s r	s r		s		s r	s	s
s r	r							
s r	s r	r		s r				s
s r	s r							
						r		s
	r							s
					s r			
	s r	r						s
							s	s
s r	s r	s r		r				s
r				r				s
s	s r	s						
s r	s r							
s	s	s						s
r	r							
r	r			s r				s
								s
s r	s r	s		s		s r	s	s
s	s							s
	s	r						s
s r	s r							s
	r							s
s	s							s

**Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1993,
as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT
Malta	r		r			s r
Marshall Islands						
Mauritania			s r			r
Mauritius	r		r	r		s r
Mexico	r		s r	s r	s r	s r
Micronesia (Federated State of)						
Monaco	r					
Mongolia	r		s r	s r		s r
Morocco	r		s r	r		s r
Mozambique						r
Myanmar			s r	s r		r
Namibia						r
Nauru						r
Nepal	r		s r	s r		s r
Netherlands	s r	r	s r	s r	s r (A.P.I)	s r
New Zealand	r	s r	s r	s r		s r
Nicaragua	s r		s r	s	s r	s r
Niger	r		s r	s r		r
Nigeria	r		s r	r		s r
Niue						
Norway	s r	s r	s r	s r		s r
Oman						
Pakistan	r		s r	s r		
Panama	r		s r	s	s r	s r
Papua New Guinea	r	r	r	r		r
Paraguay	r		s		s r	s r
Peru	r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r

Sea- Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	Inhumane* Weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	CWC
s r	s r							s
								s
								s
s r	s r	r						s r
r	s r		r	s r				s
								s
								s
s r	s r	s r		s r				s
s r	s	s	s r	s				s
								s
s	s							s
								s
					s r			s
s r	s							s
s r	s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s	s
s r	s r	r		s r	s r			s
s r	s r	s		s				s
s r	s r	r		r				s
	s r			s				s
								s r
s r	s r	s r		s r		s r	s r	s
	r							s
	s r	r	r	s r				s
s r	s r							s
	r	r			s r			s
s	r							s
	s r		s					s

**Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1993,
as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT
Philippines	r		s r	s		s r
Poland	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Portugal	s r		s			r
Qatar	r					r
Republic of Korea	r	r	s r	s r		s r
Republic of Moldova						
Romania	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Russian Federation	r	s r	s r	s r	s r (A.P.II)	s r
Rwanda	r		s r	s		r
Saint Kitts and Nevis	r					r
Saint Lucia	r				s	r
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines					s r	r
Samoa			s r			r
San Marino			s r	s r		s r
Sao Tome and Principe						r
Saudi Arabia	r			r		r
Senegal	r		s r			s r
Seychelles			r	r		r
Sierra Leone	r		s r	s r		r
Singapore			r	r		s r
Slovakia	r	r	r	r		r
Slovenia			r			r
Solomon Islands	r					r
Somalia			s	s		s r
South Africa	r	s r	r	s r		r
Spain	s r	r	s r	r		r

Sea- Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	Inhumane ^a Weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	CWC
r	s r		s r	s				s
s r	s r	s r		s r		s r	s	s
r	s r	s		s		s r	s	s
r	s r							s
s r	s r	r						s
						r		s
s r	s r	s r	s	s		s r	s	s
s r	s r	s r		s r	s r (P.2 & 3)	s r	s	s
s r	s r							s
	r							
	r	r						s
								s
					s r			s
	s r							s
r	r	r						
s r	s r							s
s	s r							s
r	r							s r
s	s r	s		s				s
s r	s r							s
r	r	r		r		r	r	s
r	r			r				s
r	r	r			s r			
	s							
s r	s r							s
r	s r	s r		s r		s r	s r	s

**Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1993,
as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT
Sri Lanka	r		s r	s r		s r
Sudan	r		s r			s r
Suriname			r		s r	r
Swaziland	r		r			s r
Sweden	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Switzerland	s r	r	s r	s r		s r
Syrian Arab Republic	r		s r	r		s r
Tajikistan						
Thailand	s r		s r	s r		r
Togo	r		s r	s r		s r
Tonga	r		r	r		r
Trinidad and Tobago	r		s r	s	s r	s r
Tunisia	r		s r	s r		s r
Turkey	s r		s r	s r		s r
Turkmenistan						
Tuvalu						r
Uganda	r		s r	r		r
Ukraine		r	s r	s r		
United Arab Emirates						
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r (A.PI & II)	s r
United Republic of Tanzania	r		s r			r
United States of America	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r (A.PI & II)	s r
Uruguay	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Uzbekistan						r
Vanuatu						
Venezuela	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r

Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	Inhumane ^a Weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	CWC
	s r	s r						s
s				s				
	r							
s r	r							s
s r	s r	r		s r				s r
s r	s r	r		s r				s
	s	s						
								s
	s r							s
s r	s r			s				s
	r							
s r	s r	s r		r				s
s r	s r	s		s		s r	s	s
								s
					s r			
	r	s						s
s r	s r	s r		s r		r	s	s
	s							s
s r	s r	s r		s		s r	s r	s
s	s							
s r	s r	s r		s		s r	s r	s
s	r	r	s r					s
		r						
	s r							s

**Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1993,
as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT
Viet Nam	r			r		r
Yemen	r		s r	r		s r
Yugoslavia	s r		s r	s		s r
Zaire			s r	s		s r
Zambia			r	r		r
Zimbabwe						r

^a Inhumane weapons Convention. Protocols I, II and III have been accepted except where noted otherwise.

^b Party has not waived requirements under article 28 of the Treaty.

^c A.P. means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

^d P. means Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	Inhumane ^a Weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	CWC
r	r	r		s				s
s r	s r	s r						s
s r	s r			s r				
	s r	s						s
r								s
	r							s

**Treaty between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)***

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and their desire to contribute to its strengthening,

Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties,

Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and of the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992,

Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms, in addition to the reductions and limitations provided for in the START Treaty,

Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a world order built on democratic values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of war,

* Circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1194).

Recognizing their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international peace and security,

Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992,

Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations between the Parties, and the relations of partnership that have been established between them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250.

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

(a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;

(b) 1200, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and

(c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500.

4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

(a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750;

(b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and

(c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall be completed no later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.

6. Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a program of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by each Party no later than December 31, 2000.

Article II

1. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), with the exception of those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities allowed under the START Treaty, and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM of the former type. Each Party shall carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. The obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III of this Treaty.

3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training launchers, shall be implemented by means of either:

(a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty; or

(b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conver-

sion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be so converted.

4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister of which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article.

5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall only be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.

6. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or launch canisters thereafter.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the applicable provisions of the START Treaty.

8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty.

9. Beginning on January 1, 2003, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty), or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty.

Article III

1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing types that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty, except that:

(a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may exceed the 1250 limit provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty;

(b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMs, other than the Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the Russian Federation, may at any one time exceed the limit of 500 warheads for each Party provided for in subparagraph 5(c)(i) of Article III of the START Treaty;

(c) each Party shall have the right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to which the number of warheads attributed has been reduced in accordance with this paragraph shall only be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an ICBM of that type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; and

(d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed is not required to be destroyed and replaced with a new reentry vehicle platform.

3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the START Treaty, each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it under this Treaty; and

(b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number of warheads attributed to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

Article IV

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count as one warhead toward the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such counting, nuclear weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type in the Memorandum of

Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum on Attribution.

3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type in the Memorandum on Attribution.

4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.

The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is actually equipped.

5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the Memorandum on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber of a type or variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification, or at a later date agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant of a type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type are actually equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type and variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification of such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of each change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution.

6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy

bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The reorienting Party shall provide to the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation. No conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role.

8. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements:

(a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 at any one time;

(b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles;

(c) such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for such missions; and

(d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

9. Each Party shall have the right to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber to a nuclear role no less than 90 days in advance of taking such action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role.

Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a conventional role.

10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are based.

11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions.

12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences

referred to in subparagraph 8(d) of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type re-oriented to a conventional role are returned to a nuclear role, one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

Article V

1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty, including the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation of this Treaty.

2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Implementation Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution, Elimination and Conversion Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections, all of which are integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, but not prior to the entry into force of the START Treaty.

2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by the Parties from the date of its signature.

3. This Treaty shall remain in force so long as the START Treaty remains in force.

4. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal.

from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article VIII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

**Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs
and on Procedures Governing Conversion of SILO Launchers
of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms**

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of heavy ICBMs and upon procedures governing the conversion of silo launchers of such ICBMs.

I. Procedures for Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters

1. Elimination of heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty or shall be carried out by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Notification thereof shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) 30 days in advance of the initiation of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or, in the event of launch, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988.

2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party:

- (a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles;
- (b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister, and other elements that shall not be subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section;
- (c) shall remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the missile into stages;
- (d) shall remove liquid propellant from the missile;
- (e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;
- (f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and
- (g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

These actions may be carried out in any order.

3. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the type and number of the missiles to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. After the procedures provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

4. Elimination process for heavy ICBMs:

- (a) missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts shall each be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (b) the self-contained dispensing mechanism as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed.

5. During the elimination process for launch canisters of heavy ICBMs, the launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister.

6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual, written report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process that the inspection team has completed its inspection.

7. Heavy ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

II. Procedures for Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers for Heavy ICBMs, and Silo Test Launchers for Heavy ICBMs

1. Conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall be carried out *in situ* and shall be subject to inspection.

2. Prior to the initiation of the conversion process for such launchers, the missile and launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs as soon as the silo launcher door has been opened and a missile and its launch canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

4. Conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall include the following steps:

(a) the silo launcher door shall be opened, the missile and the launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher;

(b) concrete shall be poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and

(c) a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters shall be installed into the upper portion of the silo launcher. The method of installation of the restrictive ring shall rule out its removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo launcher.

5. Each Party shall have the right to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section have been carried out. For the purpose of confirming that these procedures have been carried out:

(a) the converting Party shall notify the other Party through the NRRCs:

(i) no less than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence; and

(ii) upon completion of all of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section; and

(b) the inspecting Party shall have the right to implement the procedures provided for in either paragraph 6 or paragraph 7, but not both, of this Section for each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted.

6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each

silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo in question;

(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo can be measured;

(c) the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete from a location providing an unobstructed view of the base of the silo launcher, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher. The measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;

(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;

(e) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;

(f) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and

(g) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to measure the depth of each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the

pouring that it will measure the depth of the silo launcher in question both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete;

(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo launcher can be measured;

(c) the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete;

(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and to remeasure the depth of the silo launcher. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;

(e) for the purpose of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo launcher, measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;

(f) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;

(g) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and

(h) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

8. The converting Party shall have the right to carry out further conversion measures after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section.

9. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections conducted under the START Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct, using the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty, four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been converted in accordance with the provisions of this Section. During such inspections, the inspectors also shall have the right to confirm by visual observation the presence of the restrictive ring and that the observable portions of the launch can-

ister do not differ externally from the observable portions of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty. Any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct visual observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and shall not obstruct visual observation of the edge of the restrictive ring. If requested by the inspecting Party, the converting Party shall partially remove any shrouding, except for shrouding of instruments installed on the restrictive ring, to permit confirmation of the presence of the restrictive ring.

10. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for the purposes of the Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed.

III. Equipment; Costs

1. To carry out inspections provided for in this Protocol, the inspecting Party shall have the right to use agreed equipment, including equipment that will confirm that the silo launcher has been completely filled up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher with concrete. The Parties shall agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment.

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to this Protocol, costs shall be handled pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

**Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms**

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree to conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty.

I. Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers

1. For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and as required by paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall conduct exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, and heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.

2. The exhibitions of heavy bombers shall be conducted subject to the following provisions:

(a) the location for such an exhibition shall be at the discretion of the exhibiting Party;

(b) the date for such an exhibition shall be agreed upon between the Parties through diplomatic channels, and the exhibiting Party shall communicate the location of the exhibition;

(c) during such an exhibition, each heavy bomber exhibited shall be subject to inspection for a period not to exceed two hours;

(d) the inspection team conducting an inspection during an exhibition shall consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty;

(e) prior to the beginning of the exhibition, the inspected Party shall provide a photograph or photographs of one of the heavy bombers of a type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role and of one of the heavy bombers of the same type and variant of a type that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, so as to show all of their differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection; and

(f) such inspections during exhibitions shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

II. Inspections of Heavy Bombers

1. During exhibitions of heavy bombers, each Party shall have the right to perform the following procedures on the exhibited heavy bombers; and each Party, beginning 180 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, shall have the right, in addition to its rights under the START Treaty, to perform, during data update and new facility inspections conducted under the START Treaty at air bases of the other Party, the following procedures on all heavy bombers based at such air bases and present there at the time of the inspection:

(a) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, in order to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior;

(b) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior; and

(c) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, and to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, and to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible to inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior.

2. At the discretion of the inspected Party, those portions of the heavy bomber that are not subject to inspection may be shrouded. The period of time

required to carry out the shrouding process shall not count against the period allocated for inspection.

3. In the course of an inspection conducted during an exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped, and shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

**Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution
and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms**

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of January 3, 1993, on the number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy bomber of a type and a variant of a type equipped for nuclear weapons is actually equipped. No later than 30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall additionally exchange data, current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty, according to the categories of data contained in this Memorandum, on heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons; on heavy bombers specified as reoriented to a conventional role, and on heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role; on ICBMs and SLBMs to which

a reduced number of warheads is attributed; and on data on the elimination of heavy ICBMs and on conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.

Only those data used for purposes of implementing the Treaty that differ from the data in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the START Treaty are included in this Memorandum.

I. Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers
Other than Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty each Party undertakes not to have more nuclear weapons deployed on heavy bombers of any type or variant of a type than the number specified in this paragraph. Additionally, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, for each Party the numbers of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers not reoriented to a conventional role as of the date of signature of the Treaty or to heavy bombers subsequently deployed are listed below. Such numbers shall only be changed in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty. The Party making a change shall provide a notification to the other Party 90 days prior to making such a change. An exhibition shall be conducted to demonstrate the changed number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the listed type or variant of a type are actually equipped:

(a) United States of America

Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type*	Number of Warheads
B-52G	12
B-52H	20
B-1B	16
B-2	16
Aggregate Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role	_____

* Heavy bombers of the type and variant of a type designated B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, located at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination facility as of September 1, 1990, as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty, will be eliminated, under the provisions of the START Treaty, before the expiration of the seven-year reductions period.

(b) Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Type And Variant of a Type	Number of Warheads
Bear B	1
Bear G	2
Bear H6	6
Bear H16	16
Blackjack	12
Aggregate Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role	_____

II. Data on Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role and Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role that Have Subsequently Been Returned to a Nuclear Role

1. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

(a) United States of America Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Number
_____	_____
_____	_____

(b) Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Number
_____	_____
_____	_____

2. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as well as data on related air bases are as follows:

(a) United States of America Air Bases:	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
Name/Location	_____
_____	_____
Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role	Number
_____	_____

**(b) Russian Federation
Air Bases:**

Name/Location	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
<hr/>	<hr/>
Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role	Number
<hr/>	<hr/>

3. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

(a) United States of America Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Difference
<hr/>	<hr/>

(b) Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Difference
<hr/>	<hr/>

4. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that have subsequently been returned to a nuclear role are as follows:

(a) United States of America Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Difference
<hr/>	<hr/>

(b) Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Difference
<hr/>	<hr/>

III. Data on Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs to Which a Reduced Number of Warheads Is Attributed

For each Party, the data on ICBM bases or submarine bases, and on ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types deployed at those bases, on which the number of warheads attributed to them is reduced pursuant to Article III of the Treaty are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Type of ICBM or SLBM

Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs, on Which the Number of
Warheads is Reduced

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location

ICBM Type on Which
the Number of Warheads
is Reduced

Deployed ICBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads is Reduced

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on It

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM Was
Reduced

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs of that Type

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location

SLBM Type on Which
the Number of Warheads
is Reduced

Deployed SLBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads Is Reduced

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed SLBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on It

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each SLBM was
Reduced

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed SLBMs of that Type

(b) Russian Federation

Type of ICBM or SLBM

Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs, on Which the Number of
Warheads is Reduced

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location _____	ICBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads is Reduced _____
Deployed ICBMs on Which the Number of Warheads is Reduced	_____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	_____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM Was Reduced	_____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs of that Type	_____

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location _____	SLBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads is Reduced _____
Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	_____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	_____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each SLBM was Reduced	_____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs of that Type	_____

IV. Data on Eliminated Heavy ICBMs and Converted Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs

1. For each Party, the numbers of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs converted to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers _____

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs: Name/Location	ICBM Type Installed in a Converted Silo Launcher
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Silo Launcher Group: (designation)

Silo Launchers: _____

(b) Russian Federation

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers _____

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs: Name/Location	ICBM Type Installed in a Converted Silo Launcher
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Silo Launcher Group: (designation)

Silo Launchers: _____

2. For each party, the aggregate numbers of heavy ICBMs and eliminated heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America Number

Deployed Heavy ICBMs _____

Non-Deployed heavy ICBMs _____

Eliminated Heavy ICBMs _____

(b) Russian Federation Number

Deployed Heavy ICBMs _____

Non-Deployed heavy ICBMs _____

Eliminated Heavy ICBMs _____

V. Changes

Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in the attribution and data contained in this Memorandum.

The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge the acceptance of the categories of data contained in this Memorandum and the responsibility of each Party for the accuracy only of its own data.

This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of data contained in this Memorandum or to make other changes to this Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Documents of the Joint Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty

1 Upon the request of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic a joint Extraordinary Conference was convened in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 and Section VII, paragraph 4, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992.

2. At the joint Extraordinary Conference:

(a) The States Parties agreed on the Document of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its Annexes, as attached to this document; and

(b) The participating States adopted the Document of the participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its Annex, as attached to this document.

3. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will circulate this document, together with the attached Documents and their Annexes, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to all States Parties of the Treaty and participating States of the Concluding Act.

Vienna
February 5, 1993

Document of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Committed to meeting the objectives and requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed,

Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming their commitment to that undertaking,

Having met together at a joint Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Hellenic Republic in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and Section VII, paragraph 4, of the Concluding Act,

Have agreed as follows:

1. The understandings, notifications, confirmations and commitments contained or referred to in this Document and its Annexes shall be deemed as fulfilling the requirements necessary in order for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic fully to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents.

2. In this context, the States Parties note the Agreement Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic, of January 12, 1993, on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Protocols to that Agreement, as transmitted on January 20, 1993 by the Czech Republic to all States Parties to the Treaty. In this regard, Articles I, II (paragraph 2), III (paragraphs 1-3), and Articles IV-VII of that

Agreement, the Protocol on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the Protocol concerning Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridges in Active Units, the Protocol on Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty Designated for Conversion for Non-Military Purposes, and the Protocol on Active and Passive Declared Site Inspection Quotas for the First Phase of the Reduction Period to that Agreement, and paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Reduction Liability to that Agreement contain necessary confirmations, information, and commitments.

3. The States Parties note the notifications by the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic listed in the Annex to this Document on Notifications Related to the Treaty.

4. The States Parties confirm the understandings specified in the Annex to this Document on Understandings Related to the Treaty.

5. The States Parties confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group related to the Treaty.

6. This Document in no way alters the rights and obligations of the States Parties as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents.

7. This Document shall enter into force upon signature by all the States Parties.

8. This Document, together with its Annexes, which are integral to it, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depository for the Treaty, which shall circulate true copies of this Document to all the States Parties.

Annex on Notifications Related to the Treaty

A. The States Parties note the following notifications from the Czech Republic as transmitted on January 29, 1993:

1. Maximum level for holdings of conventional armament and equipment limited by the Treaty;

2. Reduction liability in the categories of conventional armament and equipment limited by the Treaty;

3. Number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles designated for conversion for non-military purposes;

4. List of the points of entry/exit;

5. Lists of inspectors and transport crew members;

6. Diplomatic clearance number;

7. Official languages;

8. Passive inspection quota for the first year of reduction period;
9. Active inspection quota for the first year of reduction period (revised February 1, 1993);
10. Counting of the aircraft destructed by accident;
11. Armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and retained outside the territory of the Czech Republic (revised February 1, 1993);
12. List of reduction sites of the Czech Republic;
13. Aggregate number of armament and equipment limited by the Treaty used exclusively for purpose of research and development;
14. Number of armament and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export/re-export; and
15. Number and types of conventional armament and equipment removed from service and reduced during previous 12 months.

The States Parties also note that, by its Note Verbale of January 29, 1993, the Czech Republic informed "all Delegations to the Joint Consultative Group that the data of Ministry of Defence, General Staff, Military Command West, Military Command Middle and of all the formations and units subordinated to them contained in the Exchange of Information submitted by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on December 15, 1992 are valid for Armed Forces of the Czech Republic until superseded by a subsequent exchange of information of the Czech Republic."

B. The States Parties note the following notifications from the Slovak Republic as transmitted on January 29, 1993 (1-11) and February 4, 1993 (12 and 13):

1. Maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment and numbers of national personnel limits limited by the Treaty (revised February 2, 1993);
2. Reduction liability in the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (revised February 2, 1993);
3. Number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles designated for conversion for non-military purposes;
4. List of the points of entry/exit into and out of the territory of the Slovak Republic (revised February 2, 1993);
5. List of inspectors;
6. Standing diplomatic clearance number;
7. Official languages;
8. Passive inspection quota for the first year of reduction period;
9. Active inspection quota for the first year of reduction period (revised February 2, 1993);

10. Numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export/re-export and retained outside the territory of the Slovak Republic (revised February 2, 1993);

11. Numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment removed from service and reduced during previous 12 months;

12. Aggregate number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty used exclusively for the purpose of research and development; and

13. Numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and retained outside the territory of the Slovak Republic.

The States Parties also note that, by its Note Verbale of January 29, 1993, the Slovak Republic informed "all Delegations to the Joint Consultative Group that the data of Military Command East and of all formations and units subordinated to it contained in the Exchange of Information submitted by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on December 15, 1992 are valid for Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic until next exchange of information of the Slovak Republic in March 1993."

Annex on Understandings Related to the Treaty

1. The first paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

"the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,"

2. The "groups of States Parties" referred to in paragraph 1(A) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to consist of:

"the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine,"

and

“the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.”

3. In Article IV of the Treaty:

—the first sentence of paragraph 2 shall be understood to read:

“within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, that part of the area of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the area of application, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Moscow Military District and the portion of the Volga-Ural Military District on its territory west of the Ural Mountains, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed.”

—the first sentence of paragraph 3 shall be understood to read:

“within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Slovak Republic, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Mili-

tary Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:"

—the first sentence of paragraph 4 shall be understood to read:

"within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:"

4. In paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, and without prejudice to any review by the Joint Consultative Group of its scale of distribution of expenses in accordance with paragraph 2(F) of Article XVI of the Treaty, the term "2.34% for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic" shall be understood to read "1.56% for the Czech Republic" and "0.78% for the Slovak Republic."

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Document of the Participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel

Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the participating States,

Committed to implementing fully the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Concluding Act, while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Concluding Act was signed,

Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming their commitment to that undertaking,

Having met together at a joint Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Hellenic Republic in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty and Section VII, paragraph 4, of the Concluding Act,

Have adopted the following:

1. The understandings, notifications, confirmations and commitments contained or referred to in this Document and in its Annex fulfill the requirements necessary in order for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic fully to implement the measures in the Concluding Act.

2. In this context, the participating States note the Agreement Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic, of January 12, 1993 on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as transmitted on January 20, 1993 by the Czech Republic to all participating States. In this regard, Article II (paragraph 3) of that Agreement and the Protocol on National Personnel Limits to that Agreement contain necessary confirmations, information, and commitments.

3. The participating States confirm the understandings specified in the Annex to this Document.

4. The participating States confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group related to the Concluding Act.

5. This Document in no way alters the measures adopted by the participating States in the Concluding Act.

6. The measures adopted in this Document are politically binding. Accordingly, this Document is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Document will come into effect simultaneously with the entry into force of the Document of the States Parties to the

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreed by the States Parties at the joint Extraordinary Conference on February 5, 1993.

7. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will transmit true copies of this Document and its Annex, the original of which is in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, to all participating States.

Annex on Understandings Related to the Concluding Act

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Concluding Act, it is understood that the reference to “the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic” is deleted and that “the Czech Republic and “the Slovak Republic” are added to that list in appropriate alphabetical order.

2. In the list of participating States set forth in Section II, paragraph 1 of the Concluding Act, it is understood that the reference to “the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic” is deleted and that “the Czech Republic” and “the Slovak Republic” are added to that list in appropriate alphabetical order.

3. In the list referenced in paragraph 2 above, it is understood that the Czech Republic has a national personnel limit of 93,333 and the Slovak Republic has a national personnel limit of 46,667.

Draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty*

The States Parties to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "States Parties",

Convinced that recent fundamental international political changes provide opportunities to take further effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear arms,

Welcoming the conclusion of the START I and START II agreements, envisaging drastic reductions in present strategic nuclear arsenals,

Underlining the importance of the prompt implementation of these and other international disarmament and arms regulation agreements,

Stressing the need for further reductions of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Declaring their intention to undertake further measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties in the Preamble to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue negotiations to this end,

Recalling that the Parties in the above-mentioned Treaty undertake to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,

Convinced that a ban on all nuclear weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, is an important instrument in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

* Issued as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1232). The two tables attached to the Protocol are not reproduced.

Article I

BASIC OBLIGATIONS

1. Each State Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out, in any environment, any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting, preparing, permitting or in any way participating in the carrying out anywhere of any nuclear explosion referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article II

IMPLEMENTATION

1. The States Parties, in order to achieve the objectives of the Treaty and to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, entrust the International Atomic Energy Agency, hereinafter referred to as the "Agency", with verification of compliance with the Treaty, as defined in Article III B.

2. The States Parties undertake to cooperate in good faith with the Agency in the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty.

3. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the Agency upon entry into force of the Treaty for such a State Party. The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Agency and with other States Parties.

4. Each State Party undertakes to take any measures it considers necessary to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Treaty anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

5. Each State Party shall inform the Depositary of the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement the Treaty.

Article III

OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES AND THE AGENCY

A. States Parties

1. Each State Party undertakes to establish in cooperation with the Agency an effective international and universal monitoring regime. The regime includes the establishment of international monitoring systems based on seismological data, hydroacoustic data and data on radionuclides in the atmosphere and the use of additional relevant techniques.

The arrangements for these international monitoring measures are laid down in the Protocol, annexed to this Treaty.

Each State Party undertakes to establish the necessary facilities to participate in these cooperative measures and through its National Authority to establish the necessary communication channels with the Agency. These arrangements shall be operative on the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Large non-nuclear explosions carried out by a State Party shall be conducted in accordance with provisions laid down in the Protocol, annexed to this Treaty.

B. The Agency

In the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty, the Agency shall

- coordinate the international monitoring regime including the exchange of seismological data, data on radionuclides in the atmosphere and other data relevant to the monitoring of compliance with the Treaty;
- endeavour, at the request of a State Party, through cooperation with the National Authorities of the States Parties and through other means, to clarify inconsistencies that may occur with regard to events relevant to compliance with the Treaty;
- verify, when inconsistencies are not clarified, compliance with the Treaty through on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV.

Article IV

VERIFICATION

1. Each State Party shall, in order to assist in the interpretation of an event that may be of relevance to the Treaty at any place under its jurisdiction or control, provide such additional information as the Agency might request.

2. Each State Party may use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law to verify compliance with the Treaty.

3. If the nature of an event cannot be clarified through the measures specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each State Party is entitled to request an on-site inspection on the territory of any other State Party for the purpose of ascertaining compliance with this Treaty. The requesting State Party shall state the reasons for its request, including the evidence available. Such requests shall be addressed to the Director General of the Agency, who shall bring the matter to the attention of the Board of Governors of the Agency.

4. If the Board of Governors decides to conduct an on-site inspection, the relevant State Party is under obligation to comply with the Board's decision.

Such inspections shall be conducted by the Agency, and the report shall be transmitted by the Director-General of the Agency to the Board of Governors and all States Parties. The Board of Governors shall decide on and report any findings of non-compliance essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, to the Security Council of the United Nations and all States Parties. Decisions on questions mentioned in this paragraph shall be made by the Board of Governors by two-thirds majority of those present and voting. Procedures for such inspections, including the rights and functions of the inspecting personnel, are laid down in the Protocol annexed to this Treaty.

5. A State Party on whose territory an event has occurred may invite the Agency to conduct an on-site inspection.

Article V

COMPLAINTS

Any State Party which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Treaty may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint shall include all possible evidence confirming its validity.

Article VI

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

1. In order to enable them to carry out the functions entrusted to them under this Treaty, the States Parties to this Treaty shall grant privileges and immunities to the Director-General and personnel of the Agency in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.

2. Provisions regarding privileges and immunities in connection with on-site inspections are contained in the Protocol annexed to this Treaty.

Article VII

STATUS OF PROTOCOL

The Protocol to this Treaty constitutes an integral part of the Treaty.

Article VIII

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

If any dispute arises between two or more States Parties or between two or more States Parties and the Agency concerning the interpretation or applica-

tion of the present Treaty, the Parties concerned shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or other peaceful means of their own choice. Any dispute may, with the consent of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement.

Article IX

AMENDMENTS

At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty or to the annexed Protocol. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and seek their views on whether a conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority, that shall not be less than thirty of the States Parties, including the nuclear-weapon States, so agree, the Depositary shall promptly convene a conference to which all States Parties shall be invited. The Conference may adopt amendments proposed, if a majority of the States Parties present and voting, including the nuclear-weapon States, so agree. Amendments shall enter into force for each Party accepting them upon their adoption by the Conference and thereafter for each remaining Party on the date of acceptance of the amendments by such a Party.

Article X

REVIEW OF THE TREATY

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, a conference of States Parties to the Treaty shall be held at ..., to review the operation of the Treaty, with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Treaty. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article XI

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by Signatory States.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by forty States, including the nuclear-weapon States. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

Article XII

RESERVATIONS

The Articles of this Treaty, including the Articles of the annexed Protocol, which constitutes an integral part of the Treaty, shall not be subject to reservations.

Article XIII

DEPOSITARY

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty and shall receive the instruments of ratification and instruments of accession.

2. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments thereto, any notice of withdrawal, and the receipt of other notices. He shall also inform the Security Council of the United Nations of any notice of withdrawal.

3. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XIV

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that, in the event of a violation by any party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

2. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the Depositary, who shall circulate such notice to all other Parties.

Article XV

OFFICIAL LANGUAGES

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty.

Protocol to the Draft Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Section I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. The International Atomic Energy Agency, hereinafter called the Agency, shall be entrusted with verification functions specified in Articles III B. and IV of the Treaty.

Article 2. Each State Party undertakes, in accordance with Article III A. 1. of the Treaty, to cooperate in good faith with each other and the Agency to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Treaty.

Article 3. The costs for the Agency's verification functions, mentioned in Article 1, shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment.

Section II

THE AGENCY

Article 4. In performing its verification functions, mentioned in Article 1, the Agency shall:

- establish and operate an International Data Centre to be the central facility of the international monitoring system based on seismological data, data on radionuclides in the atmosphere, hydroacoustic data, satellite data and other data relevant to the verification of the Treaty. Easy and free access to all services of the Centre shall be granted to all Parties to the Treaty;
- establish and operate networks of seismological and hydroacoustic stations and stations to monitor radionuclides in the atmosphere;
- conduct on-site inspections and observations relevant to the verification of the Treaty;

- cooperate with National Authorities of the States Parties to resolve uncertainties regarding compliance with the Treaty;
- assist States Parties on other issues of verification of the Treaty.

Article 5. The Agency shall establish, and the Board of Governors of the Agency shall approve, the following Operational Manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the verification system:

- Operational Manual for International Exchange of Seismological Data;
- Operational Manual for International Exchange of Data on Radionuclides in the Atmosphere;
- Operational Manual for International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data;
- Operational Manual for Satellite Data Processing;
- Operational Manual for International On-site Inspections;
- Operational Manual for On-Site Observations of Non-Nuclear Explosions.

These Manuals are not integral parts of the Treaty and can be changed by the Board of Governors of the Agency. The Agency shall inform the States Parties of any changes in the Operational Manuals.

Article 6. The Agency shall coordinate the operation of the international monitoring network and in particular

- operate the International Data Centre to compile, process and report on seismic data, hydroacoustic data and data on radionuclides in the atmosphere;
- operate a specified network of seismological stations, hydroacoustic stations and stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere;
- ensure that the operation of participating seismological stations, hydroacoustic stations and stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere and their reporting are in compliance with the respective Operational Manuals;
- provide technical support for the installation and operation of seismological stations, hydroacoustic stations and stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere;
- compile and evaluate results and experiences of the operation of the monitoring network.

Article 7. The Agency shall assist States Parties in utilizing satellite data in order to clarify seismic and other events in relation to this Treaty. The Agency shall operate the International Data Centre to compile, process and report on satellite observations, provided by States Parties or obtained from other sources.

Article 8. The Agency shall receive, compile and report to all States Parties any additional information that a State Party may provide to assist in the interpretation of an event which has occurred on its territory.

The Agency shall forward requests for information made by any State Party to any other State Party on any event relevant to this Treaty occurring on the territory of the latter State. The Agency shall receive, compile and report on any information received in response to such requests.

Article 9. The Agency shall facilitate consultations among States Parties to resolve issues related to the verification of the Treaty.

Article 10. The Agency shall, as specified in the Operational Manual for On-Site Observations of Non-Nuclear Explosions, mentioned in Article 5, conduct on-site monitoring of non-nuclear explosions in excess of 500 tons TNT equivalent, and report the result of such observations to the States Parties. The Agency shall also compile and distribute a monthly list of reported non-nuclear explosions in excess of 100 tons TNT equivalent. The Agency shall also conduct routine inspections at sites which States Parties have declared to be routinely used for the conduct of non-nuclear explosions in excess of 100 tons TNT equivalent.

Article 11. An Advisory Board of international experts shall be established by the Board of Governors of the Agency to provide scientific expertise on verification measures and to assist the Board of Governors in evaluating the methodology and the scientific quality of the procedure used and in assessing the value of new methods to be considered for the verification of this Treaty and which the Board of Governors may wish to report to the Review Conference, mentioned in Article IX of the Treaty.

Section III

THE GLOBAL MONITORING SYSTEM

Article 12. Each State Party undertakes to participate in the establishment and the operation of an international monitoring system. This obligation includes the establishment and operation of a two-tiered network of high-quality seismological stations. The first tier, referred to as a network of Alpha stations, is established and operated by the Agency and provides uninterrupted data transmitted on-line to the International Data Centre. The second tier, referred to as a network of Beta stations, is established and operated by the States Parties and provides data in near real time upon request by the International Data Centre.

The States Parties are also obliged to participate in the establishment and operation of a network of high-quality stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere. The stations are established and operated by the Agency and provide data promptly to the International Data Centre.

The States Parties are also committed to the establishment and operation of a network of high-quality hydroacoustic stations in the oceans. These stations are established and operated by the Agency and provide uninterrupted data transmitted on-line to the International Data Centre.

Article 13. Each State Party shall have the right to receive all data and information available from the International Monitoring Systems and shall make the necessary arrangement with the Agency through its National Authority.

Article 14. The Agency shall, in cooperation with the States Parties, establish and operate a specified network of high-quality seismological stations. This network consists initially of the stations specified in table 1, annexed to this Protocol. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements summarized in table 2 and further specified in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Seismological Data. Uninterrupted data from the Alpha stations shall be transmitted on-line to the International Data Centre.

Article 15. The Agency shall control the quality of the network of Alpha stations and evaluate its overall performance. The Board of Governors of the Agency may amend the network by technically upgrading stations and by adding or deleting stations in the annexed table 1, which is not an integral part of the Treaty.

Article 16. The Agency shall make the necessary legal and other arrangements with the States Parties to establish and operate one or several Alpha stations on its territory. For an existing facility, a State Party shall give the Agency authority to use the station as an Alpha station as specified in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Seismological Data and to make necessary changes in the equipment and the operational procedures to meet these requirements. A State Party shall cooperate with the Agency to establish a new station at a site to be agreed upon. The State Party shall provide the required land for the station free of charge and cooperate with the Agency in establishing the station and the infrastructure needed to support it. A State Party shall also transfer authority to operate the station or stations to the Agency and cooperate with the Agency in the routine operation.

Article 17. To supplement the Alpha network, a number of additional high-quality stations referred to as Beta stations shall be established. The Beta stations to be used initially are listed in table 3, annexed to this Protocol. The Beta stations shall be established and operated by the State Party on whose territory it is situated, The Agency shall, if requested, provide technical assistance to a State Party in this regard. The Beta stations shall meet the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Seismological Data. Data from the Beta stations are to be

requested by the International Data Centre and shall be immediately available through on-line computer connections.

Article 18. The Agency shall control the quality of the network of Beta stations and evaluate its overall performance. The Board of Governors of the Agency may amend the network by adding or deleting stations in the annexed Table 3, which is not an integral part of the Treaty.

Article 19. The International Data Centre shall routinely receive all seismological data contributed to the international exchange by its participants, process and distribute these data to all participants within two days, store all data contributed by participants as well as the results of the processing at the Centre. The procedures to be used at the Centre are laid down in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Seismological Data. The Centre shall further coordinate requests for additional seismological data from one State Party to another Party and make such data available to all States Parties.

Article 20. Each State Party is encouraged to assist in the assessment of the nature of the seismic events located by the International Data Centre by contributing any additional information available about events located in its own territory.

Article 21. The Agency shall, in cooperation with the States Parties, establish and operate a specified network of high quality stations to measure radio-nuclides in the atmosphere. This network consists initially of the stations specified in Table 4, annexed to this Protocol. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements summarized in Table 5 and further specified in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Data on Radionuclides in the Atmosphere.

Article 22. The Agency shall control the quality of the network of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere and evaluate its overall performance. The Board of Governors of the Agency may decide to amend the network by adding or deleting stations in the annexed Table 4, which is not an integral part of the Treaty.

Article 23. The Agency shall make the necessary legal and other arrangements with the States Parties to establish and operate one or several stations on its territory to measure radioactivity in the atmosphere. For an existing facility a State Party shall give the Agency authority to use the station as a station to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere as specified in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Data on Radionuclides in the Atmosphere and to make necessary changes in the equipment and the operational procedures to meet these requirements. A State Party shall cooperate with the Agency to establish a new station at a site to be agreed upon. The State Party shall provide the required land for the station free of charge and

cooperate with the Agency in establishing the station and the infrastructure needed to support it. A State Party shall also transfer authority to operate the station or stations to the Agency and cooperate with the Agency in the routine operation.

Article 24. In addition to routinely submitted measurements, each State Party may provide any other relevant measurement on radionuclides in the atmosphere. Each State Party may also request additional data from a third party through the Agency. The procedures for making such requests are laid down in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Data on Radionuclides in the Atmosphere.

Article 25. The International Data Centre shall receive all measurements on radionuclides in the atmosphere contributed to the international exchange by its participants and routinely process these measurements according to established procedures. The Centre shall, at the request by a State Party, evaluate an observed release of radionuclides in the atmosphere as well as the time and location of the source. In this analysis, relevant wind trajectories obtained from meteorological data shall be used. The results of the analysis shall be distributed to all participants within one week, and the records thereof be kept at the Centre. The procedures to be used in the analysis at the Centre are laid down in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Data on Radionuclides in the Atmosphere. The Centre shall also coordinate requests for additional measurements from one State Party to another and circulate the information obtained as a result of such requests.

Article 26. The Agency shall, in cooperation with the States Parties, establish and operate a specified network of high-quality hydroacoustic stations. This network consists initially of the stations specified in Table 6, annexed to this Protocol. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements summarized in Table 7 and further specified in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data. Uninterrupted data from the stations shall be transmitted on-line to the International Data Centre.

Article 27. The Agency shall control the quality of the hydroacoustic stations and evaluate their overall performance. The Board of Governors of the Agency may decide to amend the network by adding or deleting stations in the annexed table 6, which is not an integral part of the Treaty.

Article 28. A State Party shall, at the Agency's request, cooperate with the Agency in establishing and operating one or several hydroacoustic stations on its territory. For an existing facility, a State Party shall give the Agency authority to use the station as an hydroacoustic station as specified in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data and to make necessary changes in the equipment and the operational procedures to meet these requirements. A State Party shall cooperate with the Agency to establish

a new station at a site to be agreed upon. The State Party shall provide the required land for the station free of charge and cooperate with the Agency in establishing the station and the infrastructure needed to support it. A State Party shall also transfer authority to operate the station or stations to the Agency and cooperate with the Agency in the routine operation.

Article 29. The International Data Centre shall routinely receive data from hydroacoustic stations, process and distribute these data to all participants within two days, and store all data contributed by participants as well as the results of the processing at the Centre. The procedures to be used at the Centre are laid down in the Operational Manual for International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data.

Article 30. Each State Party undertakes to make satellite image data available on terms to be agreed by the Agency. The Agency shall, upon request, assist States Parties in the processing of satellite image data to facilitate the interpretation of events relevant to this Treaty. The procedures to be used by the Agency are laid down in the Operational Manual for Satellite Data Processing.

Article 31. The Agency shall facilitate cooperation among States Parties in using additional means of verification which any State Party may find useful. The Agency shall receive, compile and circulate any data relevant to the verification of this Treaty which any State Party makes available.

Article 32. The Agency shall, in consultation with the States Parties, provide technical support to establish, operate and maintain such additional means of verification.

Article 33. Additional means of verification of compliance with this Treaty may include acoustic and ionospheric measurements in the atmosphere.

Section IV

PROCEDURES FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND MONITORING

Part 1: Procedures for On-Site Inspections

Article 34. The basic rules for verification through on-site inspection are laid down in Article IV of this Treaty.

Article 35. The purpose of an international on-site inspection is to verify compliance with the Treaty. A team of inspectors (hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Team) shall be dispatched by the Agency and shall present a report to the Board of Governors of the Agency on the observations made during the inspection.

Article 36. The Inspection Team shall begin its inspection in the specified area to be inspected not later than seven days after the Board of Governors

of the Agency has decided to conduct an inspection This area must be continuous and not exceed 1,000 km² or a distance of 50 km in any direction. An inspection shall normally not exceed seven days after the arrival of the Inspection Team at the site in the territory of the State Party to be inspected.

Article 37. In accordance with the Agency's basic rights to use its own communication systems and means of transport and to take samples and to bring such samples out of the inspected country, the Inspection Team shall, during an international on-site inspection, be entitled to

- conduct visual inspections of the area from the air and on the ground;
- take photographs in the visual and infrared parts of the spectrum from the air and on the ground;
- measure radiation and levels of radioactivity in the atmosphere above the area, at ground level and in water;
- conduct temporary seismological measurements in the area.

Article 38. The Director-General of the Agency shall notify the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours prior to the planned arrival of the Inspection Team at the point of entry as defined in the Manual.

Article 39. An international on-site inspection shall be carried out by the personnel and experts of the Agency. The rules and detailed procedures for such on-site inspections are laid down in the Manual for International On-Site Inspections.

At all times while the inspecting personnel are in the territory of the State Party to be inspected, their persons, property, personal baggage, archives and documents as well as their temporary official and living quarters shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as provided in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to the persons, property, personal baggage, archives and documents of diplomatic agents as well as to the premises of diplomatic missions and private residences of diplomatic agents.

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it shall be the duty of the inspecting personnel to respect the laws and regulations of the State in the territory of which the inspection is to be carried out, as long as such laws and regulations are not in conflict with the proper exercise of the rights and functions provided for by the Treaty and this Protocol.

Part 2: Procedures for On-site Monitoring of Non-Nuclear Explosions

Article 40. For an explosion with a yield exceeding 500 tons TNT equivalent or any group of explosions with an aggregate yield exceeding the same limit, the State Party conducting such an explosion shall notify the Agency not later than 15 days prior to the event. This notification shall include

- the time, location, purpose and yield of the explosion;
- a full description of the event, including a timetable for loading the charge;
- any other relevant information that a State Party wishes to submit.

Article 41. A State Party conducting an explosion with a yield exceeding 100 tons but not exceeding 500 tons TNT equivalent shall provide the Agency with information on such an event not later than seven days after the explosion.

Article 42. Personnel from the Agency shall monitor on site the preparations for, and the detonation of, any non-nuclear explosion with a yield exceeding 500 tons of TNT equivalent.

Based on the information provided by the State Party conducting the explosion, the Director-General of the Agency shall decide from what date observers shall follow the preparation work. The on-site observation shall include the conduct of the explosion and observation of its result. The detailed rules and procedures are laid down in the Operational Manual for On-Site Monitoring of Non-Nuclear Explosions.

Article 43. A State Party which regularly conducts explosions with yields exceeding 100 tons TNT equivalent within a limited area, e.g. a mine, might establish a declared site for non-nuclear explosions. In the declaration the State Party shall submit to the Agency a description of the planned explosive activities, the purpose of the explosions and of the site itself. A declared site shall be open to on-site observation by the Agency at any time and the Agency might place on-site recording equipment at the site as defined in the Operation Manual for On-Site Monitoring. For explosions at declared sites a State Party is not obliged to provide information prior to or after an explosion as specified in articles 40 and 41.

Article 44. The personnel conducting the on-site monitoring shall be allowed to follow the preparation of the explosion, including the loading of the charge or charges. They should further be allowed to take pictures and to make measurements of radiation and levels of radioactivity in the air and in water in the vicinity of the event, prior to and after the explosion.

Article 45. The Agency shall establish a factual report of each non-nuclear explosion monitored and submit the report to all States Parties and to the Board of Governors of the Agency.

Article 46. On-site monitoring of a non-nuclear explosion shall be carried out by personnel and experts of the Agency. The rules and detailed procedures for such on-site monitoring are laid down in the Manual for On-Site Observations of Non-Nuclear Explosions.

At all times while the monitoring personnel are present in the territory of the State Party to be inspected or in a territory under the jurisdiction or control of that State party, their persons, property, personal baggage, archives and documents as well as their temporary official and living quarters shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as provided in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to the persons, property, personal baggage, archives and documents of diplomatic agents as well as to the premises of diplomatic missions and private residences of diplomatic agents.

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it shall be the duty of the monitoring personnel to respect the laws and regulations of the State in whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, as long as such laws and regulations are not in conflict with the proper exercising of the rights and functions provided for by the Treaty and this Protocol.

TABLE OF RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS

RESOLUTIONS

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Discussion on page</i>	<i>Votes</i>	
				<i>First Committee</i>	<i>General Assembly</i>
48/61	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	57	147	without a vote	without a vote
48/62	Reduction of military budgets: transparency of military expenditures	58 (b)	86	without a vote	without a vote
48/63	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	59	93	without a vote	without a vote
48/64	Education and information for disarmament	60	276	without a vote	without a vote

48/65	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction	61	35	without a vote	without a vote
48/66	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	62	182	104-4-29	126-4-35
48/67	The role of science and technology in the context of interational security, disarmament and other related fields	63	183	133-0-3	161-0-5
48/68	Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification	64	88	127-0-19	145-0-22
48/69	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	65	59	99-3-40	118-3-45
48/70	Comprehensive test-ban treaty	66	56	without a vote	without a vote
48/71	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	67	159	without a vote	without a vote

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Discussion on page</i>	<i>Votes</i>	
				<i>First Committee</i>	<i>General Assembly</i>
48/72	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	68	164	125-3-12	153-3-12
48/73	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	69	37	142-0-3	166-0-4
48/74	Prevention of an arms race in outer space				
	A. Prevention of an arms race in outer space	70	226	136-0-2	169-0-1
	B. Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space	70	230	without a vote	without a vote
48/75	General and complete disarmament				
	A. Relationship between disarmament and development	71 (e)	191	without a vote	without a vote
	B. Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	71	143	without a vote	without a vote

C. General and complete disarmament	71	31	94-5-39	114-6-45
D. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	71 (d)	153	without a vote	without a vote
E. Transparency in armaments	71 (g)	83	without a vote	without a vote
F. International arms transfers	71 (h)	188	143-0-1	without a vote
G. Regional disarmament	71 (f)	116	without a vote	without a vote
H. Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms	71 (h)	188	108-0-33	146-0-22
I. Regional disarmament	71 (f)	116	139-0-1	170-0-1
J. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	71	117	123-0-15	156-0-11
K. Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines	71	209	without a vote	without a vote
L. Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	71 (c)	146	without a vote	without a vote

Resolution No.	Title	Agenda item	Discussion on page	Votes	
				First Committee	General Assembly
48/76	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly				
	A. Regional confidence-building measures	72 (e)	123	141-1-1	168-1-2
	B. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	72 (b)	149	102-21-23	120-23-24
	C. United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme	72	269	without a vote	without a vote
	D. United Nations Disarmament Information Programme	72 (c)	263	without a vote	without a vote
	E. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	72 (f)	273	without a vote	without a vote

48/77	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session	73 (a)	256	without a vote	without a vote
	A. Report of the Disarmament Commission	73 (b)	258	without a vote	without a vote
	B. Report of the Conference on Disarmament				
48/78	Israeli nuclear armament	74	162	55-39-47	53-45-65
48/79	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	75	205	140-0-2	162-0-3
48/81	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	77	125	without a vote	without a vote
48/82	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	78	169	110-3-32	130-4-36
48/83	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	79	193	100-1-41	122-1-45

Resolution No.	Title	Agenda item	Discussion on page	Votes	
				First Committee	General Assembly
48/84	Maintenance of international security				
	A. Maintenance of international security	80	196	67-0-75	84-0-83
	B. Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States	80	128	without a vote	without a vote
48/85	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	81	166	without a vote	without a vote
48/86	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa	82	156	without a vote	without a vote
48/87	Rationalization of the work of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee)	156	253	without a vote	without a vote

TABLE OF SPONSORSHIP OF RESOLUTIONS

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Sponsors*</i>
48/61	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	Afghanistan, Austria, Belarus , Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Netherlands, Philippines, Russian Federation, Slovakia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Viet Nam
48/62	Reduction of military budgets: transparency of military expenditures	Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany , Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Sponsors*</i>
48/63	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
48/64	Education and information for disarmament	Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica , Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain, Suriname, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela

- 48/65 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
- 48/66 Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security
 Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Panama, Sri Lanka and Venezuela
- 48/67 The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Uruguay
- 48/68 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification
 Armenia, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, India, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Republic of Korea,

Resolution No.	Title	Sponsors*
48/68 (<i>cont.</i>)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Thailand and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
48/69		Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela
48/70	Comprehensive test-ban treaty	Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia , Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,

48/70
(cont.)

Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe

48/71 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

Egypt, Honduras and Philippines

48/72 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

Bangladesh, Pakistan and Philippines

48/73 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Bangladesh, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Madagascar, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Viet Nam

Resolution No.	Title	Sponsors*
48/74	Prevention of an arms race in outer space A. Prevention of an arms race in outer space	Algeria, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Sri Lanka , Sudan, Ukraine, Venezuela and Viet Nam
	B. Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space	Argentina and Bolivia
48/75	General and complete disarmament A. Relationship between disarmament and development B. Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	Bolivia , Haiti , Indonesia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries) and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Australia , Bolivia , Finland , France , Honduras , Indonesia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Italy , Japan , Marshall Islands , New Zealand , Norway , Paraguay , Portugal , Russian Federation , Sweden , The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

Bolivia, Mexico and Rwanda

C. General and complete disarmament

Algeria (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States), Bolivia and Haiti

D. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Nepal, **Netherlands**, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela

E. Transparency in armaments

Australia, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, **Colombia**, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Zimbabwe

F. International arms transfers

Resolution No.	Title	Sponsors*
48/75 (cont.)	G. Regional disarmament	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
	H. Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms	Afghanistan
	I. Regional disarmament	Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Netherlands, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan , Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe

- J. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels
- K. Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines
- Haiti, **Pakistan**, Panama, Swaziland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo and **United States of America**
- Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, **Canada**, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United States of America and Uruguay
- L. Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Resolution No.	Title	Sponsors*
48/76	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General As- sembly	Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon , Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe and Zaire
	A. Regional confidence-building mea- sures	Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, India , Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Sudan and Viet Nam
	B. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria , Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe
	C. United Nations disarmament fel- lowship, training and advisory services programme	

D. United Nations Disarmament Information Programme

E. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Review and implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A. Report of the Disarmament Commission

B. Report of the Conference on Disarmament

Bangladesh, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mexico, Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine and Venezuela

Algeria (on behalf of the Group of African States), Bangladesh, China, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic (on behalf of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States), Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam

Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Ireland, Mauritius, Mongolia, Republic of Korea and Ukraine

Czech Republic and Egypt (as President of the Conference on Disarmament)

Resolution No.	Title	Sponsors*
48/78	Israeli nuclear armament	Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan , Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen
48/79	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Finland, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Sweden and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
48/81	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Albania, Algeria , Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Tunisia
48/82	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	Panama, Philippines and Sri Lanka (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries)
48/83	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	Indonesia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries) and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- 48/84 Maintenance of international security
- A. Maintenance of international security
- Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, **Russian Federation**, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
- The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**
- 48/85 B. Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States
- Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
- Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, **Mexico**, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela
- 48/86 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa
- Algeria** (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the African Group of States)
- 48/87 Rationalization of the work of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee)
- Chairman**

* The State that introduced the draft resolution is shown in bold type.

Voting patterns of resolutions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session

	<i>Reference in text</i>
Resolutions on disarmament questions	
48/61	148
Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
48/62	87
Reduction of military budgets: transparency of military expenditures	
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
48/63	94
Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
48/64	277
Education and information for disarmament	
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
48/65	35
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction	
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
48/66	185
Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	
<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 4, with 35^a abstentions, as follows:</i>	

^a Subsequent to the voting the United States of America advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against the draft resolution.

48/66
(cont.)

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Israel, Monaco, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Abstaining: Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United States of America

48/67

The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

186

48/67 *Adopted by a recorded vote of 161 to none, with 5 abstentions, as follows:*
(cont.)

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

- 48/67 *Abstaining:* Andorra, France, Monaco, United Kingdom
(cont.) of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America
- 48/68 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the
United Nations in the field of verification 91

Adopted by a recorded vote of 145 to none, with 22 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

48/68
(cont.)

Against: None

Abstaining: Andorra, Belgium, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

48/69

Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

60

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 3, with 45 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

48/72 Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
(cont.) Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,
Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania,
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan,
Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turk-
menistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

Abstaining: Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Myanmar,
Seychelles, Viet Nam

48/73 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to as- 38
sure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons

Adopted by a recorded vote of 166 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra,
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica,

48/73 Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
(cont.) Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic
of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: France, Monaco, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

48/74 Prevention of an arms race in outer space

A Prevention of a arms race in outer space

227

Adopted by a recorded vote of 169 to none, with 1 abstention, as follows:

48/74 A *In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: United States of America

	<i>Reference in text</i>
48/74 B Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space	230
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
48/75 General and complete disarmament	
A Relationship between disarmament and development	192
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
B Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear dis- armament	144
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
C General and complete disarmament	33
<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 114^b to 6, with 45 abstentions, as follows:</i>	
<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon	

^b Subsequent to the voting the delegation of Mozambique advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

- 48/75 C Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian
(cont.) Arab Republic, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of
Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* France, Israel, Monaco, Russian Federation,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United States of America
- Abstaining:* Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan,
Turkey, Ukraine
- D Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes 154
Adopted without a vote
- E Transparency in armaments 84
Adopted without a vote
- F International arms transfers 189
Adopted without a vote
- G Regional disarmament 119
Adopted without a vote
- H Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms 190
*Adopted by a recorded vote of 146 to none, with 22^c
abstentions, as follows:*

^c Subsequent to the voting the delegation of the United States of America advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

48/75 H *In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Georgia, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Sweden, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Zimbabwe

48/75 I Regional disarmament

121

Adopted by a recorded vote of 170 to none, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United

48/75 I Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
(cont.) Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United
States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: India

J Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional
levels 122

Adopted by a recorded vote of 156 to none, with 11 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Granada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia,

- 48/75 J (cont.) Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* None
- Abstaining:* Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Viet Nam
- K Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines 211
- Adopted without a vote*
- L Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 147
- Adopted without a vote*
- 48/76 Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly
- A Regional confidence-building measures 123
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 168 to 1, with 2 abstentions, as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India,

48/76 A Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel,
(cont.) Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechten-
stein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated
States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Georgia, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

B Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 150

Adopted by a recorded vote of 120 to 23, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,

48/76 B Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti,
(cont.) Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar,
Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe

Against: Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Albania, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Marshall Islands,
New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

C United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and ad- 269
visory services programme

Adopted without a vote

D United Nations Disarmament Information Programme 266

Adopted without a vote

	<i>Reference in text</i>
48/76 E (cont.)	274
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<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe	
<i>Against:</i> Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,	

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Abstaining: Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zambia

48/79 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

207

Adopted by a recorded vote of 162 to none, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,

- 48/79
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- Against:* None
- Abstaining:* Georgia, Russian Federation and United States of America
- 48/81 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region 126
- Adopted without a vote*
- 48/82 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 170
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to 4, with 36 abstentions, as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,

48/82
(cont.) Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Monaco, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey

48/83 Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
(cont.) Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

48/84 Maintenance of international security

A Maintenance of international security

196

Adopted by a recorded vote of 84 to none, with 83 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia,

- 48/84 (cont.) Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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- 48/87 Rationalization of the work of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) 254
Adopted without a vote

Abbreviations and acronyms

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ASAT	anti-satellite
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CBM	confidence-building measure
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces In Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
COPUOS	Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
CSBM	confidence- and security-building measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC/EU	European Community/European Union
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
ENMOD	Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
GSETT	Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INTELSAT	International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
ISMA	international satellite monitoring agency
ISpMA	international space monitoring agency
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NTM	national technical means
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity

OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PAXSAT	peace satellite
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (I and II)
TLE	treaty-limited equipment
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission

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كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات بدور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم . استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة ، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

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