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Chairman: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEMS 17 AND 66

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2979, A/3047, A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.150 and Rev.1, A/C.1/L.152, A/C.1/L.153 and Rev.1, A/C.1/L.154 and Rev.1) (*continued*)

Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (A/2981 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.151) (*continued*)

1. Mr. OLIVIERI (Argentina) said that the public was understandably watching the deliberations of the United Nations on the question of disarmament with anxiety for it depended on their success whether a world conflagration could be warded off.
2. As the French representative had said at the 47th meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the debates on that question during the past year had been marked by four favourable developments: resolution 808 (IX), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in 1954; the proposals made by both sides in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission; the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers, held at Geneva; and the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, also held at Geneva.
3. However, the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the four great Powers, held at Geneva in October 1955, had not fulfilled the hopes which had been placed in it.
4. As the representative of the United Kingdom had said at the General Assembly's ninth session (685th meeting), no results could be expected with regard to disarmament in an atmosphere of tension and fear. That

atmosphere was again apparent today. Therefore, faced with the choice between a complete disarmament programme, preceded at each stage by effective control, and a less ambitious programme which could be put into effect without delay, Argentina would choose the latter.

5. The four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) was certainly attractive. But the USSR would have to agree to a resolution for it to be useful. As a certain Western representative, when visiting an exhibition on aerial inspection organized by the United States Air Force, had said, the exhibition would convince anyone except those who had to be convinced. In the prevailing atmosphere of fear, any step forward must be taken with caution, especially with regard to disarmament.

6. The great Powers had, of course, a special responsibility as regards the question of disarmament, but the solution to the problem directly affected all mankind. Without accusing anyone, he said it was obvious that the question had not made any progress, evidently because of the many difficulties which had to be overcome. Stagnation must at all costs be avoided and an effort made to find other formulas. The Argentine delegation felt that it was its right and duty to help to solve that problem. It did not wish to play the part of a passive onlooker.

7. The Disarmament Commission was certainly the body competent to deal with the matter. It had the right and the duty to use all means at its disposal to find a solution. The First Committee's consideration of the question of disarmament was based on Article 11 of the Charter. A series of steps had hitherto been taken in connexion with the study of the problem in accordance with Articles 24 and 26, which specified certain responsibilities of the Security Council in that regard. Voluminous reports had been produced, but very few positive results had been achieved. It would perhaps be advisable in the circumstances to set up a body, outside the Security Council and the Disarmament Commission—and hence without the participation of the great Powers—which would study the apparently contradictory proposals that had been made and put forward a compromise solution at a future session of the General Assembly which might then be submitted to the great Powers. The body in question might also serve as mediator between the Powers.

8. Although it did not wish to make a formal proposal, the Argentine delegation therefore suggested that such a committee should be set up.

Mr. Abdoh (Iran), Vice-Chairman, took the chair.

9. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said that resolution 808 (IX), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, although drafted in general terms, had been hailed as a modest but tangible sign of a new atmosphere.

10. The hopes raised by that resolution had risen further when a *rapprochement* had become evident in consequence of the discussions in the Sub-Committee of the

Disarmament Commission, and during the summer of 1955, when President Eisenhower had made his proposals which had both a moral and a practical value, and, lastly, when the Prime Minister of the USSR had stated in Moscow in August 1955 that the essence of every disarmament plan was the question of control and inspection.

11. Unfortunately, the discussions at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the four great Powers at Geneva and the discussion of the problem by the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee had shown that a wide gap existed between the positions of the great Powers. The change of fortune was not explained solely by the context of the discussion on disarmament. It reflected a change in the international situation. Disarmament was not in fact a subject which could be isolated. Its fate was determined by the international situation and international events. As Mr. Moch had said, the breakdown of the discussion on the reunification of Germany had predetermined the failure of the discussion on disarmament.

12. It was idle to consider whether confidence should precede disarmament or *vice versa*. The choice was not between total disarmament and the *status quo*; the world had to be satisfied with simultaneous and limited measures in the two parallel domains of disarmament and control.

13. From the practical point of view, certain delegations had suggested that the membership of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission should be modified. He did not think it was prudent to attempt such innovations at the moment. The Sub-Committee's task was to find common ground acceptable to all the great Powers. A disarmament agreement might in its turn have a beneficial influence on general political problems.

14. It was difficult to separate the problem of nuclear disarmament from that of conventional disarmament. The difference between the two was one of degree and not of kind. One could hardly proscribe nuclear weapons and tolerate conventional weapons, for then the balance between the Powers would merely be changed. It was shocking to realize that the relative security which now reigned was based on the fear of atomic warfare, but that was an undeniable fact.

15. Mr. Molotov had stated recently (520th plenary meeting) that the termination of the armaments race must be regarded as the primary objective. Yet, a regional armaments race had just started in the Middle East, for which Egypt was mainly responsible and those who had responded to that impulse.

16. Mr. RAMADAN (Egypt), speaking on a point of order, said he had explained (807th meeting) that Egypt had taken measures of self-defence which came within its own exclusive jurisdiction. The Israel representative's criticism of Egypt's attitude was irrelevant to the item under discussion.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that the question of the relaxation of international tension was on the agenda. However, he asked representatives to show restraint and not to go into too much detail.

18. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said that the representatives of Syria (805th meeting), Saudi Arabia (806th meeting) and Egypt (807th meeting) had spoken on the question of the equilibrium of armaments in the Middle East in great detail. He therefore considered himself entitled to answer their statements. A dangerous imbalance

in armaments had been created between a country which considered itself still at war and the State which was the target of its attacks.

19. The balance which had existed for seven years had been deliberately destroyed. It had been claimed that every sovereign State had the unlimited right to obtain arms. That was literally true. But if it was, then the problem of disarmament would become academic, for disarmament debates would constitute an intrusion into the domestic affairs of all States. Actually, the problem of disarmament was essentially an international problem.

20. He recalled that up to 11 August 1949 the importation of arms into the Middle East had been forbidden by a decision of the Security Council, and that decision had only been changed on the understanding that all the States concerned would renounce belligerency.

21. He was not, therefore, questioning the right of each State to engage in commercial transactions. The question of the level of armaments was however a subject which concerned the whole international community. Sovereign States had the right to import arms, but they had to exercise that right with prudence and moderation. The question of the relaxation of international tension was indivisible; relaxation of tension could not simultaneously be upheld as an ideal and violated by action.

22. Counter-measures had become necessary, for otherwise a State which alone among the Members of the United Nations proclaimed and practiced belligerency against its neighbour, which alone imposed an illegal blockade and wished to extend its frontiers, would be able to carry out its aggressive intentions, thanks to the superiority of its armaments.

23. The delegation of Israel was happy to note that a large number of representatives agreed with the principle that an imbalance in one troubled area was incompatible with a relaxation of tension. Israel would take all legitimate measures to re-establish that balance and the Western States should also act in that sense.

24. Peace and security in the Middle East were endangered. The United Nations was under a duty to deal with the situation. If that crisis, which reflected a more general disagreement, could not be solved within a limited regional context, there was little chance that a general agreement could materialize.

25. The Israel delegation would study the draft resolutions before the Committee in the earnest hope that they might establish sound principles for protecting mankind from the impending scourge of atomic warfare.

26. Mr. LODGE (United States of America), speaking on behalf of the four sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150), announced that a revised text,¹ which took account of the amendments proposed by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.152) and India (A/C.1/L.153), would be submitted shortly.

27. The principal issue on which the Soviet Union and the Western Powers differed was that of the kind and extent of inspection. The Soviet representative had claimed that the Western Powers had misrepresented and undervalued the Soviet Union point of view on control. However, the USSR proposals concerning inspection were inadequate. The many questions about control which the Soviet Union had been asked during

¹ This text was subsequently issued as document A/C.1/L.150/Rev.1.

the debate in the Sub-Committee in London had remained unanswered.

28. Some hopes had been roused by the Soviet Union proposals of 10 May 1955 (A/2979, annex I)² for they had recognized the problem created by the accumulation of stocks of atomic weapons and provided for the establishment of control posts at strategic points. Nevertheless, the proposals had been vague in other respects, for example their references to the objects of control.

29. During the 1955 meetings of the Sub-Committee many attempts had been made to obtain answers from the Soviet Union on the question of control. The representative of the United Kingdom, for instance, had proposed a list defining the objects of control. The Soviet representative had not agreed to the list; worse still, he had ignored it completely. The Soviet Union's only answer to questions concerning inspection before the first stage of disarmament for the purpose of making sure that clandestine stocks had not been built up and concerning the levels of armaments and armed forces had been that the control authority should have adequate powers. Furthermore, the Soviet Union proposed that, upon the completion of one stage of disarmament, the next should begin automatically, independently of the results obtained during each stage. In other words, the Soviet Union was unwilling to concede to the control authority that autonomy, under international law, which the Western Powers were willing to accept.

30. As was well known, the main purpose of the Eisenhower plan was to remove the disarmament problem entirely from controversy. If it were put into effect concurrently with Mr. Bulganin's proposals, the plan would provide safeguards against large-scale surprise attacks. The USSR representative had claimed (805th meeting) that the Eisenhower plan would provide no protection against surprise attack, and that only the Bulganin plan would. It was difficult to understand such a statement, as the United States was agreeable to the Soviet proposal's being put into effect simultaneously with the Eisenhower plan. The establishment of control posts at strategic points had some positive value. But if tied down to specific centres their value would be very limited since it cannot be assumed that a potential aggressor would concentrate forces at specified centres. Furthermore, an atomic attack could be launched without any great mobilization or preparatory concentration of troops. It was therefore essential to provide for aerial inspection to complement the network of fixed observation posts.

31. The Soviet Union representative had charged the United States with being against disarmament. The simplest answer to such a charge was to imagine that the Eisenhower plan was already in operation. There could be no doubt that it would be the beginning of a new era of confidence when armaments could be reduced. The Soviet representative had also claimed that the plan could not be put into effect unless it was tied to disarmament. President Eisenhower had already stated, and the United States delegation wished to underline that point, that the United States intended the Eisenhower plan to be a stage in the reduction of armaments, or, in other words, to be part of the task of stopping an arms race. As the French representative had pointed out, the four-Power draft resolution coupled the Eisenhower plan with all the other parts of a disarmament programme which could be put into effect under adequate

inspection. Such a method was preferable to the elaborately qualified and inadequately controlled Soviet plan.

32. According to the Soviet representative, the United States was not sincere because it reserved its position with regard to the levels of the armed forces of the great Powers. But in actual fact the United States had stated its willingness to consider adequate criteria for fixing substantially lower levels for the armed forces. The figures mentioned for the five great Powers had been given in 1952 for purposes of illustration by the United States. Since then, there had been a change in the political and technical basis on which those calculations had been made. New factors had intervened, particularly the fact that there was at present no way of detecting hidden stocks of atomic bombs. Force levels would have to be fixed within the framework of a general disarmament plan and they would have to reflect the nuclear materials situation at the time and the possibility of adequate inspection.

33. The United States had repeatedly stated that it would never use a weapon of mass destruction except to repel aggression, in conformity with the Charter; but that pledge did not satisfy the USSR representative, who had appealed to the great Powers to commit themselves not to be the first to use atomic weapons and not to use them without the approval of the Security Council. At the same time, the Soviet proposals of 10 May 1955 showed that atomic weapons could not be completely eliminated in the near future. Therefore, if the Soviet proposals were adopted, it would be tantamount to accepting the domination of the Power which was strongest in the conventional armaments, and allowing it to keep a reserve of atomic weapons with which to deal its enemies a crushing blow.

34. The democratic States had always been the first victims of aggression, with the result that they had always started with a heavy handicap. An undertaking on their part not to use their most powerful weapons in their own defense after having been attacked would amount to suicide. And furthermore, the Soviet Union proposed that the use of such weapons, even in self-defence, should be subject to approval by the Security Council. That was only another way of using the veto as a shield.

35. The Belgian representative had (799th meeting) very rightly emphasized the absurdity of a theoretical declaration on the prohibition of atomic weapons such as that submitted by the Soviet Union. He had proved that such a declaration would merely encourage an aggressor, for if a State did not hesitate to commit aggression in violation of all its obligations, there would be nothing to prevent it from violating an undertaking not to use atomic weapons.

36. It was true, as the Soviet Union representative had pointed out, that chemical weapons had not been used during the Second World War. However, no one would believe that it was respect for Germany's signature on the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare which had prevented Hitler from using chemical weapons; on the contrary, there was every probability that if he had been certain of impunity and had not feared reprisals, he would have used them.

37. The Soviet Union had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.151) on measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international

² See also DC/71, annex 15.

co-operation. It contained some unexceptionable sentiments. Any efforts of the Soviet Union to relax tension would of course be praiseworthy. Nevertheless, most of the sources of international tension still existed, although it was in the Soviet Union's power to eliminate them instantly. Furthermore, other sources of tension had actually been created by the Soviet Union; that was proved by the fact that it opposed the reunification of Germany on just and reasonable terms, as well as the removal of barriers to normal relations between East and West. What the Soviet Union really wanted was that tension should be released in a way which would serve its own interests. It was quite true that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Austria, but it was undeniable that there were still Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania, in defiance of treaty obligations. The Soviet Union had contributed to the arms race in the Middle East. The Soviet Union claimed credit for the Communist States for the cessation of hostilities in Korea and Indo-China, but the United States did not think credit could be claimed for no longer doing what should never have been done in the first place. The Soviet Union had also charged the United States once again with being responsible for the Korean war. Such charges were inadmissible, and it was impossible not to conclude regretfully from the Soviet attitude in general that the hopes of developing international co-operation were for the time being checked. It was to be hoped that the check would be only temporary, but it would be wrong to be too optimistic.

38. Finally, the Soviet leaders claimed that the Eisenhower plan would increase distrust. The reason they gave was that the plan would enable the United States to discover what was going on in the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative had quoted General Maxwell Taylor and Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry as saying that air reconnaissance was useful for military operations, and he had deduced from that that the Eisenhower plan was unsound. No one would deny that air forces could be used for military purposes. The advantage of the Eisenhower plan was that it provided for their being used for peaceful purposes, just as the Eisenhower plan of 1953 (470th plenary meeting) had provided for the peaceful use of atomic energy. The Soviet Union had therefore not given the real reasons for its opposition to the Eisenhower plan.

39. In any event, efforts to find a satisfactory solution should continue. That was the aim of the four-Power draft resolution.

40. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the United States representative had raised a number of questions that ought to be taken up, but for the time being he would limit his reply.

41. The Soviet Union delegation had asked the French, United Kingdom and United States representatives whether they were prepared to formalize the agreement reached in the Sub-Committee or whether they had changed their former position. The reply which Mr. Lodge had just given had been clear; although the United States had made no reservations when the proposals had been presented, it no longer regarded them as acceptable. Nor did it any longer consider the amount of the reductions as operative, although it had proposed the amount itself and the three other great Powers had in turn accepted it. It also repudiated the timing which it had laid down for the process of prohibiting atomic weapons.

42. The Soviet Union was being asked to accept the Eisenhower plan on faith, as the prelude to a comprehensive disarmament plan, but what the plan would be had not been disclosed. The way in which the United States, the United Kingdom and France had changed their previous positions did not encourage faith in an indefinite plan.

43. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) declared that his delegation was not in any way rejecting the time sequence for disarmament. As far as the levels of armed forces were concerned, the figures had been put forward in 1952 for illustration. As the armament situation had changed considerably since then, the United States was ready to enter into fresh negotiations to determine the final figures.

44. Mr. MENON (India) said that the General Assembly was now discussing the most important problem on its agenda. The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission had been considering it for months. The problem of disarmament and the reduction of international tension could not, of course, be solved without agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, but all other countries were concerned too. The United Nations had been discussing the matter for nine years. Little progress had been achieved up to 1952, at which time the General Assembly in resolution 502 (VI) had given the Disarmament Commission precise terms of reference. On the proposal of India (A/C.1/L.74), the Sub-Committee had been set up in 1953 by resolution 715 (VIII).

45. The present debate amounted merely to a repetition of the discussions in the Sub-Committee. Points of agreement and of disagreement already well defined were being set forth. That was very regrettable. In 1954, mainly due to the efforts of the Canadian delegation, the General Assembly had achieved a unanimous vote on the question. The present turn taken by the debate did not appear to give any hope of a similar outcome. It was true that unanimity on a vague resolution was of little value, yet the fact that no draft resolution had been submitted in the serious hope of achieving unanimity was undoubtedly a sign of regression. There could be no question of disarmament if the Powers possessing the weapons did not reach agreement. Resolutions adopted, whether by large or small majorities, would make no difference.

46. In the hope that the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the four great Powers at Geneva might assist in solving the disarmament problem, the General Assembly had decided to await its outcome before itself proceeding with its discussion of the problem. The discussion had not in fact been advanced by waiting. None of the four Foreign Ministers had thought fit to give the Secretary-General any precise information on their discussions. Yet it seemed clear that the General Assembly ought to receive information throughout the year on which it could base a valid opinion on disarmament.

47. The Disarmament Commission had done nothing more than convene the Sub-Committee and transmit the Sub-Committee's report to the First Committee. The General Assembly had not established the Commission merely to act as a clerk. As to the Sub-Committee, it had undoubtedly done good work, but it had not entirely observed the terms of reference given it by the General Assembly nor taken note of world developments. It had not supplied the General Assembly with the documents needed to study the problem profitably.

The Sub-Committee had been established with the object of dealing with the matter in private so that the statements made there might not be used for propaganda purposes. That object had been achieved during the first year, but the symptoms of international tension had soon begun to appear in the Sub-Committee.

48. The French representative's statement advocating a synthesis of ideas had been especially constructive. Regrettably, one looked in vain for indications of a synthesis in either of the two draft resolutions before the First Committee. It had been repeatedly stated that the differences in viewpoints between the two sides had been reduced, but instead of consolidating the gains made, stress was immediately laid on the differences that still remained.

49. Some progress had been made in reducing international tension, but whereas some problems had been solved, still others had arisen. There was no doubt that the nations should agree to oppose any interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. No genuine progress could be imagined unless some desire for co-existence was shown.

50. The Far East was one of the areas of the world where the need for a relaxation of international tension was most keenly felt. The General Assembly could pass resolutions which ignored reality. It could be deliberately blind to the dangerous situation in the Far East. It could forget that China was not represented in the United Nations. The fact remained that international tension could not be reduced appreciably so long as the situation in the Formosa Strait, Korea and Indo-China had not been settled. The United Nations might not be at an actual deadlock at present, but the graph of its progress was in any case falling.

51. A further cause of international tension was the continued existence of colonial warfare. The time when the colonial Powers used only their own forces in such warfare had gone. Nowadays, it was difficult to distinguish between their own forces and those proceeding from international alliances. Thus the situation had arisen where forces proceeding from regional agreements were being used to maintain the colonial Powers. India was more than ever convinced that the colonial policy of holding down peoples under a foreign yoke should come to an end. The entire military apparatus of a State should not be necessary merely for the purpose of maintaining order in a country, especially when the State was part of an international "pool".

52. What had come of the efforts of the United Nations in nine years of dealing with the disarmament problem? True, resolutions had been adopted, but a study of the statistics would show that armaments had multiplied by thirty or forty times during that period.

53. Some countries had not at first taken part in the armaments race, but they had been brought into alliances, and the only contribution they could offer might be the sacrifice of their independence. India's position on military alliances was well known; it regarded them as contrary to the Charter.

54. Indeed, the situation thus created was becoming more alarming every day. On the Asian continent the People's Republic of China, on the one hand, formed a considerable military power, whereas, on the other hand, a recently-formed alliance, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), looked very much like an encirclement. That organization had assumed the right to concern itself with territories situated below

a certain parallel, thus clearly infringing the sovereignty of certain States. Moreover, the United States had concluded a military agreement with some of India's neighbours, which had been extended to include other countries of the Baghdad Pact, which had been attended by United States and United Kingdom observers.

55. Countries engaged in the "cold war" had concluded similar alliances such as the Warsaw Alliance of the countries surrounding the Soviet Union.

56. Clearly, none of the countries parties to the alliances encircling India had any hostile intentions towards India; but the alliances themselves were part of the idea that peace could be based on a balance of power—a doctrine which India totally repudiated. India would continue to pursue a course of reconciliation and negotiation and would avoid military blocs.

57. That point had to be emphasized because, contrary to what had been claimed, the alliances in question were inconsistent with the decisions taken at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. The Conference had established the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, specifically, Article 51. Those alliances could be brought under Article 51 only by the wildest stretch of the imagination. The Charter did not authorize the establishment of an alliance in the proximity of a country that refused to join it. Such an alliance could hardly be regarded as anything but military, and in the circumstances India could not remain indifferent, for no country could afford to overlook the presence of armies massed at its frontiers.

58. None of the military alliances, whether in the East, the West, the Middle East or the Far East, was in the spirit of the Bandung Declaration, and none of them was a regional arrangement in the meaning of Article 52. Those who invoked the "spirit of Bandung" should remember that in paragraph 6 of the Declaration the signatories committed themselves to abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big Powers.

59. Since the beginning of the discussion on disarmament in the United Nations nine years before, armed strength had steadily increased, and developments in the atomic field were particularly ominous. Fear begat fear; new armaments in the one country led to new armaments in the other, and in the United Nations there were speeches about international co-operation, assistance and disarmament. It was nevertheless true that arms were being piled up every day.

60. The Committee had before it a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) which India had tried to improve in a spirit of compromise by submitting amendments (A/C.1/L.153). As worded, the draft seemed to indicate that the objective of the United Nations was not so much to formulate a disarmament plan as to draw attention to the possibilities of a sudden attack. It also seemed to contain the idea that the existing level of armaments was so high that henceforth no State could risk starting a war.

61. India considered that the only effective way in which atomic weapons could be dealt with was to eliminate them. The Indian Government would never subscribe to the view that atomic weapons could be used in any context whatever. It therefore repudiated the view of the United States and that of the Soviet Union that those weapons could be used to resist aggression. History showed that all countries always believed that

they were fighting to serve the cause of the right, peace and liberty. The limitation implicit in the words "only in case of aggression" had therefore no value. To maintain such a limitation was illusory.

62. The draft resolution first referred to General Assembly resolution 808 (IX) and the rest of the preamble had absolutely nothing to do with the subject of that resolution. Yet the matters which were omitted were important; they related to the regulation, limitation and reduction of all armed forces and conventional armaments, a proposal which India now regarded as feasible. They were also concerned with the prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and the establishment of effective international control. The first of the Indian amendments was therefore to the effect that the draft resolution should reproduce the corresponding provisions of resolution 808 (IX). The amendment had not been accepted by the sponsors of the new draft, but he would request a vote on it.

63. The second amendment recalled that agreement had not yet been reached on the question of control or on "other essential matters set out in resolution 808 (IX)". The third amendment had been drafted with the same purpose in mind.

64. The fifth amendment stressed the fact that it was impossible to achieve disarmament without first reaching agreement. Furthermore no mention was made in paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) (ii), regarding the implementation of the proposed measures. Nor was it specified that they referred to a general disarmament plan. That was the purpose of the sixth amendment. The remaining amendments were only verbal alterations.

65. The eighth and following amendments were intended to widen the membership of the Disarmament Commission by the admission of new members so that it would become more representative. The membership of the Sub-Committee should also be enlarged.

66. The idea underlying the eleventh amendment was not new: if a draft convention on disarmament were prepared and transmitted to Governments, constructive comments would be forthcoming. The differences between East and West would then relate to specific points, whereas in the past all that had happened was that the two sides had adopted opposing positions. Some progress might then be hoped for, whereas at the moment

every concrete suggestion was liable to remain a dead letter like the proposals (A/C.1/L.100/Rev.1) submitted at the ninth session by the Indian delegation regarding an armaments truce and the suspension of nuclear explosions.

67. In regard to the suspension of nuclear explosions, his delegation was not convinced by the most recent scientific conclusions; it was persuaded that research was being continued with the utmost diligence and competence. Once a policy was determined, the machinery for carrying it into effect should operate. That observation also applied to the detection of hidden stocks of nuclear weapons. Although it was probably possible, as the Soviet Union representative had said, to conceal stocks at the moment, that was not a sufficient reason for not having any kind of control at all. Paragraph 1 of the revised Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1) did not ask the States concerned to suspend experimental explosions, but to enter into negotiations for that purpose. Such negotiations should be started immediately, both because of the deleterious results of those explosions and because the knowledge at present available to the technicians of the great Powers was only too sufficient.

68. It was also disturbing to note that, after the emphasis on the ban on the use of atomic weapons, there now seemed to be a trend of opinion favouring a kind of conditional use. His Government could never subscribe to such conditional use nor to the trend away from a progressive concept of disarmament.

69. The Indian Government had no objection to proceeding step by step in disarmament, provided that the ultimate objective was not changed. His delegation was convinced that there could be no genuine disarmament without adequate control, but considered it necessary first to agree on the scope, nature and other aspects of disarmament before control machinery was devised. Disarmament could not begin effectively until there was control machinery. As the Swedish representative had said (799th meeting), a plan for alarm was no substitute for a plan for disarmament, nor could the concept of peace by horror replace the concept of peace by disarmament.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.