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Thirtieth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND ONE-HUNDREDTH AND  
FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Monday, 1 December 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon)  
Rapporteur: Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA (Venezuela)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General /35/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/ (continued) /...

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 2 DECEMBER 1975, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 5 DECEMBER 1975.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3258 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /38/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /39/ (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /40/ (continued)
- General and complete disarmament /41/ (continued)
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- Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade: report of the Secretary-General /42/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa /43/ (continued)
- Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /44/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3262 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /45/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General /46/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /47/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General /48/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific /120/ (continued)
- Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests /122/ (continued)
- Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons /126/
- Organization of work

The meeting was called to order at 11 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 120, 122 and 126 (continued)

Mr. CHUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation has studied the draft resolution tabled by Mexico and other countries on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.724, Mexico and other countries have proposed that all nuclear-weapon States undertake the following obligations: to respect the nuclear-weapon-free zones; to refrain from contributing in any way to the performance of acts in violation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, particularly to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the nuclear-weapon-free zones. Although the wording of the above propositions is not quite so clear cut -- in particular they have failed to lay emphasis on the responsibility of the super-Powers in this respect -- they indeed reflect to a certain extent the just demand of the third world countries on the nuclear-weapon States, the super-Powers in particular. The Chinese delegation therefore welcomes and supports it.

As is known to all, China has already taken the initiative in committing itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, particularly not against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Chinese delegation has repeatedly stated its principled position in support of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific, as well as the Indian Ocean peace zone.

The Chinese Government has always proposed that all nuclear-weapon States, particularly the super-Powers, should undertake the following obligations: first, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, particularly not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-weapon-free zones; secondly, to withdraw from abroad all their armed forces, including nuclear-missile forces, and dismantle all their military bases, including nuclear bases, on the territories of other countries. In our view,

(Mr. Chuang, China)

these are the necessary prerequisites for the promotion of genuine disarmament. It is precisely in view of the above position of ours that the Chinese delegation gives its principled support to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.724, submitted by Mexico and other countries.

In regard to such questions as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, the international system of verification and control and other matters, as referred to in the aforesaid draft resolution, the Chinese delegation always has its own position, and we are not going to repeat it here.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Bolivia to introduce document A/C.1/L.740, containing amendments to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724.

Mr. GUTIERREZ (Bolivia) (interpretation from Spanish): May I submit for consideration by the Committee some amendments which I am proposing to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724 concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones, submitted by Argentina, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru and Zaire.

The purpose of the sponsors is undoubtedly highly constructive: to establish an institutional structure for nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the attitude towards them that should be adopted by the nuclear-weapon Powers -- all this under the governing standards and the protective mantle of the General Assembly.

My proposal should not be viewed as reflecting any ulterior motive of obstructionism or a preconceived attitude. No one could wish more than I do to support enthusiastically and unreservedly a proposal initiated by representatives of developing countries friendly to Bolivia.

I suggest my amendments with the deep conviction that we can arrive at a general consensus which will enable us all to give the deserved support to so important a document, destined to affect the history of the future. If my idea is not accepted, it will have cost us no more than a little time and some consultations, and my conscience will be at rest.



(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

In any case, by way of excuse may I say that I lack experience in parliamentary debates in the Committees, which I am attending for the first time. I must say also that I am hesitant in amending a draft resolution submitted by such distinguished representatives as those who, with skilful arguments and a broad knowledge of the item in question, have prepared the text contained in document A/C.1/L.724 which is now before us.

In the penultimate preambular paragraph we come to the controversial aspect of the proposal it uses the expression "define the concept" of the subject, and "the scope of the principal obligations" of the nuclear-weapon States in the matter. The entire operative part of the draft resolution is based on these two phrases. The first serves as the basis for the provisions of part I, and the second as the basis for the contents of part II.

To define a concept sounds like an intellectual contradiction. Every word has its own intrinsic value, its inherent meaning. A concept refers to the idea we have of things in themselves. A definition refers to the character, qualities or constituent elements of something. A concept is in a sense indefinable. A definition is formulated rationally. A concept comes to mind a priori. Hence, my idea of replacing the word "define" by "clarify". What we need rather than to define is to clarify the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

Man has given innumerable definitions and will continue to give many more. The field is inexhaustible. The important thing is not to define man, but to know him. By knowing man, objects and events, we direct the cognitive faculty of reason. Thus to know what is or should be a nuclear-weapon-free zone must be more useful than to try to define it.

Furthermore, if we must insist on defining it, a nuclear-weapon-free zone is self-explanatory. No explanation is necessary to make it understood. Its constituent elements are three clear items, expressed in three words, "zone", "free" from something, and that something is "nuclear weapons". But what we want to do is to bring together the concept in the institutional life of the United Nations. To achieve this basic object is what we are seeking in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724, dealing with this specific subject. We want to establish what is the first origin of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This can only be a treaty or a convention agreed on among sovereign States. Subsequently we must seek, through the recognition of the General Assembly, the higher sanction of the international society in which we live. But this sanction does not and cannot commit, in simple truth, Member States unless they have solemnly accepted this commitment through the normal procedures.

If we delete from the draft resolution all the words relating to definition, we shall gain in clarity and avoid becoming engulfed in the dangerous seas of definition. And I ask again, what could we gain by defining the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, if it could be defined, over and above what I have suggested? I emphasize again that what we must know is what such a zone consists of and what would be its international effects.

We do not want to find ourselves in the same position, in trying to define a concept, as we did in the case of terrorism. Distinguished legal authorities from every country have failed to agree, even now, in defining terrorism, which is inflicting untold sorrow on many human communities. But why do we wish to define it if we know what it is through its devastating and tragic effects for mankind? Why, rather, does mankind not agree on a way of putting an end to it, and of prohibiting it as a political weapon or as a means of extorting money or inflicting pain by antisocial groups? Who has been able to define electricity? Is it a fluid? What type of energy does it involve? What does it consist of? Nobody has determined this. But electricity is something we also know well because of its effects, and we know that it is generated, transported, transformed and used in a thousand ways. What more do we want?

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

For all these reasons, I maintain that we should delete the word "definition" from the heading of part I, and simply say "concept". I forgot to mention that in the last sentence of the preamble, the word "proclaims" should be replaced by the word "makes". This is more imperative and more suitable to the body making the declaration.

One more idea regarding the clarification of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones -- it seems appropriate to delete the phrase "as a general rule", because there can be no exceptions. The zone cannot be partly free of nuclear weapons, or free of nuclear weapons in some other way. It is either nuclear-weapon-free or not. There can be no alternative. We should also delete the phrase "recognized as such by the United Nations General Assembly" which is not essential to the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Such a zone exists not because it has been recognized by our Organization, but because it has been created by a treaty or a convention. Recognition by the General Assembly relates to other effects linked with the primary objective of the Charter to preserve peace and save peoples from the danger of war, and in this case, from a nuclear or atomic war. Another point that is understood, and could therefore be omitted, is that represented by the phrase "in the free exercise of their sovereignty", since States agree to what is in their interests by virtue of their sovereignty.

After certain amendments of style, we think it is desirable to introduce something new, something which could be included in a treaty or convention on nuclear-weapon-free zones. That refers to the limits of the zone which, if I am not mistaken, has been raised by the representative of France, in the form of a question.

In subparagraph (a) I have added the words "delivery of vehicles", not in the original text. This is important in order to prevent acquisition or installation of delivery vehicles. The absence of this provision could make a mockery of our resolution. In that case, it would be quite easy for ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons to be obtained and fired. It is easier to obtain the delivery systems than the weapons. Somebody who has a gun but no bullets cannot be regarded as unarmed; only the less important part is missing. He can find a way of buying them at any time.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

Finally, I must explain why I did not retain the expression "statute of absence", as in the original text. I find inconsistency in these words. I find the combinate forced and unaesthetic. Absence is something beautiful, suggestive and poetic. Absence is more attractive than presence, although this is not understood by the nuclear-weapon States, or at least it does not suit them to understand it. Absence in itself, makes the presence felt, according to the poets; although the presence holds little charm for non-nuclear-weapon States. A statute, on the other hand, is something cold, prosaic, empty, like a rule or a standard, like a constitution or laws which are neither obeyed nor respected. The absence, therefore, by itself, of nuclear weapons from a zone is a more appealing idea to the human mind. By itself it is far more expressive and alluring than if subject to the forensic dogma of a regulation. Finally, the statute and rules are not a principal part but a secondary and ancillary part of the principal or the basic rule being proclaimed. Drafting of the rule usually comes later than the establishment of the law concerned, and in this case we are more concerned with establishing the legal framework that will lead the great Powers to sign a treaty or agreement to establish a nuclear-free zone under the aegis of the United Nations.

I believe that these explanations will suffice to inform the members of this Committee of the purpose of the amendments I am proposing to part I of the draft resolution.

With respect to part II, the draft resolution refers to "definition of the principal obligations" of the nuclear-weapon States, in the heading. I will pass over the word "principal", since in discussing obligations what we must know is what the specific obligations are and what is their true meaning. The serious problem is that there is a reference to obligations which have not been contracted by those upon whom they are being imposed, merely by virtue of the recognition by the General Assembly of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

With full reason and justification the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have expressed their disagreement with this way of creating obligations. Let us proceed step by step. A nuclear-weapon-free zone is established solely, and by virtue of their sovereignty, by the States concerned.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

They do this by a treaty or convention. They are the ones who undertake the obligation not to become nuclear-weapon States. The General Assembly can take cognizance of the international instrument concerned and undertake the protection of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concerned. It can then proceed to call upon, to recommend, to urge, or appeal in other ways to the nuclear-weapon States to undertake particular duties. Such duties, which belong strictly in the moral sphere of international relations, will become obligations as soon as those Powers have signed the document establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone.

It has been said, as a justification of the draft resolution, that when the United Nations speaks of obligations -- and it has been doing this for 15 years -- it is speaking only of obligations of an ethical or moral nature. If this is so, then we must say so, and call things by their real names. In this way there will be a clear knowledge of the scope of such obligations, which are morally binding.

An enlightened Assembly such as this, however, does not have a licence to change the semantics of words, or to confuse the peoples and deceive international public opinion. An obligation means a tie whereby a natural or juridical person commits himself to another, to do or not to do a certain thing. This interpretation with minor variations must apply in all legislations, and in all languages. And on the nuclear States we wish to impose a negative commitment, not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States, and not to threaten them with their use.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

Let us now agree that obligations have their natural source in law. Among States, which are subject to international law, the obligation refers to conventions, treaties or agreements freely entered into. I agree that it would be ideal if we, the developing countries, could impose certain obligations on the major Powers -- but we are not in Utopia. Furthermore, our Organization is far from being a supra-national Power which can impose obligations on its Members. Its action is in the sphere of appeals, recommendations and so forth; its edicts lack executive effectiveness, however much it speaks of deciding and resolving. At best, it can send troops to guarantee an armistice, arrived at through its good offices, or not recognize a country as a Member, as the League of Nations did with Armenia.

How terrible it would be if the fate of a nation were to be decided by a majority of votes, without hearing the voice of reason. We would then be in a Tower of Babel or a Pan's Commune, without anybody knowing who is who, or demolishing countries in the heat of a debate.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

For all these reasons I believe it to be necessary to replace the phrase of the second title "Definition of the principal obligations" by the "attitude" of the nuclear-weapon States. The rest remains the same.

It is also understandable that operative paragraph 1 "urges" nuclear-weapon States. Here I refer to "recognition" by the General Assembly for the effects I have mentioned in the cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The General Assembly can only "recognize" these zones and "urge" the major Powers to adopt a certain attitude. Actually, with slight changes in form, the substance of the three subparagraphs is maintained.

I wish to draw attention to the fact that my proposal means changes in regard to subparagraph (c) of operative paragraph 1 in the interest of clarity. Previously it stated:

"to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States in the zone."

It should now read:

"to refrain from using nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone, or threatening to use such weapons against them."

Operative paragraph 2 has regard to the fact that nuclear-weapon States should not use these weapons against a nuclear-weapon-free zone or the States parties to it. It has been modified in line with our views.

I have no aim other than to seek a consensus on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.724. If we succeed, that would redound to our honour and our benefit. We would have taken a positive step for the benefit of thousands of people throughout the world who wish to be free from terror. In Latin America, in the Indian Ocean and in other territories which wish to be really denuclearized, hope will flourish for a fruitful, happy and lasting life. I wish to inform the Committee that we have been in contact with some of the main co-sponsors of the draft resolution and have arrived at an agreement on a harmonization of our points of view, which I think is a matter for rejoicing.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Bolivia. I should like to announce that Bahrain has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.741.

I now invite the representative of Australia to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.738.



Mr. KEVIN (Australia): Nuclear weapons testing fuels the nuclear arms race and is its most visible and dramatic manifestation. It has therefore been a major concern of world public opinion and of the Assembly for nearly 20 years. Twelve years ago in 1963, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom agreed -- under the partial test ban Treaty -- to ban all nuclear weapon tests except those under ground. In becoming parties to that Treaty, those Powers also committed themselves to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

Since then, progress has been painfully slow and, indeed, at times has seemed to be non-existent. Nevertheless, there have been positive developments.

After a period of several years during which the two nuclear weapon States not parties to the partial test ban Treaty conducted a series of tests in the atmosphere, this year for the first time there were no atmospheric nuclear weapon tests anywhere in the world. Moreover, one of those two States has indicated that in future its nuclear weapons testing programme will be conducted under ground.

Another step in the right direction is the threshold test ban Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed in 1974 and due to come into force in 1976, which will ban nuclear weapon tests above 150 kilotons. Verification will be by national technical means. However, peaceful nuclear explosions above the 150 kiloton limit are not covered by the Treaty but will be the subject of a further agreement which as yet does not exist.

That is the extent of progress over the past 12 years: 12 years during which the Assembly has repeatedly pressed the major Powers, and the CCD over which they preside, to complete the task which they undertook under the partial test ban Treaty of achieving a comprehensive test ban (CTB). The Assembly has also in this period regularly called upon the two nuclear-weapon States outside the partial test ban Treaty to adhere to that Treaty.

Throughout those 12 years, one major Power has consistently taken the position that it cannot accept a CTB -- or even an interim suspension of testing -- unless it is satisfied that the verification procedures are adequate to detect any violation. For this purpose it has insisted upon the

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need for on-site inspection. The other major Power has consistently rejected the need for on-site inspection and has claimed instead that national technical means of verification are sufficient.

As the detection threshold has steadily come down over the years due to the advances in seismic monitoring technology -- a field in which Canada, Japan and Sweden have made a notable contribution -- the technical difficulties on this issue have apparently somewhat lessened.

But new and important problems have come into focus more recently which threaten to negate the value of the great efforts made over the past 12 years, particularly in the CCD, to find a solution to the verification problem. Indeed, there is now a real danger that we could be moving towards a situation of impasse on the CTB issue. This must seriously concern all countries that are anxious to see an early end to nuclear-weapon testing in all environments.

One major Power has lately begun to draw attention to the point that an effective CTB treaty would need to contain adequate provisions for the monitoring of any peaceful nuclear explosions by its signatories, in order to ensure that these could not be used to circumvent the intentions of the treaty. The other major Power, for its part, has come out increasingly strongly with the proposition that a CTB could not enter into force until and unless all nuclear-weapon States adhered to it. Against this, the two nuclear-weapon States outside the partial test ban Treaty claim the right to continue their nuclear-weapon testing, at least until the two major Powers begin to significantly reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in their possession.

This is a situation that threatens total deadlock: a situation in which each of the parties concerned, having arrived at its own definition of the necessary preconditions for a CTB, would then be able to blame failure to achieve a CTB on the fact that other parties concerned had not met its preconditions. Unlike verification, which is more of a technical problem, this is clearly a political issue. As such, it is an issue upon which it is entirely appropriate that this Assembly should express its views.

The co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.738 believe that it is important that the Assembly should speak with a strong and

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united voice on the issue of nuclear-weapon testing. The co-sponsorship group is broadly representative of non-nuclear-weapon States from all regions of the world. It includes developed and developing countries; it includes aligned and non-aligned countries.

It could not be expected that the precise viewpoints of all the co-sponsors on more technical aspects of the CTB issue -- which is a complex one -- would be identical. The expression of the co-sponsors' various positions on the CTB issue is a matter of public record, from their past statements in this Committee, in the CCD, and at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, where the CTB issue was discussed in some depth under the review of article VI of the Treaty.

(Mr. Kevin, Australia)

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.730 has been framed to accommodate the range of these views in order to give a single and united expression to the strongly held position of principle that there is an urgent need for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and for the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban -- which is, of course, the title of the agenda item under which the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.730 has been presented. By giving a firm expression of world public opinion on this issue, the co-sponsors hope that we will spur on the major Powers to intensify their efforts to reach agreement on an effective comprehensive test ban.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738 largely speaks for itself, and I can be quite brief in commenting on its contents. The draft resolution is based on last year's resolution 3257 (XXIX), which had a similar group of co-sponsors. Resolution 3257 (XXIX) received 95 affirmative votes in the plenary, and the co-sponsors hope that we will do even better this year.

The draft resolution begins by expressing deep concern that underground nuclear-weapon testing continues, while it welcomes the fact that there have been no atmospheric tests since the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. It recalls previous resolutions, most recently resolution 3257 (XXIX), and it recalls the stated aims of the parties to the partial test ban Treaty to seek to achieve a discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

The fourth preambular paragraph is a rather long paragraph which records in summary form the results of the discussions on a comprehensive test ban that took place at the NPT Review Conference in May 1975.

Subparagraph (a) reproduces the consensus language of the final declaration of the Conference, which expressed the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race; expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would take the lead in reaching an early solution to the technical and political difficulties on this issue; and appeals to these States to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban.

Subparagraph (b) records the fact that a considerable number of States which attended the Conference -- no less than 20, in fact -- submitted a draft

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resolution and a draft additional protocol concerning nuclear-weapon tests, whereby the nuclear-weapon States depositaries to the Treaty would agree on a moratorium which could in due course become a comprehensive test ban embracing all nuclear-weapon States. This draft protocol was included in the Conference's final documentation as document NPT/CONF/L.2/Rev.1.

Subparagraph (c) reproduces the statement contained in the Review Conference's final declaration that the desire was expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should, as soon as possible, enter into an agreement, open to all States and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear-weapon tests of adhering States for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity at that time to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.

The fifth preambular paragraph notes the section of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of a comprehensive test ban agreement.

The sixth preambular paragraph reaffirms the Assembly's conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing would be in the supreme interest of mankind, both as a major step towards controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and to relieve the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations.

I turn now to the operative paragraphs. Operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are self-explanatory. The Assembly would condemn all nuclear-weapon tests in whatever environment they may be conducted, it would deplore the continued lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban agreement, and it would emphasize the urgency of reaching agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban.

Operative paragraphs 4 and 5 introduce a new element. These paragraphs take up the question of the desirability of an interim suspension of testing, agreed between all or some of the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement. The intention of these paragraphs is to provide a statement of what the positions indicated in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of the fourth preambular paragraph have in common. To this end, operative paragraph 4

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calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all nuclear-weapon tests through an agreed suspension subject to review after a specified period,' as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test ban agreement. Operative paragraph 5 emphasizes the particular responsibility in this regard of the nuclear-weapon States which are parties to international agreements in which they have declared their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

The co-sponsors believe that the approach underlying these two operative paragraphs would be consistent with the views of a large majority of delegations as expressed in this Committee and elsewhere.

Operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 are much along the lines of last year's resolution 3257 (XXIX). Operative paragraph 6 calls upon all States not yet parties to the partial test ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith. Operative paragraph 7 urges the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report its progress to the next session of the General Assembly. Operative paragraph 8 inscribes the item on the agenda of the next session of the Assembly.

Finally, I would like to inform the Committee that a separate vote has been requested on preambular paragraph 4 and on operative paragraph 5, and this has been accepted by the co-sponsors.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738.

Mr. HULINSKY (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): Speaking on 12 November in the general debate on questions of disarmament, my delegation confirmed that the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic supports the idea of the creation of nuclear-free zones as an additional instrument which would serve to strengthen the prevailing régime governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970.

(Mr. Hulinsky, Czechoslovakia)

Even last year, at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Czechoslovak delegation supported the initiative of Finland aiming at the preparation of a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In preparing this study, contained in the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/10027/Add.1), a Czechoslovak expert also took part.



(Mr. Hulinsky, Czechoslovakia)

The study reflects in detail the views of Governments of countries whose experts took part in its preparation with regard to all the major aspects of this important problem. It also summarizes areas of agreement as well as hitherto unidentified questions and differing approaches to solving these problems.

The study confirms the unanimity of view with regard to the advisability and usefulness of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means of strengthening international security and creating a more favourable climate for making progress in the field of disarmament.

My delegation takes a favourable view particularly of the consensus on the principles which should govern nuclear-weapon-free zones -- principles contained in chapter III of the study. This chapter contains a number of important provisions, primarily the requirement that there shall be a guarantee that zones should be and remain entirely free from nuclear weapons; that the initiative for creating a zone should come from the prospective participants in a zone on the basis of voluntary participation; and that a zone treaty should include an effective system of control which would ensure total compliance with the obligations assumed, as well as other principles, in order to make progress in the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

An essential prerequisite remains the achievement of a universally acceptable way of reconciling contradictory aspects of the problem -- matters which were also touched upon, as I have mentioned, in this study.

There is no doubt that these questions can only be effectively solved by our joint efforts, and also on the basis of the views of as wide a circle of States as possible, including all States which possess nuclear weapons, with the idea that these States should assume specific and important obligations with regard to particular zones.

(Mr. Hulinsky, Czechoslovakia)

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.734 provides a constructive approach to the achievement of a universally acceptable solution. This resolution was submitted by the delegation of Finland. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of the operative part of this draft resolution, all Governments and international organizations concerned are invited to submit their views and recommendations relating to the experts' study on the basis of which the Secretary-General could prepare a report for the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.734 is a good point of departure for making progress in the matter of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

My delegation whole-heartedly supports the view contained in chapter III of the experts' study that the conditions in which nuclear-weapon-free zones could become viable and strengthen international security will, without any doubt, differ substantially from one region to another, and that the ideas and concepts of the security of the States which would be potential members of such a zone can, by the same token, differ widely too.

We agree with the view of the experts that in this regard it is impossible or unrealistic to determine beforehand specific provisions governing the creation of such zones, since the Governments of the countries concerned themselves should determine the requirements of their own security and their own national interests.

We do not think it useful to attempt at this early stage to prejudge the substance of the matter -- the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones -- by submitting draft resolutions which do not meet the above-mentioned, broadly acknowledged and well-founded conditions.

Therefore, the Czechoslovak delegation is unable to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724.

Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands): I would like to address myself to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. As you know, the permanent representative of the Netherlands had the honour to introduce, on behalf of its sponsors, the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721 concerning the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. Last Friday, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, introduced a number of proposed amendments, which are on the table under document number A/C.1/L.729. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721 have carefully considered these suggestions in a very constructive spirit, a spirit which I am sure is still present in this Committee.

On behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721, I may now state the following. Let me first say that a majority of the amendments are acceptable to the co-sponsors. A number of them we consider to be improvements. We may be able to accept some others in a spirit of compromise. However, a few of the amendments present us with considerable difficulties. The co-sponsors hope and expect that there will be a constructive dialogue with the co-sponsors of the proposed amendments.

I am happy to inform the Committee that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution can accept the first and eighth amendments which are concerned with the same subject. As Ambassador Garcia Robles rightly pointed out, similar paragraphs were included in 1st year's resolution 3261 D (XXIX). The reason why the co-sponsors did not incorporate such paragraphs in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721 in the first place was because we considered it useful to address ourselves solely to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in all of their aspects. However, we are in total agreement with the representative of Mexico that the ongoing nuclear arms race is a great danger to the world. To create no misunderstanding about our concerns in this respect, we can accept the amendments on this point.

(Mr. Meerburg, Netherlands)

Proposed amendment No. 2 in document A/C.1/L.729 would, in our view, be most unfortunate because it calls for the deletion from preambular paragraph 3 of the resolution itself of a view widely shared in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The CCD had extensive formal and informal talks on the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions in the course of this year. At the end of these discussions, wide support was given to the idea expressed in the second part of the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. To delete this part would imply that no progress at all was made in the CCD studies of the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, studies which were requested by the General Assembly in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 3261 D (XXIX).

We are also not very happy with the third proposed amendment, which would have us delete the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721. As the representative of Mexico apparently wished to use as much as possible of the language of last year's resolution, we fail to understand why preambular paragraph 5 should be deleted. The paragraph formed a very important consideration in last year's resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and we would strongly prefer to retain it in this year's resolution.

(Mr. Meerburg, Netherlands)

The co-sponsors entirely agree with the fourth and fifth proposed amendments and would be pleased to accept them.

We hesitate to accept the sixth proposed amendment. We recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union are in a somewhat unique position, as they are the only nuclear-weapon States that have conducted peaceful nuclear explosion experiments. However, we think we should bear in mind that positions do change and that Assembly resolutions should take this factor into account.

We consider the seventh proposed amendment to be an improvement, and we gladly accept it. We can also accept the ninth proposed amendment, and the same holds for the tenth proposed amendment, which is factually more correct than the original text. The co-sponsors can also agree to the eleventh proposed amendment, which rearranges the order of subparagraphs.

We are unable, however, to accept the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth proposed amendments.

The twelfth proposed amendment calls for the deletion of the whole of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721. To delete this paragraph would be to ignore totally the fact that during the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons an extensive review took place of the implementation of article V of the NPT. In Committee II of that Conference long negotiations were held which led to very substantial agreement. This was reflected in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference. We recognize that there was a draft resolution co-sponsored by Mexico and others on this question. However, several of the co-sponsors of that draft resolution later participated actively in the negotiations which led to the formulation adopted in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference.

We firmly believe that the conclusions of the Review Conference on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions are very important. We would therefore consider it a significant step backwards if the important results of the Review Conference could not be recognized. The progress of thinking on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions at and since the Review Conference has, in our view, been significantly greater than most of us had anticipated at this time last year.

(Mr. Meerburg, Netherlands)

We have even more problems with the operative paragraph mentioned in the twelfth proposed amendment. This paragraph is factually incorrect. Last year's resolution invited the Soviet Union and the United States:

"... to provide the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with information concerning such steps as they have taken since the entry into force of the Treaty, or intend to take, for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which is envisaged in article V of the Treaty". (General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX))

Did the two States mentioned ignore this invitation, as is stated in the twelfth proposed amendment? No, on the contrary: both the Soviet Union and the United States provided, in the general debate and in Committee II of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, extensive information on their situation in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions, including past and future steps towards the implementation of article V of the Treaty. All of this can be found in the summary records of the Conference. We cannot, therefore, accept the operative paragraphs set out in the twelfth and thirteenth proposed amendments.

We have come now to the stage where, in the International Atomic Agency, substantive steps are being taken to study most aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. In the International Atomic Agency's open-ended Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions an intergovernmental group has been created to discuss peaceful nuclear explosions in their different aspects, including the setting up of peaceful nuclear explosion services for the benefit of non-nuclear weapon States. Frankly, it is difficult for us to understand why the co-sponsors of the proposed amendments want to give a privileged status to the United States and the Soviet Union in negotiations leading to the conclusion of a special international agreement, or agreements, for the provision of peaceful nuclear explosion services. We assume that this view is fully shared by most, if not all, United Nations Member States. Surely, all Member States that wish to participate in discussions leading to such an agreement, or agreements, would insist on their right to do so on an equal footing.

(Mr. Meerburg, Netherlands)

That brings me to the fourteenth proposed amendment. This amendment would ignore the decisions taken by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency when they established the already-mentioned Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. Perhaps I might remind the Committee of the mandate given by the Board to the Ad Hoc Advisory Group. The Group was called upon:

- "(a) To examine the aspects of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE) coming within the Agency's sphere of competence, with particular reference to:
- (i) Procedural aspects relating to possible requests for PNE-related services;
  - (ii) Legal aspects and treaty obligations;
  - (iii) Health and safety matters; and
  - (iv) Economic aspects, including comparisons with non-nuclear alternatives, taking fully into account the work already done in these fields by technical committees under the auspices of the Agency;"

(GC (XIX)/544, pp. 66 and 67)

And the mandate goes on:

- "(b) To advise the Board on the factors involved in the establishment and operation of an international service for PNE as envisaged in paragraph 1(c) of its resolution on PNE of 13 September 1974; and
- (c) To advise the Board, within the Agency's sphere of competence, on the structure and content of agreements necessary under Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;" (ibid., p. 67)

In operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721 this important decision by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been fully taken into account. The fourteenth amendment, as proposed by the Mexican delegation and others, apparently tries, ex post facto, to restrict the work within the IAEA -- a view, by the way, which is apparently not shared by the Mexican representative in the IAEA Ad Hoc Advisory Group, whose statements in that Group's discussions we have had an opportunity to examine carefully.



(Mr. Meerberg, Netherlands)

Moreover, may I strongly recommend that all members of this Committee bear in mind resolution 3386 (XXX), adopted unanimously at the 2403rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on 12 November 1975, that is just over two weeks ago. Operative paragraph 6 of that resolution commends the International Atomic Energy Agency on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes and its mandate, a mandate on which the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721 reflects in its operative paragraph 5. It is obvious, therefore, that the proposed fourteenth amendment is unacceptable.

In this statement we have made clear what we think about the proposed amendments. I really want to stress, however, that we are willing to engage in a constructive dialogue with the co-sponsors of the proposed amendments, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution. It is our sincere hope that we shall be able to start such consultations today.

The CHAIRMAN: I would certainly hope that consultations might start today so that we could reach agreement before the end of the week.

I now call upon the representative of Iran to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.741.

Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran): By a nearly unanimous vote, the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly adopted resolution 3263 (XXIX), dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. As co-sponsor with Egypt of that resolution, my country is gratified to see that interest in the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones has revived in recent years. The growing interest in the regional approach for containing the spread of nuclear weapons is in a way a reflection of the disillusionment felt at the lack of progress on a global scale. Hence, in a more positive sense it is a concrete response by the States concerned for devising alternative ways of enhancing their own security within certain defined regions of the globe. Moreover, the disturbing outlook with respect to the depletion of traditional sources of energy has accelerated the diffusion of nuclear technology and thus increased the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

Those factors have combined to lead to an upsurge of interest in nuclear-weapon-free zones as an approach to curbing the further spread of weapons. Thus, at this Assembly session we have as many as eight agenda items dealing with non-nuclear-weapon zones. Moreover, the Assembly has been entrusted with the task of examining the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, prepared by the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX), which in our view is bound to stimulate further interest and encourage constructive efforts with respect to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The concerns underlying our proposal have already been explained at length in this Committee and elsewhere. One essential element in it, however bears constant re-emphasis. In the political climate of our region, the introduction of nuclear weapons not only cannot be discounted but also would represent the most dangerous aspect of nuclear-weapon proliferation. It would seriously complicate the prospects for peace and security in the region. All of us here know the full import of the brutal facts that confront us in that part of the world. Indeed, it is ominously easy to predict the turn of events that could follow the introduction of nuclear weapons into the area.

It is no mere coincidence that in the comprehensive study on the question the opinion has been expressed by many experts that:

"... in regions where the most acute tensions exist the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, though particularly difficult, would be particularly desirable." (A/10027/Add.1, p. 39, para. 5)

It is precisely that logic that is the basis of our advocacy of such a zone in our part of the world.

Thus, on the initiative of Iran and Egypt, resolution 3263 (XXIX), on the subject, was introduced in the General Assembly last year. As I have said, the resolution received nearly unanimous support, including the support of all the nuclear Powers. Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General has ascertained the views of the States in the region with respect to the implementation of the resolution. One may take heart from the positive tenor of the bulk of the replies received. From the answers it is obviously manifest that the idea of the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East enjoys a wide measure of support in the region.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

However, that does not minimize the complexities involved in the implementation of the proposal. In our view, mere expression of support for the idea, though welcome, is not in itself sufficient to override the existing obstacles; nor could the advocacy of conventional means for the realization of the idea stand the test of credibility in the face of the particular climate in the region. That view is amply supported by the experts studying the question when, in their conclusions, they express deceiving unanimous opinion:

"The study does not attempt to establish any precise rules, as it is the considered view of the experts that circumstances in different regions vary so widely that a pragmatic and flexible approach would need to be adopted in each case." (Ibid. p. 69)

It is in the sincere hope of offering such pragmatic means that the delegations of Iran and Egypt have endeavoured to produce a draft resolution as a follow-up to last year's resolution on the subject. It is my privilege now to introduce the text of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.741) on behalf of the sponsors.

The preambular paragraphs essentially trace the background to the present draft resolution, as well as the relevant developments since the adoption of last year's resolution, and therefore do not require elaborate explanation. I should, however, like to draw particular attention to the third preambular paragraph, which acknowledges the extensive support the proposal has received within the region, to which I referred a short time ago. The approach adopted in the operative part of the draft resolution is based on a realistic assessment of the present situation. It entails two distinct though complementary courses of action by the Governments which would form the core of the denuclearized zone in the region.

In a more general way, it would be essential to promote conditions which would be conducive to the eventual establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the exertion of efforts towards the creation of such a congenial environment

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

is the course of action advocated in the first two operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. Through actions which could be interpreted unequivocally as gestures of good faith, feelings of trust and confidence among the States of the region would be bound to be generated. In the opinion of the sponsors, adherence to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the States directly concerned could produce such a beneficial effect, and thus that is urged in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

Operative paragraph 3 addresses itself to the very heart of the matter. It recommends that the States with which the Secretary-General has consulted pursuant to resolution 3263 (XXIX) should proclaim immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territory or the territory under their control by any third party. It further recommends that these States refrain from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, transit, testing or use of such weapons, or that would be in any other way detrimental to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, under an effective system of safeguards. By thus spelling out in precise terms the urgent and substantive measures to be undertaken by the States of the region, this paragraph tries to prevent pre-emptive action that would defeat the purpose of the zone at an embryonic stage.

Operative paragraph 4 recommends that the nuclear States should extend their full co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote the objective of establishing the zone, and that they should refrain from any action that might be contrary to the purpose of the present resolution or to the objectives embodied in it. At this stage, we do not ask them to undertake a priori obligations with respect to the security of the zone. What is required of them, rather, is the avoidance of any action that would render the eventual realization of the zone even more intractable.

Finally, it only remains for me to say that, in trying to produce a suitable formula, the co-sponsors have been guided by one supreme and overriding aim, that of sparing our region from the ravages of a nuclear holocaust. And in that spirit, we have laboured to eschew, in terms of form as well as content, anything that might give legitimate cause for dissension on the part of anyone. We think we have succeeded in that endeavour. It is now our hope that all sides concerned, as well as each and every Member of the Organization, will concur in this opinion and adopt the resolution unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Iran for introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.741.

Mr. PEKOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I have asked to speak in order to make a brief statement concerning the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724, of 17 November, submitted on behalf of a group of countries by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles. s

In the course of our previous statement, the Bulgarian delegation took the opportunity to set forth its views on the problem of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Our full support for the idea of establishing such zones derives from our attitude with regard to the non-proliferation Treaty, which the People's Republic of Bulgaria has signed and ratified.

The delegation of Bulgaria thus cannot but subscribe to the basic idea of draft resolution A/C.1/L.724, dealing with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as one of the most effective means of preventing the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction.

However, the Bulgarian delegation will not be able to vote in favour of this draft resolution, the operative parts of which accord to the General Assembly the mandate and competence to recognize the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to define in advance the principal obligations of the States participating therein. This is not in accord with the United Nations Charter and goes outside the framework of the functions and powers of the General Assembly, which, as we all know, can only make recommendations. Clearly, a nuclear-weapon-free zone can be established only through an international treaty or agreement negotiated among the States concerned.

Under the terms of the draft resolution before us, the recognition of such a zone by the General Assembly would at the same time mean a recognition of the treaties establishing it. But the United Nations Charter does not provide for recognition of international treaties and agreements concluded by States Members; it provides solely for their registration with the Secretariat.

Consequently, in this case, for ourselves as for many other delegations, quite aside from the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and regardless of our opinion as to the content of the obligations to be assumed by States parties thereto, the draft resolution appearing in document A/C.1/L.724 poses another question, one of principle, namely that of the competence of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

According to the Charter, the General Assembly is not authorized to impose binding obligations on Member States. The adoption by the General Assembly of the draft resolution under consideration cannot be defended in law, and would not have the desired effect in practice. For this reason, though we are deeply convinced of the desirability of having nuclear-weapon-free zones and though we recognize the good intentions of the sponsors of the draft resolution, we regret that we cannot give it our support.

Furthermore, for the reasons I have just set forth, the delegation of Bulgaria, in the course of the discussions within the group of governmental experts this summer in Geneva, and here as well, stressed that the General Assembly cannot decree the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The representative of Bolivia introduced this morning a whole series of amendments to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724. We have not yet had the opportunity to study those amendments, and I myself was not able, at the beginning of this meeting, to listen to the statement of the representative of Bolivia. It is therefore difficult for me to pronounce myself on the proposed amendments, which seem to take into account the objections and reservations previously expressed by a certain number of delegations in this Committee with regard to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724.



Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Contrary to what might be expected, I shall not refer to what the representative of Bulgaria has just said. I believe that the concerns which he expressed could be easily dispelled were he to read what I said here on Wednesday afternoon, 26 November, at the 2098th meeting of the Committee, when I expressed my views on the reservations of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France in regard to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738, of which Mexico is a co-sponsor and which was formally introduced in the Committee by the representative of Australia.

As was quite rightly said in the statement of the representative of Australia, (spoke in English)

"It could not be expected that the precise viewpoints of all the co-sponsors on more technical aspects of the CTB issue -- which is a complex one -- would be identical. The expression of the co-sponsors' various positions on the CTB issue is a matter of public record, from their past statements in this Committee, in the CCD and at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, where the CTB issue was discussed in some depth under the review of article VI of the Treaty." (supra, p. 14-15)

(continued in Spanish)

That statement is in fact in accord with the existing situation, and I should therefore like to clarify only two points. First, the delegation of Mexico interprets the provisions of operative paragraph 3,

"Emphasizes the urgency of reaching agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban;" (A/C.1/L.738) as something which does not in any way affect the validity of what the General Assembly adopted in resolution 2934 C (XXVII) of 29 November 1972 and 3078 A (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, in which the Assembly, in operative paragraphs 2 of these resolutions, reaffirms

"... its conviction that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban of the nature contemplated in the preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;"

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The second point I wish to clarify is related to operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.738).

Operative paragraph 4

"Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all nuclear weapon tests through an agreed suspension" ---as specified there, a moratorium, in other words, which would be a provisional measure.

Operative paragraph 5

"Emphasizes in this regard the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States which are party to international agreements in which they have declared their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race;"

In this connexion my delegation would like to make it clear that, in our opinion, the tangible measures of the States referred to in operative paragraph 5 would be the ones specified in the draft Additional Protocol which 18 or 19 delegations -- I do not remember how many exactly -- of the third world submitted to the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a draft Protocol which has been reproduced in document A/C.1/1055, dated 25 September last, of this Committee.

Naturally, as I said when explaining the scope of this draft, these are not inflexible or rigid formulas or measures but formulas which, in our opinion, constitute a practical, attainable and effective method so as to make effective the promises that have so often been made to us.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce that the delegations of Kuwait and Tunisia have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.741.

## ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to give you some indication of what I shall propose to the Committee for the remainder of the week.

If the members of the Committee agree, it is my intention to proceed to the vote on all the draft resolutions before us, beginning at Thursday afternoon's meeting. We will have three meetings for voting -- Thursday afternoon, Friday morning and Friday afternoon. We hope to conclude our work at that time.

I hope delegations will have had sufficient time before then to state their positions on the draft resolutions and the amendments. This afternoon's meeting is cancelled for lack of speakers. I urge members to inscribe their names as soon as possible if they wish to speak on the draft resolutions.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation intends tomorrow to introduce revised draft resolutions on the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons contained in document A/C.1/L.711, and on the question of the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests contained in document A/C.1/L.707.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.