Accident: JAL A359 at Tokyo on Jan 2nd 2024, collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

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Accident: JAL A359 at Tokyo on Jan 2nd 2024, collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Jan 2nd 2024 10:07Z, last updated Friday, Dec 27th 2024 18:08Z

A JAL Japan Airlines Airbus A350-900, registration JA13XJ performing flight JL-516 from Sapporo to Tokyo Haneda (Japan) with 367 passengers and 12 crew, landed on Haneda's runway 34R at 17:47L (08:47Z) in night time conditions but collided with a Japanese Coast Guard Dash 8-300 registration JA722A (Coast Guard code MA722) on the runway shortly after touchdown and burst into flames. The A350 came to a stop off the right hand edge of the runway about 1680 meters/5510 feet down the runway and was evacuated. All occupants were able to evacuate. The other aircraft carrying 6 people also burst into flames, 5 of the six occupants are confirmed dead. Both aircraft burned down. 15 passengers of the A359 received injuries, the captain of the Dash 8 received serious injuries. The aircraft fires were extinguished about 8 hours after the collision.

The airline reported their A350 was carrying 367 passengers (including 8 children) and 12 crew, all of them evacuated from the aircraft. In a second press release the airline reported there had been no anomaly with the aircraft prior to departure. The crew had received and read back landing clearance. After the collision and coming to a stand still three emergency slides were used to evacuate the occupants of the aircraft. The details of the accident are under investigation by the JTSB.

Japan's Coast Guard reported their Dash 8-300 registration JA722A (Code MA722) was carrying 6 people, the captain was able to evacuate, the other 5 are currently missing. The aircraft was carrying supplies to their Niigata base where the New Year's Earthquake struck.

Tokyo's Metropolitan Police reported 5 of the occupants of the Dash 8 are confirmed dead.

Tokyo's fire department reported, the captain of the DH8C received serious injuries, 17 occupants of the A359 received injuries. Later the Fire Department corrected the number to 14 injuries amongst the occupants of the A359.

Passengers of the A359 reported the landing appeared normal at first, after touchdown there was a thud and the outside lit up in orange. A first announcement was made "please calm down" followed by "do not take your luggage and do not stand up". There was no clear announcement to evacuate, however, when other passengers stood up they also stood up and thus escaped.

Japan's Ministry of Transport stated Haneda Airport was closed, the flights cancelled, there is no prediction when the airport will open again.

In a press conference the Ministry of Transport stated that it is under investigation whether JL-516 had been cleared to land. There was a Coast Guard aircraft on the runway causing a collision, the details of the collision are under investigation. In a graphics the Ministry showed the approximate positions of both aircraft (see below).

In the afternoon of Jan 2nd 2024 (European Time) the French BEA reported they have dispatched 4 investigators and 5 technical advisors to Tokyo to join Japan's JTSB, who are investigating the accident. The team is expected to be on site by Jan 3rd 2024.

A number of arriving flights are being diverted to Narita Airport where the flights are being accepted one by one.

According to ATC recordings the A359 as well as a number of other aircraft departing runway 34R were handed off to Tower Frequency 118.725MHz, however, the Coast Guard DH8C was handed off to tower at 124.350MHz. JL-516, upon being handed off to tower by approach, was told by tower to "continue approach", about 90 seconds later tower cleared the aircraft to land.

Haneda Airport resumed operations on their runways 16R/34L, 04/22 and 05/23 at about 21:30L (12:30Z) about 3:45 hours after the accident while runway 16L/34R remains closed.

On Jan 3rd 2024 Japan's Ministry of Transport said, that the DH8C had received instructions to proceed as far as he could, the coast guard captain by his own testimony however understood this instruction as takeoff clearance, lined up runway 34R instead leading to the collision. The JTSB is investigating the occurrence.

In the evening of Jan 3rd 2024 Japan's Ministry of Transport released a transcript of the ATC communication (see below, the Ministry also released a version that translates the communication to Japanese) that states, that JL516 was cleared to land on runway 34R, winds 310 at 8. About 10 seconds later and about 2:16 minutes prior to collision the DH8C reported on tower and was cleared to taxi to holding point C5 (Runway 34R), which was correctly read back by the crew. There is no record of any further clearance to the DH8C (other than the captain of the DH8C stated that he had takeoff clearance).

On Jan 3rd 2024 the JTSB reported one of the black boxes of the DH8C have already been recovered, the blackboxes of the A359 are yet to be recovered.

On Jan 3rd 2024 Tokyo's Metropolitan Police reported they too have opened an investigation for professional negligence into the accident.

On Jan 3rd 2024 the airline reported the aircraft skidded for about 1000 meters after the collision. The last person got off the A359 at 18:05L, 18 minutes after the collision.

In the evening of Jan 3rd 2024 the British AAIB announced they also have sent a team of investigators to Japan to assist the JTSB in their investigation.

On Jan 4th 2024 the JAL reported that actually 15 passengers needed medical attention. There were three pilots in the cockpit, none of them was able to see the DH8C, therefore a go around was never considered. After the aircraft came to a stop the cockpit crew was not aware of any fire, however, flight attendants reported fire from the aircraft. The purser went to the cockpit and reported the fire and received instruction to evacuate. Evacuation thus began with the two front exits (left and right) closest to the cockpit. Of the other 6 emergency exits 5 were already in fire, only the left aft exit was still usable. The Intercom malfunctioned, communication from the aft aircraft with the cockpit was thus impossible. As result the aft flight attendants gave up receiving instructions from the cockpit and opened the emergency exit on their own initiative.

On Jan 4th 2024 Japan's Ministry of Transport stated that it appears the tower controller was not aware of the Coast Guard DH8C on the runway. The pilots of the A359 did not see the DH8C and are currently being interviewed by the JTSB.

On Jan 4th 2024 Tokyo's Metropolitan Police reported in an interview with them the captain of the DH8C stated that suddenly a fire started in the back of or behind the aircraft. The Police is investigating whether the captain was aware there had been a collision with the passenger aircraft.

On Jan 5th 2024 works to clear the runway are under way. The flight data recorder of the A359 was recovered, the CVR has not yet been found.

On Jan 5th 2024 the Ministry of Transport reported that the tower controller in charge stated in an interview, that after giving the taxi instructions to the DH8C he turned his attention towards other aircraft and did not notice the DH8C had taxied onto the runway. The runway monitoring system has been working properly. The DH8C stopped on the runway for about 40 seconds, it is possible that the controller missed the alert display, there is no rule requiring the controller to stare onto the screen all times, the screen would turn red and runway be flashing yellow (operative on all runways since 2011). Runway 34R is estimated to return to service on Jan 8th 2024.

According to a Japanese Media report by a reporter on board of the A359 as passenger the evacuation was mainly completed about 7 minutes after the collision, the captain subsequently walked through the aircraft and found a number of passengers who had not yet evacuated and prompted them to leave the aircraft. The captain was the last to leave the aircraft 18 minutes after coming to a stop.

In the evening of Jan 5th 2024 the Ministry added, that the aircraft had been evacuated within 7 minutes after the collision, however, it took another 11 minutes until the captain managed to convince several petrified passengers still in the cabin to leave the aircraft.

On Jan 6th 2024 Japans Ministry of Transport said, that so far there had been no rule requiring air traffic control to permanently monitor the positions of aircraft to prevent incorrect approaches to the runways. Starting Jan 6th 2024 a new position in the ATC center was created to permanently monitor the monitors showing aircraft positions in order to prevent aircraft incorrectly entering the runways. The number of ATC staff will not be increased, however. The Cockpit Voice Recorder of the A359 was recovered on Jan 6th and is being analysed. Interviews with the air traffic controllers in charge of runway 34R are to be conducted.

On Jan 7th 2024 (UTC) runway 34R was returned to service at midnight Jan 8th 2024 Japan Time, after the wreckages of both aircraft had been removed and the runway had been repaired. More than 1200 (domestic) flights had to be cancelled during the closure of the runway due to the non-availability of the runway.

On Jan 9th 2024 Japan's Ministry of Transport stated that the departure sequencing is no longer to be told to the flight crews, "number one" etc. is abandoned for departures. There is a possibility that the flight crew of the DH8C mistook that information as clearance for takeoff.

In a press conference on Jan 23rd 2024 the JTSB reported that the data have been successfully downloaded from the flight data recorders and voice recorders of both aircraft and are now being analysed.

On Dec 25th 2024 the JTSB released their preliminary report in Japanese only (166 pages) summarizing the events on board of the DH8C. The DH8C had been cleared to taxi via taxiways H and C to holding point C5. Tower giving priority to the aircraft indicated that the aircraft would be number 1 for takeoff, the crew read this information back correctly while taxiing towards C5, the crew verified they had sufficient takeoff distance available. The captain thought they had received clearance to line up runway 34R, the crew turned the anticollision lights on and worked the before takeoff checklist. In a partially overlapping radio communication the crew heard "Runway 34R, cleared for takeoff". The aircraft lined up and stopped. In that moment the collision between the aircraft occurred.

Related NOTAMs:
J0019/24 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021538 C) 2401031500 EST
E) RWY 16L/34R-CLSD DUE TO DISABLED ACFT

E5877/23 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021530 C) 2401302130
D) 02 05 09 12 16 19 23 26 30 1530/2130
E) TWY C1 THRU C14-CLSD DUE TO MAINT

E0023/24 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401020930 C) 2401021500 EST
E) TWY C1 THRU C14-CLSD DUE TO TRBL

J0011/24 NOTAMR J0010/24
Q) RJJJ/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021136 C) 2401021300 EST
E) ALL RWY-CLSD DUE TO DISABLED ACFT

E0025/24 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021144 C) 2401021300 EST
E) TWY C(FM C1 TO C14)-CLSD DUE TO TRBL

E0026/24 NOTAMR E0024/24
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021154 C) 2401031200
E) TWY G(BTN C AND H2),G(INT OF H2)-CLSD DUE TO RESCUE OPR

E0024/24 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401020953 C) 2401021200
E) TWY G(BTN C AND H2),G(INT OF H2)-CLSD DUE TO RESCUE OPR

J2253/23 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QLRAS/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2312271500 C) 2402211500
E) REF AIP SUP 225/23 ITEM TWY:2,3,4,5,6,7,10,11,12,13,33,38,44,54
TWY-CL-LGT FOR M1,R1,W11(BTN W AND R1)-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR E10(BEHIND SPOT 53)-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR D5-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR A(BTN W AND A2),A(INT OF W1),A1,A2(INT OF A),W1
-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR A16-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR K(BTN SPOT 304 AND C),R(INT OF K)-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR R(BTN K AND Y),R(INT OF Y)-PARTLY U/S
STOP-BAR-LGT FOR C1 THRU C14-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR T12,T14,Q,Q1,Q2-U/S
TAXIING-GUIDANCE-SIGN FOR T12,T14,Q,Q1,Q2-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR C(INT OF C3),C(INT OF C5)-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR T(BTN T2 AND SPOT 909),T(INT OF T4),T(INT OF T6)
-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR C3(INT OF RWY 16L/34R)-PARTLY U/S
RAPID EXIT TWY INDICATOR LGT FOR D5-U/S

Metars:
RJTT 021000Z 32003KT 9999 R34L/P2000N R22/P2000N R34R/P2000N R05/P2000N FU BKN015 08/04 Q1016 NOSIG RMK 7SC015 A3002 1000E FU ON RWYC-MID=
RJTT 020930Z 31007KT 9999 R34L/P2000N R22/P2000N R34R/0900VP2000U R05/P2000N FU BKN015 08/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020900Z 33008KT 9999 FEW020 07/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020830Z VRB03KT 9999 FEW020 SCT090 08/04 Q1016 BECMG TL0900 30006KT=
RJTT 020800Z 13003KT 090V150 9999 FEW020 BKN090 09/05 Q1016 BECMG TL0930 30006KT RMK 1CU020 6AC090 A3000=
RJTT 020730Z 16007KT 130V190 9999 FEW020 BKN100 08/05 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020700Z 12007KT 9999 FEW030 BKN100 09/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020630Z 13010KT 9999 -RA FEW030 BKN070 09/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020600Z 14005KT 120V180 9999 -RA FEW030 SCT060 BKN080 08/03 Q1017 NOSIG=
RJTT 020530Z 12005KT 9999 -RA FEW025 SCT060 BKN080 08/02 Q1017 NOSIG=
RJTT 020500Z 09003KT 050V120 9999 -RA FEW040 BKN060 08/02 Q1017 NOSIG=
RJTT 020430Z VRB01KT 9999 -RA FEW030 BKN050 09/01 Q1018 NOSIG=
RJTT 020400Z 01003KT 310V060 9999 -RA FEW030 BKN045 09/00 Q1018 NOSIG=

CCTV Video of line up of Coast Guard (at 2:40 mins), landing of A359 (coming into sight at 3:20 mins) and collision at 3:47 mins (Video: Single Preference):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6NbVdIoJsHY

The A350 skidding to a halt on the runway:

The aircraft after coming to a halt:

Still out CCTV recording showing the A359 shortly after touchdown, just before and at the moment of collision:

Still out CCTV recording showing the A359 just before collision

Still out CCTV recording showing the A359 just at collision

The following day the remains of the DH8C:

The following day the remains of the A359:

Aerial oversight of the accident scene:

ATC Transcript released by Japan's Ministry of Transport on Jan 3rd 2024:

Excerpt of Haneda Aerodrome Chart with positions of aircraft (Graphics: AVH/AIP Japan):

Map and assumed taxi path of DH8C (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):

Map of aircraft pathes (Graphics: JTSB):

Reader Comments: (the comments posted below do not reflect the view of The Aviation Herald but represent the view of the various posters)

Is japanese an ICAO language?
By R22 CPT on Friday, Jan 3rd 2025 00:25Z

Is japanese an ICAO language?

holding point
By peter on Sunday, Dec 29th 2024 20:12Z

ICAO uses "holding point" A holding point is a clearly defined position before the rwy and not on the runway.

holding position is problematic because of the word position: examples like "in position" , "hold position" The word position should only be used to ask for the position (location) of an aircraft

By (anonymous) on Saturday, Dec 28th 2024 04:10Z

Scarey.

By (anonymous) on Saturday, Dec 28th 2024 03:54Z

The fine line.

@ Peter
By (anonymous) on Saturday, Dec 28th 2024 02:20Z

ATC was clear and in accordance with ICAO standards?

Is "Hold Short" US-only terminology? Because nothing I saw in the translation was translated to "hold short".

By (anonymous) on Friday, Dec 27th 2024 22:34Z

6 mins maybe more by rescuers for first contact on a runway.. sleeping? ithey dont deserve anything..

Standard transmissions
By peter on Friday, Dec 27th 2024 19:53Z

The voice transmission from ATC and the readbacks from the pilots as depicted above, are very clear and ICAO standard. There is nothing to misinterpret at all.
From the transcript, the Japanese ATC Controllers apparently not only give precise ATC instructions, but also keep the aircraft crew informed with additional information to keep them in the overall picture. With the sequence numbers all crews knew exactly where they were concerning departure sequence and landing sequence. This clearly shows the Japanese ATC schooling has a very high and professional standard.

By Big in Japan on Friday, Dec 27th 2024 18:52Z

People think, for whatever reason, that japanese dont fail. But they do, massively sometimes. Heres another example.

Still no report?
By Brian Johnson on Saturday, Oct 26th 2024 13:50Z

Not even a preliminary report after 9 months?
Are there not international legal requirements to produce reports within certain time limits?

Japanese authority questioning JAL
By Keith Sketchley on Tuesday, May 28th 2024 19:20Z

Japanese officials are 'on JAL's case' about a spate of problems including the Dash8 disaster at Haneda.

Five cases are mentioned by my aviation media source, including wing touches between aircraft on ground and one more case of aircraft entering runway without authorization.

But the disaster at Haneda resulted from the JCG's Dash 8 entering a runway without clearance and the airport not fixing its system that would have warned controllers.

Tanslation accuracy
By Keith Sketchley on Friday, May 24th 2024 14:36Z

I know that there are people who understand technology and both languages well so can translate accurately.

I know that Canadian investigators have stumbled, and do not put much effort into investigating relatively minor incidents nor crashes of small airplanes.

The turbulence and small airplane reports I criticized seem as though the 'B Team' wrote them, perhaps newbies, perhaps just people who should not have the job. Japan has bureaucracies, some are obstinate, one contributed to the disaster at Haneda.

@ Keith Sketchley on Wednesday, Feb 28th 2024 19:46Z
By Simon Hradecky on Thursday, Feb 29th 2024 12:59Z

The translation by the JTSB is a lot better than if any reader (pilot, cabin crew, passenger, management, ...) attempts to translate the Japanese text himself (with or without the help of translation software). The Japanese investigator knows what he is talking about rather than guessing by the reader what this might be about. English is not their native language, and most English people do not have any similiar knowledge of Japanese. I commend the Japanese investigators for offering the English reports for the benefit of all around the planet!

While vibrating or shaking may not be the best words for describing the movement of the aircraft in (severe) turbulence, they are still perfectly understandable.

Caution about translation
By Keith Sketchley on Wednesday, Feb 28th 2024 19:46Z

Useful translation requires fluency in both languages and significant knowledge of the subject, including a good vocabulary, in my experience.

JTSB doesn't always have that - its report on a small airplane mishap and its report on a passenger injured from falling on a seat armrest when the airplane 'vibrated' in flight are examples

@Norm: Pilot Monitoring
By WhoCares on Thursday, Feb 8th 2024 08:00Z

@Norm: Thanks for some insight in the problems of using the HUD at night.
One thing that is not clear from your posts, and something that might well be a airline specific regulation: do both pilot flying and monitoring have the HUD active at the same time during final approach? There would be the obvious benefit of PM not, so that he has the clear uncluttered/light-poluted view.
But then, in case he has to take over in case of emergency, it would make more sense to already have the HUD properly setup...

Last Follow up of Landing vis through HUD
By Norm on Tuesday, Feb 6th 2024 01:10Z

Now the simplest i see to fix the problem IHMO is to mandate and fit tail light fixture with a high intensity blue irregularly flashing light slightly angled upward that works from strobes switch and weight on wheel. Then, on touchdown, the approach traffic will have a very definite specific and unobstructed id on whats on the runway and where. Same for in position and hold traffic before you land). All that good technology is in the wayf of pilots clear view and landing traffic separation is now back to a single man show, that is, the already tasked loaded controller. Fly safe.

Follow up of Landing vis through HUD
By Norm on Tuesday, Feb 6th 2024 01:09Z

It is forcing you to reset HUD intensity sometimes more than once in the final stages of landing, thereby alternating between thrust lever and intensity knob (techno burden). The EVS system won't likely make their way to commercial cockpits for a good while (cost/weight). So we are left with the technology as is, i personally mitigate by having a quick peak on the side of the HUD on short final to make sure the other guy is off the runway. I fly a lot of high density heavy traffic locations where the spacing is tight and totally get why JAL pilots could not pick the Dash. [last follow up i promise]

Visibility through HUD on night landing
By Norm on Tuesday, Feb 6th 2024 01:08Z

I've been flying with HUD aircraft (787 and A220 ) for the last 8 years and Glenn Doolan touches the bullseye in its comment. This is a technology design induced accident. The color, symbology, coating (which reflects green as intended but also washes out 80%+ of outside green wavelenght) are a real obstacle for locating dimly lighted airplane backend. Although probably not the case for Haneda 34R (haven't been there in while), the advent of LED runway lighting which are single wavelenght makes the depth perception close to impossible mixed with the HUD symbols and also triggers exagerated HUD intensity changes when the sensor gets saturated. [follow up in next post]

small typo
By nico on Thursday, Jan 25th 2024 17:46Z

Simon, a small typo:

On Jan 7th 2024 (UTC) runway 34R was returned to service at MIGHTNIGHT

i guess that should be midnight :)

please feel free to delete my comment after correction

Category
By (anonymous) on Thursday, Jan 25th 2024 12:24Z

I must admit I was initially, and remain with time, surprised that this is only an "Accident". I would have thought this was certainly a "Crash", as every single soul aboard both airplanes was deeply threatened, and that there was even a single survivor (nevermind multiple hundreds) involves a lot of luck (and a lot of great engineering).

Indeed the recent Canadian crash involves the loss of all-but-one, and the Dash 8 here also suffered all-but-one, yet this one is somehow categorized as less severe.

Of course I only say all this because I love this site, so thank you Simon regardless. Tis my goto site for news.

@Enhanced Vision
By Littlebirds737 on Wednesday, Jan 24th 2024 18:26Z

A company just certified an EFVS on the 737NG platform last month. Would almost guarantee that pilots would have been able to see an aircraft on the runway with any EFVS.

lack of technology
By Lee on Wednesday, Jan 24th 2024 17:37Z

This is NOT an aircraft specific issue - this is caused by the airport authority, NOT investing in proper runway incursion and alerting equipment. This equipment has saved countless hull losses in north america.

People WILL make mistakes and the cost of such mistakes is easily counted in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The cost of the equipment, is not.

They have a system that SHOWS the controllers where an aircraft is, but NO automated alerting system of any kind.

Even small airports here in Canada have this FFS.

JCG airplane was on departure frequency
By Keith Sketchley on Wednesday, Jan 24th 2024 16:31Z

I read that the Japan Coast Guard airplane was on tower departure frequency and interacting with ATC.

(Some suggestion too tersely, with some small potential for confusing meaning of 'you are number 1' or such. I understand JCG base is at the airport thus its crews should be familiar with ATC there.)

It would have various radios of course, to communicate with emergency service agencies at scenes of need. (Interoperability of their communication radios is being improved in Canada-US so I expect in Japan too.)

CVR readout should illuminate any confusion in flight deck of JCG airplane.

@ Diev, Control freq
By jjk on Tuesday, Jan 23rd 2024 16:14Z

�I'm confused. Is the ATC using different frequencies for the arriving and departing traffic on the same RWY? If not the JAL landing clearance would have been heard by the Dash's crew.�

S&R aircrafts use different frequency bands than commercial traffic does. This avoids interference, but also cross-communication.

Can�t ADSB help to make a difference ?
By Jan on Sunday, Jan 21st 2024 20:49Z

Should we not be able to use ADSB to get ground and the flight crews aware that the runway is occupied ? And for instance the runway lights being changed to make clear that the someone is already there and the arrival get a clear signal to make a go around. Same saying to inform the intruder aware of his mistake and initiate a clearance to the landing surface? As it is reported that the automatic airport monitoring detected the runway intrusion, there should be more than a blink at some controller screen. And it�s possible with the technology we�ve already at most airports anyway.

TCAS
By Diev on Saturday, Jan 20th 2024 15:55Z

Oh, and by the way, are Dash AC fitted with a TCAS screen of a sort? Didn't they noticed the landing traffic? The parralel RWY is quite far.
On the other hand, I'm gettig quite nervous when on short final and SO on the ground have their TCAS on. Finding the AC with the TCAS on becomes Prio #1, stable flightpath goes to #2. I can imagine it would be the same with the JAL crew. Perhaps, the TCAS was not switched on at all?

Control freq
By Diev on Saturday, Jan 20th 2024 15:30Z

I'm confused. Is the ATC using different frequencies for the arriving and departing traffic on the same RWY? If not the JAL landing clearance would have been heard by the Dash's crew.

Enhanced Vision
By John Chew on Thursday, Jan 18th 2024 23:15Z

Is the A350 fitted with Enhanced Vision from an Infrared Camera?
Many corporate jets have these.
Having experienced these systems in Cirrus aircraft and Royal Flying Doctor Service KingAirs I believe that they would show the heat from the Dash 8's engines on the runway and most likely the shape of the Dash 8.
The Royal Flying Doctor Service introduced this to alert the crew to animal incursions on landing at night on remote strips.
In the Cirrus I observed the heat from a freshly started C152 engine at night from 300m away.

Possible reduction of information by HUD combiner
By Keith Sketchley on Monday, Jan 15th 2024 20:32Z

Any surface has potential to reduce light coming through it.

Your personal example may be eyeglasses which can have anti-reflective coating.
As cockpit instruments did in the 1960s, at least from Boeing.

Mitigations include:
- anti-reflective coating
- quiet dark flight deck (a trend started years ago, shouldn't even be 'status normal' annunciators only exception lights, with two crew flight deck no instrument lights behind pilots but may be some on overhead panel).

Note that HUDs have advanced over the past few decades, they were green, I don't know if they have colour today.

@Glenn Doolan
By Sergio on Monday, Jan 15th 2024 13:00Z

Glen, thank you very much for sharing this. It is interesting the following: "The iconography of the HUD is the same color as many airport lights, leading to confusion", so seems to be that all the info is cluttered and masked. I used HUDs at the Air Force and I don�t remember so many inconveniences. Thank you very much. This would explain why if the Dash8 went unnoticed even if lighted (again, the lightning is very poor and it is masked by the bright TDZ lights at the runway, now let�s add the HUD to this equation).

HUD Air Safety Report
By Glen Doolan on Monday, Jan 15th 2024 10:39Z

I have 2305 hours on the A350. In 2018 I submitted an ASR to my company regarding this issue of the HUD.

------------------------
ASR submitted as follows
------------------------

"On the A350, the HUD can significantly restrict visibility, especially at night. This is due to a number of reasons.
1. The residual glow of the projector unit, even at minimum brightness, reduces visibility through the screen.
2. The combiner unit screen reflects the ambient light in the cockpit.
3. The combiner unit screen refracts the image of the PFD.
4. Dust and fingerprints on the screen further impede visibility.
5. The iconography of the HUD is the same color as many airport lights, leading to confusion.
6. When on path, the FPV, FD, FPA and Energy Chevrons all obscure the runway environment. Especially the PAPI
and TDZ.

The use of the HUD should be at the discretion of the crew, as and when it is safe and appropriate."

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