




Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center at the
Center for Special Studies
(C.S.S.)

Hezbollah

(part 1)

Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist
Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran
and Supported by Syria



[Left] **Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah
[Right] The **Hezbollah** emblem with a hand
brandishing a machine gun and the belligerent
slogan that quotes the Quran: "Only Allah's
congregation [i.e., Muhammad and his
followers] shall be victorious"

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Letter to the Reader

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□ This Information Bulletin's topic is **Hezbollah**, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization, which operates both in the local and the global arena under the guidance of **Iran** and with the backing of **Syria**. Iran and Syria—**two countries sponsoring terrorism**—regard **Hezbollah** as a **strategic tool** in the violent struggle conducted against Israel until the “liberation of Jerusalem” and the annihilation of Israel. The extensive assistance and support provided by Syria and Iran have transformed **Hezbollah**, over twenty years of its existence, from a local Lebanese terrorist group into a widespread terrorist network: **Hezbollah** operates a **broad military apparatus within Lebanon (including long-range missiles that pose a threat to Israeli population centers)**, and **throughout the entire world, endangering stability in the**

region. After the current war in Iraq, the **United States** is likely to contemplate, as part of its global mission against terrorism, ways to handle this deadly organization and the **terrorism-sponsoring countries** backing it.

□ This document draws its information from a **variety of sources**, including intelligence updates and findings from interrogations of **Hezbollah** members captured by the Israeli security forces. These sources provide ample material for an accurate **profile** of **Hezbollah** as a **terrorist organization of global reach**, and a clear understanding of the threat that it represents to **Israel, stability in the region**, and the **Western world**.

- This Information Bulletin comprises two parts:
- **Part 1** - a description and analysis of **Hezbollah** as the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization of global reach.
 - **Part 2** – appendices and data evidencing the nature, capabilities, and operating methods of **Hezbollah**.

For additional details concerning the services offered by the Information Center and requests for supplementary information on publications by the Information Center, please contact Ms. Fela Schterzer, our chief information officer, at:

mlm@intelligence.org.il

Tel: +972 (3) 548-2254

Fax: +972 (3) 549-7731

Yours faithfully,

Reuven Ehrlich, Ph.D.
Head of the Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center

Abstract

- Since its inception in 1982, **Hezbollah** has conducted a terrorist campaign aimed at promoting the **radical Shiite-Islamic doctrine** conceived by **Iran's** spiritual leader **Ayatollah Khomeini**, who died in 1989. The basic principles of this doctrine, which reflect the **fundamental identity** of **Hezbollah** as a **Shiite jihad organization**, are 1) the **consistent and relentless struggle against Israel until the "liberation of Jerusalem" and the annihilation of Israel** are achieved, and 2) **intense hostility toward the United States, along with efforts to force its presence and influence out of the Middle East**. In order to achieve these goals, **Hezbollah** has placed **the use of terrorism against its enemies** at the focal point of its **strategy of asymmetric conflict**, with the **weapon of suicide** as one of its key components. In **Hezbollah's** view, the United States and Israel have no adequate response to such weapon.

- During more than twenty years of its existence, **Hezbollah** has undergone a remarkable process of organizational development. Starting as a **local Lebanese terrorist group**, one among many others operating in Lebanon, it has grown into a **political movement with global capabilities in the sphere of terrorism, an extensive military apparatus, and weapons that include land-to-land missiles**. The highest authority of this intricate organizational structure, which encompasses civilian, military, and communal functions, is the Decision-Making Shura Council (see below). The Shura has been headed since 1992 by **Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah**, the leader of **Hezbollah** and the main architect of its policy. Another member of the Shura is **Nasrallah's second-in-command, Imad Mughniyah**, who is **in charge of Hezbollah's military framework**, including its **terrorist activity throughout the world and against Israel**. Despite a tendency in Europe, motivated by political interests, to differentiate between the military and political wings of the organization, the leadership itself stresses time and again that **Hezbollah is a package entity, and that the distinction between its military and political wings is merely technical**.

- It goes without saying that **Hezbollah would not have reached its present status without the extensive assistance and backing of Iran and Syria**. Iran, which regards **Hezbollah** as a means of achieving its own ideological and strategic goals, is a large-scale provider of military support to **Hezbollah**. This includes first and foremost **the al-Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC, hereinafter: "the Revolutionary Guards") in Lebanon**. Iran also supplies **Hezbollah** with a variety of military hardware, such as upgraded anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, missile launchers, land-to-land missiles of various types, **including long-range (43 km) Fajr-3 missiles and Fajr-5 missiles (with a 75 km range)**. Iranian assistance also comprises military training, logistic support, and **financial assistance estimated at several millions of US dollars yearly** (in addition to **Hezbollah's** endeavors to generate its own financial resources through fundraising in Western countries and through criminal activity, mostly **money counterfeiting** and **drug smuggling**). Following recent evidence of Iranian and **Hezbollah** involvement in the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires (1994), the Argentinian prosecution served **senior members of Hezbollah** (including Imad Mughniyah), **Iranian diplomats**, and **prominent Iranians** (including former Iranian Information Minister **Ali Fallahian**) with **arrest warrants to the judge in charge of the inquiry**. A detailed recent report by Argentinian intelligence accuses **Iran** of direct involvement in the bombing, through its intelligence services and the **Hezbollah** organization.

- **Syria**, a strategic supporter of **Hezbollah** from its founding, prevented the dismantling of the organization following the signature of the Taif Agreement in 1989, and allowed its expansion to its present dimensions. Syria has **upgraded** the policy of cautious support that prevailed during the **Hafez al-Assad** regime to a **strategic alliance** following his son **Bashar's** succession. Syria now regards **Hezbollah** as a **strategic partner in its policy toward Israel**. Syria also acts as a **major source of military support to Hezbollah, alongside Iran**, and recently provided the organization with **long-range Syrian-made missiles**. Syria also backs **Hezbollah's policy of terrorist attacks in southern Lebanon**. It guarantees **Hezbollah's freedom of operation**, while preventing the Lebanese government from enforcing its authority in the region in accordance with Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council. Since the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, the organization has carried out **some 30 terrorist attacks**,

all under the auspices of Damascus, including the deadly attack against civilians at Kibbutz Metsuba in March 2002. Damascus, while continuing to effectively control Lebanon, is **responsible for creating the conditions that transformed Hezbollah from a troublesome terrorist group into a strategic threat to Israel and the entire Middle East.**

- **From a military-operational perspective, Hezbollah operates in three main arenas:**
 - **The Lebanese arena:** Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000 and the UN Security Council's statement that Israel completed its withdrawal according to Resolution 425, did not alter the nature of Hezbollah. Neither did they affect its **adherence to terrorism** as the **principal** means of achieving its political-strategic goals, the essence of which is **to wear down Israel until its final annihilation. Hezbollah** exploits to the fullest the **freedom of operation that Syria allows it to enjoy in southern Lebanon regarding the weak Lebanese administration** in this region. It invests considerable effort in establishing, expanding, and reinforcing its military operational apparatus in southern Lebanon, with the effect of turning the region into **Hezbollah-only** country. **Hezbollah** has taken over the place of the weaker central administration and assumed the bulk of power in the region, similar to the state-within-a-state known as "Fatahland" created by the Palestinian terrorist organizations in southern Lebanon prior to 1982. Since the Israeli withdrawal, **Hezbollah** has endeavored to maintain **controlled tension** along the Israeli-Lebanese border. It has **exerted continuous pressure** on Israel by means of terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets along the northern border. At the same time, it is building up a military apparatus in **Beirut** and **Lebanon's Bekaa region**, keeping its strategic offensive system operation-ready. The latter is meant to serve as a key element in upholding the "**balance of deterrence**" **vis-à-vis Israel. Its military apparatus will enable Hezbollah to prepare to drag the region into a wide-ranging military escalation at the "right" time.**

- **The Palestinian arena:** a major component of the endeavors of **Hezbollah** is the **extensive assistance it extends to Palestinian terrorism**. Its purposes are to **enhance the operational abilities of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, encourage them to pursue their armed struggle against Israel, and to duplicate the Lebanese model in the Palestinian territories**. The assistance provided by **Hezbollah** to Palestinian terrorism comprises various elements, including the smuggling of high-quality weapons through Lebanon and Jordan and by **maritime routes** (using ships such as the *Karine-A*), as well as the provision of **military training, financial support, information, and propaganda**. Moreover, **Hezbollah** is setting up **its own terrorist apparatus within Israel and the Palestinian territories**, and is even recruiting **Israeli Arabs** to carry out terrorist missions. The leadership of **Hezbollah does not deny its granting military assistance** to the violent struggle of the Palestinians against Israel, and regards suicide attacks as a means of demoralizing Israeli society.

- **The global arena:** Since its establishment in 1982, **Hezbollah** has pursued a policy of global terrorism directed mainly **against Israeli and American targets**, and in the past also **against European targets**. This terrorism relies on a **broad international network of collaborators** recruited **mainly** (though not exclusively) **from Shiite-Muslim communities worldwide**, including the United States and South America. This network is meant to serve a number of purposes: **gathering operational intelligence** on Israeli / Jewish / Western targets; **maintaining “latent cells”** that can be activated in time of need and in accordance with the strategic considerations of the organization and the countries backing it; and **raising funds** in order to supplement the massive financing provided to it by Iran. Beyond all this, this network enables the organization to **carry out at short notice “high-quality” attacks in various places in the world**, as already happened **twice in Argentina**. The main areas of activity of this global network are in **South America, Southeast Asia, Jordan, the Persian Gulf, and Europe**. During the 1980s, **Hezbollah** attacks **targeted Western** (American and European) objectives, mostly on Lebanese soil: bombing military and civilian compounds, hostage-takings, and hijackings. **In the 1990s, Hezbollah adopted a more selective approach, focusing mainly on “high-**

quality attacks” such as the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in July 1994, and the active involvement in the bombing of a military base housing US troops in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in June 1996. At the same time, Hezbollah uses Europe as a platform for launching terrorist attacks against Israel and achieving bargaining power vis-à-vis the latter. In recent years, a number of such **Hezbollah** terrorists infiltrated into Israel with the intention of carrying out “high-quality attacks” or gathering operational intelligence for carrying out such attacks; and an Israeli citizen, Elhanan Tannenbaum, was kidnapped by **Hezbollah** in Europe in October 2000.

The bottom line:

In spite of the shockwaves and upheavals that the Hezbollah organization has endured in recent years—the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, the September 11 attacks against the United States, and the many constraints imposed on it in view of the war against Iraq—Hezbollah continues to gain strength and build up its terrorist and military capabilities. These capabilities reinforce its standing as a terrorist organization that combines operational skills, politically sophisticated methods, and a radical Islamic, anti-Israeli, and anti-Western ideology. Consequently, they transform it into a terrorist network that poses both a risk and a threat to the countries in our region and to the entire international community.

Introduction: The Fundamental Nature of Hezbollah as a Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach

• **Like** al-Qaida, Hezbollah **constitutes a** global Islamic terrorist network **with specific characteristics that make it a** constant and major threat, **not only to the State of Israel but also to** regional as well as worldwide stability. Its distinct features and terrorist character derive from the following:

- **Official backing and assistance from Iran and Syria, both of which have been identified by the American State Department as countries sponsoring terrorism:**

- **Iran** laid the foundations of the **Hezbollah** organization as part of its doctrine of “exporting the Islamic Revolution” and its strategy of using terrorism as a key element in its national security policy. **Hezbollah** was thus established in 1982 through Iran’s Revolutionary Guards sent to Lebanon’s Bekaa region during the civil war in Lebanon. Later on, the organization became the flagship of the Islamic Revolution and its major achievement outside Iranian borders. Iran **shaped Hezbollah’s ideology**, granted it **political** backing, and built up its **operational** capability. Iran continues to extend it **military support** (training and weapons), **financial aid (the bulk of Hezbollah’s budget comes from Iran)** and **assistance in its terrorist activity** (Iranian involvement in terrorist attacks as recently uncovered in Argentina).

- **Syria** is the second strategic patron of the **Hezbollah**. Indeed, **Hezbollah** has grown and developed under the auspices of Syria. Together with Palestinian terrorist organizations that operate from Syria and Lebanon, **Hezbollah** has become **a tool in the hands of the Damascus regime**, used to exert pressure on Israel in order to promote Syrian political and strategic interests. In recent years, following Bashar al-Assad’s accession to power, relations between Syria and **Hezbollah** have been

upgraded. While Hafez al-Assad adhered to a policy of “cautious support” of **Hezbollah**, under his son’s regime, **Hezbollah** has become a **full-fledged strategic ally backed by the Syrian president, who maintains close relations with its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.** Damascus, like Tehran, uses the terrorist capacity with which it has vested **Hezbollah** in order to conduct a “war by proxy” against its enemies, specifically against Israel. This war by proxy has been the Syrian policy for several decades, from the beginning of the Hafez al-Assad regime in 1970, when **Hezbollah** took over the role of the Palestinian terrorist organizations as a preferred “proxy”.



Radical Islamic ideology as conceived by Ayatollah Khomeini:

The above excerpt from a **Hezbollah** propaganda video clip features a terrorist kissing the Quran before setting out for a terrorist attack against Israel (October 2002)

○ **A sheltered territorial base that guarantees freedom of activity:** **Hezbollah**, like **al-Qaida** until the American military operation against it in Afghanistan, enjoys the benefits of a powerful territorial base. **Hezbollah** is firmly established on the **Lebanese scene** and takes full advantage of the backing given to it by the Shiite community, as well as the weakness of the official administration in the region, which is **totally dependent on Syria**, Iran’s strategic ally. Syria, motivated by **strategic** considerations, contributes to the consolidation of **Hezbollah** and the expansion of its activity. Therefore, in defiance of the Taif Agreement signed in 1989 and the ensuing dismantling of the Christian and Druze militias, Syria allowed **Hezbollah** to maintain and even

further develop its military-operational power base in southern Lebanon, Beirut, and Lebanon's Bekaa region. This policy facilitated the **establishment of a semi-autonomous apparatus, or a state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon as well as several locations in the north of the country, where a widespread and well-protected terrorism and guerilla apparatus thrives.**



Israel depicted as worse than the Nazis:

Source: a film screened on **Hezbollah**-controlled *al-Manar Television*.

Right: the Star of David equals the swastika. The legend reads: "Error".

Left: the Star of David shown as exceeding the swastika. The legend: "This is the equation."

- **Radical Shiite-Islamic ideology** that places the emphasis on a holy war (**jihad**): the jihad doctrine of **Hezbollah** as conceived by Iran, explicitly calls for the **annihilation of Israel**, the **struggle against the United States**, the propagation of the "**Islamic Revolution**" and—in the long term—the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic republic similar to that of Iran. **Hezbollah**, as a rule, is careful to **camouflage** these aspects of its ideology, emphasizing mainly its interim objectives, in particular supporting Palestinian terrorism against Israel, with the alleged purpose of defending Lebanese national interests and opposing the American presence in the Middle East. To achieve its ambitious and far-reaching goals, and in view of its own and the Palestinians' military inferiority to Israel, **Hezbollah** advocates the widespread use of the "**weapon of suicide**", stressing its **value as an asymmetric and undeterrable means** to achieving its goals. **Hezbollah** also grants extensive assistance to the Palestinians in the form of advanced weaponry and military training, the purpose

of which is to help **upgrade their terrorist activity and rule out the easing** of violence in the Palestinian territories.

This ideology and these goals obviously **far exceed the narrow borders of Lebanon** and the limited context of Israeli-Lebanese relations. These goals relate to the **entire Arab and Islamic worlds**. **Hezbollah** describes the conflict with Israel as a **microcosm of a much larger conflict between the Muslim and the Western worlds**, referring to this conflict as the very materialization of Samuel Huntington's nightmarish vision of a "clash of civilizations". **Hezbollah's** leader, Hassan Nasrallah, regards himself as a **politician** who enjoys a special status in Lebanon, a messenger of Pan-Islamism, one who carries the burden of a historical mission that transcends regions and trends: the mission of the **Muslim struggle against the West**. This ideological dimension highlights the threat embodied by this organization vis-à-vis Western countries and the international community, beyond the direct threat that it poses to Israel.

- The **availability of advanced arms and the capability to have access to unconventional power resources**, as well as the **high level of technological skills and sophistication** all far exceed the known standards of terrorist organizations worldwide, rendering **Hezbollah** a highly dangerous organization, both locally and globally. Complementing these means are **highly sophisticated tactical as well as operational capabilities, developed thanks to massive Iranian support and Hezbollah's own military experience from two decades of armed struggle against the Israeli army and many years of terrorist activity against Israeli and Western targets**.

- **Diverse military and political skills used to reach the organization's goals** - **Hezbollah** has developed a variety of capabilities in order to achieve its objectives: **operational capabilities** (including an extensive artillery system); a **military-strategic** apparatus (including long-range land-to-land missiles); the ability to carry out terrorist attacks in various locations (inside Israel, abroad, through Lebanon; behind the scenes, or with direct involvement). Furthermore,

the organization has developed various methods and approaches at the **operational level**, and devised military tactics along a variety of lines of attack, ranging from a war of attrition in varying degrees to all-out warfare. Alongside these channels, **Hezbollah** has set up an extensive **political, social, and informational apparatus** aimed at promoting its strategic agenda.

- **A broad international network**, based on **operational cells maintained as latent** throughout the world and on **sympathetic Shiite Islamic communities** – the latter serving as support apparatus for the operational system and convenient sources for recruiting collaborators. **Hezbollah** has already proven its ability to **carry out terrorist attacks in locations around the world** (e.g., Argentina), while using local apparatus and exploiting international platforms to smuggle terrorists into Israel and the Palestinian territories. **Hezbollah** has spread its network almost everywhere in the world where a Shiite Islamic community exists: South America, Canada, the United States, Australia, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, and of course Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East.

- **A source of inspiration for Islamic terrorist groups worldwide.** During its twenty-odd years of existence, **Hezbollah** has become a source of inspiration for Islamic terrorist groups throughout the world, serving an example of a **brave, sophisticated and daring organization** that relies on a radical Islamic doctrine and pursues a violent struggle against the United States, Israel, and the rest of the West, Israel being perceived as the “American proxy” in the Middle East. This inspiration is not only **spiritual** and **emotional**, but also **operational**: Its significance lies in the ability to recruit followers and encourage them to carry out terrorist attacks in the name of Islam and the far-reaching strategic goals of the organization. It is worth noting that following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, **Hezbollah** also became a **source of inspiration for the Palestinian terrorist organizations**. These organizations draw encouragement from **Hezbollah**’s experience, which proves to them that political-strategic progress can be achieved through violence and terrorism, without entering into negotiations with Israel.

- **The above analysis of Hezbollah’s power factors would be incomplete without mentioning the weaknesses of this organization.** Indeed, a significant number of constraints affect **Hezbollah’s** decision-making process and policies, the main of which is **the constant need to take into account the interests of Syria and Iran**, its two strategic patrons, at the same time as those of the **internal Lebanese system** in which it operates.

- **Hezbollah** therefore is a multi-faceted organization with a **variety of identities** existing in a **permanent state of tension**: the **Lebanese organization** that wishes to appear as defending Lebanese national interests on the one hand, and the **militant Islamic jihad movement**, backed by Iran and supported by Syria, striving to liberate Jerusalem, annihilate Israel, expel the Americans from the Middle East, and transform Lebanon from a multi-religious state into an Iranian-linked, predominantly Shiite, Islamic state on the other.

- Between these two poles, the Islamic principle of jihad is obviously the principal *raison d’être* of **Hezbollah**: jihad is the justification of **Hezbollah’s** activity, regardless of prevailing pressures and constraints exerted on it by various sources. Consequently, the militant Islamic identity of **Hezbollah** has the **upper hand** over its Lebanese identity. In other words, any attempt by the Lebanese government and Western elements to portray **Hezbollah** as a legitimate Lebanese political entity are **unfounded**.



Members of **Hezbollah** chanting “Death to America” in response to calls by **Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah [*al-Manar Television*, September 2002]

Hezbollah-controlled media, inspired by Iran, conduct systematic incitement and propaganda campaigns against the United States, broadcast throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Chapter I: Israel and the United States as Portrayed in the Doctrine of Hezbollah

- “**Hezbollah will never accept the existence of Israel.**” [Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Manar Television*, May 7, 1998]
- “**Those who have dignity are capable of turning your embassy into ruins, and returning your diplomats to you in coffins. This is the only language that America and Israel understand.**” [*al-Manar Television*, July 30, 2000]

• Since its founding in 1982, **Hezbollah** has conducted a bloody struggle and a murderous policy aimed at promoting its strategic goals. The organization’s purpose was initially to expel the foreign troops from Lebanon. However, later on, it adopted strategic goals that extended far beyond this “unassuming” one. **Hezbollah’s** ideology relies on an entrenched, radical Islamic doctrine that emanates from Tehran. It is part of the Iranian revolutionary philosophy, which set as its objectives the annihilation of Israel and the struggle against the United States, the West, and their strongholds in the region.



Hezbollah’s emblem: a hand brandishing a machine gun against the background of the globe (expressing the global ambitions of the organization), and the belligerent slogan taken from the Quran: “Only Allah’s congregation [i.e., **Hezbollah**] shall be victorious” (Sura 5, verse 56 of the Quran) - **Hezbollah’s** modern “recycling” of the verse from the Quran, which originally refers to Muhammad and his followers.

Hatred of Israel (“that vile microbe”) and the Jewish people

- A cornerstone of **Hezbollah ideology**, which derives from the vision of the founder and first leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, is the **consistent and unyielding war against the State of Israel, until its annihilation and the “liberation” of Jerusalem. Guided by this objective** and the ambition to achieve it, the organization feels **committed, both ideologically and practically, to pursuing a continuous struggle against Israel, using all possible means on all fronts.**

- In order to support and legitimize its terrorist activity against Israel, **Hezbollah** continuously emphasizes its hostile attitude toward it. The use of **anti-Semitic expressions, insults, and abusive language (“vile microbe”, “cancerous tumor”)** is intended to justify the goal of eliminating Israel. Most blatant of all are the statements made by the leader of the organization himself, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the main architect and chief spokesperson of **Hezbollah** ideology:

- **“I wish to draw your attention to the threat posed by this entity which has robbed Palestine; this cancerous tumor, this vile microbe, an entity that knows no limits, that spreads out wherever Israelis are, wherever there is a remnant from the Talmud or where a Jewish rabbi once sat... Hope is rising for the fulfillment of the divine promise to eradicate this cancerous plague...”** Nasrallah calls: “Death to Israel” and the crowd chants in response: “Death to the Israelis”. [*al-Manar television*, May 7, 1998]



Nurturing hostility against Israel: **Hezbollah** demonstrators burning the Israeli flag. Background: a demonstrator brandishing the picture of **Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah



Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, a charismatic figure and gifted demagogue, who sweeps his audiences and incites his followers to the struggle against Israel

- “All great disasters that have befallen the region originate from the existence of Israel. As long as there is a state and its name is Israel, these disasters will persist. **This is a cancerous presence in the region. If we ignore the presence of a cancer in our body, we may discover it when it is too late...Some people regard cancer as influenza...When a cancer is discovered, it must be dealt with courageously, and it must be eradicated. Part of this body and part of this blood must be sacrificed in order for this body to recover...**” [*al-Manar Television*, April 9, 2000]

• **Hezbollah hostility against the State of Israel is intertwined with hatred of the Jewish people. Hezbollah** leaders time and again make **virulent anti-Semitic statements**, using both classic and Islamic anti-Semitic “arguments”. These statements are intended not only to negate Israel as a state, but also to discredit the entire Jewish people. The following are some quotations from speeches given by Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut:

- “What do the Jews want? They want security and money. **Jews, from the dawn of history, are the most cowardly and greedy among Allah’s creatures.** If you search the entire world, you will not find anyone **stingier** or **greedier** than the Jews.” [*al-Manar Television*, September 28, 2001]

- “Unfortunately, this year, the tenth day of the month of Muharram [*Ashura*: the anniversary of the establishment of the Shiah sect in early Islamic history] falls close to the fiftieth anniversary of the bitter and tragic historical disaster of the foundation of the **state of the descendants of apes and pigs, in other words the Zionist Jews...**” [*al-Manar Television*, May 7, 1998]

- “If we would have gathered the blood spilled and the money wasted in Iran, Iraq, and the *Umma* [the Islamic nation] during the eight years of war, it would have been enough **in order to free Palestine dozens of times and eradicate Israel tens of times. True or false?**” [*al-Manar Television*, February 7, 2003]

- **Hezbollah’s philosophy rules out any possibility of a future peace agreement with Israel, of recognizing it as national entity in the region, or of peaceful co-existence with it.** Hezbollah is consistent in expressing its **steadfast opposition** to any attempts towards achieving a peace settlement in the region. It strongly criticizes all those who negotiate with Israel, in order to increase the pressure exerted on them by Arab public opinion. It has been especially adamant during recent years in preventing any peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians by means of maintaining the state of violence and terrorism in the Palestinian territories. Following are a few statements by Hassan Nasrallah:
 - “We claim that **once Arafat threw the gun away and decided to resort to negotiation on the Palestinian issue, he proved that he is a Jew...**The Taba Agreement is nothing but another nail in the coffin of the humiliating settlement [between Israel and the Palestinians]. **Sooner or later this people [the Palestinians] will judge the one who imposes such agreements upon his**

people.” [Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Manar Television*, September 30, 1995, in response to the signing of the Taba Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians]

○ “**There is no life and no co-existence with Israel; there is only one slogan: Death to Israel.**” [Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Manar Television*, April 26, 1999]

• **Hezbollah** uses such ideology to justify its terrorist activity against **civilians**. In order to legitimize attacks against civilians, **Hassan Nasrallah** designates the entire Israeli population, including women, children, and the elderly, as a “military population”. According to this view, there are no innocent people, and each civilian must be fought against:

○ “**In our opinion, Israeli society is clearly a military society. We regard the Israeli entity as an imperialist frontal military base injected into the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds. This is a society of warfare, a military society of warriors, men and women alike. There is no civilian society in this entity.**”

[Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Manar Television*, December 27, 1997]



Inculcating hatred from the youngest age :a child holding a shotgun at a **Hezbollah** parade in the Lebanon. The inscription on the headband worn by child reads: “Behold, Jerusalem, here I come”

○ “Suicide attacks shake the enemy from within, they plunge him into an existential crisis, and thus prepare the ground for victory; **these acts are completely legitimate, since there are no innocent civilians in Israel; rather**

they all are occupiers and accomplices to crime and massacre.” [Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Manar Television*, September 14, 2001]

- **Hezbollah** constantly refers to its ambition of achieving a “**balance of deterrence**” vis-à-vis Israel, with the alleged purpose of averting Israeli “aggression” against Lebanon and “defending” Lebanon, its borders, and its waters. In reality, however, **Hezbollah** does not conduct a defensive policy; rather it initiates and carries out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets—**long after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon**. By doing so, it expresses its headstrong opposition to the implementation of Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council, the purpose of which was to establish peace and security on both sides of the border. The true meaning of “**balance of deterrence**”, as perceived by **Hezbollah**, is **justifying the terrorist acts that it initiates against Israel**, while **detering the latter** from any retaliation against **Hezbollah** or the countries backing it.

- **The strategy of “asymmetric attrition”**: the operational activity of **Hezbollah** is based on the principle of “**asymmetric attrition**”, a **strategy aimed at generating continuous pressure on Israel by means of persistent terrorist activity, in defiance of Israel’s military superiority**. **Hezbollah**, as a rule, voices **contempt for the resilience** of Israeli society, depicting it as a **traumatized body** and a cobweb. It draws confidence from the internal pressures in Israel that led to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon. In **Hezbollah’s** view, the only way to annihilate Israel—albeit a lengthy process—is by persevering in the armed struggle against it and **striking at Israel’s weak spot, i.e., its civilian population**. **Hezbollah’s** contempt for the resilience of Israeli society is illustrated in the following statements by Hassan Nasrallah:

- “Israel is a myth and a fiction, as it was established on the foundations of arrogance...**The prevalent spirit among Israeli society is one of defeat... The Jews are a bunch of financiers, they are not capable of sacrifice...** They did not come to Palestine in order to sacrifice themselves...The British, which

represent the West and were succeeded by the United States, are the ones responsible for bringing the Jews together into Palestine, in order to serve Western interests. They would otherwise not have arrived here...**The Jews will not sacrifice themselves on behalf of the country called Israel.**" [*al-Manar Television*, August 19, 2000]

Hatred of the United States (“the big Satan”)

- Consistent with its hatred of Israel, **Hezbollah** also bears deep hostility against the **United States**. This hostility, **one of the main components of Hezbollah’s ideology, has its roots in the Iranian revolutionary doctrine, which defines the United States as “the big Satan”**. This ideological hostility against the United States found **tangible expression** in a series of terrorist attacks carried out by **Hezbollah** against the United States in 1982; during these attacks, dozens of Americans were killed in military as well as civilian compounds in the Middle East (Lebanon and Saudi Arabia)*. This hostility is evidenced in statements of the leaders of **Hezbollah**, in particular Hassan Nasrallah himself:

- “If Albright and Clinton and the rest of the Americans thought that, should they attack **Hezbollah** from Washington, then we would tremble and fear, let them know that we shall rejoice; because when they attack us through politics, through the media and with their army, it only strengthens our conviction and our belief that truth is at our side. **When the Satan curses us, it means that Allah is by our side.**” [*Radio Nur*, February 16, 2000]

- **Hezbollah** regards the United States as an imperialist country and claims that its political objective is to dominate the entire region and rob the Arabs of their natural resources, using Israel to implement this policy. During a conference held in

* The last FBI report on terrorist threats against the US (National Threat Assessment) states that, **with the exception of al-Qaida, Hezbollah has caused more American casualties than any other terrorist organization.**

Damascus on January 25-27, 2003, the purpose of which was to advocate the boycott of American products, Nasrallah appealed to the audience as follows: “We must discontinue all contacts with the United States and the American people, and adhere to the Arab boycott against Israel...**The Arabs must understand that Israel is merely a battalion of the American army, and that the United States is the principal enemy.**” [*Radio Nur*, January 26, 2003]



Educating toward hatred of the United States: children in military attire participate in a **Hezbollah** parade in Beirut on “Jerusalem Day”, trampling the American and Israeli flags. “Jerusalem Day” is observed by the Iranians and their followers worldwide on the last Friday of the month of Ramadan, according to the decree issued by Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian government in 1979, in order to mark the Islamic ambition to “liberate” Jerusalem.

- **Hezbollah** exploits any occasion to **agitate** against the United States and even **threaten it**. For example, when the Americans mentioned their intention of moving their embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Nasrallah stated: “The Palestinian people’s response should be as follows: You may move your embassy to Jerusalem and bring along your diplomats, but **those who have dignity are capable of turning your embassy into ruins, and returning your diplomats to you in coffins.** This is the only language that America and Israel understand” [*al-Manar Television*, July 30, 2000]. It should be noted that statements of this kind are

circulated by the Arab media **throughout the Arab and Islamic world**, thus contributing to stirring up hatred of the United States.



A conference of **Hezbollah** operatives in Lebanon. The English-language slogan in the background reads: “Our enemies forever - U.S.A. and Israel”



Hassan Nasrallah speaking at a conference in Damascus advocating the boycott of American products in January 2003. During the conference, Nasrallah took the podium several times, defying the Americans and calling for a political boycott on the United States in addition to the economic boycott.

- **The American war against global terrorism in the wake of September 11 has resulted in boosting Hezbollah incitement and propaganda against the United States.** From the onset of this campaign, **Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah, has stepped up the frequency of his criticism against the United States and its policies:

- “The Arab nations cannot be destroyed or isolated in the desert and the mountains. Never! In this region, there are living nations that will never surrender to any invader! I therefore foresee: **The beginning of the large-scale American-Israeli offensive against our region will mean the end of the American domination of the world. [This will happen] because it [the United States] will find itself involved in a new and unequal confrontation;** in such a battleground, those who function as commanders, officers, and soldiers are the common people, and not a state that could be threatened, or any specific organization that may be crumbled and whose financial resources may be frozen.”

- “This is the war of a **despotic, arrogant, and cruel country against the nations of the world**—the nations of the Arab world, Islam and the Muslims, the Latin American countries, the Christians, the Buddhists, the Hindus, and the idolaters. It is the war of a cruel, despotic, and arrogant country against all those who refuse to yield to it...Let us adopt the **definition of Imam Khomeini, who said that this is the war of the arrogant ones against the oppressed people of the world.**” [*al-Manar Television*, November 11, 2001]

- “If they insist on [conducting] a war and [embarking on] a full-scale confrontation... the Americans will find themselves on a battlefield where they cannot tip the balance, as their aircraft will be of no use to them, nor will the tanks, the trade embargo, or the freezing of funds... **for in this nation we can speak of millions of youngsters, each of whom, no matter which country he comes from or which organization he belongs to, will purchase, by his own means and by the sweat of his brow, a weapon, a knife or explosives, in order to fight those invaders.**” [*al-Manar Television*, January 26, 2003]

- **Hezbollah** thus runs an anti-American incitement campaign and propaganda apparatus in Lebanon, **backed by Iran**, which reverberates throughout the Arab and Islamic world. Its principal means of transmitting hate messages and propaganda are *al-Manar Television*, *Radio Nur*, and websites operated by the organization. Additional

Arab television channels help circulate the hate messages by offering a public stage to **Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah, who enjoys great popularity in the Arab world, and by quoting *al-Manar Television* and other **Hezbollah**-controlled media. *Al-Manar Television*, however, remains the principal means of mass communication used in the campaign against the United States:

- During the second half of October 2002, a poisonous anti-American video clip was screened on *al-Manar Television* several times daily, especially before the news broadcasts. The clip appeared only on the satellite channel (and not on the local channel), over which it was sure to reach the Arab and worldwide viewing public. The highlight of the clip was the image of the Statue of Liberty, the face of which was replaced by a skull. The Statue was shown brandishing a knife, with two cannons deployed at its feet.

- During a ceremony held in Beirut in commemoration of “Martyr’s Day”, Hassan Nasrallah, after attacking the United States, shouted: “Death to America!” **Hezbollah** terrorists who attended the ceremony raised their hands in salute and echoed the call “Death to America!” Nasrallah responded: “America will not die this way. You must raise your voices!” [*al-Manar Television*, November 11, 2001]

- **Hezbollah** stepped up its **anti-American rhetoric** in anticipation of the American war against **Iraq**. Exemplifying this is Hassan Nasrallah’s verbal attack against the United States, “the big Satan”, during a recent speech in Beirut [*Radio Nur*, February 21, 2003]:

- The Americans plan to appoint a military governor in Iraq, who will remain in office for many years. Their purpose in Iraq is to “arouse controversy and ethnic tension, and stir up ancient conflicts between Iraqis”.

- The United States, while calling itself a democracy, is the one country responsible for establishing dictatorships in the Middle East and “leading the region into all its disasters...”

- The United States and the West are responsible for providing Iraq with arms of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, so that “the Arab and Islamic states will kill each other, and that a number of regimes will take control of their populations.”
- **“The United States is an accomplice to the exploitation, the oppression, the massacres, and the tyranny inflicted by these dictatorships; as well as the cruelty, the killing with chemical weapons, and the occasional dissolving of bodies in acid.”**
- In another speech, replete with **religious** themes [*al-Manar Television*, March 3, 2003], Nasrallah alleges that the United States’ true intention in conducting this war is the **struggle against Islam**, since the latter prevents it from achieving world domination. He criticizes the Arab regimes, and calls on them to challenge the war waged by the United States on Islam by means of suicide attacks (*istishhad*, or sacrificing one’s life for the sanctification of Allah).



Excerpt from a propaganda clip repeatedly broadcast by *al-Manar Television*: the Statue of Liberty, the face of which is replaced by a skull, is shown brandishing a knife and with cannons deployed at its feet. The inscription reads: “It owes blood to all of humanity”

The doctrine of Hezbollah: Suicide attacks (“the shortest road to Allah”) are of supreme value


- A major component in **Hezbollah**'s moral support of and informational assistance to Palestinian violence is its **backing of suicide attacks** carried out by Palestinians in Israel. **Hezbollah** regards suicide bombings as *istishhad*, or the sacrifice of one's own life for the sanctification of Allah's name, in the context of an Islamic military campaign against the enemy. *Istishhad* is a sacred value embodying the **"spirit of resistance" and the culture surrounding it** (as opposed to *intihar*, which refers to "plain" suicide on personal grounds, which is prohibited by Islamic law). According to **Hezbollah** doctrine, this sacrifice does not limit itself to a one-time act but it represents a **general way of life and a culture** that the Palestinians should embrace in imitation of the Lebanese Shiite model created by **Hezbollah**.

- From the **practical point of view**, **Hezbollah** was the originator, in Lebanon, of the **"innovative" doctrine advocating the widespread use of the "weapon of suicide"** to promote strategic goals. **Hezbollah** recorded several remarkable achievements, such as the withdrawal of the Western forces and the Israeli army from Lebanon. **Hezbollah** applied the "weapon of suicide" in a series of spectacular terrorist attacks against Western and Israeli targets in Lebanon during the 1980s and the 1990s, using car bombs operated by suicide terrorists and lone suicide bombers. Its terrorist activities have served as **source of inspiration** for Palestinian terrorist organizations such as the **Palestinian Islamic Jihad** and **Hamas**, who adopted the suicide weapon as a means of perpetuating and escalating the violent struggle against Israel. **Hezbollah, inspired by Syria and Iran**, encourages the **Palestinians** to keep up the practice of the "weapon of suicide". It applies ideological justification to legitimize using this practice against the civilian population, and it prompts **the entire Arab world** to use this weapon against the Americans.



Encouraging Palestinian violence: an excerpt from a propaganda video clip in

- The theme of the “weapon of suicide” occupies a **central place** in Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches. For example, **Nasrallah** states [*al-Manar Television*, May 21, 2001] that “**in the culture of resistance, the culmination of humanity and human dignity is the decision to perform *istishhad*** in order to grant life to one’s people and dignity to one’s nation and homeland”. In this respect, the Deputy Secretary General of **Hezbollah**, **Sheikh Naim Qassem** claimed [*al-Manar Television*, October 10, 2002]: “**All people must aspire to *shahada*** [martyrdom by suicide for the sake of Allah]”. Nasrallah even defied religious rulings that oppose the practice of suicide when he appealed to the Palestinians [*al-Manar Television*, December 14, 2002] to disobey “all those who tell you that it is prohibited to carry out acts of *istishhad*”, adding that **these acts are “the shortest road to Allah”**.
- It is noteworthy that **Sheikh Naim Qassem** devotes a chapter in his book *Hezbollah: Methodology... Experience... Future* to the motive of suicide. In this book, recently published in Beirut, the Sheikh analyzes the religious ruling authorizing suicide acts (*istishhad*), and refers to these acts as “**the main source of power on which one can rely, and the effectiveness of which has been clearly proven**”. The Sheikh acclaims the achievements of these acts in Lebanon, but stresses that the use of this “weapon” must be **selective**, i.e., limited to operations that are sure to cause the enemy **many casualties**, in order not to “waste” this weapon on “routine” terrorist acts.



The front cover of *Hezbollah: Methodology... Experience... Future* by Deputy Secretary General of **Hezbollah** Sheikh **Naim Qassem** (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi publishing house, 2002). The cover picture features a group of warriors, presumably **Hezbollah**, in prayer, most probably on their way to carry out a military operation. At the background: the Dome of the Rock, a prominent religious symbol of Islam, particularly in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict The front cover **bears no sign** linking the book to **Lebanon**.



Advocating suicide bombings exemplifies the cynical manipulation by **Hezbollah** of Shiite religious values, distorting them into Sunni-Islamic principles for the sake of the Palestinian struggle. Hassan Nasrallah, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini's radical Islamic doctrine, has turned the "weapon of suicide" into a key element of **Hezbollah's** leading asymmetric strategy of jihad to be waged against Israel. He regards it as a lethal weapon in the hands of the weaker group in its struggle against the stronger and larger adversary. However, whereas according to **Hezbollah** policy the use of this weapon in **Lebanon** should remain **selective**, i.e., limited to operations involving many casualties, Nasrallah prompts the Palestinians to apply it also for **routine** terrorist attacks, on a **daily** basis: "We expect to see a suicide attack **every day or every two days**" [Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Manar Television*, June 7, 2001]. Using this weapon, according to Nasrallah, "is **the only way to wipe out the Zionists**" [*al-Manar Television*, December 14, 2001]. "Suicide acts, and not the UN, protect the Palestinians." [*al-Manar Television*, August 11, 2001]

- **Appendices:**
- Statements made by senior members of **Hezbollah** on the annihilation of Israel and engaging in violent struggle against it – see **Appendix 12**.

Chapter II: Characteristics of Hezbollah's Political and Military Wings

The “political wing” and the “military wing”: Inseparable twins

- In order to counter the American definition of **Hezbollah** as a terrorist organization, European countries have suggested that a **distinction** be drawn between the **military** (terrorist) wing and the **political** (“legitimate”) wing of the organization. Lebanese government officials have gone one step further and attempted to depict **Hezbollah** as a **political movement**, devoid of military or terrorist characteristics. These suggestions are unfounded, as is evidenced by some of **Hezbollah**'s spokesmen themselves:

“Efforts are made to tempt the **Hezbollah** in order to hold it back. The objective is not to impair its political role; rather its military wing only. But I can say that **no differentiation is to be made between the military wing and the political wing of Hezbollah**” [Muhammad Fannish, member of the Political Bureau of the **Hezbollah** party, *al-Manar Television*, January 18, 2002].


- The above statement by Fannish is **well substantiated** by the organizational structure of **Hezbollah**. From its establishment, the organization has undergone an **accelerated development process** resulting in its evolution into a **number of wings and divisions**: political, military, social, and informational. This evolution reflects **Hezbollah**'s growing strength and stature on the Lebanese scene, and its **determination not to limit** its activities to the military-terrorist spheres of its agenda. The governing body of **Hezbollah** is, as mentioned, the **Decision-Making Shura**

Council, or *Majlis Shura al-Qarar**. It comprises **nine** members, **seven of whom are Lebanese and two Iranian**, the latter representing the interests of **Iran**, the organization's strategic patron. Therefore, any attempt to depict **Hezbollah** as a purely **Lebanese** organization with no Iranian links is **groundless**.

- The Decision-Making Shura Council is headed by Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Subordinate to the Council are several **sub-councils**, including the **Political Council**, the **Military Council**, the **Judicial Council** and several other organs. The general concept is one of a centralized leadership that controls all aspects of the organization, including its military-terrorist activity.

*It should be noted that in Islamic political terminology, the term "Shura" (included in the expression "*majlis shura*" i.e. Shura Council) is of "consultative" nature only. However, in the context of the modern-day **radical** Islamic movements (or organizations), such as Hezbollah, this term refers to the **decision-making** or executive (including **operative**) nature of the leadership of these movements (or organizations).

The Organizational structure of Hezbollah



The Lebanese members of the Decision-Making Shura Council of Hezbollah (elected during the organization's General Assembly meeting in July 2001)



Hajj Imad Fayez
Mughniyah

Sheikh
Muhamm

Sheikh
Ibrahim
Amin al-
Sayyed

Hashem
Safi al-Din

Haj
Hussein

Sheikh
Naim
Qassem

Sayyed
Hassan
Nasrallah

- **The activities of all the sub-councils, in particular the Political Council and the Military Council, are determined in detail by the organization's Secretary General and the Decision-Making Shura Council. Decisions are translated into explicit policy derived from the organization's ideology and strategy, alongside an array of considerations and restraints mainly related to the interests of Iran and Syria, the organization's patrons. The differentiation between the organization's military-operational and political-social activity is therefore totally unfounded.**

- **Senior members of Hezbollah deny any such differentiation, arguing that Hezbollah, in all its aspects, is a single organic entity whose policy and activity are determined by its leadership. Thus, when asked: "Who makes the decisions regarding operations: the militia or the political leadership?" Hezbollah leader Nasrallah responded:**

“The leadership of **Hezbollah**. This issue is no longer the concern of the field operatives only. The leadership of the organization is a leadership of resistance. It takes all elements into consideration, the interests of resistance and the policy of its activity. The brothers in the field are those who [only] carry out that policy.”

[*al-Majalla*, March 24, 2002]



Carefully selected members of **Hezbollah** taking the oath to fight against Israel, their hands raised in salute. On their brows they carry the inscription in Arabic *qadimul* [“Behold, we arrive”]. In the background, the Palestinian flag is visible.

- Sheikh Naim Qassem, Nasrallah’s deputy, expressed similar views on this matter:
 - “We are a political party whose top priority is resistance. For **the struggle against Israel and the policy of opposing the occupation are acts of a political party. We believe that our political endeavors are combined with our resistance operations, which cannot be separated from our political activity.**”
- [*Lebanese Television*, January 23, 2003]

○ “If the military wing were separated from the political wing, this would have repercussions, and it would reflect on the political scene. But **Hezbollah has one single leadership, and its name is the Decision-Making Shura Council. It manages the political activity, the Jihad [i.e., the military] activity, the cultural and the social activities...Hezbollah’s Secretary General is the head of the Shura Council and also the head of the Jihad Council, and this means that we have one leadership, with one administration.**” [*al-Mustaqbal*, December 31, 2000]

The exploitation of sensitive issues in the relations between Israel and Lebanon, such as The exploitation of sensitive issues in the relations between Israel and Lebanon, such as the issue of water resources, in order to step up tension along the border: **Hezbollah** operatives in southern Lebanon putting up a billboard featuring the leader Nasrallah, a Katyusha rocket and the water pumps at the al-Wazan i spring. The slogan in the background reads: “We are ready at your command!”



Hezbollah’s leadership

Two figures stand out at the top echelon of **Hezbollah’s** hierarchy, occupying leading positions in directing the organization’s political and military activity: the leader of the organization **Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah** and his deputy, in charge of the military apparatus, **Imad Fayez Mughniyah**. The following is a profile of both leaders and their achievements:

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the organization and the brain behind its political and military activity



Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah

- **Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah**, 41, is a Shiite, born in the village **Bazouriya** in **southern Lebanon**. During his adolescent years he received a religious education in the town of **Najaf** in Iraq, as protégé of **Sheikh Abbas Musawi**, whom he later succeeded as leader of **Hezbollah**. He is the father of four children, the eldest of whom, Hadi, was killed in a clash with the Israeli army in 1997. His family lives in the Shiite Bir al-Abed neighborhood on the southern outskirts of Beirut, a **Hezbollah** stronghold and home of the organization's headquarters.

- During the 1970s, Nasrallah, still a youth, joined **Amal**, a pragmatic Shiite movement founded in Lebanon by Imam Mussa Sadr to promote the interests of the Shiite community. He filled a number of positions in **Amal**, first as being in charge of the Bekaa Desk, then as regional presiding judge in charge of discipline, and eventually as a member of **Amal's** Political Bureau. Around that time, Nasrallah also joined a radical Shiite Islamic movement, the **al-Da'wa party**, one of whose leaders was Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the most prominent clerical authority in the Shiite

community. Many of **al-Da'wa**'s members were later to join **Hezbollah**.

- In 1982, Hassan Nasrallah resigned from **Amal**, along with many others who were eager to carry out Khomeini's doctrine; together with other Shiite elements and with the assistance of Iran, they founded **Hezbollah**. Nasrallah was granted a senior position in the organization's founding nucleus. Soon after, he was placed in charge of the Bekaa region, the cradle of **Hezbollah**. He was only 22 years old.

- In 1985, Hassan Nasrallah moved to Beirut and was appointed Deputy Chair of the Beirut Council, one of the three wings of **Hezbollah** at the time. Within a few months he took charge of the organizational and military affairs of the city, and became responsible for the Recruiting Unit of the organization. In addition, he served as member of the Political Bureau of **Hezbollah**, which at that time functioned as the organization's **advisory** body. In 1987 he was promoted to a function that was created for him: head of the Executive Council, and in this capacity became a member of the **Decision-Making** Shura Council. Nasrallah held these positions until the killing of the leader of **Hezbollah**, Sheikh Abbas Musawi, by Israeli troops on February 16, 1992. Nasrallah was only 32 when he succeeded Musawi. Iran's then-President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, supported his appointment. Since then, he has been reappointed three times as head of the organization. In July 2001, he began his **fourth term**, following an amendment to the **Hezbollah** charter, which until 1998 allowed the leader of the organization to serve only two terms.

- During the 1990s, Hassan Nasrallah strengthened his relations with the Iranian authorities, **in particular with the leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who assigned him as his delegate in Lebanon on religious matters in the mid- 1990s**. Nasrallah travels several times yearly to Iran to conduct close consultations with the Iranian leadership, during which decisions are made regarding the policy and operation of **Hezbollah**. It should be noted that the leadership in Iran places great confidence in Nasrallah, and values his judgment



Hassan Nasrallah's website, in which he is portrayed as the constitutional emissary in Lebanon of the Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and as the mouthpiece for the Islamic Revolutionary way.

- Today Nasrallah is the **undisputed leader** of **Hezbollah**. He is the **principal authority and foremost decision-maker of the organization**, and enjoys the unreserved support of **Iran** and **Syria**. Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 has **further strengthened his position** as the leader who succeeded in "expelling Israel by military force" without extending it any political "rewards".
- Nasrallah holds his cards close to his chest, particularly regarding the delicate issue of the **Israeli hostages** held by **Hezbollah**, which involves only a strictly limited circle of operatives of the organization. Nasrallah **personally conducts and supervises all dealings concerning this issue**, and is adamant in his refusal to disclose even the smallest item of information. By doing so, he entirely disregards the basic humanitarian principles that are commonly upheld in the international community. He refuses to give information on the conditions of hostages, or to grant them their most basic human rights such as meeting Red Cross delegates, receiving health services, or communicating with their families. As early as the 1980s, **Hezbollah** hostages from the West were subjected to these conditions.



Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who personally deals with the issue of Israeli hostages, stresses during a speech on the topic of hostages that he has no intention of disclosing even the tiniest detail on their conditions without a "reward".

- **Character description:** Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah stands out as a **tough, autocratic, and charismatic leader**, a **gifted speaker** who enjoys the personality cult surrounding him, and insists on being personally involved in all of **Hezbollah**'s activities.
- In spite of his young age and **fierce rhetoric**, Nasrallah is evidently a **prudent leader and pragmatic in his dealings**. He is careful to maintain close relations with his patrons in Tehran and Damascus, especially since the **upgrading** of his relations with the latter after Bashar al-Assad became president of Syria in July 2000.
- Hassan Nasrallah enjoys uncontested authority within the organization. During recent months, the continued Palestinian Intifada and the American preparations for the war against Iraq clearly motivated him to aspire to a **broader leadership**, reaching beyond the local Lebanese scene.

The bottom line:

Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of **Hezbollah**, directs and maneuvers all aspects of the organization's agenda, i.e., military, operational, political, and social. As such, he **is responsible for the organization's political and terrorist activities**. These are consistent with its vision and strategy—which, in turn, derive from the vision of the founder and first leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—and are also **subordinate to** the interests of **Hezbollah**'s patrons and sponsors in Damascus and Tehran.

**Hezbollah's second-in-command, Imad Fayez Mughniyah:
the person in charge of the organization's military wing and a
senior terrorist on the
US wanted list**

- **Imad Fayez Mughniyah** (aka “al-Mukhtar” / “Abu-Salim” / “Jawad” / “Nur al-Din”) is of Shiite origin, born on July 12, 1962 in the village Tayr Dibbah in southern Lebanon. Mughniyah is **one of the ten most wanted terrorists in the United States**. An international warrant of extradition has been issued in respect of him.



- In the late 1970s, during the Lebanese civil war (which began in 1975), Mughniyah joined the ranks of Arafat's **Fatah** organization. In 1982, when the PLO evacuated Lebanon, Mughniyah remained behind and became a member of **Hezbollah**. Thanks to his close links with Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the senior clerical authority and perhaps the most prominent figure in the Shiite community in Lebanon, he soon became head of the **organization's security apparatus**. In the middle of the 1980s, Mughniyah was behind the founding of **Hezbollah's** terrorist wing operating under the **cover name of “Islamic Jihad”**.

- Even today, in the wake of the September 11 attacks against the United States, Mughniyah pursues his terrorist activity and is still in charge of **Hezbollah's** entire military and terrorist apparatus. He has direct command over the organization's overseas terrorist apparatus, and operates a network of agents in Europe, South America, Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the United States. In July 2001, Nasrallah appointed Mughniyah a member of the Decision-Making Shura Council under the alias “Jawad Nur al-Din”. He is believed to have chosen one of **Hezbollah's** strongholds in Beirut as his permanent place of residence.

- In the light of his status as a wanted terrorist in the United States, and **Hezbollah's** interest in diminishing the terrorist image of the organization, **Hezbollah** spokespeople deny any links with Imad Mughniyah. The chair of the **Hezbollah** party in the Lebanese Parliament, Muhammad Raad, once referred to Mughniyah as a "Jihad warrior not connected to **Hezbollah**" [*LBC*, November 19, 2002]. This **statement** is **untrue** and unsubstantiated since, to the best of our knowledge, Mughniyah continues to be in charge of **Hezbollah's** military and terrorist activity and occupies the position of second-in-command of the organization.

- **What makes Mughniyah one of the United States' most wanted terrorists?** Mughniyah has been implicated in numerous terrorist acts against many targets. He is responsible for a number of terrorist operations in Lebanon and abroad, including aircraft hijackings, kidnappings of Western hostages, and **terrorist attacks against Israel** as well as against American and Western targets in Lebanon and abroad.

- **The following are some of the more conspicuous terrorist attacks in which Mughniyah has been involved:**

- **The bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut** on April 18, 1983 resulting in 63 deaths. The attack was carried out through a car bomb driven by a suicide terrorist. This attack was probably the result of Syria's concern about the impending signing of an agreement between Israel and Lebanon under American auspices (which was indeed signed a month later, on May 17, 1983).

- The bombing of the US embassy was the first in a line of **suicide car bombings**, among them the bombing of the **US Marine Corps compound in Beirut** and the attack against the **French unit of the Multinational Force**, both carried out in October 1983.

- The **attack against the US Marine Corps compound in Beirut** was a particularly spectacular one. It involved a large truck carrying a cargo of 5,450 kg

of TNT, which broke into the compound through the front gate, burst in, and exploded, destroying the whole building and killing 241 American troops. The FBI Forensic Laboratory described the bombing as the largest conventional attack in the world ever investigated by its experts [Source: the FBI investigation report as cited by the *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 1984].

○ The above terrorist attacks claimed the lives of some **300 Americans and more than 40 French**. They resulted in the forced pullout of the Multinational Forces from Lebanon, as well as the “upgrading” of the Syrian patronage over Lebanon.

○ Additional terrorist activity in which Mughniyah was implicated: the bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait in 1983 and 1984; the kidnapping and murder of CIA operative William Buckley in Lebanon in 1983; the murder of Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins of the UN Observer Mission in southern Lebanon in 1988; the hijacking of the TWA aircraft in 1985, resulting in one death; the hijacking of two Kuwaiti Airlines aircraft in 1984 and 1988; the kidnappings of dozens of Western civilians in Lebanon, carried out under the cover of various organizations, and the murder of many of them in the 1980s; the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992, resulting in 34 deaths; the bombing of the AMIA (Argentinian-Israeli Mutual Association) building of the Jewish community in Buenos Aires in 1994, resulting in 86 deaths; and the bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, resulting in six deaths.

Death and destruction following the bombing of the Jewish Community (AMIA) building in Argentina in which 86 civilians were killed. Mughniyah is suspected of initiating and masterminding the attack. Officials of the prosecution in the AMIA trial have issued a warrant for his arrest and extradition.



Imad Mughniyah: a senior terrorist on the US wanted list

[Source: the FBI website
<http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/termugniyah.htm>]



IMAD FAYEZ MUGNIYAH



Alias:-Hajj

DESCRIPTION

Date of Birth Used: -1962-**Hair:**-Brown

Place of Birth:-Lebanon-**Eyes:**-Unknown

Height:-5'7"-**Sex:**-Male

Weight:-145 to 150 pounds-**Citizenship:**-Lebanese

Build:-Unknown- -

Language:-Arabic

Scars and Marks:-None known

Remarks:-Mugniyah is the alleged head of the security apparatus for the terrorist organization, Lebanese Hizballah. He is thought to be in Lebanon.

CAUTION

Imad Fayeze Mugniyah was indicted for his role in planning and participation in the June 14, 1985, hijacking of a commercial airliner which resulted in the assault on various passengers and crew members, and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

REWARD The Rewards For Justice Program, United States Department of State, is **offering a reward of up to \$25 million** for information leading directly to the apprehension and/or conviction of Imad Fayeze Mugniyah.

Indoctrination and propaganda: Hezbollah's extensive use of the media to inculcate its vision and propagate the struggle against Israel and the West

- **Hezbollah** relies to a large extent on its widespread media network in order to propagate its doctrine and its vision to all of its followers in Lebanon and the Arab and Islamic world. It also uses its communications network as a means of transmitting messages to various recipients, including the Western countries and even the Israeli public, its sworn enemy.

- The organization operates a number of powerful means of communications, the most prominent of which are *al-Manar Television* and *Radio Nur*. These channels provide continuous coverage of events in Lebanon, the Middle East, and worldwide, and broadcast statements issued by Hassan Nasrallah and other senior members of **Hezbollah**. **Hezbollah** also publishes two leading magazines, *al-Intiqad*, which deals with political issues, and *Baqiatollah*, which addresses religious matters.

- **Hezbollah makes extensive use of the Internet**; the organization operates an **official website** (www.hizbollah.tv), which provides updated information on its activity and quotations of its **leaders' statements**. Its contents comprise video clips, photographs, speeches by senior members of the organization, and narratives of "achievements" by **Hezbollah** operatives. It also features **highlighted messages that the organization intends to convey to its target users**, i.e., its **followers and the Arab and Western public**. An additional website is www.nasrollah.org, **Hassan Nasrallah's personal site** in which the leader of **Hezbollah** is portrayed as the **emissary of the Iranian leader and the "exporter" of the Islamic**

Revolution. Aside from these, each of the organization's electronic and printed media has its own website.



al-Manar Televisio



Radio Nur



The magazine *al-Intiqad*



The magazine *Baqiatollah*

- Throughout its multiple communication channels, **Hezbollah** avails itself of **advanced technology and spectacular effects** (presumably with the assistance of Iran) to produce slick propaganda films and clips. This use of the media evidences the organization's awareness of its importance in its war on the public's consciousness. Hence **its endeavors—paired with significant Iranian investments**—to promote this sphere of activity in order to position itself at the forefront of communication technology.

- An important role of Hezbollah's media network is its utilization for the purpose of incitement and propaganda aimed at reaching a large public in the Arab world, in particular the **Palestinians**. Mass media are drafted to promote the

Palestinian armed struggle, provoke the escalation of terrorism, exert pressure on the moderate / pro-Western Arab regimes, and enhance the status and impact of **Hezbollah** and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. They also serve the organization as a means of transmitting propaganda broadcasts to the Israeli public, applying psychological warfare tactics in order to achieve demoralization and encourage surrender and emigration from Israel.



A message to the Israeli public broadcast by *al-Manar Television*:
 An excerpt from a film released after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon,
 in which **Hezbollah** calls to the Israeli public (in Hebrew):
 “Return to where you have come from”. The Arabic subtitle reads:
 “Ye Zionists, return to the place from whence you have come”

The bottom line:

Hezbollah skillfully exploits its extensive communications network for the purpose of advocating its ideology and promoting its strategic goals. It avails itself of the mass media in order to stir up hatred against Israel, the United States, and Western culture; encourage the Palestinians to step up the use of terrorism and pursue their armed struggle against Israel; transmit messages of hatred and propaganda; and wage psychological warfare aimed at demoralizing Israeli society.

The financial sources of Hezbollah

- Western intelligence sources estimate **Hezbollah's** yearly budget at **approximately \$100 million**, originating primarily from Iran. This sum **finances the organization's military-terrorist activity** (arms purchases, salaries to the militia, training of the militia, and so forth); the **operation of communal institutions** such as schools, hospitals, and relief institutions, and the coverage of **overhead expenses** that derive from the various activities of **Hezbollah** (rent, office equipment, salaries to non-militia members, and so forth).

- More than **half of Hezbollah's budget originates from Iran** via **two main channels**:

- **Governmental institutions** - Part of **Hezbollah's** budget is financed through the Revolutionary Guards (represented by the al-Quds Force) and the **Iranian Foreign Ministry** (by means of the embassies in Damascus and Beirut).

- **Semi-governmental institutions** - After the 1979 revolution, a number of **charity funds** were established in Iran, which operated and continue to operate under the supervision of the Iranian leader. **These funds have branches in Lebanon**, which serve the purpose of "exporting the revolution" by extending wide-ranging financial and social assistance to **Hezbollah** and the Shiite population that identifies with the organization.

- Aside from receiving institutionalized assistance from Iran, **Hezbollah** has strived for years to **develop its own additional sources of financing** through a global funding apparatus. This supplementary funding, however modest in comparison to Iranian support, may have been motivated by the organization's ambition **to reduce its total dependence on Iranian support**. Additional financing sources include:

- **Fundraising in Lebanon and worldwide: Hezbollah** conducts fundraising

activity in **Lebanon and worldwide** (mainly in **Shiite-Muslim** communities) amounting to **several millions of US dollars** yearly. In Lebanon, this fundraising is carried out via the Islamic Resistance Support Association, affiliated with **Hezbollah**. Outside Lebanon, fundraisers operate by means of **charity funds** (similar to the fundraising practices of **Hamas**) and through **local Shiite** community centers. The main centers of fundraising activity outside Lebanon are located in the **Ivory Coast** and the tri-border region in **South America**; fundraising also thrives in the **United States** and **Western Europe** (see Chapter IV below).

- **Legitimate business activity** - This comprises commercial firms owned by **Hezbollah** or its affiliated charitable institutions, as well as a **range of business activities** conducted by **Hezbollah** operatives themselves, such as oil transactions, real estate, and small businesses.

- **Criminal activity in Lebanon and worldwide: Hezbollah** operatives engage in two main types of criminal activity: **trafficking in illegal drugs** and **money forgery** (specializing in the forgery of US \$100 bills) , which is carried out in **Hezbollah**-controlled areas of the Bekaa region. Other criminal activity includes cigarette smuggling, car thefts, and credit card forgery. It is often difficult to pinpoint whether a **Hezbollah** operative who engages in criminal activity does so on behalf of **Hezbollah** or for his or her own benefit; usually the two are **combined** (see Chapter VII below).

- **Partaking from the National Budget of Lebanon: Hezbollah** uses its faction in the Lebanese Parliament to persuade the Lebanese administration to finance projects currently sponsored by **Hezbollah** in Shiite population centers. Assigning such projects to the Lebanese administration offers two advantages to **Hezbollah**: It releases it from a heavy financial burden at the expense of the national budget, allowing it to reap the fruits of propaganda and indoctrination conducted among its Shiite supporters.

Chapter III: Support for Hezbollah Provided by Iran and Syria, Two Countries Sponsoring Terrorism

Iranian support

“We view the Iranian regime as the vanguard and new nucleus of the leading Islamic State in the world. We abide by the orders of one single wise and just leadership, represented by “*Wali Faqih*” and personified by Khomeini...Whoever offends the Muslims, offends in fact the body of our *Umma*, and we shall therefore endeavor to stand up against this threat, guided by a legitimate ruling and an all-embracing political doctrine determined by the leader i.e., *Wilayat al-Faqih*.”*

[Excerpt from **Hezbollah**’s political platform, February 1985]

○ The bulk of **Hezbollah**’s operational infrastructure was established, from 1982 onwards, through extensive **Iranian assistance**. This assistance comprises financial support, **large supplies** of arms (**mostly via Damascus**) and the training of **Hezbollah** militia. In addition, **Hezbollah** depends on Syrian political and military support, which was significantly boosted after Bashar al-Assad acceded to the presidency.

○ Iran views **Hezbollah** as its **spearhead in the use of the “weapon of terrorism” in general, and its use against Israeli targets, in particular**. It also regards **Hezbollah** as a main source of inspiration and a model for leadership in the context of the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, and in the broader context, as a key instrument in the Islamic war against Israel. This view is evidenced by Iranian leader

* *Wilayat al-Faqih*: “Rule by men of religious authority” – the Shiite revolutionary doctrine conceived by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini that advocates the involvement of clerics in politics and the delegation of ruling authority to the supreme clerical authority.

Ali Khamenei's statement in which he explicitly called on **Hezbollah** to **focus its activities on supporting the Palestinian struggle**. Khamenei made this statement after his meetings with senior members of **Hezbollah** at the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Intifada held in Tehran in April 2001. The appeal was reiterated in the closing address of the conference, which called on "all those who took part in the liberation of southern Lebanon to assist the Palestinian resistance."



Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
(left)
meets Iranian leader Ali Khamenei

○ Iran considers the consolidation of **Hezbollah's** position in Lebanon to be a **great success** (the only one so far) in realizing the doctrine of "**exporting the Islamic Revolution**". Even after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon, Iran views Lebanon as its front line against Israel, and **Hezbollah** as a key entity in leading the offensive. Based on this perception, Iran has persisted, especially during the last two years, in strengthening **Hezbollah's** military capability, including supplying it with **an arsenal of land-to-land missiles unparalleled by any other terrorist organization worldwide**. Iran consistently advocates the continued terrorist activity of **Hezbollah** along the Israeli-Lebanese border, and calls for the "liberation" of additional Lebanese territories, which it claims are occupied by Israel (in blatant contradiction to the statement issued by the UN Security Council confirming Israel's full withdrawal from Lebanese territory and compliance with resolution 425 of the Security Council).

○ The “**al-Quds Force**” [“**Jerusalem Force**”] of the **Iranian Revolutionary Guards** deployed in Lebanon is the **Iranian extension** operating in Lebanon and assisting **Hezbollah**. **Al-Quds Force** provides military guidance and support for terrorist attacks against Israel, especially those carried out by **Hezbollah** and Palestinian secular as well as Islamic terrorist organizations. **The support comprises sizeable financial resources and far-reaching military assistance** down to the tactical level. Iran’s military support to **Hezbollah** includes the following:

- Providing training and instruction to **Hezbollah** militia on various military and operational topics



Hassan Nasrallah (left) with Member of the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) Hojjat-ol-Eslam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pour, one of the founders of **Hezbollah**, and prominent member of Hamas leadership Khaled Mash'al (right), at the Conference of Islamic Clerics in Beirut on January 6, 2002

- Iran sends **military supplies** to Lebanon by **air via** the intermediary of the “**al-Quds Force**”. These supplies pass through the **Damascus International Airport**, and constitute **Hezbollah’s** near-exclusive arsenal for terrorist attacks against Israel. The Iranians are aware of this fact, and **continue to provide military assistance**, with the blessing of Syria, thus gradually building up the organization’s military and operational capabilities. **In the course of the past few years, Hezbollah has been supplied, mainly via air shipments, with large quantities of high-quality arms**, including upgraded **anti-tank missiles, Katyusha rockets, anti-aircraft cannons and missiles** of various ranges, SA-7 and SA-14 **shoulder missiles**, equipment and arms for **small-scale maritime warfare**, motorized **gliders**, and even **sophisticated military hardware such as long-range land-to-land missiles of types Fajr-3 (with a 43 km range) and Fajr-5 (with a 75 km range)**. No other terrorist organization worldwide is known to enjoy a massive, well-coordinated and ongoing supply of such high-quality arms.



A Fajr-5 missile launcher, posing a strategic threat to population centers in northern Israel **as far as the Hadera region** – instrument of military power in the hands of Iran and **Hezbollah** in the Israeli-Arab conflict, and a potential means of escalation in the future

- The **al-Quds Force** plays an important role in **Hezbollah's** operational contingency planning for **military escalation against Israel**, in outlining its implementation and in determining relevant levels of response by Hezbollah. The significance of this, is that the Iranians are **instrumental in planning Hezbollah's** operational-terrorist pursuits, and **capable of triggering regional deterioration whenever they see fit**.



Qassem Soleimani, commander of the al-Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, the units of which are deployed and active in Lebanon

- **Financing the buildup of military-terrorist power:** the financial assistance from Iran allows **Hezbollah** to translate its plans into military escalation and operational deployment. After Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, **Iran stepped up its financial support to Hezbollah** as part of the Iranian policy of promoting **Hezbollah's** military deployment against Israel, and in order to **enhance its ability to support Palestinian violence** and boost its impact as the actual ruling power in southern Lebanon.

Syrian support

- **Hezbollah** plays a key role in the “**Syrian order**” in Lebanon. In defiance of the Taif Agreement signed in 1989, Damascus has transformed **Hezbollah** into Lebanon’s chief armed militia. Whereas other ethnic militia groups have been disarmed, Syria allowed **Hezbollah** to maintain a wide-ranging military apparatus and engage in undisturbed operational activity from the South of Lebanon against Israel.

- After Bashar al-Assad became president of Syria in July 2000, **relations between the Syrian regime and Hezbollah underwent a thorough makeover**, which consisted mainly of **upgrading the organization’s status in Syrian eyes**. **Having served as an instrument in the hands of the Syrian regime** for the implementation of its policy vis-à-vis Israel and Lebanon, **Hezbollah became a strategic partner** (“front-line operational arm”) **and a key player exerting considerable influence on the above Syrian policy**.

- Underlying this major change is the **special and close relationship** developed between **Bashar al-Assad**, an inexperienced leader, and **Hezbollah** leader **Hassan Nasrallah**, in strong contrast to the reserve and distrust harbored by Hafez al-Assad in his attitude toward the organization. **Two main developments** contributed to the **rapprochement** between the two parties and **shaped current relations between them**:

- **A shift in the balance of power** between Syria and **Hezbollah**, following the **power succession in Syria and Hezbollah’s achievement in bringing about the Israeli pullout from southern Lebanon** in May 2000. During the initial stage of Bashar al-Assad’s adjustment to the presidency, Syria found itself at a political disadvantage, whereas concurrently, **Hezbollah’s** power and prestige were peaking, following its achievements in Lebanon.

- **The confluence of interests between Syria and Hezbollah** that resulted from the **collapse of peace negotiations in the Syrian route** in March 2000; the **Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon** in May 2000; and the concern about what appeared to be an Israeli attempt to impose new “game rules”, namely **attacking Syrian objectives in retaliation for terrorist attacks from southern Lebanon** in April and July 2001.

Hezbollah as Syria’s strategic partner: posters featuring Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and **Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah, displayed together during a rally in Damascus




- In the light of the above, Syrian assistance to **Hezbollah** is extended in the following ways:

- **Syria provides Hezbollah with military assistance**, complementing the assistance that it receives from Iran. Syria today is **more disposed** to granting support to the organization than under Hafez al-Assad’s rule. **Last year, it supplied Hezbollah with Syrian-made long-range missiles**, quite counter to the policy that prevailed during the former regime. From the mid-1980s, following its

entanglement in the Hindawi affair^{*}, Syria lowered the profile of its direct involvement in terrorist activity and abstained, among other activities, from granting direct military support to terrorist organizations.

- In addition to the above, **Syria is attempting to purchase upgraded anti-aircraft SA-18 missiles from Russia, which may eventually find their way into Hezbollah arsenals.** Regarding this, the Israeli press reported that **Hezbollah** already purchased this type of anti-aircraft missiles, and that Israel tried to persuade Russia to cancel the Syrian transaction. [*Israeli Television Channel 10*, cited by the daily *Maariv*, February 28, 2003]



SA-18 anti-aircraft missile. Its supply will significantly boost **Hezbollah's** ability to intercept high-altitude aircraft

- **Syria provides political backing to Hezbollah on the local Lebanese scene as well as in the international arena.** Syria allows **Hezbollah** the freedom of operation needed to strengthen its position in Lebanon and **pursue its activity in southern Lebanon.** The purpose of the latter is to prevent the cessation of

^{*} **The Hindawi affair:** In April 1986, an attempt was foiled in London to blow up an EL AL plane with a bag of explosives taken aboard by an unwitting pregnant courier. The courier was dispatched by her lover, Nizar Hindawi (a Jordanian of Palestinian origin), who had been directly instructed by the Syrian Air Force Security Directorate, then headed by Major-General Muhammad al-Khouli. Hindawi was convicted by a court in Britain; consequently, Britain severed its relations with Syria (for a short period) and the United States withdrew its ambassador from Damascus.

unrest along the Israeli-Lebanese border and to uphold a controlled level of tension. Some examples are the “casual” attacks in the Har Dov (hereinafter: “Mount Dov”) area, referred to by **Hezbollah** as Shabaa Farms; anti-aircraft retaliation attacks in excess of the usual reaction to Israeli Air Force patrols, intended to terrorize the civilian population along the border; and terrorist attacks, sometimes under Palestinian guise, outside the Mount Dov area, e.g., the attack against Kibbutz Metsuba on March 12, 2002. These incidents prevent the Lebanese administration from imposing its sovereignty and enforcing its authority in southern Lebanon, thus thwarting the full implementation of Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council.

- At the **indoctrination and propaganda level**, Syria and the Syrian-controlled Lebanese administration go out of their way to provide **Hezbollah** with an international “defense umbrella”, presenting **Hezbollah** to the global public as a legitimate “resistance organization” while denying its image of a terrorist organization.

• **Syria has sponsored almost 30 terrorist attacks** carried out by **Hezbollah** during the interval between the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the beginning of March 2003. Of these attacks, no less than 13 were carried out during Operation “Defensive Shield”, i.e., from March 30 to April 13, 2002. The majority of these attacks were carried out by means of **anti-aircraft and artillery fire** targeting Israeli outposts in the Mount Dov (Shabaa Farms) region and outside it. **In these attacks, nine Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed and 28 were injured.** The last of these attacks was reported on January 21, 2003. Other terrorist activities included **three attacks** involving explosive charges; two sniper shootings; **more than 70 incidents of anti-aircraft fire against the Israeli Air Force; one attempted attack on an outpost;** and especially the **kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers** on October 7, 2000. All of the above incidents are flagrant provocations by **Hezbollah**. They constitute **unequivocal violations** of Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council, and enjoy the **full political backing of the Damascus administration** (for additional details on the above terrorist attacks, see Part 2, **Appendices 1 and 2**)



Hezbollah operatives brandishing flags of the organization and displaying the picture of the late Syrian president Hafez al-Assad

The bottom line:

The massive and continuous support granted by **Syria** and **Iran** to **Hezbollah** have transformed this organization **from a troublesome terrorist group into a strategic threat to Israel**, to regional stability and to the international community. Heavily armed by both Syria and Iran, **Hezbollah** is well positioned as a **potential cause of regional deterioration**. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage indeed remarked (at a press conference in Brussels on September 5, 2002), that “**Hezbollah** may be the **A-Team** of terrorists, and maybe **al-Qaida** is actually the **B-Team**”.


- **Appendices:**
- Statements of senior members of **Hezbollah** regarding Syrian support to the organization – see **Appendix 7**.
- How does President Bashar al-Assad view **Hezbollah**? See **Appendix 8**.

Chapter IV: Hezbollah – Terrorist Organization of Global Reach

“One thousand suicide commandos are ready to strike at Israel worldwide”

[Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Watan al-Arabi*, June 17, 1994]

The worldwide infrastructure of Hezbollah



Hezbollah's involvement in international terrorism: An overview

- Since its founding in 1982, **Hezbollah** conducts, aside from its activity in Lebanon, a global terrorist strategy consisting of setting up operational apparatuses throughout the world (see map) and carrying out terrorist attacks against Israeli and US targets. **Hezbollah** has been thus active in a variety of arenas, while focusing on South America, Southeast Asia, Jordan, the Persian Gulf, and the European continent.
- During the 1980s, **Hezbollah** was behind a series of terrorist attacks against Western targets, congruent with the policy dictated by Iran. In the 1990s, following a shift in Iranian policy, **Hezbollah** lowered the profile of its anti-Western pursuits and focused its attention on terrorist activity against Israeli and Jewish targets, while availing itself of its worldwide apparatus.



Hezbollah operatives taking the oath, their hands raised in salute, before setting out for a terrorist attack against Israel

- **Hezbollah** has built up its capacity for carrying out attacks worldwide through its **operational wing**, which specializes in global terrorist activity. This wing, the so-called “Islamic Jihad”, operates **branches throughout the world** and is headed by **Imad Mughniyah**, Hassan Nasrallah’s military second-in-command.
- **Hezbollah** makes **considerable efforts to promote its image**, in particular since

the September 11 attacks, in order to blur its identity as a terrorist organization. It publicly denies its **involvement in terrorism in general, and the existence of a specific apparatus of global terrorism, in particular**. At the same time, it continues to **build up its strategic operational apparatus abroad**. This apparatus consists of a **network of latent operatives, local safe houses, and storage depots of arms and explosives, spread over a large number of countries worldwide**. We believe that this operational infrastructure is meant to carry out spectacular terrorist attacks against Israeli, Jewish, and US targets worldwide, **on short notice** upon receiving the order from the organization's leadership or from Iran, and in retaliation for extreme developments in Lebanon or the Palestinian territories.

- **Hezbollah** has a formidable history of terrorist activity against Western objectives. During the 1980s, it **carried out terrorist attacks** against US as well as European targets in Lebanon and abroad. These included a series of bombings in **France** and a number of kidnappings of **US** and **European** civilians and French, British, German, and Russian diplomats. The latter activity was intended to exert pressure for the release of **Hezbollah** operatives held captive in various countries worldwide. **Hezbollah** is responsible for **most of the kidnappings** of foreign nationals carried out in Lebanon during the 1980s and until the beginning of the 1990s. During that period, no less than **18 citizens of Western countries** were held hostage under harsh conditions, and three of them were killed.
- **Hezbollah's** terrorist activity against Western countries includes bombings carried out against US, French, and Arab targets:
 - **April 18, 1983** – the **car bombing of the US embassy in Beirut** in which **63 people were killed**. The responsibility for this attack was claimed by the **Islamic Jihad**, which served at the time as a **cover name for Hezbollah**.
 - **October 23, 1983** – the **car bombings against the US Marine compound and the French unit of the Multinational Force in Beirut**, in which **241 US soldiers** and **58 French paratroopers were killed**. Once again the **Islamic**

Jihad, serving as a **cover name for Hezbollah**, claimed responsibility.

- **September 20, 1984** – the **car bombing against the US embassy annex in East Beirut**, in which **some 30 people were killed**.

- **Aircraft hijackings** – the **TWA hijacking** of July 14, 1985, an attempt to obtain the release of Shiite detainees in Israel; the hijacking of two **Kuwaiti Airlines** aircraft in 1984 and 1988, both attempts intended to bring about the release of **Shiites held** by the Kuwaiti government, including one **Hezbollah** militia member.

- In the first half of the 1990s, **Hezbollah** carried out two terrorist attacks in Argentina, evidencing outstanding operational abilities. In **May 1999**, the Argentinian Supreme Court, upon completion of the official investigation, charged **Hezbollah** with the bombing of the **Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992** and issued a **warrant for the arrest of Imad Mughniyah**, a terrorist wanted by the United States since the September 11 attacks, for his involvement in terrorist activity during the 1980s.

Hezbollah as “terrorist contractor” on behalf of the Iranian regime:


The Argentinian intelligence report on the AMIA bombing

- In January 2003, SIDE, the Argentinian intelligence service, issued a 150-page report summarizing its findings on the **responsibility of Iran and Hezbollah in the bombing** of the Jewish community (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires. The attack was carried out in July 1994 and claimed the lives of 86 people. The SIDE report provides the evidential basis for the report issued by Judge Juan Jose Galiano, who was assigned to the case, and for further investigation of the affair. This **report**, parts of which were leaked to the press, charges **Iran** (including its leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and its former Intelligence Minister, Ali Fallahian) and **Hezbollah** with **direct responsibility for the bombing**.

- The report refers to **Imad Mughniyah** (a current member of the Decision-Making Shura Council and head of **Hezbollah’s** military wing) as head of the special operations unit (the so-called “Islamic Jihad”) assigned by **Iranian intelligence** to carry out the bombing as its “**sub-contractor**”. The report includes transcripts of **recorded phone calls made by officials of the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires** with **Hezbollah** operatives and others. It also mentions the contacts established by **Iran** and **Hezbollah** with Shiite collaborators in the **tri-border** area (Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay), who assisted in carrying out the bombing.

- **In view of the report’s findings**, the **Argentinian legal authorities** requested that warrants of arrest and of extradition be issued in respect of prominent Iranians, including former Intelligence Minister Fallahian, and **Hezbollah** operatives including the **head of its military wing, Imad Mughniyah**.

- The AMIA bombing is analyzed in **Appendix 5** as an example of **Hezbollah’s** modus operandi.



Terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets in Argentina: pictures of devastation after the bombings of the Israeli embassy and the Jewish Community (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires

Ali Fallahian – profile of a high-ranking Iranian instigator of terrorism

Ali Khuzistani Fallahian, formerly Intelligence Minister under the Rafsanjani regime, is currently **advisor to the Iranian leader Khamenei on matters of Intelligence and National Security**, and a member of the “Council of Experts”. He ran as candidate for the presidency during the elections of June 2001, but won almost no votes. The AMIA affair is **not the first evidence uncovering his involvement in**

overseas terrorism. He was forced to lower his profile following the **Mykonos affair**, in which he was accused of being responsible for the murder of Iranian dissidents on German soil. Fallahian pursues his activities behind the scenes, taking advantage of his position as advisor to Khamenei as well as his connections with the Intelligence Ministry, the Military Intelligence, and the Revolutionary Guards.



Former Intelligence Minister, Ali Fallahian: wanted for his responsibility for the bombing of the AMIA building

Argentina files an official accusation: Iran is responsible for the Buenos Aires bombings

By Yossi Melman

[Extended version of an article published in *Haaretz* on March 11, 2003]

Three weeks ago, Miguel Angel Toma, head of the Argentinian intelligence services (SIDE), visited Israel and met with head of the Mossad Meir Dagan and senior Foreign Ministry officials. The purpose of Toma's four-day visit was to present his Israeli counterparts with a **copy of a top-secret report**.

The report in question **directly implicates Iran, its senior leaders, its intelligence services, and the Hezbollah organization in the July 1994 bombing of the AMIA building**, the Center of the Jewish Community in Buenos Aires, in which 85 people were killed and hundreds were wounded. The SIDE report mentions, albeit in passing, that the **same pattern of operation and level of command—the Iranian leadership, Iranian intelligence, and Hezbollah—had been behind the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, in which 29 people were killed and dozens injured.**

The extensive report, **several thousand pages long**, includes appendices, transcripts of investigations and phone calls, and border control records. **It also mentions names of dozens of Iranian government officials, diplomats, and intelligence officers, as well as Hezbollah operatives and Argentinian and other South American collaborators and auxiliaries** involved in initiating, planning, and carrying out the AMIA bombing. The report is based on **eight years of intensive investigation** conducted with the assistance and participation of the Israeli Mossad, the United States CIA, and other intelligence services.

Dagan and senior Foreign Ministry officials labeled the report “**professional, razor-sharp, in-depth, and courageous**”. Toma, a senior member of the Peronist party, though a political appointee and only one year in office, has shown the courage to point the accusing finger at those identified as responsible for the murderous attack. The list comprises at least twenty-three names, including **Ali Khamenei**, Iran’s leader who, by virtue of his post, has been also in charge of its intelligence services, and numerous Iranian intelligence officers and diplomats, including **Iran’s then-ambassador to Argentina**. It also mentions **Imad Mughniyah**, the alleged “operations officer” of **Hezbollah** and head of its special operations unit—the so-called “Islamic Jihad”—who is closely connected to Iranian intelligence.

Mughniyah, who was behind the TWA hijacking in Beirut in 1985 and the kidnappings of Western hostages in Lebanon during the 1980s, features on the US list of most wanted terrorists published by the FBI in the wake of the September 11 attacks. He is also considered one of the most sought-after targets of Israeli

intelligence, and is reported by foreign sources to have escaped several attempts of the Mossad to eliminate him. The most notorious incident occurred in the south of Beirut in 1994, when a car bomb exploded at the entrance to his brother's garage. Since then, Mughniyah has been on the run, hiding in the Sudan, Damascus, and Iran.

Although the report in fact reiterates Israeli intelligence allegations that both bombings were the work of Iranian intelligence assisted by **Hezbollah**, **this is the first time that a non-Israeli and non-Jewish authority asserts in such unequivocal terms that Iranian leaders and intelligence officers initiated and perpetrated terrorist attacks.**

The report contains records of border control registrations, evidencing that **Iranian diplomats and government officials entered and left Argentina under aliases close to the time of the AMIA bombing.** It also contains transcripts of recordings of phone calls made by the Iranian embassies in Argentina and neighboring countries to alleged operatives of **Hezbollah**. In addition, it uncovers links between Iran, **Hezbollah**, and collaborators residing in the region of Ciudad del Este in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, a region known to house a large concentration of Shiite Muslim immigrants.

The report also refers to the secret testimony given by **Abdolghassem Mesbahi**, a senior Iranian intelligence officer who defected to Germany in 1996. According to this testimony—a 100-page document, parts of which were published by the *New York Times*—the decision for both bombings was made by none other than Iranian leader **Ali Khamenei** and then-President Hashemi Rafsanjani – both of whom also supervised and financed the operation.

Both defector Mesbahi's testimony and the SIDE report mention that the preparations for the bombings took a long time and necessitated meticulous planning in order to avoid leaving any fingerprints and risk the uncovering of the perpetrators. After the **Iranian leaders endorsed the decision and allocated the required funding, Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian was appointed to be in charge of the operation. Iranian intelligence approached Hezbollah to act as its sub-contractor in carrying out the bombings.** The operational responsibility was assigned to **Imad**

Mughniyah, assisted by intelligence officers who had been posted at the Iranian embassies in the region and the local network of collaborators and supporters.

According to the **SIDE report**, the bombings were inspired by ideological- religious motives of hostility toward Israel and the Jewish people, and also by political motives. The essence of the latter was to **“punish” the Carlos Menem regime for violating a commitment given by his predecessor President Raul Alfonsín to supply Iran with know-how and equipment needed for setting up the nuclear reactors in Bushehr, including the installing of a heavy water pool.** The choice of Argentina as target was facilitated by the presence of a sizeable Jewish community, and the fact that the tri-border area is home to a pro-Iranian and **Hezbollah**-supporting community, from which collaborators could have easily been recruited. The proximity of the timings to incidents occurring in the Middle East indicates that both bombings also coincided with vengeful feelings on the part of **Hezbollah**. The pretext for the bombing of the embassy was the killing of **Hezbollah** Secretary General Abbas Musawi by Israeli combat helicopters in southern Lebanon. The bombing of the AMIA building occurred shortly after the abduction to Israel of Mustafa Dirani, a senior Shiite officer with close links to Iran and **Hezbollah**, who captured and detained the Israeli air force navigator Ron Arad.

Based on the SIDE report and an independent inquiry, a few days ago Argentinian Investigating Judge Juan José Galiano issued international arrest warrants in respect of four Iranian officials: **former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian**, already sought by German authorities in connection with the murder of dissident Iranians; **Ali Balesh Abadi**, a courier for Iranian intelligence; **Mohsen Rabbani**, an Iranian intelligence envoy posted under the cover of “cultural attaché” at the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires, and designated in the report as the “operations officer” of the bombing; and **Ali Akbar Parvaresh**, former Education Minister and Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament. **The latter three visited Argentina a short time before and at the time of the bombing, and left the country immediately afterwards.**

Judge Galiano’s report quotes the SIDE report in stating that the **bombing was carried out by “armed units” of Hezbollah.** It does not, however, demand the arrest of any of **Hezbollah’s** operatives. Judge Galiano is also hesitant to directly implicate

the Iranian leadership, and chooses to refer, in the explanatory notes accompanying his request to issue arrest warrants, to “radical circles” in Iran. These formulations exacerbate the suspicion that Judge Galiano arouses among Jews in Argentina. The Jewish community has already accused him and the country’s legal system of conducting an indecisive policy of cover-ups and disinformation, following the disappearance of important documents pertaining to the investigation and incidents where vital witnesses failed to appear before the court.

The general mood was also affected by allegations made by the Iranian defector Mesbahi and published by the *New York Times*. According to these allegations, former President Carlos Menem received \$10 million in bribery from a secret bank account in Switzerland controlled by Khamenei and the son of former supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini, in order to smother the investigation. Menem, who is running again for the forthcoming presidential elections, denied the allegations, threatened to file a libel suit against the newspaper, and is now hoping to see his reputation cleared by the inquiry conducted at present in Switzerland.

The relatives of the victims claim that, even though the SIDE report is an important document, it has shifted attention away from the Argentinian scene towards the international arena: it turns the focus away from the collaborators, among whom are police officers who may have known about the impending bombing and did nothing to impede it. During the past few months, a lawsuit is being brought against twenty people suspected of collaboration, mainly in connection with the purchase of the bomb car. Most of these suspects are criminals and some of them are former police officers. In spite of the above, the Israeli Foreign Ministry already communicated its appreciation to the Argentinian government for its courageous stance. The Iranian government, on its part, denies the allegations against it. It also warned, in a strongly worded conversation with the Argentinian chargé d’affaires at the embassy in Tehran, that pursuing what it defines as a “smear campaign” will lead to the deterioration of relations between the two countries.

Hezbollah’s involvement in additional terrorist activities overseas


- **Aside from** the bombings in Argentina, **Hezbollah** has been involved in additional overseas terrorist activity during the 1990s: in June 1996, a bombing was perpetrated against a **US military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia**, by the **Saudi Hezbollah** (according to the FBI report issued in June 2001, on which the indictments were based). The attack was presumably coordinated with and assisted by **Hezbollah** (**Saudi Hezbollah** operatives were trained in Lebanon). **Hezbollah** also carried out the **kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum** in October 2000, the Israeli abducted in **Brussels** and subsequently transferred to Lebanon to serve as a “bargaining chip”.

- Despite **Hezbollah**’s reluctance in recent years to carry out terrorist activity outside Lebanon, it maintains its **readiness** to carry out such attacks, once a decision is made, and builds up its operational capability to this effect. **Hezbollah**’s operational-terrorist capability constitutes a **potential weapon** in the hands of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, which they can utilize in the future in line with “strategic considerations” (e.g., in response to a US or an Israeli offensive against **Hezbollah**’s terrorist apparatus in Lebanon, or against Iran, as one of the three states comprising the “axis of evil”).

Europe as an operational platform for terrorist attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territories

- **In recent years, and in particular since the pullout of the Israeli army from Lebanon, Hezbollah has clearly focused its activity on targets in Israel and the Palestinian territories. It has even harnessed its overseas operational apparatus for this purpose, and dispatched operatives via Europe to carry out operational missions on Israeli territory.** These missions include gathering operational intelligence, dealing with explosives and arms, and even attempting to carry out terrorist attacks.

Chart showing the process of using Europe as base for terrorist missions in Israel and the Palestinian territories



- The following are a few episodes uncovered in Israel, evidencing the way in which Hezbollah exploits the European continent as an operational platform for preparing and launching terrorist attacks on Israeli territory:

- **The Hussein Mikdad episode (1996):** Hussein Mikdad, a Shiite Lebanese citizen and Hezbollah operative, was sent from Lebanon to Israel presumably in order to carry out a “high-quality terrorist attack” on Israeli territory. Mikdad flew from Syria to Austria and traveled by train to Switzerland. He stayed a few days in Hotel Regina in Zurich together with his handler, who prepared him for his entry into Israel. Mikdad entered Israel via Ben-Gurion Airport, using a forged British passport. **He spent several days in Tel Aviv and subsequently in Jerusalem, and was seriously injured while assembling an explosive charge in his hotel room at the Lawrence Hotel in**

East Jerusalem.

○ **The Smirak episode (1997):** Stefan Smirak, a young German who converted to Islam in 1994, made up his mind to become a *shahid*, or martyr, by committing a suicide attack in Israel. To achieve this end, in August 1997 Smirak approached a **Hezbollah** operative in Germany, who referred him to the **Hezbollah** headquarters of overseas terrorist activity in Lebanon. In November 1997, Smirak boarded a flight from **Amsterdam** bound for Tel Aviv. Upon his arrival in Israel, he was supposed to collect an explosive charge in order to carry out a suicide bombing.

○ **The Fawzi Ayub episode (2000):** Fawzi Ayub is a **Lebanese Shiite** of **Canadian** nationality, and an **operative of Hezbollah's apparatus of overseas terrorist activity**. Ayub **left Lebanon for Europe in October 2000, on his Canadian passport**. Upon his arrival in Europe, he left his passport behind and purchased new personal belongings to conceal his Lebanese origin. He met with a **Hezbollah** operative, who supplied him with a **forged US passport** for his entry into Israel. Ayub stayed in Jerusalem, attempted to approach arms brokers, and was arrested in Hebron by the Palestinian police. In June 2002, following an Israeli military operation in Hebron, Ayub was apprehended by the Israeli security forces. The purpose of his stay in Israel was thus far not uncovered. It is assumed that he intended either to carry out a spectacular bombing, or gather operational intelligence on "high-quality" targets in Israel. Another likely purpose was his infiltration in order to set up an apparatus for future terrorist activity in Israel and the Palestinian territories.

○ **The Jihad Shuman episode (2001):** Jihad Shuman, a **Lebanese Shiite** and **Hezbollah** operative of **British nationality**, entered Israel in January 2001. Shuman flew from Lebanon to the United Kingdom on his Lebanese passport, which he was instructed to leave in a hiding place for its collection by another **Hezbollah** operative. Shuman **availed himself of the Hezbollah apparatus** in the United Kingdom, and flew to Israel on his **authentic British passport**. He stayed in Jerusalem, presumably, among other purposes, on a mission of operational intelligence for a terrorist attack in Israel.



Jihad Shuman and the British passport with which he entered Israel -
 Taking advantage of **Hezbollah's** operational apparatus in
 the United Kingdom to enter Israel and prepare terrorist attacks against Israel

Operational activity of Hezbollah in European countries

Germany

- In **January 1987**, **Muhammad Hamade**, brother of senior **Hezbollah operative Abdel Hadi Hamade**, was arrested in Germany while attempting to smuggle containers of liquid explosives camouflaged in three large bottles of arrack. During his interrogation, Hamade revealed the existence of several storage depots of arms near the French-German border. Following his arrest, **Hezbollah** carried out several terrorist attacks against German targets, including the kidnapping of two German nationals in Lebanon.
- Some two years later, in **March 1989**, the German authorities arrested **Bassam Garib Makki**, a **Hezbollah operative and student in Germany**. Makki was found to have **in his possession documents** containing operational intelligence on Israeli, Jewish, and US targets in Germany that had been targeted for terrorist attacks. He also held operational intelligence on other (British, French, Iraqi, Saudi, and Kuwaiti) objectives, designated as potential targets. **The search carried out in his flat in Darmstadt revealed items associated with terrorist activity, such as instructions in Arabic for the preparation and use of explosive charges.**
- In the bombing of the **Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in September 1992**, **four senior members of the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party were killed and others**

were injured. The attack was initiated by the Iranian Intelligence Ministry, one of whose officials presumably recruited two operatives of the **Hezbollah** cell in Germany with whom he was acquainted, and who **assisted in carrying out the bombing**.

Spain

- In November 1989, a **Hezbollah** cell, comprised of **Hezbollah** operatives and local collaborators, was uncovered in the Spanish town of Valencia. The uncovering occurred after a large cache of **arms**—including explosives and detonators—was found on board a ship that **had arrived from Lebanon via Cyprus**. The members of the cell were arrested, and additional arms were found in their homes. During their interrogation, they admitted their intention to use these arms in order **to carry out terrorist attacks against Israeli and US targets in Europe**.

France

- In March 1987, French authorities arrested the members of a terrorist network headed by Paris-born **Fouad Saleh**, who had received military training in Iran in 1981-1982. The arrest led to the uncovering of a **widespread operational apparatus** that had been responsible for **13 terrorist attacks in France**, most of them in the Paris Metro, in all of which **Hezbollah** operatives were involved.
- In 1989, **Hezbollah** devised a scheme of carrying out suicide attacks using **small aircraft crashing onto French ships**. Iran trained a number of **Hezbollah** operatives to fly small, single-engine aircraft for this purpose.



Spreading the message of annihilating
Israel:

Excerpt from a **Hezbollah** propaganda film
broadcast on *al-Manar Television*, the end-
title of "Israel will stop existing"

United Kingdom

- **Mustafa Maza**, a **Hezbollah** operative, was killed in August 1989 in a London hotel, when the luggage in his possession exploded.

Cyprus

- In 1986, Cypriot security forces arrested two **Hezbollah** operatives in Larnaca, after they were found in possession of weapons and explosives.
- In 1997, a **Hezbollah** unit collected operational intelligence on the US Embassy in Nicosia.

Russia

- In September 1985, **Hezbollah kidnapped four Soviet diplomats** in Lebanon. The kidnappers demanded that the Soviet Union exert pressure on Syria to stop the military activities of pro-Syrian organizations against an Islamic movement in Tripoli. The Soviet diplomats were set free following PLO leader Yasser Arafat's intervention.
- Between 1995 and 1999, **Hezbollah** recruited Palestinian students in Russia for the purpose of setting up an operational apparatus for terrorist activity. The students collected operational intelligence on Israeli and Jewish institutions in Russia, focusing mainly on the Israeli embassy in Moscow. They were also instructed to gather intelligence on US institutions in Moscow.

Italy

- In November 1984, a **Hezbollah** operative was arrested upon his arrival from Lebanon to Switzerland, after he had been found in possession of arms. His arrest led to the uncovering of an **operational network** comprised of Lebanese students, who had planned an attack against the **US embassy in Rome**.

Kidnappings of Israeli citizens in European countries

- During the 1980s, **Hezbollah** “specialized” in kidnapping citizens of Western countries. Nowadays it is trying its hand at kidnapping Israeli nationals in **European countries**, and transferring them to Lebanon in order to create a “stock” of “bargaining chips”.



- **Hezbollah** uses the European continent as a setting for its operatives to contact Israelis, as part of its newly devised **enticement scheme**. Examples so far:
 - In October 2000, **Elhanan Tannenbaum**, a **reserve colonel** in the Israeli army, was abducted and transferred to Lebanon. **Hezbollah** carried out the kidnapping with the intention of obtaining a “bargaining chip” for future negotiation of prisoner exchanges with Israel. Tannenbaum had traveled from Israel to **Brussels** to attend a meeting in Europe. He was flown from Brussels to Lebanon, possibly via one of the Gulf States.
 - **Hezbollah** planned—but failed to execute—a similar abduction of former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev to Lebanon.

Uncovering a Palestinian recruited by Hezbollah to carry out terrorist activities in Europe and Asia

- Israeli security forces recently arrested **Ghulam Mahmud Qawqa**, a Palestinian operative of the Fatah's **al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades** who was also employed by **Hezbollah from Lebanon**. Aside from his terrorist intentions inside Israel, such as the bombing of nightclubs and hotels in Jerusalem, Qawqa also engineered terrorist attacks **against Israeli targets in Europe**. At the end of 2002, Qawqa **planned the killing of Israeli ambassador to Germany Shimon Stein**. He instructed a Lebanese woman residing in Germany and with whom he was in contact, to take pictures of the Israeli embassy from four different angles.

- Qawqa attempted a similar operation in **Asia**. A Jordanian who worked in China and with whom Qawqa was acquainted, offered to provide him with a flight ticket to China. Qawqa's idea was to fly to Jordan and from there to **China**, where he intended to **kill the Israeli ambassador to China Yitzhak Shelef**. Qawqa approached a **Hezbollah** operative and started things rolling, but his scheme was cut short by his arrest.

Hezbollah's activity in Jordan

- As part of its endeavors to support Palestinian violent activity, **Hezbollah engages in the smuggling of "high-quality" military hardware into the Palestinian territories and Israel via Jordan**. At the end of June 2001, Jordanian security forces arrested three members of **Hezbollah's** operational unit specializing in overseas terrorist activity. The operatives were caught **transporting 25 rockets of 107 mm caliber, which had been transferred from Lebanon via Syria to Jordan and were obviously intended to reach the Palestinian territories**. The three men were released from Jordanian prison in May 2002 and returned to Lebanon.

Hezbollah's activity in Southeast Asia

Singapore

- In 1995, **Hezbollah** set up a terrorist cell in **Singapore** with the intention of attacking **US and Israeli** targets on the island. **Hezbollah** operatives, who had traveled from Lebanon to Singapore, recruited five Muslims among the local population to operate the cell. The cell's mission was to launch **explosive boats** against **US and Israeli ships** passing through or anchoring in the Singapore Straits, based on relevant operational intelligence. The operatives also took pictures of the **US and Israeli embassies** in Singapore.

The Philippines and Malaysia

- Pandu Yudhawinata, an Indonesian **Hezbollah** operative, was arrested in 1999 at the Manila city airport in the Philippines. During his interrogation, he revealed **Hezbollah's** intentions to recruit Malaysians and Indonesians in order to carry out terrorist attacks in **Australia** and in **Israel**.
- Tri-lateral cooperation between the United States, Israel, and the Philippines led to the arrest of a senior **Hezbollah** operative based in **Malaysia**, who had planned to carry out **terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia**.



Advocating hatred against the United States: Nasrallah, disappointed by his audience's "Death to America" calls, admonishes that the United States will not die from such feeble calls. The audience responds in a loud chorus: "Death to America!"
 [al-Manar Television, November 11, 2001]

Hezbollah's activity in the United States

- **Hezbollah** activity has even reached the United States, the country that defined it as a dangerous terrorist organization, and which suffered hundreds of casualties in its murderous bombings in Lebanon. In July 2000, 23 people suspected of supporting **Hezbollah** were arrested in North Carolina. They were accused, among other things, of providing assistance to terrorist organizations and of money-laundering activities. Like **Hamas** and other Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, **Hezbollah** conducts fundraising activities in the **United States** (see below).

Hezbollah's activity in South America

- South America is home to numerous Shiite Lebanese communities with connections in Lebanon. **Hezbollah's** core activity in the region is in the **tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay**. This area constitutes a fertile environment for terrorism-sponsoring activity. In addition, **Hezbollah** operates cells in **Colombia, Venezuela, and other countries**. **Hezbollah's** operational apparatus was instrumental in carrying out the organization's two strategic attacks in Argentina: the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and of the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires in 1994.

- **Hezbollah's operational** apparatus in **Argentina** seems to be **still intact**. Its network of operatives and collaborators is still engaged in collecting operational intelligence on various targets, while building up stocks of high-quality arms and explosives to carry out bombings. **Hezbollah's** concern that the current US military presence in Iraq may be exploited for waging an Israeli or US military operation in Lebanon, has stirred up **increased activity in the South American arena**. **Hezbollah** operatives **convened** in the region in order to discuss ways of **improving the retaliation potential** of the organization in the event of an Israeli or US offensive in Lebanon.

- **In addition to its operational-terrorist endeavors, Hezbollah conducts a variety of activities in South America:**

- **Hezbollah-operated training camps in the rain forest:** at least one of these camps serves as a training ground for youngsters in the use of military hardware, combined with radical indoctrination including anti-US and anti-Semitic messages.

- **Raising funds for the financing of terrorist activity:** **Hezbollah** generates revenues through legal businesses, but also—and more commonly—through criminal pursuits, ranging from **drug smuggling** to **CD counterfeiting**. **Hezbollah** engages in large-scale **smuggling of cigarettes and drugs** in the tri-border area. **Hezbollah** operatives in this area have been asked by their Lebanese counterparts to provide them with equipment such as computers, night vision devices, mine detectors, GPS satellite navigation devices, and aviation equipment. According to various estimates, **Hezbollah** revenues in South America amount to **hundreds of thousands of US dollars yearly**, totaling **tens of millions of US dollars** so far.

THE CARRYING OUT OF A STRATEGIC TERRORIST ATTACK BY HIZBOLLAH ABROAD

Preparing the operational infrastructure

Decision from the Hizbollah leadership about carrying out of a terror attack abroad (specific target)

Sending activists to the target
final preparations

updating target
file

Use operational
apartments

Preparations of
explosive charge

Buying/renting car bomb

Preparation of suicide bomber

Operational activists leaving back to Lebanon

carrying out the terror attack

Worldwide purchase of arms and equipment

- **Hezbollah** uses its apparatuses throughout the world not only to strengthen its operational capabilities for launching terrorist attacks, but also as a means of purchasing the advanced arms and equipment needed for the organization's operational activities. To transact these purchases, **Hezbollah** uses its operatives who reside **outside** Lebanon (either permanently or temporarily), “innocent” businesspeople (including Lebanese), and companies founded by the organization (some of which are **front companies**). The equipment purchases comprise computers of various types, night vision equipment, satellite navigation equipment (GPS), mine detectors, and aviation-related software. This equipment is used on a regular basis by **Hezbollah** to conduct its operational activity in Lebanon.
- **Hezbollah's** procurement system is active in the **United States** as well, availing itself of the advanced technology on this market. In the beginning of 2001, US authorities issued warrants for the arrest of several **Hezbollah** operatives—including **Ali Amhaz** and **Mohammad Dbouk**—**involved in supplying arms and combat support equipment to Lebanon**. **Ali Amhaz** was even arrested in **Canada** at the end of 2001, and charged for his role in providing arms and equipment to the organization. In 2000, some seventeen people were convicted of trading in counterfeit consumer goods, money laundering, and supplying equipment to Lebanon, such as night vision equipment and satellite navigation devices. One of these, **Ahmed Hammoud**, is suspected to have undergone **military training** in Lebanon.
- It seems that the organization is keen on keeping itself on the cutting edge of the **most advanced technological means** available on the free market, in order to support its operational-terrorist apparatus. **Hezbollah** purchases these means on a regular commercial basis, and delivers them to its apparatus in Lebanon, to **complete** the ongoing supplies of **Iranian** equipment

Worldwide fundraising activity

- **Hezbollah** raises funds in Lebanon and among Lebanese Shiite communities **throughout the world** as an “add-on” to the massive financial support that it receives from Iran. We estimate the total annual amount raised by **Hezbollah** at **several millions of US dollars**, half of which originate from sources outside Lebanon. Besides operating a worldwide network of fundraisers, funds are also raised through so-called “**charity funds**”. Some of these are **extremist Islamic** institutions that, while not directly connected to **Hezbollah**, support it, albeit marginally, in view of their radical Islamic orientation.

- The **Hezbollah fundraising network** stretches over the **American, African, Asian,** and **European** continents. This network, most of which is supervised by the organization’s **Foreign Relations desk**, is closely linked to **Hezbollah’s** civilian apparatus in Lebanon. The following is a description of **Hezbollah’s** fundraising activity broken down by continents and countries:

North America

- **Hezbollah** employs several dozen operatives in North America whose fundraising activity accounts for tens of thousands of US dollars annually.

The United States

- **Hezbollah’s** fundraising in the United States focuses mainly on areas housing sizeable **Shiite communities**, such as New York, Detroit, Boston, and Los Angeles. While US authorities define **Hezbollah**, including its civilian wing, as a **terrorist organization**, we know of no concrete measures taken against charity funds associated with **Hezbollah** and operating in the United States.

- Among the centers mentioned above, **Detroit**, home to a large Shiite community of southern Lebanese origin, stands out as the **main center of Hezbollah’s fundraising activity in the United States**. Compared with other centers, fundraising

in Detroit is carried out by a **fairly well organized mechanism**. **Three charity funds** operate in the Detroit area. Additional fundraising is carried out through the **Islamic Resistance Support Association**. **Al-Shahid Fund** [the “Martyr’s Fund”] appears to be the major fundraising institution in Detroit, probably **Hezbollah’s** main fund in the United States. It is closely linked to **Hezbollah’s** Foreign Relations desk, and is also related (to an extent which is yet unclear) with the **al-Shahid Association** in Lebanon. Two additional funds operate in Detroit: the **Educational Development Association (EDA)** and the **Goodwill Charitable Organization (GCO)**.

- The **Islamic Resistance Support Association** raises funds in the **Detroit** area by means of “alms boxes” placed in restaurants in the local Shiite community. Until recent years, donors were also openly referred to bank account numbers used by the “Support Association”. Since the September 11 attacks, however, this practice is no longer in use. It is still possible, though, to donate money directly to the bank accounts used by the Islamic Resistance Support Association.



The emblem of the Islamic Resistance Support Association’s

. The Arabic word on <http://www.moqawama.net> website the emblem is *da’m*, i.e. support, usually referring to **material** support. Through this site, **Hezbollah** raises money extensively in

- **Hezbollah**'s main fundraisers in the United States are:
 - **Ahmed Ali Ghassan**, aka "Abu Bakr", born 1965, resident of Middletown, New Jersey
 - **Sheikh Abdallah Bazi**, Shiite, born in Lebanon in 1961. A radical sheikh of a mosque in Dearborn, Detroit, he has resided in the United States since 1990.

Canada

- **Hezbollah** fundraising in **Canada** is carried out in the cities of **Montreal** and **Ottawa** and the towns of **Hamilton** and **Windsor** (both in the Toronto area). The fundraising center is located near Toronto, possibly because of this city's proximity to the US border and the large Shiite community living in this area.
- One of **Hezbollah**'s operation channels in Canada is the **al-Shahid Association**, a branch of the Lebanese **al-Shahid Association**. The latter institution provides financial support to families of **Hezbollah** members killed in terrorist attacks (including suicide bombers), carried out by these members.

In December 2002, the Canadian government outlawed Hezbollah's political activity shortly after having declared a similar ban on the activity of the organization's **military** wing. What triggered the Canadian decision was a (quite frequent) statement made by **Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah in support of the Palestinian suicide bombings. The **practical** significance of the decision was the **freezing of Hezbollah's assets in Canada, and the prohibition of fundraising in Canada on behalf of the organization**. To the best of our knowledge, however, the Canadian government has so far taken no concrete measures in this matter. Yet we assume that as soon as these restrictions are enforced, **Hezbollah's** activity in Canada will decrease drastically.

South America

- **Hezbollah** fundraising in South America is carried out in **two main centers**: the **tri-border area and Venezuela**. Of these two centers, the tri-border area is the main center for two reasons: the sizeable local **Shiite community**, estimated at tens of thousands of members, and the **relative ease** of carrying out fundraising on behalf of **Hezbollah**, with little interference on the part of the local law enforcement authorities.

- The **tri-border area** is the region surrounding the meeting point of the **Brazilian, Argentinian, and Paraguayan** borders. Three towns are located in this area: Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil. These towns serve as centers for **Hezbollah's** fundraising activity in South America. Among those involved in this activity is the **Barakat clan**, a prominent Shiite family whose members are spread throughout the tri-border area and who raise funds for **Hezbollah's** civilian projects. **As'ad Ahmad Barakat**, one of the clan chiefs, is currently **detained in Brazil** because of his involvement in fundraising on behalf of **Hezbollah**. Barakat had already been arrested by the Paraguayan police in December 2001 on the same charge, but was released shortly afterwards and escaped to Brazil.

Africa

- African countries, in particular **the Ivory Coast**, **play an important role in Hezbollah's fundraising activities**. **Shiite communities** have lived in these countries for many years, and some of them identify ideologically with **Hezbollah**. **Hezbollah's** activities also benefit from the **relatively slack enforcement of the law** by the local authorities. According to our estimates, funds raised in Africa amount to hundreds of thousands of US dollars yearly. The main fundraising countries are:

- **The Ivory Coast** – **Hezbollah's** foremost fundraising country in Africa and one of the organization's main fundraising centers worldwide.

- **South Africa** – fundraising for **Hezbollah** in this country is carried out on a small scale, probably reaching the amount of tens of thousands of US dollars yearly. The

following **Hezbollah**-related organizations operate in South Africa:

- **PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs)** – a Muslim organization founded in 1995 following a dramatic rise in crime and the authorities' inability to cope with it. PAGAD, which started as a communal militia for self-defense, soon became a militant opposition organization **involved in terrorist activities against Jewish and American interests and the South African administration. PAGAD appears on the American list of terrorist organizations.** We have no evidence of any fundraising activity by this organization on behalf of **Hezbollah**, even though it seems highly likely. For in an interview granted to the press in 1996, a senior member of **PAGAD** admitted the **link between this organization and Hezbollah.**

- **Karballah Foundation for Liberation** – an organization founded in 2002 by Shiite residents of **Johannesburg**, with the purpose of raising funds on behalf of the Palestinians. Part of the funds are possibly meant for **Hezbollah**, or funneled through **Hezbollah** to the Palestinians.

- **Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)** – The core of the Lebanese-Shiite community's activity in this country is a mosque in the capital, Kinshasa. The mosque is **financed by the Iranian embassy** and as of the end of 1996, was headed by **Sheikh Hassan Salah Mahdi**. We believe that, due to the lack of any other central institution of the community, the mosque constitutes a kind of umbrella framework for fundraising activity on behalf of **Hezbollah.**

- **Senegal** – about 30,000 Lebanese immigrants live in Senegal, the majority of which in the capital, Dakar. It also serves as a secondary center for **Hezbollah's** fundraising activity in Africa. We have no estimate as to the extent in which the Lebanese community in Senegal is linked to **Hezbollah**. Still, one cannot ignore the **abortive attempt in 1998 to smuggle approximately \$1.7 million from Senegal to Lebanon.** When this affair was uncovered, the local Lebanese community admitted that **senior members of the community had been behind**

the attempt, but denied any connection with **Hezbollah** and claimed that the smuggling was intended to circumvent Senegalese law.

Europe

- **Germany** is **Hezbollah's main arena** for fundraising activity in Europe. We estimate the amount of funds raised in this country at **tens of thousands of US dollars annually**. These funds are mainly destined to finance **Hezbollah's** social welfare work, but we do not rule out that part of the donations make their way to other channels as well.

- In 2002, Germany **closed** the Al-Aqsa fund which was engaged in fundraising for **Hezbollah**. It is rather difficult to evaluate, for the time being, the impact of this measure on the scope of **Hezbollah** fundraising in Germany. To the best of our knowledge, however, Germany's measures were not aimed at challenging the activities of **some of the more conspicuous Hezbollah institutions in Germany**:

- **The Fatima Mosque** – This mosque, located in the town of Münster, was established in 1994 with Iranian financing.

- **The Lebanese Islamic Association** – This association made headlines in June 2002 following loud protests by the local (non-Muslim) residents sparked by the association's plans to establish an Islamic center in Berlin. The center was intended to house a religious school, a kindergarten, and a youth club. The German authorities suspected that it was also meant to serve the additional objective of facilitating fundraising on behalf of **Hezbollah**. We assume that the protest thwarted the plans to establish the center. It is not known whether the association is planning to set up an Islamic center elsewhere.

- **The Al-Aqsa Fund** which was closed – a fund owned by the **Hamas** movement, which in the past conducted several fundraising campaigns also **on behalf of Hezbollah**. The manager of the Netherlands branch of the al-Aqsa Fund mentioned some time ago that the branch conducts fundraising activity on behalf of **Hezbollah** in coordination with the main office in Germany. The German al-Aqsa fund was

outlawed in 2002 because of its links with **Hamas**; yet, its branch in the Netherlands is still active. We know of no link between **Hezbollah** and the fund that presumably succeeded the al-Aqsa Fund

United Kingdom

- **Hezbollah's** fundraising activity in this country is conducted on a **small scale**. According to our estimates, fundraising does not exceed a few tens of thousands of US dollars yearly, despite the fact that some key figures of the Lebanese community in the UK are involved in fundraising institutions. The following are some of the institutions active in fundraising on behalf of **Hezbollah**:

- **LWC – the Lebanese Welfare Committee** – this is presumably **Hezbollah's political wing in the UK**. As such, it is also active in fundraising, and is also involved in propaganda, albeit on a small scale.

- **The Help Foundation** – established in 1987 for the purpose of raising funds for Lebanon, and is suspected of raising funds for **Hezbollah**.

- **Ahmed al-Saifi** – a Lebanese who operates an **Islamic center** in London, through which funds are raised for **Hezbollah** among the Muslim communities in the UK. The funds are transferred to Beirut by means of checks drawn to the order of **Jam'iyat al-Abrar** [“the Association of the Righteous”], a Lebanese charity fund which supports the Palestinians.

- **Belgium** – **Hezbollah's** activities in Belgium seem to focus mainly on indoctrination and propaganda; fundraising plays only a marginal role.

- **Switzerland** – Imad al-Musawi, a member of **Hezbollah**'s political bureau, has **admitted to donations made** in support of the organization by the Lebanese community in Switzerland. The manner in which these funds are raised has not been disclosed.
- **Italy** – Italy seems to be a marginal source for fundraising on behalf of **Hezbollah**. The manner in which the funds are raised is not clear, but **Hezbollah** is known to be involved in the Lebanese community in Italy. In 2002, the city of Como hosted a convention intended to strengthen the bond between the Lebanese community in Italy and its homeland Lebanon. A **Hezbollah** delegate, a member in the Lebanese parliament, was the guest of honor at the convention and he also delivered a speech.
- **The Netherlands** – this country occupies a very marginal position as far as fundraising for **Hezbollah** is concerned. As mentioned earlier, the manager of the Netherlands branch of the al-Aqsa Fund **admitted to raising funds** on behalf of **Hezbollah** in cooperation with the German fund. The scope of fundraising is unknown, but since the al-Aqsa Fund raises funds mainly for **Hamas**, the sums destined for **Hezbollah** are bound to be small.

Asia

- **Arab countries** – no designated fund or other fundraising institution affiliated with **Hezbollah** is known to operate in any Arab country. It is, however, known in general that **Hezbollah** raises funds in Arab countries.
- **Turkey** – an article published in 1998 reported the uncovering of a network of seven charity funds active in fundraising in Turkey on behalf of **Hezbollah**. We know of no fundraising activity in Turkey in support of **Hezbollah** ever since.
- **Thailand** – no fundraising activity in Thailand on behalf of **Hezbollah** seems to take place. There is, however, a non-governmental organization giving financial

support on a monthly basis to some of **Hezbollah**'s operatives in Thailand. This organization's name (loosely translated) is the **International School for Religious Studies Abroad**. It is run by **Hussein Ali Pour**, an Iranian active in Bangkok, among other places.

Appendices:

- Major terrorist attacks carried out by **Hezbollah**'s overseas terrorist apparatus – see **Appendix 4**.
- The bombing of the Jewish Community building in Argentina (1994), an example of **Hezbollah**'s modus operandi abroad – see **Appendix 5**.
- Hassan Nasrallah's statements regarding **Hezbollah**'s overseas activities – see **Appendix 6**.

Chapter V: Duplicating the Lebanese Model in the Palestinian Territories – Hezbollah’s Support for Palestinian Terrorism

The “Palestinian *jihād* resistance” is the “vanguard of *jihād*”; it “deprives the Zionists of their self-confidence” and proves to them that “their only choice is to pack their belongings and return to the places where they came from”; “**Hezbollah** is determined to continue expressing its support of the Intifada, no matter whether or not the Shabaa Farms are occupied, and it will not hesitate to make a move in favor of the Intifada when the time is right.” [Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Manar Television*, April 24, 2001]

Overview

- In the context of the policy dictated by Syria and Iran, and consistent with its own goal of annihilating the state of Israel, **Hezbollah** endeavors by various means to assist the Palestinian terrorist organizations and improve their capabilities in pursuing their armed struggle against Israel. The violent struggle conducted by these organizations since September 2000 has opened a new channel of activity for **Hezbollah**. It has motivated **Hezbollah** to **support Palestinian violence in order to undermine and shatter the foundations of Israel from within thus accelerating the process of its elimination.**



Two senior leading personalities of terrorist organizations notorious for their attacks against Israel: Hezbollah leader Nasrallah and one of the most prominent figures of the Hamas leadership Khaled Mash'al at a "Jerusalem Day" convention on January 28, 2001

- The means of wearing down Israel consists of “exporting” the methods that **Hezbollah** used in its war against Israel in Lebanon. It means waging an **asymmetric war of attrition, an unremitting struggle aimed against the civilian home front**, in order to undermine the sense of security of the Israeli population and accelerate its demoralization and disintegration.
- In this context, **Hezbollah** uses **four main channels** of assistance to the Palestinian violent struggle:
 - **The military channel:** **Hezbollah**'s military support includes supplying arms, smuggling them into the Palestinian territories, training Palestinian militias, setting up terrorist apparatuses in the Palestinian territories, sending terrorists to the Palestinian territories, and recruiting Israeli Arabs to carry out terrorist attacks and gather intelligence.
 - **The channel of cross-border operations:** **Hezbollah** carries out terrorist attacks from the Lebanese-Israeli border, using various tactics, as a means of supporting the Palestinian struggle. When Israel exerted military pressure on the Palestinians during Operation Defensive Shield, **Hezbollah** boosted its activity,

launching a Palestinian terrorist attack against a civilian target, Kibbutz Metsuba.

- **The financial channel: Hezbollah** transfers funds to terrorist organizations active in the Palestinian territories, mainly those identified with **Fatah**.
- **The indoctrination and propaganda channel: Hezbollah** enlists its media channels—in particular *al-Manar Television*—to the Palestinian violent struggle, broadcasting messages focusing on the need to **pursue** violence and resist peace negotiations and the relief of tension.
- Senior members of **Hezbollah** often boast of their support of the Palestinians:
 - **Muhammad Raad, chair of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament:** “We do not deny that we support the Intifada, stand by it, and assist it on the political, informational [media] and operative levels.” [Interview granted on March 3, 2002 to *al-Siyasa*, an Egyptian quarterly focusing on international relations]
 - **Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem:** “We are eager to assist our Palestinian brothers...This assistance takes on many forms, **including military support.**” (*NTV*, April 21, 2002) “We support the Intifada in various ways, such as carrying out operations in Shabaa Farms, financial aid, donations, **military support, transferring arms, and training.**” (*NTV*, May 25, 2002)



Hezbollah **Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem**. The English caption reads “Resistance attacks are to continue despite the negotiations” Background: a poster featuring Iranian leader Ali Khamenei.

- **Abdallah Qusseir, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament:** “We believe in providing all forms of support...All fear the most dangerous form of support and are afraid to talk about it. I refer to the military support. **We publicly state that we provide military support to the Intifada, to the best of our ability...All roads are open before us; none is forbidden.**” [*LBC Television, April 4, 2002*]

The use made by **Iran** of **Hezbollah** as a means of assisting Palestinian terrorism is well illustrated by an intelligence report dated October 31, 2002 prepared by **Jibril Rajoub**, former head of the Preventive Security Service of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The report mentions intensive talks held in **Damascus** between **Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad**, the purpose of which was “to step up the joint activity ‘inside’ [the Palestinian territories and Israel, hereinafter: ‘inside’] sponsored by Iran.” According to the report, this was based on “an Iranian message conveyed to the leaderships of **Hamas and [Islamic] Jihad, allowing no relief [of tension] at the present time**”. The report further states: “What is required now is to carry out **suicide attacks** against Israeli targets in Gaza, the West Bank, and **inside Israel**.” (for the translated report and a copy of the original, see **Appendix 9**).

Recruiting and operating Israeli Arabs and Palestinians

- Since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and in particular once violence has started in the Palestinian territories, **Hezbollah** is focusing its efforts on recruiting Israeli Arabs and Palestinians, viewing them as major potential for setting up terrorist apparatuses. **Hezbollah** draws on existing terrorist groups (usually identified with **Fatah**), operating them from Lebanon in order to carry out terrorist attacks, while **supporting and financing them**. An additional resource is **recruiting collaborators in order to set up an apparatus for gathering intelligence information**.
- **Hezbollah** trains and sponsors these terrorist apparatuses located ‘inside’ **by giving the operatives military instruction in camps in Lebanon, and transferring arms from Lebanon** through various **smuggling** channels. In addition, **Hezbollah** attempts **to infiltrate terrorists into Israel** for the purpose of performing spectacular attacks on Israeli territory. One of these is **Hussein Mikdad**, a Lebanese Shiite who entered

Israel, gathered intelligence information on prime targets, and accidentally blew himself up while preparing an explosive charge in his room at the Lawrence Hotel in East Jerusalem in 1996.



Hussein Mikdad, who was seriously injured in his hotel room in Jerusalem

- **Hezbollah** is trying hard to set up its own network of collaborators on Israeli soil, which may eventually be used for terrorist activities. It **recruits Israeli citizens, both Arabs and Jews**, to carry out missions such as smuggling arms into Israel, passing on intelligence information to Lebanon, and even carrying out terrorist activities. The following are some examples:

- **Hezbollah** recruited several Arabs and Druse residents of villages in the north of Israel (the Galilee and the Golan Heights), in order to smuggle arms **from Lebanon to Israel**, including Claymore **mines**, mortars, small arms, and explosives. Part of the arms were captured when the smuggling was uncovered in October 2001.

- In 2002, the Israeli security forces arrested **Nissim Nasser**, an Israeli citizen

of Lebanese origin, on charges of assisting **Hezbollah**. He was reported to have Israeli relatives serving in the Israeli army, some of whom high-ranking officers, which may have been the incentive for his recruitment. At the end of 2000, a **Hezbollah** cell was uncovered in the Galilee. The cell consisted of Israeli Arabs from the village of Abu-Snan, and was operated through a collaborator in Lebanon, a relative of the recruited Arabs. **The cell had planned to kidnap an Israeli soldier and even to plant bombs in public places.**

• **Additional episodes illustrating Hezbollah’s recruiting efforts among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians:**

○ In **October** 2001, Israeli security forces arrested a **Palestinian from the Samaria** region, the father of thirteen children. He had been recruited by **Hezbollah** operatives while in Saudi Arabia to perform the *Hajj*, or pilgrimage to Mecca required by Islam. He revealed to his interrogators that his handlers had instructed him to gather intelligence information on **Israeli settlements in Samaria** and to consider **purchasing arms**. The **Hezbollah** operatives had also tried to assign him to recruit additional operatives (including one of his sons), and had planned to use him as mediator to make contacts with Israeli Arabs.



Hassan Nasrallah emphasizes in a speech that Hezbollah and the Palestinians are at war against Israel “no matter whether or not the Shabaa Farms are occupied.”

- In the second half of **2002**, **Hezbollah** assigned several groups of **criminals from among the Israeli Arab population** in the north of Israel to carry out missions, consisting mainly of **gathering operational intelligence**. In order to transmit the intelligence data, **Hezbollah** availed itself of channels used for drug smuggling into Israeli territory. **In July 2002**, a gang of drug dealers from **Nazareth and the Israeli part of the village of Ghajar** (see below) was arrested. They were suspected of smuggling into Lebanon computer software, maps, equipment, various documents, and classified material in return for drugs and arms. The smuggling was carried out by residents of **Ghajar**, a village divided between Israel and Lebanon (following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon), whose residents can easily access both countries.
- In **September 2002**, ten Israeli citizens of the Galilee region were arrested under suspicion of handing over sensitive **information** to **Hezbollah** in Lebanon in return for **drugs and money**. The main detainee in this affair was Lieutenant-Colonel Omar al-Hayb of the village of Beit-Zarzir, who had a long-time relationship with Lebanese drug baron Kamil Nahara (code-named “Abu Sa’id”) and closely connected to **Hezbollah**. “Abu Sa’id” asked al-Hayb to supply him with maps of the northern part of Israel as well as information on the Israeli troops in the Shabaa Farms region, on the former Chief of the Northern Command (now deputy Chief-of-Staff of the IDF) Major-General Gabi Ashkenazi, and on tank ambushes. Two other detainees, arrested after making a drug deal near the border fence, were used as couriers **for passing on intelligence information to Lebanon and smuggling drugs into Israel**. The remaining detainees in this affair were also linked to **Hezbollah** agents in Lebanon, and had been engaged in handing over to them intelligence information. One of the detainees had smuggled several Israeli cellular phones into Lebanon in the context of these contacts. **In the course of the investigation, it turned out that one of these phones was found on the body of one of the Palestinian terrorists who had entered Israel with Hezbollah assistance and carried out the attack near Kibbutz Metsuba in March 2002, that cost the lives of six Israeli citizens.**

- In **November 2002**, Israeli security forces arrested Ahmed Rageh Ahmed Awiti, a man in his forties who had arrived in 1994 from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip along with other Palestinian Authority personnel. Awiti was employed as a flight engineer at the Dahaniya Airport in Gaza. During his interrogation, Awiti admitted that on February 24, 2001, he traveled to Mecca together with an official delegation from the Gaza Strip, for the *Hajj* pilgrimage. During his stay in Saudi Arabia, Awiti met a **Hezbollah** operative, who recruited him to act as **agent for the organization in the Gaza Strip and conduct terrorist activity against Israel**. Awiti was given a Lebanese phone number to call his **Hezbollah** handler, code-named “Rimon”. He called him several times from his office at the Dahaniya Airport in the Palestinian authority. “Rimon” invited Awiti to Lebanon, presumably for the purpose of military training and assignments against Israel. Awiti was arrested by the Israeli security forces upon returning from Lebanon.

- In **February 2003**, the Israeli security forces uncovered a particularly serious affair involving Israeli citizens from the **village of Ghajar (mentioned above) and the Israeli border town of Kiryat Shmona**; they had been operated by a senior member of **Hezbollah** through the mediation of **Ramzi Nahra**, a Lebanese drug dealer and **Hezbollah** collaborator. The following are the main elements of this affair:

- Underlying the affair is a **mass network of drug smuggling** into Israel. The main convict in the affair, **Saad Kahmuz**, a resident of the village of Ghajar, admitted during his interrogation to having recently smuggled **four tons** of drugs into Israel. Drug smuggling from Lebanon into Israel is carried out with the **full support and backing of Hezbollah**, which controls southern Lebanon. **Hezbollah** avails itself of Israeli and Lebanese drug dealers in order to achieve operational intelligence objectives and, as a by-product, **weaken Israeli society** (see Chapter VII: Crime and Terrorism – **Hezbollah’s Criminal Activity**).

- **Hezbollah** instructed the **Ghajar drug dealers** to use the criminal gang’s network in order to carry out **intelligence missions** inside Israel and set up an **apparatus of Israeli collaborators**. Saad Kahmuz confessed that he had carried out several intelligence missions during recent months on behalf of the drug

dealer **Ramzi Nahra, with whom he was connected** (Nahra was killed in an explosion near his home village on December 6, 2002). He also admitted to having been aware that Nahra was closely related to **Hezbollah** and worked for the organization.

- Saad Kahmuz further told his interrogators that he had carried out several **video filming missions** in the area stretching from the village of Ghajar to the Golani intersection north of Tiberias, and that he had been instructed to focus especially on **military bases and shopping malls**. He filmed the northern border town of **Kiryat Shmona** from various angles, and also took still pictures of **intersections and signs in the Ghajar and Kiryat Shmona area**. The investigation also uncovered three pistols supplied by Ramzi Nahra to gang members, and revealed that various purchases were made in Israel and delivered to Nahra. These included state-of-the-art night vision binoculars, electronic translation devices and various reference books such as atlases, business management manuals, and the *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, the annual publication of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

- **The results of all of the data-gathering missions carried out by the Israeli recruits were delivered to Ramzi Nahra and his collaborators at meetings that took place in the northern part of the village of Ghajar.** Kahmuz, in light of his “professional relations” with Nahra, was also invited to meetings **on Lebanese territory**. These meetings would sometimes last 24 hours, and were **attended by people known to the Israeli security forces as Hezbollah operatives and prominent collaborators**, including members of the Nahra family, a notorious family of drug smugglers.

- **A man and a woman, both residents of Kiryat Shmona,** were arrested in connection with the affair. They admitted to have known about the activity of Saad Kahmuz, and to having helped him carry out his drug deals. The woman confessed that she had been aware of Kahmuz’s meetings in Lebanon, and that he had asked her to buy a copy of the *Statistical Abstract of Israel* in order to take it across the border to Lebanon. She had also purchased, together with

Kahmuz, night vision binoculars and electronic translation devices, which were taken to Lebanon. The man confessed that he had received two pistols sent from Lebanon, that he had purchased a *Statistical Abstract of Israel* for Kahmuz, and that he knew about the purchase of the night vision binoculars.



Hezbollah-inspired education of Palestinian children toward terrorism: During a ceremony in the Gaza Strip, a child impersonating Nasrallah calls for the struggle against Israel. Other children appear dressed up as suicide bombers and leaders of various terrorist organizations.

Background: the Hezbollah flag.

Training and instruction provided by Hezbollah to Palestinian terrorist organizations

• **Hezbollah** organizes military training courses for Palestinian terrorists in **camp**s in **Lebanon**, the purpose of which are to **upgrade** Palestinian terrorist activities against Israel. In the course of these training sessions, the terrorists are taught various tactics for planning and executing terrorist attacks aimed at inflicting **maximum damage to human lives**. Graduates of these training sessions are sent back to the Palestinian territories in order to consolidate the terrorist apparatus and raise the level of attacks against Israel. A noteworthy example is the **training in Lebanon of Fatah / Tanzim operatives from the village of Burka in Samaria**. The following are highlights of the episode:

- Between **May and July 2002**, **three Fatah / Tanzim operatives** from the Samaria region were arrested. They admitted to having received **military training in Lebanon from Hezbollah**.

- One of the three, **Omar Hamdan Muhammad Seif** from the village of Burka, confessed to his interrogators to having been sent in 2002 **from Jordan to Syria and from there to Lebanon**, in order to undergo a **Hezbollah** training course. After arriving in **Syria**, Omar was joined by a Lebanese, who accompanied him to **Beirut**. From there, he was taken to a closed training compound in the mountains, belonging to **Hezbollah**. The training consisted of a number of stages. At first he received instruction in the dismantling and assembly of various weapons including a pistol, an Uzi sub-machine gun, and an M-16 rifle. Then he practiced the use of these weapons. Once this stage was over, he joined a **Hezbollah** instructor, who taught him the use of **explosives** in theory, after which he received **practical** training including detonating **explosive charges**. He was also trained in operating RPG launchers and throwing hand grenades.

- During the training, Omar was returned to **Beirut** to attend a meeting, in

which he was instructed to recruit **additional operatives in the Palestinian territories** and send them for training in Lebanon. He was also given 400 dinars, and was promised **additional sums of money for the purpose of purchasing arms**, which would reach him through recruits that he would send to Lebanon. During his stay in Lebanon, Omar was asked to buy a **map of a central city in Israel**, presumably for carrying out a terrorist attack in that city.

○ At the end of the training, Omar was sent back to Jordan via Syria and from there he returned to **Burka**. Omar did what he had been instructed to do: He recruited three candidates for **military training** from his village. One of them, Fadi Azzam Ahmad Seif, 21, admitted during interrogation that he accepted Omar's offer. In June 2002, Fadi traveled to Jordan with two additional recruits, Darjam Salah and Iyad Qassem. However, he was refused an entrance visa into Jordan, and returned to Burka. His two companions, Darjam Salah and Iyad Qassem, made it to Jordan and from there to Syria and Lebanon. In Lebanon, they underwent **military training by Hezbollah, during which they were instructed in carrying out terrorist attacks in Israel**.

Smuggling high-quality weapons into the Palestinian territories

“Supplying arms to the Palestinians is highly important...because the explosive charge, the machine-gun, the bomb, or the shell greatly influence the continued resistance ‘inside’ ...” [**Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah, *al-Manar Television*, April 8, 2002]

Overview

- Consistent with **Iranian and Syrian** policy, **Hezbollah** strives to incite the **escalation of Palestinian violence**. One of the means to achieve this goal is the supply of high-quality military hardware to the Palestinian territories. **Hezbollah**’s strategy is to provide the Palestinians with **sophisticated** means **that will improve their operational capabilities**, establish a “balance of terror” vis-à-vis Israel, increase the loss of human lives among the Israelis, escalate violence, and **duplicate the “Lebanese model” in the Palestinian territories**.

- The terrorist organizations operating in the Palestinian territories, such as **Hamas**, are indeed **inspired** by what they regard as **Hezbollah**’s successful experience in Lebanon. Launching **Qassam** rockets against Israeli population centers, such as the southern town of **Sderot**, is meant to imitate the firing of Katyusha rockets on the northern towns of Israel. It is intended to create a “balance of terror”, which will eventually tie the hands of Israel and enhance the freedom of action of Palestinian terrorism¹.

- **Hezbollah** was behind at least three smuggling attempts by sea. The first of these

¹ Not all elements of Palestinian society are willing to adopt this view: **Ghazi al-Khalili**, member of the Palestinian National Council, wrote in an article published by the Palestinian newspaper *al-Ayyam*: “We should remember that launching rockets is not a target in itself, and that we must spare the [Palestinian] population acts of retaliation for actions devoid of practical value. There is no point in foolishly insisting on **duplicating Hezbollah’s experience in Lebanon** pretending that the Qassam rockets equal Katyusha and Scud missiles, and that the besieged Gaza Strip resembles the open area of southern Lebanon, which enjoys unlimited support from the outside...” [*al-Ayyam*, March 2, 2003].

was carried out on the ship *Santorini* (in January and April 2001). A third, more conspicuous attempt of unprecedented scale was made on the ship *Karine-A*. Following are highlights of these affairs, based on the interrogation of the ships' crews after their capture by the Israeli navy:

Hezbollah's involvement in the Karine-A affair

- The interrogation of the *Karine-A* crew evidences **Hezbollah's** involvement in the arms shipment intended for the **Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian terrorist organizations**. Facts pointing to this involvement are mentioned by the *Karine-A* captain **Omar Akawi** as well as other crew members:

◦ Omar Akawi revealed that he was due to arrive in **Iran** in July 2001 for “special arrangements”—apparently referring to instructions to Palestinian Authority personnel—for handling submersible containers (custom-made, leak-proof containers used for the arms smuggling; they could not have been manufactured in Lebanon, but were definitely **Iranian-made**). **However, he did not arrive in Iran as planned, following a briefing according to which Hezbollah operatives would take charge of this matter.**

◦ **Salem Mahmud al-Sankari**, a *naqib* [captain] in the Palestinian naval force, who had previously taken part in an attempted naval terrorist attack against Israel, was on board the *Karine-A* at the time of its capture. He told his interrogators that he had undergone a designated training program in **Lebanon** in September 2001, during which he practiced diving and handling the submersible containers. **His instructors were Hezbollah operatives. According to al-Sankari, when the arms cargo was loaded on board the *Karine-A*, off the Iranian coast, one of these operatives was there.**



The arms ship *Karine-A*: using the maritime route to smuggle sophisticated arms into the Palestinian territories

- **Riyad Abdallah**, one crew member, revealed that he had traveled to Syria in July 2001 in order to purchase a ship. **There he met with a Hezbollah liaison officer called Hajj Bassam, who provided him with an advance payment to carry out the purchase.**
- On board the *Karine-A*, seized on January 3, 2002, were “**force multiplier**” weapon systems, including **107 and 122 mm rockets and launchers** with a range of up to 20 km, which the Palestinians do not possess for the time being. Providing these rockets and launchers to the Palestinian Authority **could have implied that big Israeli cities would have been within Katyusha range**; or, in other words, that the “Lebanese model” would have indeed been duplicated in Israel. The ship also carried improved anti-tank launchers, 120 mm mortars, mortar shells, and powerful explosives. **These arms, had they reached the Palestinian Authority, would have significantly improved the operational capability of the terrorist organizations, in particular the Fatah / al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; they would have increased**

their power of deterrence vis-à-vis Israel; and they would have created a Lebanese-style “balance of terror” – all of which are goals which the Iranians, the Syrians, and Hezbollah strive to achieve.

- A large part of the weapons and ammunition found aboard the vessel had been manufactured in **Iran** (manufacture year: 2001). Among these were: **anti-tank rockets** of types PG-7 Tandem and PG-7 Nader, **YM3 anti-tank mines and YM1 anti-personnel mines**. The markings on most of the weaponry items had been modified and the weapons’ serial numbers **erased so that their origin could not be identified and traced. Typically, the Iranians were quick to deny any connection with the affair [January 4, 2002], to evade being identified as “terrorism-sponsoring**



Weapons and ammunition captured aboard the *Karine-A*: Had they reached their destination, they could have significantly upgraded the operational capability of the terrorist organizations and promoted the goal of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah – i.e., to escalate the situation in the Palestinian territories.

Hezbollah's involvement in the Santorini affair

- Another example of **Hezbollah's** (and **PFLP-GC's**) endeavors to smuggle "high-quality" arms from Lebanon into the Palestinian Authority is the *Santorini*, which was seized while sailing toward the coast of Gaza, on its way to deliver its deadly cargo to the Palestinian terrorist organizations.
- The crew members of the *Santorini* told their interrogators that by the time of their arrest, **four smuggling attempts had been made**, using the *Santorini* and another ship named *Calypso-2*. Three of these attempts succeeded (some of the arms reached Gaza and the Sinai shores) and the fourth was thwarted by the Israeli Navy. One of the successful **smuggling operations was carried out by Hezbollah from the Jiyah beach, south of Beirut, in April 2001**.
- On its last voyage, the *Santorini* left **Tripoli, Lebanon** and was to unload its cargo off of the northern Sinai coast. It was captured by the Israeli Navy on May 6, 2001, about 150 miles west of Tyre. Aboard the ship, the navy found **a large variety of quality weapons**, including dozens of barrels packed with **Katyusha rockets, anti-aircraft (Strela) missiles, anti-tank missiles, mortars**, and small arms and ammunition. **Ahmad Jibril, head of the PFLP-GC**, admitted publicly that his organization was responsible for the arms shipment, which was meant to support the Palestinian people [A.P., May 8, 2001]. **Hezbollah** chose to hush up its role. If these arms had reached the Palestinian territories, they would have **significantly improved** the operational capability of the terrorist organizations.
- The interrogation of the *Santorini* crew uncovered several important aspects of **Syria's and Hezbollah's involvement** in arms smuggling operations from Lebanon to the Palestinian territories. One crew member, a Lebanese named **Dib Muhammad Rashid Awita**, gave his interrogators the following account:
 - During the search for a suitable vessel for arms smuggling to the Palestinian territories, a boat named *Abd al-Hadi* was found in the port of **Arwad** in Syria.

Awita traveled to **Syria** with the help of PFLP-GC to examine the boat. The boat was found suitable for the task, and an agreement about its purchase was reached in the Shahin Restaurant in the port town of **Tartus** in the north of Syria. The *Abd al-Hadi* was then registered as Lebanese, **and its Syrian registration was erased**. A **Syrian crew** sailed the vessel from Syria to the port of Tripoli in Lebanon, where it was renamed *Santorini*.

○ Awita overheard a conversation about an arms transfer from **Syria** to Lebanon, to be loaded onto the *Santorini* during one of the smuggling attempts from Tripoli. The arms were placed in barrels in **Syria**, loaded aboard a **passenger bus** with **Syrian license plates** from which the passenger seats had been removed, and transferred via the Damascus-Beirut highway to Zahlah and from there to Tripoli in the north of Lebanon.

○ During the third smuggling attempt from the coast of Jiyah, **Hezbollah** loaded the arms on board the *Santorini* **in a manner reminiscent of a military operation**. **Twenty-five Hezbollah operatives took part** in the operation, some in charge of securing the shore and the roads leading to it while others engaged in loading the boat. According to Awita, if a Lebanese Navy patrol had arrived on site, **Hezbollah** operatives would have fired in order to chase it off.

○ The project of high-quality arms smuggling into the Palestinian territories was conducted **jointly between Hezbollah and the PFLP-GC**. **Two senior operatives** were presumably involved in it:

- On the part of **Hezbollah** - Awita recounted that he had met with a **Hezbollah** liaison officer named **Hajj Bassam** just before the third arms smuggling attempt. Awita visited Bassam's **office** near Beirut Airport, where he recalled having noticed a picture of **Khomeini** on the wall of the office. From there they drove to a small bay on the Jiyah coast in order to load the arms onto the boat.
- On the part of the **PFLP-GC** - According to information published in the press

following his death, **Jihad Jibril** had been in charge of the desk responsible for relations with the Palestinian Authority in the PFLP-GC [*al-Watan*, Saudi Arabia, May 21, 2002]. Jibril, the son of PFLP-GC leader Ahmad Jibril, was also reported to have been the **leading figure** in the financing and procurement of arms, ammunition and explosives, and their shipment to the Palestinian territories.



Hezbollah involvement in an attempt to smuggle high-quality arms into the Palestinian territories, including rockets, rifles, hand grenades, mortars, and a host of other weapons and ammunition, captured aboard the Santorini

The land route: Arms smuggling via Jordan

- A secondary channel used by **Hezbollah** for arms smuggling to the Palestinian terrorist organizations is the **land route**, which cuts through the borders between Israel and neighboring countries (mainly **Jordan**). In one of **Hezbollah**'s attempts to use this route, three of its operatives were caught and placed under arrest in Jordan in June 2001. They had planned to smuggle **twenty-five 107 mm Katyusha rockets** into the Palestinian territories.

- The capture of the **Hezbollah** operatives aroused massive media interest, and fuelled fiery criticism by **Hezbollah**'s leader against Jordan and the manner in which it handled the issue. **Hassan Nasrallah** portrayed the smuggling attempt **as a legitimate and permissible step, and stressed the need to pursue this type of operation:**

- **“We must assist the Palestinian people at least with weapons and money... They did not ask us to send them warriors, they only ask for support – especially weapons. It is therefore our and everyone’s duty to send weapons to the Palestinians; whoever does not do so is thoughtless and criminal...If supplying arms to the Palestinians is a legally punishable crime, then we are prepared to be punished.”** [*al-Majalla*, March 24, 2002]

- “The Palestinians need weapons – military equipment, explosives, etc. They also need money to finance and carry on their operations...”

Supplying arms to the Palestinians is highly important. We must supply the arms to the Palestinians, so that they can be used in the Intifada; for the explosive charge, the machine-gun, the bomb, or the shell greatly enhance the continued resistance ‘inside’.”[*al-Manar Television*, April 8, 2002].



Incitement against the United States: excerpt from a propaganda film broadcast on *al-Manar* Television, in which Iraq, Palestine, and Afghanistan are shown as being “wanted dead or starved” by the United States. **Hezbollah** shown as being “wanted dead or starved” by the United States. **Hezbollah** portrays the US war against terrorism as a **global terrorist activity**.

The war on consciousness: Hezbollah's moral support for the Palestinian violent struggle

- Besides military support, **Hezbollah** provides the Palestinian terrorist organizations with large-scale assistance in **indoctrination and propaganda**. **Hezbollah** makes **extensive use of the media channels that it owns—especially *al-Manar Television*—to broadcast incitement and propaganda** to its target publics throughout the Arab world, in particular the Palestinian Authority. The **messages** directed toward the Palestinian population **advocate violence**, particularly **suicide attacks** against Israel, and discourage all efforts to relieve tension and promote a cessation of hostilities. *Al-Manar Television* also provides a **platform** for Palestinian terrorist organizations closely linked to Syria and Iran, through which they **publicly assume responsibility for terrorist attacks performed ‘inside’**.

- Demonstrating their genuine desire to show their **solidarity** with the Palestinian struggle, **Iran and Hezbollah** also make **cynical and manipulative use of the Palestinian** cause. The massive attention directed at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict indeed serves their interests, as it distracts the US from Iran (a member of the “axis of evil”) and **Hezbollah** (a leading terrorist organization). **Iran and Hezbollah** also know that this conflict occupies the attention and efforts of **Israel**. **Hezbollah** leader Hassan Nasrallah remarked on *NBN Television* on January 5, 2002 that **as long as Israel is trapped in the Palestinian conflict, it can do nothing against Hezbollah or any of the other Arab countries**.

- The **Hezbollah** leadership encourages the Palestinians to carry out suicide attacks and escalate the situation in the Palestinian territories, in full disregard of the damage this causes the Palestinian population. It also **uses the Palestinians as cover for its own terrorist pursuits against Israel**, in areas where the organization has no “legitimacy” for carrying out terrorist attacks. The most striking example was the terrorist attack near **Kibbutz Metsuba on March 12, 2002, in which Palestinian terrorists were used** in order to camouflage **Hezbollah’s “fingerprints”**.

Appendices:

- **Seized document:** A Palestinian intelligence report dated October 31, 2001 concerning the **Iranian** intention to use **Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad** in order to escalate the situation in the Palestinian territories – see **Appendix 9**.

- **Statements** of senior members of **Hezbollah** regarding the need to support the Palestinian violent struggle against Israel – see **Appendix 10**.

Chapter VI: Lebanon as Base for the Military, Political and Social Activities of Hezbollah

Overview

- **The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2002, followed by the UN Security Council’s statement that Israel completed its withdrawal according to Security Council Resolution 425, has not altered Hezbollah’s strategy or reduce its adherence to the use of terrorism as a means of achieving its goals.** The withdrawal, however, deprived **Hezbollah** of its main cover of legitimacy for terrorism, and confronted it with the increasingly challenging **dilemma** of pursuing its military-operational activity from Lebanese territory.
- This dilemma originates from the growing need to maneuver the organization’s policy along an **intricate system of considerations and constraints that are subject to adjustments from time to time.** **Hezbollah’s** main constraint consists of the need to coordinate its policy with the policy and interests of Syria and Iran, the two countries that sponsor it. Other considerations that the organization cannot afford to overlook are possible retaliations by Israel (including the risk of an offensive against Syria) and constraints deriving from the local Lebanese scene. Regarding the latter, Israel’s withdrawal exacerbated the **controversy over Lebanon’s future character, rejecting both the “Hong Kong doctrine”—which could transform Lebanon into a peaceful and prosperous country—and the “Hanoi doctrine” in favor of continued violence consistent with Iranian and Syrian interests** [both terms were coined by the Druse leader and head of Lebanon’s Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, who stated in January 2001 that Lebanon “cannot be both Hanoi and Hong Kong”].




Lebanon as the “Hanoi” of the Middle East: **Hezbollah** militia in southern Lebanon, an area controlled by **Hezbollah**, even after the Israeli pullout from the “Security Zone”

- **Regarding this controversy, there is no doubt that Hezbollah has already succeeded in turning southern Lebanon into a “Hanoi”.** Since the Israeli pullout from Lebanon, **Hezbollah has made considerable efforts in establishing, expanding, and enhancing its operational-military apparatus in the area.** Exploiting the freedom of operation it enjoys in southern Lebanon, **Hezbollah** is motivated by its basic interest of preventing the relief of tension along the Lebanese-Israeli border. **Hezbollah** also takes advantage of the support generously provided to it by Syria and Iran. The latter support constitutes an essential element of **Hezbollah’s** ability to maintain a **military apparatus** far exceeding the scope and quality of the apparatuses of other terrorist organizations known to us in the world.
- After the Israeli withdrawal, **Hezbollah** positioned its forces in the former “Security Zone” **along the entire border**, thus preventing the Lebanese army from deploying and exercising its control in the area. It set up a **massive military**

- apparatus, including long-range land-to-land rockets, enabling it to carry out various types of terrorist attacks at short notice. **Hezbollah** has built up remarkable operational capability for **emergency and escalation scenarios**, in which it will no doubt seek to employ the immense power it has accumulated in recent years. For it has developed considerable endurance and stamina, allowing it to **wage a prolonged war** against Israel, based on its apparatus of military equipment and human resources in southern Lebanon.

- **The basic concept underlying Hezbollah's operation is "asymmetric attrition"**, which consists of exerting **sustained pressure on Israel by means of continuous terrorist endeavors**. As a rule, **Hezbollah** voices contempt for the resilience of Israeli society, depicting it as a "**cobweb**". According to Nasrallah, the weakness of Israeli society was a decisive element in the outcome of the conflict in Lebanon, i.e., the Israeli one-sided pullout. In this context, **Hezbollah** seeks to drag Israel, through repeated provocations, into an "**ambush**" that will force it into **escalation**. This will eventually leave Israel **bruised and damaged**, demoralized by these new "character-shaping" experiences, aimed at **inculcating the concept of threat and weakness into Israeli society** while boosting the confidence of its enemies.

- In addition to its operational apparatus in the southern Lebanese frontier, **Hezbollah** maintains a **strategic offensive capability in Beirut and the Bekaa**, which is kept on alert and serves as the organization's main tool in the "**balance of deterrence**" vis-a-vis Israel. **This apparatus is part of Hezbollah's well-known strategy of tying Israel's hands and preventing it from responding harshly to the organization's terrorist attacks** (or as Hassan Nasrallah puts it: "**the whole northern area, from Haifa to Tiberias, is in the grip of Hezbollah's warriors in Lebanon**"). From the viewpoint of **Iran and Syria**, this offensive capability enables the potential exhaustion of Israel from Lebanese territory, adding **an extra dimension** to the military capability of their respective **armies**.



A side charge used by **Hezbollah**

When does Hezbollah intend to put its strategic and operational capabilities into practice? So far, the organization has proven that it is not deterred by a possible escalation of the conflict with Israel. It must, however, choose a **convenient timing**, in which regional and international conditions would provide a suitable environment for such conflict. For example, a **deterioration in the Palestinian arena** or a **US entanglement in Iraq** may motivate **Hezbollah** to drag Israel into escalation on the Lebanese front. The scope of such a development may be restricted, at least in its initial stage, to a so-called “legitimate” activity inside the Shabaa Farms area, including terrorist attacks along the border without **Hezbollah’s** “fingerprints”. However, even this limited activity under the above parameters still **constitutes a significant threat of potential escalation and deterioration.**



Media coverage of **Hezbollah** operations as part of its “war on consciousness”: A photograph taken during an attack against an Israeli outpost at Mount Dov, in which the terrorists penetrated the area and put up the organization’s flag on top of the post fence

Operational activity from Lebanon

- In disregard of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the UN Security Council announcement that Israel fully implemented Resolution 425, **Hezbollah continues to pursue** its terrorist operations against Israel along the Lebanese border.
- Since the Israeli withdrawal and until the beginning of 2003, **Hezbollah** has carried out **more than 33 terrorist attacks**. During these attacks, **Hezbollah killed** five Israeli soldiers and six civilians, **kidnapped** three soldiers from Mount Dov outposts and one Israeli civilian abroad, and **wounded** 33 soldiers and eight civilians. In spite of all these, Israel has retained its policy of restraint, forbearance, and refraining from opening a “second front” at the Lebanese border.



Upholding the tension along the Israeli-Lebanese border:

Lebanese youngsters throw stones at Israeli soldiers posted at Fatma Gate near Metulla a few days after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon. Hezbollah organized numerous gangs of youth to demonstrate that border tension would not recede.


- The main characteristics of **Hezbollah** activity along the Lebanese border:
 - **Hezbollah focuses** its hostile operations against Israeli outposts on the Mount Dov slopes, or the area known as Shabaa Farms, **claiming that these operations are legitimate** (a claim rejected by the international community).

◦ **Hezbollah** has also engaged in **sporadic attacks** on additional locations along the border, especially at the height of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (during Operation “Defensive Shield”). The most conspicuous of these episodes was the infiltration of Palestinian terrorists, who carried out a shooting incident and suicide attack near Kibbutz Metsuba (see below).

◦ **Hezbollah makes frequent use of anti-aircraft fire** above Israeli population centers (with “special attention” given to the towns of Kiryat Shmona and Shlomi). The aim of this activity is to cause casualties, damage to property, and panic, and thus terrorize and demoralize the population. **Hezbollah** is also engaged in this activity **even when the Israeli Air Force does not patrol** the skies above Lebanon.



Real-time documentation of **Hezbollah** operations, another tactic used in the war on Israeli consciousness: The above shows a shooting attack on Mount Dov, in February 2001.



Hezbollah operatives post a placard marking the “anniversary of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon”

- **Hezbollah**, as part of its military operations and consistent with its usual practice, makes extensive use of **indoctrination, propaganda, and psychological warfare** aimed at demoralizing Israeli soldiers and civilians. The following are some examples:

- **Displaying posters and placards glorifying and encouraging terrorism, violence, and bloodshed** along the border.

- **Frequent statements** by senior members of **Hezbollah**, in particular its secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, touching raw nerves of Israeli society, such as repeated mention of deadly terrorist attacks and of the fact that **kidnapped Israelis are held by Hezbollah**.

- **Extensive use of the media**, including the broadcasting of real-time documentation of **Hezbollah's** terrorist operations along the Israeli-Lebanese border [*al-Manar Television*].



A rally organized by **Hezbollah** in Lebanon to mark the Ashura day. During such rallies, calls such as “Death to Israel and America” are frequently heard.

A terrorist attack against an Israeli civilian target, launched from Lebanese territory: The Metsuba incident

The most notorious of **Hezbollah's** terrorist attacks since the Israeli pullout from Lebanon was the cross-border raid involving the infiltration of **to Palestinian suicide terrorists from southwestern Lebanon, deep into Israeli territory on March 12, 2002**. The infiltrators opened fire on vehicles moving through the intersection outside **Kibbutz Metsuba. Five Israeli soldiers and one civilian were killed**. The two Palestinian terrorists were killed as well.

To **cover up** its involvement in this terrorist attack, which was carried out outside the Shabaa Farms area, **Hezbollah** operated Palestinian terrorists and refrained from assuming explicit responsibility for the attack. However, it did not deny that it stood behind it.




The ladder used by the infiltrators, found near the Israeli-Lebanese border shortly after the terrorist attack near Metsuba



Pictures of the two Palestinian terrorists sent by **Hezbollah** to carry out the attack near Metsuba

The infiltration route used by the terrorists who carried out the attack near Kibbutz Metsuba on March 12, 2002



Hezbollah's military apparatus in southern Lebanon

- **Hezbollah** has built up an **extensive operational military apparatus** in southern Lebanon, comprising hundreds of militia members trained in various types of warfare, in addition to thousands of other guerrillas. It has furnished the militia with a **vast arsenal** consisting of large quantities of explosives, small arms, anti-tank missiles (including Tow and Sagger), and a wide range of artillery weapons such as mortars, cannons, and various types of rockets with a range of approximately 30 km.
- After the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, **Hezbollah** deployed its militia throughout the former “Security Zone”, and began setting up its operational apparatus—which includes long-range missiles—in the areas evacuated by the Israeli troops.
- **Hezbollah's** deployment in southern Lebanon enables it to launch a **variety of complex terrorist attacks at short notice**, and to wage a **prolonged and unrelenting war** based on its existing human resources and equipment in the south, without resorting to external aid. The main characteristics of **Hezbollah's** deployment and operation in southern Lebanon are:
 - **Explosives** - **Hezbollah** has planted mines and explosives along the Lebanese border with Israel, and presumably also deep inside Israeli territory.
 - **Artillery** - **Hezbollah** has prepared various artillery targets situated deep inside Israeli territory, in order to achieve a more efficient operation of its artillery layout and improve its capability to strike at the **civilian** front.
 - **Intelligence** - **Hezbollah** has deployed **intelligence equipment of various types**, including cameras and bugging devices, which provide it with accurate

operational intelligence allowing it to carry out highly complex terrorist attacks.



Preparing a rocket

- **Entrenchment** - **Hezbollah** has built **underground bunkers** and **widened natural tunnels in southern Lebanon** for use as storage depots for arms.
- **Military doctrine** - **Hezbollah** studies Israel's methods of operating and has developed various combat strategies and tactics that it believes will improve its military capability against Israel.
- **Planning** - **Hezbollah** has developed various lines of attack against Israel, such as using gliders to infiltrate Israeli territory, seizing control of Israeli communities, and kidnapping civilians for "bargaining purposes".



Interconnected Claymore charges used by **Hezbollah** in Lebanon. Hezbollah seeks to pass on know-how accumulated during years of fighting against Israel to the terrorist organizations operating in the Palestinian territories.

Hezbollah's military arsenal in Lebanon

Hezbollah has built up a large and diversified arsenal of weapons and ammunition in Lebanon, supplied to it by Iran over the years. **Hezbollah's** arsenal comprises the following arms:

- Thousands of **Katyusha** rockets (of 107 mm and 122 mm caliber)
- **Cannons** and **mortars** of various types
- **Long-range** Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 **rockets**, with a strike range of up to **75 Km**
- **Anti-tank** Tow and **Sagger** **missiles**
- **Anti-aircraft** **cannons** of various types and **anti-aircraft** SA-7 **missiles**. It was recently reported that **improved SA-18 anti-aircraft missiles** may also find their way to the organization.
- **Explosive charges** among the most advanced in the world and a wide range of **small arms**.
- **Hezbollah** probably avails itself of **gliders**, which enable it to penetrate Israeli territory while bypassing the array of obstacles along the border.




Anti-tank Tow missile



D-30 cannon

Hezbollah's long-range artillery threat



Transforming southern Lebanon into a Hezbollah-controlled zone



Southern Lebanon a region controlled by **Hezbollah**, and over which the Lebanese government maintains only loose control:

- **In 1989**, in the context of the **Taif Agreement**, Syria imposed on the Lebanese administration the continued presence of **Hezbollah** as the **only** militia organization in Lebanon, whereas all other ethnic militias were dismantled. **Hezbollah's special status—along with the weakness of the Lebanese central regime—has enabled the organization as of 1989 and until today, to use its power and seize military as well as civilian control in southern Lebanon (and several areas of the Bekaa region)**, while taking over the place of the legitimate Lebanese regime. This process has continued even after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon.
- Southern Lebanon has in fact turned into a state-within-a-state, or a “**Hezbollahstan**”, similar to “Fatah-land” – the territory of southern Lebanon controlled by the Palestinians until 1982. **Hezbollah** has thus become the **ultimate authority** in this region, undisturbed by the Lebanese regime's loose control, which centers mainly on economic development projects that are themselves approved by **Hezbollah**.

- In the light of these circumstances and with Syria's blessing, **Hezbollah** pursues its **own** policy in southern Lebanon, which it **imposes** on the Lebanese government:

◦ **Hezbollah opposes the effective deployment of the Lebanese army in the south.** It prevents the Lebanese regime from assuming responsibility for this region's security and implementing its sovereignty. According to resolution 425 of the UN Security Council, the **Lebanese army** was to deploy in the south of the country. However, **Syria** got in the way, using **Hezbollah** as its **means** and the continued struggle against Israel as an **excuse**. Or, as expressed by **Hezbollah** Deputy Secretary General **Sheikh Naim Qassem** on *Lebanese Television* on January 31, 2002: "Those who demand the entrance of the Lebanese army into the south, actually wish to **close the file of the conflict with the enemy...We find this logic unacceptable.**"

◦ **Hezbollah maintains a state of controlled tension along the border, and is constantly looking for pretexts to build up that tension with Israel,** even on **non-military** issues. For example, regarding the Israeli-Lebanese controversy over the al-Wazani spring water pumping, **Hezbollah** official in charge of the southern region, Sheikh Qaouq, stated that the issue "**is not open for bargaining or negotiation**" [*al-Liwa*, October 9, 2002]. Similarly, Muhammad Raad, chair of the **Hezbollah** faction in the Lebanese parliament, mentioned that "the world is trying to force us into negotiating about the al-Wazani waters...We have the right to use this water as we wish and in every way we find appropriate, and no one is entitled to interfere with this right of ours." In other words, this is a terrorist organization, which assumes the authority of an official Lebanese body representing the interests of the legitimate administration, determining whether or not negotiations are to take place over water rights.



- Senior spokesmen for **Hezbollah** did not hesitate to assert **in public** that the organization had “imposed itself” and also imposed the concept of armed struggle on the Lebanese government. The following are some examples of threatening rhetoric by leading **Hezbollah** figures, directed toward the Lebanese government in this respect:

- **Abdallah Qusseir**, a **Hezbollah** delegate to the Lebanese parliament, voiced the threat that if the Lebanese government should strive to achieve a political agreement with Israel, “**it will have a problem** with the organization and with other parties in Lebanon.” [*Radio Tehran*, October 24, 2000]

- **Nawaf al-Musawi**, in charge of **Hezbollah**’s foreign relations desk, stressed that “**the resistance imposed itself as a reality, and forced international legitimacy to recognize it.**” [*al-Mustaqbal*, November 24, 2000]


- **Muhammad Raad**, chair of **Hezbollah**’s faction in the Lebanese parliament, argued that “**no one will succeed** in preventing us from pursuing our armed

struggle...**and no one will succeed** in forcing us to lay down our weapons.” [*al-Ittihad*, December 4, 2000]

° **Hezbollah** does not shy away from confrontations with UNIFIL observers posted in southern Lebanon. **On April 4, 2002, Hezbollah** guerrillas assaulted and beat **six observers in the “Shabaa Farms” area**, five of whom had to be hospitalized. **The reason given for the assault: “intrusion” into the area without Hezbollah’s “permission”.**

- **Hezbollah**, in its ambition to strengthen its foothold in the Shiite community, is **constantly opposing and physically obstructing any “rival” attempt to operate among the Shiite population centers in southern Lebanon and Beirut.** It does so even at the cost of **severely harming the Lebanese economy and impairing foreign investments in Lebanon.** For example, in response to Prime Minister Hariri’s initiative to develop the al-Uzai (Shiite) area in Beirut, **Hezbollah operatives clashed with the Lebanese internal security forces, physically assaulting members of the “development council”** on June 26, 2002.

- **Hezbollah incited the local population to molest government officials who had arrived for a visit. Hezbollah operatives beat the prime minister’s advisor and vandalized vehicles belonging to the security forces and equipment belonging to the project. Senior members of Hezbollah contacted their peers in the security forces and threatened them. Hezbollah leader Nasrallah himself threatened that, if worse came to worst, he would arrive on site to prevent the works with his own body.** Government spokespeople claimed in return [*NBN Television*, June 26, 2002], that **Hezbollah** was thwarting any infrastructure project attempted by the government in areas where the organization operates, and accused **Hezbollah** of extortion and violation of the law.



The June 26, 2002 clashes between **Hezbollah** and Lebanese government officials:

- Syria's control over Lebanon **prevents** the latter's government and Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, from challenging **Hezbollah**, in particular regarding issues relating to the south of Lebanon. The Lebanese government has therefore no choice but to yield its authority in southern Lebanon to an organization representing **foreign "interests"** determined in **Damascus** and **Tehran**.

Hezbollah's social and welfare activities within the Shiite community

- The **Shiite community**, the largest in Lebanon, has always been the most underprivileged among the ethnic communities in Lebanon. Its status of social and economic underdog in Lebanon and lack of initiative on the part of the Lebanese government have created fertile soil for the extensive social and economic activity of **Hezbollah**. Far-reaching social and welfare activities, financed by the abundant **funds** received from Iran, have earned **Hezbollah** the trust and support of many Shiite community members as well as non-Shiites. Behind this activity lies **Hezbollah's** long-term objective of consolidating its political status on the Lebanese scene and achieving key positions in the upper echelons of the regime. These steps concur with the objective of promoting the vision of an **Islamic republic in Lebanon**, in which social predominance will shift from the Christian to the Shiite-Muslim community.

Hezbollah's wide-ranging social activities are conducted through a system of specialized departments:

- the "**culture and information department**", responsible for cultural

activities within the community;

- the “**education department**”, which runs educational institutions and dictates their curricula;
- the “**women’s affairs authority**”, in charge of the education and vocational training of Muslim women;
- the “**health authority**”, responsible for providing health and medical services, including clinics, medications, evacuation of casualties, and distribution of food;
- the “**social bureau**”, in charge of finding solutions for social welfare problems;
- the “**bureau of religious studies**”, responsible for religious education;
- the “**philanthropic association**”, in charge of establishing and running welfare institutions;
- the “**Scouts**”, a youth movement in which youngsters receive paramilitary training



The emblem of the “Islamic authority for health affairs”: Hezbollah The emblem of the “Islamic authority for health affairs”: Hezbollah wins popular support by providing health and medical services to its followers in Lebanon



The emblem of the “Fund of the Wounded”: **Hezbollah** assists operatives who were wounded in action and their families





- At the **economic level**, **Hezbollah**'s efforts focus on assisting the Shiite community in developing income sources. **Hezbollah** is a primarily **Shiite organization**, and as such is genuinely interested in strengthening the Shiite community (though also enlisting its support). It is in constant struggle with the Lebanese administration over the **allocation of resources for rehabilitating disadvantaged Shiite areas and raising Shiite living standards**. **Hezbollah**'s policy is clearly a **narrow, sectoral** one, whose agenda centers on the underprivileged Shiite community, mainly in the **Baalbek-Hermel area in the Bekaa region** and the so-called "**liberated areas**" in southern Lebanon. On these grounds, **Hezbollah** has challenged several Lebanese governments, and is engaged **from time to time in heated confrontations with Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri**.



The emblem of the "al-Shahid Social Association",
which assists the families of **Hezbollah** and



Children in full military attire during a march organized by **Hezbollah**: In the schools operated by **Hezbollah**, children are educated to hate Israel. Many underprivileged Shiite families are compelled to send their children to Hezbollah schools, where they receive free education and other benefits, and as a “bonus” - incitement to hatred.

Summary

Since Israel's withdrawal from the Lebanese "Security Zone", **Hezbollah has tightened its grip over southern Lebanon** and become the main power-broker in the region. **Hezbollah** poses a challenge to the Lebanese government and to any other entity that, in **Hezbollah's** view, could interfere with its program of action. **Hezbollah** is engaged in far-reaching political, social, and economic activities in southern Lebanon (and throughout the country), owing to the abundant financial resources granted to it by the Iranian regime. At the same time, the organization's aggressive policy toward Israel, based on maintaining tension in the area, **inflicts great damage to the local Shiite population**. In fact, the above policy **precludes any possibility of rebuilding the area of southern Lebanon and reconstructing its economy**. It also perpetuates the status of the whole Shiite population as **Hezbollah's hostage**—i.e., a **deprived, oppressed community**, dependent upon the goodwill of **Hezbollah** as the alternative to the central, legitimate Lebanese regime.

Appendices:

- Survey of **Hezbollah's activities** against Israel along the Lebanese-Israeli border after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon – **Appendix 1**.
- Survey of **Hezbollah's attacks** against Israeli outposts in the Mount Dov area ("Shabaa Farms") after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon – **Appendix 2**.
- A detailed list of **Hezbollah's arms arsenal** – **Appendix 3**.
- **Statements** by **Hezbollah's** leader Hassan Nasrallah regarding **Hezbollah's military capabilities** – **Appendix 11**.

Chapter VII: Crime and Terrorism – Hezbollah’s Criminal Activity

Overview

- Aside from its military-terrorist, political, and economic-social endeavors, **Hezbollah** is also engaged in **large-scale criminal** activities. These consist of heavy involvement in **illegal drug dealings and money counterfeiting**, both of which are thriving industries in Lebanon, as well as **other** criminal pursuits. **Hezbollah’s** criminal activity is intended to promote several **objectives** of the organization:

- Creating an independent **fund-raising** channel **in addition** to the financing received from **Iran**.

- Taking advantage of professional criminal elements to **improve Hezbollah’s operational capabilities** in Israel, in Arab countries, and worldwide (this was well evidenced by the uncovering of drug-smuggling networks in Israel, which **combined** their drug pursuits with operational intelligence and arms smuggling missions on behalf of **Hezbollah**).

- As a byproduct, **weakening the social and economic fabric** of Israel and Western countries, in particular the United States, as part of the global war waged by Iran and **Hezbollah** against the Western world.

- In the context of its involvement in the drug and money counterfeiting “industries”, **Hezbollah** makes **clever use of the following advantages**:

- Its status as the **main power-broker** among the Shiite population of the **Bekaa region**, where the centers of these “industries” are located;

- Its **control** over the “marketing” routes of the drugs and the forged money, including **smuggling routes** from southern Lebanon to **Israel**;
- Its strong links with **Lebanese communities abroad** and its operational apparatuses throughout the world, especially in international crime and smuggling centers such as Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the former Soviet Union;
- Its connections with **Iran**, from which it receives advanced **training and technological support** (a luxury not enjoyed by “ordinary” terrorist organizations). These connections **enable Hezbollah to maintain high standards of money counterfeiting**.
- Its tight relations with the **Syrians**, who control the Bekaa region. **These relations** consist of granting **Hezbollah’s** criminal activity **immunity** from the law enforcement authorities in return for transferring part of the proceeds to senior Syrian officials. **Mustafa Tlas**, the Syrian minister of defense and Major-General **Ghazi Kan’an**, who was until recently in charge of the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, have been mentioned in the past as beneficiaries of these dealings.

Drug production and trade

- Lebanon is regarded as a large-scale **drug-producing** country, cultivating poppy and cannabis and even engaging in the import of “raw materials” from which it produces **heroin and cocaine**. The “raw materials” used for the Lebanese “drug industry” are derived from **three sources**:

- **Poppy and cannabis** are grown in the Bekaa region; the former serves as headquarters for the production of **heroin**, and the latter as headquarters for

hashish and marijuana processing.

- The “raw materials” used to manufacture **morphine-based heroin** are imported from the Far East (the “Golden Triangle”) and from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey.
 - **Cocaine salt** (cocaine hydrochloride) is imported into Lebanon directly from Latin American countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil) or via Europe.
- The above “raw materials” are processed into illicit drugs in **dozens of home-based laboratories** spread throughout the Bekaa villages, especially in the **Baalbek** region. Lebanese drugs are exported to the rest of the Middle East (including **Israel**), Europe, the **United States**, and other destinations worldwide. The proceeds of this flourishing “market” are estimated at more than \$1 billion annually, of which **Hezbollah** receives its major share.
 - The poppy and cannabis cultivation and the drug production in laboratories are carried out in areas **populated by Shiites**, where **Hezbollah** occupies a **central power position** and the Lebanese regime’s control is extremely **loose**. Furthermore, **Hezbollah** controls the **smuggling routes** from Lebanon, by land and by sea, to the rest of the Middle East (**Egypt** is a major outlet for hashish) and the West. This control further strengthens **Hezbollah**’s position in Lebanon’s “drug industry”.
 - The Bekaa families who handle the cultivation, production, and marketing of drugs are mainly **Shiite clans** whose members occupy senior positions in **Hezbollah**. The more prominent among these are the **Hamiya** family (of the village Taraiya, west of Baalbek), the **Tles** and **Mazloum** families (of the town Brital) and the **al-Masri** family (of the village Hawr Ta’ala).
 - The rate of drug cultivation and production in the Bekaa region has gone through **ups and downs**. Between 1992 and 1996, it slumped significantly. The reason was a change in Syrian and Lebanese policy, aimed at giving the **false impression** (especially to the United States) of joining the war against the “drug epidemic”. Since 1997, however, a **resurgence** in cannabis cultivation has been evident, resulting from

the economic crisis in Lebanon and the financial troubles of the local population, for which drug cultivation is a **major source of income**. At the same time, heroin and cocaine production are believed to have decreased.

- During the years of **slowdown in cannabis and poppy cultivation** in the Bekaa, the home-based laboratories in the region **increased their output of hard drugs**, especially **heroin** produced from imported raw materials. It should be noted that the hard drug business offers **larger profit margins** and **smaller risks of incrimination for Syria and Lebanon**.

- Regarding the **Israeli illegal drug market**: its main import from Lebanon is hashish, whereas heroin and cocaine are marginal markets. According to Israeli Police estimates, **hashish imports from Lebanon into Israel in 2002 amounted to some 10 tons**. **Hezbollah** takes advantage of its control over the Israeli-Lebanese border and the routes accessing it in order to “**grant its patronage**” to drug-smuggling activities, combining them with missions intended to support its operational-terrorist activity in Israel.

- For additional reading on how **Hezbollah** exploits drug smuggling to promote its **operational** objectives in Israel, see “Recruiting and Assigning Israeli Arabs and Palestinians”, in Chapter V.



A caricature published in the Lebanese newspaper *Daily Star*, indicating the gravity of the drug problem throughout Lebanon (the hashish smoke is in the shape of Lebanon). The Lebanese government does not take any effective measures to curb this phenomenon.

Counterfeiting money

The Iranian and Syrian roles

- **Iran** is an important center of the global counterfeiting industry. Several **Iranian** attempts to flood the world market with high-quality fake US dollar notes were uncovered during the 1990s. However, the volumes circulated were not such as could severely harm the American economy.

- Iran's **relative advantage** in this respect is its **access to advanced technologies**, which enable it to produce fake 100-dollar bills of **outstanding quality** (the so-called "**Super Dollars**" or "**Super Notes**"). The manufacture of "Super Dollars" requires a combination of photogravure printmaking, sophisticated printing blocks, special ink and paper, proficiency in color separation, and the technical ability to reproduce security features (e.g., security stripes). **These technologies and know-how are typical of national authorities**, not of terror and crime organizations, let alone individuals. **Iran** owes these advanced capabilities to none other than the **United States**, who supplied them to the **Shah's regime**; the Ayatollahs' regimes **employed them** to forge American money.

- **In order to ward off incriminating evidence** and avoid an entanglement with the United States, Iran chose to use **Hezbollah** (and possibly other Lebanese elements as well) as personnel for the **manufacture and circulation** of counterfeit notes. To this effect, Iran shipped counterfeit notes to Lebanon and supplied it with advanced technologies. In the early 1990s, "Super Dollar" notes surfaced in Lebanon's **Bekaa**. It seems that in the initial stage these notes were printed in Tehran, and Lebanon was used only as distribution center. However, at some point in the **early 1990s**, Iran

provided Lebanon with intaglio machines, and the Baalbek region in **Syrian-controlled Bekaa** became a production and marketing center of “Super Dollar” notes.

On June 15, 1996, **Elaine Sciolino** and **Douglas Jehl** published an article in the *New York Times* about Syria’s support of terrorism titled “**Syrian’s [sic] Game: Both Ends Against the Middle**”

[<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20E16F73C5D0C768DDDAF0894DE494D81>]. The article refers among other things to the Syrian support of the drug and money counterfeiting “industries” in Lebanon. The following is an excerpt from the article, which appeared under the heading “**A blind eye to drugs and counterfeiting**”:

“Syria also tolerates the counterfeiting of **\$100 bills** in the Bekaa. The Bekaa and other parts of Lebanon have produced **high-quality fake \$100 bills for years**. In recent years, the Lebanese and the Syrian authorities have uncovered offset presses and confiscated **millions of dollars** and other currencies. **But American officials are much more worried about “super notes”, phony \$100 bills made with rag cotton paper and printed on huge, sophisticated intaglio machines used by the United States**. The first “Super Note” surfaced in Hong Kong in 1989, **but they appeared shortly afterwards in the Bekaa, Treasury Department officials said**.

President Clinton raised the issue of counterfeiting – particularly the “**Super note**” – with **Assad** at their meeting in Geneva in **January 1994**, asking for help in uncovering the network. Christopher has asked the same question several times since.”

Following American pressure on **Syria** at the most senior levels (e.g., during the Clinton-Assad meeting in 1994), the intaglio machines used for the manufacture of “Super Dollars” were moved from Lebanon to another country. This happened in the mid-1990s, but the counterfeiting “industry” is still alive.

Hezbollah as producer and distributor of forged notes

- During the second half of the 1990s, **money counterfeiting in the Bekaa region continued to thrive**. However, though the fake dollars were still of high quality, they **did not match the standards** of the “Super Dollar”. In this “industry”, **Hezbollah** plays a prominent role, while joining forces with **criminal elements** and taking advantage of its powerful position in the Bekaa and its relations with Iran and Syria.
- The Bekaa region is the **heart** of the counterfeiting “industry” in Lebanon. The **Hezbollah-controlled town of Brital**, south of Baalbek (which is home to a population of some 7,000 Shiites) is the **main center of money counterfeiting**. In the second half of the 1990s, **Brital** housed an estimated **ten to fifteen printing presses**. These presses were operated in homes and workshops, and specialized in various lines of production, in particular **high-quality fake 100-dollar bills**. In the past they also produced fake **20-dollar** and **50-dollar** bills as well as fake currency of other Western and Arab countries, of varying qualities. Reports from the last two years **confirm** that

the counterfeiting “industry” in Bekaa is **still thriving**, and that **Hezbollah** as well as criminal elements are involved in it[^].

- The Lebanese counterfeiting “industry” is in the hands of powerful **criminal elements**, mainly members of large Shiite clans who closely cooperate with **Hezbollah**. The leading clans in this respect are Mazloun, Saleh, Sadek, Tles (in Brital) and al-Masri (in the village Hawr Ta’ala, south of Brital). **Hezbollah** also maintains relations with southern Lebanese clans engaged in large-scale drug smuggling, such as **Nahra** (from Ibl al-Saqi) and **Berro** (from the village Kafr Kila).

- **Hezbollah’s** involvement in the money counterfeiting “industry” allows it to benefit from the **proceeds** of this industry, and also entails **operational advantages** for its overseas activities. The technical know-how required for counterfeiting was exploited, as a by-product, to develop a **sophisticated apparatus of document forgery**. This apparatus produces **passports** used by **Hezbollah** operatives, and exports its “products” all over the world, mainly to Russia, the Ukraine, Cyprus, Latin American countries, and Arab countries.

- As for the **Israeli market**: fake dollars, originating from Lebanon, have been found in the past in Israel. As of now, there are **no indications** of attempts to “export” large amounts of forged notes to Israel. During an Israeli military operation in the

[^] Another important money counterfeiting center is located in the **Ein el-Hilweh** refugee camp south of Sidon. It is run by **Munir Maqdah**, a former member of **Fatah** and other Palestinian terrorist organizations. In this center, high-quality 100-dollar forged notes were found in the past, including two “Super Dollar” notes (1998).

Palestinian territories, the Palestinian Security forces were found in possession of forged Israeli notes, but these did **not** originate from Lebanon. Nonetheless, both Iran and **Hezbollah** have the technological **capabilities** enabling them to flood the Israeli market with high-quality counterfeit notes, if and when the decision is made to do so.

Specimens of counterfeit notes from the “production line” of the printing presses in the town Brital (as of 1998)



A fake 100-dollar bill produced by a printing press owned by the Mazloun clan: high-quality forgery featuring good print quality, a good watermark, printed fibers on the paper, and a security stripe with delicate “USA” print.



A fake 100-DM note (no longer legal tender), produced by a printing press owned by the Mazloun clan: high-quality forgery, including forged watermark and security stripe.



A fake Saudi 500-Rial note produced by a printing press owned by the Mazloun clan: high-quality forgery, including forged watermark and security stripe, and a good forgery of the silver mark (center of note).

Other criminal activities

- **Hezbollah's** operatives and the criminal elements linked with the organization are also involved in “commonplace” felonies (theft, fraud, and smuggling), as an additional means of “diversifying” their revenues. A particularly thriving line of activity is **stealing cars** and other property for the purpose of smuggling and selling the stolen goods:

- **Hezbollah** dealings in **Lebanon** include: trade in luxury cars stolen in Europe; theft of luxury cars and other property; transferring this property to the Bekaa region (mainly to Brital) and “restoring” it to its owners in return for large ransoms.

- Sources in **Europe** reported in 1999-2000 that **Hezbollah** members had cooperated with European and international criminal elements in **smuggling cars stolen from European countries**. The cars were sent by sea to **Lebanon** and transferred to Middle Eastern and other countries, where they were sold.

- **Hezbollah** operatives in Europe engage in other criminal activities as well. In November 2001, **Spanish police arrested criminal elements connected with Hezbollah** on the charge of fraudulent dealings (summer cottages in the Caribbean), forgery, blackmailing, money laundering, and other criminal activity, amounting to **millions of US dollars**.

- Several cases of criminal activity uncovered in recent years in the United States and Canada evidence that **Hezbollah has spread its tentacles from Europe to countries overseas**.

- **In the United States:** a major smuggling operation was uncovered in 2002 in **Charlotte, North Carolina**. Over the years, several Americans of Lebanese origin have been engaged in a large-scale smuggling of **cigarettes, taking advantage of the tax differentials** between the low cigarette tax in North

Carolina and the high cigarette tax in Michigan. Part of their profits went to **finance Hezbollah activity in the Middle East**. Mohammad Hammoud, the leader of the smuggling network, was recently sentenced to 155 years' imprisonment. His brother Shawki was sentenced to four years, and three others individuals of Lebanese origin received between two and three years.

° Similar criminal pursuits have been reported in **Canada**, as well as other illegal activities of Lebanese Shiites linked to **Hezbollah**. These include purchases of arms and explosives, fundraising, and **car theft**. In addition, large sums of money were transferred to **Hezbollah** in Lebanon through Canadian banks.

° In **Latin America**, Lebanese Shiite criminal elements with links to **Hezbollah** engage in similar pursuits, including smuggling, drug trafficking, blackmail, and racketeering. Part of their profits are funneled to sponsor **Hezbollah's** activities in Lebanon and abroad. The most popular area for these pursuits is the **tri-border area** between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, where the local law enforcement is extremely lax.