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Titel: Real options and investment incentives / Gunther Friedl. - Berlin: Springer, 2007

PPN: 259545589

Bibliographischer Datensatz im SWB-Verbund

ISBN: 978-3-540-48266-6Gb.EUR 74.85 (freier Pr.), sfr 123.50 (freier Pr.); 3-540-48266-0Gb.EUR

74.85 (freier Pr.), sfr 123.50 (freier Pr.)