- Abe endorses Suga’s performance because he’s the successor most likely to complete the mission of advancing constitutional reform
- Support for constitutional reform has a strong generational bias - older demographics are mostly for it, younger against
Reform has a strong aura of misdirection: the headline issue is Article 9 and explicitly including the JSDF, but that’s inherently contradictory; all it would do is allow Japan to participate in (US-led?) military operations overseas, which goes against the stated goal of “escaping from the US-imposed constitution”.
- Real goal of reform appears to be a return to the “good old days” in which the constitution didn’t exist to limit the power of the government (see e.g. this).
However, this is incredibly delusional, specifically the notion of a unity of purpose between government and populace lasting for the decade through Japan’s WWII defeat, as Noah Smith discusses here.
The real goal appears to be making it easier to limit public freedom and concentrate authority on the central government, specifically the PM’s office, as the extension of a multi-year exercise in consolidating power in the Kantei and specifically the PM (see e.g. this article by Haru Takenaka of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies).
The justification for the latest attempt to get a referendum bill through parliament (which given the LDP majority will presumably pass) appears to be that the government needs the power to do more than ask for stuff to control the pandemic, though this is also pretty convoluted, and has been met with widespread scepticism.
The main response, naturally, has been along the lines of “probably learn to play the guitar before you ask for a more expensive guitar”. I.e., while the government started out with some pretty clear messaging that got across the urgency of social distancing and avoiding the “three Cs” (and cash handouts both to households and businesses, though the latter were in some cases less than generous) it then diluted it with a travel and eating out campaign and a dual agenda of opening up and preventing infections that encouraged indecision.
The central government also didn’t appear to learn from the US and UK’s experience with their vaccine rollouts, instead offloading the planning to local governments who lacked the necessary resources and experience and creating generalised confusion and massive duplication of effort. It only took the lead in setting up mass vaccination centres and bringing in Self-Defence Force medics to supplement healthcare professionals after a third state of emergency declaration in March prompted a spike in public discontent. (As of 7 May, only around 2% of the population had received at least one vaccine shot; the mass vaxxing centres come online later in May.)
In extending the ongoing state of emergency (until 31 May), PM Suga at last stated on 7 May the target of vaccinating a million people a day and of getting shots to the under-65s starting in June. Whether this is achievable (previous targets for testing, for example, have not been met) remains to be seen; the central government’s attempts thus far to accelerate the rollout have reportedly mostly involved telling local authorities to pull their finger out. However, the fact that Suga cited the UK’s success in using vaccines to bring down infections is a positive sign in terms of getting the messaging around the rollout on track.
So to sum up, it looks like the kids of the ruling generation that presided over Japan’s wartime defeat and didn’t like the result are trying to ram through at least a referendum on the view that the pandemic represents their last good opportunity/excuse for the foreseeable future. But it feels unlikely to succeed, in that (1) it will come across as another case of the government mixing up its priorities unless the vaccine rollout proceeds, and (2) if the rollout does succeed, the rationale for enshrining more drastic measures in the constitution would diminish.