TOURISM, TERRORISM, AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

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Abstract:
Concepts of terrorism, political turmoil, and war appear unrelated to tourism. Closer examination of their points of convergence and impacts on tourism reveals otherwise. This paper examines literature focusing on the relationships between these phenomena. Research themes which emerge from available studies include impacts of terrorism and political instability on tourist demand, motives of terrorists in targeting tourists, using tourism as a political tool, the effects of political violence on destination image, crisis management, and recovery marketing efforts. The intent of this article is to synthesize research on these relationships, to present a comprehensive index of relevant publications, and to suggest topics for future research.
Keywords: terrorism, political instability, war, international tourism, destination image, crisis management, recovery marketing.

Résumé: Tourisme, terrorisme et instabilité politique. A premiere vue le terrorisme, l'instabilité politique et la guerre ne semblent pas être liés au tourisme. Mais une examination plus approfondie de leurs points de convergence et de leurs impacts sur l'industrie du tourisme indique autrement. Cet article examine las littérature sur les relations entre ces phénomenes. Les themes des études precedentes incluent les impacts du terrorisme et de l'instabilite politique sur la demande touristique, les motivations des terroristes prenant pour cible des touristes, l'utilisation du tourisme comme outil politique, les effets des violences politiques sur l'image des destinations, la gerance des crises et les efforts de promation suite aux incidents. L'article presente aussi un index exhaustif des publications importantes et suggere des sujets de recherche future.
Mots-clés: terrorisme, instabilite politique, guerre, tourisme international, image des destinations, gerance de crises, promotion.

Article:
INTRODUCTION
Even its demonstrated economic success does not shield international tourism from the sinister power of terrorism. While numerous natural and human-caused disasters can significantly impact the flow of tourism, the threat of danger that accompanies terrorism or political turmoil tends to intimidate potential tourists more severely. Fear of random terrorist violence is not new, but the attention it has commanded from scholars can be traced back only a decade. As international terrorism peaked during the mid-80s, its inevitable effects on tourism became the object of serious concern. More recently, the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the possibility of related global terrorism refocused attention on the topic. This continues to intensify as a result of terrorist incidents and political turmoil which make headlines around the world. A parallel can be drawn between the escalation of volatile political situations that threaten tourists and the proliferation of published works on the topic; the volume of scholarly attention focusing on this subject has begun to approach its significance.

Issues of tourist safety and risk are as engrossing as they are weighty. A literature search fueled by an interest in the relationship between tourism, terrorism and political conflict also yields studies on the topics of war and crime. The question remains, however, whether all of these works shed sufficient light on the current under-standing of how international tourism can be protected from terrorism or political conflict. The terrorism and tourism literature has several foci: terrorists' motives for targeting tourists or the industry; impacts of terrorism on tourism demand; and possible solutions for tourists to help minimize their risks. Studies examining the effects of political unrest or war on the industry focus on specific situations such as the Philippines, Fiji,

Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tibet, China, Mexico, and Yugoslavia. These works are valuable as case studies that provide readers with the opportunity to analyze situations and deliberate on successful and unsuccessful management efforts of the governments involved. Several of these cases are examined from different perspectives and can be organized into broader discussions of tourism as a political tool; the effects of political turmoil on tourism; and recovery marketing efforts. Because each case is highly unique, however, it is difficult to outline common strategies.

Well publicized examples of terrorism or political conflict involving the tourism industry are frequently referred to by the studies which—although useful in chronicling the relationship offer few solutions. Important questions remain: how do destinations burdened with political challenges deal with negative images? How does the industry manage the crisis of terrorism or political strife? How can it become immune to the effects of terrorism and political problems? Thus, this paper attempts to synthesize what is known about the relationships between terrorism, political instability and tourism; to present a comprehensive index of publications on the topic for future studies; and to stress the need to better understand this dangerous relationship by suggesting topics for additional research.

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL TURMOIL

The US Department of State defines terrorism as " ... pre-meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against civilians and unarmed military personnel by subnational groups ... usually intended to influence an audience"; and international terrorism as " ... involving citizens or the territory of more than one country" (1996:4). As a form of political expression, terrorism dates back to 6 A.D. when Jewish patriots opposed to Roman rule in Palestine, organized under the name of Zealots and launched a terrorist campaign to drive Romans out of Palestine (Poland 1988; Schlagheck 1988). Terrorism recurred from 116-117 A.D. and again from 132-135 A.D. until the Jewish population was driven out of Rome. The term did not officially enter political vocabulary until the 18th century, when Edmund Burke criticized the "reign of terror" following the 1792-94 French Revolution, when the French government used systematic terror to intimidate and eliminate its enemies (Murphy 1989; Poland 1988; Schlagheck 1988). On and off, the use of terrorism can be traced to present day. International terrorism increased rapidly during the late 60s and early 70s; after a brief lull in activity, the 80s began and ended with terrorist violence. By the end of the decade, terrorism had become commonplace (D'Amore and Anuza 1986; Richter and Waugh 1986). Comparatively fewer terrorist incidents have been recorded for the first half of the 90s; however, their nature and magnitude are not easily comparable to those of past years' events as indicated by the US Department of State,

> Yet, while the incidence of international terrorism has dropped sharply in the last decade, the overall threat of terrorism remains very serious ... the threat of terrorist use of materials of mass destruction is an issue of growing concern ... (1997:1).

Nevertheless, one of the highest recent death tolls, resulting from international terrorist attacks, was recorded in 1996: 311 people compared with 163 in 1995 (US Department of State 1997). The mercurial nature of terrorism is illustrated by a quote from *Patterns of Global Terrorism,* an annual US State Department publication containing information on terrorist organizations and statistics:

> In most countries, the level of international terrorism in 1995 continued the downward trend of recent years, and there were fewer terrorist acts that caused deaths last year than in the previous year. However, the total number of international terrorist acts rose in 1995 from 322 to 440 ...international terrorist attacks against US interests rose to 99 in 1995 from 66 in 1994, and the number of US citizens killed rose from four to 12. The total number of fatalities from international terrorism worldwide declined from 314 in 1994 to 165 in 1995, but the number of persons wounded increased by a factor of ten to 6,291 persons; 5,500 were injured in a gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in March (1996:5).

Closer scrutiny of terrorism—for the purpose of understanding some of its underlying currents—begs a look at world conditions. As a new millennium is about to begin, nations wrestle with hunger, disease, and numerous

other socioeconomic and environmental problems, which are further exacerbated by the alarming growth in the world's population rate, the combination of which may nurture terrorism. It is suggested that terrorist organizations can easily recruit members by offering better conditions to people living in undesirable circumstances in undeveloped nations (D'Amore and Anuza 1986).

A plethora of definitions, typologies, and theories have been developed in the earnest effort to understand and explain terrorism; as a result, an integrative theory is difficult to find. Fortunately, one lucid explanation shadows the many others. Terrorism, "as a symbolic act", according to Karber, "can be analyzed much like other mediums of communication," (1971:9). This conceptualization is accompanied by four basic components of the communication process within the context of terrorism: transmitter of message (terrorist); intended recipient of message (target of terrorist's message); message (terrorist act involving individual or institutional victims); and feedback (reaction of the recipient). Karber's explanation supports a familiar scenario: terrorists initiate communication when they hijack a passenger airline; the target of their message is likely to be a large and usually removed audience (i.e., the government being protested); travelers on the plane and the hijacking itself represent the message (which may involve certain demands); and governmental compliance with terrorist demands represent the feedback required by the terrorists to confirm successful communication. Karber's (1971) description of terrorism is realistic in the light of the terrorist incidents the world has witnessed over the past two decades. Aided by mass media, terrorists are able to successfully communicate their plight and their objectives to large audiences they would otherwise never access.

Predictions of the future of terrorism are provided by diverse sources who echo each other in forecasting that terrorist organizations will demonstrate more frequent and bolder action (D'Amore and Anuza 1986; Jenkins 1987, 1988; US Department of State 1996). Experts speculate that terrorists will continue to select vulnerable ("soft") targets, that their attacks will become more indiscriminate, that terrorism will become institutionalized and spread geographically as a method of armed conflict, and that the public will witness more terrorism than ever before due to the media's improved ability to cover terrorist incidents (Atkinson, Sandler and Tschirhart 1987; Jenkins 1988). According to Jenkins (1988) extraordinary security measures will become a permanent and accepted way of life just as terrorism will become routine and "almost tolerable". A recent string of terrorist attacks, many in the United States (i.e., 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 1996 bombing of US base in Saudi Arabia, 1996 bomb explosion at Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park, 1996 discovery and detonation of pipe bomb on tarmac of Chicago's O'Hare International Airport has indeed caused tightened security measures confirming the first part of Jenkins's prediction.

In discussions of the future of terrorism, several trends were identified at the 10th Annual Symposium on Criminal Justice Issues held in 1995:

> 1. Marxist/Leninist terrorist motives of the 70s and 80s have been largely replaced by Islamic fundamentalism. 2. Terrorist states providing essential weapons, supplies, financing, coordination, training, and safe haven to sustain terrorism have changed from Moscow, Havana, Sofia, and East Berlin (in the 80s) to Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (in the 90s). 3. Unraveling connections between terrorists and their groups has become more difficult due to increased cooperation among major terrorist groups and changes in their organizational nature from structured to fluid. 4. Increasing possibility of terrorists employing weapons of mass destruction (i.e., biological, chemical, nuclear). As the first recorded occurrence of terrorists committing mass-murder with such a weapon, the 1995 "sarin" gas attack in Japan—which killed 12 persons and injured 5,500 rush-hour commuters—introduced the world to this disturbing reality of terrorism (Ranstorp 1996; US Department of State 1996).

In retaliation, nations around the world have begun to join forces in counter-terrorism activities, law enforcement, and intelligence gathering. Various multilateral conferences and summit meetings have been organized in an effort to devise strategies to fight terrorism. In 1995, officials from Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the United States, attended a regional ministerial meeting in Argentina to discuss measures against terrorist threat in the region (US Department of State 1996). In response to mandates set by the Halifax

Summit held in June 1995, a counter-terrorism conference was held in December in Ottawa and was attended by heads of state from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States (e.g., Group of Seven, G-7), and Russia. Six international counter-terrorist meetings were held in 1996: the "Summit of Peacemakers" in Egypt cohosted by President Clinton and President Mubarak; Asia and Pacific conferences on terrorism hosted by the Philippines and Japan; the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism in Lima, hosted by Peru; and the meeting in Paris of the ministers of the G-7 and Russia.

In the United States, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act into law in 1996, thereby increasing the federal government's powers to fight terrorism. The Clinton administration is also negotiating new extradition treaties with other nations and blocking assets of terrorists and their groups in this country. The strict US counter terrorist policy "stresses three general rules: make no deals with terrorists and do not submit to blackmail; treat terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law; and apply maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions and by urging other states to do likewise" (US Department of State 1997:2). Repeated terrorist incidents during the summer of 1996 and growing attention to terrorism by the US government serve as sobering testimony to terror's prominent place on US political and security agendas.

Political instability describes the condition of a country where a government "has been toppled, or is controlled by factions following a coup, or where basic functional pre-requisites for social-order control and maintenance are unstable and periodically disrupted" (Cook 1990:14). Current or present examples of highly publicized political conflicts include the 1991 disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina; racial, ethnic, religious conflicts in Burundi, Haiti, India, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia and South Africa; student uprisings in China and North Korea; and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. This suggests that countries around the world facing some form of political conflict outweigh those that enjoy peace and stability.

Terrorism and political instability are not unrelated (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Lea 1996; Wieviorka 1994). Wieviorka (1994) uses Lebanon, Italy, and former West Germany as examples of how political crises can eventually erupt in terrorism. Aside from terrorism, international, regional and civil wars, ethnic cleansing, declarations of martial law, military coups and riots can often be traced to political unrest, threatening both the safety of specific countries and of entire regions, such as Middle East, Balkans, and East Africa (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Wieviorka 1994). The strong link between political instability and terrorism may explain the difficulty in separating the two in some of the literature. Several articles take the reader back and forth into discussions of terrorism and political turmoil until the reader is unsure of any fundamental differences in their impacts on tourism. Despite different characteristics, both political instability and terrorism impact tourism severely. Terrorism occurs quickly and briefly and assures immediate public attention through intense and dramatic media coverage. Political turmoil—even though it does not always command the same level of media scrutiny—has lingering effects and can effectively impede travel to affected areas and create an enduring barrier to international tourism; fortunately, issues of tourism within the context of political turmoil or war have been receiving increased attention (Gartner and Shen 1992; Hall 1994; Hollier 1991; Richter 1983; Schwartz 1991; Scott 1988; Teye 1986, 1988). In particular, readers interested in understanding relationships between tourism and politics are referred to *Tourism and Politics: Policy, Power and Place* (Hall 1994), a synthesis of studies on the subject. Other recent contributions to the existing body of knowledge include *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues* (edited by Pizam and Mansfeld 1996) and proceedings of the "Talk at the Top International Conference on Tourism Security and Risk", organized in 1995 by Mid Sweden University. The former is a book divided into four sections distinguished as: tourism and crime; tourism and political instability; tourism and war; and crime and the hotel industry. The latter is a compilation of papers presented at the first conference of its kind focusing on issues of tourist safety and risks, crime, terrorism, and hospitality crisis management.

Paradoxically, international terrorism and tourism share certain characteristics. They both cross national borders, involve citizens of different countries, and utilize travel and communications technologies (Schlagheck 1988). Their relationship has become the topic of numerous news reports over the years. Random terrorist

activities intimidate tourists and curtail or realign tourism flows until the public's memories of the publicized incidents fade. For some countries, however, persistent terrorism tarnishes the destination's positive image and even jeopardizes its entire tourism business. Tourism suffers when prolonged terrorist attacks affect tourist perceptions and when terrorist organizations specifically target the industry. Examples of countries where terrorism or political problems and tourism have intersected, resulting in either the hindrance of tourist activity or modification of tourist type or role are discussed in Table 1. These examples validate Wahab's (1995) claim that terrorism absorbs each society's characteristics. Countries may face different circumstances but their tourism industries share similar challenges—some more drastic than others.

Table 1. Examples of Countries where Tourism has been Affected by Terrorism or Political Unrest

CHINA: With the world as witness, Chinese authorities cracked down on student protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on June 4 1989. Prime-time news coverage of army tanks and chaos coincided with a period when the People's Republic of China had officially opened itself to international tourism. World view of the government turned very negative. As a result of the conflict, hotel occupancy rates in Beijing dipped below 30%, 300 groups (approximately 11,500 individuals) canceled their travel plans, and tourism earnings declined by $430 million in 1989 (Gartner and Shen 1992; Hall and O'Sullivan 1996).

EGYPT: Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), an indigenous Egyptian Islamic extremist group interested in replacing President Hosni Mubarek's government with an Islamic state, became active in the late 1970s (US Department of State 1996). The group has specifically targeted and launched attacks against Egypt's tourism industry since 1992. Over 120 attacks were systematically carried out against tourists between 1992 and 1995, causing the death of 13 tourists. Egypt experienced a 22% drop in international visitors, a 30% drop in tourist nights, and a 43% decrease in tourism receipts (Aziz 1995; Wahab 1996). The crisis caused Egypt to be removed from programs of international tour operators. The last terrorist attack against tourists took place in April 1996; 18 Greek tourists were killed in Cairo.

FIJI: Two military coups occurred in Fiji within months (May 14 and September 28) in 1987, following the election of a mainly non-Fijian government. Sensational media coverage was followed by travel advisories issued by Australia and New Zealand. The first coup was followed by a hijack attempt of an Air New Zealand Boeing 747 at Fiji's Nadi Airport (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Lea 1996; Scott 1996).

ISRAEL: Since its establishment in 1948, both Israelis and Palestinians living in the occupied territories have experienced continuous turmoil. In 1987, the Palestinian uprising (*Intifada*) intensified and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) formed from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood to establish an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel (US Department of State 1996). Attacks initiated by both Israelis and Palestinians have resulted in heavy death tolls and casualties. Tourist arrivals between 1970 and 1994 have climbed steadily with sharp declines in numbers after negative events (Bar-On 1996).

MEXICO: When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect on January 1 1994, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) initiated an armed rebellion against the Mexican government. The first 12 days of the uprising resulted in 145 to 500 deaths (depending on the source). Military troops established road blocks and searched vehicles in Chiapas (southeastern Mexico). The March 1994, assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosia, a favored presidential candidate, created further agitation in Mexico. San Cristóbal in Chiapas, the largest town held by the Zapatistas where the uprising occurred and also where negotiations occurred, experienced sharp declines in international and domestic tourism. As a result 1994 visitation dropped by 70% in January and 70% in February, compared with the same period of the previous year (Pitts 1996).

NORTHERN IRELAND: The Provisional Republican Army (PIRA) formed in 1969 as the covert armed wing of Sinn Fein (legal political movement with the goal of removing British jurisdiction over Northern Ireland and unifying it with the Republic of Ireland) (Ni Aolain 1996; US Department of State 1996). Targets have included senior British government officials, British military and police in Northern Ireland. Terrorist activity and retaliation by British troups have impeded tourist activity.

Table 1—continued

Visitor arrivals fell from the 1967 peak of 1,080,000 to 321,000 in 1976 as a result of an image of risk and danger (Buckley and Klemm 1993; Wall 1996; Witt and Moore 1992). The ceasefire which began on August 31 1994 was observed until February 9 1996 when a bomb exploded in London killing two bystanders and injuring 43. During the 18-month cease-fire, the Northern Ireland Tourist Board recorded a 59% increase (from previous year) in inquiries, 11% increase in hotel occupancy, 18% increase in out-of-state visitors, and 68% increase in holiday visitors (O'Neill and Fitz 1996). More recently, a hotel near Belfast was bombed in July 1996; however, a second cease-fire was ordered to begin July 20 1997.

PERU: the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), a Maoist terrorist group, formed in the late-1960s to replace existing Peruvian institutions with a peasant revolutionary regime and free Peru of foreign influences (US Department of State 1996). Attacks caused a steep decline in tourism from 350,000 international visitors in 1989 to 33,000 in 1991 (Wahab 1996). On December 17 1996 a rival terrorist group, Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)—demanding the release of imprisoned rebels— raided the Japanese Embassy and took 500 people hostage. The stand-off between the rebels and the Peruvian military force lasted for 126 days, during which time small groups of hostages were released periodically. On April 24 1997 the final 72 hostages were released after the military organized a successful rescue.

SLOVENIA: The Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia in June 1991. Slovenia's war continued for 10 days before moving to Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. Specialized tour operators for Yugoslavia lost over one million booked tourists in 1991 as a result. Even "two years after the ten-day war, the figures for Slovenian tourism were still far behind the pre-war figures. The number of total nights in 1993 was 32% lower than in 1990" (Mihalič 1990:237).

SPAIN: the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was founded in 1959 to create an independent homeland in Spain's Basque region (US Department of State 1996). Politicians and members of the military and government have been traditional targets; however, ETA specifically targeted Spain's tourism industry between 1984 and 1987. Tourist hotels and travel agencies were bombed. Over 200 letters were mailed by ETA to foreign embassies, travel agencies and foreign media in Spain stating intentions to terrorize tourists (Enders and Sandler 1991). ETA's 1996 "summer campaign" included six bombing attacks in early July. At Reus Airport near Barcelona, 35 were injured and hotels along Spain's Costa Dorada were bombed. Downward trends in tourism activity have been recorded (Bar-On 1996).

TIBET: Nationalist unrest which began in 1987 was punctuated by the declaration of martial law in March 1989, in Lhasa. In 1990 three foreigners were shot at and one was killed in Kathmandu, as they tried to photograph pro-democracy demonstrations. Tibet's tourism industry suffered a serious blow as a result. In 1988, 22,000 visitors were recorded, but in the first six months of 1989, 1092 tourists arrived in Tibet (down from 5,000 visitors during the same period in 1988). Only 3.1% of the visitation projected by the government was recorded and a loss of 4.52 million yuan was reported by tourism businesses (Schwartz 1991).

THE GAMBIA: This small West African developing country, enjoyed political stability following its independence from Britain in 1965. In the summer of 1994, a bloodless coup occurred. The Travel Advice Unit of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) issued several subsequent and stringent travel warnings against The Gambia. As a result, first British then Scandinavian tour operators pulled out, virtually crippling the country's tourism industry. Arrivals fell from 5,000 to 300;

Table 1—continued

over 2,000 jobs directly and indirectly linked to tourism were lost; eight hotels closed; and the country's economic and social conditions quickly deteriorated (Sharpley and Sharpley 1995).

TURKEY: The Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group interested in establishing an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey, was established in 1974 (US Department of State 1996). PKK primarily targeted Turkish government forces and civilians until recently. Since 1993, PKK has become more active in Western Europe against Turkish targets and has specifically targeted Turkey's tourism industry since 1991. The PKK has emulated ETA's letter campaign warning foreign companies against sending tourists to Turkey, bombed tourism sites and hotels, and kidnapped foreign tourists. Foreign visitor arrivals dropped 8% from 1992–1993 (Bar-On 1996). After a self-imposed cease fire by the PKK, international arrivals reached record levels (9.5 million) in 1996.

ZAMBIA and ZIMBABWE: Zimbabwe's (previously South Rhodesia) Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 was followed by a 15 year liberation war which lasted until 1990. As a result, tourism to the immediate area (including neighboring Zambia) was seriously impeded. Teye (1986) compared Kenya's tourist arrivals which increased from 250,400 in 1964–66 to 3,524,000 in 1970–78 to Zambia's arrivals which only increased incrementally from 429,700 to 466,800 for the same period. During the 1967–69 period, Zambia was unable to record any tourist arrivals because of the war.

The Terrorism—Tourism Relationship

It is logical to believe that understanding terrorist goals may help untangle the relationship between terrorism and tourism. Not all may agree on terrorists' motives, but several studies attempt to explain the nature of the terrorism—tourism relationship. It is evident from the literature that targeting tourists or the industry is quite deliberate and helps terrorists achieve several goals (i.e., publicity, economic disruption, ideological opposition to tourism). In one of the earliest articles on the topic, Richter (1983) illustrates the symbolic nature of the terrorism—tourism relationship by drawing parallels between peaceful international tourism and diplomatic relations. She suggests that tourists are targeted because they are viewed as ambassadors for their countries, as soft targets, and often because of their "symbolic value as indirect representatives of hostile or unsympathetic governments" (Richter 1983; Richter and Waugh 1986:235). This concept was fatally demonstrated during the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro yacht by Palestinian terrorists. The selection of the only Jewish American on board as the one passenger to be killed is anything but coincidental. Over the years, terrorist recognition of the political significance of international tourism has been repeatedly and tragically communicated. According to Richter, terrorism involving citizens of other countries may be a response to strict limits on political expression: "terrorism against one's own citizens may in fact go unmentioned by a media controlled by the hostile government" (1983:328). The reason is simple and obvious and has been demonstrated by numerous incidents: when nationals of other countries become involved, news coverage is guaranteed. This way, terrorists know they will secure media attention while curtailing their government's ability to censor news content. When tourists are kidnapped or killed, the situation is instantaneously dramatized by the media, which also helps the political conflict between terrorists and the establishment reach a global scale. Terrorists achieve the exposure they crave (Richter 1983) and the media increases its circulation and/or ratings.

Terrorists' goals are classified broadly as revolutionary (narrow or broad, antigovernment, including overthrow of the regime) or subrevolutionary (including policy and personnel changes). More specifically, objectives are classified as ideological, strategic, and tactical (Richter and Waugh 1986). Ideological objectives are long-range in nature and may involve a national struggle. Tactical objectives, which are short-range and motivated by legitimized concerns, often involve robberies and choice of targets from affluent tourism locations, tourists themselves who are vulnerable to attack, and resort areas at which socioeconomic and political elites reside—strongly resembling everyday criminal activity. Richter and Waugh suggest that terrorists target tourists to achieve strategic objectives and that attacking them can provide terrorists with instrumental advantage by

disrupting the industry and assuring publicity. Terrorists gravitate toward inter-national tourists and facilities to satisfy their own resource needs. Large groups of foreign-speaking and -looking tourists provide camouflage and safety while offering various opportunities and choice of targets. Terrorists can circulate among tourists and carry out financial transactions in foreign currencies without arousing suspicion (Richter and Waugh 1986). Viewed differently, terrorists target tourists in order to achieve ideological objectives, punish nationals for supporting the government, and strengthen claims to political legitimacy by making the government look weak (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996).

Even though authors describe terrorism objectives differently, they agree that terrorists have much to gain by targeting tourists. When tourism symbolizes capitalism and, if it is state-sponsored, then the attack on the industry is an attack on the government as well. Because this trade represents a significant economic activity, terrorist attacks on tourists cause foreign exchange receipts to decline, thereby allowing terrorists to impose indirect costs on the government and to gain political advantage over the officials (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Richter and Waugh 1986). According to Edgell (1990), tourist decisions to stay home or choose "safer" destinations are translated into significant losses for the industry of the country suffering from terrorism. Egypt's 43% drop in tourism receipts as a result of terrorist attacks, which began in 1992, is sobering proof of how terrorists can damage a country's economy (Wahab 1996).

Several studies offer logical socioeconomic and cultural explanations of the terrorism–tourism relationship (Aziz 1995; Lea 1996; Richter 1983; Wahab 1995, 1996). According to Richter, tourism can "spawn divisive conflicts among proponents and opponents of tourism development" (1983:18-19). She further points out, foreign business travelers and tourism facilities might become "legitimate" targets for terrorists who oppose the control socioeconomic and political elites exert over the industry. The perception that tourism development does not really benefit locals can provoke violence when it is blamed for "exploiting and destroying indigenous industries and cultures ... " (Richter and Waugh 1986:237). Lea's statement that "a failure on the part of tourist [developers] to design, locate, and manage their projects in a way that ensures community support will ultimately lead to community opposition and likely violence" (1996:124) supports this proposition. It is possible that local frustration with the tourism industry can ultimately lead to opposition followed by violent action (Lea 1996).

In his discussion of terrorism in Egypt, Aziz (1995) counters the misconception that Islam is simply against foreign tourists with a socioeconomic explanation. According to Aziz, tourists and locals in Egypt are separated by language barriers as well as economic and social gaps. When poverty stricken locals are forced to co-exist with international tourists enjoying luxuries, friction is inevitable. Aziz's explanation supports Richter's (1983) earlier suggestion that travel styles can be representative of ideological values, class behavior, and political culture of tourists and their countries. As a result, tourists may be targeted because of their tourism styles which may demonstrate conspicuous consumption (i.e., demonstration of money or credit cards; flashy photography equipment; expensive clothes, jewelry, and luggage). Resentments which build against tourism can thus ignite into dangerous expressions of bitterness.

Friction between host and guest can also result from clashing cultures or values. Certain tourist behaviors (i.e., consumption of pork and alcohol; gambling; Western dress; codes of behavior incongruent with Islamic tradition)—incongruent with Islamic cultural values—are also suggested as a possible explanation for the Egyptians' frustration (Aziz 1995). Wahab concurs by suggesting that sometimes terrorism specifically targets tourism because it is seen as a movement of " 'alien' visitors representing a form of neo-colonialism or a threat to well-established societal norms, traditions, value-systems, and religious convictions" (1995:85). Wahab's explanation that Egypt's terrorist attacks against tourists represent their desire to revive classic Islamic societal rules to resist the corruption of modernity (perceived as deviation from Islam) supports Richter and Waugh's earlier implication that discord could result when tourism is blamed for the " ... contamination of culture due to simple contact" (1986:237). More conservative locals or Muslim activists may feel they need to take drastic action to prevent what they perceive as a threat to their national culture, tradition, and religious beliefs (Wahab 1995). Regrettably, in extreme cases, the desire to protect sacred beliefs manifests itself in terrorism.

Simply put, the literature demonstrates that tourism can be the message as well as the medium of communication initiated by terrorists. Tourism can inspire terrorist violence by fueling political, religious, socioeconomic, or cultural resentment and be used as a cost effective instrument to deliver a broader message of ideological/political opposition. In either case, the choice of the tourist as target is not coincidental. For terrorists, the symbolism, high profile, and news value of international tourists are too valuable not to exploit. Diverging from other writers, Ryan (1993) treats terrorism as an advanced form of crime in a typology of crimes involving tourism. Admittedly, at first glance terrorism and crime are similar because they both involve random violence against individuals and threaten tourism. It is important, however, to differentiate between the two because the lack of a clear delineation of motives can only add to the difficulty of devising solutions. Terrorism clearly differs from everyday crime on the basis of political or religious motives. Undoubtedly, crime can impede tourism by wielding a significant blow to the fragile nature of a destination's safe image. The ramifications can be long-term and extremely difficult and expensive to recover from. Murders of foreign tourists in Miami have exemplified such challenges faced by a destination. Many studies discuss the relationship between crime and tourism (Bach 1996; Bloom 1996; Chesney-Lind and Lind 1986; Cohen 1996; Demos 1992; Hollinger 1995; Kemmer 1995; Lankford 1996; LeBruto 1996; Pizam 1982; Prideaux 1996; Ryan and Kinder 1996; Schiebler, Crotts and Hollinger 1996; Tarlow and Muehsam 1996).

The statistics clearly demonstrate that risks alter tourism demand patterns. For example, over six million Americans visited Europe in 1985 and seven million more were projected to go in 1986; however, 54% of them canceled their reservations to Europe due to the peak in terrorist activity (D'Amore and Anuza 1986). According to a Gallup Poll conducted by *Newsweek* the same year, 79% of Americans said they would avoid overseas destinations that summer (D'Amore and Anuza 1986). The events of 1986 (which also included the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the US military raid on Libya) significantly reduced visitation to Europe; travel to several European countries fell below projections—e.g., Greece by 30%; the United Kingdom by 68%; and former West Germany by *77%* (Brady and Widdows 1988). Mediterranean countries recorded a 50% decline in bookings and Egypt alone recorded a 65% reduction in American visitors. The World Tourism Organization attributed the $105 billion in lost tourism receipts in 1985 to terrorism. On the other hand, tourism activity has been found to increase when terrorism risk is removed. Referring to the 18-month (August 1994 to February 1996) cease-fire initiated by the Provisional Irish Republican Army and joined by the Combined Loyalist Military Command, O'Neill and Fitz note that: "one of the most manifest 'peace dividends' was the massive increase in the level of tourism activity within Northern Ireland in the first year of the joint cease-fires" (1996:161).

The inherent logic of the belief that terrorism impacts tourism negatively has been tested by researchers who have quantified the relationship—using complex methods and computer models—to ascertain changes in tourist activity. The conclusions are consistent: that the potential of risk significantly impacts tourist behavior. The influence may begin with the decision-making process (Cook 1990; Sonmez and Graefe 1998). Studies have found that tourists modify their behavior—a type of protective measure—during travel (Hartz 1989); substitute risky destinations with safer choices (Gu and Martin 1992; Mansfeld 1996); attribute terrorism risk to neighboring countries not directly affected (Enders, Sander and Parise 1992); demonstrate a delayed reaction to terrorism (Enders and Sandler 1991; Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992); and exhibit cultural differences in their reactions to risk (Hurley 1988; Tremblay 1989; Wall 1996).

The impact of terrorism on tourists' decisions has not been investigated extensively, however. The introduction of risk into the already complex decision process is likely to further complicate it. In addition, tourism type (i.e., leisure or business) can affect the decision process. For instance, business tourists are more restricted in their destination and scheduling choices. Cook (1990) and Sonmez and Graefe (1998) investigated decisions involving terrorism and political instability risk by using two different populations. According to Cook business travelers' propensity for international destinations is predicted by their reluctance to change their plans in response to media coverage of terrorism and their level of previous international experience. Cook provided subjects with hypothetical situations and imaginary countries in order to understand their reactions to terrorism risk. The effectiveness of his method to gauge realistic responses might be questioned, as individual's imagined

response to a hypothetical terrorist threat cannot represent their actual response to real danger. Similarly, Si5nmez and Graefe examined vacation decisions but found past international experience to have only an indirect impact on future behavior. Further, results indicated that positive attitudes toward international destinations and lower levels of perceived risk increase individuals' propensity for foreign choices and temper the need for safety factors in selecting one destination over another. However, it should be noted that during their study, no terrorist events were recorded; thus, the relative calm during the research process may be reflected in the results. In order to achieve a more concrete under-standing of decisions involving risk, actual situational factors need to be included in the research (i.e., current threat, media coverage of terrorism).

As a result of earlier mentioned restrictions, business travelers may face higher risks of being targeted by terrorists. In a study of high level business executives of American multinational corporations—who traveled abroad extensively despite international terrorism—Hartz (1989) found them modifying their on-trip behavior in order to minimize risks. Cognitive and affective coping styles, uses of denial, anxiety, and self-reported behavioral changes related to security, were examined through in-depth interviews, which revealed that many subjects had experienced danger personally. For example, they reported "near misses" (e.g., missing a flight which was later hijacked, leaving a hotel lobby shortly before it was bombed), being victimized in actual terrorist events (e.g., hijacking, bombing), or "close calls". Predictably, the majority (83%) reported changing behaviors to more secure styles. In addition to this modification, most international business travelers experienced restricted freedoms, increased inconvenience, and heightened anxiety levels. Hartz defines secure behaviors as keeping a low-profile, dressing down, eliminating conspicuous consumption, and not identifying oneself with a large corporation. It might be quite possible for them to adopt these strategies and blend into crowds of the host nation; but tourists—while they might be somewhat able to alter their behavior—would be seriously challenged in becoming totally inconspicuous because their characteristics (e.g., dress; behavior; places visited) would easily delineate them from locals.

The assumption that tourists are rational consumers who move through the decision process by weighing utilities against costs suggests that risks associated with increased terrorist incidents at a destination increase the perceived cost of the experience. Therefore, terrorist activities at one destination increase tourists' perceived risks (and the cost of the experience) which then results in substitution with a destination perceived as safe (Enders and Sandler 1991; Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992; Gu and Martin 1992). This concept is sup-ported by Gu and Martin's (1992) study which identified destination substitution as a logical solution for international tourists who perceive risk. In an effort to explain passenger traffic increase at Orlando International Airport (OIA) between 1971 and 1984, they examined passenger arrivals, using secondary data. From the correlation between the increase in terrorist hijacking incidents in the Middle East and Europe and increased passenger arrivals at OIA, Gu and Martin identified a substitution effect between Orlando and European or Middle Eastern destinations. A comparable pattern emerged during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when tourists preferred Caribbean and North-American cruises to travel to Europe. Similar but regional changes are discussed in a recent study of political instability in the Middle East. Mansfeld (1996) identifies shifts in tourism from the less stable "inner ring" of the Middle East (e.g., Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) to the calmer "outer ring" (e.g., Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey) due to Arab—Israeli conflicts in the former situation. Mansfeld states that "a country that does not take an active part in conflict is not regarded by potential tourists as a threat" (1995, 1996:275). He supports his argument by explaining that the outer ring gained visitors the inner ring lost as a result of the conflict in the region—which he calls the "spillover effect" (tourism gains by neighbors of countries experiencing conflict). In fact, according to Mansfeld, a country's visitor numbers correlate with its level of involvement in security situations. Wahab's statement that "when some chain of events deters tourists from visiting certain destinations, other destinations, whether proximate or faraway, will benefit" (1996:176) supports Mansfeld's (1995, 1996) findings.

While it is difficult to assess such change as a "spillover effect" instead of simple destination substitution, one must keep in mind that intra-regional tourists might easily prefer calm destinations neighboring those in conflict, unlike inter-regional ones who generalize conflict to entire regions, which might explain the decline in tourist interest in Iraq's neighbors during the Gulf War. It might also be wise to consider other situational factors

at work which might cause travel shifts, such as intensive marketing efforts and currency exchange rates. The substitution effect explains why some destinations are preferred over others. The "generalization effect" might explain why some tourists who perceive terrorism threat in one country tend to presume entire regions to be risky (Enders, Sadler and Parise 1992). The result is the deterrence of tourism from perfectly safe countries when their neighbors experience terrorism. This was demonstrated by the decline in overall European travel as a result of terrorism in a few countries whose neighbors were experiencing political turmoil. For example, the Mediterranean region registered serious decrease in tourism during the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq (other examples are discussed later in the paper).

The pervasive nature of print and broadcast media leads one to believe that reports of terrorism would immediately deter tourism in affected areas. To the contrary, related research indicates that tourists' reaction to terrorism is delayed. In the case of Spain, Enders and Sandler (1991) found that after a typical international terrorist occurrence, international visitation dropped by over 140,000—but the decline began three months after the incident. This finding is supported by a second study which investigated the effects of terrorism on tourism in 12 continental European countries (with special attention to Greece, Italy, and Austria). Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992) found tourism to react to terrorist occurrences after a period of 6-9 months. Because these studies used secondary data, it is difficult to determine why the reaction was delayed, which leaves room for speculation. International tourism is an expensive purchase and tourists may be reluctant (or may be unable) to change their plans immediately after a terrorist occurrence. In fact, they may believe that the immediate probability of other incidents at the same destination is slim. Another possible explanation might be that continuing media coverage after terrorism occurs might exert a strong influence on travel flows.

A final point of interest in the discussion of tourist response to terrorism involves cultural differences in reacting to risk. Cross-cultural studies of risk perception have demonstrated differences not only in ranking risks but also in the magnitude and source of perceived situations (Goszczynska, Tyszka and Slovic 1991; Mechitov and Rebrik 1990; Tiegen, Brun and Slovic 1988). Similarly, international tourists' country of origin was found to predict their reaction to terrorist threat (Hurley 1988; Tremblay 1989). In a study comparing the 1985 and 1986 international arrivals in Rome, Hurley (1988) found a 59% decline in American visitation. The study concluded that American tourists were "fickle" and suggested that European hoteliers shift their marketing emphases to tourists originating in Europe and Asia. This characterization of Americans as fickle is rather unfair when one considers that a significant portion of past terrorist activity specifically targeted US citizens. Another study on the effects of terrorism on the tourism receipts of 18 European countries found receipts to have different elasticities according to tourists' country of origin (Tremblay 1989). The study attributed its findings—that terrorism did not significantly impact receipts from European tourists—to the fact that they may be better informed about political events in Europe and are able to control their destinations and timing according to regions of high or low terroristic probabilities. Tremblay (1989) accedes that the decline in receipts from North American tourists might be because they have often been victimized by terrorist violence and have been exposed to more intense media coverage of terrorist events. Echoing Tremblay's argument that tourists who are better informed about political events react less severely, Wall (1996) suggests that visitors to Northern Ireland who were quite aware of terrorist activity still felt less threatened by it because they understood its underlying reasons. In his comparison of Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland—with regard to visitors' origins and numbers, tourism revenues by country of origin, and main travel purpose—Wall (1996) found that Northern Ireland had fewer visitors (than the Republic of Ireland) who spent less money because they came mostly to visit friends and relatives. This motivation is also likely to overcome trepidation related to terrorism risk, possibly because of a safety-net provided by those individuals.

The studies mentioned above are helpful because they each provide a piece of the puzzle. It is essential to understand cognitive and affective processes individuals experience when they feel threatened. Travel, especially for leisure, should be an enjoyable experience. When dark elements enter the equation, the experience is immediately stripped of any joy only to be replaced by apprehension. Research, particularly when secondary data is used, can shed only limited light on these issues. Deep rooted emotions such as fear and the need for safety are difficult—if not impossible—to quantify. More creative, perhaps qualitative methods are

needed to understand why people behave the way they do: However, these studies certainly do provide a starting point for much needed future research.

Political Instability and War

Although circumstances differ significantly, tourism emerges as a political tool in the Philippines, Tibet, and The Gambia (Table 1). Using a detailed analysis of the situation in the Philippines, Richter argues that if used skillfully, tourism can be an extremely powerful tool. Richter supports her argument with facts gleaned from a four-month content analysis of three leading Philippines daily newspapers. President Marcos's 1972 declaration of martial law—intended to abrogate his political opposition—established the New Society which promised "a reformed and cleansed social order" (1980:237). Marcos successfully managed negative international reaction to the undemocratic nature of martial law thereby avoiding damage to the country's economic power. Richter credits Marcos's political skill in legitimizing martial law by presenting it as a tenable response to an emergency situation involving communist subversion and public violence. Through a series of clever strategies, Marcos effectively used tourism to repair the country's political image. Prior to martial law, the Philippines were "reputedly seething with subversion and violence" whereas after the declaration of martial law, the country was marketed as a safe destination where tourism was a priority industry (1980:242). Because positive publicity generated by tourism implied peace and safety, the New Society was credited for making the country safe. Richter points out that the country's positive image was more useful to the government than actual tourism revenues. By using tourism development as an instrument of foreign and domestic policy, the Philippine government bought goodwill with it. In fact, tourist arrivals increased from 144,321 in 1971 to 859,396 in 1978. One government official went so far as to declare "Martial Law—Filipino Style" a tourism attraction (1980:242).

Tourism also became a political tool in Tibet, but of a different sort. The declaration of martial law in March 1989, in Lhasa, punctuated the nationalist unrest which began in 1987. Tibet's fledgling tourism industry suffered a serious blow as a result of the martial law; however, the most noteworthy effect of the unrest was the formation of a secret network of tourists who gathered information on human rights problems in order to carry the Tibetans' message to the rest of the world. Schwartz—who spent a total of eight months in Lhasa where he collected information as a participant-observer—provides a fascinating and informative "insider's" account of the change in the nature of the tourists, which he calls the "politization of the role of traveler" (1991:599). During the unrest, journalists were not per-mitted to enter the country and tourists became the only source of information about the turmoil in Tibet. Tourists both witnessed and photographed demonstrations in which civilians were shot and killed by police. Some foreigners were arrested for taking photographs, their films, cameras, and passports were confiscated. According to Schwartz, tourists

> ...being present alongside Tibetans when the police opened fire in the square in front of the police station dramatically changed the relationship between Tibetans and foreigners...foreigners were no longer just sight-seers... but international witnesses to "Chinese brutality" and potential political allies (1991:591).

These events clearly demonstrate that the opportunity to witness events in another country—afforded by tourism—can be utilized as a political tool involving information gathering and communication of political activities on behalf of those trapped and brutalized by it.

Tourism emerges as a political tool from yet another country. Sharpley and Sharpley (1995) examined the consequences of a military coup on the Gambia's tourism industry. They allege that by using travel advisories, governments of tourism generating countries can influence the flow of tourists in order to wield political power over countries dependent on this trade. To support their claim, they cite US travel bans on Cuba and China, as well as the US boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. In the case of the Gambia, when the politically stable West African country (from 1965-94) experienced a bloodless coup, The Travel Advice Unit of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) issued several subsequent and stringent travel warnings against the Gambia. The country's economic and social conditions quickly worsened in a domino effect: British and Scandinavian tour operators pulled out, arrivals fell, hotels closed, and tourism related jobs were lost.

According to the Gambian government, the FC0's travel advice was " ... a political decision aimed at putting pressure on the military regime ... ", in effect " ... an unofficial trade embargo" (Sharpley and Sharpley 1995:173,175). Some-what of a parallel can be drawn between this example and the travel advisory issued against Zimbabwe by the US State Department after US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 1976 visit to Zimbabwe (during its 15 year liberation war that lasted from 1965-90). The advisory stated " ... unsettled conditions, the potential for increased violence, inability of local government to provide assistance or protection ... " (Teye 1986:601). Even though the advisory was not intended for neighboring Zambia, it exacerbated the already negative impacts of the war on Zambia's tourism.

To avoid hasty and damaging travel advisories, Sharpley and Sharpley (1995) recommend creating an independent, international organization to collect, update, and disseminate touristic information in an impartial, accurate, and apolitical manner. Some may argue that it is every government's prerogative to issue travel advisories against countries it chooses—in response to political or environmental occurrences—to protect its own citizens. On the other hand, the formation of the proposed organization (possibly housing an agency within the World Tourism Organization) might possibly prevent the exploitation of tourism as a political weapon by some countries against others. The literature demonstrates that governments can and do exert political pressure through tourism and use it as a promotional vehicle to convey a positive image or as a sanction against others. In the unique case of Tibet, tourism enabled the host and guest to share tragic experiences—an opportunity they would not have had otherwise—resulting, in the visitors' willingness and ability to assist Tibetans through mutual trust. The political force of tourism is evident, but whether it is positive or dangerous appears to hinge upon whose hands are controlling it.

Few can deny the truism that peace, calm and safety are requisite to attract tourists to any destination. In fact, a country's prospects of developing a strong tourism industry remain dismal in the absence of political stability (Teye 1988). Whether public attention converges on a country's political troubles briefly or indefinitely, its industry is bound to suffer. Referring to political problems, Scott effectively stressed the potential for long-term damage: " ... whereas a natural disaster creates havoc and passes, a political crisis may last for days, months, or even years", totally destroying the fragile concept of image for a developing tourism industry (1988:58). This statement is especially true for occurrences that receive global media coverage and was aptly demonstrated by China's 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. The entire world witnessed government brutality against pro-democracy student protesters—thanks to up-to-the-minute news coverage by major networks. The negative images of China translated into declining hotel occupancy rates and lost tourism revenues. China's eager efforts to attract international visitors came to a screeching halt for several years. Although a 55% increase in foreign visitation was recorded in 1991 and 48% in 1992, the memory remains (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996). The televised images may have lasted for a brief time but their impact was very powerful.

The concept of image appears to extend as much beyond spatial boundaries as time boundaries. The "generalization effect" referred to earlier in the context of terrorism (Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992) is also applicable to political problems and war. The 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1991-96 Bosnia-Herzegovina War were confined to very specific geographic areas. Still, these wars symbolized political unrest for their entire regions. During the Persian Gulf War, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates experienced a sharp drop in tourist arrivals even though they were not all equally affected (Hollier 1991; WTO 1991). The US tourism industry experienced serious problems in business as well as inbound-outbound international tourism (US House of Representatives 1991; WTO 1991). The threat of terrorism and political unrest in the Middle East triggered a massive realignment of international travel flows during Operation Desert Storm due to the threats and expectations of related terrorism (Abu Fadil 1992; Hollier 1991).

The war in the Balkans (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) quickly halted Yugoslavia's tourism activity. When the Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia in June 1991 (even though the war in Slovenia lasted 10 days before moving to Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992), specialized tour operators for Yugoslavia lost over one million booked tourists according to Mihalies study. Even after a period of two years, " ... figures for Slovenian tourism were still far behind the pre-war figures" (1996:237). The author attributes this to several

factors: public confusion of Slovenia with Slavonia (area in Croatia); lack of knowledge about either Slovenia or the country's political situation; and the proximity of Slovenia to the ongoing war (at the time of the study) in former Yugoslavia. Understandably, Slovenia's recovery from the Balkan war has been much slower than China's tourism rebound. The explanation may be the profuse and graphic media coverage of the war for its duration. Images of the atrocities against the Bosnians left indelible scars on the collective psyche. Slovenia may be as safe and calm as any peaceful country; however, the images associated with her neighbors can linger long after the war has ended.

The effect of Zimbabwe's war on Zambia's tourism industry is another demonstration of the generalization of risk to unaffected areas. After examining the effects of Zimbabwe's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Teye attributes Zambia's plummeting tourism to Zimbabwe's armed conflict. The sharp decline is also ascribed to a long list of detrimental factors: kidnapping of and firing upon tourists; negative publicity; perceptions of high crime levels, systematic targeting of tourism infrastructure; restrictions of tourist activities; absence of night life due to dawn-to-dusk curfews; blackouts imposed on tourists' main entry and exit points; military roadblocks; occupation of certain areas by guerilla groups; and total bans on photography (Teye 1986). Tourist arrivals to neighboring Zambia dropped drastically (the country was unable to record arrivals between 1967 and 1969) which in turn caused ground operators to withdraw tourism services. Not only was Zambia's industry sabotaged by the conflict, but serious organizational and management problems also ensued—such as protecting tourists who remained in the area during the conflict (Teye 1986).

Regardless of whether risks are real or perceived, Teye's (1986) study clearly shows that the impact of political conflict reverberates to its surroundings and this ripple effect extends to multiple tourism interests over what could be a lengthy period of time. Following his examination of the impacts of coups d'etat on African tourism development in general and Ghana's in particular, Teye (1988) concludes that tourism activity halts in the short term when travel agents stop suggesting the destination to potential tourists, when border closures intended to prevent tourism activity both to and from the country are implemented, and when the delivery of tourism services is suspended or canceled. Teye also argues that overall tourism development suffers in the long term when a country's image is damaged (by negative media coverage and travel advisories) and when foreign investors lose interest in the country experiencing political upheavals. It appears that a variety of political problems have comparable impacts on tourism: destination image is damaged, visitation suffers, revenues are lost, and development plans are shelved.

An intriguing study by Pitts (1996) diverts attention to a chameleon-like quality of tourism. After interviewing numerous tourism constituents—regarding the effects of the 1994 armed rebellion against the Mexican government—Pitts notes sharp declines in domestic and international visitation. A new tourist type was detected in San Cristobal, whom Pitts refers to as "conflict or war tourists". These tourists were interested in becoming a part of the action and in seeing what was happening. They also transformed Chiapas from an ethnic tourism product to one offering the experience of conflict and "thrill of political violence" (1996:224). A second group of tourists appeared in the form of journalists, researchers, and human rights activists. Pitts (1996:226) underscores an interesting change in tourist perceptions in stating that "many travelers were more afraid of the Mexican military and their checkpoints than they were of the Zapatista insurgents" during the first six months of the uprising (1996:226).

Perhaps a destination's social, cultural and environmental characteristics are stronger determinants of how tourism is affected than the type of political conflict (i.e., military coup, armed rebellion and regional war). Such distinctions make it difficult to codify impacts into an inventory in order to devise solutions. Each destination faces different challenges in the effort to overcome a negative image, declining tourism and lost revenues. Solutions for one country may not prove effective for another; however, strategies to recover from tourism crises that are triggered by political problems or terrorism still need to be identified.

The multidimensionality of the war and tourism relationship becomes apparent only after careful consideration. The breadth of the relationship is imaginatively communicated by Diller and Scofidio:

Tourism and war appear to be polar extremes of cultural activity—the paradigm of international accord at one end and discord at the other. The two practices, however, often intersect: tourism of war, war on tourism, tourism as war, war targeting tourism, tourism under war, war as tourism arc but a few of their interesting couplings (quoted in Smith 1996:249).

Several of the above couplings (e.g., tourism under war, tourism of war, war as tourism etc.) deserve mention. First and most obviously, war is a negative influence on tourism demand *(tourism under war)* and diverts tourist flows to safer regions (Bar-On 1996; Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Mansfeld 1995, 1996; Mihalie' 1996; Richter 1980; Teye 1986, 1988). This can be viewed positively or negatively, depending on the country's position— since safer countries (not involved or less involved in hostilities)—might gain visitors lost by the more dangerous destinations (Mansfeld 1995, 1996). A second dimension of the war-tourism relationship involves the creation of a new kind of tourist, attracted by the conflict *(tourism of war)* (Mihali'6 1996; Pitts 1996; Wahab 1995). For example, some tourists wanted to see the results or consequences of the war in Croatia and Bosnia (Mihalie' 1996; Wahab 1995) while others wanted to witness armed rebellion in Mexico (Pitts 1996). Wahab (1995:90) describes these "war spotters" as risk takers in search of excitement. Other types drawn to a warring region include members of the media, human rights activists, and refugees *(war tourists)* (Pitts 1996).

A third dimension of the relationship involves the transformation of the memory of war into a sentimental tourism attraction *(war as tourism).* Smith explains the strange link between tourism and war by comparing the two as " ... social processes that are inseparable from the underlying and diverse cultural threads of group values, sanctions, beliefs and behaviors" (1996:250). The violence of war is believed to differ from that of terrorism or crime, according to Smith (1976) "because of its penetrating societal involvement" and also because terrorist or criminal violence usually ends quickly and without leaving a "heritage to become permanent tourist markers". She suggests that war gives special meaning and memory to places and events that link warfare to tourism and adds " ... despite the honors of death and destruction (and also because of them), the memorabilia of warfare and allied products (such as the houses where 'George Washington slept here') probably constitutes the largest single category of tourist attractions in the world" (1996:248). Examples include battlefields (e.g., Civil War, WWII); cemeteries (e.g., Arlington); memorials/ monuments for soldiers (e.g., Vietnam Memorial); flames for the fallen, museums for medals, historical re-enactments and military museums. According to Mihalie", when a war ends "it becomes part of the historical memory of a certain destination and this memory becomes a tourist attraction"; the recent emergence of Vietnam as a tourist destination is a testimony to this statement. Similarly, when war destroys famous tourist attractions (e.g., destruction of Dubrovnik, a famous destination of the former Yugoslavia), media attention and tourist interest intensify (1996:234-235).

Whether a country is experiencing war, political unrest, terrorism, or heavy crime, its tourism industry is bound to pay a heavy toll— regardless of the abundance of scenic or cultural attractions. Even normally secure destinations can suffer when security is threatened (Richter 1980). Destinations with erratic politics or histories of ethnic or socioeconomic troubles have little hope of developing strong and successful tourism; the same can be said for countries with neighbors in turmoil (Bar-On 1996; Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Richter 1980; Teye 1986, 1988).

The Media's Role, Destination Image, and Crisis Management
Despite global political threats, the recent history of international tourism indicates that this phenomenon will be an enduring human activity. Since there is little reason to doubt that political conflicts and terrorism will also continue at some level, the importance of developing strategies for managing the relationship becomes evident. The effects of political disruption and violence on the industry need to be regarded as a crisis in need of management. Obviously, tourism is quite adept at utilizing proven marketing principles. When it suffers a serious setback due to negative occurrences, however, it can no longer rely on traditional marketing efforts. The industry must con-duct "recovery marketing"—or marketing integrated fully with crisis management activities. Destination image—a recurring reference in this paper—in particular, is one aspect of tourism which demands crisis management and recovery marketing, because it is often the first casualty of violence.

Image has been described as "simplified impressions" (Mayo 1973), "total impression an entity makes on the minds of others" (Dichter 1985:75), and "the sum of beliefs, impressions, ideas, and perceptions that people hold of objects, behaviors, and events" (Crompton 1979). Images are believed to develop on two levels: organic (formed internally as a result of actual experience or visitation) and induced (formed from externally received and processed information such as from advertisements, publicity, news reports, or input from acquaintances) (Gartner 1989; Gunn 1972). Media coverage of terrorism or political upheaval has the potential to shape the induced image individuals have of destinations. The media's power to actually change preexisting attitudes is somewhat questioned, but Weimann and Winn defend its ability to impact attitudes that have not been fully formed. They state:

> Media coverage of terrorist events has an especially powerful potential influence because media coverage is frequently the only source of information on an issue available to the audience. Media coverage is not only frequently a unique source of information but it may also be a unique source of interpretation. In particular, the general public is apt to rely to an enormous degree on media accounts for an understanding of terrorists' motives, the implications of their actions, and the essential character of the situation (1994:154).

This statement refers to attitudes about terrorists and their aims but can also be applied to attitudes about destinations, on which the public is not well informed. Negative media coverage can impact attitude formation quite easily. Because of the intangible nature of the tourism experience, destinations depend heavily on positive images. As a result, the image becomes a crucial factor in travel choice and tourism marketing (Bramwell and Rawding 1996; Chon 1991; Dann 1996; Echtner and Ritchie 1991; Gartner 1993). During decision-making, potential tourists compare destinations according to perceived costs and benefits (Crompton 1992; Enders and Sandler 1991; Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992; van Raaij and Francken 1984; Woodside and Lysonski 1989). Some destination alternatives may be eliminated as a result of their potential costs (or perceived risks), especially if associated with media images of terrorist threat or political turmoil. Even though the importance of image to marketing is well known, the impact of terrorism or political violence on destination image (Witt and Moore 1992) and the link between it and mass media (Butler 1990; Ehemann 1977) have received scant research attention.

In a study of negative image caused by civil unrest and terrorism, Witt and Moore investigated whether promoting special events created enough tourism interest to outweigh Northern Ireland's negative external image. They articulate the need for more attention to "overcome negative images of a destination caused by terrorism" (1992:64). But instead of solutions to overcome negative images, the authors suggest strategies for increasing visitation (i.e., developing new tourism products to divert attention). Even though they are quick to add that staging special events alone is not enough, they simply advise that such efforts must be supported with heavy promotions. Butler (1990) discusses the influence of three types of media (oral, literary, visual) on image formation from a historical perspective but does not delve into the effects of mass media on destination image. An earlier study examined print media coverage of events in the Republic of Ireland by focusing on vocabulary use (Ehemann 1977). The author cites Brookfield's (1969) classification of individuals' perceived environment by types of information they receive: daily experience (clear and accurate); shadow zone (occasional or secondary experience beyond individual's immediate domain); and outer field (dependent on secondary information sources). Accordingly, negative media coverage of a destination can contribute to the "outer field" of potential travelers' perceived environment. Ehemann (1977) objects to value-laden statements (i.e., "Ireland is a turbulent country") used by print media which can convey a value judgment about a destination and which can potentially contribute to a negative evaluation of that destination. Ehemann's statement "behavior is geared to the perceived world, however distorted it may be" (1977:28) alludes to the power of mass media over public perception and the fact that perceptions represent reality for most individuals. A brief example provides this assertion with credibility: in 1985, 28 million Americans went abroad and 162 were either killed or injured in terrorist activities, indicating a probability of less than 0.00057% of becoming a victim of terrorism. Despite the low probability, 1.8 million Americans changed their foreign travel plans in 1986 due to the previous year's terrorist events which equals about 6.43% of the previous year's over-seas travel volume.

In their examination of the mutual reliance between mass media and terrorists, Weimann and Winn (1994) underscore the impact of mass media on public perceptions. An extensive and insightful analysis of three separate terrorism-related data sets (chronology of terrorist events between 1968 and 1986 developed by the RAND Corporation; news coverage of ABC, CBS, and NBC television networks from the Vanderbilt Archives; terrorism—related content from nine inter-national newspapers of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan) leads Weimann and Winn to conclude that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorists and journalists. Their book, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism* (1994), posits that terrorism is both a symbolic event and a performance that is staged for the benefit of media attention. Karber's (1971) description of terrorism as communication takes on new meaning in light of Weimann and Winn's description of terrorism as a media event. Broadcast media (especially television) provides the perfect stage for the riveting performance of terrorist incidents. Oddly and despite different motives, the media and terrorists converge to aid each other in the effort to communicate with the audience; the media achieves higher ratings and terrorists achieve their goal of publicity. Frederick Hacker (behavioral expert and Austrian-American psychiatrist) succinctly describes this relationship:

> The mass media willingly or unwittingly are the spokesmen of the terrorists, the transmitters of the terroristic message, the instrument through which terroristic deeds with all their excitement, drama and significance become known to a world audience (quoted in Weimann and Winn 1994:111).

This way,

> By capturing the media agenda for days or weeks, such groups can hope to (a) increase their profile and amplify their message; (b) enhance their relative moral legitimacy; and (c) improve their organizational effectiveness (Weimann and Winn 1994:143).

While simply achieving media coverage might be satisfying to international terrorists seeking such attention, their level of satisfaction depends on tangible benefits resulting from the coverage (i.e., increasing public recognition, dominating competing terrorist groups, moving closer to political objectives) (1994:173). Considering terrorist motives to disrupt tourism, media coverage of violence involving tourists is likely to be extremely gratifying to terrorist groups. Continuing their examination of the bizarre and mutually dependent nature of the terrorist-media relationship, Weimann and Winn discuss factors that predict media coverage of a terrorist incident. Events become televised if 13 conditions (determined significant by Galtung and Ruge 1965) are satisfied: *the frequency* of events must be compatible with the frequency of news production (the intensity, short duration, and fast-pace of terrorist events are naturally preferred to events which unfold slowly); the terrorist event easily surpasses a *threshold* of emotional significance necessary for an event to be televised; the act itself is clear, *unambiguous,* and easy to report; the incident is often *meaningful* within the audience's cultural framework (especially when international tourists are involved) and is readily broadcast; the event is *relevant to* most nations around the world; and it is usually *unexpected* and embodies the element of surprise. Judging from these conditions, among others, terrorism appears to be an ideal subject for broadcasting; in turn, the broadcast media gives terrorists the ultimate instrument with which to voice themselves. A statement by Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein (IRA's political wing) seems to say it all:

> The tactics of armed struggle is of primary importance because it provides a vital cutting-edge. Without it the issue of Ireland would never even be an issue. So, in effect the armed struggle becomes armed propaganda (Weimann and Winn 1994:59).

The mutual benefits of their relationship to the media and terrorists are clear. What seems to be missing, however, is the social responsibility of media members in their decisions to cater to the wishes of terrorist organizations in turn for higher ratings. Another and far more provocative explanation of media coverage of terrorism is attributed to Chomsky and Hermann:

> ... mass media attention devoted to [nonstate] "terrorism" is greatly over-blown and that this misrepresentation of reality reflects United States propaganda strategy for distracting the public from the

"real terrorism", the organized purposeful violence practiced by the United States and its Third World allies (quoted in Weimann and Winn 1994:240).

This critical view that Western countries highlight certain types of terrorism (i.e., by anti-Western terrorist organizations) to divert attention away from state-sponsored terrorism, is indeed troubling. Regardless of the motives, the time and attention afforded to terrorists clearly benefit both their organizations and the media. The losers include society as well as those destinations which suffer as a result of the negative images such coverage spawns.

Protection from the ramifications of terrorism can occur on different planes. Individual tourists can access safety tips from various sources. Popular travel magazines and various other periodicals expound on the dangers of international travel detailing preventive or cautionary measures concerning terrorism, political turmoil, as well as health issues (Chandler 1991; Englander 1991; Fedarko 1993; Fletcher 1993; Hagerty 1993; Norton 1991; Reeves 1987; *The Economist* 1986a, b, 1990). International tourists are warned against dangers of different destinations by books (Felton and Aral 1995) and periodic, up-to-date governmental travel advisories alerting individuals to actual and potential global security issues (currently accessible directly from the US Department of State website on the Internet). There are also articles focusing on travel security issues in academic journals (Lehrman 1986; Ryan 1993; Skolnik 1991).

Based on the availability and the applicability of information, tourists are pretty much on their own; individuals must make their own decisions and proceed accordingly. Several protective strategies are offered to those who decide to travel despite risks. D'Amore and Anuza (1986) were among the first to suggest crisis management for international tourists. For example, they are advised to avoid displays of wealth, keep a low profile, vary daily routines during lengthy business trips, and fly economy (since hijackers are known to prefer first class to establish their temporary headquarters). If the potential costs of the trip appear to outweigh the benefits, the tourists can decide to stay home. Unfortunately, for destinations plagued with terrorism or political turmoil, the solution is not as simple. Especially if their economic stability depends on tourism, they have little choice but to deal with the issue as a crisis badly in need of management. If terrorism can be viewed as a crisis by the industry, its energy and interest can be effectively channeled into managing it. While the need for tourism crisis management is obvious, few have addressed the issue (Sonmez, Backman and Allen 1994; Wahab 1996; Waugh 1990). To clarify, a *crisis is " ...* any event which creates negative publicity and the period of time after a disaster occurrence which lasts until full recovery is achieved and pre-disaster conditions resume"; whereas a *disaster is " ...* an event that abruptly causes loss of life, human suffering, public and private property damage, economic and social disruption" (Sonmez, Backman and Allen 1994:2.1). Then, a *tourism crisis is:*

> ... any occurrence which can threaten the normal operation and conduct of tourism related businesses; damage a tourist destination's overall reputation for safety, attractiveness, and comfort by negatively affecting visitors' perceptions of that destination; and, in turn, cause a downturn in the local travel and tourism economy, and interrupt the continuity of business operations for the local travel and tourism industry, by the reduction in tourist arrivals and expenditures. (Sonmez, Backman and Allen 1994:2.2)

It can be inferred then that crisis situations which threaten tourist activity, often begin with short-lived disasters, whether natural or human-caused. Thus, a single terrorist incident (viewed initially as a disaster) or repeated attacks can create a crisis situation if that destination's image of safety is significantly damaged (i.e., Egypt, Peru, and Spain) (Wahab 1996). The destination must not only manage the crisis but also initiate marketing efforts to recover lost tourism by rebuilding its positive image.

Tourism crises triggered by terrorism are likely to be different from those caused by natural disasters; however, recommendations for managing general tourism crises are in order. It is recommended to first organize a task force (prior to any negative occurrence) to deal expressly with crisis situations, one which efficiently delegates to teams the responsibilities of communicating with the media, public relations, information coordination, fund raising, and marketing and advertising. It is further suggested to initiate crisis management activities with the

proper identification of a situation as a crisis. Once the "crisis mind-set" is in place, the gravity of the situation is likely to assure discipline and dedication until full recovery is achieved. Other recommendations include organizing press conferences, developing a strong relationship with media members to assure balance and accurate coverage, and developing press kits for media distribution (Sonmez, Backman and Allen 1994). These recommendations actually direct crisis managers to implement recovery marketing, of which the central motive is to repair the destination's ruined image.

Drawing from Egypt's retaliation to terrorism (Table 1), Wahab describes possible actions for managing a tourism crisis that hinge on security and promotion. Egyptian police adopted preventive and proactive measures that eventually helped them find and arrest terrorist leaders. After terrorists targeted international tourists, the country's police force

> ...adopted counter-measures against terrorism that were heavily based upon tight anti-criminal actions aiming at protecting the country at large and the vulnerable tourist industry in particular... every bus, train, and Nile cruiser transporting tourists has a "discreet" police guard (1996:181).

Another facet of Egyptian crisis management involved aggressive promotions. The ministry re-evaluated its existent marketing strategy prior to setting new objectives which included heavy advertising. In support of the ministry's measures, Wahab states,

> ... the only way to overcome such poor image (resulting from sustained terrorism) projection is by vigorous promotions that can provide wide exposure sufficient to capture the international media's attention (1996: 195).

To create positive publicity, Egypt hosted a sequence of international special events to draw world and industry attention away from the terrorism. Recognizing that promotion alone is insufficient, Wahab (1996) also recommends maintaining good contacts with members of the international media; providing comprehensive information to international tour operators, travel agents, and the press (to evaluate travel risks in their proper context); and wisely guiding tourists away from high risk areas. Elsewhere, once the conflict in Chiapas, Mexico (Table 1) had ended, aggressive recovery efforts were exerted by the new tourism minister. All activities converged on efforts to increase domestic tourism by re-establishing confidence in Chiapas. One million letters were sent to businesses in Mexico entreating them to hold their meetings and conferences in the city's new convention centers. As incentives, businesses were offered tax breaks for using Chiapas hotels, and hotel prices were lowered to more competitive levels. In addition to these, Pitts (1996) suggests producing and distributing videos of other destinations that suffered a similar fate, demonstrating their return of peace and stability, and developing slogans to the same effect to aid recovery efforts.

Terrorism is obviously more than a violent fad which can be expected to cease anytime soon. But few nations around the world afflicted with terrorism or political turmoil can afford to give up their tourism earnings. Instead, they need to search for strategies to cope with negative occurrences. Understanding the relationship between terrorism and tourism may be among the first steps. It may be difficult—even impossible—to fully control terrorism, but nations cannot ignore the problem either. In fact, both the government and the tourism industry need to focus on this threat in order to assess risks to international tourists and strategize for effective crisis marketing (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996). Most crises are difficult to prevent, due to their unpredictable nature—especially those resulting from terrorism or political problems. Furthermore, each crisis situation is different and difficult to resolve with simple formulas. Destinations need to prepare a plan of action specific to their needs. Having such a blueprint merely promises to save valuable time, energy, and other resources when a destination is faced with a crisis. In light of societal and global complexities, no destination is immune to negative occurrences; thus adhering to an "it can't happen to us" philosophy is naive, if not reckless.

CONCLUSION

Even a cursory review of events during the past 25 years is enough to demonstrate that terrorism will not suddenly vanish—a view more indicative of realism than pessimism. Accepting the permanence of terrorism and regional political problems is a requisite to managing them. This is pertinent not only for governments of countries afflicted by terrorism or political disturbances and those generating tourism, but also for the international tourism industry itself. When the industry experiences negative events caused by natural disasters, greater public and industry understanding and tolerance are invoked. But human caused events, especially those involving political violence, trigger public outrage or intimidation. Although the problem at hand is exceptionally complex, the hope for effective and applicable solutions lies in additional research and cooperative efforts of industry practitioners, government agencies, and academic institutions.

This article has attempted to provide a background on the theme of terrorism and political instability in the context of tourism for those interested in developing it through investigation. A considerable and largely cohesive body of literature emerges from the contributions of scholars from different disciplines (Table 2). This should serve as the foundation on which future studies are built, rather than models for duplication. For example, studies focusing primarily on arrivals, expenditures, and re-alignment of travel flows are useful, but too many of them do little more than support each other in the conclusion that terrorism results in economic loss. Aside from negligible differences, researchers unanimously agree in principle that political violence in any form is detrimental to destination image and, as a result, to tourist flows. Since this has been established, researchers need to explore possible solutions and preventive measures to deal with terrorism. Although many studies cited in this paper advocate the necessity of crisis management efforts, few have taken up the challenge. This may be attributed to the enormity of the task and the intimidating nature of managing a crisis evolving from terrorism and one which includes restoring a destination's image. Despite useful studies focusing on the topic, the need for additional research is both urgent and clear. Several possible topics for future studies are suggested below.

Table 2. Studies Focusing on the Relationship between Tourism and Terrorism or Political Instability

Reference	Topic/Major Findings/Conclusions
1980 Richter	Four-month content analysis of 3 leading daily newspapers in the Philippines. President Marcos declared martial law in 1972 to maintain order when he introduced "New Society". Declaration of martial law facilitated marketing the country as a "safe destination" and the tourism industry caused the New Society to be credited for making the country safe. Author asserts that tourism became a political tool and concludes that political stability exceeds scenic/cultural attractions in importance as requisites for successful tourism.
1983 Richter	Relationships between terrorism and tourism are discussed and parallels are drawn between peaceful travel and diplomatic relations. Author identifies tourists as useful targets for terrorists.
1986 D'Amore and Anuza	Review of impacts of terrorism on international travel, travelers' responses to terrorism threat, marketing implications, and security issues for individuals and tourism industry. Study results indicate that more experienced tourists take terrorism in stride compared with more apprehensive first-time ones.
1986 Richter and Waugh, Jr.	Classification of terrorist goals and objectives suggests that attacks on tourism/tourists are considered logical for terrorists opposing socioeconomic and political elites controlling the industry.
1986 Teye	Discussion of the effects of Zimbabwe's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia's tourism industry. Zimbabwe's liberation war affected tourism in surrounding areas. Zambia's arrivals declined drastically as a result of withdrawal of ground operators of tourism services, kidnapping of and firing upon tourists, negative publicity, choice of tourism infrastructure as soft targets, restriction of tourist activities, curfews, blackouts, bans on photography, and US State Department issued travel advisory (for Zimbabwe).
1988 Brady and Widdows	Study applied consumer demand analysis methods to determine demand for European tourism and to estimate impacts of various occurrences (i.e., terrorism; Chernobyl; US raid on Libya) on 1986 summer tourism.
1988 Conant, Clark, Burnett and Zank	An empirical study of 359 largest US travel agencies' response to 1986 terrorism crisis through mail survey. Respondents were asked to explain marketing strategies in light of terrorist threat and evaluate importance of 16 competitive marketing strategy elements in minimizing effects of terrorism. Results indicated promotion, public relations and personal selling play important roles in managing terrorism. Improvements to traveler security systems and boycotting destinations sympathetic to terrorists

Table 2—continued

	were suggested as additional management strategies. Low response rate (22%) jeopardized generalizability.
1988 Hurley	Study compared foreign visitation to Rome in 1985 to that in 1986 and examined occupancy rates of major hotels after terrorist occurrences of mid-80s. Findings indicate that American visitors to Rome decreased by over 59% and occupancy rates decreased by over 37% for 4–5 star hotels in Rome. Author concluded that American tourists are "fickle" and that hotels dependent on American business should shift marketing emphasis to European and Asian travelers.
1988 Scott	Author examined the case of Fiji, where tourism suffered as a result of 2 military coups in 1987 within 2 months. Travel advisories issued by Australia and New Zealand, an attempted hijacking of Air New Zealand Boeing 747 at Fiji's international airport, and sensational media coverage exacerbated declines in tourism.
1988 Teye	Author examined political instability in post-colonial Africa by focusing on the effects of coups d'état on African tourism development in general and Ghana's in particular. Key areas of tourism industry identified as suffering most from military interventions in government include effectiveness of national tourism body when challenged by incoming rulers who void government and its mandates; flow of international tourists curtailed by border closures preventing tourists from entering/leaving country (trapped tourists during military coup subjected to dawn-to-dusk curfews restricting freedom); damage to country's image resulting from negative media coverage/travel advisories (leading to reluctance of travel agents in suggesting destination to potential travelers); development of resources/attractions and actual delivery of tourism services severely hindered and development plans suspended/canceled during military intervention.
1989 Hartz	In-depth interviews were conducted with 29 high-level business executives of 4 US multinational corporations who traveled abroad extensively, by board-certified psychiatrist. Study found 66% reported near misses, 31% were victims of actual terrorist events, 2 had over 8 close calls in last 5 years, 83% changed behaviors to more secure behaviors. They experienced restricted freedoms, increased inconvenience, and heightened anxiety.
1989 Tremblay	Tourism receipts of 18 European countries were examined by pooling secondary data. Receipts represented dependent variable and terrorist activity, transport costs, exchange rates, relative prices, and income represented independent variables in a regression analysis. Study found tourism receipts to have different elasticities with respect to terrorism, according to tourists' country of origin. Terrorism was not found to have a significant impact on receipts from European tourists unlike receipts from North American tourists which were significantly impacted by terrorism.

Table 2—continued

1990 Cook, Jr.	Empirical study of the effects of terrorism, crime, political instability on 408 business tourists' willingness to travel internationally. Survey with hypothetical situations were administered to 140 subjects attending an international security conference. In a second phase, 268 executives were surveyed. Data were analyzed using regression and ANOVA. Results indicated that willingness to travel internationally increased parallel to prior experience. Reluctance of executives to change plans in response to media coverage of terrorism was the strongest predictor of executives' willingness to travel under high risk of terrorism. Subjects feared crime but were found to be more apprehensive about terrorism. Political instability did not elicit serious concern unless accompanied by terrorism.
1991 Hollier	Author examined the effects of the Persian Gulf War on tourist activity. During Gulf War, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates experienced a sharp drop in tourist arrivals, and a massive re-alignment of international travel flows was witnessed during Operation Desert Storm.
1991 Schwartz	Author examined the case of Tibet during martial law (declared in Lhasa in 1989) and the subsequent transformation of the tourist-host relationship. Tourists witnessed/photographed demonstrations in which police shot/killed civilians urged by local citizens to carry their message outside.
1992 Enders, Sandler and Parise	Secondary data were used to examine effects of terrorism on tourism on 12 continental European countries between 1968–1988. Tourism market shares were forecast using ARIMA Model with a transfer function based on time series of terrorist attacks on country/region. Economic cost of terrorism was represented by value of tourist revenues reported by IMF. Study found no possible way to attribute monetary value to tourists' perceived cost of terrorism. European countries dependent on tourism for foreign exchange lost 12.6 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for Continental Europe, 2.58 billion for Austria, 615 billion for Italy, and 427 billion for Greece ($1 = 0.7431 SDR in 1988) due to terrorism. Study identified "generalization effect" deterring tourism in one country when its neighbor experiences terrorism. Tourism was found to react to terrorism after 6–9 months.
1992 Gartner and Shen	Examination of the case of China when its newly developing tourism industry suffered due to worldwide coverage of 1989 Tiananmen Square conflict. Hotel occupancy rates in Beijing fell below 30%, 300 groups (about 11,500 individuals) canceled travel plans, tourism earnings declined by $430 million in 1989.
1992 Gu and Martin	The increase in passenger arrivals at Orlando International Airport (OIA) was examined by using secondary data. Passengers departing from OIA were surveyed in 1986. Forward stepwise regression procedure and other regression analyses were used. Increase in terrorist hijacking incidents in the Middle East and Europe was found to affect passenger arrivals to OIA positively, indicating a destination substitution effect between Orlando and Europe/Middle East.

Table 2—continued

1992 Witt and More	Empirical study involving personal interviews with attendees to 8 special events in Northern Ireland (NI) in 1985 to examine country's image as a tourist destination. Study investigated if promoting special events created enough interest to outweigh NI's negative external image caused by terrorism and civil unrest. Results pointed to necessity for NI to improve its share of tourism market to encourage increased inbound tourism. To increase visitation, authors suggest developing new tourism products accompanied by heavy promotion.
1993 Ryan	Conceptual study offering a typology of the crime and tourism relationship, classified into five types, and terrorism is classified as an advanced form of crime—"organized criminal and terrorist groups commit specific violent acts against tourists and/or facilities".
1994 Hall	Comprehensive book which discusses the relationship between tourism and politics and touches upon the utilization of tourism by governments for implementing national policies by providing examples from around the world (e.g., Fiji, Australia, New Zealand, Antarctica).
1994 Sönmez, Backman and Allan	Guidebook for managing tourism crises with a focus on natural disasters. "Disaster" and "crisis" are defined for the tourism industry. Authors indicate that repeated terrorist attacks can create a crisis situation for a country if a destination's image of safety is damaged (e.g., Egypt, Peru, Israel).
1995 Aziz	Egyptian terrorist incidents against tourists are discussed and friction is attributed to a socioeconomic chasm between tourists and locals in Egypt. Tension resulting from clashing cultures and values are used to explain terrorist attacks. Locals' frustration with some tourist behaviors (i.e., Western dress; consumption of pork and alcohol; gambling) which are incongruent with Islamic tradition and cultural values—are highlighted.
1995 and 1996 Mansfeld	Examination of relationship between war and tourism with a special emphasis on the "Middle East" factor. Author provides an overview of events impacting the Middle East with a more narrow focus on Israel.
1995 Sharpley and Sharpley	Examination of the repercussions of a military coup on The Gambia's tourism industry. The Gambia was politically stable from its 1965 independence from Britain until a bloodless coup in 1994. The Travel Advice Unit of British Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued several subsequent and very stringent travel warnings. When tour operators pulled out, arrivals fell from 5,000 to 300, over 2,000 jobs were lost, 8 hotels closed, economic/social conditions deteriorated. Authors suggest that governments of tourism generating countries, can influence flow of tourists for political reasons through travel advisories, and give examples such as US travel bans on Cuba and China and the US boycott of 1980 Moscow Olympics. Authors recommend creating an independent international organization to collect, update, and disseminate travel information in impartial, accurate, and apolitical manner.

Table 2—continued

1995 Wahab	Conceptual study examines Egypt's terrorist attacks against tourists as "groups trying to revive classic Islamic societal rules to resist corruption of modernity." Author believes that conservative locals may feel they need to take drastic action to prevent what they perceive as a threat to national culture, tradition, and religious beliefs—in extreme cases, resentment manifests itself in terrorism.
1996 Bar-On	Travel and tourism trends are tracked in a complex examination of tourist activity in Egypt, Israel, Spain and Turkey in relation to terrorist attacks, wars, and drastic political problems.
1996 Hall and O'Sullivan	Discussion of link between tourism, political stability, and violence. Authors provide an overview of dimensions of political instability (international wars, civil wars, coups, terrorism, riots/political protests/social unrest, strikes) and focus on the effects of political unrest on the tourism industries of China and Croatia. A list of nations experiencing political instability/violence is included.
1996 Lea	Examination of tourism development in South Pacific island states. Authors explains that "failure on part of tourist developers to design, locate, manage projects in way to ensure community support will ultimately lead to community opposition and likely violence" and adds that local frustration with the industry can ultimately lead to opposition followed by violent action.
1996 Mihalič	Case study of the impact of war on tourism in Slovenia. Yugoslavia's tourism activity halted abruptly due to Balkan war (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina). The Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia in June 1991—war in Slovenia lasted only for 10 days before moving to Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992; however, specialized tour operators for Yugoslavia lost over 1 million booked tourists in 1991.
1996 Pitts	Case study of the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN)'s armed rebellion against Mexican government in reaction to NAFTA. Author conducted 27 interviews in 2 stages with hotel owners, government tourism officials, tourism vendors, and tourism minister. San Cristobal in Chiapas (held by Zapatistas) experienced sharp declines in international/domestic tourism. Author found the emergence of two new tourist types in San Cristobal: "conflict or war tourists" (interested in the action) and journalists, researchers, and human rights activists. Chiapas was transformed from ethnic tourism product to one offering experience of conflict and "thrill of political violence".
1996 Smith	Conceptual study of the link between tourism and war. The author compares the two as having social processes inseparable from underlying cultural threads (group values, sanctions, beliefs, behaviors). Social involvement of war separates it from violent crime, war leaves heritage to become permanent tour-

Table 2—continued

	ism marker, war gives special meaning/memory to places/events linking warfare to tourism, and memorabilia constitutes large category of attractions around world (e.g., battlefields, cemeteries, memorials/monuments, military museums, historical re-enactments).
1996 Sönmez and Graefe	Empirical study of the relationships between 10 types of risk and overall risk perceptions of US international tourists and the degree of risk associated with 8 geographic regions and top 7 vacation destinations. Results indicate that terrorism, equipment, political instability, and satisfaction risks are most often associated with international travel by American tourists. Equipment, political instability, satisfaction, and physical risks were found to be associated with different geographic regions and specific destinations were associated with equipment, terrorism, and financial risks.
1996 Wahab	In a discussion of Egypt's retaliation to terrorism, the author explains that Egyptian police force adopted counter-terrorism measures based on tight anti-criminal actions to protect country and tourism. Police measures changed from defensive to preventive and reactive to proactive and multifaceted strategy was implemented by Egyptian tourism minister to handle crisis. Author concludes that the only way to overcome poor image projection is vigorous promotions to provide wide exposure to capture international media's attention. Recommendations to create positive publicity include initiating special events, providing complete information to international travel professionals and press, and keeping tourists in safe areas.
1996 Wall	Author compares Northern Ireland to Republic of Ireland in terms of tourist numbers, origins of visitors, tourism revenues by country of origin and main travel purpose. Northern Ireland was found to have fewer visitors than the Republic of Ireland, who spent less money because travelers came mostly to visit friends/relatives. Paper concludes that visitors to Northern Ireland were quite aware of terrorist activity and felt less threatened by it because they understood its underlying reasons.
1998 Sönmez and Graefe	Empirical study of relationships between key stages of international vacation decision-making process and threat of terrorism international tourism experience, risk perception level, international attitude, age, gender, education, income, and presence of children in household. A mail survey sent to 500 international tourists achieved a 48% response rate. Data were analyzed using multiple and simple regression. International tourism attitude, risk perception level, and income were found to directly influence international destination choice but tourism experience and education emerged as indirect influences.

New case studies of destinations that have experienced terrorism, political strife or regional war can be extremely beneficial in determining effective and ineffective management and recovery efforts. Others' experiences, successes, and failures can be an invaluable source of information for tourism officials and managers who need realistic solutions for handling similar crises. Unquestionably, the industry needs a set of comprehensive terrorism crisis management guidelines. It might be feasible to compile an inventory of effective

crisis management and recovery marketing solutions by examining (from case studies) other destinations' efforts (especially when the case is tracked through full recovery). As needed, solutions can be tailored to correspond with other destinations' particular needs and circumstances. Additional research is also needed to better under-stand how political violence influences destination image, how mass media contributes to the development of destination image, and how image can be repaired after a negative occurrence, especially when accompanied by media scrutiny. Even though a wide body of literature exists on destination image, little attention has been paid to such topics. Another concern, albeit more difficult to respond to, is how to mitigate media exploitation of terrorist incidents, especially when a country's tourism image and possibly its subsequent economic viability as a destination are at stake.

The element of risk as a component of tourist decisions has received limited attention (Cook and Fesenmaier 1992; Um and Crompton 1992; Sonmez and Graefe 1996, 1997. Potential tourists are often exposed to media coverage of international political violence. The volatile relationship between tourism and terrorism is magnified by the media in a manner to cloud actual probabilities of being targeted by terrorists. As a result, perceived risk may outweigh reality in forming attitudes toward destinations. Travel risk should be studied in terms of real and perceived risk and in relation to destination image and tourists attitudes, because it is crucial for destination marketers to understand perceptions and attitudes in order to devise promotional strategies to address concerns and to alter negative and reinforce positive perceptions.

Finally, the feasibility and logistics of creating an independent and international organization to disseminate impartial travel information (as suggested by Sharpley and Sharpley 1995) should be investigated. The formation of such an entity may actually preclude serious damage to the tourism industry of a destination unaffected by political violence but declared dangerous by other countries (either intentionally, for political reasons or carelessly, as an over-reaction). Additional relevant and timely topics are likely to emerge from future studies. The responsibility of dealing with terrorism and its impacts on the tourism industry is shared by governments, journalists, and international organizations. It might be overly idealistic to attempt to influence their agendas; however, it is quite reasonable to expect realistic solutions to a serious problem, which could threaten the future of peaceful travel, from the academic community of tourism researchers.

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