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authorMichael Paquier2023-02-06 02:20:07 +0000
committerMichael Paquier2023-02-06 02:20:07 +0000
commit71c37797d7bd78266146a5829ab62b3687c47295 (patch)
treed0100c3526ebed7674ef48b777ca8ad6637c98ef
parent2f6e15ac93c58c1140e4a4affe61e78f7346497a (diff)
Properly NULL-terminate GSS receive buffer on error packet reception
pqsecure_open_gss() includes a code path handling error messages with v2-style protocol messages coming from the server. The client-side buffer holding the error message does not force a NULL-termination, with the data of the server getting copied to the errorMessage of the connection. Hence, it would be possible for a server to send an unterminated string and copy arbitrary bytes in the buffer receiving the error message in the client, opening the door to a crash or even data exposure. As at this stage of the authentication process the exchange has not been completed yet, this could be abused by an attacker without Kerberos credentials. Clients that have a valid kerberos cache are vulnerable as libpq opportunistically requests for it except if gssencmode is disabled. Author: Jacob Champion Backpatch-through: 12 Security: CVE-2022-41862
-rw-r--r--src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c2
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c
index 6220e4a101..038e847b7e 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c
@@ -573,6 +573,8 @@ pqsecure_open_gss(PGconn *conn)
PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
+ Assert(PqGSSRecvLength < PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ PqGSSRecvBuffer[PqGSSRecvLength] = '\0';
appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, "%s\n", PqGSSRecvBuffer + 1);
return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;