Paper 2014/887

Hardware Implementation of Secure Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme

Pei Luo, Yu-Lun Lin, Zhen Wang, and Mark Karpovsky

Abstract

Shamir's secret sharing scheme is an effective way to distribute secret to a group of shareholders. But this scheme is vulnerable to cheaters and attackers and thus how to protect the system from cheating and attacks is a big problem. In this paper, we proposed to use robust codes and algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes to protect the secret sharing module. Simulation and synthesis results show that the proposed architecture can improve the security level significantly even under strong cheating and attack models with some extra area and timing overheads.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. High-Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE), 2014 IEEE 15th International Symposium on
Keywords
Secret sharing
Contact author(s)
silenceluo @ gmail com
History
2014-10-30: last of 4 revisions
2014-10-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/887
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/887,
      author = {Pei Luo and Yu-Lun Lin and Zhen Wang and Mark Karpovsky},
      title = {Hardware Implementation of Secure Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/887},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/887}
}
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