Paper 2012/347
Algebraic Differential Fault Attacks on LED using a Single Fault Injection
Xinjie Zhao, Shize Guo, Fan Zhang, Tao Wang, Zhijie Shi, and Keke Ji
Abstract
This paper proposes a new fault attack technique on the LED block
cipher using a single fault injection by combining algebraic
side-channel attack (ASCA) and differential fault attack (DFA). We
name it as algebraic differential fault attack (ADFA). Firstly, a
boolean equation set is constructed for LED using algebraic
techniques. Then, the fault differences of the S-Box inputs in the
last round of LED are deduced by DFA and represented using algebraic
equations by the multiple deductions-based ASCA (MDASCA) technique
proposed in COSADE 2012. Finally, the key is recovered by solving
the equation set with the CryptoMiniSat solver. We show that, as to
ADFA on LED under the single nibble-based fault model, the 64-bit
key can be recovered within one minute on a common PC with a success
rate of 79\%, which is more efficient than previous work. We modify
the CryptoMiniSat solver to count and output multiple solutions for
the key, and conduct ADFA to calculate the reduced key search space
for DFA. The key search space of LED is reduced to
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Algebraic fault analysisLED
- Contact author(s)
- zhaoxinjieem @ 163 com
- History
- 2012-06-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/347
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/347, author = {Xinjie Zhao and Shize Guo and Fan Zhang and Tao Wang and Zhijie Shi and Keke Ji}, title = {Algebraic Differential Fault Attacks on {LED} using a Single Fault Injection}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/347}, year = {2012}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/347} }