THE PROCEEDINGS of The South Carolina Historical Association 1986

William S. Brockington
Editor

The University of South Carolina at Aiken
The South Carolina Historical Association

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Historical Association
1986-1987

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It is the policy of the South Carolina Historical Association to publish all papers presented at the Annual Meeting. The Editors of **The Proceedings** disclaim any responsibility for the scholarship, statement of fact and opinion, and the conclusions of the contributors.

MINUTES
South Carolina Historical Association
Annual Meeting - 1986

The fifty-sixth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association convened at Francis Marion College, Florence, South Carolina, March 1, 1986. An estimated ninety members and guests of the SCHA attended the gathering. After registration and an official welcome in the McNair Science Building from SCHA President Joseph T. Stukes, Francis Marion College, the membership dispersed to one of three 10 AM sessions.

Alice Henderson of USC-Spartanburg chaired the session, "South Carolina Women in Education and Politics." Diane Neal, Central State (Okla.) University, presented a paper, "What Have They Done for Our Women?: The Impact of the Tillman Movement Upon Higher Education for Women in South Carolina." Joanne V. Hawks, University of Mississippi, offered "Ladies in the Gentlemen's Club: South Carolina Women Legislators, 1928-84." Carlanna Hendrick, Francis Marion College, commented on these papers.

A session on "Artisans and Mercenaries in Revolution and War" was chaired by Jeffrey Willis of Converse College. Ralph C. Canevali, The Citadel, presented "Artisans and the Revolution of 1848 in Germany," while William S. Brockington of USC-Aiken discussed "Scottish Mercenaries in the Thirty Years' War." Don McKale, Clemson University, added some observations on these two topics.

Robert Simpson, Coker College, presided over a session titled "Congressional Careers." Edward Lee, USC-Columbia, spoke on "America Comes First With Me: The Early Political Career of Congressman James P. Richards", and Roger P. Leemhuis, Clemson University, contributed "Olin D. Johnston Runs for the Senate, 1938-62." Daniel W. Hollis, USC-Columbia, offered his comments on these two presentations.

After a brief breather, the membership moved on to one of three 11:30 panels.

Robert Moore of Columbia College chaired a session examining "Two Crises in Charleston." Kenneth E. Peters, USC-Columbia, presented his findings on the "Economic Consequences of the Charleston Earthquake," and Stephen O'Neill of the University of Virginia analyzed a second crisis, "The Charleston Medical College and County Hospital Strike of 1969." George Hopkins, The College of Charleston, and John R. Wunder, Clemson University, contributed their comments on these crises.

A second session, "Theatre and Religion in the French Revolution" was chaired by Lorraine de Montluzin, Francis Marion College. Jesse L. Scott, Newberry College, presented "Marie-Joseph Blaise Chenier (1764-1811): The Staging of Charles IX," and Fred Hembree, USC-Columbia, discussed

"Revolutionary Ideology and Dechristianization, 1789 to 1' an II." John Newell, College of Charleston, commented.

"Africa in the Twentieth Century" was the theme for the third session, chaired by James Brown, USC-Spartanburg. Ken Mufuka, Lander College, spoke on "World Hunger and African Development Policies," and April Gordon, Coker College, discussed "Agricultural Policy and Development in Cameroon." Don Gordon, Furman University, and panel Chair James Brown added their comments.

At 1 PM a famished but wiser membership gathered for a splendid bouffet luncheon at the Smith College Center. President Thomas M. Stanton welcomed the SCHA membership to the impressive campus and facilities of Francis Marion College. After the luncheon a sated group of historians strolled to the Cauthen Educational Media Center for the business meeting, which was to be followed by the featured speaker and the final, afternoon session.

President Joseph T. Stukes convened the annual business meeting at 2 PM. First on the agenda was an announcement by Dan Hollis regarding the John Porter Hollis Prize Fund. He expressed his hopes that the Association could begin making awards as early as 1988. Although the details of the award were still to be worked out, a monetary prize of as high as perhaps $400 would be awarded regularly to an outstanding paper on South Carolina History since 1876.

Secretary-Treasurer Val Lumans, USC-Aiken, presented the financial statement. The statement disclosed a checking account balance on 2/24/86 of $3,073.03; general savings account, $1,435.12; Proceedings Publication Endowment Fund, $2,582.67; Hollis Prize account, $1,167.11. He noted that the general savings account and the Hollis Prize account had not been updated to the exact balance at present, and would therefore amount to slightly more than indicated.

The next item on the agenda was the approval of revisions in the constitution of the SCHA, as proposed by the executive council. After the reading of the revisions John Edmunds moved to adopt the revised text, Robert Herzstein seconded the motion. The revised constitution was overwhelmingly approved. The following is the the text of the revised and approved constitution. Since the constitution (article VII) requires the publishing of the constitution in **The Proceedings** every five years, the following text, when it appears in the next issue as a part of the minutes, will serve that purpose:

CONSTITUTION

I. The name of this organization shall be the South Carolina Historical Association.

II. The objects of this Association shall be to promote historical studies in the state of South Carolina: to bring about a closer relationship among persons living in this state who are interested in history; and to encourage the preservation of historical records.

III. Membership shall be open to anyone interested in the objects of the Association. Annual dues shall be determined by the Executive Committee.

After having been a member of the Association for ten years, and upon reaching the age of sixty-five, any member upon notifying the Secretary-Treasurer in writing, may be elected an emeritus member by the Executive Committee. Emeritus members have all the rights and privileges of membership without being required to pay the annual dues.

Members in student status shall pay annual dues at half-rates.

IV. The officers shall be a president, a vice-president, and a secretary-treasurer; these shall be elected at each annual meeting. The vice president shall be an automatic nominee for president. The Executive Committee shall normally nominate at least two persons for each of the offices of vice president and Executive Committee Member. The Executive Committee shall appoint a secretary-treasurer subject to confirmation by the membership. Nominations from the floor may be made for any office.

Officers shall have the duties and perform the functions customarily attached to their respective offices with such others as may from time to time be prescribed.

V. The Executive Committee shall be composed of the officers, the editor of **The Proceedings**, and three other members elected for a term of three years. The duties of the Executive Committee shall be to fix the date and place of the annual meeting, to attend to the publication of **The Proceedings** of the Association, to prepare a program for the annual meeting, to prepare a list of nominations for the officers of the Association as provided in Article IV, to supervise expenditures of the Association's funds, and such other duties as may be from time to time assigned to them by the Association. There shall be such other committees as the president may appoint, or be instructed to appoint, by resolutions of the Association.

VI. There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time and place appointed by the Executive Committee.

VII. A. The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be known as **The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association.** It shall contain the minutes of the annual meeting together with such papers and documents selected by the Executive Committee. Each fifth year, **The Proceedings** shall include a copy of the constitution of the Association. At least every five years, **The Proceedings** shall include a current list of the membership.

B. All papers read at the annual meeting shall become the property

of the Association except as otherwise may be approved by the Executive Committee.

C. The Executive Committee shall annually elect an editor of **The Proceedings** who shall have authority to appoint an associate editor and shall be a member of the Executive Committee.

VIII. In the event of dissolution, the remaining assets of the association, if any, shall be donated by the Executive Committee to another organization which share the objects and aims of the Association.

IX. This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the members present at the annual meeting.

Following the approval of the constitution revisions the next item on the agenda was the nomination and election of officers and Executive Committee members for 1986-1987. The following were nominated: Jeff Willis, Converse College, president; Robert Moore, Columbia College, vice-president; Val Lumans, USC-Aiken, secretary-treasurer; Rodger Stroup, South Carolina Museum Commission, Alice Henderson, USC-Spartanburg, and Clara Gandy, Coker College, Executive Committee. Since there were no further nomination from the floor, the proposed slate was elected by acclamation.

Newly elected president Jeff Willis reminded the membership that next year's meeting would convene on March 7, 1987, at Columbia College. The business meeting was adjourned.

Following the business meeting the featured guest speaker, Professor Stephen E. Ambrose, University of New Orleans, appealed to the researcher and writer in all of us through his talk, "On Writing History." A lively and stimulating question and answer exchange followed.

After a brief interlude the membership gathered at 3 PM for the final session of the day, "Movietone News Covers the Fascist Era: A Source for Teachers and Reseachers." Robert E. Herzstein, USC-Columbia, directed a presentation of Movietone News selections dealing with Nazism and Fascism. A panel of experts on the subject, consisiting of Michael Barrett, The Citadel; Peter Becker, USC-Columbia; and Don McKale, Clemson University, commented on the film clips and the use of such films in the classroom and for research purposes. An enlightening exchange of questions, answers and comments between the panel and the rest of the membership ensued.

Following the last session a weary but intellectually stimulated membership retired to the lovely on-campus home of President Thomas C. Stanton for a post-meeting reception.

Respectfully submitted,
Valdis O. Lumans
Secretary-Treasurer, SCHA
March 1, 1986

"WHAT HAVE THEY DONE FOR OUR WOMEN?" THE IMPACT OF THE TILLMAN MOVEMENT UPON PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION FOR WOMEN IN SOUTH CAROLINA

Diane Neal

During the antebellum period, South Carolina took great pride in the South Carolina College in Columbia which offered a brilliant classical education under the guidance of renowned scholars such as Thomas Cooper, John and Joseph LeConte, and James Thornwell. Students who wished an education with a military orientation chose the Citadel in Charleston or the Arsenal in Columbia. In addition to these state supported facilities, South Carolina boasted of a number of fine denominational colleges including Erskine, Furman, and Wofford, as well as the municipally owned College of Charleston. These institutions adequately met the needs of the state's white male citizens who wished to train for the professions, expecially law and the ministry.

However, as slaves, South Carolina blacks were excluded from all but secretive educational opportunities. Like blacks, the state's female population derived no direct benefit from the higher education facilities. Instead, girls usually found that their education ended with graduation from female academies which emphasized social graces with a smattering of the three r's. Nonetheless, a very few fortunate women were able to avail themselves of the opportunities which Columbia College and the Greenville Women's College offered.[1]

The Civil War and Reconstruction brought massive political and social changes in South Carolina. Along with the ending of slavery and suffrage for black men, Congressional reconstruction of the state resulted in the South Carolina College being reorganized as the University of South Carolina and the facility being opened to black male students. This innovation spawned white hostility, and most white South Carolinians withdrew in protest. However, with the election of Redeemer Wade Hampton to the governor's post in 1876, the University again limited its student body as well as its faculty to white males.[2]

Public higher education in post-Reconstruction South Carolina continued to experience upheaval. In an effort to serve the needs of the state's economically distressed farming population in the 1870's and 1880's, both the Citadel and the reorganized South Carolina College gave free tuition to a small number of students. The South Carolina College also broadened its offerings to include practical and theoretical training in agriculture.[3]

In the post-Reconstruction period, black students found themselves confined to facilities such as the Baker Biblical Institute in Charleston and

Benedict Institute in Columbia. These institutes slowly evolved into colleges. By 1871 the Baker Institute had moved to Orangeburg and had merged with Claflin College founded in 1869. Benedict gained collegiate status in 1895. Claflin received assistance in 1872 when the state legislature established the South Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical Institute as an affiliate of Claflin. The arrangement lasted until 1896 when South Carolina State College was chartered.[4]

The white women of the state also benefited from the establishment of several private colleges in the post-bellum era. In 1872 Columbia College reopened. The same year the Reverend Samuel Lander founded the Williamston Female College. Influential Spartanburg citizens, including Dexter Converse, whose daughter was near college age, in 1889 established Converse College for women.[5]

Although religious groups and public spirited citizens tried to fill the gap in female higher education, many women could not afford the tuition at private colleges or felt that the liberal arts courses of study they offered were impractical in rural South Carolina. Clearly, there was a need for practical training to enable young women to become self-supporting or to manage households more economically. Moreover, expansion of the state's public school system was creating a demand for professionally trained teachers.[6]

Among those South Carolinians who recognized the vacuum in the state's higher education system was Benjamin Ryan Tillman of Edgefield. A progressive farmer who had won praise from his neighbors for his innovative methods, Tillman in 1885 emerged as the champion of the state's agrarian masses who found themselves crushed by declining crop and land values, the crop lien system, and a state government which seemed oblivious to their problems. Angrily, Tillman, in the next few years, demanded the repeal of the lien law, reorganization of the fertilizer industry, and the offering of inexpensive, practical education in scientific farming methods. Indignantly, he labled the agricultural annex of the South Carolina College a "mere sop" or "bribe" to maintain the support of farmers in the state legislature. Upon reflection he called for a separate agriculture college rather than a reorganization of the South Carolina College's agricultural wing.[7]

In April, 1886, in his address to the Farmers' Convention in Columbia, Tillman broadened his demand for educational reforms and suggested that the Citadel which he derisively stigmatized as "a military dude factory" be closed and its funds transfered to the South Carolina College in order to transform the latter into a "first class institution" for instructing young men in literature and the professions. He urged that the General Assembly

follow the example of other states and establish a school for women which would offer a traditional liberal arts education as well as practical training to enable its graduates to earn a living. As an economy measure, the Citadel campus at Charleston should be the site for the new school. After toning down his resolutions by removing the reference to the Citadel as a "military dude factory," the convention adopted his program. However, no action was forthcoming to implement it.[8]

Meanwhile, the educational needs of the state's females had attracted additional support from two other influential citizens: Dr. David Bancroft Johnson, superintendent of the Columbia City Schools, and Dr. Edward S. Joynes, a member of the Columbia City School Board and Professor of Ancient and Modern Languages at the South Carolina College. Recognizing the need to provide trained teachers to staff the state's public schools, Johnson in his 1884-1885 report to the school board, recommended that a training school for teachers be established in connection with the city's high school. At Joynes' instigation, the board approved the recommendation and authorized Johnson to request a grant from the Peabody Board which administered the legacy of George Peabody for the improvement of education in the South. Johnson's visit with Robert Charles Winthrop, president of the Peabody Board, resulted in an annual appropriation of $1500 for the proposed institution, which was gratefully named the Winthrop Training School.[9]

Under Johnson's supervision, the Winthrop Training School opened in a one-room building belonging to the Columbia Theological Seminary on November 15, 1886. The new institution prospered and received favorable mention in the reports of Governor John Peter Richardson, who advocated that the legislature consider the possibility of providing greater facilities for training teachers. The legislature proved responsive and provided a $150 scholarship from each county for a student to attend the Winthrop Training School.[10]

Practical, inexpensive education was on the verge of becoming a reality in South Carolina. This goal received much needed assistance with the death in April, 1888, of renowned Southern agriculturalist, Thomas Green Clemson. A son-in-law of John C. Calhoun, Clemson bequeathed the old Calhoun estate at Fort Hill and an $80,000 endowment for the establishment of an agricultural college in South Carolina. He chose seven trustees, including Ben Tillman, to serve for life, in addition to six others to be elected by the state legislature. After bitter opposition from some members of the Calhoun family and friends of the University of South Carolina (formerly the South Carolina College), the Citadel, and various denominational colleges, the state accepted the bequest, and the General Assembly

passed an act signed by Governor Richardson authorizing the establishment and maintenance of the Clemson Agricultural College.[11]

Despite the realization of his aim of a separate agricultural college, Ben Tillman continued his drive for additional political reforms to benefit the state's agrarian majority. Disgusted and frustrated by candidates who appealed to farmers for votes, but ignored their needs once in office, Tillman decided to enter the governor's race in 1890. After a hard fought race for the Democratic nomination and a campaign against Conservative independent Alexander C. Haskell in the general election, Tillman emerged victorious.

The election of Tillman to the gubernatorial post proved felicitous for South Carolina women. In an address to the Teachers' Institute at Florence in July, 1890, Edward S. Joynes advocated transferring the Winthrop Training School to state control and transforming it into a college which could offer industrial and normal education for women. He sent a copy of his speech to Governor-elect Tillman who invited him to a conference to discuss the matter. Tillman favored the establishment of such a college, but felt that the public would not accept another state-supported college so soon after the founding of Clemson. However, he did agree to Joynes' suggestion that a committee be appointed to investigate the organization and cost of such an institution.[12]

Tillman followed up by including in his December, 1890, inaugural address a statement emphasizing the need for an industrial school for women and condemning the state for neglecting their education. The South Carolina system of educating women, according to the governor, was geared to "giving them accomplishments for the adornment of society. But reverse of fortune or death often brings the necessity of bread-winning, and the tender mother left a widow, or a daughter left an orphan, finds how little worth in dollars and cents are the music, drawing and painting etc. upon which money and time had been lavished in her so-called education." To right this deficiency, he resurrected his previous proposal of abolishing the Citadel and establishing a normal and industrial school for girls in its place. He requested authorization to appoint a commission to investigate the cost and possible location of such an institution. As an afterthought, he commended the Winthrop Training School for its work and voiced his belief that the funds appropriated for its scholarships had been well spent. Aside from his reference to abolishing the Citadel, Tillman's comments on a women's college aroused propitious comments throughout the state.[13]

Against this favorable backdrop, David Bancroft Johnson reported to Tillman that he had consulted with the Peabody Board about the prospect

of merging the Winthrop Training School with a state industrial college. According to Johnson, The Board approved the proposed merger and promised to continue its financial support on the condition that teacher training be emphasized at the new institution.[14]

Shortly after Johnson's report, the commission which had been investigating the possibility of combining industrial and normal education in one institution completed its work. After sending out questionnaires to educators both in the United States and abroad and visiting numerous industrial training facilities, the commission advised that normal and industrial education could be combined effectively.[15]

Bolstered by this conclusion, upon Johnson's recommendation, the Columbia School Board formally transferred the Winthrop Training School to the state and asked that the state administer and maintain it. Tillman communicated the action to the legislature and suggested that an act be passed establishing an industrial and normal college for women with the Winthrop Training School as its nucleus. The proposal received favorable action and on December 23, 1891, the General Assembly approved a bill establishing a normal and industrial college for the white women of South Carolina. The same day, the legislature elected a board of trustees and specified that the governor would chair the board. The trustees were to select the highest bidding town as the site for the new institution.[16]

The high bidder proved to be Rock Hill, in the Piedmont, which offered $60,000 in bonds, 30 acres of land valued aty $75,000, bricks, and $700 in cash. In addition, to financial support, Tillman later recalled that the people of Rock Hill had impressed him as earnestly desiring to have the school in their city.[17]

Construction proceded rapidly on a classroom building, and proceeds from the state liquor dispensary financed construction of a dormitory to house 400 or 500 girls. In order to economize on construction costs, the legislature authorized the use of convict laborers.[18]

The laying of the cornerstone of the classroom building of the Winthrop Normal and Industrial College for Women in May, 1894, drew praise from all over the state. In the spirit of the occasion, even political antagonisms were forgotten as the editor of the Columbia **State**, a newspaper long hostile to Tillman, rejoiced that the South Carolina girls no longer had to grow up in ignorance because they were poor. The Rock Hill **Herald** wildly proclaimed the event as the "most glorious . . . in the history of the state."[19]

As chairman of the board of trustees, Tillman relished the opportunity

to deliver the opening address. He declared that the words "normal and industrial" would serve as "lodestars" to guide the people of South Carolina "out of the bog of poverty, ignorance, and stagnation." Concluding his remarks, the governor sought to allay fears of some citizens that Winthrop would "unsex" the students, instead he claimed that the college would teach girls to be good wives and mothers.[20]

In October, 1895, with David Bancroft Johnson as president, Winthrop opened in Rock Hill. Although Tillman had left the governor's office to assume a seat in the United States Senate, he retained a deep affection for both Winthrop and Clemson, which he regarded as the most lasting legacy of his administration. Viewing them almost as his children, he lavished love and concern upon them in his capacity as trustee of both institutions. For Winthrop his activities included running interference between the college and the legislature and municipal authorities when the college's well-being seemed in jeopardy. Of particular significance was his effort in 1914 to prevent the establishment of a second state-supported college for women. A bill had been introduced in the General Assembly to have the state assume control of the College for Women in Columbia and make it an affiliate of the University of South Carolina. Believing that Winthrop was doing an excellent job and that the state could not support another facility which would virtually duplicate Winthop's mission, Tillman successfully lobbied against the measure. On a more personal level, he delighted in selecting trees and flowers for the campus and in helping procure government documents for the library. He also used his influence to persuade philanthropist Andrew Carnegie to donate funds for a separate library building at Winthrop. His regard extended to individual students, and he occasionally made loans to those who evinced ability and determination as well as financial necessity.[21]

Tillman's central concern was that Winthrop provide the poor women of South Carolina with practical education and thus prepare them to earn a living. In this respect, he was well pleased with the progress Winthrop had made in the direction of "elevating the poor girls . . . and giving them a start in life." To prevent poor students from feeling inferior to those who could afford expensive clothes, Tillman insisted that the girls wear uniforms as a means of eliminating distinctions based on wealth.[22]

Not only did Ben Tillman enthusiastically support a separate industrial and normal college for women, he also became an advocate of coeducation. In 1893, he proposed admitting women to the South Carolina College stressing that it was a "matter of justice and common sense, in keeping with the spirit of the age." Tillman believed that women were entitled to a liberal arts education which was not available at Winthrop. Several private female colleges in the state offered liberal arts instruction,

however he dismissed the education offered in these institutions as "at best, imperfect" since their graduates were not really college graduates in a true sense, but only qualified to enter the junior class at the South Carolina College. Also, high tuition and other fees could deter poor students from attending the private women's colleges. Moreover, he added, admitting women would increase enrollment which had been in decline since the second University had been dissolved and the institution reconstituted as the South Carolina College in 1891. Reflecting the dominant view in the state, the College's administration and faculty resisted the change arguing that coeducation was not desirable in South Carolina. Undaunted by opposition, Tillman employed his influence to persuade the legislature to include a provision authorizing the admission of qualified women at or above the junior level in the 1893 appropriation bill.[23]

Although the measure passed, no women entered the 1894 classes. However, Tillman's interest in coeducation was shared by his successor, Governor John Gary Evans. At Evans' instigation in December, 1894, the legislature dropped the junior class restriction and instructed the trustees to admit qualified women to any class. Following up on this policy, the trustees in June, 1895, also admitted women to special and irregular classes. With the lifting of all restrictions, several women enrolled in special courses in the fall, 1895 term, however, none of this first group enerolled in a degree program. The first woman to receive the A.B. degree was Mattie Jean Adams who graduated in 1898. Although small numbers of women enrolled in either special classes or degree programs, they constituted only a tiny portion of the student body until after World War I. In large part, they were deterred by the unfriendliness of both faculty and male students and by the failure of the institution to provide dormitory facilities for them.[24]

Ben Tillman's death on July 3, 1918, marked the end of an era in the history of higher education for women in South Carolina. When he first articulated the desire for an industrial college for women in the spring of 1886, his was one of a few voices crying in the wilderness. However, by incorporating such an institution into his program of political and educational reform, Tillman gave life to the concept and helped to make it reality. Not content with segregating women in a normal and industrial institution, he boldly championed admitting them to the South Carolina College at a time when coeducation was decidely unpopular in the state. Tillman certainly was no feminist as his opposition to women's suffrage indicates, but he did believe that women as well as men should have access to liberal arts and practical education programs. He never wavered in this commitment. As his contemporaries eulogized at memorial services for him, Winthrop and Clemson stand as monuments to his determination to make higher education available to South Carolinians regardless of wealth or sex.

[1]Mabel Newcomer, **A Century of Higher Education for American Women** (New York: Harper and Brother, Publishers, 1959), 9-12; Thomas Woody, **A History of Women's Education in the United States** (New York: The Science Press, 1929), 329-397; Erskine College, **Catalog, 1983-84** (Due West, South Carolina: Erskine College, n.d.), 6; Columbia College, **Bulletin, 1983-1984** (Columbia: Columbia College, n.d.), 1; Furman University, **Bulletin, 1984-1985** (Greenville, South Carolina: Furman University, n.d.), 6.

[2]Daniel Walker Hollis, **University of South Carolina**, 2 vols. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1956), 2: 61-88.

[3]Ibid., 2: 94-103; South Carolina, **Acts and Resolutions** (1885-1887), 603.

[4]Benedict College, **Catalogue, 1984-1985** (Columbia: Benedict College n.d.), 17; South Carolina State College, **Catalogue, 1984-1985** (Orangeburg, South Carolina: South Carolina State College, 1984), 1; Claflin College, **Catalog, August 19, 1983** (Orangeburg, South Carolina: Claflin College, 1983), 19.

[5]Columbia College, **Bulletin, 1983-1984**, 1; Lander College, **Catalog Issue for the 1984-1985 Academic Year** (Greenwood, South Carolina: Lander College, n.d.), 9; Converse College, **Catalog, 1984-1985** (Spartanburg, South Carolina: Converse College, n.d.), 9.

[6]Edgar W. Knight, **Public Education in the South** (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1922), 415-436.

[7]Charleston **News and Courier**, August 7, 1885; Columbia **Register**, August 7, 1885; Columbia **State**, June 30, 1929; Edgefield Chronicle, August 12, 1885; B.R. Tillman, "The Origins of Clemson College," January 18, 1912, in Benjamin R. Tillman Papers, Clemson University Library (CUL).

[8]Charleston **News and Courier**, May 1, 1886.

[9]Hugh S. Magill, "Joint Celebration of Founder's Day," **Celebration of Founder's Day** (n.p.: Extension Department of Winthrop College, March 1922), 6; Edward S. Joynes, "Origin and Early History of Winthrop College," **Winthrop Normal and Industrial College of South Carolina**, Anniversary Number, VI, No. 1 (1912), 57-58.

[10]Joynes, "Origin and Early History of Winthrop College," 60-61; South Carolina, **House Journal** (1887), 13; South Carolina, **Acts and Resolutions** (1887), 816-817.

[11]Alester G. Holmes and George R. Sherrill, **Thomas Green Clemson: His Life and Work** (Richmond: Garrett and Massie, Inc., 1937), 193-201; Charleston **News and Courier**, April 6, 30, May 2, 12, 1888; Charleston **World**, August 8, 1888; Orangeburg **Times and Democrat**, April 18, 1888; Spartanburg **Carolina Spartan**, April 25, July 11, 18, 1888; Hollis, **University of South Carolina**, 2: 148-153; South Carolina, **Acts and Resolutions**(1889), 277-280.

[12]Joynes, "Origins and Early History of Winthrop College," 65-66.

[13]South Carolina, **House Journal** (1890), 137-139.

[14]D.B. Johnson to B.R. Tillman, October 12, 1891, Benjamin R. Tillman Correspondence, Winthrop College Archives (WCA).

[15]South Carolina, **Reports and Resolutions** (1891), 2: 411-425.

[16]Winthrop College, "Minutes of the Board of Trustees," Meetings of November 30, 1891, January 5, 1892, WCA: South Carolina, **House Journal**, (1891),45-46, 596; South Carolina, **Acts and Resolutions**, (1891), 1102-1107, (1893), 1: 394-397.

[17]Winthrop College, "Minutes of the Board of Trustees," Meetings of April 21, June 2, 1893; Winthrop College, **Laying of the Cornerstone of the Winthrop Normal and Industrial College of South Carolina at Rock Hill, South Carolina, May 12, 1894** (Lancaster, S.C.: Enterprise Publishing Company, 1894), 52-53; Charleston **News and Courier**, April 15, 1912.

[18]South Carolina, **Senate Journal** (1893), 45, 46.

[19]Columbia **State**, May 13, 1894; Rock Hill **Herald**, n.d., cited in Winthrop College, **Laying of the Cornerstone**, 7-8.

[20]Columbia **Register**, May 13, 1894.

[21]B.R. Tillman to D.B. Johnson, May 4, 1900, March 4, 1902, February 24, 1914, September 2, 1909, January 15, 26, February 4, 1914; D.B. Johnson to B.R. Tillman, January 13, 15, February 13, 1914; B.R. Tillman to Mrs. Chapel, October 15, 1910, all in Benjamin R. Tillman Correspondence, WCA; Winthrop College, "Minutes of the Board of Trustees," Meeting of April 10, 1905; Rock Hill **Record**, January 9, May 25, 1908; Rock Hill **Herald**, April 4, May 13, 1908.

[22]B.R. Tillman to T.A. Crawford, June 17, 1911, in Benjamin R. Tillman Papers, CUL: Charleston **News and Courier**, April 15, 1912; Columbia **State**, June 19, 1902; Rock Hill **Journal**, June 20, 1902.

[23]South Carolina, **Senate Journal** (1893), 44; Hollis **University of South Carolina**, 2: 170-171.

[24]Hollis, **University of South Carolina**, 2: 170-171.

[25]"Resolutions Passed by the Winthrop College Summer School, Committee: James P. Kinard, J.W. Thomson, and E.C. Coker, July 8, 1918," in WCA; Winthrop College, "Minutes of the Board of Trustees," Meeting of November 27, 1918.

LADIES IN THE GENTLEMEN'S CLUB: SOUTH CAROLINA WOMEN LEGISLATORS, 1928-1984

M. Carolyn Ellis and Joanne V. Hawks

The South Carolina General Assembly has historically been composed of select and powerful men. V.O. Key characterized its upper chamber as a "gentlemen's club" which wielded enormous influence on state politics.[1] This exclusive bastion of male power existed intact until the eve of the third decade of the twentieth century. With the ratification of the 19th Amendment in 1920 the way was paved for women to enter politics. However, it was 1928 before a woman was elected to the General Assembly, and female participation was slow in developing. By mid-century only one other woman had served. Not until the mid-1970's did women enter the legislature in any significant number. These later women, like their male colleagues, were also select and capable of wielding power.

This paper describes the women who have served in the South Carolina General Assembly and seeks to determine what variations, if any, exist in their profile in the 50-odd years since the beginning of their legislative experience. Their motivations, goals, tactics, styles, successes, and public image will be considered.

Despite great diversity among the legislative women, there are notable similarities. For instance, thirteen of the total twenty-seven who served in the legislature attended women's colleges. Practically all of the women were active in public affairs prior to elective office through club work and volunteer projects. Club work and service projects were for South Carolina's women politicians, as well as for women in other Southern states, an important preparatory background.[2] In later years, particularly, the legislative women played active roles in party politics. As might be expected in a traditionally one-party state, most of the women were Democrats.[3] Ten of the group were involved for some part of their pre-legislative careers in education, either as teachers or administrators.[4] Four were lawyers.[5] The remainder worked in a variety of areas, including business, writing, and banking. Five described themselves as homemakers.[6] The women also represented a variety of religious affiliations. While most of the women have been Protestants, Catholic or Jewish women have also been elected. Only three of the women have been black.[7]

The first woman in the South Carolina General Assembly was Mary Gordon Ellis, elected in 1928 as Senator from Jasper County. After teaching in one-room schools, Ellis was elected County Superintendent of Education in 1924. As a result of some political maneuvers during her term, the position was legally changed from an elective to an appointive office,[8] and Ellis decided to run in the next election for the state senate. Her

legislative concerns focused primarily on education and Jasper County interests.[9]

Seventeen years after Ellis' election, a second woman was elected to the General Assembly. Harriet Johnson served during 1945-46, filling an unexpired term and thus becoming the first woman to sit in the House of Representatives. Johnson, a World War I widow, had been a teacher, a home demonstration agent and a 4-H Club leader. She ran for public office at the urging of her women friends and a woman even served as her campaign manager.[10] An article written shortly before her death depicts her as politically naive but sincere:

> She had to learn how men transacted their business and sometimes she learned the hard way. When the Democratic Convention came along in the spring, a woman delegate and she rode to Columbia together. Mrs. Johnson confided, 'I have accepted an invitation to speak to a women's group at the same time as the convention's luncheon meeting. I understand now that it is at this meeting that all decisions are made. Now I have to solve this problem.'[11]

Johnson's legislative career is typical in several respects of other Southern women politicians. Like many women of the time she was sympathetic to the black child's lack of educational and vocational opportunities. This sympathy was probably an outgrowth of her general interest in education. Also typical was her animosity to the Equal Rights Amendment. In 1946, she was a sponsor of a resolution calling on Congress to vote against the Equal Rights Amendment.[12] The women politicians of the 1930's and 1940's were a far cry from the more feminist-oriented politicians of later years.

The 1950's brought four women to the General Assembly, only one of whom served an appreciable period of time.[13] Martha Thomas Fitzgerald was elected to the House of Representatives in 1950, thus becoming the first woman to be elected to a full-term in that body.

Typical of the initial entry of women into male enclaves was the legislature's ado over how to address Fitzgerald during the session. The uncertainty over etiquette went so far that two of her colleagues introduced a resolution calling for the creation of a committee to determine the proper way to address a woman legislator.[14]

Fitzgerald retained her seat for twelve years. During that time, she developed into an active legislator, sponsoring legislation and making

speeches from the floor of the House. In her second term, she became the 2nd Vice-Chairman of the Education and Public Works Committee. Such a committee assignment was a natural place for Fitzgerald; she had spent years teaching, and most of her career was spent working with the State Department of Education.[15]

Her own characterization of her legislative career is demure. As reported by one journalist, she claimed:

> . . . 'I learned early that I could do more good by supporting or rejecting proposed state legislation with my vote, rather than by being a proponent of it . . . . I have never been a militantly aggressive person, so I was more interested in accomplishing what I wanted than in getting credit for it.'[16]

Her claims for modesty and her passive method of legislation are characteristic of the behavior of other women politicians in the South at that time.

Although she was a woman of some substance, she was apparently highly concerned with form. Managing a perfect attendance record in the legislature became a source of inordinate pride to her. When speaking of her attendance record, she lost her usual shyness and became quite boastful.[17] It was as if there were some things for which women could rightfully take credit such as attendance records, and other activities about which they could not boast, such as legislative activities.

Despite her modesty about her political activities, her legislative experience apparently whetted her political appetite. She twice ran for Congress, first in a special election in 1962 to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Representative John Riley and again in 1965. On both occasions she was defeated. The race in the 1962 special election was unusual for the time because it pitted one woman candidate against another. She lost to Riley's widow, who did not in any way actively campaign. The voters' preference for the incumbent's passive widow over a more active and experienced female politician may be an indication of their perception about gender roles. Congress was viewed as a man's world; for them a woman's role was limited to caretaker of the seat.[18]

Fitzgerald, like many of the early women politicians in the South, did not view herself as a feminist: "Just because I am a woman is no legislative virtue in itself, just as some men are not qualified to meet the problems we

face her."[19] Nonetheless, she was extremely proud of her continual sponsorship of a bill to allow women to serve on juries: "My Jury Resolution was perhaps the only statewide issue I hammered on patiently throughout my tenure."[20] Though she remained unsuccessful in pushing the bill forward, the legislation was eventually passed after Fitzgerald left office. It is interesting to note that jury bills of this sort often become the rallying point for women in Southern legislatures, women who otherwise rejected a feminist label.[21]

Martha Fitzgerald's tenure in office occurred at a point when a Southern woman in politics was caught between fulfilling the traditional ideal of Southern lady and the non-traditional role of politician. The balance was difficult to maintain and generally in such cases the woman's effectiveness as a politician suffered. In many ways Fitzgerald, who tried to walk that line, was enough of a politician to pave the way for more assertive women politicians. She served as a precursor for a remarkably dynamic legislator, Carolyn Frederick.

Frederick, who served in the House from 1967 to 1976, was a transitional figure in the history of women in South Carolina politics. She stood between the early "lady politicians" and the later "professional politicians." For the women who came to politics after her she served as a role model and a mentor. As a female representative said in 1983, "Carolyn Frederick was the mother of us all."

Frederick entered politics out of an intense desire to bring two-party politics to South Carolina. Her initial entry appears to have stemmed from a wish to see the Republicans field a full county slate of candidates for the legislature.[22] She was also motivated to enter politics by frustration. As a member of the American Association of University Women, she had lobbied for education reforms. She quickly learned that politicians would sometimes display sympathy for a piece of legislation yet not exert themselves on behalf of the bill. She reached the realization that if she cared enough to lobby passionately and to confront legislators, she should care enough to become an agent for change herself.[23]

In Frederick we see a prototype of the later female politician, the woman who is challenged by the unresponsiveness of some male legislators and the ineptitude of others. Although by Southern standards she was clearly a lady, she made a clean break with her forerunners who tried to balance "ladyhood" with politics. She astutely noted in 1969:

> 'From the time you were a little girl, you were taught to be sweet and to look pretty and to kiss Uncle Herbert and say thank you to Aunt Susie.

> 'The first thing that hits you in politics is that you can't please everyone. Whereas the average man will shrug and move on to the next issue, the average woman will mull it over and worry.'[24]

While in the legislature she combined her interest in women's equality with what she perceived as women's special interests: "education, work laws, and juvenile delinquency."[25] She was an early and avid supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment. Her support for the ERA was in sharp contrast to the anti-ERA stance of a young female legislator during that same period, Sherry Shealy Martschink. Martschink was elected when she was a twenty-one year old student. At that time Martschink was single and a rising young star in Republican politics. Martschink's and Frederick's opposing stances on the ERA are particularly interesting because it was the younger woman who was locked into a traditional way of thinking whereas the older woman showed flexibility and imagination.

Frederick was interested in a wide range of programs. She championed her causes enthusiastically, and she was tireless in her efforts to advance the stature of women and the status of South Carolina.

Frederick's legislative demeanor had much appeal. Her age, dignity, background in clubwork, and her Southern graciousness mingled with a vivid enthusiasm for politics made her a kind of elder stateswoman. She advocated in the 1960's that women get involved in politics. She believed that a great influx of women into political office could shape South Carolina in a more positive, creative, and compassionate way than was then being accomplished.[26] She told women that their political horizons were unlimited and a new generation of women heard and saw her and heeded her words and her example.[27]

The women who followed Frederick in the General Assembly were diverse in their interests and their styles. The great common thread running among them was their sense of professionalism. They were legislators; they no longer concentrated on balancing an antiquated notion of femininity with their political role in the male-dominated legislative arena. They were too concerned with lawmaking and political maneuvering to cater to form; the substance of the political world was more the focus.

Jean Toal exemplified this professionalism. Born in 1943, she was educated at the University of South Carolina Law School shortly before the influx of women law students in the 1970's. Her school peers, although not accustomed to seeing many female students, accepted her. Together with other members of her school circle, she plotted her political future.[28] Her legal education provided her two important edges: a legal framework and a

perspective from which to view legislation and the political process as well as numerous valuable contacts. Law school in the mid-1960's was very much a male domain. Toal, one of four women in her class, was aware that women had to be a "cut above" the male students to be successful.[29]

Her education in this male-dominated world stood her in good stead when she entered the legislature. Her ability to work well with ambitious men and to work harder than most of them paid off. Toal's legislative approach was to grapple with the more complex and demanding work and to gain expertise in the intricacies of the body's rules. For instance, she was the floor leader for a successful major rules change in the House. She was generally recognized for her mastery in parliamentary procedure, and because of that ability she was considered capable of sophisticated political maneuvering.[30] Toal chaired the House Rules Committee.

Toal was either floor-leader of or a significant participant in court-reform legislation, consumer credit legislation, home rule, and ethics measures. In addition to chairing the Rules Committee, she was the first woman to sit on the House Judiciary Committee.[31] While tackling procedural and economic legislation, Toal remained one of the staunchest ERA supporters in the House. Toal's effectiveness in the House was indisputable. After only eight years in the General Assembly a politician was moved to say about her:

> If you asked every member . . . to list . . . the five leaders in the House, she'd be on everyone's list . . .[32]

Harriet Keyserling, one of Toal's legislative contemporaries, exemplified a different, albeit effective style. Keyserling devoted most of her adult life to the roles traditionally performed by women. When she entered the General Assembly, she was 55 years old. Married to a Beaufort physician, she had reared four children and devoted years to civic work. Like many of the political women of her generation, her political maturation was a product of club work.[33] However, unlike most of her legislative counterparts, she herslef was born and reared outside the South. Keyserling, with a new B.A. degree in Economics from Barnard College, married and moved to her husband's South Carolina home in 1940's.[34] By the time of her election to the legislature, she had spent three decades in the South and any adverse political effect of being a non-South Carolinian had disappeared.

Keyserling's interest in being a legislator developed late. She was urged by a retiring incumbent to run for his seat.[35] In deciding to campaign, she had a vague sense that she wanted to find solutions to problems, but she had no agenda. Once elected she quietly began to study and observe; she quickly gained a reputation for "doing her homework."[36] She shied away from a dominant speaking role in the House, but she poured her energies into

writing articulate and convincing position papers for the local newspaper. The observation that female politicians are likely to communicate more often and better in writing than in legislative debate was true of Keyserling.[37]

Keyserling's legislative interests were myriad. She worked with Toal on modernizing the house rules. Aggressively she worked for passage of numerous bills she sponsored, including gun registration, consumer advocacy, living wills, educational reform, and the ERA. She was the first non-lawyer to be appointed to the House Judiciary Committee. In her steady way Keyserling seized several important issues and became the spearhead for them. In a quiet, deliberate, and thorough way, she became one of South Carolina's chief spokespersons against nuclear waste.

While Keyserling came late to politics, Elizabeth Patterson was born to it. Patterson's father, Olin Johnston, was one of South Carolina's most important twentieth-century political figures. Patterson was born in 1939 between her father's two terms as governor. Her girlhood was largely spent in Washington, D.C., where Johnson served as Senator for twenty years.

Patterson was the third woman elected to the state senate. At the time of her election she was the only woman senator. While her first political experience was campaigning for her father, Patterson's first active political role in her own right was a member of a county council. Despite the fact that she ran for county council, an active political role was not what she originally sought. She had been groomed to be a politician's wife and waited for her husband to run for elective office. When her husband announced finally that he had no interest in leaving his law practice, Patterson herself ran. Patterson typified the woman who, having been a keen observer of politics, yearns for a more active role. Her attitude seemed to be, "Why, I can do this better than it is currently being done."[38]

Her initial interest in politics was general. Like many women who entered politics belatedly, she had no special issues or favorite topics. To the extent that she expressed legislative interests, she did so vaguely. Her chief interests appeared to be education and mental health. Patterson was essentially constituent-oriented, a characteristic quite probably learned from her father.[39]

A supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment, she nonetheless shunned the label of "woman legislator." Patterson stated, "I don't think of people as male and female, but rather just as good citizens working together."[40] While she was probably astute to reject the label in an attempt to broaden her base, the legislature did not always accommodate her. Patterson noted that when a study committee assignment came along with the word

"woman" or "child" in it, she was automatically put on it.[41]

When Elizabeth Patterson arrived at the Senate, she was greeted by Nancy Stevenson. Stevenson, then Lieutenant Governor, presided over the Senate. She had served in the General Assembly for four years as a representative from Charleston. During her time in the House, she focused on education, health care, the ERA, child abuse, and housing legislation.[42] The House served as a stepping-stone to higher office; in 1978 she was the first woman elected lieutenant governor in South Carolina.

Toal, Keyserling, Patterson, and Stevenson were all Democrats, as indeed most of the women legislators have been. By 1984 there had been twenty-two Democratic and five Republican women in the General Assembly. While the Republican numbers were small, two women, Joyce Hearn and Norma Russell, showed that diversity nevertheless existed on the Republican side of the aisle.

Hearn described herself as a "Progressive Conservative."[43] Her interest in Republican politics seemed to have a practical as well as ideological basis. Philosophically she felt comfortable with conservative Republican doctrine. Additionally, at the time she became involved in party politics, the emerging Republican Party may have offered her political opportunities that the Democrats could or would not.[44]

Before becoming politically active, Hearn had taught school. It was there that she developed an awareness of women's problems when she discovered that women were not paid equally for equal work.[45] Despite this, she was not an active supporter of the ERA. Her stand on the ERA may have been constituent-oriented as was reflected in her remark that she would adhere to "what the majority of my constituents want."[46]

Her legislative interests showed some variety, but tended to fall into categories to which women have traditionally related. She was the chief author of a new sexual assault law. She also worked on adoption laws, medical research, drug abuse legislation, and judicial merit selection.

Norma Russell represented a different kind of Republicanism. Russell, a Senator, fell on the extreme right of the political spectrum. A former court reporter, she described herself as ultra-conservative.[47] She considered herself an independent who for politically expedient reasons ran on the ticket whose ideology more nearly reflected her own.[48] An ambitious woman who was defeated for lieutenant governor in 1982, she was largely ineffective in passing legislation. She was characterized as uncompromising and as a "spitfire with a quick temper and scorching tongue."[49] Russell launched a one-woman crusade designed to ferret out abuse, notably sexual

favors, in government. Consequently, many of her colleagues shied away from either professional or personal contact with her. Her extremism in philosophy and style put distance between her and other female legislators. She was largely viewed by them as a detriment to the enhancement of the political woman.

While these six women exemplified various types, they shared certain similarities. All were motivated, ambitious, and hard-working. All were vocal and influential.

Although all the women who have been profiled are white, there have been black female legislators in the General Assembly. The first black woman to gain a seat in the legislature was Juanita Goggins, elected in 1974.[50] A former school teacher, Goggins listed herself in the South Carolina legislative manual as a "creative homemaker." Goggins was motivated to run for office after years of campaigning for Democratic candidates. Like Frederick before her, she noticed the officeholder's dilatory behavior: "After they're elected, they often forget . . . . So I decided it was time to do it myself."[51]

Goggins realized that she was subject to the so-called double whammy, but she wanted to deflate the image of herself as black and female.[52] She claimed, "I want to be good enough that people forget I'm black and forget I'm a woman and no, I don't want to be pushed because I'm black or because I'm a woman."[53] Nonetheless, she recognized that her womanhood was advantageous: "I feel women have a very special place in government . . . . We have a special sensitivity to many issues that you just don't get from men."[54]

Goggins did not complete her first term. Citing exhaustion and medical reasons, she resigned from the General Assembly in 1975.[55] Her last two years in office were notable for her frequent absences, a factor which limited her opportunity to be an effective representative. Her significance rested rather in paving the way for other black women to follow.

No matter what type these women were, it is important to remember that they were from one of the most traditional Southern states. The idea of "ladyhood" was a particularly strong notion in South Carolina. The motivations that impelled them to walk to the beat of a different drummer have a consistent theme and involve several steps. Most often, through club work, they began a quasi-academic study of government. The study set the stage for the second level of involvement, promoting and following a piece of legislation, usually one with a strong public interest orientation. The third step was intensive lobbying and the developing of a certain political acumen. This intense participation was often frustrated when the favored

project failed to be enacted. This disappointment then frequently spurred the individual to seek public office herself in the hopes of achieving the goals for which she had previously campaigned.

For some women the motivation came not from clubwork but from an earlier experience of political involvement, often beginning in high school. For instance, Virginia Crocker's motivation was first stimulated in high school. Although her high school days paralleled the birth of the second women's movement, that movement had not caught on in South Carolina at the time. Weighing her ambition in the South Carolina world of the late sixties, she envisioned that her political career would be spent as a political aide. But the women's movement ultimately had its effect for as Crocker noted, "As I continued through school I realized the emerging power of women in the process and decided to run myself."[56]

Regardless of the time of awakening of the desire to seek office, virtually all the women claim that their basic reason was to serve the public. Many, if not most, did not have specific legislative interests; they had only a notion of the public good. Only a handful like Stevenson, Fitzgerald, and Toal tried to build on their legislative experience for higher office. For most the legislature itself was the final goal.

In pursuing their legislative goals, the female legislators brought a variety of styles. Some were reticent. It was said of Mary Ellis, for instance, she "served her county quietly and seldom made a speech."[57] The legislative journals indicate that Ellis spoke on the floor of the Senate only on four occasions in four years.[58] Ellis' reluctance to speak was shared by Harriet Johnson. In her two years of service, Johnson spoke only four times.[59] Harriet Keyserling, a much later representative, also preferred to work quietly; much of her effective work was done in committees rather than on the floor. While Keyserling did not often use the house chamber as her forum, she was known as a thoughtful and decisive person who worked tirelessly on issues that interested her.[60]

If the reticent speaker was at one end of the spectrum, the forceful speaker was at the other. Frederick is probably the first real example, but in general the later women showed less reluctance to take strong stands. Jean Toal and Norma Russell were later examples. Russell's style was so strong that often it appeared more strident than forceful. Toal's style, on the other hand, was more complex. As reported in a feature article about her, she was

> described as enormously bright, articulate, a consummate politician and a skilled parliamentarian by her supporters and as brash, hot-tempered, overly agressive and fickle on issues by her detractors . . .[61]

In the same article, Toal described her success in the General Assembly in this manner: "The way I made it in the legislature was to be very good and very tough. That gave me a very arid, tough image that is probably greatly at variance with how I am."[62]

Toal earned a reputation as a skillful debater and an effective user of parliamentary rules.[63] Her accomplishments were such that a colleague was moved to say of her: "Even on one of her bad days . . . she's one of the best legislators here."[64] Several of the effective legislators, such as Patterson and Hearn, fell in the middle of the spectrum.

To be one of the boys or not to be one of the boys was a continual dilemma over the years. When there were fewer women in the legislature and when the emphasis on traditionalism reigned, women often avoided valuable contact with male legislators and lobbyists after legislative hours for the sake of appearance. As Martschink noted, much legislative business was "accomplished over a 'few drinks at a bar' during 'unofficial' legislative sessions in the evenings. I was not a part of that, and certainly would have tarnished my political image had I been a part of that as a single young woman in the early 70's."[65] Sometimes their styles may have affected their colleagues' acceptance of them; other times it was irrelevant. Certainly over the 60 years covered by this study, the male legislators' view of women in the General Assembly changed. Carolyn Frederick remarked on the changes in acceptance and attributed it to the dramatic increase in the number of women legislators in the mid-70's.[66] For Virginia Crocker, acceptance was problematic because the 27-year-old solon was mistaken for a page and sent on errands by male legislators on a couple of occasions.[67] Several of the women reported that acceptance came slowly only after they had "proven" themselves in the legislative arena.[68] The decision to refrain from the establishment of a women's caucus in part was a result of the females' concern not to alienate their male colleagues.[69]

The feminist orientation of some women legislators did not enhance their status among the men. Even though some women steadily pursued feminist concerns, they realized the importance of working quietly. Sylvia Dreyfus, Toal, Keyserling and Patterson, among others, supported the Equal Rights Amendment, but none were by any means one-issue politicians. As the women who could be considered feminists in the General Assembly might claim, the idea of what is a true feminist issue has expanded over the years to include broader issues, such as the economy, education, nuclear waste and governmental accountability.

Just as their colleagues' attitudes toward them changed over a period of time, so did the media's. The press' reaction to the women was to treat them as novelties or to emphasize their feminine characteristics. While women

have gotten publicity, often a substantive story was mixed with phrases describing their pulchritude and charm. Such descriptions prevailed until the late 1970's. In 1964 the Columbia paper in recording Ruth Williams [Cupp's] defeat for re-election said:

> Miss Ruth's unfailingly cheerful disposition and her smile, so explosively sunny and yet so feminine, brightened the day of many a State House inhabitant in that dour world of males in sessions past.[70]

The same article referred to her presence in the House of Representatives as "the rustle of silk and the faint scent of perfume."[71]

As late as 1984, when Norma Russell was defeated for re-election, the Columbia newspaper said this about her:

> The frosty blonde with the icy blue eyes, the bright red dresses, the noisy crusader and the tirades against 'good ol' boy' politics isn't coming back to the General Assembly . . . .[72]

Much of the publicity surrounding Russell in general was negative. This depiction of Russell was the last in a long line of descriptions which characterized her as a strident fire-brand. Jean Toal was another legislator who received a great deal of publicity. Toal, however, had the ability to use the press to her advantage. As a result she received generally positive coverage. Virtually all of it focused on her legislative positions and her success in the House.

Martschink was also the recipient of much publicity, most of it focused on her youth. For instance, an entire news story was devoted to her presiding in the House for 45 minutes during one afternoon session. In the article about this "first" for women in South Carolina, she was described as a "shapely blond and former beauty queen," and her wielding of the gavel was met with "good-natured" chuckles.[73]

Conclusion

Women who served prior to the mid-1960's juggled roles. They had the ambition to be political figures, but both society and their own non-assertiveness were factors mitigating against any real success. Carolyn Frederick, elected first in 1966, brought a new style to the legislature. While maintaining South Carolinian graciousness she hammered away at issues, often took controversial stands, spoke publicly and forthrightly about the topics of the day, and, in so doing, served as a model for future female

legislators. She proved that the dominant culture's ideal of femininity could be successfully combined with a healthy dose of assertiveness and open ambition.

The women who succeeded her in the General Assembly were more inclined to be issue-oriented than those who preceded her. The 1970's saw a blossoming among the women legislators; they grappled with a fervor previously reserved only for constituent issues. Because of the ERA and the general emphasis on women's concerns during this period, they were compelled to align themselves with projects and proposals their predecessors had avoided. Many of them, though shunning the feminist label, were indeed feminists. Feminism as such was not something to which they paid much attention. However, the substance of feminism was familiar ground for them, for most belonged to the "I'm-not-a-feminist-but-I-believe-in-equal-pay-for-women" school of thought. No matter what degree of feminism different individuals professed, they all assiduously eschewed the feminist tag. To the extent that this avoidance was conscious, it was done primarily for pragmatic reasons. An avowed feminist in the mid-1970's might have been considered a pariah in the General Assembly. The women who wanted to promote the causes of women also wished to advance other concerns. They perceived, and perhaps rightly so, that aligning themselves with a feminist camp would have placed them outside the mainstream of legislative politics. Pragmatic concerns such as these prevented the formation of a women's caucus, even when some felt that a caucus would have been beneficial.[74] The dilemma was solved by an informal network of women.

Although by 1984 a caucus had not been formed, women continued to assert themselves on both narrowly-defined women's issues and broader issues. During the period from the early 1970's to the early 1980's, as a result of this assertion, women became more interested in expanding their power than ever before. A new sense of confidence was pervasive; women no longer took a back seat or walked on the proverbial egg shells. Rather they acquired a degree of power, and they were not afraid to use it.[75]

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[1]V.O. Key, Jr., **Southern Politics in State and Nation** (Vintage Books, 1949), p. 152.

[2]See Anne Firor Scott, **The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics 1830-1930** (University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 135-163.

[3]Five out of the 27 women have been Republicans: Carolyn Frederick (1967-76); Sherry Shealy Martschink (1971-74); Jewel Baskin (1973-74); Norma Russell (1973-84); and Joyce Hearn (1975-).

[4]Mary Ellis, Harriet Johnson, Emma Jane McDermott, Martha T. Fitzgerald, Virginia Gourdin, Juanita Goggins, Joyce Hearn, Sylvia Dreyfus, Virginia Crocker and Nell Smith.

[5]Ruth Williams [Cupp], Thomasine Mason, Irene Rudnick, and Jean Toal.

[6]Carolyn Frederick, Sylvia Dreyfus, Harriet Keyserling, Jean Harris, and Elizabeth Patterson.

[7]Juanita Goggins (1975-80); Juanita White (1981-); Mary Miles (1983-84).

[8]**The** (Columbia) **State**, April 22, 1970. Cited hereinafter as **The State**.

[9]See South Carolina **Senate Journals**, 1929-31.

[10]**The State**, April 23, 1970.

[11]**Ibid.**

[12]South Carolina **House Journal**, 1946.

[13]Martha Fitzgerald (1951-62); Emma Jane McDermott (1953-54); Ruby Wesson (1959-60); and Virginia Gourdin (1959-62).

[14]**The State**, April 28, 1951.

[15]Herbert Ravenel-Sass, **The Story of the South Carolina Low Country**, 3 volumes (1956), Vol. III Biographical.

[16]**The State**, April 24, 1970.

[17]**The** (Columbia) **State/Record**, March 9, 1960.

[18]**The State**, February 14, 1962; Irwin N. Gertzog, "The Matrimonial Connection: the Nomination of Congressmen's Widows for the House of Representatives," **Journal of Politics**, Volume XLII (1980), pp. 820-831.

[19]**The State**, April 24, 1970.

[20]**Ibid.**

[21]Joanne V. Hawks, M. Carolyn Ellis, and J. Byron Morris, "Women in the Mississippi Legislature (1924-1981)," **Journal of Mississippi History**, Volume XLIII, No. 4 (November, 1981), p. 290.

[22]Interview with Carolyn Frederick by the authors, January 29, 1983.

[23]**Ibid.**

[24]**The State**, April 25, 1969.

[25]**Ibid.**

[26]**Ibid.**

[27]**Ibid.**

[28]Interview with Jean Toal by the authors, January 27, 1983.

[29]**Ibid.**

[30]**The** (Columbia) **Record**, December 21, 1982, p. 19-a. Hereinafter cited as **The Record.**

[31]**The State**, March 16, 1977.

[32]**The State**, March 13, 1983.

[33]**South Carolina Legislative Manual**, 1982, p. 90.

[34]**Ibid.**

[35]Questionnaire completed by Harriet Keyserling, October 25, 1982.

[36]**McCall's**, March, 1980, p. V-4.

[37]"A Woman's Place Is In the Capitol," **State Government News**, September, 1984, p. 9.

[38]Interview with Elizabeth Patterson by the authors, January 27, 1983.

[39]**The State**, December 5, 1979.

[40]**Ibid.**

[41]Patterson interview.

[42]Literature from Nancy Stevenson's campaign for Lieutenant Governor.

[43]Campaign letter from Hearn, June 5, 1978.

[44]Interview with Joyce Hearn by the authors, January 27, 1983.

[45]**Ibid.**

[46]**The Record**, May 26, 1978.

[47]**The State**, November 10, 1980.

[48]**The Greenville News**, May 26, 1977.

[49]**The Record**, March 17, 1977.

[50]**The State**, November 8, 1974.

[51]**The Record**, December 16, 1974.

[52]See Chapter 6, "The Double Whammy for Black Women," in **Women and Politics, the Invisible Majority**, by Sandra Baxter and Marjorie Lansing (University of Michigan Press, 1980), pp. 92-112.

[53]**The State**, November 8, 1974.

[54]**The Record**, September 16, 1974.

[55]**The State**, November 13, 1979.

[56]Questionnaire completed by Virginia Crocker, November 2, 1982.

[57]**The State**, April 22, 1970.

[58]**Senate Journals**, 1929-32.

[59]**House Journals**, 1945-46.

[60]**McCall's**, March, 1980, p. V-4.

[61]**The State**, March 13, 1983.

[62]**Ibid.**

[63]**Ibid.**

[64]**Ibid.**

[65]Questionnaire completed by Sherry Shealy Martschink, April 4, 1983.

[66]Questionnaire completed by Carolyn Frederick, November 19, 1982.

[67]**The State**, July 21, 1978.

[68]Keyserling questionnaire, October 25, 1982.

[69]Interview with Jean Toal by Joanne Hawks, April 11, 1985.

[70]Unmarked clipping from Columbia **State/Record** Archives.

[71]**Ibid.**

[72]**The State**, October 10, 1984.

[73]**The State**, May 9, 1973.

[74]See Keyserling speech in **Women State Legislators**, Conference Report June 17-20, 1982 (Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers - The State University of New Jersey).

[75]See Eileen Shanahan's article, "Women Legislators," July 22, 1982, reprinted in **Women State Legislators**.

MASTER ARTISANS AND THE GERMAN REVOLUTION OF 1848

Ralph C. Canevali

The master artisan has had an uncertain place in German historiography. This is readily apparent in the way the craftsman's role in the Revolution of 1848 has been portrayed. Over the last thirty years western historians have gone to great lengths to demonstrate, that in the absence of a genuine proletariat in Germany, independent craftsmen were the group with the greatest revolutionary potential. Study after study seems to have confirmed this conclusion. Research done, for example, on the casualties of the street-fighting in Berlin, on the membership of democratic political associations in Saxony, and on the composition of revolutionary militia in Cologne, bears witness to the extent of artisan participation in the Revolution of 1848.[1]

But traditional explanations for artisan activism during the Revolution have, in my view, clouded as much as clarified the reasons behind this support. By relying excessively on economic determinants, historians have ignored political and cultural influences which also had a bearing on artisan behavior. Most often the revolutionary stance of the artisans in 1848 is attributed to the critical state of the handicrafts in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century. The origins of this crisis are complex, having to do with the problem of economic stagnation and with the decay of the guild system. Far from declining, the number of independent artisans in Germany was actually rising during the first half of the nineteenth century, at rates far in excess of those for the population at large.[2] Excessive competition, shortages of capital, and a low level of technology meant that many small masters were reduced to an existence hardly superior to that of the wage labor they employed. The time of reckoning for these fledgling artisan enterprises came in the 1840s, when a series of disastrous harvests, followed by a slowdown in industry, left thousands of tradesmen ruined and bankrupt. At a time when one's reputation as a burgher and head of a household was intimately bound up with economic independence, this sudden confrontation with poverty was a hard blow indeed. With the loss of one's estate came the loss of one's standing in the community, and in most places, one's citizenship rights as well. Historians have argued that the pauperization of so many formerly independent masters spawned in Germany a large group resentful of wealth and distrustful of authority. The masters' independence and strong corporate identity ensured, furthermore, that their grievances would find effective political expression. In sum, the artisans' support for the Revolution of 1848 is seen as a defensive reaction to industrial capitalism, and a desperate attempt to restore a vanishing way of life.

Western historians who have written on the subject of 1848, most

notably Theodore S. Hamerow, P.H. Noyes, Edward Shorter, and Barrington Moore, all emphasize the pivotal role played by craftsmen during the Revolution.[3] The eventual failure of the Revolution in Germany, in fact, they attribute to the artisans' defection from the revolutionary movement. This alleged volte face occurred not, as Marxist historians still maintain, because of the intrinsic timidity and unreliability of the petty bourgeois masters, but rather, say Hamerow and the others, because of the obduracy of their political allies, the liberal middle classes. Specifically, it was the unwillingness of the middle classes to support policies which would have sheltered the master artisans from economic competition that prompted the artisanate as a whole to desert the revolutionary coalition. If guild controls were not to be resurrected in their entirety, then at least some legal protection was necessary from what was commonly regarded as the unregulated anarchy of the marketplace. Otherwise, artisans feared, the handicrafts would be overwhelmed by intruders who refused to adhere to the strict esthetic and moral standards concomitant with the status of master craftman. By prohibiting such riff-raff from entering the trades, the well-being of respectable craftsmen would be preserved. True, such an ordinance must infringe on the right of an individual to follow his particular calling in life, but in the eyes of most guildsmen, freedom of occupation had to be subordinated to the interests of society at large. Not only would the unrestricted freedom of occupation hasten moral decline, but as more and more honorable tradesmen were displaced by unfair competition, it would also result in social upheaval. In the words of one master, "occupational freedom means anarchy in the trades, which must also lead to political anarchy."[4] Such conservative attitudes on social and economic question were indeed typical for German artisans at the time. The need to preserve in Germany a stable core of small property owners, in their view, took precedence over "progress" or economic growth. Without the independent master to serve as a buffer between the capitalist on the one hand, and the worker on the other, society was destined to break apart into mutually hostile groups of rich and poor. Without the so-called "Mittelstand" to serve as ballast, the ship of state too was likely to run aground. To prevent these things from occurring, over one hundred master artisans, representing all of the larger and most of the smaller German principalities, assembled in the city of Frankfurt in the summer of 1848. Their purpose was to draw up for Germany an industrial ordinance which would uphold the traditional prerogatives of the guilds, by restricing competition and by closing off the handicrafts to outsiders. Special trade councils composed of masters would be established to set standards for admission into the guilds, thereby circumscribing the activities of capitalists, middlemen, and rural artisans.[5]

But the masters' nostalgic vision of society in no way diminished their support for the Revolution. Far from it. In the words of Edward Shorter, the artisans were "fanatical reactionaries, and in this way a revolutionary

class."[6] In 1848, according to Shorter, the masters had forged a tactical alliance with the liberal elements who had spearheaded the Revolution. When it became clear, however, that the German National Assembly was not about to ratify the program of the Masters' Congress, this revolutionary coalition began to fall apart. It had been for such economic reforms, after all, that the masters had backed the Revolution in the first place. Their only alternative at this point, said Shorter, was to abandon a movement which no longer seemed to have their interests at heart. When in 1849, the last remaining edifice of the Revolution, the Frankfurt Parliament, was itself torn down, most masters looked on with indifference, some even joining in the demolition. "Any revolutionary elite," writes Shorter, "which so carelessly alienates a major body of supporters is bound to fail."[7] In his view, then, it was not, as Marx and Engels had it, the artisan who betrayed the Revolution, but rather, the Revolution which betrayed the artisan.

Despite Shorter's and the other's attempts to distance themselves from the Marxists, their arguments in fact share with the latter's a number of similarities. For just as Marx and Engels attributed the political unreliability of the small tradesman to his intermediary position between labor and capital, so also do Shorter and the others link the revolutionary stance of the masters to their loss of status and economic privation. Above all, both groups see economic factors as decisive in determining the political alignment of artisans in 1848. The direction of their argumentation may be different, but the assumptions on which it is based are not.

Unfortunately, too much about the artisan and the Revolution of 1848 has simply been assumed and not adequately demonstrated. Three presuppositions in particular require closer scrutiny. First of all, did the National Assembly, as Shorter and the others maintain, really spurn the advances of the craftsmen? Second, was the result an exodus of artisans from the liberal party? And finally, were the artisans, as the evidence seems to indicate, truly a revolutionary group? Time does not permit me to address in any detail the first two questions. Suffice it to say, however, that the economic views of German liberals at the middle of the nineteenth century differed hardly at all from the prevailing sentiments of the masters. Both groups, for example, recognized the importance of a stable "Mittelstand" to the well-being of Germany, and shared the belief that laissez-faire policies were not in the best interest of the nation. The failure of the National Assembly to act upon the proposals of the Masters' Congress did not reflect a contempt for the craftsmen and their point of view, but stemmed instead from the Assembly's preoccupation at the time with more pressing political matters.[8] On the other question, the alleged swing to the right on the part of master artisans, one can only say here that such a phenomenon has never been established definitively. The armed uprisings which broke out in many parts of Germany on behalf of the National Assembly in 1849 suggest that the

Revolution failed, not due to inadequate support from artisans or anyone else, but rather because of the overwhelming military superiority of those governments opposed to it.[9] One of the most distinctive features in fact of the broad coalition of social groups which backed the Revolution was its tenacity and durability, even on the very brink of defeat.

The question to which I would like to devote the remainder of this presentation is the last one: namely, did German artisans (and by extension artisans in other parts of Europe who were facing similar conditions in 1848) constitute a group especially predisposed to revolutionary activity. Without a doubt, artisans had to play an important role in the Revolution of 1848, if only by virtue of their preponderance within the population at large. But even if most revolutionaries were artisans, it does not therefore follow that most artisans were revolutionaries. Early in the course of the Revolution, before any hint of a "bourgeois betrayal" was evident, examples can be found of craftsmen whose relation to the democratic movement was highly ambiguous, if not downright hostile. The complexity and relative indeterminacy of artisan politics are revealed in what is an especially important source of material on the artisan and 1848, namely the petitions to the German National Assembly drafted by artisans in support of the proposed industrial ordinance. Although these petitions concentrated on economic issues, they often addressed political questions as well, providing insight into how the two areas of thought were related in the minds of the master craftsmen. Despite their fundamental agreement on matters pertaining to society and the economy, artisans could and did differ dramatically on questions of politics. One might be tempted to attribute these political differences to differences in economic position. But there is little indication of a close correlation between political allegiances and material circumstances. The over one thousand petitions to the German National Assembly in 1848 represent artisans from a wide variety of trades, rich and poor. What does seem to hold true, however, is this: the political views of the masters normally conformed to the prevailing attitudes and sentiments of the communities, districts, and regions in which they resided.

This is clearly the case for the thirty petitions from the Grand Duchy of Baden. Baden was one of the most politically advanced of the German states, and an important center of revolutionary activity in 1848. Despite the overall liberal, even radical, tone of most of the Badenese petitions, there were some which assumed a conservative stance. These originated exclusively in politically conservative parts of the country, most notably the capital city of Karlsruhe.[10] For the masters of Karlsruhe, as for almost all of the artisans who addressed the National Assembly, economic and political questions were closely interconnected and linked with the artisan's overall world-view. The masters of Karlsruhe, for instance, were staunch monarchists opposed to radical elements in the revolutionary movement. Occupational freedom they regarded as an unwholesome consequence of the same

libertarian impulses which had conjured up the Revolution in the first place. They likened the guild to the monarchy, for both were agents of order and stability, and thus antidotes to the political confusion and social unrest of their times. The right of the individual to select his own occupation was much like the right of the citizen to choose his own government; the inevitable consequence of both would be "a desperate struggle . . . which will have as its result general destruction." The conservative political views of the master artisans of Karlsruhe clearly transcended any economic ties they might have had enjoyed with the court or the administration, and reflected instead the general conservatism of the capital and the surrounding districts. For centuries this part of the country had been under the control of the present ruling family, now the Grand Dukes, of Baden. A tradition of uninterrupted dynastic rule, together with an enlightened agrarian policy, had generated on the part of the common people a strong sense of national identity and an attachment to the crown. Baden as a whole in 1848 would gain notoriety for its revolutionary zeal, but Karlsruhe and vicinity would remain throughout a loyalist stronghold.[11]

In the southern half of Baden things were different. This region had only recently been incorporated into the Grand Duchy, and its people identified more with the freedom-loving Swiss to the south than with the conservative burghers of Karlsruhe. The continued presence here also of a powerful nobility and the relative remoteness of this region helped to reinforce a sense of isolation from the capital. In 1848 the South would surpass the rest of Baden in its support for the democratic cause and its oppostion to the government. Artisan petitions from this region reflect such sentiments.[12] The masters of southern Baden, for instance, accused the authorities in their petitions of doing too little to alleviate the economic plight of the artisan. Too long, they said, had regulation of the handicrafts been the "football of the bureaucracy." What these craftsmen found most appealing about the proposed industrial ordinance was the autonomy it granted them in the handling of their own affairs. Even the clock makers of the Black Forest, who were rather less sympathetic than most craftsmen to guild controls, subscribed to the view that it was bureaucratic "regimentation of commerce and industry which had brought Germany to the brink of ruin." In the petition from the southern town of Constance the masters went so far as to blame the depressed state of the economy on the continued presence of troops in their district, a leftover from an unsuccessful republican uprising earlier that year, in which large numbers of craftsmen had taken part.[13] For the master artisans of southern Baden, as for their counterparts in Karlsruhe, politics and economics were closely linked, but not in any reflexive or predetermined way.

One of the most telling of these petitions to the German National Assembly came from Weinheim in the north of Baden.[14] It opened, like all

the others, bemoaning the chaotic state of the handicrafts in Germany. It then went on to compare the situation in Germany with that of the United States. The overall prosperity of America, the artisans of Weinheim pointed out, was intimately tied to her democratic system of government, just as Germany's economic malaise could only be understood in light of the inadequacies of her political institutions. The masters concluded from this that an American-style economic system, with its emphasis on an absence of regulation would, "only result in harm for the German people, so long as it remains impossible to recreate American conditions in Germany in their entirety." In other words, until Germany, like America, was able to enjoy the benefits of free expression and democratic government, then the hardships associated with the free enterprise system would be intolerable. What the masters were suggesting was that the solution to Germany's social and economic problems was to be found not in social, but in constitutional reform.[15] This rather naive tendency to look to politics for answers to the "social question" was characteristic of German political and social thought during the first half of the nineteenth century. It helps explain why political issues took precedence over social issues in the minds of most revolutionaries in 1848. Want and deprivation on their own did not compel craftsmen or anyone else to defend the Revolution. Neither did their continued support hinge on the implementation of this or that economic reform. Disappointed, as many masters certainly were, by the National Assembly's failure to enact the proposed industrial ordinance, this by itself was not likely to alter their feelings about the Revolution.

The abundant literature on the involvement of master artisans in the German Revolution of 1848 has provided us with considerable information about the organizational activity of craftsmen, but has been rather less helpful in accounting for their political beliefs. The attempt by Western historians to rehabilitate the master craftsman in light of a century or more of Marxist invective is understandable. But in doing so they have only repeated the mistakes of their predecessors. Relying upon a strict class analysis, and ignoring other intermediary factors, they have succumbed to making sweeping and entirely unwarranted generalizations. For all their efforts, Western historians have merely substituted one revolutionary class for another.[16] Artisans, no less than other elements of the population, were susceptible to influences which had little to do with their economic situation. Not the least of these, and one whose importance for our understanding of the Revolution of 1848 cannot be overestimated, was that of community and region. The petitions from Baden, as we have seen, divided themselves according to the political sentiments of the areas from which they originated. Regional and local loyalties were and are largely autonomous factors, on which economic conditions exerted a partial influence at best. It is not my intention of course to substitute a determinism based on location for one based on material forces. To do so would only

serve to exclude from consideration the host of contingencies which affected both the direction into which artisans' activism was channelled, and their potential for violent confrontation with the authorities. What I am suggesting, however, is this: that in our preoccupation with national history, the importance of regional diversity is often overlooked. A greater emphasis on regional studies in a European context would have a salutary effect on historical inquiry in general.[17] Not only would it serve as a corrective to often facile generalizations about the behavior of certain social groups, but for students of the German past especially, it would help foster a fond appreciation for an historical tradition whose richness and complexity are its prime attractions.

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[1]Ruth Hoppe & Juergen Kuczynski, "Eine Berufs- b.z.w. auch Klassen- und schichtenanalyse der Maerzgefallenen 1848 in Berlin," **Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschaftsgeschichte**, Part IV (1964), 200-277; Hermann-Josef Rupieper, "Die Sozialstruktur demokratischer Vereine im Koenigreich Sachsen 1848-55," **Jahrbuch des Instituts fuer deutsche Geschichte** 7 (1978), 457-68; Karl Obermann, "Die soziale Zusammensetzung der Buergerwehr in Koeln 1848/49," **Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschaftsgeschichte** 4 (1970), 141-58.

[2]Helmut Sedatis, **Liberalismus und Handwerk in Suedwestdeutschland: Wirtschafts-und Gesellschaftskonzeptionen des Liberalismus und die Krise des Handwerks im 19. Jahrhundert** (Stuttgart, 1979), 126f.

[3]Theodore S. Hamerow, "The German Artisan Movement 1848-49," **Journal of Central European Affairs** 21 (1961), 135-52; P.H. Noyes, **Organization and Revolution: Working-Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848-49** (Princeton, 1966); Edward Shorter, "Middle-Class Anxiety in the German Revolution of 1848," **Journal of Social History** 2 (1969), 189-215; Barrington Moore, **Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt** (White Plains, N.Y. 1978).

[4]**Karlsruher Zeitung**, 3 Sept. 1848.

[5]Manfred Simon, **Handwerk im Krise und Umbruch: Wirtschaftliche Forderungen und sozialpolitische Vorstellungen der Handwerksmeister im Revolutionsjahr 1848-49** (Cologne, 1983).

[6]Shorter, 199.

[7]Shorter, 215.

[8]Sedatis, 89-92; Simon, 158ff.

[9]See Christoph Klessman, "Zur Sozialgeschichte der Reichsverfassungskampagne," **Historische Zeitschrift** 218 (1974), 283-337.

[10]Deutsches Bundesarchiv Frankfurt, Akten der Nationalversammlung, Volkswirtschaftlicher Ausschuss (hereafter DB), 51/117 "Petitionen betr. Gewerbeverhaeltnisse aus Baden" (1848-49).

[11]One example of the conservatism of this region is the fact that out of the five hundred deomcratic political associations established in Baden during the Revolution, only 32 were situated in the **Kreis** encompassing Karlsruhe and the surrounding districts. Generallandesarchiv Karlruhe, Innenministerium, Abt. 236/8509 "Tabelle ueber die Mitglieder der Volksvereine" (1849).

[12]DB 51/117.

[13]Reinhold Reith, **Der Aprilaufstand von 1848 in Konstanz** (Sigmaringen, 1982), 24.

[14]DB 51/116 "Petitionen betr. Gewerbeverhaeltnisse aus Baden" (1848-49).

[15]Dieter Langewiesche makes this point in "Republik, Konstitutionelle Monarchie und die Soziale Frage," **Historische Zeitschrift** 218 (1980), 529-48.

[16]For more on this subject see Gareth Stedman Jones, "The Mid-century Crisis and the 1848 Revolution," **History and Theory** 12 (1983), 505-19.

[17]James J. Sheehan's "What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the **Nation** in German History and Historiography," **Journal of Modern History** 53 (1981), 1-23 is particularly illuminating on this topic.

SCOTTISH MERCENARIES IN THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

William S. Brockington, Jr.

While the story of Scottish mercenaries during the era of the Thirty Years' War in Germany (1618-1648) is an interesting one, time and space preclude any lengthy discussion of the particulars of their service on the Continent. Also fascinating, and an integral part of their story, would be a study of the Thirty Years' War itself, of the evolution of a new style of warfare during that era, and of the religious struggles that existed not only on the Continent but also in England and Scotland at the time. These, too, are beyond the scope of this paper. Of necessity, this paper will concern itself primarily with the impact, if any, of those Scots who served on the Continent during the Thirty Years's War on the war itself and/or on Scotland.[1]

Prior to the Thirty Years' War, Scotland had had a long history of providing troops for Continental armies. Scottish soldiers were often found in the armies of France, the Habsburgs, various German states, Poland, the Low Countries, Denmark, and Sweden. During the period of the Thirty Years' War approximately 40,000 Scots left their homeland to join the various armies on the Continent.[2] For some, religious motives encouraged a desire to serve Protestant armies on the Continent. For others, the desire to serve under a great leader and to attain military glory was the primary reason for leaving Scotland. But for most, the underlying cause of the exodus was the abject poverty of their country, a condition which can be attributed to factors ranging from geography and climate to poor farming techniques to socio-political problems. The main consideration for most Scotsmen was survival, and serving abroad as a mercenary seemed to offer a chance for this. Sadly, this was but an illusion. Of the Scots who left their native land to serve in armies abroad, few returned.[3]

Scottish mercenaries were viewed ambivalently by their foreign masters. They were often accused of being incapable of accepting discipline and were believed to be unwilling to do menial tasks such as digging trenches. As a group, they were considered to be the smelliest, filthiest, and most difficult nationality with whom military entrepreneurs and leaders had to deal. Yet they were sought after because of their abilities on the battlefield. They were considered by many to be the best assault troops available at the time. For that reason, in virtually every military activity where Scottish units took part, they were considered to be indispensible. They were either in the van on a march, in the forefront of an assault, or were placed at a crucial point in the line. And for that reason, Scottish units were sought after by all combatants.[4]

The peak period for using Scottish mercenaries during the Thirty Years' War occurred during the Danish (1625-1630) and Swedish (1630-1635)

phases of that war. There had been some Scottish mercenaries serving on the continent prior to 1625, but most of the British mercenary troops raised had been recruited in England or Ireland and had served in either the Palatinate or in the Low Countries. When the Scandinavian kings, first Christian IV of Denmark and then Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, became involved in the war, Scots began appearing in ever greater numbers. This was perhaps due to the closer ties of Scots with Scandinavian areas or perhaps because the Scandinavian kings paid better and more promptly. Whatever the reason, by 1627, they had become an important segment, albeit a relatively small proportion, of the army of each king.

During the Danish phase Scottish units arrived after most of the German states were under the control of Imperial troops, but they quickly established a reputation for hard fighting.[5] Their primary role was to slow the advance of the Imperial army under Tilly and to cover the retreat of the army of Christian IV. At Boizenburg, in August 1627, four companies of Highlanders (800 men) under Major Dunbar held off 10,000 soldiers while the rest of the Danish king's army escaped. A month later, at the Battle of Oldenburg, a Scottish regiment under Sir Donald Mackay blocked the advance of Imperial troops and prevented the annihilation of the last major Protestant force in the north of Germany. At the siege of Stralsund (1628), Scottish units successfully held the Frankentor, the weakest section of the defenses, against repeated assaults by Imperial troops. Yet these actions merely postponed the end for Christian IV and his allies. For all practical purposes the Protestant forces had been driven from the German states. Imperial troops occupied or controlled most of the territory south of the Baltic Sea. This the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, could not permit; he prepared to attack the Imperial forces. The most significant era for Scottish mercenaries was about to occur.

Of the mercenaries serving in the Swedish army in 1630, approximately 12,000, or one-sixth of the total manpower of the Swedish army, was Scottish. Gustavus Adolphus considered them to be, next to his own Swedish and Finnish troops, the best soldiers in his army. This was obvious because, over the next two years, he used the Scottish troops extensively in key roles. At Neu Brandenburg (1631) the Scots played a major role in the capture of the city, and over 500 were left behind as part of the garrison. Unfortunately, when the city was recaptured by Imperial troops, most of the Scots were killed. At Frankfurt on the Oder, on Palm Sunday 1631, revenge was extracted by their countrymen. As usual, a Scottish brigade was in the vanguard of the assault. It refused Imperial efforts for a parley and slaughtered 1700 of the defenders.

At Breitenfeld, during the Rhine and Bavarian campaigns, and at Nuremberg (where Scots under Gustavus Adolphus fought Scots under

Wallenstein), Scottish units continued to be in the forefront. The most famous unit, the Green, or Scots, Brigade had performed its task so well that by October of 1632 its strength had diminished from nearly 4500 to less than 800. As a result, the King, after first thanking them before the rest of the army, left the unit in garrison while he moved northward to Luetzen where he was to die in battle. Following his death the Swedish army declined in both quantity and quality. At Noerdlingen (1634) the Swedish forces were completely overwhelmed by a superior Imperial force. Thus, the Scots Brigade, which had been reconstituted by new mercenary forces, was so crippled that it was never to act again as a separate unit. Indeed, the number of Scots in continental wars was to decline dramatically for many reasons, not the least of which was the religious controversy that erupted in Scotland in the late - 1630's.

The religious policy of Charles I of England had effected a revolution in Scotland, and an army was being raised there to resist the King. The leaders of the Scottish Kirk issued a "Circular Letter from the Committee" which called for the raising of regiments under the command of

> a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and a sergeant-major who, being prime officers, ought to be men of skill, and must be sent for out of Germany . . . The captain and ensign may be noblemen or gentlemen, the lieutenants and sergeants must be sent for out of Germany . . .[6]

As a result of this plea, many Scottish officers hurried home. Note that only the officers, not the enlisted men were called home. Most who left wanted only to obtain a leave of absence, but were forced to resign because of possible international complications. As these officers were leaving the Swedish service to take part in a rebellion against their lawful ruler, Sweden would not openly support a revolt against a king. Also, some of the officers requested artillery and muskets in lieu of back pay. This too could have led to international complications. Therefore, weapons were given to the men as rewards for their services, not as part of their wages. In this manner several thousand muskets, several artillery pieces, gunpowder, and other weapons were bought home by the officers.

With these men in command, Scotland soon had an army that was far superior to the army of Charles. The soldiers were raw recruits but ". . . they were an army and not an armed mob."[7] During the English Civil War itself, Scottish units served with distinction on the Parliamentary side. At Marston Moor (1644) the units which had been trained in the style of Gustavus Adolphus acted with well-trained, disciplined precision, and prevented a Royalist victory. However, following the execution of Charles I (1649), most Scots refused to work further with Parliament. Cromwell in-

vaded Scotland (1651) in order to suppress the Covenanter Movement. Sadly for the Scottish cause, just before the decisive battle of Dunbar, a purge of the army was conducted by the Scottish Kirk: and over one-eighth of the army was dismissed because of their lack of theological perception and devotion. Moreover, at the battle itself, a committee of ministers forced the Scottish generals to abandon their favorable position - these tactics having been ". . . revealed to them by the Lord of Hosts" - and to move forward against Cromwell. A disaster followed. Most of the skilled officers who had served in the Thirty Years' War were either killed in that battle or served long prison terms for their part in the Scottish insurrection against Parliament.[8]

Militarily then, the Scottish mercenaries who returned home to Scotland affected the military policies and strategy for over a decade after their return. However, their long-term success was not great because recruits were unwilling to drill and train as was necessary, preferring instead the "auld style" of a quick, shock-attack with claymores [Scottish broadswords] to the new style. In addition to this, the Scottish officers and non-commissioned officers who did return to help Scotland found that their efforts were hindered by clan politics and by the ministers of the Scottish Kirk. Moreover, the disasters on the battlefield against Cromwell decimated the officer corps as well as sent many other officers into exile. Therefore, it may be concluded that there was little noticeable influence by these soldiers on the military customs and tactics as practiced by the Scots for hundreds of years prior to 1618. Indeed, it was not until after the Union of 1707, and the formation of new Scottish regiments to serve in the English armies, that the old style of fighting completely died out.

Given all of the above, one might ask whether this large group had much of any impact other than the manuring of the fields of Europe with its bodies. The answer is, "probably not," unless one counts a "glorious military tradition" as a legacy. Scottish mercenaries played a small, but significant role in the middle phases of the Thirty Years' War. However, this role was primarily that of combat. Scottish troops were valued as fighters, and as has been noted, were more often than not in the forefront. That, as well as the high death from disease rate, meant that most of the Scots who served in the Thirty Years' War never left Germany. Indeed, they would probably not have been welcomed home as they would have simply been another group of mouths to feed. As noted above, the enlisted men were not asked to come home; only the officers and non-commissioned officers were. The common soldier had little hope of leaving the army after enlisting. This was especially true with regard to those men who had been forced to enlist for if they deserted their regiment, they were subject to a death penalty. Since the common soldier was not allowed to resign, the Scottish soldier generally remained in an army until he was killed or

rendered incapable of actively engaging in combat. Indeed, the very reputation of Scottish soldiers caused their casualty rates to be very high. However, their reward was small, for most of these soldiers now lie in unmarked graves at the sites of the battles and of their camps. Their impact on anyone or any place was negligible.[9]

The officer class was somewhat more fortunate even though death was the common reward for most of them as well. A survey of the officers with the rank of lieutenant-colonel or above (of those whose fate is known) shows that sixty per cent were either killed in action or died as a result of wounds or disease. As the lower ranking officers led a more dangerous life and lived under more squalid conditions, it may be assumed that their mortality rate was higher. Scottish officers who survived battle and disease were occasionally able to attain high rank, albeit at a very slow rate; e.g. two Scots attained the rank of Field-Marshal in the Swedish service, but only after each had served Sweden for almost thirty years. The obvious reason for the slowness of promotion for Scots was that during the time of the Thirty Years' War, high rank was usually reserved for men of noble birth; few of the Scots who sought service abroad fit into that catagory. Thus, Scottish officers served primarily in subordinate command roles, and were rarely given the opportunity for independent command. In the one real chance they had for independent command, they found their opportunities blocked by the power structure at home. Of those officers who were fortunate enough to survive the rigors of combat and camplife, few were able to profit from their long years abroad. Full and regular payment of the soldiers was a rare occurence, especially in losing campaigns. It was not uncommon for grants of land to be the only remuneration available, but these land grants were usually in newly conquored territory. If that land were reoccupied, and it frequently was, then all that had been worked for was gone, unless a government felt that there was an obligation to those who had fought for them. This rarely happened to the dispensible Scots. With but a few exceptions, indebtedness and an uncertain old age waited the Scottish mercenary who served abroad.

Did the Scottish mercenaries have much impact on matters such as religion, social and political advancement, the exchange of ideas, or economic development? The influence on religious ideas would certainly have been an important area of impact as the mercenaries would have been in contact with other creeds and doctrines for many years. Yet no such impact is evident. To the contrary, the Scottish Kirk of that era made change virtually impossible for it was supreme in spiritual matters and took seriously its charge ". . . to punish heresy, to enforce discipline, and to suppress any church which threatened rivalry."[10] If the returning Scots were interested in promulgating new ideas about religion, and it is doubtful that they were, they would certainly have had a most difficult time doing so.

Another area of possible influence would have been social advancement due to wealth obtained or glory won. There were some high-ranking officers who returned home and received titles of nobility which would seem to ensure the men a place of distinction. The evidence indicates otherwise for these men, returning to Scotland at a time of trouble, never had a chance to assert their new power. Most of them had either landed in prison or had fled to the Continent within ten years of returning home. Also, the nobles who had been the leaders of Scotland before the return of the mercenaries remained the leaders after their return and delegated authority to the returnees only when necessary. Thus, there is little indication of any immediate effect on the social and political structure in Scotland following the return of the officers.

The outflow of such a large number of men should have had a dramatic economic impact, but it did not. Those men were considered to be surplus population, and an economic drain, not an economic asset. Interestingly enough, they may have had a reverse economic impact because Scottish trade with the Baltic region did increase. "At the bases where these regiments were equipped, solid merchant houses [were] established."[11] Clearing houses were then established abroad, and traders were sent abroad - Scandinavia, the Low Countries, the Germanies - where Scottish troops were located. "Scottish trade was concentrated mainly in those areas and at those towns where Scottish merchants [and other Scots] settled down."[12]

In summation, then, it must be stated that the Scottish mercenary had very little effect on his native land or on the Continent. If there was any actual impact, it was felt by the military leaders of the day who recognized the fighting qualities of the Scots and their value as shock troops. There were few Scots who were able to rise to positions of high command, but there were many Scots who served as junior-grade officers, as non-commissioned officers, and as foot soldiers. The Scottish mercenary who did return home rarely brought anything of value with him; and his social, political, intellectual, and economic impact on Scotland was small. The Scot who returned home was little more than an alien in a changed world.

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[1]For a more complete discussion of these topics, see William S. Brockington, Jr., "The Usage of Scottish Mercenaries by the Anti-Imperial Forces in the Thirty Years' War" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of South Carolina, 1968).

[2]The number of 40,000 is only an educated guess as accurate records from this period are virtually non-existent. Authorized by the Privy Council of Scotland were levies of 54,000 men [**Register of the Privy Council of Scotland**. 1st Series (1619-1625), Vols. 12-13, edited by David Masson, 1895-1896, and 2nd Series (1625-1660), 8 Vols., edited by P. Hume Brown and David Masson, 1899-1908]. From sources such as Robert Monro **Monro, His Expedition with the Scots Regiment** (London: W. Jones, 1637) and **The Swedish Intelligencer** (London: N. Butter

and N. Bourne, 1633-1634), actual numbers of troops raised were gleaned. From a comparison of the two types of sources, it can be seen that levies were usually oversubscribed in the early years and undersubscribed in the later years.

[3]S.G.E. Lythe, **The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625** (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, Ltd., 1960) covers the issue of economic distress.

[4]While Monro, **Expedition,** and **The Swedish Intelligencer** are the best primary sources for the value of Scottish mercenaries, these reports are certainly biased. Scondary works such as Thomas A. Fischer, **The Scots in Germany,** (Edinburgh: Otto Schulze and Co., 1902) and **The Scots in Sweden,** (Edinburgh: Otto Schulze and Co., 1908) are no less biased. However, Michael Roberts' work in Swedish archives [**Gustavus Adolphus, A History of Sweden: 1611-1632.** 2 Vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953 & 1958)] and Fritz Redlich's work on mercenaries [**The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force.** 2 Vols. **Vierteljahrschrift fuer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte,** Vols. 47 & 48. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1964 & 1965) reached the same conclusions.

[5]Descriptions of the fighting may be found in James G. Fyfe, **Scottish Diaries and Memoirs, 1550-1746** (Stirling: Eneas Mackay, 1928); James Grant, **Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn, Commander of the Scots Brigade under Gustavus Adolphus** (Edinburgh: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, 1851); Monro, **Expedition; The Swedish Intelligencer;** and James Turner, **Pallas Armata** (London: M.W. at the Rose and Crown in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1683).

[6]Great Britain. Public Record Office MSS. Domestic Series. 511 Vols. **Letters and Papers of Charles I,** Vol. CCCX, No. 167, Circular Letter, January 1639.

[7]C.H. Firth, **Cromwell's Army.** (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1902), p. 14.

[8]The description of the battle and its results is from Jane Lane, **The Reign of King Covenant** (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1956), pp. 224-227.

[9]See Brockington, "Scottish Mercenaries," for a more complete discussion of the conclusion presented in this paper.

[10]John Buchan and George A. Smith, **The Kirk in Scotland** (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1930), p. 28.

[11]David Mathew, **Scotland Under Charles I** (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), p. 278.

[12]T.C. Smout, **Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707** Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1963), pp. 96-97. See also Fischer, **Germany, Sweden,** and **The Scots in Eastern and Western Prussia** (Edinburgh: Otto Schulze and Co., 1903).

"AMERICA COMES FIRST WITH ME": THE EARLY POLITICAL CAREER OF CONGRESSMAN JAMES P. RICHARDS[1]

Joseph Edward Lee

As the Great Depression ravaged the farms, eroded the cotton fields, shut the textile mills, emptied the bank vaults, and ruined the businesses of South Carolina's Fifth Congressional District, thirty-eight year old James Prioleau "Dick" Richards, Lancaster County's probate judge and member of a politically prominent family based in the hamlet of Liberty Hill, declared his candidacy on 11 June 1932 for the United States House of Representatives. The incumbent congressman, seventy-one year old William Francis "Seaboard Bill" Stevenson of Chesterfield County, had represented the seven county rural district since 1917.[2]

It should be stressed that Congressman Stevenson appeared, on paper at least, to be a formidable foe. Born in North Carolina during the Civil War, he taught public school prior to graduating in 1885 from Davidson College. After reading law for two years, Stevenson was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1887. From 1887 to 1892, he practiced law in the town of Chesterfield. In 1892, the thirty-one year old attorney moved to the neighboring town of Cheraw.[3]

Stevenson's political career blossomed with his 1895 election as mayor of Cheraw. A year later the electorate chose him as one of Chesterfield County's members of the state assembly. His political rise was aided by his chairmanship from 1896 to 1902 of the county's Democratic Party Executive Committee. In 1900, his peers in the state House of Representatives selected him speaker of that body, and he retained the speakership until he left the legislature in 1902. Stevenson began his seventeen year service in 1900 as legal counsel for Seaboard Railroad. In addition to this lucrative position he was general counsel of the state dispensary commission from 1907 to 1911. He returned to the state legislature in 1910 and remained there for four years. In 1917, he defeated four opponents in a battle to represent the Fifth Congressional District in congress. Perhaps the extent of Stevenson's clout can best be seen in his election in 1901 to represent Chesterfield County on the powerful State Democratic Party Executive Committee. His tenure lasted until his death in 1942.[4]

On the other hand, James P. Richards' resume is quite different. After two unproductive years at Clemson College, Richards left the school in the spring of 1917 to enlist at Camp Styx, South Carolina in the United States Army. Of his scholarship at Clemson, Richards later admitted "I did not distinguish myself at all in my studies." Athletics rather than academics dominated his life at least until the time of his military service.[5]

The trenches of France matured Richards as he rose through the ranks from private to a battlefield commission as a second lieutenant. He saw combat in France and Belgium as a member of the Old Hickory Division, and by the time of his 1919 discharge he had decided to study law at the University of South Carolina.[6]

Richards immersed himself in the university's academic athletic, and extracurricular life. A review of the 1921 **Garnet and Black**, the student yearbook, reveals an impressive list of activities in which the veteran was engaged. He captained the school's baseball team, and the yearbook's editors commented "He's one of the few fellows to be found on college teams who can be called a baseball scientist." In addition to his first base skills, Richards, despite an arm injury, played halfback on the football squad. The**Garnet and Black** applauded his gridiron expertise and observed "It took real nerve for a man so injured to even try to play football." Richards' athletic talents earned him the presidency of the athletic association and membership in the Block C Club.[7]

Richards was associate editor of the student newspaper and served as vice-president and literary critic of the Clarisophic Literary Society. His oratorical skills were demonstrated in the Gonzales Oratorical Contest. Politically, Richard led the Campus Democratic Club, a forerunner of the present day Young Democrats. His two years of military service were not forgotten during his law school enrollment; he joined with other veterans in forming the Old Hickory Club.[8]

I find the **Garnet and Black** profile of young Richards to be especially enlightening. The editors said "We have in 'Dick' a perfect combination of all-star athlete and all-round lawyer." The editors labeled him "a politician of the old order." His concern for his classmates, the editors predicted, was "a gift that is bound to accomplish for him every office that lies within the power of his people to bestow." The profile of Richards at age twenty-seven concluded "a brilliant career for him lies just beyond Liberty Hill."[9]

After successfully passing the South Carolina Bar Exam, Richards moved from Liberty Hill to Lancaster where he ran for the county's probate judgeship in 1922. Victorious in his first attempt at elective office, he served as Lancaster County's probate judge from 1923 until he became congressman in March 1933.[10]

Why did Richards decide to risk the security of his judgeship to challenge Congressman Stevenson? It seems to me that there were a variety of compelling reasons. Thirty-eight year old Richards suspected that septuagenarian Stevenson might be toppled in a vigorous campaign. Furthermore, Richards was assured of the valuable support of the district's

veterans; Stevenson had no military record. Also, Richards could depend on the network of contacts who had rallied to his uncle John G. Richards' banner when the elder Richards won the state's governorship in 1926. Having the surname "Richards" certainly did not handicap James P. Richards. Finally, Richards appears to have been genuinely alarmed by the turmoil flowing across the district in 1932. New representation in congress could energetically assist the soon to be elected president in combatting the economic paralysis afflicting America.

During the campaign, Richards blasted the incumbent's record. At a well-attended Winnsboro stump meeting, Richards revealed that Stevenson had a top level staff member, A.E. Hutchinson, who held the dual position of reading clerk of the South Carolina House of Representatives. Richards told the audience that the Stevenson aide unfairly received two salaries "while millions of others have no work at all." Sounding what would be a major campaign theme, Richards argued that the incumbent was out of touch with the district's constituents. The youthful challenger noted "I believe in change in office." Furthermore, Richards implied that Stevenson shared with President Herbert Hoover the blame for America's dire economic condition. In his closing remarks, Richards inquired "What has Stevenson done? What can you expect of him in the future?"[11]

Similarly, Richards criticized Stevenson's legislative record during a joint campaign appearance in Chester. Defending himself, Stevenson read from entries in the **Congressional Record** to prove his productivity. He blamed the Republicans for the economic collapse and expressed his hope that he and Richards could be friends after the 30 August Democratic Primary.[12]

Before 1500 onlookers assembled in the district's largest city, Rock Hill, Richards charged that former Congressman D.E. Finley had done more for the district during a brief four year period than Stevenson had done since 1917. Shifting his attack, Richards reminded the voters of his World War I military record. Then, in what I consider the campaign's climax, Richards turned to face the rotund Stevenson, pointed, and shouted "When he was rolling in fat, I was carrying a rifle."[13]

In massive last minute newspaper advertisements, Stevenson defended his performance in office. He blamed his modest legislative record on Republican control of the House. One advertisement pleaded "Mr. Richards is a young man and evidently has not kept up with the work of Congress in general and my work in particular." Stevenson's argument, however, fell on deaf ears. When voters visited the polls on 30 August, Richards ousted the incumbent by a hefty 9000 vote margin. Two months later, Richards routed a little known candidate, J.C. Hambright of Rock

Hill, offered for sacrifice in the general election by the district's disheartened Republican Party.[14]

The sobering condition of America's banks which confronted President Franklin Roosevelt and Congressman Richards in early 1933 has been called by Professor Paul Conkin "a sharp ravine in the broad valley of depression." Trapped in this "ravine" were thousands of collapsed financial institutions like Chester's National Exchange Bank. Its doors closed, its officers disgraced, its vaults empty, and its depositors ruined, this bank was typical of many others of the day. One of the bank's officers lamented to Richards in a March 1933 letter "The amount reported (missing) is substantially larger than indicated by my records. I am not connected with the others in their misfortune and had no idea that any of them were in trouble until disclosed by the various audits." Richards was sympathetic but noncommittal when he wrote the dejected bank executive "I do not know of the particulars of the bank failure in Chester but I want you to know that you have my deepest sympathy in the trouble you mentioned in your letter."[15]

Richards clashed later that spring with Roosevelt over the administration's Economy Bill, legislation designed to limit costly veterans' pensions and to slim a bloated federal bureaucracy. In his maiden House speech, Richards affirmed "no one has greater admiration for President Roosevelt than I." Nevertheless, Richards argued the bill "will place upon the shoulders of the States and the municipalities the expense of providing care for many disabled and incompetent veterans who should by rights be wards of the Federal Government." Splitting with the administration, he told his colleagues "If I had voted for this bill, feeling as I do about its unjust effects upon disabled war veterans of our country, I would be a traitor to them and to my own conscience."[16]

Minimizing his Economy Bill quarrel with FDR, Richards wrote a veteran in the summer of 1933 "Regardless of my difference with the President on this point, I admire him very much as he has shown his ability to take a position and stick to it. That is the real test of a President after all." His basic admiration of Roosevelt's program is especially evident in the legislator's praise for FDR's farm policies such as the Agriculture Adjustment Act and the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act which Richards cosponsored. In a June 1934 speech, Richards told the House "To my mind, any unbiased person will admit that the present administration has done more to alleviate the distressing conditions facing the tillers of the soil than has any other administration in the last half century."[17]

An analysis of the congressman's New Deal voting record reveals that he followed the president's lead an impressive 70% of the time. This pro-New Deal posture placed the legislator near the top of FDR's supporters in the

South Carolina delegation. Among the major legislation endorsed by Richards were both Agriculture Adjustment Acts, funding for the Civil Works Administration, establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Civilian Conservation Corps, and authorization of the National Recovery Administration.[18]

Clearly, Richards' alignment with the New Dealers did not harm him back home. When two opponents, J.E. Beamguard of York County and A.L. Wood of Cherokee County, challenged him in the 1934 Democratic Party Primary, Richards easily overwhelmed both men. Beamguard received 6246 votes and Wood netted 3780 while the Richards landslide consisted of 32613 votes. The magnitude of Richards' victory that year deterred anyone from challenging him in 1936 or 1938.[19]

Richards' position in the House was also strengthened in the mid-1930's. He discarded seats on the Patents, War claims, and World War Veterans' committees in favor of a slot on the more prestigious House Foreign Affairs Committee. This 1935 change is a watershed in Richards' early career. From his vantage point on the Foreign Affairs panel, he became a staunch advocate of strong neutrality legislation. He assailed various interest groups which were lobbying to dilute the provisions of the 1935 Neutrality Act. Focusing on certain ethnic groups, Richards asserted in a powerful March 1936 House speech "It is feared that any more extensive (neutrality) legislation. . . may offend the delicate sensibilities of Englishmen, or Italians, or Germans, or Frenchmen, or whatnots who happen to live within our borders-legally or illegally." He called for permanent rather than merely temporary, neutrality safeguards. Richards told his colleagues "Europe is preparing for war, and only God can prevent it." Explaining his sentiments, the congressman said "The United States has always shown a sense of obligation to downtrodden people all over the earth, but that does not change the fact that our primary obligation is to our own people."[20]

As other southern congressmen abandoned their previous isolationist leanings, Richards continued to cling tenaciously to his. When the House debated in February 1940 the merits of fortifying Guam, Richards emphasized the 6000 mile distance from mainland United States to the island. He conceded that Japan's accelerating belligerance was worrisome, but he explained "I am not here to argue about Japan." Responding to admirals who advocated fortification, he stressed "I am always glad to take the advice of naval experts when it comes to the question of what kind of ship is best, but I am not willing to take the advice . . . when it comes to the question of foreign policy." Ominously, three days later Richards warned "We are hunting trouble when we go out there, and if we go out there we are going to have more trouble than you ever heard of in the event of war . . . ."[21]

After France capitulated to Adolph Hitler in the summer of 1940, Richards told congress "Our country may in a few months be the last citadel of liberty in the world." He lamented that our military strength was insufficient to meet the challenge. He remarked "our Army, Navy, and air force must be built up, but the job should not be done hysterically or spasmodically. Our plans should be sound, our purposes definite, our goal clear." Concluding, he expressed the hope "That in the trying days ahead I may never be called upon to vote to send our boys to the horrors of the battlefield; but I am firmly convinced that, if we really intend to prevent war, we must be strong enough to demand and preserve peace."[22]

Richards' pronouncements on foreign policy and national defense did little to erode his popularity back in the Fifth District. When Cherokee County Probate Judge Roy C. Cobb challenged Richards in the summer of 1940, the incumbent received 33262 votes to 12748 for Cobb. The district had endorsed their congressman's position that America was ill-prepared for another world war.[23]

In his judgment, time was needed for our nation to prepare for the Axis challenge. Richards voted in September 1940 for conscription. The following February, he supported the administration's Lend-Lease Bill. There was a limit, however, to how far Congressman Richards was willing to go along this path of military mobilization and widening American involvement in European conflict.[24]

Nowhere do we see Richards' cautious sentiments expressed more clearly than in his November 1941 opposition to modification of the Neutrality Act. The congressman's "through-the-back-door" speech on 12 November was an emotional appeal to not allow American cargo ships to enter combat zones. He recalled World War I when "Many of our men, hundreds and hundreds of them, paid the supreme sacrifice." He sensed that America was not ready for another conflict, and he pleaded "If we are going to go into this war by means of these amendments or otherwise, we should first strip our decks for action, not during the battle, but before it." He continued "I am thinking of the thousands and thousands of mothers' sons who may be sent to foreign soil and foreign seas and never come back." He commented that his two sons were not yet military age, but that he hoped that if they ever went to war it would be for a clear and direct reason. As he concluded his remarks, he said of his own sons - and of American's sons - "May they never be called to battle untrained, half-armed, and in a haze of doubt because of a divided nation behind them; may they never have cause for belief that their country sent them to foreign battlefields through subterfuge and indirection."[25]

Reaction to the speech came from all regions of the nation. My research reveals that approximately 150 letters and telegrams in the James P. Richards Papers supported his position while fifty criticized him. This ratio concurs favorably with the research of Diplomatic Historian Thomas Paterson who estimates that in September 1941 an overwhelming 80% of the American public opposed our drift toward war.[26]

In a South Dakota radio broadcast, Congressman Karl Mundt told his constituents "Probably the most impressive speech of the debate was given by Congressman Jim Richards of South Carolina." Mundt stated that he gave thanks "to men like Jim Richards who put patriotism above politics, who serve their conscience as they read its insistent plea, and who dare to speak out against tremendous pressure urging them to hold their peace." A Georgetown University professor who witnessed the debate concurred and wrote Richards "Nothing it seemed to me stood out so magnificently in those closing hours as those strong, sincere and elequent words which you there expressed." A soldier on maneuvers added his praise and confide "Let me say that the applause was not limited to the House Chamber."[27]

When the S.C. American Legion's commander lambasted Richards' speech and questioned his patriotism, the legislator expressed regret that he did not have the veteran's confidence and added "I am sure that we both, as well as the overwhelming majority of the American Legion, are willing, should the call come, to die for our country." Another detractor urged Richards to redeem himself by supporting immediate military action against the Nazis, who the critic labeled "a bunch of international outlaws." When University of South Carolina Law School Dean J. Nelson Frierson, one of five instructors at the law school when Richards attended two decades earlier, cited America's historic ties to England, chided Richards for abandoning Britain, and lectured him on Anglo-American relations, Richards was stung. The congressman retorted to his former professor "I owe no allegiance to the Crown-America comes first with me."[28]

The State newspaper printed an edited version of Richards' speech. Refusing to criticize or endorse the congressman's stance, the newspaper editorialized "he was aware of the fact that he was differing from the majority opinion in his home state. So his own reasons are worth printing as information." The newspaper observed that the speech was delivered "in a voice which was described as shaking with emotion."[29]

A newspaper in Richards' district was less sympathetic to the congressman. **The Chester Reporter** compared the lawmaker's neutrality position as being "equivalent to a boxer's entering the ring with Joe Louis with his arms dangling by his sides." Another newspaper in the same town, however, editorialized "He voted his honest convictions, which happened

to be opposite those of the White House." This newspaper urged Richards to continue to "vote his own convictions, after giving the matter under consideration careful thought."[10]

The words of praise and condemnation of Richards were swept away three weeks later when Japan attacked America's naval base at Pearl Harbor. Thus, we find Congressman Richards at the end of 1941 disheartened by the reality of a war he had struggled to stall. Richards' anti-war posture was founded on his conviction that the United States, still weak from the effects of the Great Depression, was not prepared to do battle with the Axis powers. The climax of James P. Richards' early political career was his sincere but unsuccessful attempt to gain for his homeland a few more precious months to, as he had told his congressional colleagues, "strip our decks for action.

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[1]During Congressman Richards' twenty-four years in the United States House of Representatives, no decision created as much of an uproar as his November 1941 vote to oppose revision of the Neutrality Act. When University of South Carolina Law School Dean J. Nelson Frierson criticized Richards' position on this controversial issue, the congressman replied "I have great admiration for the British Government and the British people but I owe no allegiance to the Crown - America comes first with me." James P. Richards to J. Nelson Frierson, 24 November 1941, James P. Richards Papers, South Carolinians Library, Columbia, South Carolina. Hereinafter, this collection will be referred to as the Richards Papers.

[2](Rock Hill, S.C.) **Evening Herald**, 13 June 1932; Frank E. Jordan, **The Primary State: A History of the Democratic Party in South Carolina 1896-1962**, 115.

[3]For profiles of Congressman Stevenson, I suggest the **Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774-1971** (Washington, 1971), 1754-55, **Who Was Who in American Politics** (New York, 1974), 543, and **Men of the Time: Sketches of Living Notables** (Spartanburg, S.C., 1902), 403.

[4]**Biographical Directory of the American Congress**, 1754-55.

[5]A good starting place for biographical information on Congressman Richards are his papers at the South Caroliniana Library. Additionally, I suggest the **Biographical Directory of the American Congress**, 1606, the **1956 Legislative Manual** (Columbia, 1956), 335, **Who's Who in South Carolina 1934-1935** (Columbia, 1935), 398, and the congressman's obituaries which appeared in **The Lancaster** (S.C.) **News** 23 February 1979, the**Evening Herald** 22 February 1979, and the **New York Times** 24 February 1979; Lanelle Willoughly Bethea, "The Richards Mission To The Middle East, 1957" (M.A. thesis, Winthrop College, 1969), 21.

[6]**Biographical Directory**, 1606 and Richards Papers biographical file.

[7]**Garnet and Black** vol. 23 (Columbia, 1921), 108; ibid., 147; ibid., 136.

[8]Ibid., 108.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Inez Watson, ed. **1956 Legislative Manual** (Columbia, 1956), 335.

[11]**The** (Columbia, S.C.) **State**, 2 Aug. 1932.

[12]**Chester** (S.C.) **Reporter**, 4 Aug. 1932.

[13]**Evening Herald**, 3 Aug. 1932.

[14]**Evening Herald**, 27 Aug. 1932; Ibid., 1 Sept. 1932; **Chester Reporter, 1 Sept. 1932; The State**, 9 Nov. 1932.

[15]Paul K. Conkin, **The New Deal** 2nd. ed. (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1975), 29; James H. Glenn to Richards, 29 March 1933, Richards Papers; Richards to Glenn, 4 Apr. 1933, Richards Papers.

[16]**Time**, 20 March 1933, 16; **Congressional Record**, 73 Cong. spec. sess. (14 June 1933), 6052.

[17]Richards to R.E. Wylie, 15 June 1933, Richards Papers; **Congressional Record**, 73 Cong. 2 sess. (8 June 1934), 10876.

[18]Jack Irby Hayes, Jr., "South Carolina and the New Deal 1932-1938" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1972), 150.

[19]Jordan, **The Primary State**, 116.

[20]**Current Biography** vol. 12, Sept. 1951, 47-51; **Congressional Record**, 74 Cong. 2 sess. (11 March 1936), 3619.

[21]**Congressional Record**, 76 Cong. 2 sess. (12 Feb. 1940), 1534-35; ibid., (16 Feb. 1940), 1549.

[22]**Congressional Record**, 76 Cong. 2 sess. (10 July 1940), 9442; ibid., 9445.

[23]Jordan, **The Primary State**, 116.

[24]**Congressional Record**, 76 Cong. 2 sess. (7 Sept. 1940), 11754; ibid., 77 Cong. 1 sess. (4 Feb. 1941), 522-40.

[25]**Congressional Record**, 77 Cong. 1 sess. (12 Nov. 1941), 8773.

[26]Thomas G. Paterson, **et al. American Foreign Policy: A History** (Lexington, 1977), 382-83.

[27]Transcript of radio broadcast by Karl Mundt, 24 Nov. 1941, Richards Papers; Charles Coolahan to Richards, 17 Nov. 1941, Richards Papers; James P. Ready to Richards, 18 Nov. 1941, Richards Papers.

[28]Richards to R.J. Fairey, 15 Nov. 1941, Richards Papers; W.W. Crawford to Richards, 18 Nov. 1941, Richards Papers; Richards to J. Nelson Frierson, 24 Nov. 1941, Richards Papers.

[29]**The State**, 15 Nov. 1941.

[30]**The Chester Reporter**, 17 Nov. 1941; **The Chester News**, 18 Nov. 1941.

OLIN JOHNSTON RUNS FOR THE SENATE, 1938 to 1962

Roger P. Leemhuis

Olin Dewitt Talmadge Johnston (1896 - 1965) was born in Anderson County and resided in Spartanburg during most of his life. This World War I veteran and lawyer had a long political career that began in the state legislature in the 1920's. Throughout his public life he presented himself as a spokesman for the common white people, while associating with the Democratic party. As this party became identified nationally with the cause of racial equality, he frequently found himself in a difficult position, because most white South Carolinians, including himself, were hostile to the civil rights movement. He ran for the United States Senate six times; the last four of these bids were successful. During one of these campaigns one newspaper derisively called him a "Jim Crow New Dealer."[1]

1938: Against "Cotton Ed" Smith

Completing a term as governor, Johnston tried to unseat veteran Ellison D. ("Cotton Ed") Smith. 1938 was the year of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "purge" drive against several Democratic legislators who were unfriendly to his New Deal. The president hinted that Smith was one of his targets, and it was generally assumed that he favored the governor. Also in the race was State Senator Edgar Brown of Barnwell.

Pleased to be recognized as the president's man, Johnston concentrated on economic issues, and backed the wages and hours bill (Fair Labor Standards Act), which Roosevelt endorsed and Smith opposed. He charged that big business, Wall Street, and the Republicans were behind the incumbent. The governor frequently posed the question: Should the Democratic state of South Carolina choose a senator who is antagonistic to the party's national leader? Denying that he was anti-Roosevelt, Smith called himself an independent person who cooperated with the president "whenever I thought it was beneficial and right and opposed it when I thought it was wrong." The senator scoffed at his rivals as "coattail swingers" who could not exercise independent judgment.[2]

The governor's record was controversial, especially his use of the militia in a futile attempt to take control of the Highway Department. During that encounter he had annoyed several state legislators, including the so-called "Barnwell Ring" headed by Edgar Brown. Although Smith's record was also attacked, he was not hurt politically. He argued persuasively that he had worked to protect the farmers and other people. He enjoyed the advantage of seniority and prestige as chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee.[3]

In addition, "Cotton Ed" savored a reputation as an eloquent apologist for the Southern way of life (white supremacy and racial segregation), which he saw as imperiled. In his view, fulfledged backing of the New Deal had to include acceptance of racial equality. The senator charged that the pro-New Deal C.I.O. (Congress of Industrial Organizations) and N.A.A.C.P. (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) were helping the governor. "A vote against me is a vote for that gang." Johnston tried to resist being labeled a friend of the blacks. In May he signed legislation that allowed only whites to vote in Democratic primaries, and he stated proudly that no blacks would be casting ballots. When some blacks appeared at a rally in Sumter, he ordered them to leave the meeting hall. After "Cotton Ed" declared that support of the New Deal meant support of an anti-lynching bill, Johnston noted that the president had not recommended the bill. At one meeting he announced that no lynchings had occurred during his term in office, then added, 'We keep the Negro in South Carolina where he belongs and you know we do."[4]

Johnston wanted to focus on economic issues, to make a class appeal, and he was irritated by Smith's pursuit of the race question. At one point he complained that the incumbent felt impelled to "hop on the Negro man and try to ride him back to the Senate." Smith's skillful use of the race question threw his opponents off stride. His warning that the C.I.O. aimed to wipe out the color line among industrial workers was heard. "Cotton Ed" was a spellbinding orator and a master of ridicule. He exploited public resentment against "dictation" by outsiders, and this feeling was undoubtedly a major factor in his success. Roosevelt visited the state briefly on August 11. Addressing a crowd from a train in Greenville, he asked his listeners to elect men who would back his program. The presidential appearance was counterproductive. Smith defeated Johnston decisively in the August 30 primary, 186, 519 to 150, 437. (Brown withdrew shortly before the balloting.) One newspaper commented that South Carolina had rebuffed not Roosevelt but rather "his apparent attempt to fill Congress with 'yes men.' "[5]

1941: Against Burnet R. Maybank

After his defeat in 1938 Johnston returned to the practice of law. Three years later, in the summer of 1941, he ran for the state's other United States Senate seat, after James F. Byrnes resigned to accept a Supreme Court appointment. His competitors were Governor Burnet R. Maybank, a Charleston businessman, and Congressman Joseph Bryson of Greenville. A Democratic primary and a special election were scheduled. While the campaign was in progress the United States was drifting steadily towards war with the Axis nations, and the international crisis provided the setting. All of the aspirants were pro-New Deal and behind Roosevelt's foreign policies. Johnston and Maybank publicized what they had done, during their respec-

tive governorships, to help build up the nation's defenses. Maybank, as the incumbent, was able to make especially good use of the defense theme.[6]

None of the contenders excited the electorate, and no controversial questions emerged. Johnston took the offensive against his chief opponent, Maybank, and tried to arouse class feelings against the affluent Charlestonian. The people were warned about the dangers of electing rich men to public offices. "Has Democracy in South Carolina reached the point where only the 'member of an old and wealthy family' can serve them as their public servants?. . The common people as well as the wealthy have a right and place in our Democracy but this right and place will be forever lost unless you wisely exercise this right before it is too late." The rich must know that ballots cannot be bought "by money or jobs or promised influence." He accused his main rival of promising two vacant federal judgeships "to goodness how many people." Maybank responded that he had done no bargaining with judgeships or pardons, and that no "pardons racket" presently existed in the executive office. (Here the Charlestonian was referring to a "pardons racket" which had allegedly existed while his predecessor had been governor.)[7]

The man from Spartanburg could not develop a winning issue. Success eluded him as he tried to stir the "dry" sentiments of much of the population on the liquor question, a perennial issue in South Carolina. One of his advertisements stated: "Johnston is a dry. He has always been dry . . . These are perilous times -- we NEED, SAFE, SOBER MEN OF THEIR WORD IN WASHINGTON!" (Maybank was generally perceived as "wet.") Moreover, the former governor berated Maybank for signing legislation that allowed baseball games, movies, and other pleasures on Sundays. "Do you think these things desecrate the Sabbath Day?" Johnston also predicted that the "Barnwell Ring" would widen its influence if Maybank vacated the governship. His successor would be Lieutenant-Governor J. Emile Harley, of Barnwell County.[8]

Of the two leading contenders, Maybank was a better campaigner. His message to the voters was more in tune with the public mood during the international crisis. He projected a more unifying image, in contrast with Johnston, who appeared to be rather divisive as he sought to ignite class feelings. The governor argued: "Burnet Maybank believes the most important problem before the American people is the crushing of Hitlerism. To bring this about he believes that all American must stand united. He has never sought to arouse hate of one group for another and as Governor he has worked for unity among the people of South Carolina." The Charlestonian was a likeable and handsome man who convinced the voters that he would be more effective than either of his rivals in the nation's capital. "With the expanded activities of the federal government, South Carolina

needs in Washington a Senator who enjoys the friendship of President Roosevelt and those holding key positions in the Federal government in order that he can get things done for the state. Such a man is Burnet Maybank!'"

The governor came close to obtaining a majority in the first round of balloting on September 2; Bryson was eliminated. In the runoff two weeks later Maybank polled 92,100 votes against Johnston's 70,687. In spite of his defeat, the Piedmont lawyer remained a formidable public figure, and in the following year, 1942, he won a second (nonconsecutive) term as governor.

1944: Against "Cotton Ed" Smith

In 1944 Johnston tried again, as in 1938, to oust "Cotton Ed" Smith. Three other persons also ran in the July Democratic primary. The governor proclaimed his general support of Roosevelt: "I am not one hundred per cent for what the present administration has done in domestic affairs," but he was fully behind its foreign and defense policies. He complained about price restrictions on South Carolina's melons, tobacco, cotton, and Irish potatoes, and charged that federal regulations discriminated in favor of other states.[10]

In 1938 Smith had called himself an independent-minded Democrat who often backed Roosevelt. By 1944 he had a reputation for open antagonism towards the president. "Four more years of this and our government is gone. Our people are regimented," he said. The veteran legislator pursued several points that he had used in his last contest -- his seniority, chairmanship of an important committee, efforts on behalf of farmers, and devotion to white supremacy.[11]

The governor was better prepared than previously to face Smith on the subject of race. He had recently summoned the legislature to enact laws barring blacks from voting in Democratic primaries. On one occasion he blasted the Republican presidential nominee, Thomas E. Dewey, for attending a "negro drinking party." Here, in his words, was proof that South Carolina had to remain Democratic. "President Roosevelt has never been pictured at a negro drinking party." His stand in favor of states' rights, white supremacy, and the Roosevelt administration left him open to charges of inconsistency. The Charleston **News and Courier** called the governor a "Jim Crow New Dealer," implying that Jim Crow and the New Deal were incompatible.[12]

Johnston gave only secondary attention to his racial views. At one meeting he declared that he did not intend for his platform to stand upon

the race question alone. However, he wanted nobody to doubt his adherence to segregation and white supremacy. As "Cotton Ed" pressed the race issue, his principal challenger emphasized the need for unity during war, remarking that this was no time "for demagoguery, jokes, slurs or sarcasm . . . we should do nothing to prolong this war."[13]

In Washington Smith had opposed some defense measures which were popular in his home state. The governor was more in accord with public opinion when he said, "Now is the time to fight the Japs and the Germans and not the administration." Also working against the elderly Smith was his declining physical condition, visible to the electorate. He had difficulty standing up on the platform at public meetings. In the July 25 balloting Johnston polled a substantial majority and led "Cotton Ed" by over 40,000 votes. Victory in the Democratic primary was tantamount to election.[14]

Assuming his new post in January 1945, the junior senator from South Carolina was liberal on most issues except foreign aid and civil rights. The Marshall Plan he regarded as "designed for big industry" and not likely to help Europe's needy people. President Harry S. Truman's backing of the civil rights movement offended him, and in the months preceding the Democratic national convention in Philadelphia in July 1948, Johnston spoke disparagingly of him. He hoped that Dwight D. Eisenhower would be the Democratic nominee for the White House, but the general was not interested in a political race.[15]

In July 1948, after Truman secured the nomination and called Congress into special session, the man from Spartanburg criticized him sharply. He was confident that the Southerners in Congress would fight any attempt to push through civil rights legislation. "We will not be clubbed into subservience to the will of a man who has defied his party and the will of the American people by kidnapping a nomination for the presidency." One month later he was less critical of Truman, and speculated that the calling of the special session had caused the Republicans some embarrassment. Now he believed that the president had strengthened the Democrats' chances to win in November.[16]

The senator did not endorse the "Dixiecrat" ticket of South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond (for president) and Mississippi Governor Fielding Wright (for vice-president). As always, he stood by the national Democratic party, and was quoted as saying that South Carolinians could not "be in the party and out of it at the same time." If that party gained control of Congress, he forecast, Southerners would hold important committee positions and be able to block any civil rights bills. Supporting Truman's economic program, and particularly convinced that Republican policies would harm the Southern farmer, he was among the minority of

white South Carolinians who backed the president on election day. The Thurmond-Wright "Dixiecrat" ticket swept the state.[17]

A judicial decree in 1947 changed the political atmosphere in the Palmetto state. Federal District Judge J. Waties Waring ruled that blacks could not be excluded from voting in Democratic primaries. Johnston shared the outrage of most white South Carolinians. "Judge Waring went too far in his order," he told a reporter in July 1948. "The court has no right to legislate such matters." An appeals court sustained Waring's decision, and in 1948 blacks were voting in a Democratic primary. Two years later, when the state's junior senator ran for a second term, the blacks' recently confirmed right to vote had an impact.[18]

1950: Against Strom Thurmond

In the 1948 presidential election South Carolina's white voters overwhelmingly endorsed a revolt against the national Democratic party. They had a chance to do the same two years later when choosing a senator. Thurmond, the "Dixiecrat" standard bearer of 1948, now tried to unseat a man who had always been affiliated with the national Democratic party. Thurmond believed that he stood for the true "South Carolina Democracy." He told the white people, "I stuck my neck out for you two years ago. Don't forget that I fought the fight for states' rights while my opponent ran out on the Democrats of South Carolina."[19]

Johnston wanted to fight the South's battles within the national party. This was the way that Georgia's Senator Richard B. Russell fought, and likewise many other prominent defenders of the Southern way of life. By fighting this way, Johnston asserted, Southern Democrats occupied the chairmanships of major Congressional committees, as they acquired seniority and preserved their ties with the national party. With six years in the Senate behind him, the upcountry legislator pointed out, he was building up his seniority and influence. As a member of the Senate Agriculture Committee, he noted, he had done much to help the farmers of South Carolina. Thurmond belittled this argument, commenting that his opponent "loves his patronage and his committee assignments better than he likes the people of South Carolina."[20]

Caught in the crossfire between these two hardhitting politicians were the blacks. They accounted for nearly one-seventh of the registered voters, even though they comprised about forty per cent of the state's population. More than 70,000 blacks were registered, and they did not have an attractive choice. Both candidates, battling fiercely for white support, presented themselves as ardent champions of white supremacy. Each accused the other of trying to break down segregation.

In Thurmond's words, the N.A.A.C.P. and other liberal groups were trying to re-elect a "Trumanite" by appealing to "minority bloc" voters (the blacks). The governor chided his adversary for remaining silent when Truman desegregated the armed forces, and for voting to confirm J. Howard McGrath, a pro-civil rights person, as attorney-general. Infuriated by one of his rival's comments, Johnson retorted that "any man who says that I am for the mixing of races is an unmitigated liar." He was able to throw his challenger on the defensive. On the recommendation of the state medical association, Thurmond had named a black physician to a hospital advisory board. As the senator publicized this appointment, Thurmond replied that legally he had no choice; state law required the chief executive to certify the medical association's nomination. At a rally in Charleston Johnston said, "Had I been Governor Thurmond, I would never have appointed the nigger physician of Charleston, Dr. T.C. McFall, to displace your beloved white physician of this community." This statement provoked an uproar in the black section of the meeting grounds. The senator waved and spoke into the microphone, "Make those niggers keep quiet!" Also cited against Thurmond was a letter which he had sent to the black governor of the Virgin Islands, inviting him to visit the executive mansion in Columbia. Thurmond explained apologetically that the invitation had been extended through a "clerical error."[21]

Closely related to the race question was the subject of federal aid to education. Johnston reasoned that South Carolina was so poor that federal aid was necessary to upgrade the quality of education. He insisted that federal funds would not bring integration. On the contrary, he believed, South Carolina could use federal money to elevate the black schools to a level of equality with the white facilities, and thereby forestall any breakdown of segregation. The senator quoted a recent Supreme Court ruling that the states must provide equal educational facilities for the races. He saw a need to comply with the high court's verdicts: "We don't like them, but you have to abide by the Supreme Court." He criticized his opponent for favoring foreign aid, which meant spending billions of dollars "every year to build up foreign countries -- but Thurmond opposes sending one thin dime of Federal funds to South Carolina to build up the schools of South Carolina in order to prevent the breaking down of the barriers of racial segregation, and to pay our teachers better salaries." The governor doubted that federal aid was needed. "If the federal government will cut its expenses and leave more money in this state, we can run our schools properly." He was convinced that federal subsidies would eventually bring "integration of the races and regimentation of curricula, of teachers and pupils."[22]

The two men disagreed about the Taft-Hartley Act and foreign aid. The

senator stood against the labor law, which Thurmond favored. Johnston maintained that the sending of foreign aid abroad was destroying American jobs. In his view, low paid overseas workers were producing cheap goods which competed unfairly with American goods in this country's markets. "Cheap labor and foreign goods will lose your job, your home, your car!" Thurmond believed that the foreign aid program had saved Western Europe from a communist takeover. In his words, the sending abroad of American commodities, including South Carolina cotton and tobacco, had prevented "a shooting war in Europe." The governor observed that his opponent had voted against the British loan and also against the Korean assistance act of 1949. He had joined a small "hard core of Republican isolationists in seeking to wreck this nation's effort to win the cold war against the spread of Communism."[23]

Both candidates assailed Truman whenever possible. After the Korean War began in late June, both men criticized his conduct of foreign policy. Thurmond blamed him for failing to send sufficient aid to South Korea, and for "playing politics" with national security (i.e., desegregating the armed forces). "If the president had not been so busy playing Negro politics we would not be in the serious situation we are in." Johnston, denouncing the foreign aid program, thought that the communist invasion of South Korea provided evidence that "friends cannot be bought with dollars." War materials which the United States had sent abroad, he declared, were now being used to kill American boys. The senator suggested that Truman would be delighted to have Thurmond in Washington to vote for foreign aid.[24]

Thurmond charged that a "pardon racket" had operated in Columbia during his opponent's governorship. The senator replied that the number of pardons which he had granted was grossly exaggerated, and he noted that many of his parolees had been named by Thurmond to the state constabulary. Also injected into the campaign was the question of the governor's "dignity." Thurmond, a physical fitness buff, had been photographed by **Life Magazine** standing on his head. At one meeting, when the stand-on-head matter was raised, Thurmond retorted that Johnston, as governor, had once invited a strip tease dancer to spend a night in the executive mansion.[25]

"Who Dislikes Truman Most? It's the Burning Question in South Carolina's Race for Senate." With these words the **Sumter Daily Item** described the primary contest. Johnston, identified with the national Democratic party, was more vulnerable to charges of being pro-Truman. But Thurmond's efforts to tag the senator as a "Trumanite" did not hurt fatally. The governor expected that his opponent would be backed by the New Deal - Fair Deal coalition, which included industrial workers and

blacks. These voters went solidly for Johnston, who carried 24 of 46 counties. He won the July primary with a margin of about 24,000 ballots. The election was close, and the black voters, viewing the incumbent senator as the lesser of two evils, undoubtedly made the difference between victory and defeat.[26]

1956: Against Leon Crawford

After the historic decision of May 1954, banning segregation in public schools, Johnston no longer spoke about any need to "abide by the Supreme Court." He echoed the sentiments of most white South Carolinians when he predicted that "there will be no breaking down of segregation in our schools." He remained a "Jim Crow New Dealer," and he continued to back his party's presidential nominees. In 1956, as Johnston swept to an easy re-election victory, the national Democratic presidential candidate, Adlai E. Stevenson, garnered a plurality of popular votes in South Carolina. Stevenson, who accepted integration, drew about 138,000 votes against 75,000 for Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower and 88,000 for an Independent slate of electors. The Independents, who advocated defiance of the Supreme Court decree on racial mixing, promised to vote for Virginia Senator Harry Byrd for president.[27]

Johnston's Republican opponent was Mayor Leon Crawford of Clemson, who pictured him as a friend of Northern liberals and labor leaders, people hostile to the South. The senator insisted that the region must remain Democratic and enable Southern Democrats to occupy the major Senate committee chairmanships. Only in this way, he argued, could segregation be preserved. In contrast, a Republican-dominated Congress would surely "ram integration down the throats of the South." As in the past, he described the Republican domestic policies as harmful to farmers and small businessmen. The senator polled over 200,000 votes against Crawford's 50,000. Even though there was a significant revolt against the Democratic presidential ticket, South Carolina was still a heavily Democratic state, and Crawford had no serious chance of winning. With his reputation as a staunch foe of integration, the incumbent was unbeatable.[28]

1962: Against Ernest F. Hollings and William Workman

Six years later, when Johnston ran for a fourth term, changes were evident on the political landscape. The civil rights movement had gathered momentum. The Republican party was gaining strength in the South, voicing the protest of many people against the welfare state and "big government." In 1956 Johnston's Republican rival, Crawford, took about one-fifth of the statewide vote. In 1962 his Republican challenger, William Workman, drew almost forty-three per cent.

In 1962 the upcountry legislator faced Ernest F. Hollings of Charleston, the state's young and attractive governor, in the Democratic primary. Calling himself a conservative, Hollings embraced the principles of free enterprise and disdained "government intervention" in the economy. In his words, Johnston was a friend of Northern labor bosses who wished to prevent industrial growth in the South. Hollings deplored the senator's opposition to the Taft-Hartley Act, which allowed state right-to-work laws. The governor maintained that South Carolina's right-to-work law was a key factor in luring industry to the state.[29]

Johnston took credit for attracting industry and jobs during his governorship (1935 - 39 and 1943 - 44), while the incumbent chief executive made similar claims for the years since 1959. The senator was proud of his reputation as a friend of labor. "Yes, labor is for me -- organized and unorganized. And they've got a reason." He emphasized his seniority in the Senate, pointing to his chairmanship of the Post Office Committee and vice-chairmanship of the Agriculture Committee. In his words, he had done much to help the state's farmers, and he had worked to block civil rights bills. And once again, as in past campaigns, he reminded his constituents of his status as a "dry."[30]

Hollings contended that the senator's long record of service had not really benefitted South Carolina. In his view, the A.F.L. - C.I.O. was the real possessor of Johnston's seniority. He called his opponent a man who claimed power but apparently had none. He charged that his rival, as head of the Post Office Committee, had done nothing about a black postal carrier accused of indecent exposure while on the job.[31]

The governor's arguments did not sway the electorate, and the primary result in June was one-sided. Only one county (Calhoun) went for Hollings, who polled about 110,000 votes against 216,000 for the winner.

The Republican aspirant in the general election was William D. Workman, a Columbia journalist who believed that John F. Kennedy's Democratic administration was taking the country to "state socialism." While Johnston advocated medical care for the aged, financed through Social Security, his opponent rejected this proposal and other parts of the New Frontier program. Attempting to stir racial feelings, Workman criticized the federal government's use of force to integrate the University of Mississippi. He laughingly suggested that the United States could resolve the Mississippi and Cuban crises by enrolling James Meredith at the University of Havana. (The Cuban missile crisis occurred while this campaign was in progess.) Workman and his followers contended that a victory for the incumbent senator would be a vote of confidence for Kennedy.[32]

Stressing his seniority and economic issues, Johnston again named the Republican party as the party of the rich and the privileged. Still a "Jim Crow New Dealer," he sought to reassure whites that he was fighting for the Southern way of life. One of his pamphlets mentioned his record of "filibustering against all kinds of Civil Rights legislation, and working with other Southern leaders to out-maneuver Northern liberals." A few months before the election he made a Senate speech denouncing Thurgood Marshall, a black lawyer, as unfit to serve as a federal appeals judge in New York.[33]

At the same time Johnston was the only candidate for any office who published an advertisement in a black newspaper, the **Palmetto Times** (Columbia). His message to the blacks highlighted his seniority as beneficial to South Carolina; no comments were made about civil rights or racial matters. In late October about thrity-five black leaders met in Orangeburg to discuss the election. While believing that blacks had little to choose from among the candidates, they preferred the Democrats, and they regarded Workman as obnoxious. J.B. Drake, one of these black leaders, remarked, "One thing Johnston has done, he has found it very necessary to be out of town when the time comes to vote on civil rights legislation so that he would not have to vote for or against civil rights. He has not yet come out against our people."[34]

The senator tried to put some distance between himself and Kennedy. In one speech he denied that he had been solidly for the president's program, noting that on 94 votes he had been with the administration 59 times and against 35 times. In 1962 as in 1950, when he faced Thurmond, he wanted to avoid close identification with a pro-civil rights liberal Democratic president. In November he won his fourth term, but the Republicans were gaining ground in South Carolina. Workman polled 133,930 votes against 178,712 for the incumbent.[35]

Two years later, during the presidential contest between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater, the senator stood by his party, and he worked closely with a black civil rights leader, I. DeQuincy Newman, on behalf of the Democratic ticket. The Republican nominee, Goldwater, he characterized as a "trigger happy reactionary." In 1964 South Carolina resisted the national trend by giving its electoral votes to the Republicans.[36]

Johnston, who died in 1965, was primarily concerned with economic growth and prosperity, and secondarily interested in racial questions. Black voters, who overwhelmingly favored the national Democratic economic programs, supported the senator. During his last years he made some conciliatory gestures toward the black community.

[1]The "Jim Crow" label was used by the Charleston **News and Courier**, July 12, 1944.

On Johnston's early years, Anthony B. Miller, "Palmetto Politician: The Early Career of Olin D. Johnston, 1896 - 1945" (Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina, 1976), has been helpful. For the early campaigns, these have also been consulted: Martha Bouknight, "The Senatorial Campaigns of Ellison D. ('Cotton Ed') Smith of South Carolina" (M.A. thesis, Florida State University, 1961), and Marvin Cann, "Burnet R. Maybank and the New Deal in South Carolina, 1931 - 1941" (Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina, 1967).

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I am grateful to these persons who granted me interviews: State Senator Elizabeth Patterson, December 29, 1985; Mrs. John Bolt Culbertson, August 18, 1985; former Congressman W.J. Bryan Dorn, August 17, 1985; and the late Senator I. DeQuincy Newman, August 30, 1985.

[2]**The State** (Columbia), June 15, 17, 19, 22, July 13, August 3, 24, 30, 1938.

[3]**Ibid.**, June 15, July 8, 9, 12, August 3, 1938.

[4]**Ibid.**, June 15, 16, 17, August 3, 20, 25, 1938; Charleston **News and Courier**, June 27, August 2, 1938.

[5]**The State**, August 3, 12, September 1, 1938; **Greenville News**, September 1, 1938; **New York Times**, August 31, 1938.

[6]**The State**, August 3, 5, 7, 27, September 2, 14, 1941.

[7]**Ibid.**, August 28, 30, September 2, 4, 11, 1941.

[8]**Ibid.**, September 11, 1941.

[9]**Ibid.**, September 14, 1941.

[10]**Ibid.**, June 15, 1944; Charleston **News and Courier**, July 1, 12, 1944.

[11]**The State**, June 15, 1944.

[12]**Ibid.**, May 25, 1944; Charleston **News and Courier**, July 6, 12, 1944.

[13]**Ibid.**, July 8, 15, 1944; **The State**, July 15, 1944.

[14]Charleston **News and Courier**, July 6, 1944; **Greenville News**, July 27, 1944; **New York Times**, July 26, 27, 1944; Interview with former Congressman W.J. Bryan Dorn, August 17, 1985.

[15]**The State**, March 16, 27, May 17, July 1, 7, 1948.

[16]**Ibid.**, July 17, August 8, 1948.

[17]**Ibid.**, August 19, November 4, 11, 1948.

[18]**Ibid.**, July 29, 1948. At this time the senator urged the Democratic party of South Carolina to appeal Judge Waring's order that it must enroll blacks.

[19]**Ibid.**, July 2, 1950; **Greenville News**, June 3, 1950.

[20]**Ibid.**, June 3, 1950; **Anderson Independent**, June 1, 1950; Charleston **News and Courier**, July 5, 1950; **The State**, July 5, 6, 1950.

[21]**Ibid.**, June 9, July 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 1950; **Anderson Independent**, June 23, 1950; Charleston **News and Courier**, July 7, 8, 9, 1950.

[22]**The State**, June 7, 10, 25, July 23, 1950; **Greenville News**, June 3, 7, 1950; **Anderson Independent**, June 4, 1950. On June 3, the South Carolina House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the state's Congressional delegation to back a bill providing annual appropriations to aid South Carolina's schools. The state's lower house also passed a concurrent resolution, pointing out that the Supreme Court had ruled that each state must provide equal school facilities for both races in order that segregation might continue.

[23]**Ibid.**, June 30, 1950; **The State**, July 2, 7, 1950.

[24]**New York Times**, July 8, 1950; Charleston **News and Courier**, July 9, 1950.

[25]**Ibid.**, July 2, 1950; **Anderson Independent**, June 23, 1950; **The State**, July 2, 10, 1950; **New York Times**, July 9, 1950.

[26]**Sumter Daily Item.**, June 21, 1950, in Strom Thurmond Scrapbook on 1950 election, Clemson University Library; **New York Times**, July 9, 12, 13, 1950. The late I.D. Newman, a civil rights leader, told the author that the black voters overwhelmingly backed Johnston. Interview with Newman, August 30, 1985.

[27]**The State**, January 27, 1956.

[28]**Ibid.**, June 16, October 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, November 7, 1956; Charleston **News and Courier**, October 30, November 2, 3, 5, 7, 1956.

[29]**The State**, April 4, 24, May 1, 5, June 11, 1962.

[30]**Ibid.**, April 15, 24, 26, May 1, 5, 9, 17, 23, 1962.

[31]**Ibid.**, April 26, May 5, 9, June 11, 1962.

[32]**Ibid.**, October 20, 23, 24, November 3, 1962.

[33]**Ibid.**, October 20, 25, November 2, 1962; Campaign pamphlet and text of speech opposing Thurgood Marshall (September 11), 1962 Campaign material, Olin D. Johnston Papers, University of South Carolina Library.

[34]**Palmetto Times** (Columbia), October 25, November 1, 1962; **The State**, October 25, 1962.

[35]**Greenville News**, November 3, 1962.

[36]**Ibid.**, October 16, 1964; Interview with Newman, August 30, 1985; Interview with State Senator Elizabeth Patterson, December 29, 1985.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHARLESTON EARTHQUAKE

Kenneth E. Peters

Nearly 100 years ago the eastern United States experienced a great earthquake. This earthquake affected an unprecedented area of over two-million-square-miles.[1] It was perceived by millions of Americans from Florida to Michigan and from New Jersey to slightly west of the Mississippi River, making this seismic event one of the most widely felt earthquakes in American history. In comparison, the famous San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 rocked and jolted an area one twentieth as extensive.

The closest major settlement to the source, or epicenter, of this tectonic earthquake was Charleston, South Carolina. For this reason the earthquake generally has been known as the Charleston Earthquake, even though the true epicenter for the disturbance probably lies closer to Summerville, South Carolina, some 22 miles northwest of Charleston.

The great earthquake struck Charleston after sundown at 9:51 p.m., 75th Meridian Time, on Tuesday, August 31, 1886. It was the strongest earthquake that Charleston, than South Carolina's largest municipality and commercial hub, ever had experienced. The earthquake had the high intensity of X on a 12-point scale and a magnitude of 7 on a 10-point scale.[2] It and the most powerful of its 79 or more aftershocks sheared over 14,000 chimneys at the roof lines, toppled walls, parapets, and cornices, cracked plaster, and heavily damaged or seriously weakened upwards of two thirds of the city's buildings (including almost all of its brick structures). The earthquake and its aftershocks caused destruction ranging from $5,000,000 to $6,000,000 to a proud and historic southern port city of 62,000 people (32,540 blacks and 29,460 whites) whose estimated total assets in building structures stood at between $20,000,000 and $25,000,000.[3]

When daylight broke on Wednesday, September 1, 1886, it was all too obvious that something could have been finer than Carolina in the morning. Abundant visible proof of the earthquake's nocturnal visitation was omnipresent. The city of Charleston indeed had lived through a nightmare.

Evidence of wholesale devastation could be seen in just about all of South Carolina's "Queen City's" wards. The great earthquake and earthquake-initiated fires had leveled dozens of houses and other structures. Many of the city's streets were impassable, being blocked by tons of fallen bricks and other debris. Choking dust filled the air as Charlestonians congregated nervously and dazed in the city's squares, parks, vacant lots, and few other open areas. No respecter of race or socio-economic class, the earthquake had exacted a toll from Charlestonians whether they were black

or white, rich or poor, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, immigrants or scions of old Charleston families.

The unexpected seismic catastrophe that so greatly injured Charleston's real estate also contributed directly to the deaths of 83 individuals and physical injury and severe mental anguish to several hundred more persons in a city that had had more than its fair share of misfortunes. For many residents of Charleston and South Carolina, the earthquake seemed to cap the natural calamities and man-made disasters that had beset South Carolina's "City by the Sea" over a number of generations. Charleston had a long-standing tradition of recuperating from horrible epidemics of measles, yellow fever, smallpox, and influenza since its founding at the confluence of the Ashley and the Cooper rivers on Oyster Point in 1680; likewise it had an amazing capacity of recovering from hurricanes, cyclones, and great fires. During the Civil War, it even had survived a nasty artillery bombardment by General Quincy A. Gilmore's troops who, among other things, had sent ten shells crashing into the sanctuary of St. Philip's Episcopal Church, demolishing it and the church's expensive pipe organ. But, when the great earthquake struck, many Charlestonians had serious misgivings whether they and their city could muster enough pluck and mettle to surmount one more major challenge to Charleston's integrity. Yet, in the wake of the earthquake crisis, Charleston and its populace somehow found the strength to overcome adversity and press on with "business as usual."

This illustrated short paper will focus on some of the economic consequences that the Charleston Earthquake had for Charleston and its people. It will touch on how Charlestonians coped with the immediate herculean task of disaster relief -- how they dealt with such matters as caring for the injured, infirm, destitute, demoralized and psychologically disturbed individuals, how they managed with giving food, shelter, and other sustenance to those persons that the earthquake had displaced from their regular residences or had deprived of their livelihoods, and how they handled rebuilding or replacing their fractured dwellings, businesses, churches, and public buildings. It also will highlight how they restored public confidence in the viability of Charleston's business and commercial institutions and recaptured or captured markets that would give Charleston the income necessary to regain its economic status and well-being and to continue the steady progress that it had made in manufacturing and commerce since the early 1870's.[4]

However, before treating these economic consequences of the Charleston Earthquake, let us gain a visual perspective of the problem by viewing about 30 slides of Charleston and Charleston area houses and other buildings as they appeared after the great earthquake.

The following 35 mm. slides are of photographs that Charleston photographer George L. Cook and other photographers took during the first several weeks after the Charleston earthquake. They graphically illustrate the extent to which Charleston and its environs were damaged by an unusually powerful earthquake. If people visit Charleston today and look closely at some of the old buildings, they may be able to detect scars which the earthquake caused nearly a century ago.

[the slide show]

It cannot be pinpointed with any degree of precision just when disaster relief from the Charleston Earthquake began and when it ended. Perhaps it commenced in those dark and dust-choked moments immediately after the initial shock of earthquake at 9:51 p.m., when old women were seen with hatchets chopping away at debris as they tried to free trapped relatives and salvage family possessions. It well may have continued beyond the year 1887 to about 1910, originally to commemorate Charleston's economic deliverance from the earthquake and to promote commerce and to bring capital to Charleston. However, the important point is not when relief came to Charleston, but rather that it came.

Disaster relief connected with the 1886 Charleston Earthquake assumed many different forms. Some of the relief was spontaneous and unsolicited, while some was solicited and organized. Some of the relief was designed to satisfy earthquake victims' pressing needs for such items as health care, food, pure water, clothing, and shelter. Other disaster relief was concerned more with long-term issues such as the complete repair, renovation, or reconstruction of earthquake-damaged structures. Relief also covered a wide spectrum of efforts designed to assist earthquake victims. Sometimes these efforts were but kind words. Other times they were efforts to feed, clothe, and shelter earthquake victims, to secure employment for those made jobless by the earthquake, to rehabilitate private residences so that they again could be occupied by the time cold and blustery weather arrived, to repair churches, business houses, factories, government buildings, and structures used by schools and various fraternal groups, and to provide the overall cultural, governmental, economic, and financial climate which would stimulate Charleston's full recovery from an event that had prostrated a great American city of the South and deeply interfered with the lives and livelihoods of persons throughout South Carolina and other states.

Many of the disaster relief efforts were initiated locally almost immediately after the earthquake, many being nothing more than self help or family member assisting family member, friend assisting friend, and neighbor assisting neighbor with problems and needs arising from the earth-

quake. Charleston firemen, policemen, physicians, nurses, clergymen, and city employees did what they could to handle the incumbent problems of the first night and the following several days. But it soon became clear that these local relief initiatives would not suffice to solve the myriad problems that the great earthquake had caused Charleston. Outside help and disaster relief would need to be encouraged and enlisted. Yet, Charlestonians and other persons concerned with Charleston's recovery were not all of one opinion as to what form disaster relief should take or how it should be administered.

Advocates of state aid hoped for the state of South Carolina to come quickly to the assistance of Charleston. However, there was little that the State could do because of prohibitions in its constitution and the unpreparedness of its government to act effectively and swiftly in this crisis. The state could repair or reconstruct its own buildings damaged in the earthquake, but that was about all that it could do. Some state politicians talked of relief for Charleston, but with the legislature not scheduled to meet until November 23, 1886, most realists knew that the state could be counted on for little immediate assistance.[5] State officials were sympathetic to Charleston's plight, and Governor John C. Sheppard from the outset was in contact with Charleston's municipal officials; he even made a trip to Charleston on September 5 to assess the extent of damage. However, Sheppard, greatly limited in his executive powers by the state's constitution and intimidated to a degree by its powerful legislature, seemed powerless and maybe unwilling to mount any full-scale campaign of state aid unless Charleston city officials and low-country politicians and their friends pleaded with him to do so. State aid for Charleston's recovery was a political "hot potato" that Sheppard preferred not to have to juggle, especially when the state aid advocated came to be less advocated for things such as food, clothing, and temporary shelter and more for the repair of Charleston private residences. Even pressure from several important Charleston businessmen and pro-state-aid articles and editorials in three or four leading South Carolina daily newspapers, including **The Columbia Register** and **The [Orangeburg] Times and Democrat** could not convince Sheppard to call an extra session of the legislature so that a constitutional amendment could be proposed aimed at easing the burden for Charleston homeowners and landlords. Meanwhile, the governor and the state's government did what little they could do to channel asssistance to Charleston and indicate their willingness to present to the regular session of the legislature those other earthquake disaster relief measures which they deemed essential.[6]

Proponents of federal aid earthquake relief for Charleston were eager to suggest that the Federal Government offer Charleston considerable help in its recovery from the great earthquake. The Federal Government acted with alacrity in announcing plans for repairing Federal buildings and facilities in-

jured by the earthquake, in sending several large hospital tents from Washington's Marine Hospital to Charleston to shelter patients of Charleston's hospitals all of whom had to be relocated because of severe damage to the hospital buildings, in sending scientists to investigate the cause of the earthquake, and in sending engineers and architects to Charleston to aid local personnel with inspection of the city's buildings for earthquake injury. It also acted swiftly in dispatching a Department of the Treasury revenue cutter to Charleston with a Wilmington, NC, citizens' relief committee on board which had provisions for Charleston's needy citizens. But, on the whole, the Federal Government provided little to a city that needed so very much.

Some Charlestonians, particularly a number of influential financiers, sought to bring Federal money to Charleston through complicated lending operations and other financial packages. Two local financial organization, the Charleston Exchange and the Merchants' Exchange of Charleston, as early as September 3, adopted a resolution petitioning the President and the Congress for a federal loan of 10-million-dollars under which owners of damaged Charleston residences could finance repairs of these structures at low interest rates over a long period of time.[7] Talk of this loan was pervasive during most of the fall of 1886. But, while some Charleston businessmen pushed hard for this form of federal aid, others maneuvered just as hard to block it and all other such federal aid. "Strict constructionist" Charlestonians and South Carolinians had carried the day when they had spurned federal aid after the Charleston Cyclone of 1885, and they were just as determined to prevail again despite the greater damages wrought by the earthquake.[8]

One of these "strict constructionists" was William L. Trenholm, who seemed to have as many or more close contacts in the various national exchanges and banking institutions as did his rivals who touted federal aid. With men like Trenholm in opposition, federal aid proponents would find it very difficult to engender enthusiasm for their proposals, and they did.[9]

In addition to the moribund efforts to provide disaster relief to Charleston through state aid and through federal aid, there were many other strategies aimed at combating Charleston's economic plight. "Sympathy, money, and business -- all three in great abundance," said **The [Orangeburg] Times and Democrat**, would bring Charleston's recovery.[10] To a remarkable extent that newspaper was correct. Although some individuals tendered Charleston only their sympathy, many others connected their sympathy with their pocketbooks and sent Charlestonians money to use for disaster relief, assisted them by doing business with Charleston firms, or helped individual Charlestonians and Charleston enterprises by easing credit, payment, etc. Charleston's agents sought major donations

and financial favors from the large banking and commercial houses and exchanges in the North and elsewhere, and they also petitioned them for leniency toward Charleston merchants, some of whom were in arrears in their payments because of the earthquake.[11] These agents were successful in a number of these ventures.

Many businesses did special favors for their customers who were earthquake victims. All three of South Carolina's major railroads maintaining connections with Charleston aided relief efforts by awarding free passes or reduced fares to Charleston earthquake refugees who were certified as being too poor to pay for tickets to take them out of the beleaguered city to friends or relatives in South Carolina's midlands or piedmont.[12] The South Carolina Railroad Company even placed several rooms in the Union Depot over their main offices in Columbia at the disposal of the Columbia Relief Committee for temporary quartering of indigent earthquake refugees from Charleston and Summerville.[13] Telegraph companies sent wired earthquake subscriptions monies free of any charges. Life insurance companies, like the Equitable Life Assurance Society and the Mutual Life Insurance Company, allowed Charleston policyholders an extra grace period of 60 days to pay their premiums.[14]

When Francis W. Dawson's **News and Courier**, which acted as a mouthpiece for earthquake news and relief efforts, ran a major nationally syndicated article headlined "Charleston Ready for Business," in its September 3 issue in an effort to convince readers that the earthquake had not annihilated most of Charleston's wholesalers and other business houses and in an effort to buoy Charleston's commercial sales, and thus speed relief and recovery in Charleston, most South Carolina newspapers and the communities which they served paid heed. Most of these newspapers subsequently ran editorials encouraging local persons and businesses to increase their trade with Charleston business concerns.[15] Most newspapers ran statements similar to the one that **The Anderson Intelligencer** for September 9 carried which said, "Charleston is the commercial hope of our State, and her prosperity is a matter of interest to all our people." But, behind some of these outpourings of charity lurked old frictions and commercial rivalries. Such was the case with Georgetown, whose newspaper **The Enquirer** was prompt to fault Charleston and its **News and Courier** for slighting Georgetown, which, the paper alleged, had raised more money for Charleston's recovery than had any other community in South Carolina except for Columbia. **The Enquirer**, while agreeing that Georgetown customers and firms should cultivate trade with Charleston, turned progressively parochial, and it cautioned Georgetown residents to trade only with those Charleston merchants who advertised in **The Enquirer.**[16] Similar glints of commercial jealousy and/or local economic selfishness manifested themselves in the **Aiken Recorder** and the **Newberry Herald and News** in

editorials appearing respectively on September 9 and September 8.

While Charlestonians in 1886 and 1887 endeavored to do whatever they could to restore their city to its pre-earthquake grandeur, it was obvious to most of them that they could not achieve this goal by their own initiative alone. Had not other individuals, groups, and governments come to their aid, Charleston may have had a much longer and more difficult time in its recovery.

By far the largest, most significant, best documented, and also the most organized, successful, and appreciated relief efforts connected with the Charleston Earthquake were those which Charleston's municipal government sponsored and coordinated. The city of Charleston initiated its official earthquake relief efforts on Friday, September 3, when William E. Huger, Charleston's acting mayor, called a meeting of the Charleston City Council. The Council, believing that Charleston needed prompt relief, feeling that the relief needed was well beyond the capacity of the regular municipal relief agencies (all of whose facilities had been crippled or impaired by the earthquake) to provide, and anticipating the stream of financial assistance from places outside of Charleston, created the Executive Relief Committee (ERC). The ERC, then consisting only of three persons, was charged with the oversight of the provision of shelter, the distribution of food, clothing, bedding, and other rations, and the dispensation of other relief to earthquake sufferers as could be afforded with monies being received for relief. The work of the first ERC and its appointed committees commenced on September 4. But the life of this ERC was brief. However, its ambitious activities paved the way for the more extensive and less frenetic efforts of its successor of the same name.

The second ERC was the brainchild of Charleston's very popular mayor, William A. Courtenay, who, shortly after his return to Charleston from a trip to England, on September 7 reorganized the ERC and increased its membership so as "to embrace representative men from all classes of citizens."[17] It was Courtenay's intention that the new ERC should assist not just certain elements of Charleston's population but all of its people who had been left destitute by the earthquake regardless of social class, race, ethnic background, occupation, or religious preference. The mayor also entertained hopes that the ERC's relief efforts would tower above all others being undertaken. He believed that the establishment of one comprehensive relief agency such as the ERC would enjoy significant advantages. For one thing, he saw it as having more potential for raising more money for relief than smaller, less visible fund-raising efforts were doing or would be capable of doing. Second, he looked to the ERC to foster a sense of unity and local pride among the people of Charleston. Third, he believed that

with the ERC serving as the recipient and collector of contributions, donors would be spared the frustration of being dunned repeatedly by so many Charleston groups and their friends, all seeking gifts for their own pet relief operation. Fourth, he felt that the ERC would be about the only vehicle through which these destitute persons in Charleston having no ties to other charity could be helped. Fifth, he felt that the ERC could so conduct its own operations as to encourage the indigent and the destitute to gain meaningful employment so that these persons could begin to help themselves and, thus, eliminate the need for further relief from the ERC, which then could pass out of existence, its purpose fulfilled.

The ERC under Mayor Courtenay held regular meetings from September 10, 1886, to January 10, 1887, most of the time meeting once each day. It remained a viable agency until it submitted its final report to the City Council on March 22, 1887. The ERC was responsible for the disbursement of $646,109.90, which it ultimately received in contributions.[10] Its busiest and most hectic days were those immediately after the earthquake, when the human needs seemed to be the greatest. Although it made mistakes and sometime rankled and antagonized, its generally professional, caring, and efficient style of performance drew high commendation and praise locally, state-wide, nationally, and even internationally.

The ERC, unlike so many of the other relief efforts connected with the Charleston Earthquake, intrinsically did not have as its primary goal the solicitation of monies. It usually relied on individuals and groups aligned and friendly to it to provide it with the wherewithal to carry on its work. Nonethless, because the compass of its activities was directly determined by the money in its coffers, the ERC naturally was supportive of any enterprise designed to enhance its financial position. Indeed, there were moments during the fall of 1886 when the ERC had serious doubts about whether enough disaster relief revenue was being generated. But, when shortfalls in relief money threatened the ERC's efforts, it prevailed on its supporters to canvass for funds, often using the newspapers to broadcast its appeals. Fortunately, Mayor Courtenay and the ERC knew well the value of the press for exploiting the sympathies and pocketbooks of persons and groups throughout the nation who possessed the material wealth that they needed. Thus, when money problems arose in mid-September, Mayor Courtenay, through **The News and Courier**, issued his famous "Proclamation" of September 17, appealing to the "Press of the United States to give this proclamation the benefit of its far reaching circulation."[19] The Associated Press wire service helped along this proclamation, as did the newspapers themselves. This strategy worked well, so well that the flow of contributions increased to the point that the ERC on October 5, with the City Council's backing, decided to end the active solicitation of monies under the mayor's

proclamation.[20]

Most communities in South Carolina were very willing to assist Charleston's recovery. Examples of great outpourings of sympathy and financial aid and other support were evidenced throughout the state. Aiken's efforts were perhaps typical.

Aiken established a relief committee two days after the earthquake, and the **Aiken Journal and Review** posted a subscription list at its office. By September 11, the people of Aiken county had subscribed a total of $1,120.59 to Charleston's ERC. The total included monies from the Aiken town council, the Aiken Baptist Church, the Aiken Episcopal Church, and Aiken Citizens' group, and the Graniteville Relief Association. Later, still other groups joined in to boost the total; these groups included the Aiken African Methodist Episcopal Church, the Masons, and the Aiken Methodist Church.

Besides the monies and goods that they sent to Charleston, Aikenites were not in the least reticent about helping the many earthquake refugees who flooded into Aiken county following the earthquake. The **Aiken Recorder** for a while in September printed the names of recent Charleston and Summerville refugees and where they were staying in Aiken. Kinsfolk and friends of the low country sojourners made room for these displaced souls in their homes, and generous landlords, like Henry Hahn, a German emigree, gave rent-free shelter in several of his Aiken houses to a number of such persons. Hahn's charity motivated other Aiken landlords to at least offer reduced rates in their rooming houses and hotels to the refugees.

Eschewing financial help from the national govenment and even state aid for Charleston, Aiken's two local newspapers advanced their own panaceas for Charleston's economic recovery as well as mirrored the economic philosophies of individuals and special interest groups in the area. Particularly interesting were the economic remedies that they proposed for the revitalization of Charleston's trade and commerce.

On September 15 the **Journal and Review** ran an editorial strongly suggesting that Aiken county farmers and merchants pay up or even pay in advance to ease the economic pressures being put on the Charleston business community by the earthquake. By September 21 the **Aiken Recorder** was editorially echoing the same message and was calling on Aiken merchants to increase their orders and to throw as much of their trade to Charleston as was "compatible with sound business principles" in order to stimulate Charleston's economy. Yet, it was clear that the assistance of the **Recorder** was not totally disinterested because in another editorial on the very same page the newspaper stated that ". . . The Charleston merchants should not

only send out their drummers but they should do what they never have done in a proper amount, viz. advertise liberally in the country press."[21]

It is sheer conjecture whether or not Charlestonians took seriously such ruminations from Aiken or from any other place or persons. It also is conjecture to speculate whether the earthquake of August 31, 1886, greatly interfered with Charleston's long-term economic development. What is clear, though, from a painstaking scrutiny of newspapers, letters, journals, reports, and other documents contemporary with the earthquake, is that the earthquake generally was a sizeable temporary economic setback to Charleston. Yet, it was a setback which Charlestonians, through remarkable initiative, enterprise, and effort, were able to greatly meliorate.

Carl McKinley in the last two pages of his 94-page, very informative "A Descriptive Narrative of the Earthquake of August 31, 1886" that appeared in the city of Charleston's **Year Book - 1886** remarked that Charleston's economic recovery had "been marvelously rapid and thorough." McKinley's account, which was published at least nine months after the earthquake, may not be completely objective in its appraisal. However, it leaves the reader with the unshaken impression that Charlestonians successfully weathered the earthquake crisis and, by themselves and with outside help, rebuilt their beloved city and its economy. McKinley admitted that "lingering signs of the distrubance" remained, but that "the energy of the citizens, reinforced by the generous aid of the people of the nation, and of friends beyond the sea, ha[d] well nigh cancelled the last visible tokens of the play of the vast forces of nature . . . [and that] growth ha[d] followed recovery; nay, ha[d] accompanied it, hand in hand."

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[1]T.R. Visvanathan, **Earthquakes in South Carolina, 1698 - 1975**. Bulletin 40 (Columbia: SC Geological Survey, 1980) and G.A. Bollinger, **A Catalog of Southeastern United States Earthquakes, 1754 through 1974**. Research Division Bulletin 101 (Blacksburg: Department of Geological Sciences, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1975).

[2]Ibid. Charleston experienced earthquakes in 1698, 1754, 1757, 1766, 1799, 1816, 1817, 1857, 1860, and 1876 prior to the 1886 earthquakes, but the 1886 events dwarfed all of these earlier tectonic events. Interestingly Charleston physician and historian David Ramsay and Charleston architect Robert Mills both give scant attention to these earlier earthquakes. It is true that five occurred after Ramsay wrote his book and three happened after Mills compiled and wrote his famous study on South Carolina; however, their identical statement that "From the fatal consequences of earthquakes, we are happily exempt," from hindsight seems foolishly naive. Ramsay passes off the earthquakes of May 19, 1754, and April 4, 1799, as rather mild ones; he then writes, "Though earthquakes in Carolina are harmless, thunder storms are not always so . . . ." Mills echoes Ramsay verbatim. See David Ramsay, **Ramsay's History of South Carolina from Its First Settlement in 1670 to the Year 1808**. Vol. III (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Company, 1858), 171, and Robert Mills, **Statistics of South Carolina** (Charleston: Hurlbut and Lloyd, 1826), 67.

[3][Charleston] News and Courier, **Annual Trade Review - 1886 - 1887 (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co., Printers, 1887).**

[4]**W.H. Callcott, editor, South Carolina: Economic and Social Conditions in 1944** (Columbia: USC Press, 1945), 51.

[5]**The Columbia Daily Register**, September 9, 1886. The reluctance of South Carolina's government to act was alluded to in an editorial in this newspaper which said: "We see the poor Charleston sufferers are looking to Congress for help to build up their ruined city. God grant they may get it . . . Nevertheless we cannot see with what grace we can ask anything from the Federal Government until the State of South Carolina herself has shown the willingness to help her own people in their dire calamity . . ."

[6]Letters of Governor J.C. Sheppard, Columbia, October 4 and 5, 1886, to William A. Courtenay, Courtnay Scrapbook, Vol. III, 127-128, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina (SCL-USC).

[7]**The Columbia Daily Register**, September 4, 1886.

[8]**The Cincinnati [OH] Commercial Gazette**, September 4, 1886.

For a detailed explanation of William L. Trenholm's views on federal aid and for a look at his own detailed plan for the formation of a joint stock company under the laws of South Carolina which would be able to assist home owners in Charleston and Summerville with financing repairs to their residences at low interest rates see: Letter [copy], W.E. Dodge, New York, September 10, 1886, and Letter [copy], W.L. Trenholm, Washington, September 14, 1886, to W.E. Dodge, Courtenay Scrapbook, Vol III, 109 - 110, SCL-USC.

[10]**The [Orangeburg] Times and Democrat**, September 9, 1886.

[11]Letter of J.B. Lanneau, New York, September 11, 1886, to Mayor Courtenay, Courtenay Scrapbook, Vol III, 114, SCL-USC.

[12]Letter of Maggie [Mrs, James Simmons], Charleston, September 12, 1886, Bryce Family Papers, SCL-USC. Later in September, October, and November railroad lines which had provided such services to earthquake refugees recouped their lost revenues by sponsoring special "excursion trains." These excursion trains transported citizens from many South Carolina, Georgia, and North Carolina communities to Charleston so that they could have first-hand views of the damage and evidence of the great earthquake. Most of these trains were filled to capacity. One newspaper account tells of an excursion train for blacks only that was chartered to go to Charleston from Cheraw, SC. By mid-September the railroad companies serving Charleston restricted their giving of free passes out of Charleston and Summerville to indigent women and children; however, by that time most of those persons seeking escape from Charleston and its environs already had departed. Acccording to **The Columbia Daily Register** for September 9, 1886, the exodus from Charleston was "beginning to slow to a trickle."

[13]**The Columbia Daily Record**, September 9, 1886.

[14]**The New York Evening Post**, September 2 and 3, 1886.

[15]**[Charleston, SC] Southern Christian Advocate**, September 9, 1886. South Carolina newspapers and many out-of-state newspapers also often carried advertisements for earthquake memorabilia, especially bottles of earthquake sand and photographs of earthquake damages in Charleston. Photographers came from as far away as Boston and New York to photograph earthquake-injured structures so that they could market these views to South Carolinians and other persons, of course, for handsome profit. Some newspapers ran advertisements for products designed to capitalize on the earthquake mania. Many stores advertised earthquake sales or a "shake down" in prices; Charleston's Palmetto Brewery ran a large advertisement for what it called "Earthquake Beer." Enough of such sensational advertising occurred as to warrant an historical study.

[16]**The [Georgetown] Enquirer**, September 8 and 15, and December 22, 1886.

[17]City of Charleston, SC, **Year Book - 1887** (Charleston: Lucas, Richardson and Company, 1887) 300.

[18]City of Charleston, SC, "Minutes of the Executive Relief Committee, 1886 - 1887," 13, Charleston City Archives, Charleston. **The Annual Trade Review - 1886-1887** on pages 2, 6, and 7 says that in addition to the $646,109.90 contributed to the ERC, societies and lodges raised $50,000, individuals raised $25,000, and the churches raised $288,000, making a total of $1,009,109.90.

[19]**The [Charleston] News and Courier** September 18, 1886. On September 15 Mayor Courtenay reported that he and the ERC had received only a little over $200,000 to be spent on disaster relief. He, the City Council, and the ERC determined that this amount was far below what they needed, knowing that damages to buildings alone had been estimated at over $5,000,000. See **The Charlotte [NC] Home-Democrat**, September 15, 1886.

[20]**The [Charleston] News and Courier**, October 6, 1886.

[21]**The [Aiken] Recorder**, September 21, 1886.

THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY COMES TO CHARLESTON: THE HOSPITAL STRIKE OF 1969

Stephen O'Neill

The Charleston hospital workers' strike of 1969 provides an important opportunity to understand the city's race relations and how those relations entered a crisis that would fundamentally transform them. Until now, the hospital strike has been portrayed by historians as primarily a labor struggle or as an ill-fated but potentially revolutionary attempt to ally northern union strength with the southern civil rights movement.[1] The first interpretation does not appreciate the real underlying source of the workers' dissatisfaction. The second view looks at the strike in terms of what it might have accomplished but did not. Both of these approaches overlook the primary importance of the event. The hospital strike, as the first major disruption of the stability and quiescence between the races in Charleston, forced white and blacks to become aware of and to address the inequality which pervaded their culture.

Historically the relationship between the races in Charleston has been a cordial one -- at least on the surface.[2] White Charlestonians have viewed themselves and their city as distinctive, governed by aristocratic ideals. Consequently, they have been more responsible in their conduct of racial policy than the upstate or other areas of the Deep South. During the extremism of the Tillman-Blease era of White Redemption, no fewer than 120 lynchings occurred in the state, yet none of them in Charleston. During this period and after, the Ku Klux Klan thrived throughout most of South Carolina, but Charlestonians proved to be notably unreceptive.[3]

Integrated housing patterns have also been part of Charleston's history. This demographic factor fostered close contact between blacks and whites. Before the Civil War, free people of color had lived interspersed throughout the city, and slaves usually lived in their master's house or in separate quarters in the yard.[4] The end of the war did not alter this residential situation much, and it was not until the post-World War II years that whites began to leave the peninsula for the suburbs across the Ashley or Cooper Rivers. Charleston, then, was different from the average southern town. Blacks and whites in the city grew up together and were geographically if not socially integrated. Rev. Z.L. Grady, a life-long Charlestonian, and prominent black leader, tells what this residential pattern meant for black-white relations: "Black and whites were living next door to one another. As far as a lot of animosity and not getting along and misunderstanding, we didn't have that."[5] Yet racism was embodied within this amicable relationship. The goodwill of the whites was always predicated on blacks' tacit acknowledgement of their inferior position. Grady punctuates his remarks

above, "There was still the feeling that blacks had a certain place."[6]

Not having to face the hostility that was prevalent elsewhere in the South, black Charlestonians, for their part, were less attracted to radicalism. The early 1960's, a time of tumult in many cities throughout the South, brought only a few lunch-counter sit-ins and peaceful demonstrations to the Port City. Mayor Palmer Gaillard set the tone for the white response by enforcing court orders and maintaining law and order.[7] Charleston missed the violence and bloodshed that racked other cities; yet without direct confrontation and violent responses by the establishment, the majority of the blacks in the city remained complacent and inequalities were perpetuated.

White Charlestonian William H. Barnwell discusses the blacks' lack of initiative which he encountered during his struggles against the prevailing racial inequalities in the pre-strike years:

> As far as I can tell, there is very little indigenous leadership . . . The issue of segregation appears to be far removed from their minds. That's not to say these people don't feel suppressed. . . . But there is no open talk of fighting for one's rights. Not once have I heard the mention of the name of any civil rights leader, not even Dr. King's. The people of this neighborhood seem to accept their servile position. Their frustrations and hostility remain dangerously subconscious. And this is, at least partially, the result of "dead-end" paternalism.[8]

This "dead-end paternalism" undergirding Charleston's placid exterior was perfectly mirrored in conditions at the South Carolina Medical College. The College had no black nursing students enrolled and the College's hospital had no black doctors on the staff.[9] Almost all of the lower-echelon, non-professional positions -- nurses aides, practical nurses, orderlies, kitchen workers -- were staffed by black women. The loose organizational structure governing the operations of the hospital provided no job descriptions, no personnel procedures, and no vehicle for airing grievances.[10] Consequently, whites held nearly every position of authority, from the lowest level of supervisors to the president; and any racial tension could easily be exacerbated by the lack of any formal rules directing the relations between worker and supervisor. In short, the more these working relationships were based on personal, face-to-face interaction, the greater the possibility of racial subjugation.

Job dissatisfaction centered on two issues. One was the concrete matter

of wages. The second and more important concern involved respect. The condescension with which most white supervisors at the hospital traditionally viewed blacks increasingly came in conflict with the rising expectations of black workers. Charleston, despite its unique racial history, did not exist in a vacuum. The civil rights struggles of the 1960's had raised the consciousness of the blacks, but those blacks had not yet been confronted with an issue on which they could take a stand. The treatment of the black non-professionals at the hospital provided that issue. The blacks slowly came to realize that the power that whites exercised over them at the hospital transcended vocational rank. Claire G. Brown, an obstetrical technician at the hospital, explains:

> There was a lot of lack of respect. Basically, it was a black-white issue. I don't think whites [in similar non-professional positions] felt it. Of course there wasn't too many whites that was in the positions we were -- unlicensed, nurses' aides-type positions. Basically [whites were] R.N.'s, professional workers.[11]

Mary Moultrie, who was born and reared in the shadows of the hospital and who emerged as the most important strike leader among the actual workers recalls conditions at the hospital:

> If you were white you ran the hospital. Seventeen- and eighteen-year old nursing students who didn't know the work -- we had to show them what to do -- but they gave us the orders. The white nurses just sat and drank coffee while we did all the work.

Although Moultrie says that the low wages were a factor, especially considering the number of single parents among the workers, she believes that the working relations catalyzed the strikers. "The treatment is what motivated people to want to change things. The discrimination, the prejudice sort of blew the top off the bottle."[12]

The particular incident that pushed the workers toward an organized response to the situation at the hospital occurred just before Christmas in 1967, more than a year before the strike. Five non-professional blacks were fired when they refused to go to work without first being given the usually customary access to the patients' reports.[13] The five contacted Mary Moultrie. She contacted William Saunders who worked full-time at a downtown mattress factory and served as community liaison with the Health, Education, and Welfare Department. The local office of HEW, acting under civil rights regulations, ordered the hospital to reinstate the five

workers. The hospital complied and the workers returned.[14]

But the issue was not closed. Mary Moultrie and Saunders initiated informal meetings to try to muster some sort of organized response to the administration. Saunders stresses the fact that, at this time,

> A union is not what we were interested in. We felt that the doctors and nurses had their associations. They don't call them unions, but the American Medical Association is the most powerful union in this country today. We were looking for an employees' association.[15]

Many blacks, accustomed to inferior treatment for so long, were reluctant to join the fledgling workers' group. "When we started to organize." Moultrie remembers, "a lot of people were afraid. I was instrumental in letting them know, 'We ain't got nothing to start with.' "[16] The ranks of the movement grew slowly at first, but expanded rapidly as workers realized the strength in numbers. They met at local churches once a week, and according to Moultrie, "Each week the people who came were responsible for bringing one other person with them. And it just kept growing until we got 450 to 500 people strong."[17] Thus during spring and summer of 1968 a new phenomenon was taking place in Charleston. A group of blacks who had traditionally been cautious and complacent were beginning to confront their unequal relationship with whites.

During the time from the firing of the five workers in December of 1967 until the beginning of the strike on March 19, 1969, every official door was closed to the workers.[18] They had nowhere to go to address what they felt were legitimate grievances, and they decided their only recourse was a union. "The union was called in at a point when we realized they were not going to sit down and talk," Saunders says.[19] J. Edwin Schacte, President of the Board of Trustees of the hospital during the strike, agrees: "Through another course of action, early in the game, this whole thing could have been avoided. These people got not recognition from the administration and that's when the thing got out of hand."[20] A powerful New York union, Local 1199 of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers, took up the hospital workers' cause. Fresh from a series of labor victories over hospitals in the northeast, yet well aware of the traditional obstacles to unionization in the South, 1199's leadership nevertheless was banking on a coalition of "union power and soul power" to forge revolutionary inroads in a hostile Dixie.[21]

On March 19, 1969, the hospital administration, aware of union activity, forced the workers' hand by firing twelve workers, ostensibly for derelic-

tion of duty. That night 1199B, the name assumed by the Charleston affiliate of the RWDSU, voted to strike; the struggle for black equality had come to Charleston. In the one hundred days that it took to settle the strike, Charleston witnessed over eight hundred arrests, hundreds of demonstrations and rallies, a dusk to dawn curfew, numerous fire bombings, and over five hundred National Guardsmen with fixed bayonets in the city streets. The issue, which had begun with deceptive inauspiciousness, soon mushroomed to include the foremost civil rights and labor leaders in the nation, the state governor, the state legislature, both houses of Congress, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and the closest advisors to the President of the United States.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference quickly adopted the cause of the striking workers. The presence of Ralph Abernathy and Andrew Young served to bolster the strikers' morale and to focus the national media's attention on the Holy City. The presence of the SCLC served another important though less visible role: it forced the black leadership to galvanize behind the strike effort. Ever since the workers' dispute had become widely-known in the black community, the local leaders had disagreed on the issue. The older, established elite who had political ties with the white establishment had refused to support the workers wholeheartedly. Saunders remembers,

> The black leadership of Charleston was not involved. They assured Mayor Gaillard and them that they were not involved and it would not work. If the strike came on it would be over in ten days or less.[22]

Before the SCLC arrived, the hospital dispute had threatened to polarize the black community; but the organization's presence tended to pull the community together.

A split was also observed in the black churches in the city. The Southern black church had functioned as the center of the modern civil rights movement, and Charleston was no different. The Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance, a group of black clergy formed to push for economic rights for their people, could not agree to support the workers. A faction of younger, more progressive leaders, led by the Reverends Grady and J.T. Enwright, split to form the pro-strike Committee of Concerned Clergy. "A number of ministers," Grady recalls,

> were afraid to open their doors, and others did open their doors but did not take a very active part. We formed the Committee of Concerned Clergy because some denominations in the Interdenominational Ministerial

Alliance would not take a firm stand.[23]

As the days passed and tensions mounted, most of the reluctant clergy "became a part whether they wanted to or not."[24]

Support among the black community at large was strong, especially after the walkout. A crowd estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000 joined Mrs. Martin Luther King, Ralph Abernathy, and Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers' Union, for a Mother's Day march on the hospital.[25] At nighttime rallies in the churches around the city, crowds of 2,000 were not uncommon. The fact that the four hundred women who walked out came from points all around the Charleston tri-county area meant most blacks knew at least one of the strikers.

As no settlement appeared, the media attention increased and tension rose. The New York **Times** called the strike "the country's tensest civil rights struggle."[26] Each side held firm, and despite the efforts of the Committee of Concerned Clergy and an ad hoc Citizen's Committee set up by Mayor Gaillard, no direct communication between the workers and the administration took place for six weeks. The situation looked hopelessly deadlocked in May when the governor vowed "no surrender" and the SCLC announced that it would "never leave until the union is victorious."[27]

Although he was backed by the state's executive branch on the union issue and affirmed by a resolution in the state legislature, Medical College President William McCord emerged as the biggest obstacle to the settlement. Even after the workers had conceded the issue of union recognition, McCord took the extremist position of refusing to meet with any strikers and refusing to consider rehiring the twelve fired workes.

Sometime during May, Governor McNair determined that the strike had little hope of settlement as long as McCord directed the administration's efforts.[28] Vice-President for Development William D. Huff surreptitiously took over negotiations at the Governor's behest. At this point the union, the SCLC, the Committee of Concerned Clergy and a couple of politically appointed citizens' groups all claimed to represent the interests of the workers. But Huff shunned these quasi-official representatives and sought out Saunders, who had been involved with the workers since the initial incident in 1967, but had been overshadowed by the national figures during the months of the strike.

Saunders came from a position outside the black establishment. He was not beholden to any group -- the SCLC, the union, the white or black power

structures. This fact and his honesty had earned the trust of the blacks and the respect of the whites. Schacte remembers Saunders as "a reasonable person who was motivated by the welfare of his own people, but practical enough to understand what mediators would say to him."[29]

Huff and Saunders set up a clandestine meeting of worker representatives and some moderate members of the hospital administration at the Santee-Cooper hydroelectric plant in Moncks Corner, some thirty-five miles north of Charleston. Neither McCord nor members of the union or SCLC was present. It was at this meeting, on June 5, that the basic terms of the settlement were hammered out face-to-face, on a personal level. Saunders calls it "the real turning point." He continues,

> The Board realized that these people were just good people. These black women and these white men got together. The men held their chairs out and stuff like that. The union was feeding the workers all this shit about how bad the Board of Trustees were. And the lawyers were telling the Board how bad these people are. And they're going to take over your state and they're going to run everything.[30]

Events moved quickly in the wake of the meeting. Governor McNair and the Board of Trustees announced that the rehiring of the twelve workers was no longer an obstacle for them. A pay hike, which the state insisted was already in the plans, was presented. It raised the workers' wages to the levels they had demanded. The workers softened their demands for union recognition, saying that a well-structured grievance procedure and a credit union would suffice.[31] But McCord still stood firm in his position, refusing to rehire the workers. Only when it became clear that the HEW intended to follow through on its threats to cut off $12 million in federal funds to the hospital did McCord agree to settle.

The immediate results of the strike did address those aspects of employment at the Medical College that the workers found most onerous. A grievance procedure was set up which mitigated the prejudicial attitudes of white supervisors. A job classication system clearly prescribed the responsibilities of each position, thereby curtailing the discretionary power that whites had held over blacks.

Although all agree that conditions improved vastly, some dissatisfaction and charges of discrimination persisted after the settlement. Despite at least some remaining discontentment and the fresh memory of the recent struggle, the union lasted barely a year, falling victim to lack of interest and in-

fighting among indigenous blacks vying for power.[32] When the SCLC, the national media, and the big guns of the union left the scene, local blacks could not maintain their ranks.

William Saunders sees the workers' retrenchment as a tendency to celebrate an initial victory when much work still remains to be done. He faults those workers who complain about conditions for not capitalizing on the opportunities presented them:

> If any [bad] conditions exist at the hospital, it's the workers' fault. We changed the rules. We had the grievance procedure enacted. You are responsible for youself. And there are certain people . . . who are looking for others to be responsible for them. All I've fought for is for blacks to have access, to have the right. Now whether you utilize that right is your own damn business. But don't complain to me if it's bad that you need a savior to come and get you.[34]

Perhaps Saunders is too harsh. Black Charlestonians' attitudes and actions are the product of a long and unique history. If blacks are still not adamant enough in pushing for their rights, one must still appreciate how far they have had to come. A way of life, a culture, does not die out overnight; but considering white Charleston's long record of cordial superiority and black Charleston's traditional absence of militancy, the hospital strike represents the start of a new era in race relations in the city. If remnants of black complacency still remain, so does the type of personal rapport that made the Santee-Cooper meeting a success.

Since the strike, Charleston has been able to combine the positive aspect coming out of the strike with useful traditions from her history to build a new order. The pre-strike harmony has returned, but the harmony is no longer based on black acquiescence. The strike activated the black population and forced whites to recognize their power. Z.L. Grady describes the long term effects of the strike.

> It brought the power structure of the blacks and whites together to help them form a better relationship in the community overall. A number of prominent whites in the community became afraid of what could happen in the community. They were interested in saving the community from bloodshed or hatred.[35]

Saunders believes the strike changed the way blacks and white saw themselves:

> It brought a recognition of a change. The important thing was a changing of attitudes. Changing blacks' attitudes -- that you are not helpless, creature. You are somebody. You are important. And the white structure recognizes also that you are important. It was a real coming together for the state of South Carolina. And we've had one of the better race relations systems since then.[36]

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[1]Steve Hoffius, "Charleston Hospital Workers' Strike," in **Working Lives**, Marc S. Miller, ed. (Pantheon, 1980), 244-258; and Leon Fink, "Union Power, Soul Power," in **Southern Changes**, March-April 1983, 9-22.

[2]South Carolina as a whole compares favorably to the rest of the Deep South on this account; within the state, the low country whites' attitude toward the blacks has been more favorable than in the Piedmont. See G. Croft Williams, **A Social Interpretation of South Carolina** (Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1946), 28; Robert Rosen, **A Short History of Charleston** (Lexicos, 1982), 137; I.A. Newby, **Black Carolinians** (Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1973), 5-8, 280-3; and Jack Bass and Jack Nelson, **The Orangeburg Massacre** (Mercer, 1984), 10-13.

[3]Rosen, 137; Newby, 60.

[4]Michael P. Johnson and James L. Roark, **Black Masters** (Norton, 1984), 226.

[5]Interview with Z.L. Grady, Nov. 29, 1985.

[6]Grady interview.

[7]Rosen, 148.

[8]William H. Barnwell, **In Richard's World** (Houghton Mifflin, 1968), 56.

[9]Leon E. Panetta and Peter Gall, **Bring Us Together** (Lippincott, 1971), 183.

[10]Interview with John E. Wise, former Vice-President of MCSC, Nov. 30, 1985.

[11]Interview with Claire G. Brown, Nov. 30, 1985.

[12]Interview with Mary Moultrie, Nov. 1, 1985.

[13]Hoffius, 250; Moultrie interview.

[14]"Case Study: The Charleston Hospital Strike," in **Southern Hospitals**, March 1971, p. 6.

[15]Interview with William Saunders, Nov. 2, 1985.

[16]Moultrie interview.

[17]**Ibid.**

[18]"Case Study . . .," p. 39.

[19]Saunders interview.

[20]Interview with J. Edwin Schacte, Oct. 31, 1985.

[21]Fink, p. 10.

[22]Saunders interview.

[23]Grady interview.

[24]Brown interview.

[25]**News and Courier**, 29 March 1969, 1-B.

[26]Rosen, p. 149.

[27]**News and Courier**, 2 May 1969, 1-B.

[28]Interview with J. Palmer Gaillard, Oct. 31, 1985.

[29]Schacte interview.

[30]Saunders interview.

[31]**News and Courier**, 6 June 1969, 1-B; 11 June 1969, 1-A; 24 June 1969, 1-A.

[32]Brown interview; letters from 1199's files.

[33]Brown interview.

[34]Saunders interview.

[35]Grady interview.

[36]Saunders interview.

MARIE-JOSEPH BLAISE CHÉNIER (1764-1811): THE STAGING OF CHARLES IX

Jesse L. Scott

Marie-Joseph Blaise Chénier (1764-1811), revolutionary playwright and politician, was actively involved in Parisian life. He sparked controversies among his contemporaries, and his work endured to inspire, or to infuriate, succeeding generations, who, depending on their political perspectives, perceived Chénier as a revolutionary hero or villain. Chénier the playwright and politician reflected his society and tried to influence it through his drama and through his work as a politician.

Paris after 1789 became a city of theaters in which dramatists and actors and actresses played out the theatrics of the political arenas and events they witnessed about them during the French Revolution (1789-1799). Young men and women, mothers and daughters, fathers and sons, merchants and craftsmen, aristocrats and **sans-culottes**, politicians all, often gathered during the late afternoon around Paris' theaters eager to be entertained and, though perhaps unsuspectingly, to be educated and politicized as well.

Charles IX is undoubtedly Chénier's most famous play. His struggle to have this play performed and the play's consequent success are the subject of this paper. The production of **Charles IX** on November 4, 1789 signalled the advent of revolutionary changes within the Parisian world of theater. By the Autumn of 1789 Paris had already many times demonstrated its explosiveness. The revolution was well under way. Accompanying the more traditional political, economic, and social upheavals during these years was a less written about but no less significant revolution that thrived within the hierarchical world of theaters. At the heart of this controversy was Chénier's **Charles IX**, a play of utmost influence that was both a mirror of and a model for society. No aspect of society was immune to the revolution's convulsions. Paris' theater audiences, its actors, producers, and even the organization of the theaters themselves reflected important political changes and historical developments in general.[1]

Charles IX is based on the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 when Charles IX (1560-1574) ruled France under the eye of his mother, Catherine de Medici. During a truce in the Wars of Religion the Protestant Henry of Navarre, a cousin of the King, was in Paris to marry Charles IX's sister. Catholics attacked Huguenots in the early morning of St. Bartholomew's Day. Many Huguenots and their leaders were killed. The violence spread throughout France. Perhaps more than 10,000 Protestants were massacred.

Set in Paris in the Château du Louvre, **Charles IX** attacks fanaticism,

criticizes the aristocracy and ridicules the Church. Allusions to contemporary circumstances, though Chénier claimed them to be fortuitous, were evident to many people and threatening to some. **Charles IX**, heralded as France's first national tragedy, made Chénier's career.

Chénier ridiculed The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre and the people responsible for the atrocity. Absolute monarchy is symbolized in the character of Charles IX, who is a weak and indecisive man easily led by his wicked and domineering mother, Catherine de Medici. It is Catherine de Medici who persuaded Charles IX to allow the murder of the Huguenots. Disturbed and guilt-ridden after the massacre, Charles IX laments, "I am no longer a king;| I am an assassin . . .| And I am covered with the blood of my subjects . . .| I have betrayed my country, and honor and law.| Heaven, in punishing me| Provides an example to kings."[2]

Even the Church, as an institution perpetuating fanaticism, does not escape Chénier's scorn. Catholicism is symbolized in the character of the Cardinal of Lorraine who, like Catherine de Medici, plays a vital role in shaping Charles IX's attitudes and decisions. The Cardinal is a hypocrite as evil as any Tartuffe ever conjured. He is only concerned with preserving the power of the Catholic Church against the Protestants. In answer to Charles IX who questions the benevolence of a God who would condone such carnage as the massacre, the Cardinal responds, "the God we serve is a God of goodness;| But a God of goodness, of peace, and indulgence,| Sometimes demands war and vengence . . . ."[3]

Charles IX was not initially a success. Many people attempted to ban the play from the stage. But with time the play became a success because its controversial topic fit perfectly with the events of its day. Years before 1789, in 1764 specifically, Voltaire had suggested that "the time will come when the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day will be made the subject of a tragedy."[4] That day had arrived. On September 2, 1788 the Comédie-Française, the royal theater, had heard a reading of **Charles IX** and had accepted it into its repertory. Yet J.-B. Antoine Suard (1734-1817), the royal censor, banned the play from the stage because he considered its attacks on the Church and the State "excessive."[5] As early as late 1788 Chénier began his battle against censorship in order to have **Charles IX** staged.

Charles Palissot de Montenoy (1730-1814), Chénier's mentor, arranged for **Charles IX** to be read before the Duke and the Duchess of Orleans; the reading took place in the home of the Viscount of Ségur in early January 1789. As one contemporary observed, "nobody was moved, many yawned and all exclaimed that it was magnificent . . ., but the play was feared by the Duke of Orleans himself."[6] In January 1789 Chénier could not muster sup-

port for his play, persuade the royal actors to perform it, or remove the royal ban from it. Throughout the eighteenth century the **philosophes** had attacked religious fanaticism, but **Charles IX** was different:

> it is no longer fanaticism alone, but royal authority as well as the Church, which are flouted, humiliated, and held up to public scorn, in the character of Charles IX, Catherine de Medici, and the Cardinal of Lorraine, during that sinister St. Bartholomew night, so cruelly expiated.[7]

It was this message from the play that the royal actors refused to deliver from their stage.

From January to August 1789 a number of events took place that combined to create an atmosphere in which Chénier was able to make progress with his fight to stage his play. For Chénier the timing was just right. On May 2, 1789 the Estates General was called. On June 20, 1789 the famous Tennis Court Oath was signed. News of Finance Minister Necker's dismissal vibrated throughout Paris beginning on July 11, 1789. And on July 14, 1789, the Bastille was stormed. Between August 4-11, 1789 the National Assembly produced its famous decrees in which liberal nobles renounced their feudal rights and privileges. Chénier like all of Paris was aware of these incidents.

It was under these precarious circumstances that Chénier managed to find support for the staging of his play. On a Wednesday, August 19, 1789 at the Comédie-Française (Théâtre de la Nation) an event of historic importance took place. For the first time since the outbreak of the revolution, a political and not simply a literary faction demanded the production of **Charles IX**.[8] The restive mobs in Paris had already forced a number of closings and had intimidated the royal actors of the Comédie-Francaise into changing the theater's name to Théâtre de la Nation. The royal theater realized its monopoly was in jeopardy. Already a host of minor theaters, though unsanctioned by the government, had begun to stage plays from the classical repertory as well as other plays supporting the revolution. With the weakening of the throne, the royal theater weakened as well.

On August 19, 1789 during the intermission between a performance of Fontenelle's **Ericie, ou la Vestale**, which had been banned twenty years earlier, and a scheduled presentation of Jean Baptiste Poquelin Molière's (1622-1673) **Ecole de maris**, members of the audience distributed handbills demanding **Charles IX's** performance. Handbills were thrown throughout the theater and filled the orchestra pit.[9] One of the statements titled "Adresse aux Bons Patriotes" declared that Chénier's play was intended to

inspire hatred of fanaticism and that it had been written for a nation of free people.[10] This handbill was signed "Du Croisi," probably a pseudonym used by Chénier. Regardless, the controversy over **Charles IX** had become a political and a public matter.

Likewise another handbill was simultaneously distributed among the audience that evening. It carried the title "Appel aux Spectateurs" and explained that **Charles IX** was France's national tragedy and that it must be represented for a people who had destroyed despotism.[11] That evening's audience was already in an excitable frame of mind since it had just witnessed a staging of **Ericie**, a controversial play in itself which had not been performed for twenty years.

The audience, characteristically uproarious, even verging on rioting, barked forth calls. From the orchestra pit, as the curtain rose on Molière's **L'Ecole des maris**, a voice shouted, "why do you not perform **Charles IX**?" Other voices joined this first caller, Georges Jacques Danton (1759-1794), a leader of the people in the revolution. They shouted repeatedly, "**Charles IX! Charles IX!**" The house was filled with these cries; Moliere's play was delayed.

Abraham Joseph Bénard Fleury (1751-1822), actor and member of the royalist faction among the actors called "les Noires," appeared on stage alone to face the audience. A voice asked, "why is **Charles IX** not performed?" Fleury claimed the company lacked official permission. Suddenly the audience screamed at Fleury, "no more permission . . ."; Danton insisted, "it is time that despotism and censorship cease: we want to have the freedom to hear and to see works represented that please us, just as we are now free to think."[12] Fleury, frightened by the outbursts and demands but unwilling and unable to appease the crowd, promised to approach the municipality on the next morning.

The protesters were temporarily calmed by Fleury's agreement. They left the theater, and Molière's play was performed. Fleury kept his promise to the audience by approaching the municipal assembly on August 20, 1789.[13] Unlike during the old regime, the royal actors after the revolution began in July 1789 were subject to not just the king's censors but also to the municipality and the newly established mayor of Paris. Also evident is the fact that already by August 1789 public opinion had begun to play a role in determining which plays would and would not be staged at the theaters.

This incident of August 19, 1789 made clear the fact that popular leaders such as Danton, Lucie Simplice Camille Benoit Desmoulins (1760-1794), Honoré Gabriel Riquetti, comte de Mirabeau (1749-1791), as well as Chénier, were aware of the advantage of using the stage to promote their in-

terests and to influence public opinion. Without doubt the controversy over **Charles IX** became a matter of general, or public, interest. Its fate was directly tied to the revolution's success or failure.[14] From the very beginning of the revolution audiences began to manipulate and to dictate what would be performed in the theaters. Many people such as Danton and Chénier were determined to use the theater to fuel the revolution; the stage became an effective weapon.[15]

The next morning, on August 20, 1789, Fleury accompanied by several other actors walked from the Comédie-Française to the City Hall to approach the municipal assembly. They found Jean Sylvain Bailly (1736-1793), a constitutional royalist who was then Mayor of Paris. They informed him of the previous evening's events at the theater and requested permission to stage **Charles IX.** Suard, the royal censor, was no longer answerable to the king but to the Mayor of Paris, who had control over the city's theaters.[16] Bailly postponed making a decision and insisted that the matter must be presented to the National Assembly. He did, however, state later in his memoirs that he had been at the time against the staging of Chénier's play. Bailly remarked, "I thought that in our present circumstances at a moment when the entire population had revolted, not against the king, but against arbitrary authority, it was not prudent to exhibit on the stage one of the authority's most fightful abuses . . . ."[17] Bailly passed the matter on to the Assembly; the Assembly in return appointed a committee to examine the play.

This delay prolonged the controversy over whether to stage or not to stage **Charles IX.** It continued throughout September and much of October 1789. The National Assembly was preoccupied with more urgent business at this time. Between August 20-26, 1789 the Assembly was forging and proclaiming the declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The Municipal Assembly meanwhile had denied Chénier's request to read his play before them or to be present during a reading of his play. He wanted to answer any questions immediately and on the spot. He also wanted to keep his hands on his manuscript.[18] He waited for the committee's verdict though not silently.

From late August through September Chénier confronted much opposition. On August 23, 1789 Chénier insisted in his **Discours prononcé devant M.M. les représentans de la commune** that censorship must be abolished completely and that all free men had the right to publish their thoughts.[19] Four days later on August 27, 1789 Suard, the royal censor, published anonymously in the **Journal de Paris** an argument for upholding censorship. Censorship was necessary for preserving public order, he argued. Chénier, knowing the author's true identity, published a refutation, signed it with Suard's name, and in this brief pamphlet cleverly had Suard disman-

tle the arguments of his earlier anonymous article and even has the royal censor, Suard, call himself a "jackass."[20] On September 6, 1789 Chénier published his **Courtes réflexions sur l'état civil des comédiens.**[21] In this treatise he attempted to defend actors' civil and political rights.[22] Though he had weakened the opposition to his play among the actors with this timely and opportunistic declaration, his play still was not performed. He had, though, contributed to the movement to gain citizenship for actors and artists in France.[23] Overall, Chénier worked to promote his play. He believed **Charles IX** was being unfairly judged by people who had not even bothered to read his play.[24]

In late September or early October 1789 the committee appointed to study Chénier's play decided that **Charles IX** could be presented by the royal actors; however, opposition continued in October, especially after the march of the women on Versailles during Octobr 5-6, 1789.[25] This **journée,** which returned the king and the National Assembly to Paris, frightened many people who were convinced that a staging of **Charles IX** would only create more unrest.[26]

Preparations for the production were halted on October 15, 1789 when the municipal assembly ordered the police to suspend the performance. Chenier was furious. On October 20, 1789 in his "Adresse aux soixante districts de Paris" Chénier appealed to Parisians. He ignored the protests from royalists such as Suard, bishops, or academecians from the Sorbonne who hoped to ban his play permanently. In short, he professed his civic loyalty and his general good intentions. [27] He also patronized Louis XVI to evidence his support of the monarchy.[28]

Initially the October Days had fostered reaction against **Charles IX** and jeopardized its performance, but in the long run this march on Versailles had produced revolutionary sentiment among Parisians who felt more comfortable and confident with the royal family within shouting distance. **Charles IX** was finally scheduled for presentation on November 4, 1789, a Wednesday. About the staging of the play, Fleury lamented, "that time which Voltaire's prophetic imagination pictured at a remote distance among future generations, arrived eleven years after his death: Chénier produced his **Charles IX, our L'Ecole des Rois.**" Later, however, Fleury admitted that "**Charles IX** brought us as rich a harvest as **The Marriage of Figaro.**"[29]

It was afternoon, November 4, 1789. Chénier was at the Café Noël together with his friends and associates: Charles Palissot, Jean Marie Collot-d'Herbois (1750-1796), Philippe François Nazaire Fabre-D'Eglantine (1755-1794), Jacques Danton, Mirabeau, and many others who had crowded into the Café to talk and to have a bit of brandy before heading off to the Comédie-Française. It was on this Catholic St. Charles day, ironically

enough, that Chénier's play, **Charles IX,** was first performed by the royal actors. He and his party of political associates and a body of nearly one hundred supporters from Paris' surrounding districts were at the Café Noel to muster their forces, their courage, and to organize their strategy for the evening's performance of the controversial play. The battle Chénier had waged against censorship since late 1788 and that he and his associates had fought since August 19, 1789 made them all a bit nervous. They claimed their fears and uncertainties about the coming evening. After their brandy they headed off with Chénier to the Théatre de la Nation (Comédie-Française) with hope of a victory to be relished.[30]

An actress at the Comédie-Française, Mme. Vestris, insisted to her friend Chénier that "I am running some risk on your account. This queen mother is so hateful that I am certain to be shot at."[31] Mme. Vestris was playing the role of the evil Catherine de Medici. The actors were also nervous about the performance. The gulf between the factions of the revolutionary "les Rouges" (Reds) and the royalist "les Noires" (Black) had widened during the fight over **Charles IX.** Etienne-Maynier Saint-Fal, royalist, had refused the role of Charles IX; he disliked the play's sacrilegious tone. It was thus that François Joseph Talma (1763-1826), a young actor in the company, gained his first great role, by default.[32]

Nearly everyone, whether actor or spectator, anticipated trouble at the performance on November 4, 1789. Chénier had been warned that his play would not be well-received. Anonymous threats had been made on the actors' and the actress' lives. Fifteen minutes before the opening curtain a person barged into Mme. Vestris' dressing room to tell her of an assassination plot against her life. She believed her worst fears were coming true. Swords and pistols were in plain sight among the audience, which included Mirabeau with delegates from the National Assembly, Camille Desmoulins, Danton, and Cordeliers from various districts.[33] In a sense Chénier had the peoples' support from the beginning; Danton led the people. Danton supported Chénier.

Even before the curtain was raised a voice from the orchestra pit warned that the performance would be seen from start to finish by the people. Charles Palissot, Chénier's dramatist mentor, shouted in agreement. Moments later throughout the audience came threats of "to the lantern." Any person in the audience who had hoped to spoil the play was likely to have been intimidated into silence by such threats. In fact, given the controversial history behind **Charles IX's** first staging, the performance proceeded without much disturbance.[34]

The audience cheered, stamped its feet, and voiced its approvals time and again. The theater was packed; orchestra seats, usually only forty-eight

sous, had sold for a **louis** apiece; receipts, as they would be for the first six performances were over 5,000 livres. They would not fall below 3,000 livres through twenty-three performances during the next two months. In two months time an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 spectators saw Chénier's **Charles IX.**[35] **Charles IX** was a smash.

A story has it that after the performance Desmoulins bragged, "Gentlemen, this play brings monarchy and priestcraft nearer their doom than the July and October days." Likewise, Danton predicted, "if **Figaro** killed the nobility, **Charles IX** . . . will exterminate royalty."[36] Talma, congratulated by Chénier backstage for his brilliant performance, pulled the playwright on stage with him to greet a demanding audience; showered with applause they left the theater to celebrate their triumph. Even Fleury, who had opposed both the play and Talma's having been cast in the lead role, admitted, "we did not certainly anticipate that the young tragedian would have produced the effect he did in this part . . . The sublimity of Talma's conception . . . filled us with no less astonishment than admiration."[37] What was evident and most important, as a contemporary, Amaury Duval, explained, was that "the première of **Charles IX** was more than a dramatic event; it was a political event."[38]

As each month passed Chénier became more firmly placed in Paris' eye --winning him friends and foes alike. True enough, each performance, to lesser and greater degrees, instigated controversies, heightened fears among counter-revolutionaries or inspired revolutionaries to work toward their goals. An anonymous contemporary admitted, "I cannot get away from the idea that Hell itself must have entered M. de Chénier's domicile, that Pluto dictated what he wrote, and that the devil held the ink-pot."[39] Even Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais (1732-1799), author of **The Marriage of Figaro**, staged just more than four years previously on April 27, 1784 in spite of much opposition to its presentation, explained to an actor, Florence, that he was uneasy about **Charles IX**. The letter from Beaumarchais to Florence is dated November 9, 1789. It was written only four days after the first performance of Chénier's play. In short, Beaumarchais warned that **Charles IX** would incite the people to revolution.[40] Indeed, the play spawned disputes. But it also won the author fame and friends among the revolution's popular leaders and it gave him the people's support. News of the play spread through Paris during the first weeks of November 1789. Popular songs praised Chénier and **Charles IX**, or "The School for Kings." In mid-November several districts bestowed a "civic crown" on Chénier to express their appreciation and admiration.[41]

From as early as 1788 up to 1791 with the passing of the January 13-19, 1791 Le Chapelier Laws Chénier had already played a major role in reforming Parisian theater, had written political pamphlets and songs, had con-

tributed to journals, had frequented salons and clubs, and was elected eventually to the National Convention, for which he served most notably beginning in 1792 on the Committee of Public Instruction. Though his political, as well as his theatrical opinions, and consequently his popularity, vacillated between 1789 and 1795 with the oscillations of the revolution, Chénier remained, throughout the years, a republican who, later, during the Empire (1804-1815), was considered too liberal and forced to defer to Napoleon I's regime. [42]

After the suppression of his play, **Timoléon**, by the centralized government of the Terror in 1794, Chénier's popularity as a playwright and as a politician declined. He became a symbol of the moderate revolutionary who had once directed the revolution of 1789. Chénier remained a republican, but during the Terror he became **persona non grata**. After the fall of Robespierre he again pursued his political career. But never again after 1794 did Chénier or his drama reach the height of popularity they once held in Paris. The mood or beliefs of Parisians changed, but, regardless, Chénier had also become between 1789 and 1794 a social and political figure, as well as an accomplished playwright and man of letters.

His literary career and his political associations and aspirations made him an often controversial man and enabled him to be an observer of and a commentator upon the political and the social circumstances of his day. To be sure, Parisians and, for that matter, the world as we now know, long remembered the glories and the tragedies of the French Revolution of 1789, which has irreversibly impressed its ideals and images in posterity's minds. Equally, on the eve of the French Revolution's bicentennial, one participant, the politicized playwright, Marie-Joseph Blaise Chénier (1764-1811), revolutionary martyr or monster, has not been forgotten.

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[1]J.L. Godechot, **The Taking of the Bastille, July 14th, 1789.** trans. Jean Stewart. (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1970). Also see: Michèle Marie Root-Bernstein, **Revolution on the Boulevard: Parisian Popular Theater in the Late-Eighteenth Century.** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981): Marvin Carlson, **The Theater of the French Revolution.** (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966); **Recueil fac. d'articles et programmes concernant la vie et les oeuvres de Marie-Joseph Chénier.**

[2]M.J.B. Chenier, **Charles IX, ou L'Ecole des rois.** (Paris: Imp. du P. Fr. Didot Jeune, 1790), pp. 142-144.

[3]Ibid., p. 72.

[4]F. Hawkins, **The French Stage in the Eighteenth Century.** (London: 1888, 2 vols.), vol. II, p. 339. Also: A. Fleury, **The French Stage and the French People as Illustrated in the Memoirs**

of M. Fleury. trans. Theodore Hook. 2 vols. (London: 1841,) vols. II, p. 161.

[5]Adolphe Lieby, **Etude sur le Théâtre de Marie-Joseph Chévier** (Genéve: Slatkine Reprints, 1971), p.33; Alfred J. Bingham, **Marie-Joseph Chénier: Early Political Life and Ideas (1789-1794)**. (New York: Privately Printed, 1939), p. 8; Carlson, p. 22.

[6]Luchet de la Roche du Maine, **Memoires IV**, January 13, 1789 as cited in Bingham on page 8.

[7]M. Lenient, **La Poésie patriotique en France dans les temps modernes.** (Paris: Hachette, 1844, 2 vols.).

[8]Bingham, p. 3.

[9]C. Labitte, "Marie-Joseph Chénier," **Etudes Littéraires; Revue des Deux-Mondes.** (nouvelle série 5) (1844): 240-324.

[10]Labitte, p. 260.

[11]Labitte, p. 260; Bingham, p. 6. Also see: M.J.B. Chénier, **Oeuvres completes de M.J. Chénier précedées de notices historiques**, edited by M. Arnault et M. Daunou. 8 vols. (Paris: L.P. Dupont, 1829), vol. II, p. 302.

[12]F.M. Grimm, **Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique**. 16 vols. (ed. M. Tourneux). (Paris: Garnier Freres, 1877-1882), vol. 16, pp. 239-241.; Georges Duval, **Souvenirs de la Terreur de 1788 a 1793**. 4 vols. (Paris: Werdet, 1842), vol. I, pp. 195-196.; Labitte, pp. 260-261.; Lieby, pp. 38-39.; Bingham, p. 2. It was Labitte who named Danton; Grimm writes it was an "anonymous" voice.

[13]Jean Sylvain Bailly, **Mémoires**. (Paris: 1821-1822), vol. II, p. 282. Also : La Bibliotheque de la Comédie-Frnaçaise. Carton 181, B. "Letter of Wednesday, 19 aout 1789."

[14]Labitte, p. 259.

[15]Carlson, p. 20.

[16]Ibid., p. 23; Bingham, p. 9; Lieby, p. 39; Labitte, p. 261.

[17]Bailly, **Mémoires**, v. II, p. 283 ff.; also in **Oeuvres**, vol. I, p. 367, ff. This is Bingham's translation

[18]Labitte, pp. 261-262.; Carlson, p. 23.; Bingham, pp. 9-10.; Lieby, pp. 41-43.

[19]M.J.B. Chénier, **Discours prononcé devant les représentans de la commune**, August 23, 1789. (Paris: Didot Jeune, 1790), p. 165.

[20]Bingham, pp. 10-11.; Labitte, pp. 259-260.

[21]**Oeuvres**, vol. IV, pp. 440-449.

[22]Ibid., p. 449.

[23]On December 24, 1789 the National Assembly fully enfranchised actors.

[24]La Bibliotheque de la Comédié-Française. Carton 181, B. "Letter about **Charles IX** by M.J. Chénier." n. d.

[25]Lieby, pp. 42-43.

[26]Ibid., p. 43. Dazincourt, royalist actor, was hostile toward Chénier, who threatened to withdraw his plays from the Comédie-Française's repertory.

[27]M.J.B. Chénier, **Adresse aux soixante districts de Paris, 20 octobre 1789** in **Oeuvres,** vol. I, p. 387.

[28]M.J.B. Chénier, "Epitre au Roi." in **Oeuvres,** v. III, p. 64.

[29]Fleury, v. II, pp. 161-162; p. 168.

[30]Duval, vol. I, p. 126 ff.

[31]Hawkins, v. II, pp. 343-344.

[32]Carlson, p. 26.

[33]E. Jauffret, **Le Théatre Révolutionnaire**. (Paris: 1869), pp. 40-41.

[34]Bingham, p. 13; Carlson, p. 28.

[35]Lieby, p. 54; Bingham, p. 13; Carlson, p. 28.

[36]Duval, vol. I, p. 130.

[37]Fleury, v. II, pp. 166-167.

[38]Duval, v. I, p. 130.

[39]Lénient, vol. II, p. 139; also, Bingham, p. 15.

[40]Henri Welschinger, **Le Théâtre de la Révolution, 1789-1799.** (avec document inédits). (Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1968, 1st ed. 1880), pp. 47-48. This letter is frequently cited by various scholars.

[41]Bingham, p. 14.; **Oeuvres**, v. I, p. 381. Based on his research of the holdings of La Bibliotheque de la Comédie-Française, Lieby has made available the performance dates of **Charles IX** and has included the amount of the receipts for each performance listed. For more detail than provided by Lieby see: La Bibliotheque de la Comédie-Française. **A Dossier: Chénier (Marie-Joseph de) 1764-1811. Lettres autographes et documents historiques.** (compiled by Noel Charavay, June 1964).

[42]These Le Chapelier Laws legislated January 13-19, 1791 basically destroyed the monopoly previously enjoyed by the royal theater, Comédie-Française, in Paris. These laws should not be confused with the Le Chapelier Laws of the Summer of 1791 (June, July) concerning the support of bourgeois capitalism and the forbidding of labor unions. For details see: J.L. Godechot, **Les Institutions**, pp. 214-217.; **Les Archives Parlementaires**, January 13-19, 1791, vol. 22, p. 244.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND DECHRISTIANIZATION, 1789 to L'AN II

Fred Hembree

The men of 1789 shared with the **philosophes** the same developing religious and intellectual currents, but the French Revolution accelerated these still indentifiable currents to such a degree that it is possible to recognize a birthing ideology unique to the Revolution. This ideology, while holding many attitudes in common with the Enlightenment, reached a new plane when political action was no longer the ideal of the thinker, but the duty of **le législateur**. The ideas of the Enlightenment and the ideology of the French Revolution both "arose out of the conflict with the existing order," and both sought "to overthrow the clerical-theological view of the world."[1] The influence of the eighteenth-century deistic and rationalistic cults, as well as atheism and anti-clericalism, are evident in the development of a new revolutionary religion which, nevertheless, was characterized by the worship of **la patrie** more than any other factor because the revolution had drastically changed "the existing order" and therefore the field of conflict. Reason, nature, virtue, the Supreme Being, were definitely concerns of the revolutionaries, and these **conceptual symbols** (rather than concepts, because the **words** were used as a call to action, not cognition)[2] outwardly clothed the Revolution's ideological evolution. The "progress of man" by means of **raison**, however, was supplanted as the primary goal by the desire to ensure the "progres de la Révolution" by destroying perceived enemies of the Revolution. The thought of the Enlightenment, which after all simply identified existing social, economic, and political problems and alternatives, provided a sufficient supply of enemies with which to begin, but successive **journées** of the Revolution brought more single-minded objectives and greatly expanded the supply of conceivable counterrevolutionaries.

This steady radicalization of the Revolution victimized the Church and Christianity in much the same way as other **ancien** institutions and beliefs came under condemantion. There is nothing aberrational in the course of Church/State relations during the French Revolution. Nationalization of church property, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, persecution of refractories, the dechristianization of **lán** II -- each may be explained in the context of the French Revolution if the Revolution is considered in its overlapping subjective and objective aspects. An analysis of public events, such as fetes and persecutions, and of political actions and writings from 1789 to September 1793, should reveal recognizable evolutionary developments which render the dechristianization movement of **lán** II, if not unavoidable, at least understandable.

It is not meant to deny here John McManners' observation that the dechristianization of the Year II was "qualitatively as well as quantitatively

different from what had gone before," although differences in extremes are more easily demonstrable than differences in essential characteristics.[3] Just as there is a qualitative difference between a constitutional monarchy and a Republic, especially a nascent Republic with an emergency executive, so is a Catholicism limited by the State distinguishable from a civic religion which openly purports to replace Christianity. Nevertheless, if qualitative distinctions can be made, so can qualitative similarities, particularly with regard to the French Revolution which brought so many "qualities" to the fore in such a brief period of time. In a sense, the rapidly changing Revolution developed its own unique **Überqualität**. The Revolution's transitions were so swiftly and confusedly negotiated that they lost their normally perceived singularities, and the process of transition itself has become an object of study. The period of the Terror, for example, was in many ways different from what had gone before, but it has no real meaning if enclosed in the years 1793-1794. Jacobin ideology, as Jack Richard Censer has admirably demonstrated, was not so much a sharp break as a continuation of developing ideological courses.[4] Dechristianization, which was an external manifestation of the same revolutionary trends which radicalized the government and the nation, may likewise be traced to events and attitudes unfolding in the earlier years of the Revolution.

The pronounced mania for solidarity was a characteristic of the revolutionary mentality which may allow us to distinguish revolutionary ideology from the diverse thought of the Enlightenment. The **philosophes**, in their relatively calm world, wrote down their thoughts under no pressure to conform to any imperative model and with no authority to create an imperative model. They disagreed with one another, and each writer frequently contradicted himself. Rousseau, for instance, has been intelligently evoked by the anarchist and by the dictator, by the mystic and by the rationalist. Whether Jean-Jacques was none or all of these things, his attractive writings, taken as a whole or individually, did not present a sufficiently unambiguous objective which could sustain an ideology. The French Revolution was much more concrete, and it acquired immediate recognition and singleminded devotion. The **philosophes** received proper tribute[5] and maintained the allegiance and close attention of their readers, but it was the Declaration of the Rights of Man which replaced the Decalogue in the hearts of **le peuple.**

Long before France was seriously threatened by foreign invasion or civil war, the Revolution spontaneously began developing means to distinguish itself from counterrevolution. An early patriot might publicly sport his tricolor **cocarde** or his **bonnet rouge** while striking a meditative pose under the nearest "arbre de la liberté," perhaps recuperating from the preceeding night's "banquet civic."[6] Revolutionary symbolism was taken very seriously. Liberty trees, upon their untimely deaths, were on occasion given elaborate funerals.[7] When it proved difficult to persuade all the

women of Paris to wear the cockade, the Commune on 13 September 1793 and the Convention on 21 September decreed that all **citoyennes** must wear the "signe vénérable de la liberté." Punishments were severe for non-compliance.[8] Also in September 1793, two curés were condemned to death for having, it was charged, "arraché et foulé aux pieds la cocarde nationale."[9]

A humorous contemporary account of republican manners and dress may be found in a letter written in September 1792 by the English visitor John Moore, who was amused to find the newspapers condemning the custom of taking off one's hat and bowing as a sign of greeting because this indicated the pernicious influence of their former slavery and was "unbecoming the independent spirit of free men."[10] The revolutionary journals proposed that to place the right hand to the heart would be a more befitting gesture of heartfelt salutation. Moore discusses the republican clothing, which had been designed by Jacques-Louis David and which had "already been adopted by many." The Englishman, who must have felt like a man from another world, describes one fashion-conscious republican who was equiped with complete regalia:

> His appearance was rather fantastical. His jacket and trousers were blue; his coat, through which the blue sleeves appeared, was white with a scarlet cape; his round hat was amply supplied with plumage; he had two pistols stuck in his belt, and a very formidable sabre at his side: he is a tall man, and of a very warlike figure; I took him for a Major of Dragoons at least: on enquiry I find he is a miniature painter.

Christian names, for streets, buildings, geographical areas, cities and people, were often replaced by republican and deistic appelations. An early patriot named Jean Chrétien might change his name to Grave Plébéien, or carry his infant child to a civic baptism to be washed in the glory of **la patrie** and dubbed Plébe Plébéien.[12] Some unwisely chose less humble names such as Brutus Gracchus, thereby arousing the jealous suspicion of their neighbors and resulting in charges of "aristocratie!" A well-meaning **citoyen** guilty of this **faux pas,** or perhaps some other error such as using the aristocratic **vous** form of address rather than the egalitarian **tutoiement,** could redeem himself by selecting a more sober sobriquet like Légume Vertueux, taking himself to the local "autel de la patrie," and swearing the customary oath to the Revolution.[13] Considering that oath-taking was common, it is understandable that the non-juring clergy would come under suspicion for their refusal to take a seemingly innocuous oath "d'être fidèles à la nation, á la loi et au roi, et de maintenir de tout leur pouvoir la Constitution décrétée par l'Assemblée nationale et acceptée par le roi."[14] If the

clergy would not give up the old and accept the new, they would perish with the old. All social activity, including and especially religious activity, was obliged to conform to revolutionary ideology.

The mania for solidarity also displayed a tendency to exaggerate the dangers posed by aristocrats and conspirators. "Durable villians" such as nobles, royal ministers, and ecclesiastics need not commit an act of treason; it was only necessary **to be** a noble, a royal minister, or an ecclesiastic to provoke the loud hatred of patriots. Jack Censer has pointed out that the revolutionaries "drew heavily from the stereotypes provided by their ideology. In fact, the effect. . . was as much a reemphasis of their ideology as it was an accurate characterization of a certain group or individual."[15] It is true that the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was not popular in the Vendée[16] and that Pius VI and emigré bishops favored the enemies of France in the war, but it is likely that animosity towards the clergy sprang more from the revolutionaries' ideological hatred of tradition than from any real acts of treason committed by the clergy.[17] As early as 1790, after the clergy's resistance to the Civil Constitution had ended the democratic honeymoon between the curés and the laity, the "brigands d'église" were being described as "an evil race" determined to halt the Revolution and to maintain the Church's arrogant prodigality.[18] The clergy's "treason" was that of promoting "superstition" and "ignorance" in order to spread unrest by undermining the new "philosophie du peuple"[19]

Anticlericalism was also in evidence in the Parisian Jacobin Club. On 1 July 1793, Jean-Marie Collot D'Herbois' praise for Jacques-René Hébert brought the applause of his fellow Jacobins: "Vous auriez vu Hébert promener le flambeau de la vérité sur la tête du prêtre hypocrite, et faire fondre son masque, comme un limon impur qui couvrait sa tete. . . . Les républicains révolutionnaires ont concouru au triomphe de la raison et de la vérité."[20] On 4 August 1793, in the Jacobin Club, François Chabot declared that France should "déporter tous les pretres."[21] On 16 August another Jacobin asserted that two-thirds of the constitutional clergy

> sont opposés par leurs principes aux principes républicains; il s' en trouve meme dans Paris qui ont fabriqué des brochures contre-révolutionnaires, ou ils attaquent overtement les autorités constituées. . . . Il est grand temps de purger la République de ces hommes qui veulent encore alimenter, au mépris des lois, la superstition et le fanatisme.[22]

All this was not mere rhetoric; action was being taken. Silvain-Phalier Lejeune, who along with Collot d'Herbois, Joseph-Marie Lequinio and Jacques Isoré had been **en mission** in l'Aisne and l'Oise, reported to the Jacobin Club in Paris on 6 September 1793 that they had "destitué les

nobles, les prêtres, les gens suspects; ils les ont fait mettre en état d'arrestation."[23] In the summer of 1793, the **agents secrets** of the Ministry of the Interior placed a close surveillance on Parisian priests who misled the populace by daring "encore chercher des proselytes," and maneuvering "pour fanatiser le peuple et le remettre sous le joug de la superstition."[24] One police agent, who on 15 September reported hearing a long sermon at the church of Saint-Roche on the virtues of the sign of the cross, was indignant that such "contre-révolution" was still allowed by the law. "Bons républicains" could not be formed amid such "riaiseries ultramontaines."[25] As for the laity, they would do best not to be found engaging in Christian worship, but rather attending an anti-clerical play such as Marie-Joseph Chénier's **Charles IX**, or perhaps passing their time at a public place "remplis de citoyens qui jouaient, buvaient et chantaient des chansons patriotiques et des hymnes en l'honneur de la République, de la Liberté et de l'Egalité."[26] Anticlericalism and a superseding patriotic ideology, those two principal traits of dechristianization, were developing side by side in the first four years of the French Revolution.

Other traits of the dechristianization movement of the Year II may be detected in earlier periods of the Revolution: The validity of Christianity's doctrines were denied;[27] before Hébert used the fashionable term, **sans-culotte**, to describe Jesus Christ, Jesus was being portrayed as a "prolétaire";[28] stress was laid on the morality, virtue, and fraternity of the Revolution, and the immorality, vice, and "égotisme" of the "aristocratie";[29] puritanical attitudes concerning gambling, sex, and the like, were displayed;[30] and "everything" was explained in gross terms of "plots and conspiracies." As one radical journalist put it: "Partout ou se trament des complots contre la patrie ou contre la raison, soyez sûr qu'il y a des prêtres."[31] The early revolutionaries, like those of the Terror, worshiped Reason irrationally and Nature unnaturally. Before the Year II, a sweeping **aristocratie** had been created which was "no less than than the most goulish ogre of a childhood fantasy."[32]

The mania for fraternity and solidarity also led to the emergence of revolutionary fetes and to a cult of revolutionary martyrs. Communes throughout France united to form district federations, which in turn came together to form a national federation on the first anniversary of Bastille Day. The revolutionary pageantry which unfolded on the Champ de Mars in Paris and in similar open-air sites in other cities on 14 July 1790 was marked by patriotism. Frenchmen took their oaths before the altar of the fatherland and offered homage to the "philosophie" which had brought France to such a glorious status. In the period 1790-1793 other fetes, which "annoncent et préparent le culte de la Raison,"[33] arose in commemoration of "les grandes dates révolutionnaires" such as 20 June 1789 (Tennis Court Oath), 4 August 1789 (renunciation of privilege, and 10 August 1792 (fall

of the monarchy).[34] In addition, festivals and "funérailles" associated with the "culte des martyrs de la liberté" honored such **philosophes** and early Republicans as Voltaire and Brutus and such revolutionaries and patriot saints as Honoré Mirabeau, Jean-Paul Marat, Michel Lepeletier,[35] and the victims of the 1791 massacre on the Champ de Mars.[36] Virtually every characteristic of the fetes of the Year II may be found in these earlier festivals. Many major participants and designers of the pre-Terror fetes—Mathieu, Charles-Gilbert Romme, Jacques-Louis David, Jean-Baptiste Gobel, J.-J. Chénier, Charles-Philippe Ronsin—are familiar to the student of the dechristianization campaign of the Year II. One finds the same symbolism,[37] and the same emphasis on the Enlightenment and on antiquity.[38] The same terms are bandied about: **liberté, raison, nature, nation** and **patrie,**[39] **unité, être suprême, régénération.** The secularization process was also manifested as legislators and other civic officials steadily replaced clerics in performing what became strictly civic ceremonies.

The "fête de l'Unité" on 10 August 1793 may serve as an illustration. This festival for the new constitution was designed by David and celebrated on the site of the Bastille, where a strinkingly feminine statue of Nature, with the inscription, "NOUS SOMMES TOUS SES ENFANTS," was erected. "De ses mamelles, qu'elle pressait de ses mains," said the **procès-verbal,** "s'épanchaient dans un vaste bassin deux sources d'une eau pure et abondante. . ." Marie-Jean Hérault de Séchelles, a member of the Committee of Public Safety and at that time president of the Convention, delivered a speech before the statue:

> Souveraine du Sauvage et des nations éclairées, o Nature! Ce peuple immense, rassemblé aux premiers rayons de l'astre du jour devant ton image, est digne de toi. Il est libre! C'est dan ton sein, c'est dan tes sources sacrées qu'il a recouvré ses droits, qu'il s'est régénéré....o Nature! reçois l'expression de l'attachement éternel des Français pour tes lois et que ces eaux fécondes qui jaillissent de tes mamelles, consacrent dans cette coupe de la fraternité et de l'égalité les sermens que te fait la France. . . .[40]

Hérault then stretched forth his cup to catch a drink of the sacred water flowing from the breasts of Nature. Six days later the Convention decreed that this "coupe d'agate," from which the president had drunk water from "la fontaine de la Régénération," be deposited in the Muséum National with an inscription which would recall "l'usage touchant et sublime auquel elle a servi."[41] The revolutionary religion was creating its relics.

It thus seems evident that a revolutionary religion arose simultaneously with the persecution of the Catholic Church and threatened to replace Chris-

tianity prior to the outbreak of the dechristianization movement of the Year II. On 26 June 1793 the Committee of Public Instruction proposed that a series of national festivals replace religious festivals, and even earlier, in December 1792, Jean-Paul Rabaut de Saint-Etienne had urged that a uniform enthusiasm for "liberté, égalité, et fraternité" be fostered among Frenchmen. Rabaut suggested that each canton have a "temple national" to serve as a school building and as a meeting place for citizens where the people could receive lessons in ethics, listen to readings by **lecteurs patriotes** of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and sing hymns in honor of the fatherland.[42] Even this was not new in December 1792. The "titre premier" of the Constitution of 1791, prepared by the Constituent Assembly, contained the following article: "Il sera établi des fêtes nationales pour conserver le souvenir de la Révolution français, entretenir la fraternité entre les citoyens, et les attacher à la constitution, à la patrie, et aux lois."[43] The Legislative Assembly accelerated the propaganda effort in November 1791 when it instructed the Committee of Public Instruction to solicit and distribute patriotic pamphlets, and in August 1792 the Assembly appropriated 100,000 livres to finance the efforts of the Ministry of the Interior's "bureau d'esprit public" to get out "la bonne parole philosophique."[44] The Jacobin Club urged affiliate societies to spread patriotic literature and to exhort the people at popular meetings, meetings often held in former churches. A circular of 27 February 1792 from the mother society advised the provincial clubs:

> Comment s'est établi la religion chrétienne? Par les missions des apotres de' l'Evangile. Comment pouvons nous établir solidement la Constitution? Par les apotres de la liberté et de l'égalité.[45]

The revolutionary calendar had even earlier beginnings. In 1788 the atheist Sylvain Maréchal published an **Almanach des honnêtes gens** which was dated "the first year of the reign of Reason." Maréchal's calendar, like that created in the Year II, had twelve months thirty days in length, and three decades per month. Maréchal replaced the patron saints with an assorted and somewhat incongruous array of **honnêtes gens** such as Voltaire, Hobbes, Dante, Heloise, and Jesus.[46] In 1792 the Convention unsuccessfully attempted to abolish the observance of Sundays and all religious festivals, and the Committee of Public Instruction commissioned Romme and others to plan a reform of the Gregorian calendar.[47] Romme on 20 September 1793 submitted his plan for a republican calendar which was adopted by the Convention on 5 October.[48] The decrees establishing the republican calendar, which replaced Sundays with **décadi**[49] and saints days with "fruits and vegetables" days, were introduced and debated within the Convention along with philosophic attacks against Christianity. The

"désacralisation de l'Etat par la Révolution"[50] had clearly begun with the birth of the French Republic, an era in which many seemed to agree with one Parisian woman who declared: **"Dieu est de l'aristocratie."**[51]

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[1]Karl Mannheim, **Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge,** trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York, 1936), pp. 219, 221.

[2]Thus Robespierre could speak of "the despotism of liberty over tyranny," or of "virtuous terror," and people would act like they understood him.

[3]John McManners, **The French Revolution and the Church** (New York, 1969), p. 85. McManners himself does an excellent job tracing these essential characteristics: "The men of '89 had a core of religious belief which was sub-Christian though not consciously recognized as such, because the necessity for clarification had never been imposed. Once conventional Christian observances fell out of favor, the revolutionaries were driven to define and affirm what they really believed"(p.77).

[4]Jack Richard Censer, **Prelude to Power: The Parisian Radical Press 1789-1791** (Baltimore, 1976).

[5]The remains of Voltaire, for example, were deposited in the Panthéon on 11 July 1791. See the eyewitness acounts of this event in J. M. Thompson, **English Witnesses of the French Revolution** (Oxford, 1938), pp. 133-35.

[6]See Albert Mathiex, **Les origines des cultes révolutionnaires, 1789-1792** (Paris, 1904), pp. 29-35. The exuberance of this early patriotism is reflected well in the journal, **La Cocarde Nationale** (British Library, F. 1581).

[7]F.-A. Aulard and Marc Bouloiseau, eds., **Recueil des actes du comité de salut public avec la correspondance officielle des représentants en mission et le registre du conseil exécutif provisoire,** 27 vols., 2 indexes, and 2 Supplements (Paris, 1889-1971), v. 10, pp. 546-47. (Hereafter cited as **CPS.**) Liberty trees were often fertilized with the ashes of martyred soldiers, and they replaced crosses in public places. See James H. Billington, **Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith** (New York, 1980), p. 46. On 27 May 1792, the **garde nationale** of Nimes held a **fete civique** in order to inaugurate a tree of liberty, "un Chene surmonté d'une Pique et d'un Bonnet." Archives Nationales, Flc III Gard 9, "Fetes nationales." the commune of Angouleme followed suit on 7 June 1792. British Library, F. 69*, **Fetes civiques,** no. 12. These municipalities shared the desire of the Paris Commune that liberty trees be "immortels comme la République." British Library, F. 1463, **Journal de la Commune de Paris,** no. 29, 5 pluviose/24 janvier 1974, p. 296.

[8]Pierre Caron, ed., **Paris pendant la terreur: rapports des agents secrets du ministre de l'intérieur,** 6 vols. (Paris, 1910-1964), v. 1, pp. 94, 149, 154-55.

[9]Ibid., p. 118.

[10]J. M. Thompson, **English Witnesses of the French Revolution,** p. 214.

[11]Ibid., p. 215.

[12]Those unfortunate enough to bear the name of "Louis" were especially desirous of a name change. In August 1793, a "société républicaine" in the department of the Lot decreed "qu'a ce titre odieux pour de vrais républicains sera substitué celui de **Montagnard.**" M.-J. Guillaume, ed., **Procés-verbaux du comit d'instruction publique de la Convention nationale,** 6 vols. (Paris, 1890-1908), v. 2, p. 533. (Hereafter cited as **CPI.**)

[13]See Edouard Lévy, **Le manuel des prénoms** (Paris, 1922). and Roger de Figuéres, **Les noms révolutionnaires des communes de France** (Paris, 1901). It was not unusual for patriots

to give their children names such as Vache, Carotte, or Rhubarbe. Jean Robiquet, **La vie quotidienne au temps de la Révolution** (Paris, 1938), p. 143.

[14]M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, eds., **Archives parlementaires de 1787 a 1860, premiere serie (1787 à 1794)** (Paris, 1879-1914), v. 21, p. 80. (Hereafter cited as **Arch. parl.**)

[15]Censer, **Prelude to Power,** pp. xxii,93. François Furet, in his **Interpreting the French Revolution,** trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 63-69, describes well this "two-dimensional world where nothing existed but patriotism and treason, the people and aristocratic plots," a Manichaean world in which "the denunciation of traitors thus became a mechanical reaction that could strike anyone at any time."

[16]See Timothy Tackett, "The West in France in 1789: The Religious Factor in the Origins of Counterrevolution," **Journal of Modern History** 54(1982):715-45; Paul Bois, **Paysans de l'ouest** (Paris, 1971); and Donald Sutherland, **The Chouans: the Social Origins of Popular Counter-Revolution in Upper Brittany 1770-1796** (London, 1982).

[17]Mona Ozouf, in "War and Terror in French Revolutionary Discourse (1792-1794)," **Journal of Modern History** 56(1984):579-97, for example, argues that the justification of the September Massacres of 1792 "was moral," and **not** an appeal to expediency. "The imaginary held sway over the real."

[18]B.-J.-B. Buchez and P.-C. Roux, **Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française,** 40 vols. (Paris, 1834-38), v. 5, pp. 560-69; **Journal universel,** no. 242, 22 juillet 1790, p. 2932; and **Révolutions de Paris,** no. 73, 4 décembre 1790, p. 390. See also **Révolutions de Paris,** no. 79, 15 janvier 1791, pp. 8-12, 16-17, and **La Trompette du Pére Duchene,** no. 2, mai 1792, pp. 6-8. The latter suggested that priests be deported "au Missipipi."

[19]**Journal universel,** no. 178, 19 mai 1790, p. 1420. See Censer,**Prelude to Power,** p. 46. Marat (**Ami du peuple,** no. 271, 4 novembre 1790, pp. 4-5) announced that "the time of **philosophie** had now arrived." The **Révolutions de Paris** (no. 1, 17 juillet 1789, p. 5) boasted that the citizens of France were already "éclairés par le flambeau de la saine philosophie, armée des droits sacrés des peuples, de la raison et de l'humanité." Audouin (**Journal universel,** no. 434, 30 janvier 1791, p. 3470) and Stanislas Fréron (**Orateur du peuple,** no. 38, n.d., v. 1, p. 301) also identified **philosophie** as the motivating force of the Revolution, although they made no distinction between eighteenth-century **philosophie** and that of the Revolution.

[20]F.-A. Aulard, ed., **La Société des Jacobins: recueil de documents,** 6 vols. (Paris, 1895),v. 5, pp. 282-83.

[21]Ibid., p. 328.

[22]Ibid., p. 358.

[23]Ibid., p. 389.

[24]Caron, ed., **Paris pendant la terreur,** v. 1, pp. 12, 109-10.

[25]Ibid., p. 110.

[26]Ibid., p. 31.

[27]See **Orateur du peuple,** v. 2, no. 29, n.d., pp. 153-55.

[28]**Révolutions de France et de Brabant,** no. 3, 12 décembre 1789, p. 109.

[29]**Mercure national,** no. 2, 7 janvier 1791, pp.54-55, and no. 21, 18 mars 1791, pp. 384-85; **Révolutions de France et de Brabant,** no. 38, 16 aout 1790, pp. 675-76.

[30]**Journal universel,** no. 455, 20 février 1791, pp. 3637-38; **Révolutions de France et de Brabant,** no. 83, 12 février 1791, p. 211; **Mercure national,** no. 12, 15 février 1791, p. 5. See also Michael Kennedv. in "The Best and the Worst of Times: The Jacobin Club Network from October 1791 to June 2, 1793," **Journal of Modern History** 56(1984), who notes the "proselytizing fire"(p. 645) of the Jacobins, one of whose concerns was "how to end vices"(p. 648).

[31]**Révolutions de Paris,** no. 158, p. 126. Richard Cobb, "Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire," **Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine** 6(1959):81-120. The tendency to readily think in terms of plots and conspiracies has been traced to the **ancien régime** by Steven Laurence Kaplan, **The Famine Plot Persuasion in Eighteenth-Century France** (Philadelphia, 1982).

[32]Censer, **Prelude to Power,** p. 58. According to John Black Sirich, people were often denounced "with no indication of their 'crime', or with only a stereotyped remark such as 'incivic remarks', 'aristocrat', 'has shown no attachment to the revolution', 'fanatic', 'counterrevolutionary', 'indifferent'." Sirich, **The Revolutionary Committees in the Departments of France** (Cambridge, 1943), p. 67.

[33]A. Mathiez, **Les origines des cultes révolutionnaires,** p. 46.

[34]Marie-Louise Biver, **Fetes révolutionnaires à Paris** (Paris, 1979); Mona Ozouf, **La fête révolutionnaire, 1789-1799**(Paris, 1976). The latter is an extremely significant analysis of the meaning of revolutionary festivals. The early festivals were often attended by a mass, but the mass was celebrated on the "autel de la patrie" and was followed by "serments civiques" and patriotic speeches by constitutional clergy. Archives Nationales, Flc III Creuse 8, "Fetes nationales" ("commune de Luçon," 1792). By the time of the "fête de la fédération" of 10 August 1793, Catholic priests and ceremonies were notably absent; all was "nouveau." Archives Nationales, Flc III Vienne 7, "Fêtes nationales" (10 aout 1793). As one report from the department of the Cher stated, "Enfin la patrie a ses fetes, comme les a chaque religion. On n'y voit plus les pretres." British Library, F. 69*, **Fetes civiques,** no. 6, "Rapport sur la fete de la Réunion Républicaine du 10 aout 1793, l'an 2e de la République," p. 1.

[35]**Arch. parl.,** v. 58, p. 400. See the report of a "Fête funèbre célébrée à Arras, le 28 janvier 1793, en honneur de Michel Le Pelletier," in Archives Nationales, Flc III Pas-de-Calais 14, "Fêtes nationales." On 19 September 1793, the Convention decreed "la rédaction d'un recueil officiel des actions heroïques et civiques des républicains français, pour remplacer la vie des saints." This collection, organized by Léonard Bourdon and Antoine-Claire Thibaudeau, was disseminated early in 1794 to schools, municipalities, armies, and popular societies. **Arch. parl.,** v. 74, pp. 402-03; F.-A Aulard, **Le culte de la raison et le culte de l'être suprême** (Paris, 1892), pp. 34-35.

[36]Albert Soboul, "Sentiment religieux et cultes populaires pendant la Révolution: saintes patriotes et martyrs de la liberté," **Annales historiques de la Révolution française** (1957):195-213. (Hereafter cited as **AhRf.**) See Michel Vovelle, **Religion et Révolution: la déchristianisation de l'an II** (Paris, 1976), p. 199, for a geographic distribution of the cult of martyrs.

[37]For an excellent example of festival symbolism, see the **Ordre et marche de la fête de l'Hospitalité. . .**in Buchez and Roux, **Histoire parlementaire,** v. 25, pp. 469-70.

[38]See Harold Parker's perceptive analysis, **The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries: A Study in the Development of the Revolutionary Spirit,** reprint (New York, 1965).

[39]See Jacques Godechot, "Nation, patrie, nationalisme et patriotisme en France au XVIII[e]siécle," **AhRf** 43(1971):481-501, and Jean-René Suratteau, "Cosmopolitisme et patriotisme au siécle des lumiéres," **AhRf** 55(1983):364.

[40]Buchez and Roux, **Histoire parlementaire,** v. 28, p. 438, and F.-A. Aulard, **Le culte de la**

raison et le culte de l'être suprême, pp. 31-32. M.-J. Chénier reported that the fete cost the nation 1,200,000 livres. See Biver, **Fetes révolutionnaires à Paris,** pp. 68-77.

[41]**Arch. parl.,** v. 72, p. 264; and **CPII,** v. 2, pp. LXXV-LXXVI.

[42]**Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur: seule histoire authentique et inaltérée de la Révolution française,** 42 vols. (Paris, 1860), v.17, 6 juillet 1793, p. 41 (Hereafter cited as **Moniteur**); and **CPI,** v. 1, pp. 231-33.

[43]L.G. Wickham Legg, ed.,**Select Documents Illustrative of the History of the French Revolution,** 2 vols. (Oxford, 1905), v. 2, p. 219.

[44]A. Mathiez, **Origines des cultes,** p. 139.

[45]Ibid., pp. 98-106.

[46]George Gordon Andrews, "Making the Revolutionary Calendar," **American Historical Review** 36(1930-31):515-32; and Georges Villain, "Etude sur le calendrier républicain," **La Révolution française** 7(1884):538. In 1793, Maréchal expressed his disgust for Christianity in another **Almanach des républicains pour servir a l'instruction publique.** Andrews, **AHR** 36(1930-31):525. See Maurice Dommanget, **Sylvain Maréchal, l'égalitaire: l'homme sans Dieu'**(Paris, 1950).

[47]**CPI,** v. 2, pp. LXXVI, 434; and Adolphe Schmidt, **Paris pendant la Révolution d'après les rapports de la police secrète, 1789-1800,** trans. Paul Viollet, 4 vols. (Paris, 1894), v. 4, **Affaires religieuses—Instruction publique,** pp. 7-12. One secret police agent observed that "le même peuple qui persécute les prêtres et profane les temples" also took part in the unlawful "fete de la Pentecote" of 19 May 1793. Adolphe Schmidt, ed., **Tableaux de la Révolution française, publiés sur les papiers inédits du département de la police secrete de Paris,** 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1867-71), v. 1, p. 264.

[48]**CPI,** v. 2, pp. 434-51, 579-91, 605-09; and **Arch. parl.,** v. 76, pp. 120-21.

[49]According to the new calendar, approved on 5 October 1793, the year was divided into twelve months of thirty days each with five "complementary days" left over. Each month was divided into three ten-day periods, or decades, and each tenth day was termed a **décadi.** Months, days and **décadi** were designated only by ordinal denomination. Each four-year period was called a franciade, the day ending that period "le jour de la Révolution." Each day even was divided into equal parts according to the decimal system. In the **séance** of 24 October 1793 **(Arch. parl.,** v. 77, pp. 496-99), Fabre d'Eglantine introduced names for each month and each day of the year. Natural designations were decreed for months and days, while the thirty-six **décadi** were named after farm implements. Later the days of the year reverted to ordinal delineation, and the complementary days became the **sans-culottides.** The various decrees on the calendar were officially codified on 24 November 1793 **(Arch. parl.,** v. 80, pp. 6-13).

[50]Michel Vovelle, **Piété baroque et déchristianisation en Provence au XVIII siecle** (Baissiére, 1973), p. 18.

[51]A. Schmidt, **Tableau de la Révolution,** v. 2, p. 7. See also **Tableau,** v. 2, p. 41.

WORLD HUNGER AND AFRICAN DEVELOPEMENT POLICIES

Ken Mufuka

One cannot begin to appreciate the present predicament of Sub-Saharan Africa until one casts his mind back to the early 1960's. At that time, I was a student in the Universaity of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The whole of Africa was beginning to awake from its slumber. Idioms and phrases used at the time reflect the great enthusiasm with which we faced the future.

It was proposed at the United Nations, that 1960 be named "Africa's year". Mr. Harold Macmillan, then British Prime Minister, gave a stirring speech to a joint session of South African Houses of Parliament at the Cape entitled, "The Winds of Change". W.E.B. Dubois, the great American scholar, said that the remainder of the centry will be known as "Africa's century". He, himself, gave up his United States citizenship and "returned" to Ghana, a place he considered his homeland.[1] To us, sitting in the University corridors, seeing white colonials giving up power all around us and that same power falling like ripened fruit into the hands of native African sons, we knew that, this indeed was our century. It is difficult now to appreciate the goodwill and enthusiasm we had for ourselves and from our friends.

My contention is that the political-economy of most Sub-Saharan states is actually more severe than the general world overview would have us believe. To illustrate this point, I will use the facts and figures from East Africa, which fall among the better managed states to show that even better managed countries are retrogressing and have not even started to tackle the major issue of unemployment. I also write from my experience in Zimbabwe, during my sojourn in 1982-1984.

OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

Enthusiasm for the future has now been replaced by a feeling of unrelieved gloom. Our hopes of building a free and prosperous Africa have not been realized. The drought and famines which enveloped all the fifty countries in Africa between 1980-1985 were only symptoms of a deeper malaise, the inherent insecurity and corruption of African regimes which made even the distribution of food impossible. An American visitor to the Sudan in 1984 found that twenty years after the British left, the roads and railways they left were still the only ones available except that they were now unusable.[2]

I will argue that even elected governments in Africa have not developed a sense of legitimacy, let alone a sense of security. Nepotism and corruption

are a natural growth from a desire to strengthen the power base and build obligatory systems among party or tribal supporters of the ruling party. The tendency towards socialist industry arises from the same desire by government to use these industries as a hunting ground for party stalwarts. Any large scale organization or industry, which remains independent of government, is seen as capable of giving rewards and sinecures and therefore an alternative source of power to the government. In the long run, because of the inefficiency resulting from the system, significant economic progress is impossible. Indeed, the system created within itself a monster, a **gotterdamarang,** that feeds on its tail in order to survive.

My own impressions lead me to the view that economic progress will depend on whether African leaders can be made accountable to the people they lead. Until then, the situation cannot be reversed. The organization of African Unity usually takes an optimistic attitude about African problems. In one of their rare moments of introspection, they confessed that: "drought, famine, dropping farm output now below the 1965 level creates huge expanses of poverty. Factory production in (most of Africa) is lower than in 1970. Many plants run at twenty-five percent of capacity". The organization noted ruefully that the basic problems are "incompetence, corruption, falling commodity prices. . . .at best the slide can be slowed, but not stopped". Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director of the Economic Commission for Africa, suggests that only gross negligence could have destroyed the hopes of a continent which once held so much promise.[3]

There is a growing consensus in the academic world that the drought and famine of 1980-1985 are only symptoms of a long term deterioration in the political economy of Africa as a whole. The World Bank (1984), points out that with an ever increasing population on one hand and agricultural output declining on the other, imports of food which now provide about a fifth of the region's requirements cannot long provide the solution. The seeds for a political and economic nightmare are already in place. The World Bank Report calls this a "deepening crisis".[4]

We should place emphasis on the population growth relative to the expansion of the economies in question. The magnitude of the population explosion does seem to strengthen the theory proposed by the Reverend Thomas Matthus in 1799. Population grows in a geometrical pattern while food production increases in small percentages if at all.[5] The population figures of any selected Sub-Saharan state seems to indicate a doubling of population in less than one generation. A table provided by the World Bank illustrates the point.[6]

Country	1980	2000	2020 Population Millions
Zimbabwe	7	15	31
Cameroons	8	14	25
Ivory Coast	9	16	31
Ghana	12	23	45
Kenya	16	37	81
Tanzania	19	37	72
Zaire	28	52	95

The average growth of population was two percent per annum, the highest in the world. An expanding population pushed more and more people into the cities but the industrial base all over Sub-Saharan Africa was eroding at the same time that the agricultural base was failing. The growth of African cities is even faster than the rate of population growth as a whole. Of the thirty-five cities selected for study by the World Bank in 1980, the average growth was eight to nine percent per year. At that rate, the cities double in population every ten years.[7]

We still mention in passing a few reasons why the hunger drives families to have larger families. In 1980, the average fertility rate per each Kenyan woman was eight live births. Generally, the women interviewed wanted more children than they already had. A curious but significant fact was that the poorer the women, the more children they wanted.[8] The argument behind that is that every African woman hopes that at least one of her children will one day be a "big chief" in the government. Through nepotism, the big chief will raise the economic status of his brothers and sisters. To put it bluntly, a starving family sees an increase in the number of children as a guarantee for survival. Since, virtually none of the East African countries have any social security to take care of old age, children are still the only means of insuring an income in old age.

The fact that government is the only industry that has shown consistent growth since 1960 is very important if we are to sustain the general thesis of this paper. Government employment is predicated upon the needs of the ruling party to reward its supporters. Secondly, within that framework the party "chiefs" are allowed to reward their personal or tribal followers. Compared to colonial public services, the post-independence services are ernomous. The combined results of all these factors are that by far the governments are the major employers. Since, they cannot stand competition, the private economies have been in decline vis-a-vis the parastatals. The table below will illustrate the point.[9]

Country	Year	Public Employment as percentage of total formal employment
Ghana	1957	51.4
	1972	73.9
Tanzania	1962	27.0
	1974	66.0
Zambia	1976	71.5
Kenya	1963	29.6
	1977	41.7
Uganda	1962	41.8
	1970	42.2

To support these bureaucracies, African governments have become ingeneous in creating new taxes. An example from Zimbabwe will suffice. Income tax deducted at source for all earnings of 15,000 p.a. and over in 1980 was thrity-three percent. We need to emphasize this point. This means that the actual take home pay was 10,000 p.a. Income tax for married women whose husbands were also income earners was forty percent per anum. General sales tax in 1980 was twenty percent. A hunger tax of three percent of total income was imposed in 1984. When all the sundry taxes were added, seventy-two percent of income was gone. The heavy taxes alone are a definite drag on the economy. Secondly, it drives many activities underground. In order to make ends meet, many middle-class families in Zimbabwe had developed extensive networks of informal trade. A farmer would deliver meat and mealie-meal to customers in their homes, thus avoiding for himself the Grain Marketing Board levies and for his customers the heavy sales taxes. This informal network was so extensive that even cars were repaired at home, dresses and men's outfits were delivered clandenstively to the homes of customers and many began to grow their own food in their backyards.

The result is that the governement is forced to introduce new oppressive taxes which in turn force the people to hide their incomes. The private industry, cannot, in the long run, succeed, because African governments control prices or imports and exports. The revenue generated from that angle in Zimbabwe has been steadily declining since 1960.

The conclusion is inescapable. "Without policy (changes) there is insufficient structural adjustment to get the economy back onto a faster growth

track. Domestic savings stagnate. All that higher aid can do is help to sustain the level of imports and also that of investment."[10]

A brief survey of seven countries will show that while their population is poised to double every twenty years, their food production has generally been declining even in actual volume.

AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT IN MILLIONS OF $$

Country	1960	1979	Percentage of Annual Growth
Zimbabwe	18	12	-0.7
Cameroons		32	1.1
Ivory Coast	43	26	-0.9
Ghana	41	46	-0.2
Kenya	38	34	-0.5
Tanzania	57	54	-1.5
Zaire	30	33	-1.4

World Bank Report, 1984 p. 145 and 167.

The desire to reward family members and political supports is distorted by the fact that in most African countries the major industry is that of government. Therefore, there are no significant opportunities outside the political arena. Even private industries find that their major clients are governmental groups or affiliates and they can lose business if they are not seen as supporters of government.

Without any sense of legitimacy at all, most African governments are pre-occupied with sheer survival, hence, the tremendous growth of police and defence apparatus. Within these security apparatus, the tribal supporters of the ruler form the first line of defence, or put simply, an information service. Thus otherwise innocent organizations such as the **Societe Generale d'Alimentation,** a general grocery chain in Zaire loses its obvious purpose of securing and selling groceries in competition with the Belgian companies. With his brother, Mr. Mabuto as head of that trading group, and other members of his family in strategic positions, President Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire demands tribute from a population of over thirty million. To refuse to do business with **Societe** is viewed as a political protest and therefore treasonable.[11]

In order to strengthen his influence, President Mobuto has surrounded himself with two hundred families. The government regularly flies fresh fruit and vegetables from Kivu province, over a thousand miles from Kinshasha the capital for the enjoyment of these privileged families. Members of the Central Committee are paid up to 9,000 in United States dollars per month in order to enable them to procure luxuries of life which they cannot purchase at home.[12] Examples abound all over Africa. In the midst of a devastating famine in Ethiopia, in 1982, the government continued to order cases of whiskey for a celebration for the revolution. The cost of the celebrations was estimated at 200 million dollars, an amount which would have more than paid for all the relief aid. But more important was the continued military build up and expenditures of 2,500 million dollars of equipment. The total expenditure on security for that year was forty-six percent of the national budget.[13] Paradoxically food production for that year was eighty-one percent of what it was in 1970.[14]

It is my contention that whatever the immediate causes of African problems and world hunger are, the main cause is the lack of acountability by politicians to their constituencies. All the factors that go wrong can be traced to that one basic fact of African life. We shall list a number of factors that contributed to food shortages in East Africa. In Kenya, for many years agricultural extension workers have been employed in the cities and not in the rural areas. Consequently, they need automobiles to travel to the peasant farms. These vehicles are simply not available. Politicians have been happy to receive American wheat which is less trouble than growing their own. In any case, American wheat serves only the towns, or more specifically, the civil servants whose loyalty the politicians cultivate.[15]

The most controversial issue relates to agricultural programs that are supported by international financial organizations or by African governments themselves. In this paper my contention is that these programmers fail to improve food production because their **raison detre** was never food production but political rewards for government supporters. This later aim has definitely been achieve. Two examples will suffice.

In 1970 to 1980, well over 2,500 local co-operatives were formed in Tanzania. These co-operatives became the main channel through which all government aid to peasants was to flow. Those who refused to join the co-operatives did not receive government aid. This meant that no schools, health clinics and market facilities for their coffee and sisal would be provided. Naturally, these co-operatives were headed by party political stalwarts. They did their politicization so well that by 1976 the Tanzanian villagers had learnt their political lessons well but did little farming. In fact, their production was lower than in the previous years. "In 1976, President Julius Nyerere abolished the country's 2,500 local co-operative unions,

arguing that they were corrupt, inefficient and politically uncontrollable." In their place he appointed government parastatals to manage agricultural production. These parastatals could buy seed, fertilizers, give credit, buy tools and store food crops as well. These parastatals proved to be more mismanaged than the co-operatives. In 1974 and in 1982 the World Bank provided support totalling 174 million dollars to Tanzania. The Bank reported that "due to overwhelming problems both internal and external to the parastatals, the assistance had little effect."[16]

The mistakes were classical. The government of Canada was prevailed upon to establish a 70,000 acre wheat farm. The workers employed were taken from their nine acre peasant farms to manage the conglomerate. The World Bank gave a loan of 10 million dollars for six cashew nut plants. There are not enough cashew nuts to occupy the plants for more than six months of the year. The Canadian bakery which makes 100,000 loaves a day in Dar-es-Soloam cannot sell more than half of its supply so it works every other day, or every other week, if at all. The same World Bank reported confidentially that of the tractors it had helped to buy, 2,663 of them were idle in 1981 for lack of spare parts or know how. They were supposed to help peasants revolutionize agriculture.[17]

Our second example comes from Zambia. In 1965, President Kenneth Kaunda in his wisdom, against the advice of his party and experts, issued the CHIFUBU DECLARATION. This was to be the basis on which Zambia was to defeat their corn shortages once and for all. Since the white civil servants in the ministry of Agriculture had recently left for Rhodesia with the break-up of the Rhodesian Federation, he did not get nay technical support from that department. In fact farmers could not get their letters replied to and had to come into town if they had any inquiries.

The Department of Co-operatives was forced to register all who applied, especially if they were members of the ruling party. The money for this scheme was handled by the Credit Organization of Zambia, an affiliate of the ruling party. This organization was so awash with money that it paid fifteen English pounds per acre for land clearing when commercial farmers paid only five. The co-operative farmers were given loans and grants according to the size of their farms. They claimed vast amounts of lands, paid five pounds per acre for clearing and pocketed the difference which they attributed to "supervision expenses". To say that most of the land remained fallow is to say the obvious. To say that the Zambian government agency which gave these loans soon found itself broke is also an obvious deduction. The system was abolished in 1970 when the Zambian treasury had suffered an overall deficit.[18]

We should not lose sight of the fact that both the Tanzanian and the

Zambian schemes were primarily political instruments aimed at consolidating support for the ruling party. This aim was definitely achieved in both cases. The improvement of food production was a by-product and if it had been achieved, the governments concerned, would have been happier. But the fact that loans were not given to proven farmers but to political supporters explains the inevitable failure of these schemes.

The general tendency by African countries to nationalize industry or to use parastatal organizations to carry on business on behalf of the governments concerned should be seen in the wider context of African politics. The government itself is the largest paymaster and supporters of the ruling party expect to be appointed to lucrative jobs, whether they are qualified for them or not. Any African government therefore sees large independent companies as direct competitors for patronage and support. It is because these companies have the ability to offer patronage in direct competition with government that they are considered undesirable. This also explains why companies are formed which have no business to transact. An example from Zambia will suffice. The Zambia Transport Services Company was formed to haul goods from Dar-es-Salaam to Lusaka by road. The road itself was unusable for half a year and the government gave away the contract to Beira-Harare-Lusaka railway line. Since the Zambian governnt had political obligations to the men working at Zambia Transport Services, these workers were paid for four years after their company had become redundant. In 1984, the National Milling Company was closed while its chairman, Mr. Adrian Kalimina, and the chairman of SUGARLOAF, Mr. Mestone Nsensema, were in the United States looking for wheat. It does not matter whether these two companies make bread or not because they were formed primarily to reward men who had served the party or the president.[19]

African leaders seem to be pre-occupied with the idea that no group in the economy should be allowed to produce anything unless they are politically supportive of the ruling party. Thus economics are subordinated to politics. It is the classical story of a Chinese communist who would not allow a capitalist cat to catch rats in the area under his jurisdiction. While the Zambian government has gone out to recruit white farmers from South Africa to occupy the farms abandoned at independence, it has meanwhile expelled 70,000 efficient Zimbabwe farmers of the Apostolic Faith Church. Their faith does not allow them to actively participate in pro-government politics. Faced by all these contradictions, the Zambian Economic Report makes the obvious observation that Zambian parastatal organizations have been operating "their government metal mines despite persistent unremunerative world metal prices for nearly a decade now". The report advises that "an effective structural change is the crying need of the Zam-

bian situation. The country has to mobilize adequate resources both domestic and foreign to restructure effectively the economy into agriculture and local based manufacturing industries both large and small".[20]

The words "restructure", "mobilize", and "adequate resources", have become standard vocabulary in East and Central Africa. What the Zambian government report fails to accept is the fact that adequate resources were available during the CHIFUBU agricultural scheme but were squandered for political reason. Unless the restructuring is done in such a way as to make politicians accountable on a regular basis, no amount of resources will be adequate.

ZIMBABWE

I shall now briefly allude to the development policies of Zimbabwe since 1980! When the Zimbabwe African National Union came to power in April 1980, it had emerged from a bitter war with the colonial government of Mr. Ian Smith. During that war, the colonial government had received private and public support from South Africa, Britian and the United States. There was definite evidence to show that the British government was in collusion with British Petroleum and Shell Oil to undermine the oil sanctions imposed by the United Nations.[21] By contrast, the two natinalist parties fighting for independence received generous training and material support from the Soviet Union and China. Twelve years of such close working relationships left them somewhat sympathetic to communism and socialist management policies. There is a widely-held belief among African nationalists that racism and capitalism are bed-fellows. These two factors are important to the understanding of African politics.

On coming to power, the Zimbabwe government issued a document entitled, GROWTH AND EQUITY (1982). I shall confine myself to those policies which relate to economic development and hunger. The pamphlet alluded to above on growth was a polemical treatise to the effect that unless investors share their wealth with the proletariat, economic growth without this promise would be avoided. Various strategies were found to implement this policy.

The Zimbabwe government, using emergency powers, set a new minimum wage of sixty-five dollars per month for domestic workers and 110 dollars for industrial and commercial workers. In effect, the government assumed sweeping powers over all prices and commodities, electricity, water, bread, wages, beer, etc., thus making everyday management planning for private industry difficult. Workers could not be dismissed without government permission. In 1985, agro-industrial wages were doubled from 75 dollars per month to 143.75 dollars per month by government decree.[22]

Secondly, the governemnt hoped to attract multi-nationals on a co-operative basis with itself. During the last six years, only three companies have entered into such arrangements, Holiday Inn, Sheraton Hotels and Heinz. The combined total of employment involved in these three companies is not significant. The Zimbabwe government however, is aware of the reluctance of multi-nationals. The Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, believes that: "Foreign investment is a very sensititve thing, extremely sensitive. Even if we were to declare ourselves capitalists as Zaire (sic), you see there is not much investment there. Look at developing countries which are capitalists and you will see that over the five years or so very little investment has gone to those countries."[23] The solution was to create government owned companies. The umbrella Industrial Development Corporation, formed in 1965 as a joint venture with private enterprise became wholly government owned. The Zimbabwe National Oil Company will eventually replace LONRHO, a British Company, the Zimbabwe Tourist Company will compete with the private hotel industry, the National Housing Corporation uses communist style building brigades to provide cheap housing and Hwange Colliery is managed by a joint company with Anglo-American Corporation. This is only an example of the direction in which the Zimbabwe government has taken.[24]

Even within the short span of life these corporations have had, the expected results have not been forthcoming. The universal problem of all government owned companies has always been that even though the managers are instructed to make profit, they are appointed to the positions because of political loyalty. It is the classical case of a cat which catches mice and a communist cat which is ideologically preferable. The government rhetoric could not be aimed at encouraging free enterprise. Zimbabwean socialism is described by the Prime Minister thus: ". . .our socialism is scientific and recognizes that its course will be through a class struggle. . . .based on Marxist-Leninist principles. The socialist stage will have been placed in possession of the means of production and capitalism will have been completely transformed.[25]

Government owned companies are faced by two major serious problems in Africa. We have mentioned the fact that government must find secure jobs for its supporters and these supporters in turn must provide secure jobs for their tribal relatives. The whole principle of allowing civil servants to manage commercial enterprises is self-defeating. As soon as the nationalists took over the management of Iron and Steel works in 1981, (ZISCO) there was a scramble to find jobs for party stalwarts and tribal followers. Whereas the steel mills were losing 20 million dollars per annum in 1983, by 1984, they were losing over 100 million dollars per annum. There was serious "over employment". The government minister responsible for ZISCO confessed to parliament that: "For instance, one of the things that

will have to be done at ZISCO is to share surplus labor and make a review of all unnecessary engagements. . . .one also gets the impression that there is a very severe overmanning of this organization."[26]

Air Rhodesia, now AIR ZIMABAWE, and AFRETAIR were two of the few national airlines on the African continent which were profitable. The nationalists combined the two companies into one national airline AIR ZIMBABWE after independence. From a surplus of twelve million dollars a year, by 1985 the airline was facing overdrafts of 100 million dollars. A Zimbabwe government report said that there had been severe overmanning, gross mismanagement and theft of company monies.[27]

The report issued by the Minister of Transport on the mismanagement at AIR ZIMBABWE should be followed in some detail at the risk of superfluity because it offers an authoritative summary of the classical problems facing an African government. Because employment is predicated upon political and tribal loyalty, the temptation to overemploy is unavoidable. As a result, overdrafts and subsidies quadruple overnight. The report says that:

(Col. 4) Manual recruiting channels were apparently abandoned and the general manager (i.e. the big man) made his own appointments. . . .There was over-employment.

(Col. 1) (Overdrafts) rose from 18.2 million dollars in 1983 to 45.7 million in 1984 and later to almost 84 million in 1985. There were a lot of people hired who had no specific functions.

(Col. 3) Other staff had been moved from the places they were trained for to make room for friends of the big man. The staff thus employed showed no discipline at all. They were safe under the protection of the "big man". The report says that:

(Col. 2) Staff morale had plummented. . . .employees arriving late and leaving early. Staff did not care about the public which paid for the service.

Oral evidence not found in the rport indicated that passengers were sometimes thrown out in order to give way for political "big men" who had not booked for flights. A most damning practice found in the report is that the manager was reluctant to employ qualified blacks.

It says that:

(Col. 4) There was fear of competition from qualified blacks and a desire to use (retired) whites who were believed to be prevented by political considerations to take over the highest post. (sic).

The privileged few demanded that the government pay for their promiscuous pleasures while on leave. The report says that:

(Col. 4) Captains on overseas duty took their wives or girlfriends with them and wanted hotel accomodations upgraded. . .by the airline (sic).

The only redeeming feature is that some members of government are honest enough to confess the inherent weaknesses of the system. However, as in the case of Ghana, under Dr. Kwame Nkurumah, it can be foreseen that by the time the whole government becomes aware of these inherent weaknesses, the financial backbone of the state will have been irreversibly destroyed. This is not an exaggeration at all.

Oral evidence seems to indicate that in the railways, as many as three people were employed for one job. The result has been disastrous for the Zimbabwean treasury. Within two years of the nationalist takeover, subsidies to parastatals became a major drain on the Zimbabwe treasury. From less than one hundred million 1980, they exceeded 600 million in 1985. In 1985, about twenty-five percent of total government revenues went to subsidies for parastatals. The significance of this is that some of the parastatals were revenue generating companies before government takeover. The proliferation of government companies therefore creates a **gottadamarang**, a monster that consumes its tial in order to sustain itself. The minister of finance reported in 1985 that: "Last year, I expressed strong concern about the large amounts of funds being allocated as subsidies to finance losses incurred by parastatals. The position continues to give cause for concern. This situation is unsatisfactory."[28]

Clearly, the methods used to create employment in Zimbabwe are insufficient to meet the challenge. The official account is that since 1982, Zimbabwe produced 80,000 school leavers per annum. Of these, less than forty-two percent passed their high school examinations. In the private sector, only 7,000 new jobs were created between 1980-1985. Taking into account the closure of many private industries during the same period, the private sector has shrunk from its 1980 position. The government has in the meantime expanded and may soon employ sixty-seven of the total in the formal sector. Given the proviso that the expansion of government employment creates unemployment in the private sector. In any case, the total employment is not anywhere near what is required. The minister of finance confessed: "In-

deed the employment trends which I referred to earlier gave cause for alarm. They constitute a development which cannot be viewed with any degree of complacency and which calls for redoubled efforts. . .to favor the growth with employment lest the nation finds itself. . .with increasing thousands of educated jobless in our streets."[29]

The question of foreign engagements is seen by the government as unavoidable. In this article we are only interested in as far as it puts severe strains on the national treasury. It is suggested that 7,000 troops are engaged in Mozambique in order to protect the railway line. The situation is disastrous no matter what action is taken by government. The South African alternative is humiliating politically, yet the Mozambican alternative must in the long run be disastrous to the treasury.[30]

I have left the external factors to the end. African politicians say that they are not to blame for droughts, the declining purchasing power of their currencies and worst of the disadvantages terms of trade for their sugar, coffee, tobacco, and minerals. I shall dispose of these arguments briefly. Generally, it is not the lack of rainfall **per se** that has caused the drought. For instance, the state of Texas in the United States receives less rainfall than Zimbabwe (32 inches per annum). Since independence, however, because the nationalists believe that they owe a special debt for their success to the support given them by peasants. They have therefore allowed the peasants, without any planning to occupy virgin lands and to clear them of vegetation. This author was a member of the Great Zimbabwe-Lake Kyle committee which presented a confidential report to the Governor of Masvingo Province on the destruction of vegetation. Within two years of uncontrolled peasant occupation of the area; the committee feared that Lake Kyle, the second largest water system in the country, would be silted up within five years. Without ground cover rainfall which had once been adequate, is not washed away within minutes. Sometimes an area experiences a "dry spell" two days after a thunderstorm. It would seem that the greater danger to African environment comes from deforestation which in turn exaggerates fluctuations in rainfall.

Nationalists cannot be blamed for the decline in the terms of trade. But the nationalists are definitely to blame for inability to plan for fluctuations in the terms of trade. During the Rhodesian Federation, the colonial government calculated its copper revenues on the lowest possible price for that year. In the United States, many state governments save five percent of their annual revenues as a safety net against revenue fluctuations.

The problems of employment, world hunger, and general development in Africa are merely symptoms of a severe disease of mismanagement that underlies most African governments. Paradoxically, the mismanagement itself appears to be mandated by the circumstances in which they achieved

independence and the lack of legitimacy and accountability. Until these factors are overcome, I see no light at the end of the tunnel in the forceable future.

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[1]K. Nkurumah., **Dark days in Ghana** (Pan African Publishers, London, 1968) p. 138

M. Meredith - **The first dance of freedom** (Harper & Row, 1984) pp 111 ff.

[2]**U.S. News and World Report** July 8, 1985 p. 4

[3]**Ibid.** p. 34

[4]**World Bank Report:** Towards sustained development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1984, p. 1

[5]T. Malthus., **Essay on Population**(London Edition 1935)

[6]**World Bank Report (as Above)** 1984 Table 8.1 p. 112

[7]**Ibid.** p. 115

[8]Population Reference Bureau Vol. 35 No. 3 **Kenya** 1980, p. 29-30

[9]**World Bank Report** 1984, Table 4.1 p. 41

[10]**Ibid.** p. 123

[11]D.J. Gould., "The development policies of Zaire"., **(Journal of Modern African Studies** Sept. 1977) p. 354 and 357

[12]**Ibid**

[13]NEWSWEEK/NOVEMBER 26th, 1984 p. 54

[14]**Ibid** p. 55

[15]U.S. News and World Report Dec. 3, 1984 p. 32

[16]**Manchester-Guardian Weekly** Dec. 9, 1984 p. 1ff

[17]**Ibid**

[18]**S.A. Quick., "Rural socialism in Zambia.", Journal of Modern African Studies op cit** p. 384ff

[19]I am indebted to Ms. Rebecca Love for excerpts on the Zambia Economic Report 1984.

[20]**Zambia Economic Report** (1984) Extracts. See above. I did not see the original copy myself.

[21]"Report on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to Rhodesia". H.M.S.O. 1978 para 8. 13.

[22]**Zimbabwe Financial Gazette** Nov. 15, 1985 p. 21

[23]**Zimbabwe Herald** Aug. 16, 1984 p. 9

[24]Presidential Speech, July 26, 1985, **Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates** date as above. pp. 14-24

[25]**Zimbabwe Herald** March 16, 1984

[26]**Parliamentary Debates**, Aug. 7, 1985 Col. 330-331

[27]**The Zimbabwe Herald** Feb. 8, 1986 p. 4 Cols. 1-6

[28]**Parliamentary Debates** Aug. 7, 1985 Col. 83

[29]**Ibid** Col. 96

[30]**Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates**, Aug. 7, 1985 Vol. 12 No. 9, Col. 283-284

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON

April Gordon

Introduction

Although independent since 1960, the nation of Cameroon is the result of the unification of formerly French East and British West Cameroon in 1972. In comparison with many other African countries, Cameroon has enjoyed healthy economic growth in a climate of political stability. Western development and lending agencies consider the Cameroon economy to be well managed. As an indicator of this, between 1970 and 1982 the economy grew at an average rate of 7% in real terms (World Bank, 1984: 58) and production was relatively well diversified. Largely due to the cushion provided by oil exports, Cameroon has in recent years enjoyed a positive balance of trade, and Cameroon's debt service ratio of 12% is low in Africa. To its credit, the government has also, for the most part, avoided expensive, non-productive showcase projects and has followed a "conservative public investment policy." (Ndongko, 1984: 1-2) The overarching development strategy of "planned liberalism" has been a fairly open-door invitation to foreign investors. (See Gordon and Gordon, 1983)

It is generally acknowledged that agriculture has been the dynamic force behind the economy's growth. (DeLancey, 1984) The production of export crops provided foreign exchange to finance the import of capital goods and services for the development of the economy as a whole. Moreover, Cameroon has been one of the few countries in Africa to remain largely self-sufficient in food production, thus further saving foreign exchange. As DeLancey reports (1984) total agricultural production has been growing at an annual average of 3.9%.

Although Cameroon has been fortunate compared to many of its neighbors, underlying the overall appearance of progress are numerous contradictions and problems similar to those besetting other African nations. Despite its avowed dedication to "balanced development," i.e. rural and regional equity; an examination of the policies and social forces in operation in Cameroon, reveal that profound inequities exist which are slowly strangling "the goose that lays the golden eggs," that is the agricultural sector of the economy.

The following discussion will be a highlighting and brief analysis of the main influences on agricultural development in Cameroon. This will involve, first of all a look at Cameroon's 5-year development plans since independence and the impact of government policies on agricultural development. Overall, my conclusion is that agriculture and rural areas have been consistently shortchanged. Next, I will discuss why and how this has occurred. Last, the problems of the rural-agricultural sector will be outlined as well as some prospects for the near future.

Cameroon's Development Policies

Since independence, Cameroon's development goals have been laid out in a series of 5-year plans which include proposed expenditures for different items in the plan. As is true throughout Africa, many sections of the plan are not fully funded or may receive no funds at all. Although each plan is different in its priorities, there are some unifying threads in the first five plans. To "benefit the country as a whole and each Cameroonian," the government espouses planned liberalism, self-reliant development, balanced development, and social justice. (Ndongko, 1984: 4)

Although promoting industry has been the number one priority, agriculture figures prominently in all five development plans. The first plan, 1962-1966, emphasized cash crop agriculture, infrastructure, import substitution industry, and an extremely generous investment code to lure foreign capital. The second plan, 1966-1970, concentrated heavily on diversification of industry, processing of local products, employment, and regionally oriented industrialization. (Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983: 21-27) While recognizing the need to supply the farmers with credit and fertilizers, both the first and second plans virtually ignored food crop agriculture. (Ntangsi, 1983) However, the second plan recognized several growing problems in the rural areas: outmigration to increasingly overcrowded cities, population pressures in the highly productive Bamileke areas in West Cameroon, low rural incomes, and inappropriate educational programs to help promote farming. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, 1966: 27-29)

Only in the third plan, 1971-1976, was there a real attempt to bring mostly agricultural West Cameroon into the national development scheme. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, 1971: 72-76) Ndongko (1984: 7-8) sees a new emphasis on self-reliant development, e.g., a movement away from import industries. Promoting food crops was accorded more importance - although actual investment proved to be quite small compared to investment in industry and cash crops. The overall budget for all types of agriculture was 25 billion CFA compared to 70.3 billion CFA for industry. (Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983: 22) During the fourth plan, 1976-1981, large-scale development projects to promote production of new cash crops - rice, cotton, and wheat - were funded. (Ntangsi, 1983) Overall, the greatest attention to agriculture occurred during the fifth plan, 1981-1986. The plan committed 23.7% of the investment budget to the agricultural sector -more than twice that of the fourth plan. (DeLancey, 1984: 16) Emphasis is still focused, however, on promoting industry. But in line with the goal of self-reliance, Cameroon hopes to move away from "foreign oriented industry." (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, 1981)

Agricultural Policies

In its efforts to develop its economy, Cameroon, as well as other African nations, has had to rely on two main sources of financing: 1) foreign capital since few sources of indigenous capital were possible during the colonial period; and earnings from exports. While oil is becoming a more important source of capital, most government revenues depend on the profits from agricultural exports such as cocoa, palm oil, and coffee. These are produced privately, often by small-holders, and by government parastatals such as the CDC (Cameroon Development Corporation).

In the process of extracting the rural surplus to finance the national budget, government policies toward agriculture are making it increasingly difficult to make a living in rural areas. Despite its official commitments to agriculture, actual policies have an overwhelming "urban bias" which is having dramatic negative repercussions, to be discussed more fully below. Indeed, Schiavo-Campo et al. (1983: 34-35) in their detailed examination of the plans conclude that agricultural policies actually amount to a "neglect" of agricultural needs. In the last three plans, for instance, actual investment fell far short of the amounts stipulated in the plan. From 1971-1980 (3rd and 4th Plans) investment was only 11 and 13.5% of the total investment budget. DeLancey (1984: 32) adds that the actual investment during the Fourth Plan was only 51% of the proposed amount. Unfortunately, many objectives from the Fifth Plan are also falling short.

The deficiencies in Cameroon's agricultrual policies are similar to those facing other African states. (See World Bank, 1981; Picard, 1984; Bates, 1983) At root, policies fail to provide adequate incentives to farmers to produce or even to stay in rural areas. They favor urbanites at the expense of the rural majority.

Most of Cameroon's agricultural production has come from smallholders (90% in the 1960's) with the remainder from plantations and parastatals producing primarily for export. Government investment and other policies have overwhelmingly favored export crops in an effort to earn foreign exchange and to fund government operations and development schemes. Thus, one of Cameroon's major policies has been to control the marketing of export crops and set prices paid to farmers. Ostensibly to offset fluctuations in world prices, the cocoa stabilization fund was established for export producers. Throughout the 1970's the government consistently paid farmers much less than the world market price for their crops. The surplus went for administration, the stabilization fund, infrastructure, research, grants to credit unions, etc. Large amounts went to the national budget as a "contribution" (almost 25% in 1981). (Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983) Although some of the stabilization fund went to agricultural development, most went to general development. (DeLancey, 1984: 14)

The result for farmers is a disincentive to produce export crops, which in the 1970's actually declined. (World Bank, 1981: 167) This decline in production occurred despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of programs to promote agriculture have been directed towards cash crops. Credit, the extension system, agricultural education programs, price supports, cooperative ventures and input subsidies all favored export farmers.

Food crop producers, most of whom are women, have been largely ignored. (See DeLancey, 1984; Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983; Nelson et al., 1974) Of the relatively small amount of investment made overall in agriculture between 1971-1980, only 25% has gone for food crops - and over ⅔ of that for rice, and another 16% for wheat. Only .5% of the total public investment budget went to basic food crops. (Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983: 34-35) Rice and wheat, by contrast, are primarily mainstays in the diet of more affluent urban dwellers, often to the detriment of producers of locally grown, traditional grains. (See World Bank, 1981)

Recently, prices for export crops are being raised, but this is arousing concern that food crop production will suffer. This concern is well-founded, since food crop production in Cameroon is from latest reports falling behind population growth-per capita food production at-.9% from 1970-1982. (World Bank, 1984: 77)

Government attempts to regulate food prices, keeping prices lower for consumers, are another disincentive to farmers as well as an opportunity for abuse by officials. "La mercuriale" (maximum prices set for foodstuffs and merchandise) is set at the prefect level. Official prices are much too low and, according to Lippens and Joseph (1978: 120-122) mainly subsidize consumption of the civil servants setting prices. In reality, prices are often enforced by other officials and gendarmes arbitrarily, a situation ripe for corruption.

Government efforts to promote rural development are also inadequate and suffer from bureaucratic inefficiencies. Government-assisted regional cooperatives have not been successful except for UCCAO (Union des Cooperatives de Cafe Arabica de l'Ouest), a West Cameroon coffee coop. Joseph (1978: 151-153) attributes the failure of coops to the domination of government officials and local leaders as well as to exorbitant charges of middle men. (See also Trouvé and Bessat, 1980: 49) Similar problems of bureaucratic domination are also mentioned in reference to the ambitious ZAPI (Zones d'Actions prioritaires integrees) integrated rural development program, a French-inspired program. In his appraisal of the program, Sobgui (1976: 116-123) notes that ZAPI has not resulted in upgrading agriculture or rural conditions. Policymakers and administrators didn't take into account local conditions or views of the rural participants. (See also Belloncle, 1979)

The government's wage policies also discriminate against rural workers. Urban workers, especially those in Douala, Yaounde, and Edea, are in the top wage zone. Lowest wages are set for those in agriculture. (Nelson et al., 1974: 196) And the wage gap widened in the 1970's, partly because the minimum wage in the countryside was poorly enforced. Purchasing power, hence real income, was also reduced by the high prices charged for manufactured goods. (Gwan, 1976: 19-20; see also Trouvé et Bessat, 1980: 49)

Government investment has done little to upgrade rural infrastructure and services compared to urban centers. In areas of housing, water, electricity, roads, health, recreation, and other measures of living standards, regional and especially rural-urban disparities are striking. For instance, the 1976 census reports that only 23% of all urban dewellers have electricity, but 36.2% of those in Douala and 42.9% of those in Yaounde do. The rural rate is only .5%. Even in the Central South district in which Yaounde is located, only .7% of rural dwellers have electricity, 1.9% in the Littoral region where Douala is located. Over 63% of Douala's residents have piped water; 53.5% have water in Yaounde. Only 4% of rural dwellers have access to such water; 3.4% in the Central South, 7% in the Littoral. In the underdeveloped North, even urbanities find few amenities: 9.4% have electricity; 28.4% have piped water. The North's rural dwellers are the most underserviced group: .2% have electricity; .9% have water. (Trouvé et Bessat, 1980: 52-58; Bureau Central du Recensement, 1977)

Access to education is also variable for regions and rural-urban groups. Although 68% of eligible students are in primary school in Cameroon, (Central Bureau of the Census, 1977: 16) a notable achievement in Africa, almost 100% of those in Douala and Yaounde are enrolled. At the other extreme, only 18% of the eligible rural population in the North have access to schools; (The Futures Group, 1983: 20) most of the students above theprimary level are in the major cities. Increasingly, education appears to be a selection tool for upward mobility in Cameroon society which will restrict access to good jobs to a privileged few. Most manual workers' children fail the primary school exams. Most rural children, unless they send their children to Yaounde have little chance for secondary education. (Peil, 1981: 275) Whereas secondary schools enroll 19% of the eligible population, universary education is rare: only 2% of the population 20-24 is receiving higher education. (World Bank, 1984: 87) According to Ngango et al., (1983: 87-88) for the average citizen, the educational system is actually a detriment in solving rural or urban umemployment. It does not increase the number of qualified workers or promote development. Not only do most drop out or fail, but the level of instruction and student achievement is so low as to be maladaptive to the needs of the society and a threat to the growth of the economy.

In the mid-1960-s IPAR (Institute of Rural Applied Pedagogy) was one strategy employed to promote rural education. IPAR was a response to the fact that education in rural areas was a major factor promoting urban migration. The hope was that if rural educatin could be geared to mass, rural needs rather than to urban, white collar applications, the rural exodus might be slowed. (Gwan, 1976; Kale and Yembe, 1980: 316-317) IPAR is to date a failure. For one, the urban elites opposed the program. They were products of modern education and didn't want their own children back on the farm. Teachers opposed the idea that they would be agricultural extension workers. Even the rural people themselves saw IPAR as a government effort to keep their children in rural hardship rather than to provide education for social mobility - that is, salaried jobs in the city. (Kale and Yembe, 1980: 318, 322)

"Revitalization"-providing the social services of urban areas to the countryside and promoting rural industries is another possibility mentioned in the Fifth Plan. (DeLancey, 1984: 27-28) More investment in infrastructure, transport, communication, and distributional activities to enhance regional growth are also proposed. (Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983: C-3 - C-4) Perhaps more to the heart of rural problems, increasing incomes of farmers is recognized as important. (Ngango et al., 1983: 34-36) But it is still too early to tell how many of these objectives are being met or what commitment there is among Cameroon's elite to actually foot the bil required to meet them.

Why Policies Shortchange Agriculture

Although the issues are more complex than I can do justice to in this brief paper, some general explanation for the often counter-productive agricultural policies pursued by the Cameroon government is in order. That explanation is best found in a modified version of dependency theory that takes into account both external and internal constraints on Cameroon development. (See Frank, 1969; Amin, 1976; Leys, 1975; Hermassi, 1978; and others) As is true of much of the African continent, Cameroon must rely on Western sources of development aid and investment. Until very recently in Cameroon, this has meant overwhelming reliance on the French. To mention a few sources of this dependency: Cameroon's currency is backed by the French, its development plans were largely drawn up by or highly influenced by the French, investment and external trade are dependent on the French and other Western nations, top industrial managers and consultants are French or other Westerners, and so on. In essence, for Cameroon to get the capital it needs, it has had to cater to the needs of foreign interests often to the detriment of its own professed goals and interests. This has meant concentration of investment in the Douala-Yaounde areas and in production of export crops to foot the bill, also the promotion of large, capital-intensive foreign firms to the disadvantage of indigenous

businessmen and most workers.

The reliance on foreigners, however, is not simply economic. Cameroon's elite - its national and local political leaders, the swollen government bureaucracy, favored economic groups linked to foreign capital (e.g. some workers, businessmen, farmers)-also benefit from the dependence on foreigners. Their wages, profits, emulation of the Western lifestyle, and power all depend on the continuation of current inequities. That is, the urban bias in living standards, wages, and investment is a major means by which a small proportion of Cameroon's population, i.e., its elites, promote and maintain their interests by exploiting the laboring rural and urban masses. For a more complete discussion of these issues, read Gordon and Gordon (1985).

Consequences of Cameroon's Policies

The distortions and imbalances inherent in Cameroon's neglect of rural interests are manifold. A major consequence is rapid population growth and the deluge of rural migrants to Cameroon's two major cities as well as to other regional urban centers. The total population of Cameroon increased from 4.1 million in 1950 to 7.6 million in 1976 (Central Bureau of the Census, 1977: 1) and is currently estimated at between 9.6 million (the Futures Group, 1983: 4,4a) and 9.8 million (Ngango, 1983: 1-2), an increase of approximately 240%. If current patterns remain, The Futures Group expects the national population to be over 16 million by 2000, while the World Bank expects 17 million (1984: 82). The latest estimates and projectins by the World Bank (1984: 82) are that Cameroon's population will grow at an average rate of 3.5% between 1980 and 2000, and that it had been growing at an average of 3.0% between 1972 and 1980! A growth rate of 3.5% means that a country's population will double every 20 years.

The percentage of people living in urban areas increased from 5.8% in 1950 (The Futures Group, 1983: 4) to 28% in 1976 (Central Bureau of the Census, 1977). Ngango (1983: 2) estimates that 38.6% of Cameroonians will be urban by 1986, and urban-rural parity is expected by 1990. (The Futures Group, 1983:18). In stark contrast to the overall urban area rate of growth of over 6% is the 1% rate of growth of rural areas. (Ngango, 1983: 34)

Truly phenomenal population increases have been experienced by Douala and Yaounde. Since independence these cities have had growth rates of 7 to 10% per yhear, well above the extraordinary Third World average of 5-6% per year. Douala's population is expected to reach 1.7 million in 1990 (The Futures Group, 1983: 2), and Yaounde's growth rate since independence is believed to have been even higher than that of Douala, ranging from 8.5% to a current 10% per year. From 54,000 in 1957 the city grew to 313,000 at the 1976 census. Estimates for 1990 by Gerull and Schmitter

(1979: 18) and The Futures Group (1983: 2) range from 800,000 to 1.2 million.

Migration studies repeatedly show that urban migrants seek economic opportunities in the city but often because they have few or no opportunities back in the rural areas or smaller towns. (See Marguerat, 1975; Aignet, 1976; Fraqueville, 1971; Barbier, 1978) The absence of dynamic villages or village centers blocks any alternative to migration to large cities and also blocks improvement in the satisfaction of rural needs or standards of living. Yet the problems of small towns are ignored in Cameroon's industrial or agricultural policies. (Trouvé et Bessat, 1980)

As population gravitates toward the large cities, Cameroon's population becomes increasingly distorted in both rural and urban areas, a condition further exacerbating economic and equity problems in the society. For as regions and rural areas lose their young and more educated workers to the major cities, the population left behind is aging and increasingly female. This trend is most pronounced in the Central South, West, and Littoral where more than 50% of the male labor force is over 40. More female dominance in traditional agriculture, where investment and capitalization is lowest, is occurring. (Trouvé et Bessat, 1980; Bureau Central du Recensement, 1977: 18-19)

On the other hand, urban migrants are finding that good jobs are scarce and competition keen. Services and housing, although superior to the countryside, are crowded, dilapidated, and overextended. Employment is often marginal; informal sector jobs, unemployment, crime, or - for females - prostitution become the avenues to advancement for the overwhelming majority. (See Barbier et al., 1978; Ministere de l'Urbanisme et l'Habitat, 1981; Gwan, 1976)

Cameroon's leaders are not oblivious to many of the problems outlined above. Some level of commitment to balanced development and to supporting the rural as well as urban living standards have been part of every Five Year Plan. Yet urbanization shows no signs of abating and the rural-urban income gap widens. At the same time the living conditions and employment prospects for both the urban and rural masses are not promising. (Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983: 9)

In 1980, before the launching of the latest 5-Year Plan, various government ministries met to discuss Cameroon's development needs. Urban problems were central concerns. The Ministry of Economic Affairs issued a report on perspectives on development to the year 2000. In this report, unemployment accompanying rapid urbanization was listed as one of Cameroon's most crucial national problems. The MINEP report blamed

failures in the agricultural sector for having worsened the employment situation and accelerating the outmigration of rural youth. The Technology and Employment Development Commission for the year 2000 recommended the creation of local technology rather than dependence on the transfer of outside technology to provide employment. This would require more scientific and technical research and financial support. (Ngango et al., 1983: 104) Also in 1980, the Ministry of Urbanism and Housing sponsored a conference to revise Yaounde's plan for the next 10 years. With Yaounde projected to grow by an astronomical 9% in 1985, long term planning would be increasingly necessary to cope - including zoning and land use policies. (Ministere de l'Urbanisme et l'Habitat, 1981)

Prospects for Cameroon

The long term consequences of distorted development in Cameroon are at this point speculative to be sure. Nontheless, continued unemployment, poor living conditions, and inequality in the midst of rising popular expectations raise the question of whether the economy can expand rapidly enough to ameliorate, if not solve, these problems. The risks of political instability are a foremost consideration.

As Sandbrook (1982: 81-82) points out, the development strategy pursued by Cameroon (and several other African states), promotes mass poverty and eventually class formation. Unemployment and gross inequalities between elites and masses, adds Hance (1970: 275-276), is a situation ripe for discontent. At this point in time, evidence of class formation and class consciousness among the masses in Cameroon is mixed. (See Kofele-Kale, 1984; Peil, 1981: 114-121) However, Forje's (1977: 101) contends that the creation of a privileged elite in the towns alongside rural and urban mass poverty is producing the "beginnings of a class structure which was not previously noticeable in Cameroon." A trend toward class formation would eventually result in more attempts at collective solutions to inequality and limited opportunity and could well sharpen demands for more radical structural changes in the society.

As for the rural masses in the near future, many will continue to use urban migration as the road to improving their lot, thus alleviating some of the pressure on rural resources. The better off farmers, who receive more benefits from rural development policies and projects, will most likely ally themselves with the political system. The remaining rural masses will simply cope as best they can. (See Bates, 1983: 131-133) But for both the rural masses and more prosperous rural elements, economic stagnation could undermine their support for the system.

In the rural sector there are already ominous signs that such stagnation is taking place. Stagnation and, for some commodities, decline in produc-

tion is a reality. Currently, the export crops which provide most of Cameroon's foreign exchange have declined the most. (DeLancey, 1984: 10-12) Even more ominous, in their report on Cameroon's economy, Schiavo-Campo et al. (1983: 34) predict that the country will no longer be able to feed itself over the next 15 years unless productions grows faster, a distinct possibility given current declines in food crop production. (World Bank 1984: 77) If the rural economy declines, the industrial economy will not be far behind. Continued urban migration, high birth rates, disparities in rural-urban and regional incomes and living standards, inequality between elites and masses, and inappropriate government development policies which contribute to these problems must be altered soon.

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