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The code itself is not obfuscated and contains no obvious hardcoded credentials or intentionally hidden payloads. However, it intentionally executes commands and writes files driven by an input configuration (which can be a remote link). This creates a significant supply-chain / execution risk: a malicious or compromised configuration can cause arbitrary command execution and arbitrary file system modifications. Treat configuration sources as fully trusted only if obtained from a secure, verified origin. Recommend validating/whitelisting commands, sanitizing paths, and avoiding automatic execution of remote configs.

Live on PyPI for 1 hour and 41 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module performs deliberate data collection of sensitive environment and host information (including process.env) and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded external domain. The behavior is malicious or constitutes a serious backdoor/supply-chain risk. Immediate remediation is recommended: remove the code/package, investigate outbound connections to the domain, and rotate any potentially exposed secrets.

The file defines a function `perm(private_key)` that improperly builds its payload as a list containing a set with the misspelled key `'ptivat_key'` and the sensitive `private_key`. It then sends this data in plain HTTP POST to https://66c0dc0bba6f27ca9a57c4bf[.]mockapi[.]io/tron—effectively exfiltrating the private key. Immediately afterward, it issues a GET to https://66c0dc0bba6f27ca9a57c4bf[.]mockapi[.]io/switcher and uses the (potentially attacker-controlled) JSON response to alter its return value, indicating a remotely controlled backdoor. This behavior constitutes malicious credential theft and poses a high security risk.

Live on PyPI for 47 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script is likely being used to collect sensitive data from the user's system and send it to a remote server. This represents a breach of privacy and can be seen as a form of malware.

Live on npm for 11 days, 10 hours and 54 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits clear malicious behavior by exfiltrating sensitive user data and application information to a remote server. The infinite loop and repeated network requests raise significant security concerns.

Live on npm for 49 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is heavily obfuscated and performs network requests, file system operations, and shell command executions, which pose potential security risks. The obfuscation makes it challenging to verify the legitimacy of the operations, warranting a thorough investigation.

Live on npm for 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module’s entrypoint (index.js) immediately launches a detached, unobserved Node.js child process executing the local script ./lib/caller.js, passing it JSON-serialized arguments. The spawn call uses { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' } combined with child.unref(), which ensures the background process continues after the parent exits and suppresses all output or errors. Such a pattern is frequently used to hide backdoor or exfiltration routines in supply-chain attacks. Since all sensitive activity is delegated to the concealed lib/caller.js and no logs or errors are surfaced, this code functions as a stealthy loader for arbitrary malicious payloads. Do not use or publish this package until every invocation of ./lib/caller.js is audited and its behavior fully understood.

The code exhibits high-risk security behavior due to eval on untrusted input and unpickle of data derived from that input. This constitutes a severe supply-chain-like risk if used in a library, since it allows remote control and code execution. The data_to_msg function is flawed and would need correction, but even with that, the core risk remains in msg_to_data. Overall, this fragment should be treated as dangerous and unsuitable for inclusion in any public-facing package without significant hardening (avoid eval, avoid pickle on untrusted data, implement safe deserialization).

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This file injects a module-load routine that exfiltrates local documentation/metadata (dumpJSON) to a remote AI Studio dataset (ID 443696818363039744) at bbqa2t5pfyfroyobmzknmktshckzto4btkfagxyjqwy[.]did[.]abtnet[.]io[ ]/api/datasets/443696818363039744/documents. It uses a hard-coded Cookie header containing a login_token JWT and unconditional shouldUpdateKnowledge=true to first GET existing items via GET …?page=1&size=100, then PUT to …/documents/{id}/text or POST to …/documents/text, sending the full serialized dumpJSON as the request body. These automatic side-effects with embedded credentials create a high-risk supply-chain and privacy backdoor and must be removed or gated behind explicit, opt-in credential handling.

This module is a high-risk utility because it fetches Python code from remote URLs and local markdown files and executes that code directly via execute_py_script_string_as_new_proc without validation or sandboxing. The code itself does not contain obvious obfuscation or hardcoded credentials, but it provides an execution surface that enables remote code execution and potential data exfiltration or system compromise depending on the executed snippets and the implementation of execute_py_script_string_as_new_proc. Treat calls that use remote URLs or untrusted markdown as dangerous. Use only with trusted content or add validation/sandboxing (e.g., static analysis of snippets, running in containers with restricted privileges, allowlists, checksums/signatures).

The code exhibits potential malicious behavior with data exfiltration and tracking activities, posing a significant security risk. It should be further investigated and potentially removed.

Live on npm for 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module performs intentional data exfiltration of host- and user-identifying information to a hardcoded remote domain via multiple channels (HTTPS GET, DNS subdomain lookup, and HTTPS POST) at module load time without consent and with silent error suppression. Treat this as a high-risk backdoor/spyware; remove and investigate any projects that import or bundle this code.

This install script performs a destructive filesystem operation (removing the katex directory) and then executes an unknown command. Even if not overtly labeled as malware, it poses a high risk: it can cause data loss and enables execution of arbitrary code. You should not run this without inspecting the package contents and verifying what `copy-files-from-to` refers to and why katex is being removed.

Live on PyPI for 16 hours and 19 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits highly dangerous patterns: insecure deserialization of untrusted input using pickle, dynamic code execution via eval of an externally supplied function name, and thorough exposure of environment data plus multiple disk writes of serialized results. These factors collectively enable remote code execution and data leakage, making this component extremely risky in a supply-chain context. Hardening must replace pickle/eval with safe alternatives, restrict environment exposure, and avoid exfiltration through stdout/disk writes.

The code exhibits ransomware-like behavior by encrypting files and communicating with external servers. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 55 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This package contains clear supply-chain/backdoor patterns: it fetches and exec()'s arbitrary code from a remote server and runs those features on every incoming request or socket event, exposing request data and the host runtime to remote-controlled code. The default hardcoded server URL, dynamic imports, and BotEnv functionality (which can access/decrypt runtime secrets) strongly indicate this is a high-risk backdoor. Do not include this module in trusted applications. Replace with well-audited, signed, and minimal code that does not execute remote code without explicit, auditable consent.

All three reports identify high-risk backdoor-like behavior with remote code execution, persistence via session payloads, and extensive capabilities spanning file, command, and database operations. Report 1 is the strongest at highlighting backdoor sinks and persistence paths; Report 2/3 corroborate with broader context and multiple execution vectors. The composite assessment indicates a highly dangerous component that should be treated as malware in open-source contexts and removed or heavily sandboxed in deployments.

The file implements a parser that dangerously calls eval() on untrusted input (regex capture groups), creating a direct arbitrary code execution vulnerability. There is no evidence of deliberate malware, but the unsafe eval makes the code high risk and unsuitable to run on untrusted inputs until fixed. Other issues: Python-2 style iterator usage and silent debug handling that reduce robustness and visibility.

This file includes hardcoded credentials (a Telegram bot token and chat ID) and transmits newly created SSH usernames and passwords to a remote endpoint (e.g., example[.]com) without user consent.

Possible typosquat of azure - Explanation: The package 'azure-graphrbac' is labeled as a 'security holding package', which often indicates a placeholder to prevent typosquatting. The name 'azure-graphrbac' closely resembles legitimate Azure package naming conventions, which could confuse users. The maintainers list includes 'npm', which is not a specific known maintainer. Therefore, it is likely a typosquat.

Live on npm for 6 hours and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code itself is not obfuscated and contains no obvious hardcoded credentials or intentionally hidden payloads. However, it intentionally executes commands and writes files driven by an input configuration (which can be a remote link). This creates a significant supply-chain / execution risk: a malicious or compromised configuration can cause arbitrary command execution and arbitrary file system modifications. Treat configuration sources as fully trusted only if obtained from a secure, verified origin. Recommend validating/whitelisting commands, sanitizing paths, and avoiding automatic execution of remote configs.

Live on PyPI for 1 hour and 41 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module performs deliberate data collection of sensitive environment and host information (including process.env) and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded external domain. The behavior is malicious or constitutes a serious backdoor/supply-chain risk. Immediate remediation is recommended: remove the code/package, investigate outbound connections to the domain, and rotate any potentially exposed secrets.

The file defines a function `perm(private_key)` that improperly builds its payload as a list containing a set with the misspelled key `'ptivat_key'` and the sensitive `private_key`. It then sends this data in plain HTTP POST to https://66c0dc0bba6f27ca9a57c4bf[.]mockapi[.]io/tron—effectively exfiltrating the private key. Immediately afterward, it issues a GET to https://66c0dc0bba6f27ca9a57c4bf[.]mockapi[.]io/switcher and uses the (potentially attacker-controlled) JSON response to alter its return value, indicating a remotely controlled backdoor. This behavior constitutes malicious credential theft and poses a high security risk.

Live on PyPI for 47 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script is likely being used to collect sensitive data from the user's system and send it to a remote server. This represents a breach of privacy and can be seen as a form of malware.

Live on npm for 11 days, 10 hours and 54 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits clear malicious behavior by exfiltrating sensitive user data and application information to a remote server. The infinite loop and repeated network requests raise significant security concerns.

Live on npm for 49 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is heavily obfuscated and performs network requests, file system operations, and shell command executions, which pose potential security risks. The obfuscation makes it challenging to verify the legitimacy of the operations, warranting a thorough investigation.

Live on npm for 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module’s entrypoint (index.js) immediately launches a detached, unobserved Node.js child process executing the local script ./lib/caller.js, passing it JSON-serialized arguments. The spawn call uses { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' } combined with child.unref(), which ensures the background process continues after the parent exits and suppresses all output or errors. Such a pattern is frequently used to hide backdoor or exfiltration routines in supply-chain attacks. Since all sensitive activity is delegated to the concealed lib/caller.js and no logs or errors are surfaced, this code functions as a stealthy loader for arbitrary malicious payloads. Do not use or publish this package until every invocation of ./lib/caller.js is audited and its behavior fully understood.

The code exhibits high-risk security behavior due to eval on untrusted input and unpickle of data derived from that input. This constitutes a severe supply-chain-like risk if used in a library, since it allows remote control and code execution. The data_to_msg function is flawed and would need correction, but even with that, the core risk remains in msg_to_data. Overall, this fragment should be treated as dangerous and unsuitable for inclusion in any public-facing package without significant hardening (avoid eval, avoid pickle on untrusted data, implement safe deserialization).

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This file injects a module-load routine that exfiltrates local documentation/metadata (dumpJSON) to a remote AI Studio dataset (ID 443696818363039744) at bbqa2t5pfyfroyobmzknmktshckzto4btkfagxyjqwy[.]did[.]abtnet[.]io[ ]/api/datasets/443696818363039744/documents. It uses a hard-coded Cookie header containing a login_token JWT and unconditional shouldUpdateKnowledge=true to first GET existing items via GET …?page=1&size=100, then PUT to …/documents/{id}/text or POST to …/documents/text, sending the full serialized dumpJSON as the request body. These automatic side-effects with embedded credentials create a high-risk supply-chain and privacy backdoor and must be removed or gated behind explicit, opt-in credential handling.

This module is a high-risk utility because it fetches Python code from remote URLs and local markdown files and executes that code directly via execute_py_script_string_as_new_proc without validation or sandboxing. The code itself does not contain obvious obfuscation or hardcoded credentials, but it provides an execution surface that enables remote code execution and potential data exfiltration or system compromise depending on the executed snippets and the implementation of execute_py_script_string_as_new_proc. Treat calls that use remote URLs or untrusted markdown as dangerous. Use only with trusted content or add validation/sandboxing (e.g., static analysis of snippets, running in containers with restricted privileges, allowlists, checksums/signatures).

The code exhibits potential malicious behavior with data exfiltration and tracking activities, posing a significant security risk. It should be further investigated and potentially removed.

Live on npm for 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module performs intentional data exfiltration of host- and user-identifying information to a hardcoded remote domain via multiple channels (HTTPS GET, DNS subdomain lookup, and HTTPS POST) at module load time without consent and with silent error suppression. Treat this as a high-risk backdoor/spyware; remove and investigate any projects that import or bundle this code.

This install script performs a destructive filesystem operation (removing the katex directory) and then executes an unknown command. Even if not overtly labeled as malware, it poses a high risk: it can cause data loss and enables execution of arbitrary code. You should not run this without inspecting the package contents and verifying what `copy-files-from-to` refers to and why katex is being removed.

Live on PyPI for 16 hours and 19 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits highly dangerous patterns: insecure deserialization of untrusted input using pickle, dynamic code execution via eval of an externally supplied function name, and thorough exposure of environment data plus multiple disk writes of serialized results. These factors collectively enable remote code execution and data leakage, making this component extremely risky in a supply-chain context. Hardening must replace pickle/eval with safe alternatives, restrict environment exposure, and avoid exfiltration through stdout/disk writes.

The code exhibits ransomware-like behavior by encrypting files and communicating with external servers. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 55 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This package contains clear supply-chain/backdoor patterns: it fetches and exec()'s arbitrary code from a remote server and runs those features on every incoming request or socket event, exposing request data and the host runtime to remote-controlled code. The default hardcoded server URL, dynamic imports, and BotEnv functionality (which can access/decrypt runtime secrets) strongly indicate this is a high-risk backdoor. Do not include this module in trusted applications. Replace with well-audited, signed, and minimal code that does not execute remote code without explicit, auditable consent.

All three reports identify high-risk backdoor-like behavior with remote code execution, persistence via session payloads, and extensive capabilities spanning file, command, and database operations. Report 1 is the strongest at highlighting backdoor sinks and persistence paths; Report 2/3 corroborate with broader context and multiple execution vectors. The composite assessment indicates a highly dangerous component that should be treated as malware in open-source contexts and removed or heavily sandboxed in deployments.

The file implements a parser that dangerously calls eval() on untrusted input (regex capture groups), creating a direct arbitrary code execution vulnerability. There is no evidence of deliberate malware, but the unsafe eval makes the code high risk and unsuitable to run on untrusted inputs until fixed. Other issues: Python-2 style iterator usage and silent debug handling that reduce robustness and visibility.

This file includes hardcoded credentials (a Telegram bot token and chat ID) and transmits newly created SSH usernames and passwords to a remote endpoint (e.g., example[.]com) without user consent.

Possible typosquat of azure - Explanation: The package 'azure-graphrbac' is labeled as a 'security holding package', which often indicates a placeholder to prevent typosquatting. The name 'azure-graphrbac' closely resembles legitimate Azure package naming conventions, which could confuse users. The maintainers list includes 'npm', which is not a specific known maintainer. Therefore, it is likely a typosquat.

Live on npm for 6 hours and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.