Maybank Investment Regional Asean X Macro 24 Nov 2024

November 24, 2024
ASEAN X Macro
Musings on Trump 2.0
3 weeks after US election that saw strong mandate for Trump and a Economics
Republican sweep of the Congress, Trump 2.0 policy execution is coming Suhaimi Ilias, Regional Co-Head, Macro Research
Chua Hak Bin, Regional Co-Head, Macro Research
into sharp focus. With a second – and final - four-year term as President,
Erica Tay, Economist
expect Trump 2.0 to do “as much and as soon as possible” after his Brian Lee Shun Rong, Economist
inauguration on 20 Jan 2025 to deliver election pledges and promises, as Fatin Nabila Mohd Zaini, Economist
well as produce tangible results ahead of Nov 2026 mid-term election.
Key themes of Trump 2.0’s policies and priorities are “Deregulation”, Foreign Exchange
Saktiandi Supaat, Head, FX Research,
“Immigration”, “Taxes” and “Tariffs”. Expect a busy first 9 months of
STRATEGY
2025, starting with “Deregulation” and “Immigration” within the first 3 Fixed Income
months. Among the earliest “Deregulation” acts are reversing Biden’s Winson Phoon, Head, Fixed Income Research
curbs on energy projects and exiting (again) the Paris Climate Accord,
while “Immigration” as a policy priority is demonstrated by Trump’s picks
of hardliners as Homeland Security Secretary and Border Czar.
“Taxes” i.e. extending the “goodies” under 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA) expiring end-2025 and lowering corporate income tax rate to 15%
from 21% should be done in time for the next fiscal year starting Oct 2025.
Regional
On “Tariffs”, the first 6 months will focus on China first given that the
hawkish trade policy and tariffs on China have been in place since 2018
under Trump 1.0 which remained – and was extended - under Biden
Presidency, with Rest of the World (RoW) coming later. A wildcard - and
hope for mitigation – is Trump 2.0’s tariffs threat is more of a strategy to
extract deals and negotiate concessions from trading partners to address
the trade imbalances. To note, immediate blanket tariffs on all imports is
unlikely due to the process (e.g. investigations by US Commerce
Department and US Trade Representative) - thus time (6-12 months) –
involved, even under legal provisions that grant US President the
discretionary power to impose import tariffs and restrictions.
Other things to watch include:
 US Fed’s interest rate path. Amid concerns over the upside risk to
inflation from Trump 2.0’s policies especially on “Immigration”,
“Tariffs” and “Taxes”, we forecast a progressively shallower fed funds
rate (FFR) cuts by Fed between 2024 and 2026 i.e. -100bps total cuts
this year to 4.25%-4.50% (including another -25bps cut at the 17-18 Dec
2024 FOMC meeting); -75bps cuts in 2025 to 3.50%-3.75%; and -50bps
cuts in 2026 to 3.00%-3.25%. This outlook is predicated on a “stickier”
path towards Fed’s 2% inflation target as we forecast US inflation rate
of +2.8% in 2025 (revised from +2.3% previously) and +2.5% in 2026
(2024E: +3.0%; 2023: +4.1%; 2022: +8.0%).
 China macro policy in response to Trump 2.0’s tariff threat. On top of

the monetary easing and government debt measures in Sep-Nov 2024,
we expect next year to deliver additional interest rate cuts by PBOC
(e.g. -25bps cut in the 1-Year Loan Prime Rate (LPR) to 2.85% from
3.10%) and larger deficit spending by the central government (2025F:
-5.5% of GDP; 2024E: -4.2% of GDP; 2023: -3.9% of GDP) on potential
RMB10-15 trillion stimulus package.
Our FX Research Team has extensively and comprehensively discussed the

FX market impact of Trump 2.0 in the previous issue of ASEAN X Macro on
9 Nov 2024 titled “Trump Term 2.0: FX Adjustments”.
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY MAYBANK RESEARCH PTE LTD Co. Reg No: 198700034E
MICA (P) : 099/03/2012
SEE PAGE 27 FOR IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS
ASEAN X Macro
Macro Views
ASEAN-6 Key Macroeconomic Indicators [email protected], (65) 6231 5830
Real GDP growth (%) Headline Inflation (%, average) Policy Rate (%, year-end)
2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Global 6.3 3.5 3.3 3.2 2.9 4.7 8.7 6.7 5.2 4.0 -
US 5.8 1.9 2.9 2.8 2.0 4.7 8.0 4.1 3.0 2.8 0.125 4.375 5.375 4.375 3.625
China 8.5 3.0 5.2 4.8 4.5 0.9 2.0 0.2 0.3 1.4 3.80 3.65 3.45 3.10 2.85
Indonesia 3.7 5.3 5.0 5.1 5.2 1.6 4.2 3.7 2.3 2.6 3.50 5.50 6.00 5.75 5.00
Malaysia 3.3 8.9 3.6 5.2 5.1 2.5 3.4 2.5 1.9 3.0 1.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 3.00
Philippines 5.7 7.6 5.5 6.0 6.2 3.9 5.8 6.0 3.2 2.8 2.00 5.50 6.50 5.75 4.75
Singapore 8.9 3.6 1.1 3.6 2.6 2.3 6.2 4.8 2.6 1.7 0.19 3.10 3.71 3.10 2.65
Thailand 1.6 2.6 1.9 2.6 2.8 1.2 6.1 1.2 0.6 1.2 0.50 1.25 2.50 2.25 2.25
Vietnam 2.6 8.0 5.1 6.7 6.4 1.8 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.4 4.00 6.00 4.75 4.75 4.75
Cambodia^ 2.9 5.1 5.0 5.9 5.8 2.9 5.4 2.1 0.9 2.0 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
Exports of Goods & Services (%) Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) Private Consumption (%)
2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Indonesia 18.0 16.2 1.3 5.0 4.7 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.2 4.9 2.0 4.9 4.8 4.9 5.2
Malaysia 18.5 14.5 (8.1) 5.8 6.0 (0.7) 6.8 5.5 9.5 8.1 1.8 11.3 4.7 5.5 5.6
Philippines 8.0 11.0 1.4 6.9 8.9 9.9 9.7 8.2 8.3 9.8 4.2 8.3 5.6 5.2 6.4
Singapore 11.7 (1.3) 2.4 6.7 4.1 18.0 1.6 (0.2) 1.4 2.2 6.6 9.7 3.8 5.8 3.5
Thailand 11.1 6.8 1.4 4.4 4.0 3.1 2.2 0.3 2.4 2.9 0.6 6.3 3.9 3.1 2.5
Vietnam 14.0 4.9 (2.5) 14.4 8.6 2.8 5.6 4.6 6.6 6.7 2.2 7.7 3.3 5.9 6.2
Cambodia 6.1 21.3 8.5 14.5 7.6 4.7 5.4 3.3 7.0 6.8 (2.4) 5.2 5.0 6.0 5.8
China* 1.9 0.5 (0.6) 1.4 0.7 12.0 5.4 4.3 4.0 4.2 13.1 2.3 6.4 3.6 4.0
Note: Total consumption shown for Myanmar, as Myanmar does not provide breakdown of private & government consumption. Gross Capital Formation shown for
Myanmar. Laos’ real GDP data is provided with breakdown by industry. Data series on breakdown of real GDP by expenditure components was discontinued since 2017.
Vietnam policy rate refers to <6M deposit rate cap,
* Net Exports of Goods and Services for China is expressed in percentage point contribution.
^ Cambodia using the reserve requirement ratio as the policy rate.
Source: CEIC, Maybank IBG Research
USD vs. Major & Regional Currencies Forecast [email protected], (65) 6320 1379
Spot
4Q24 1Q25 2Q25 3Q25 4Q25
(as of 21 Nov 2024)
DXY (Dollar Index) 106.97 104.65 105.23 106.03 104.91 103.82
Japanese Yen 154.54 150.00 155.00 150.00 140.00 135.0000
Euro 1.05 1.0700 1.0700 1.0500 1.0500 1.0600
Pounds Sterling 1.26 1.2850 1.2800 1.2750 1.2800 1.2850
Australian Dollar 0.65 0.6800 0.6800 0.6700 0.6700 0.6700
Renminbi 7.24 7.12 7.18 7.20 7.20 7.2500

Indian Rupee 84.50 83.50 83.60 83.70 83.60 83.5000
HK Dollar 7.78 7.76 7.76 7.77 7.78 7.79
Taiwan Dollar 32.50 31.80 32.00 32.50 32.50 32.50
Korean Won 1398.60 1380 1400 1420 1400 1380.00
Singapore Dollar 1.35 1.3200 1.3350 1.3350 1.3250 1.3150

Malaysian Ringgit 4.47 4.35 4.45 4.45 4.35 4.25
Indonesian Rupiah 15925.00 15500.00 16000 15800 15700 15600
Thai Baht 34.64 34.00 34.50 34.40 34.30 34.25
Philippines Peso 59.00 58.00 58.90 58.80 58.00 57.50
Vietnamese Dong 25420 25100 25000 25200 25200 25200
Source: Bloomberg, Maybank FX Research & Strategy
November 24, 2024 2

ASEAN X Macro
Fixed Income: Government Bond Yield Forecast [email protected], (65) 6320 1379
Current
10-year Yield (%) Outlook 4Q2024 1Q2025 2Q2025 3Q2025
(as of 21 Nov 2024)
China Neutral 2.08 2.10 2.10 2.05 2.05
Indonesia Neutral 6.89 6.75 6.70 6.60 6.50
Malaysia Neutral 3.81 3.85 3.80 3.70 3.60
Philippines Neutral 5.99 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.50
Singapore Neutral 2.86 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75
Thailand Neutral 2.42 2.50 2.40 2.25 2.25
US Neutral 4.40 4.20 4.00 3.75 3.75
Source: Bloomberg, Maybank IBG Research
November 24, 2024 3

ASEAN X Macro
[email protected], (603) 2297 8682

Focus Piece: [email protected],
(603) 2297 8685
Musings on Trump 2.0

It has been three weeks after the US elections on 5 Nov 2024, where Trump
convincingly won the Presidential race and the Republican party took control of
both houses of the US Congress. In this edition of ASEAN X Macro, we provide some
updates on what has been happening since the election day and share our musings
on Trump 2.0 after taking some time to do some readings, observing and thinking
(rather than rushing to join the bandwagon of talking heads).
Execution of Trump 2.0’s policies and priorities

coming into sharp focus
“As soon and as much as possible”. The key agenda right in front of us is the
speed and scope of implementing Trump 2.0’s policies and priorities. In short, we
can expect “as soon - and as much - as possible” from the word go i.e. right after
Trump’s inauguration scheduled on 20 Jan 2025. This is essentially to deliver on
the election pledges and promises, plus producing tangible results ahead of the
mid-term election in Nov 2026. To put it bluntly, politicians don’t really think or
care about the “future” and the “next generation”, just the “now” and the “next
election”. Trump is on his second – and final - four-year term as President, given
the two terms limit for US Presidency (successive two terms or a total of two terms).
Begin with stable administration by appointing aides, advisors, loyalists and

high-profile supporters. Given the strong mandate and the Republican sweep, plus
lessons learnt and experience gained from Trump 1.0, first and foremost, we
expect a stable administration filled via the appointments of loyalists, aides and
high-profile supporters. This is to avoid the “revolving door” administration of
Trump 1.0 that was beset by teams made up of “pro-establishment” and
“institutionalists” Republicans and appointees who were not necessarily on the
same page with Trump, resulting in a strings of changes in personnel, resignations
and firings.
This “stable administration of aides, advisors, loyalists and high-profile supporters”
narrative is shaping out as per the key appointments announced so far listed below
(Fig 1).
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ASEAN X Macro
Figure 1: Trump 2.0's Key Appointments (as at 22 Nov 2024)

Name Position Remarks
Susan Wiles White House Chief of Staff First woman to serve as White House chief of staff. A veteran of
Republican politics, Wiles was the co-chair of Trump’s 2024
campaign and his Florida director in 2016 and 2020. Wiles is a long-
time Florida political operative and fundraiser.
Stephen Miller Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy An advocate for tough immigration policies. Miller previously
worked in the White House as director of speechwriting and as a
senior adviser to the president. After leaving the White House, he
began running the right-wing group America First Legal, where he
worked alongside former Trump chief of staff Mark Meadows. Miller’s
group was also one of more than 100 conservative agendas that
formally backed Project 2025.
Scott Bessent Secretary of Treasury A position with vast influence over economic, regulatory and
international affairs. Bessent spent his career in finance working for
macro investment billionaire George Soros and noted short seller Jim
Chanos, as well as running his own hedge fund, and is an advocate
for tax reform and deregulation, particularly to spur more bank
lending and energy production.
Macro Rubio Secretary of State A three-term senator from Florida and former speaker of the Florida
House, as well as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and vice chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence. He has been a
staunch defender of Trump since the two traded barbs during the
2016 election campaign. Rubio endorsed Trump three times and
backed his agenda in Congress.
Thomas Homan "Border Czar" Former acting director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
worked at the agency under both the Obama and Trump
administrations. Trump has said Homan will be in charge of the borders
with Mexico, Canada, and maritime and aviation security. The role will
not require Senate confirmation. An immigration hard-liner, his
leadership saw increased ICE arrests of noncriminal migrants and
workplace raids. In July 2024, Homan promised that he would “run the
biggest deportation force this country has ever seen.”
Kristi Noem Homeland Security Secretary Current governor of South Dakota, Noem would oversee several
national security departments, including ICE, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S.
Secret Service. Noem is an immigration hard-liner and has
previously said the country was facing “a time of invasion”.
Tulsi Gabbard Director of National Intelligence Former House member who was elected to represent a district in
Hawaii as a Democrat. But after she left Congress, she eventually also
left the Democratic Party and became a vocal supporter of Trump.
Gabbard has no background in intelligence, nor did she serve on the
Intelligence Committee. She is a lieutenant colonel in the Army
Reserve who served in the Hawaii Army National Guard and was
deployed to Iraq with a medical unit.
Mike Waltz National Security Advisor Current Florida Republican Congressman who is also an Army veteran
and was a Green Beret. He served in Afghanistan, the Middle East and
Africa. Waltz serves on the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs and
Intelligence committees. Like other congressional Republicans,
Waltz has also criticized U.S. aid to Ukraine in its war against the
Russian invasion.
Howard Lutnick Secretary of Commerce The Cantor Fitzgerald CEO is Trump’s transition co-chair. He has
led and been the public face of Trump's transition to date. The
billionaire businessman is a friend of the president-elect who has
been an outspoken advocate for Trump’s agenda since beginning
his role with the transition team in August. He has been working at
Cantor Fitzgerald since 1983.
Chris Wright Secretary of Energy Trump’s campaign donor and fossil fuel executive i.e. CEO of
Denver-based Liberty Energy. A vocal advocate of oil and gas
development, including fracking, a key pillar of Trump’s quest to
achieve U.S. “energy dominance” in the global market. Wright has
been one of the industry’s loudest voices against efforts to fight
climate change.
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ASEAN X Macro
Lee Zeldin Environmental Protection Agency A former member of the U.S. House from Long Island, New York. After
Administrator Congress, Zeldin joined the America First Policy Institute, a
conservative think tank launched by former Trump administration
officials in 2021. He has said he will prioritize efforts to roll back
regulations while in office.
Pete Hegseth Secretary of Defence An Army National Guard veteran who served in Iraq and Afghanistan,
spent eight years as a co-host at Fox News. Previously, he ran
Concerned Veterans for America, a political group that pushed
veterans to become more politically involved.
Robert F Kennedy Jr Secretary of Health & Human After he initially ran for president as a Democrat, he opted to run
Services as an independent and then dropped out and backed Trump.
Kennedy has spent his career advocating for environmental and health
issues and is a vocal critic of the pharmaceutical industry, vaccines
and existing public health programmes. In picking Kennedy, Trump
said Kennedy will be focused on “harmful chemicals, pollutants,
pesticides, pharmaceutical products, and food additives.”
Elon Musk & Vivek Ramaswamy Department of Government Tech mogul Musk, the world’s richest man, and entrepreneur
Efficiency Ramaswamy are being tapped to head up a new Department of
Government Efficiency, fulfilling a Trump campaign pledge to give
Musk sweeping oversight of government spending. The two men
have until July 2, 2026, to try to remake the federal bureaucracy,
working in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget.
They will be advisory, non-governmental roles.
Doug Burgum Interior Secretary North Dakota Governor who oversees the nation’s vast land
holdings and that has an important say in issues like drilling on
public lands. Burgum’s background before becoming governor was in
business.
Linda McMahon Education Secretary Prior to joining the Trump 1.0 administration, she worked for the
Connecticut State Board of Education in 2009 and then ran two
unsuccessful bids for the Senate in 2010 and 2012. Served as the head
of the Small Business Administration during Trump’s first term i.e.
until 2019, when she stepped down to lead a pro-Trump policy
group and super PAC. She was also one of Trump’s top donors this
year and served as a co-chair of Trump’s presidential transition
team.
Pam Bondi (replaces Matt Gaetz Attorney General Florida’s former attorney general and a long-time defender of
who bowed out amid indication Trump, who repeated Trump’s claims that the Department of
of not having enough support Justice’s investigations on him have been politically motivated.
from Senate Republicans to be
confirmed) (Trump initially tapped Gaetz to run the Justice Department, an
agency that has been the focus of much ire from the president-
elect who was charged with federal crimes after he left office.
Gaetz has echoed much of Trump’s criticism and also defended
people who have been charged in connection with the 6 Jan 2021
attack on the US Capitol)
Sources: NBC News (https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/trumps-white-house-cabinet-appointments-tracker-selections/); Maybank IBG Research compilation
De-regulation, Immigration, Tariffs, Taxes… Once the process of assembling the

Trump 2.0’s administration team is completed, the next agenda is policy execution.
In Figure 2 (see next page), we listed the key policies and priorities under Trump
2.0, and the path towards implementing them i.e. involving the President’s
executive action and/or Congress approvals, plus risk of legal challenges.
November 24, 2024 6

ASEAN X Macro
Figure 2: Path to Enacting Trump 2.0's Policies and Priorities

Key Trump 2.0's Policies and Priorities, and examples of measures Executive Congressional Potential
Action Legislation Legal
Alone Required Challenge?
Deregulation e.g.
Reverse Biden's Limits on Energy Projects X
Exit Paris Climate Accord X
Ease Regulations on Crypto-Currency Industry X X
Immigration - Deporting Illegal Immigrants/Foreign Workers e.g.
Deploy National Guard X X
Invoke Alien Enemies Act, 1789 X X
Reinstate Trump 1.0 policies/measures invalidated by Biden X X
Tariffs e.g.
Proposed 60% on all imports from China X X
Proposed 10%-20% on all imports from Rest of the World (RoW) X X
Taxes e.g.
Extend tax cuts under the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (TCJA) 2017 X
Lower Corporate Tax Rate from 21% to 15% X
Sources: Bloomberg News; The Peterson Institute for International Economics; The USC Sol Price School of Public Policy; Cato Institute;
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Deregulation and Immigration: Firsts among

equals…
Quick moves on “Deregulation” and “Immigration” under Trump 2.0 via re-
instating Trump 1.0 policies and measures revoked by Biden Administration.
From Fig 2, “Deregulation” is the one with the path of least resistance as they
largely involve the President’s executive power and Congressional legislation
where both houses are under Republican control. Therefore, we expect among
the earliest acts of Trump 2.0 under the “Deregulation” headline is reversing
Biden’s curbs on energy projects and exiting (again) the Paris Climate Accord. This
is very much expected in view of the appointments of Chris Wright as Energy
Secretary – who is from – and a vocal advocate of - oil & gas industry, including
fracking, as well as being the industry’s main critic of efforts to address climate
change, and the “pro-deregulation” Led Zeldin to lead the Environmental
Protection Agency (Fig 1). Moreover, the lists of Trump 2.0 administration’s
appointees from industries or with business backgrounds further point to the strong
“Deregulation” bias.
“Deregulation” will be accompanied by the prospect of “hard and fast”

execution of Trump 2.0’s policies and priorities on “Immigration” i.e. deporting
illegals, which is emphasized and exemplified by Trump’s early/quick
appointments of immigration hardliners as Homeland Security Secretary and
Border Czar (note: a key position created that requires no Senate hearing and
confirmation).
Further, speeding up the deportation of illegal immigrants and foreign workers

will very likely involve bringing back Trump 1.0’s policies and measures that
were invalidated by President Biden e.g. elimination of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals Programme (DACA). DACA was originally established via
executive action in June 2012 to protect certain undocumented immigrants who
were brought to the US as children from removal proceedings and receive
authorization to work for renewable two-year periods, and as of June 30, 2024,
there were roughly 530,000 active DACA recipients in the U.S. from close to 200
different countries of birth).
In addition, there will also be the potential new rules e.g. during election
campaign, Trump renewed his call to end the long-standing constitutional right i.e.
birthright citizenship, saying he would sign an executive order on day one of his
Presidency that will result in children born to parents who do not have legal status
in the US will not be considered US citizens.
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ASEAN X Macro
Tariffs: China first, Rest of the World later…?

Trump’s proposed hikes on US import tariffs could be in two parts in our opinion
i.e. “China first, Rest of the World later”. The first part is on China given that
the hawkish trade policy and tariff measures on China have been in place since
2018 under Trump 1.0 and remain – and extended - under Biden Presidency.
Furthermore, as per Fig 2 and Fig 4 (see next page), US President has the executive
power to impose tariffs on China as amply demonstrated during Trump 1.0 and
Biden Presidency (Fig 3), especially via the applications of Section 301 of the Trade
Act 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and on China’s
products that are already subjected to tariffs and/or tariffs hikes.
Figure 3: US Tariffs Hikes on Selected China Products 2018-2026
Source: White House
But immediately imposing a blanket 60% tariffs on all imports from China
seems unlikely as Fig 4 (see next page) indicates the due process that must be
adhered to even with the applications of relevant sections in the trade-related
Acts that granted discretionary powers to the President.
November 24, 2024 8

ASEAN X Macro
Figure 4: US Laws Granting US Presidents Discretionary Powers to Impose Tariffs and Restrict Trade
International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974
Issue/purpose “Unusual or extraordinary” threats to national Imports that threaten national security Unfair foreign trade practices, Discrimination of US commerce by “Large and serious” balance-of-
security, foreign policy, or the economy including trade agreement foreign countries payments deficits
violations, or acts that are
unjustifiable or unreasonable and
burden US commerce
Powers granted to the president to restrict Impose embargoes or sanctions; block imports and Adjust imports of the products that threaten Direct the US trade representative 1) Impose tariffs of up to 50 Temporarily impose tariffs of up to 15
trade exports; block numerous types of transactions, sales, national security and their derivatives (USTR) to impose tariffs or other percent ad valorem on imports percent and/or quotas on imported
and acquisitions trade restrictions; withdraw from from countries that have products
or suspend trade agreement discriminated against US
concessions; enter into binding commerce, relative to commerce
agreements that require the from other nations; 2) Bar the
targeted country to eliminate the importation of goods from the
practice(s) at issue or provide the foreign country into the United
United States with compensatory States, in case the president finds
trade benefits that a foreign country already
targeted by tariffs under this has
maintained or increased its
discriminations against US
commerce
Targets of actions taken or directed by the Property, including financial assets and currencies, in Imports of specific products from all countries Imports of all products from a Imports from a particular foreign Imports of goods, from all countries
president which a foreign country, organization, or individual specific country country (or specific subdivisions of unless the president determines more
has interest such country, as determined by the targeted actions are necessary
president)
Temporal, numerical, geographical, or The action is effective until the president or None, for the most part; if an action targets 1) An action must be specific to a 1) Tariff rate of up to 50 percent 2) 1) Tariff rate of up to 15 percent; 2)
circumstantial limits to powers granted to Congress terminates the national emergency declared imports of petroleum or petroleum products, foreign country; 2) For instances Action must be specific to a The duration of any action is limited to
the president under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) Congress may render it ineffective by passing where the USTR is statutorily foreign country (or subdivisions of 150 days unless extended by an
a disapproval resolution mandated to take action, such such country) affirmative act of Congress; 3) Quotas
action must be equivalent in value may only be imposed if there are
to the burden or restriction existing international trade or monetary
imposed on US commerce (this agreements that allow the imposition of
limit is not applicable to quotas as a balance-of-payments
discretionary actions); 3) If the measure and if the fundamental
practices at issue are covered by imbalance cannot be addressed through
the provisions of US trade a tariff alone
agreements (i.e., the WTO
agreements or US free trade
agreements), the USTR must
initiate proceedings under the
dispute settlement mechanisms of
the relevant agreements; 4) If an
action is taken within a four-year
period and before the end of that
four-year period neither the
petitioner of the Section 301
investigation nor any
representative of the domestic
industry that benefits from the
action submits a request for
continuation of the action, the
action shall terminate at the end of
the four-year period
Prerequisites for exercising presidential 1) A national emergency is declared under the NEA 2) Issuance of a report by the Department of The USTR must initiate a Section Existence of discrimination of US Existence of “fundamental”
authority The president must consult with Congress “in every Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security 301 investigation and decide (or be commerce by a foreign country, international payments problems; the
possible instance” before taking action showing that imports of certain products mandated) to take action following relative to commerce from other statute provides no limitations for the
constitute a threat to national security the recommendations of the countries, which the president or president ascertaining this at their own
Section 301 committee that the International Trade Commission discretion
conducted the investigation may ascertain
Requirements to report to Congress 1) The president must “immediately” report to Within 30 days after making a determination The USTR must submit a report to None None
Congress the factual elements surrounding the to take (or not take) action, the president the House of Representatives and
exercise of IEEPA authorities—-including the must transmit a report to Congress on the the Senate semiannually describing
circumstances that necessitate taking action(s) under reasons for taking (or not taking) action the Section 301 petitions filed and
the statute; the authorities exercised and action(s) determinations made; the status of
taken; and the countries affected by the ongoing Section 301 investigations
action(s)—and their justification for exercising them or proceedings; the actions taken
in light of those factual elements; 2) At least once or reasons for taking no actions;
every six months, the president must report to and the commercial effects of the
Congress on additional actions taken since the last actions taken
report and any changes to the facts and justifications
reported upon taking action under the statute
Source: Cato Institute
November 24, 2024 9

ASEAN X Macro
The second part is on the Rest of the World (RoW). Whether it will be the
proposed 10%-20% blanket tariffs on all imports from the RoW or on staggered
basis to focus on specific trade partners and products is still up in the air in our
view. Again, this is because of the aforementioned process that must be
undertaken which can take up to between 6-12 months, notwithstanding the
legal provisions that provide US President with discretionary powers to impose
import tariffs and restrictions.
We are also mindful of the risk that Trump 2.0 administration could instead focus
on US Treasury’s semi-annual report to the Congress on the trade/current account
balance and foreign exchange policies of US major trading partners. Within the
context of ASEAN and China, as per Fig 5, a prime target is Vietnam who breached
2 out of the 3 thresholds that are used to define a trading partner having unfair
currency advantage resulting in trade and current account surpluses with the US.
Singapore also in the same boat, but we take the view the risk of it facing US trade
tariff actions is unlikely and mitigated by its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the
US.
Figure 5: - China and ASEAN

[1] Bilateral Trade [2] Current Account > 3% of [3] Foreign Exchange Intervention
Surplus with US > $15bn GDP (>2% of GDP)
Country Net USD

Goods and Services
Purchases in
Surplus with US (USD Bn, % of GDP (4Q Trailing Sum) % of GDP (4Q Trailing Sum)
8 of 12
4Q Trailing Sum)
months
China 247 1.2 0.3 to -1.5 Yes

Indonesia* 16.5 -0.5 1.1 No
Malaysia 23 1.5 -2.2 No
Philippines* 4.2 -2.3 3.2 No
Singapore -31 20.1 9.4 Yes
Thailand 40 2.0 -0.5 No
Vietnam 112 5.4 -1.5 No
Cambodia* 11.9** 1.3^^ -0.03^ No^
Notes:
Indicators that exceed thresholds are marked red.
* Indonesia, Philippines and Cambodia: Based on estimates as they are not included in US Treasury's report.
** Cambodia’s bilateral trade surplus with US is computed based on goods trade only
^ Based on 2022 annual figures as 2023 GDP is unavailable; ^^ refers to 2024 data
Source: US Department of the Treasury, CEIC, IMF Article IV Reports of Cambodia, Indonesia and Philippines,
Maybank IBG Research, National Bank of Cambodia, Bureau of Economic Analysis US Department of the Treasury,
"Report to Congress - Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United
States", Nov 2024. National Bank of Cambodia, "Annual Report 2023", 10 May 2024.
A potential risk to the above views on US tariffs on China and RoW is Trump utilizes
Section 122 of the Trade Act 1974 – which have never been used before, where the
President can impose import tariffs across the board without prior investigation.
However, application of blanket import tariffs under this legal provision is limited
i.e. up to 15% tariff (and/or import quotas) for a period of 150 days against
countries with large balance of payments surplus, and any extension would require
Congress approval.
A wildcard - and a hope for mitigation – is Trump 2.0’s tariffs threat is more of
a strategy for US to extract deals and negotiate concessions from trading
partners to address its trade imbalances. Raising some glimmer of hope for a less
disruptive US trade policy under Trump 2.0 via the proposed blanket tariff hikes is
the appointment of Scott Bessent as US Treasury Secretary as some commentators
remarked that he understands the markets and this could reduce the chance of
severe blanket tariffs. But this is something that we will only know – and the
picture will get clearer - next year onwards as Trump’s second-term Presidency
kicks off.
November 24, 2024 10

ASEAN X Macro
To also note, thus far – at the time of writing – we have yet to see any of the usual
suspect(s) i.e. hardcore “trade hawks” being named to be part of Trump 2.0’s
administration. One person in particular that is so far missing is Robert Lighthizer
who was in the running - albeit a long-shot - for Treasury Secretary. Lighthizer also
missed out on the Commerce Secretary post that goes to Trump’s transition co-
chair Howard Lutnick, who Trump said will be overseeing the trade and tariff
agenda, with direct responsibility for the Office of the US Trade Representative
(USTR), a position that Lighthizer occupied under Trump 1.0.
Taxes: In time for the next fiscal year

Trump 2.0’s agenda on “Taxes” should be the key part of the upcoming budget
for fiscal year Oct 2025 – Nov 2026. Extending all the “goodies” under the 2017
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) that are expiring at the end of 20251 and the
proposal to lower corporate income tax rate to 15% from 21% is expected to
materialize within the next round of budget process given that it requires the
greenlight from the now Republican-controlled Congress.
To note, the US fiscal year starts on the first day of October each calendar year
and runs until the last day of September the following calendar year. The formal
US budget process – though not necessarily adhered to - involves the following key
timelines and flows:
 President traditionally outlines budget priorities in the State of the Union in

January.
 President submits budget request to Congress on the first Monday of February

as required by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) submits its analysis of the President’s
budget request by 15 February to the House and the Senate Budget committees
with emphasis on the long-term fiscal and economic outlooks.
 Senate Budget Committee submits “concurrent resolution” on the budget by 1

April.
 Congress to pass its Budget resolution on 15 April to guide decision-making for

the 12 appropriation subcommittees which will begin hearings on specific
proposals that can last into the summer, including addressing potential changes
to mandatory spending and tax laws. Committees then submit bills to
respective chambers for adoption, eventually forming a comprehensive budget.
 House begins formally approving annual appropriation bills drafts by 15 May.
 House Appropriation Committee submits last annual appropriation bill to

committees by 10 June.
 Congress adopts “reconciliation legislation” if required by 15 June.
 House to approve annual appropriation bills by 30 June – although in practice

this rarely occur.
 President approves and vetoes within 10 days of receiving the final proposed
budget. A veto means the process must start again.
 If a final budget is not adopted on 1 Oct, Congress will pass “continuing

resolution” (CR) to ensure federal agencies have the money to operate (plus
the federal government is servicing its debt). Otherwise, the government will
be “shut down”, meaning all non-essential programmes are closed and federal
government workers are furloughed.
1
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/which-provisions-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-
expire-in-2025/
ASEAN X Macro
Overall, the first nine months of Trump 2.0 Presidency will see the rolling out
of policies to deliver the election pledges and promises. Our expected timelines
are:
 “De-Regulation” and “Immigration” as soon as within the first three months;
 “Trade Tariffs” within the first six months, with focus on China first (Rest of
the World later into the year); and
 “Taxes” to be in time for the next fiscal year starting Oct 2025.
Legal Challenges: Execution risk…?

Legal challenges to Trump 2.0 policies are possible, but risk of major
derailments or “no show” in Trump 2.0’s policies seems low. There are
possibilities of legal challenges to Trump 2.0 policies on immigration and tariffs as
delaying tactics/attempts that can/may be employed by opponents of Trump and
his policies – be it political (Democrats) and non-political (businesses/industries;
NGOs).
But the risk of major derailments or “no show” in Trump 2.0’s policies due to legal
challenges appears to be somewhat low. A key reason for this is that past cases
suggest that the courts – including the Supreme Court - are likely to take a
deferential approach to executive branch decisions involving foreign policy,
national security, and international economic policymaking, recognizing that it
falls outside their normal purview and expertise.
Furthermore, aside from the appointment of “pro-Trump” Pam Bondi as Attorney

General noted above (Fig 1), the positions of Deputy Attorney General (Todd
Blanche), Solicitor General (John Sauer) and White House Counsel (Bill McGinley)
are also filled with other “Pro-Trump” individuals. Given that prosecuting a sitting
President is unlikely, existing cases against incoming President Trump will be more
of less “null and void”. We take the liberty of interpreting the purpose of these
“pro-Trump” legal appointees are to provide backing to Trump 2.0 policies,
including to address any court challenges.
Other things to keep in sight

Fed’s interest rate policy. There are lingering talks about whether President-
elect Trump is going to replace US Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell
when he comes into office. At the press conference after the 6-7 Nov 2024 FOMC
meeting, and in response to media questions, Chairman Powell said he will not
step down and added that the law does not allow a President to unilaterally change
the Fed Chairman. Our view is Powell will remain as Fed Chairman until his
current second four-year term ends in May 2026, after which we will see a new
person appointed by Trump.
More importantly is the Fed’s interest rate policy outlook, following Powell’s
comment on 14 Nov 2024 at an event in Dallas that the Fed needs not rush into
cutting interest rate. This came after two successive cuts in the fed funds rate’s
(FFR) target range i.e. -50bps to 4.75%-5.00% at the 17-18 Sep 2024 FOMC meeting,
followed by a further -25bps to 4.50%-4.75% at the 6-7 Nov 2024 FOMC meeting.

ASEAN X Macro
We are now in the new round of guessing game on Fed’s policy. Recall that when
Fed was on policy tightening mode / interest rate hike cycle in Mar 2022 - July
2023, it was about how fast and how high will Fed go. When Fed paused since Aug
2023, the debate was whether FFR is going to stay high for long. Now that Fed is
in easing cycle since Sep 2024, market pricing of the federal funds rate turns
volatile again, as per the shifting sands on the probability of FFR (i.e. another
round of cut to 4.25%-4.50% or stay at 4.50%-4.75%) at the last FOMC meeting of
the year on 17-18 Dec 2024 (Fig 6) and the recent weeks’ trend between FFR and
the 10-Year US Treasury yield (Fig 7).
Figure 6: Fed Funds Rate at the 17-18 Dec 2024 FOMC Meeting
(Probability, 0-1)
Source: CME FedWatch Tools (https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-

tool.html)
Figure 7: Fed Funds Rate vs 10-Year US Treasury Yield (% p.a.)
Sources: CEIC, Bloomberg

ASEAN X Macro
Expect a progressively shallower Fed rate cuts over 2024-2026 i.e. -100bps in
2024 to -75bps in 2025 to -50bps in 2026. At this juncture, we still expect
another -25bps cut in FFR target range to 4.25%-4.50% at the final FOMC meeting
on 17-18 Dec 2024 to bring a total of -100bps cut in FFR. Next year, we trim further
our FFR cuts projection to a total of -75bps from -100bps previously (which was
revised from -125bps earlier) and expect the current round of interest rate cuts to
be done by end-1H 2025, sending FFR to 3.50%-3.75% level before Fed goes into
pause mode in 2H 2025. We also take the view that the pause in 2H 2025 will
extend to May 2026 when Powell current terms in office as the Fed Chairman ends.
As mentioned earlier, we foresee Trump not extending Powell’s tenure and appoint
a new Fed Chair who will resume the interest rate cuts, where we price in -50bps
reductions to 3.00%-3.25% by end-2026.
This baseline forecast or scenario of “slower and shallower” US Fed’s monetary

policy easing cycle reflect the upside risk to US inflation as the result of the
above-mentioned policies and priorities of Trump 2.0. We expect a “stickier”
path towards Fed’s 2% inflation target ahead i.e. forecasting inflation rates of
+2.8% (revised from +2.3% previously) in 2025 and +2.5% in 2026 vs the
estimated +3.0% in 2024 after +4.1% in 2023 and +8% in 2022.
Meanwhile, our Fixed Income Research team takes the view that the result of US
election heightened the uncertainties on US growth and inflation outlook,
especially given the reflation risks of Trump 2.0 policies. Acknowledging the
possibility of shallower interest rate cuts cycle and thus the potential of higher
terminal rate than the 2.90% indicated by the median forecasts of FOMC members
(i.e. dot-plot) in Sep 2024, the US Treasury yield curve has bear-flattened. We
expect yields to remain elevated with the 10-year US Treasury of 4.25%-4.50% in
the near term. With the FFR decision at the 17-18 Dec 2024 FOMC turning into a
coin toss between another 25bps cut and no change, a Fed pause could trigger
additional upward repricing in US Treasury yields. Our Fixed Income Research team
recommends a neutral positioning on US Treasury as current yield levels appear
fair. Over the next 6-12 months, the team expects a steeper curve with the 2-year
– 10-year spread rising to ≥30bps from 7bps currently. The US Treasury 10-year yield
may find it hard to fall below 4.00% if progress towards 2% inflation stalls or reverse.
China’s policy responses to Trump 2.0, which in a way have materialized with
the People’s Bank of China’s (PBoC) easing blitz on 24 Sep 2024, that was
followed by the Ministry of Finance’s (MoF) fiscal injections to stimulate China’s
“under-whelming” post-pandemic growth performance that was in large part due
to the real estate slump (Fig 8 – see next page).
We expect these coordinated monetary and fiscal stimuli to continue next year,
which among others include additional interest rate cuts (e.g. we penciling in
-25bps cut in the 1-Year Loan Prime Rate (LPR) to 2.85% from 3.10%) and larger
deficit spending by the central government (2025F: -5.5% of GDP; 2024E: -4.2%
of GDP; 2023: -3.9% of GDP) reflecting a potential RMB10-15 trillion stimulus
package aimed at boosting domestic demand, especially consumer spending.
With regards to potential reactions to Trump 2.0’s tariffs hike on China imports,
which we see as the “clear and present danger” within the first 3-6 months of next
year, our China Economist Erica Tay penned the following thoughts for us to keep
an eye on:
 In the next few months, US and Chinese companies are likely to stockpile
shipments of goods that are hard to substitute. This will lead to a jump in intra-
Asia trade activity, before a slowdown from 2Q 2025 onwards.
 Chinese firms are likely to crystallize the ASEAN foreign direct investment (FDI)
plans they had been mulling and announce actual investments in the next few
months.

ASEAN X Macro
 As for the Chinese authorities, they will not be able to slap 60% of tariffs on a
similar amount of US imports as Trump threatens on Chinese exports since China
simply doesn’t import as much from US goods as it exports to US i.e. in 2023,
US exports USD148b to China vs China exports USD501b to US. For a given list
of US tariffed products, China will likely announce strategic retaliatory tariffs
i.e. choosing products that affect US economy/industry the most while
minimizing the harm to its own firms that rely on US inputs. It will likely target
goods from the states of influential US politicians, as well as focus on US goods
where there are adequate substitutes, whether domestically or from other
exporting nations e.g. agriculture and livestock products (soyabeans, corns,
pork); energy commodities (crude oil; LNG); airplanes; critical materials for
advanced manufacturing and strategic sectors (including semiconductor,
defence, renewable energy and clean technology). China may also restrict
domestic market access to US products such as automotive and the various
segments within the broad universe of technology.
Figure 8: China’s Monetary and Fiscal Stimulus, Sep-Nov 2024
PBOC’s “Easing Blitz” Politburo Statement 26 Sep 2024 MoF’s Fiscal Stimulus
24 Sep 2024 • Fiscal Stimulus – Increase Central 12 Oct 2024
•Cuts 7-Day Repo by 20 bps to 1.5% and Local Governments issuance •Additional special Central Govt
•Existing Mortgage Interest Rates of Special Bonds Bonds (CGB) issuance (current total
lowered by 50 bps RMB1tn)
•Reduce RRR by 50 bps to 6.50% • Policy pivot from letting housing •RMB400b Local Govt Bonds (LGB)
releasing RMB1tr liquidity bubble deflate, to halting in the issuance to relieve provinces’
•Cut Second-Home Down-Payment shortfalls, restructure debts, repay
property market’s decline arrears owed to corporates.
from 25% to 15%
•Guide banks to lower mortgage •RMB3.9tn in special LGBs earmarked
• Introduce private sector for this year, RMB2.3tn have yet to
rates by 50bps
promotion law, create a be spent. Disbursement will be sped
•Raise PBOC’s Share of Affordable conducive environment for up in 4Q 2024. Local governments
Housing Re-Lending from 60% to
100%
protecting entrepreneurs’ rights allowed to use these funds to buy
back land sold but undeveloped,
•RMB800bn of liquidity for the stock and buying unsold housing inventory
market • Focus on the employment of to be converted into affordable
fresh graduates, migrant housing
21 Oct 2024 workers, low-income and zero-
•Cuts 1-Year and 5-Year Loan Prime employment families and other
key groups 8 Nov 2024
Rates by 25bps •Local government debt swap of
RMB10trn over five years, resulting
in RMB600bn in interest savings
Source: Maybank IBG Research compilation
Figure 9: Machinery and Electronics Dominates China Exports Figure 10: US Exports to China Relatively More Diversified
to US (% Share of Total) (% Share of Total)
Note: Total China exports to US is USD501b in 2023 Note: Total US exports to China was USD148b in 2023
Source: Institute of International Finance (IIF) Source: Institute of International Finance (IIF)

ASEAN X Macro
Appendix: Summary Tables
Table 1: China - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Real GDP (%) 2.5 8.5 3.0 5.2 4.8 4.5
Private Consumption (%) 0.0 13.1 2.3 6.4 3.6 4.0
Government Consumption (%) 5.0 4.6 6.6 6.9 5.5 5.4
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) 1.9 12.0 5.4 4.3 4.0 4.2
Net Exports of Goods & Services (% pt cont) 0.6 1.9 0.5 (0.6) 1.4 0.7
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.4 1.8 1.4
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) (3.7) (3.1) (2.8) (3.9) (4.3) (4.3)
Inflation Rate (%) 2.5 0.9 2.0 0.2 0.3 1.4
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.2 5.1 5.5 5.2 5.2 4.8
Exchange Rate (per USD, end-period) 6.52 6.38 6.96 7.10 7.12 7.25
*Benchmark Interest Rate (% p.a., end-period) 3.85 3.80 3.65 3.45 3.10 2.85
* Refers to 1 Year Loan Prime Rate.
Note: Expenditure related figures (Private Consumption, Government Consumption, and Gross Fixed
Capital Formation) for 2023 are estimations, pending official data release.
Table 2: Indonesia - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Real GDP (%) -2.1 3.7 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.2
Private Consumption (%) -2.6 2.0 4.9 4.8 4.9 5.0
Government Consumption (%) 2.1 4.3 -4.5 2.9 5.1 5.7
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) -5.0 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.2 5.1
Exports of Goods & Services (%) -8.4 18.0 16.2 1.3 5.0 4.7
Imports of Goods & Services (%) -17.6 24.9 15.0 -1.6 4.5 4.9
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.4 0.3 1.0 -0.1 -0.8 -0.9
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -6.1 -4.6 -2.4 -1.7 -2.7 -2.6
Inflation Rate (%, period average) 2.0 1.6 4.2 3.7 2.3 2.6
Unemployment Rate (%, end-period) 7.1 6.5 5.9 5.3 5.0 5.0
Exchange Rate (per USD, end-period) 14,050 14,253 15,568 15,399 15,500 15,600
BI Policy Rate (% p.a., end-period) 3.75 3.50 5.50 6.00 5.75 5.00
Note: Unemployment rate is released bi-annually, in February and August.
Table 3: Malaysia - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Real GDP (%) (5.5) 3.3 8.9 3.6 5.2 5.1
Private Consumption (%) (3.9) 1.8 11.3 4.7 5.5 5.6
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) (14.4) (0.7) 6.8 5.5 9.5 8.1
Exports of Goods & Services (%) (8.6) 18.5 14.5 (8.1) 5.8 6.0
Imports of Goods & Services (%) (7.9) 21.2 16.0 (7.4) 7.0 7.4
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 4.2 4.2 3.2 1.5 1.3 1.8
Inflation Rate (%, period average) (1.1) 2.5 3.4 2.5 1.9 3.0
Unemployment Rate (%, period average) 4.5 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.3
10-Year Government Bond Yield (%, end-period) 2.65 3.59 4.00 3.80 3.30 3.30
Benchmark Interest Rate (% p.a., end-period) 1.75 1.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 3.00

ASEAN X Macro
Table 4: Philippines - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Real GDP (%) (9.5) 5.7 7.6 5.5 6.0 6.2
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) (27.3) 9.8 9.7 8.2 8.3 9.8
Exports of Goods & Services (%) (16.1) 8.0 10.9 1.4 6.9 8.9
Imports of Goods & Services (%) (21.6) 12.8 13.9 1.0 6.6 10.3
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 3.3 (1.4) (4.5) (2.6) (2.5) (2.0)
Inflation Rate (%, period average) 2.4 3.9 5.8 6.0 3.2 2.8
Table 5: Singapore - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Real GDP (%) (3.9) 8.9 3.6 1.1 3.6 2.6
Government Consumption (%) 13.0 3.7 -2.3 2.6 3.0 1.9
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) (14.8) 18.0 1.6 -0.2 1.4 2.2
Exports of Goods & Services (%) 0.4 11.7 -1.3 2.4 9.0 6.4
Imports of Goods & Services (%) (1.1) 12.0 -1.9 1.0 10.4 7.2
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 16.4 18 19.3 19.1 19.0 18.2
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) (10.5) 0.3 0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.1
Inflation Rate (%) (0.2) 2.3 6.1 4.8 2.6 1.7
10-Year Government Bond Yield (%, end-period) 0.83 1.64 3.09 2.71 2.75 2.75
3M SORA (% p.a., end-period) 0.13 0.19 3.10 3.71 3.10 2.65
Table 6: Thailand - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Real GDP (%) -6.1 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.6 2.8
Private Consumption (%) -0.8 0.6 6.3 3.9 3.1 2.5
Government Consumption (%) 1.4 3.7 0.2 -0.8 1.8 2.0
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) -4.8 3.1 2.3 0.3 2.4 2.9
Exports of Goods & Services (%) -19.7 11.1 6.8 1.4 4.4 4.0
Imports of Goods & Services (%) -13.9 17.8 4.1 -1.5 4.0 3.5
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 4.2 -2.1 -3.4 1.3 1.6 2.2
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -5.2 -4.8 -3.5 -3.5 -3.9 -3.5
Inflation Rate (%, period average) -0.8 1.2 6.1 1.2 0.6 1.2

ASEAN X Macro
Table 7: Vietnam - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E
Real GDP (%) 2.9 2.6 8.1 5.05 6.7 6.4
Private Consumption (%) 0.4 2.2 7.7 3.3 5.9 6.2
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) 4.1 2.8 5.6 4.6 6.6 6.7
Exports of Goods & Services (%) 4.1 14.0 4.9 -2.5 14.4 8.6
Imports of Goods & Services (%) 3.3 16.2 2.2 -4.3 13.7 8.4
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 4.3 (2.2) (0.3) 6.6 3.9 3.1
Inflation Rate (%) 3.2 1.8 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.4
Benchmark Interest Rate (% p.a., end-period)* 4.00 4.00 6.00 4.75 4.75 4.75
*Policy rate refers to <6M deposit rate cap
Table 8: Cambodia - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023E 2024E 2025E
Real GDP (%) (3.0) 2.9 5.1 5.0 5.9 5.8
Private Consumption (%) (1.9) (2.4) 5.2 5.0 6.0 5.8
Government Consumption (%) 9.2 12.3 (1.2) 6.0 5.8 5.6
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) (1.8) 4.7 5.4 3.3 7.0 6.8
Exports of Goods & Services (in USD terms, %) (12.2) 6.1 21.3 8.5 14.5 7.6
Imports of Goods & Services (in USD terms, %) (8.3) 1.9 18.6 1.3 13.2 7.3
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (3.4) (-40.4) (19.0) 1.6 (0.5) (0.7)
Inflation Rate (%) 2.9 2.9 5.4 2.1 0.9 2.0
Reserve requirement ratio (% p.a., end-period) 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Source: CEIC, Maybank IBG Research, 2023 GDP data refers to National bank of Cambodia

ASEAN X Macro
Performance and Valuation Summary
Equity performance by Country (in local currency terms)

--- Absolute performance (local currency) ---
Name Index level FX rate -1w -1m -3m -6m -1y MTD QTD YTD
MSCI All Country World 851 (1) (0) 2 7 23 2 2 17
MSCI Emerging Market 1,085 (6) (5) (2) (1) 10 (3) (1) 6
MSCI Asia Pac (inc Japan) 182 (5) (4) (2) 0 12 (2) (2) 7
MSCI Asia Pac (ex Japan) 577 (6) (5) (1) 2 14 (3) (0) 9
MSCI Asia x JP 706 (7) (6) (1) 1 13 (3) 0 10
MSCI Far East (ex Japan) 608 (6) (5) 2 2 11 (3) 3 10
MSCI ASEAN 693 (3) (4) (4) 10 14 0 1 9
MSCI Emerging Asia 598 (7) (6) (1) 1 13 (4) (1) 10
MSCI EM Latin America 2,060 (7) (5) (7) (17) (17) (1) (8) (23)
MSCI EMMEA 205 (1) (2) (3) (1) 7 (1) (2) 2
MSCI Frontier 532 (1) (1) (1) 1 8 (1) (1) 5
MSCI Asia x JP Small Cap 1,394 (7) (6) (5) (2) 9 (5) (5) 4
China - Shanghai Composite 3,370 7.2 3 3 23 7 10 3 19 13

China - H-shares 7,035 7.8 (7) (4) 10 3 16 (4) 11 22
Hong Kong - HSI 19,601 7.8 (7) (4) 7 2 11 (4) 9 15
Taiwan - TAIEX 22,556 32.6 (2) (4) 2 6 30 (1) 1 26
Korea - KOSPI 2,481 1,397.6 (5) (5) (4) (9) (1) (2) (7) (7)
Singapore - STI 3,739 1.3 4 3 3 13 21 5 9 15
Malaysia - KLCI 1,589 4.5 (3) (3) (5) (2) 9 (1) (5) 9
Thailand - SET 1,440 34.6 (2) (3) (1) 5 1 (2) 6 2
Indonesia - JCI 7,141 15,925.0 (6) (8) (8) (1) 3 (5) (7) (2)
Philippines - PSEi 6,863 59.0 (6) (7) (5) 3 11 (4) (1) 6
India - Sensex 77,156 84.5 (6) (5) (9) 4 17 (3) (6) 7
Vietnam - Ho Chi Minh 1,228 25,413.0 (5) (4) (3) (4) 11 (2) (4) 9
Australia ASX 200 8,323 1.5 1 (0) 1 6 18 3 3 10
New Zealand - NZX50 12,765 1.7 (0) (1) 2 9 14 2 3 8
Japan - Nikkei 225 38,026 154.3 (4) (2) 1 (2) 14 (0) (2) 14
Japan - TOPIX 2,683 154.3 (1) 0 2 (3) 13 1 (1) 13
S&P 500 5,949 1.0 2 2 4 12 31 4 5 25

Russell 2000 2,364 1.0 5 6 6 13 33 7 7 17
FTSE 100 8,149 0.8 (2) (2) (1) (3) 9 (0) (3) 5
Euro Stoxx 4,756 1.0 (6) (4) (2) (6) 10 (2) (4) 5
Source: Maybank IBG Research, Factset, MSCI, data as of 21 Nov 2024

ASEAN X Macro
Equity performance by Country (in USD terms)

--- Absolute performance (USD) ---
MSCI All Country World 851 (1) (0) 2 7 23 2 2 17
MSCI Emerging Market 1,085 (6) (5) (2) (1) 10 (3) (1) 6
MSCI Asia Pac (inc Japan) 182 (5) (4) (2) 0 12 (2) (2) 7
MSCI Asia Pac (ex Japan) 577 (6) (5) (1) 2 14 (3) (0) 9
MSCI Asia x JP 706 (7) (6) (1) 1 13 (3) 0 10
MSCI Far East (ex Japan) 608 (6) (5) 2 2 11 (3) 3 10
MSCI ASEAN 693 (3) (4) (4) 10 14 0 1 9
MSCI Emerging Asia 598 (7) (6) (1) 1 13 (4) (1) 10
MSCI EM Latin America 2,060 (7) (5) (7) (17) (17) (1) (8) (23)
MSCI EMMEA 205 (1) (2) (3) (1) 7 (1) (2) 2
MSCI Frontie 532 (1) (1) (1) 1 8 (1) (1) 5
MSCI Asia x JP Small Cap 1,394 (7) (6) (5) (2) 9 (5) (5) 4
China - Shanghai Composite 3,370 7.2 0 1 20 7 8 1 16 11

China - H-shares 7,035 7.8 (7) (4) 10 3 16 (4) 11 22
Hong Kong - HSI 19,601 7.8 (7) (4) 7 2 11 (4) 9 15
Taiwan - TAIEX 22,556 32.6 (3) (6) (0) 5 25 (3) (1) 19
Korea - KOSPI 2,481 1,397.6 (8) (6) (9) (11) (9) (4) (11) (14)
Singapore - STI 3,739 1.3 1 1 (1) 13 20 4 5 13
Malaysia - KLCI 1,589 4.5 (6) (7) (11) 3 13 (3) (8) 12
Thailand - SET 1,440 34.6 (6) (7) (5) 10 3 (4) 4 0
Indonesia - JCI 7,141 15,925.0 (8) (11) (12) (0) (1) (6) (10) (5)
Philippines - PSEi 6,863 59.0 (9) (10) (11) 2 4 (5) (5) (0)
India - Sensex 77,156 84.5 (6) (5) (10) 3 15 (4) (7) 5
Vietnam - Ho Chi Minh 1,228 25,413.0 (7) (4) (7) (4) 5 (3) (6) 4
Australia ASX 200 8,323 1.5 (2) (3) (3) 4 17 1 (1) 5
New Zealand - NZX50 12,765 1.7 (4) (4) (4) 5 11 (0) (4) 0
Japan - Nikkei 225 38,026 154.3 (7) (5) (6) (1) 9 (1) (7) 4
Japan - TOPIX 2,683 154.3 (4) (3) (5) (2) 9 1 (7) 4
S&P 500 5,949 1.0 2 2 4 12 31 4 5 25

Russell 2000 2,364 1.0 5 6 6 13 33 7 7 17
FTSE 100 8,149 0.8 (5) (5) (6) (4) 10 (3) (7) 4
Euro Stoxx 4,756 1.0 (9) (7) (8) (9) 6 (6) (9) 0

ASEAN X Macro
Equity performance by Country – relative performance

--- Relative performance to MSCI Asia x Japan ---
MSCI All Country World 851 6 5 3 6 10 5 2 7
MSCI Emerging Market 1,085 0 0 (1) (2) (3) 0 (2) (4)
MSCI Asia Pac (inc Japan) 182 1 1 (2) (1) (1) 2 (3) (3)
MSCI Asia Pac (ex Japan) 577 1 1 (0) 0 1 1 (0) (1)
MSCI Asia x JP 706
MSCI Far East (ex Japan) 608 1 0 3 0 (2) 0 3 0
MSCI ASEAN 693 4 2 (4) 9 1 4 1 (1)
MSCI Emerging Asia 598 (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 (0) (1) 0
MSCI EM Latin America 2,060 (0) 1 (7) (19) (30) 2 (8) (33)
MSCI EMMEA 205 5 4 (2) (2) (6) 2 (2) (8)
MSCI Frontier 532 5 5 0 (1) (5) 2 (2) (5)
MSCI Asia x JP Small Cap 1,394 (0) (0) (4) (3) (5) (1) (5) (6)
China - Shanghai Composite 3,370 7.2 7 7 21 5 (5) 5 16 1

China - H-shares 7,035 7.8 (1) 1 11 2 3 (1) 11 12
Hong Kong - HSI 19,601 7.8 (1) 1 8 1 (2) (1) 9 5
Taiwan - TAIEX 22,556 32.6 4 (0) 1 4 12 1 (1) 8
Korea - KOSPI 2,481 1,397.6 (2) (1) (8) (13) (22) (0) (12) (24)
Singapore - STI 3,739 1.3 8 7 0 12 7 7 5 3
Malaysia - KLCI 1,589 4.5 0 (1) (10) 2 0 1 (9) 2
Thailand - SET 1,440 34.6 1 (1) (4) 9 (10) (0) 3 (10)
Indonesia - JCI 7,141 15,925.0 (1) (5) (11) (2) (14) (3) (10) (15)
Philippines - PSEi 6,863 59.0 (2) (4) (10) 1 (9) (2) (5) (10)
India - Sensex 77,156 84.5 0 0 (9) 1 2 (0) (7) (5)
Vietnam - Ho Chi Minh 1,228 25,413.0 0 1 (6) (5) (8) 1 (7) (6)
Australia ASX 200 8,323 1.5 4 3 (2) 2 4 5 (1) (5)
New Zealand - NZX50 12,765 1.7 3 1 (3) 4 (2) 3 (4) (10)
Japan - Nikkei 225 38,026 154.3 (0) 1 (5) (3) (4) 2 (7) (6)
Japan - TOPIX 2,683 154.3 3 3 (4) (3) (5) 4 (7) (6)
S&P 500 5,949 1.0 8 7 5 10 18 7 5 15

Russell 2000 2,364 1.0 12 11 7 11 19 10 6 7
FTSE 100 8,149 0.8 2 1 (5) (5) (4) 0 (7) (6)
Euro Stoxx 4,756 1.0 (2) (1) (7) (10) (8) (2) (9) (10)

ASEAN X Macro
Links to past reports

Date Report title Analysts
Economics
10-Sep-24 Philippines External Trade, July 2024 - Mixed performance continues Suhaimi Ilias
15-Sep-24 China Economics - Flailing Consumption Weighs on Production Erica Tay
17-Sep-24 Indonesia Economics - BI Surprises With Rate Cut, More Easing to Come Brian Lee Shun Rong
17-Sep-24 Indonesia Economics - Trade and Consumption Improve in August, BI to Stand Pat Tomorrow Brian Lee Shun Rong
17-Sep-24 Philippines OFWR, July 2024 - OFWR value hit the year’s high Suhaimi Ilias
17-Sep-24 Singapore Economics - NODX Climbs for Second Month, Electronics Surge to 14-Year High Hak Bin Chua
19-Sep-24 Malaysia External Trade, Aug 2024 - External trade momentum remains steadfast Suhaimi Ilias
23-Sep-24 Singapore Economics - Core Inflation Creeps Up, Expect MAS to Stand Pat in October Hak Bin Chua
24-Sep-24 China Economics - PBOC Goes Big: Game-Changer? Raising 2025 GDP Forecast Erica Tay
24-Sep-24 Malaysia CPI, Aug 2024 - Inflation momentum remain subdued Zamros Dzulkafli
26-Sep-24 Singapore Economics - Electronics Powers Manufacturing Surge, Expect +4.3% Flash 3Q GDP Hak Bin Chua
26-Sep-24 Thailand Economics - Export Growth Tapers as Key Markets Slow Down Erica Tay
26-Sep-24 Thailand Economics - IP Contracts Anew, BOT Likely to Ease if Weak Data Piles Up Erica Tay
29-Sep-24 China Economics - The Politburo: Xi’s Put Erica Tay
1-Oct-24 Indonesia Economics - Headline Inflation Hits 3-Year Low, Opens Door for Another Rate Cut in Oct Brian Lee Shun Rong
2-Oct-24 Vietnam Economics - FDI: Threats to the Crown? Brian Lee Shun Rong
3-Oct-24 Singapore Economics - MAS Preview: Maintain Stance in Oct, May Ease in 2025 When Inflation Drops Hak Bin Chua
4-Oct-24 Philippines CPI, Sep 2024 - Headline inflation decelerated to +1.9% YoY; the lowest since May 2020 Zamros Dzulkafli
7-Oct-24 Thailand Economics - Headline and Core Inflation Rise, BOT Likely to Hold in October Erica Tay
7-Oct-24 Vietnam Economics - GDP Strengthens in 3Q, Raise GDP Forecast to 6.7% in 2024 Brian Lee Shun Rong
8-Oct-24 Philippines Labour Market, Aug ‘24 - Unemployment rate fell to 4.0%; higher employment in Services Zamros Dzulkafli
10-Oct-24 Malaysia Labour Statistics, Aug 2024 - In a state of “full employment” Suhaimi Ilias
10-Oct-24 Philippines External Trade, Aug 2024 - Mixed performance persists Suhaimi Ilias
11-Oct-24 Malaysia Macro Update - Budget 2025 Preview Suhaimi Ilias
12-Oct-24 China Economics - MOF Teases Greater Deficit, Unlocks Stranded Fiscal Firepower for Property Rescue Erica Tay
12-Oct-24 Malaysia Monthly GDP Estimate, Aug 2024 - GDP growth eased in Aug 2024 Suhaimi Ilias
14-Oct-24 China Economics - Deflationary Pressure Spreads, Core Inflation at 44-Month Low Erica Tay
14-Oct-24 China Economics - Exports and Imports Slow in Tandem Erica Tay
14-Oct-24 Singapore Economics - MAS Maintains Appreciation Pace, GDP Surges to 4.1% in 3Q Hak Bin Chua
15-Oct-24 Indonesia Economics - Exports Chug Along While Retail Sales Ease, Expect BI to Hold at Oct Meeting Brian Lee Shun Rong
16-Oct-24 Indonesia Economics - BI Stands Pat Amid Rupiah Pressure, But Sees Room For Further Rate Cuts Brian Lee Shun Rong
16-Oct-24 Philippines OFWR, Aug 2024 - OFWR value hit the year’s high Suhaimi Ilias
16-Oct-24 Thailand Economics - BOT Cuts Rates Unexpectedly, Raise 2024 Growth Outlook to +2.6% Erica Tay
17-Oct-24 China Economics - Property Backstop Takes Shape Erica Tay
17-Oct-24 Philippines BSP Monetary Policy - Second -25bps cut of the year Zamros Dzulkafli
17-Oct-24 Singapore Economics - NODX Grows At Slower Pace in Sep, PMIs Suggests Recovery Intact Hak Bin Chua
18-Oct-24 China Economics - GDP Growth Steadies, On Track to Reach +4.8% in 2024 Erica Tay
21-Oct-24 Malaysia 3Q 2024 GDP Advance Estimate - 5%-plus growth momentum sustained Suhaimi Ilias
21-Oct-24 Malaysia External Trade, Sep 2024 - External trade signals continued firm economic activities in 3Q 2024 Suhaimi Ilias
22-Oct-24 Indonesia Economics - A ‘Merah-Putih’ Cabinet for President Prabowo’s Vision Brian Lee Shun Rong
23-Oct-24 Singapore Economics - Core Inflation Ticks Up, MAS 2% Core Guidance by Year-End Looks Ambitious Hak Bin Chua
25-Oct-24 ASEAN Economics - Finding Growth in a Fragmented World Hak Bin Chua
25-Oct-24 Malaysia CPI, Sep 2024 - Inflation stays sub-2% YoY year-to-date, upside risk next year Suhaimi Ilias
25-Oct-24 Singapore - Manufacturing Climbs +10% Even As Electronics Slows, Expect 3Q GDP Upgrade to +4.6% Hak Bin Chua
1-Nov-24 Indonesia - Headline Inflation Cools in October, But Prices Broke 5-Month Spell of Sequential Deflation Brian Lee Shun Rong
5-Nov-24 Philippines CPI, Oct 2024 - Headline inflation firmer, maintain 2024 and 2025 forecasts Suhaimi Ilias
6-Nov-24 BNM Monetary Policy - Wrapping up a “stable” year Suhaimi Ilias
6-Nov-24 Indonesia Economics - 3Q GDP Growth Slows Marginally, Maintain Full-Year 5.1% Forecast Brian Lee Shun Rong
6-Nov-24 Philippines Labour Market, Sep ‘24 - Unemployment rate dipped for the second month in Sep 2024 Suhaimi Ilias
6-Nov-24 Thailand Economics - CPI Inflation Inches Up, BOT Likely to Hold for Rest of 2024 Erica Tay
7-Nov-24 China Economics - Exports Rebound But Trade War 2.0 Looms Erica Tay
7-Nov-24 Philippines 3Q 2024 GDP - Slower growth Suhaimi Ilias
8-Nov-24 US FOMC Meeting, 6-7 Nov 2024 - Cutting on the cuts… Suhaimi Ilias
9-Nov-24 China Economics - RMB10tn Local Government Debt Swap Unveiled, Inflation Weakens Further Erica Tay
11-Nov-24 Malaysia Quarterly GDP Preview - 3Q 2024 GDP: Staying 5%-plus YoY Suhaimi Ilias
15-Nov-24 China Economics - Retail Sales Recovers, Industrial Production Steadies Suhaimi Ilias
15-Nov-24 Indonesia Economics - Exports Outperform But Retail Sales Ease, BI to Hold in Nov Meeting Brian Lee Shun Rong
16-Nov-24 Malaysia 3Q 2024 GDP - Economic growth stayed 5%+ on “investment upcycle” Suhaimi Ilias
16-Nov-24 Philippines OFWR, Sep 2024 - Sustained OFWR growth momentum Suhaimi Ilias
18-Nov-24 Malaysia Balance of Payments, 3Q2024 - Narrow current account surplus persist Suhaimi Ilias
18-Nov-24 Singapore Economics - NODX Declines in Oct, More Headwinds from Tariffs in 2025 Hak Bin Chua
18-Nov-24 Thailand Economics - 3Q GDP Growth Rises to 3%, Govt Investment Normalises Erica Tay
20-Nov-24 Malaysia External Trade, Oct 2024 - Soft start to 4Q 2024 Suhaimi Ilias

ASEAN X Macro
Strategy
9-Jul-24 Singapore Strategy - If Trump wins Thilan Wickramasinghe
12-Jul-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (1 – 12 July, 2024) Regional Research Team
15-Jul-24 Malaysia 2H24 Outlook & Lookouts - Sustaining Momentum Suhaimi Ilias
15-Jul-24 Thai Market Compass - Local roadshow feedback Chak Reungsinpinya
20-Jul-24 ASEAN X Macro - Is EM Asia FX Under Risk of Further Weakness? Regional Research Team
22-Jul-24 Philippines Strategy - Ready get set… Kervin Sisayan
26-Jul-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (15 – 26 July, 2024) Regional Research Team
26-Jul-24 Singapore Economics - MAS Holds, Raises GDP & Cuts Headline Inflation Forecast Hak Bin Chua
1-Aug-24 Portfolio Seasons - Malaysia: Sustaining Momentum with Less Obvious Stocks Seng Yeow Ong
1-Aug-24 MIBG Sustainability Research - Hybrids gaining traction globally, ASEAN sees EV pick-up Jigar Shah
2-Aug-24 Malaysia Strategy - Jul 2024: Equity Fund Flows Shao Yang Yin
4-Aug-24 ASEAN X Macro - Malaysia: Investment Upcycle of the Third Wave Regional Research Team
8-Aug-24 Malaysia Thematic - Counting our durians before they fall Shao Yang Yin
9-Aug-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (29 July – 9 Aug, 2024) Regional Research Team
13-Aug-24 Vietnam Strategy - Adjusting the sail, maintaining the direction Hoang Huy
15-Aug-24 Thai Market Compass - Towards greater political clarity Chak Reungsinpinya
16-Aug-24 ASEAN X Macro - Malaysia Property Bonds: Credit Trends & Performance Regional Research Team
19-Aug-24 Philippines Strategy - 1H24 earnings pave way for bright outlook Kervin Laurence Sisayan
20-Aug-24 Indonesia Strategy - 2025 Budget: Takeaways, winners and losers Jeffrosenberg Chenlim
23-Aug-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (12 – 23 Aug, 2024) Regional Research Team
25-Aug-24 Singapore Markets - When interest rates fall Thilan Wickramasinghe
26-Aug-24 MIBG Sustainability Research - ESG outperformance continues in ASEAN Jigar Shah
30-Aug-24 ASEAN X Macro - Southeast Asia’s Chip Race: Prospects and Perils Regional Research Team
3-Sep-24 2Q24 Results Roundup - Growth estimates intact; raising YE KLCI target Chew Hann Wong
3-Sep-24 Indonesia Strategy - Switching into commodities Jeffrosenberg Chenlim
3-Sep-24 Malaysia Strategy - Aug 2024: Equity Fund Flows Chew Hann Wong
5-Sep-24 Indonesia Strategy - Indo rate optimism may have hit the wall; buy commodities Jeffrosenberg Chenlim
5-Sep-24 Philippines Strategy - Positive feedback and relatively under-owned Kervin Laurence Sisayan
6-Sep-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (26 Aug – 6 Sept, 2024) Regional Research Team
6-Sep-24 Thai Market Compass - A strong finish to 2024E Chak Reungsinpinya
6-Sep-24 Thai Market Compass - A strong finish to 2024E Chak Reungsinpinya
9-Sep-24 ASEAN Equity Strategy - Singapore Switches Anand Pathmakanthan
10-Sep-24 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) - Middle Age Aspirations Anand Pathmakanthan
12-Sep-24 Philippines Strategy - What’s in store with CREATE More Kervin Laurence Sisayan
12-Sep-24 Thai Market Compass - MOF roadshow takeaways: expects improvement in 2H24 Chak Reungsinpinya
14-Sep-24 ASEAN X Macro - Assessing FX Volatility Amid Current Uncertainty Regional Research Team
18-Sep-24 Indonesia Strategy - Improving market breadth Jeffrosenberg Chenlim
23-Sep-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (9 – 20 Sept, 2024) Regional Research Team
24-Sep-24 Singapore market - Rate cut. Now what? Thilan Wickramasinghe
27-Sep-24 ASEAN X Macro - MY Fixed Income Outlook 4Q24: Clipping Coupon Regional Research Team
29-Sep-24 Invest Malaysia Iskandar 2024 - “Where Policy Meets Progress” Chew Hann Wong
1-Oct-24 Indonesia Strategy - Riding on China reflation trade Jeffrosenberg Chenlim
2-Oct-24 Malaysia Strategy - Sep 2024: Equity Fund Flows Chew Hann Wong
2-Oct-24 Singapore Strategy - Impact Makers Thilan Wickramasinghe
4-Oct-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (23 Sept – 4 Oct, 2024) Regional Research Team
7-Oct-24 FBM KLCI constituents review - On the watch list Chew Hann Wong
8-Oct-24 Philippines Strategy - The next leg Kervin Laurence Sisayan
11-Oct-24 ASEAN X Macro - Malaysia: Budget 2025 Preview Regional Research Team
11-Oct-24 Thai Market Compass - FTAs key to unlocking FDI, trade growth Chak Reungsinpinya
16-Oct-24 Portfolio Seasons - Thailand: Early stages of recovery Seng Yeow Ong
16-Oct-24 Indonesia Strategy - Big confidence boost from reappointment of MoF head Jeffrosenberg Chenlim
17-Oct-24 Malaysia Thematic - Chinese tourism - of durians and Fan Bingbing Shao Yang Yin
18-Oct-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (7 – 18 Oct, 2024) Regional Research Team
18-Oct-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (7 – 18 Oct, 2024) Regional Research Team
20-Oct-24 Malaysia Budget 2025 - Fortifying MADANI Economy Suhaimi Ilias
25-Oct-24 ASEAN X Macro - Finding Growth in a Fragmented World Regional Research Team
3-Nov-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (21 Oct – 1 Nov, 2024) Regional Research Team
4-Nov-24 Malaysia Strategy - Oct 2024: Equity Fund Flows Anand Pathmakanthan
6-Nov-24 Indonesia Strategy - Unenergetic 9M24 results Jeffrosenberg Chenlim
6-Nov-24 Thai Market Compass - 3 themes under Trump Chak Reungsinpinya
9-Nov-24 ASEAN X Macro - Trump Term 2.0: FX Adjustments Regional Research Team
15-Nov-24 ASEAN+ FORTNIGHTLY - Highlights (4 – 15 Nov, 2024) Regional Research Team
15-Nov-24 Philippines Strategy - Timely CREATE More Act Kervin Laurence Sisayan
19-Nov-24 MIBG Sustainability Research - Malaysia ESG Focus: Slow transition, improving disclosures Jigar Shah
19-Nov-24 Thai Market Compass - Takeaways from meeting with Thailand’s Finance Minister Chak Reungsinpinya

ASEAN X Macro
FX Research
10-May-24 FX Weekly - US Inflation Data Looms Saktiandi Supaat
18-May-24 FX Weekly - Focus on PMIs Saktiandi Supaat
27-May-24 FX Weekly - Finer Calibrations Saktiandi Supaat
31-May-24 FX Monthly - 2024, Issue 5: June Central Bank Moves & Deliberations Matter Saktiandi Supaat
31-May-24 FX Weekly - The Cutting Week Saktiandi Supaat
7-Jun-24 FX Insight - INR: Election Pressures Fade, RBI Supportive of Carry Saktiandi Supaat
14-Jun-24 FX Flash - BOJ Likely to be Gradual, USDJPY to Stay Elevated Saktiandi Supaat
14-Jun-24 FX Weekly - Whipsawing Could Continue Saktiandi Supaat
20-Jun-24 FX Insight - Divergent Plays of Commodity Currencies Saktiandi Supaat
24-Jun-24 FX Weekly - Stars Are Not Aligned for USD to Drop Much Saktiandi Supaat
25-Jun-24 FX Note - USDIDR Upward Move Can be Limited Near Term Saktiandi Supaat
28-Jun-24 FX Weekly - Starting Next Week with Risk Events Saktiandi Supaat
1-Jul-24 FX Monthly - 2024, Issue 6: While Pockets of USD Resilience Linger… Saktiandi Supaat
5-Jul-24 FX Insight - GBP, EUR: UK Labour Win; French Elections Up Next Saktiandi Supaat
5-Jul-24 FX Insight - Playing the Yuan’s Crawl Lower Saktiandi Supaat
8-Jul-24 FX Note - PHP View Intact Saktiandi Supaat
8-Jul-24 FX Weekly - Focus on Inflation Next with Politics Out of the Way Saktiandi Supaat
10-Jul-24 FX Flash - Taking Profit on NZDCAD and AUDNZD Trades Saktiandi Supaat
12-Jul-24 FX Flash - Possible Intervention But USDJPY to Stay Elevated Saktiandi Supaat
15-Jul-24 FX Weekly - The Third Plenum That May Not matter Saktiandi Supaat
19-Jul-24 FX Insight - Is EM Asia FX Under Risk of Further Weakness? Saktiandi Supaat
22-Jul-24 FX Flash - Understanding the Trump Trade Saktiandi Supaat
22-Jul-24 FX Insight - SGD Preview: No Hurry to Ease Saktiandi Supaat
22-Jul-24 FX Weekly - Core PCE, US Elections Beckons Saktiandi Supaat
26-Jul-24 FX Flash - JPY Climb – Will it Continue? Saktiandi Supaat
26-Jul-24 FX Flash - SGD: No Move as Expected Saktiandi Supaat
26-Jul-24 FX Flash - Yuan Rides on Carry-Trade Unwinding Saktiandi Supaat
26-Jul-24 FX Weekly - Brace for the Fed and the BoJ Saktiandi Supaat
1-Aug-24 FX Flash - Policy Shifts to Give JPY More Support Saktiandi Supaat
1-Aug-24 FX Monthly - 2024, Issue 7: US Election Phase Intensifies Saktiandi Supaat
5-Aug-24 FX Weekly - Fear Sets In Saktiandi Supaat
13-Aug-24 FX Weekly - Plenty to Watch – US Inflation Prints and CB Decisions Saktiandi Supaat
15-Aug-24 FX Flash - BSP Cut, PHP Steady Saktiandi Supaat
16-Aug-24 FX Insight - Opportunistic FX Plays Beyond Recent Market Volatility Saktiandi Supaat
16-Aug-24 FX Weekly - With a Soft Landing Looking More Likely… Saktiandi Supaat
19-Aug-24 FX Flash - THB Outperforms Regionally Saktiandi Supaat
23-Aug-24 FX Weekly - Paring Back the Rate Cut Expectations Saktiandi Supaat
24-Aug-24 FX Weekly - Paring Back the Rate Cut Expectations Saktiandi Supaat
30-Aug-24 FX Weekly - Anticipating NFP Saktiandi Supaat
2-Sep-24 FX Monthly - 2024, Issue 8: Fed Matters Saktiandi Supaat
6-Sep-24 FX Weekly - Fears, Jitters and Recession Indicators Saktiandi Supaat
6-Sep-24 FX Weekly - Fears, Jitters and Recession Indicators Saktiandi Supaat
13-Sep-24 FX Weekly - The Week of Central Banks – Fed in Focus Saktiandi Supaat
18-Sep-24 FX Insight - Playing the JPY Game Saktiandi Supaat
19-Sep-24 FX Flash - Positive Signal From BI Surprise Cut, Focus on Fed Saktiandi Supaat
19-Sep-24 FX Flash - Update – IDR Lifted By Positive BI Surprise Cut Signal Saktiandi Supaat
19-Sep-24 FX Insight - FX Strategy Update – Fed Frontloads, USD Bears Run into Fatigue Saktiandi Supaat
20-Sep-24 FX Weekly - When Fed and Markets are in Congruence, Look for Other Cues Saktiandi Supaat
27-Sep-24 FX Weekly - Road to NFP Saktiandi Supaat
1-Oct-24 FX Monthly - 2024, Issue 9: A Data Dependent Path and US Elections in Play Saktiandi Supaat
4-Oct-24 FX Weekly - USD Rebounds, Awaiting NFP, CPI Saktiandi Supaat
8-Oct-24 FX Insight - SGD Preview: Stand Pat on Sticky Inflation, Robust Growth Saktiandi Supaat
11-Oct-24 FX Weekly - An unhurried Fed Sets the tone for other CBs And, Watch China Saktiandi Supaat
14-Oct-24 FX Flash - SGD: Sixth Time Standing Pat Saktiandi Supaat
14-Oct-24 FX Note - How High Will USDJPY Go? Saktiandi Supaat
16-Oct-24 FX Flash - IDR, THB and PHP Impact From Triple Central Bank Decisions Saktiandi Supaat
17-Oct-24 FX Insight - Of Moderating China Optimism, US Election Risks and a Chance for CNHJPY To Fall Saktiandi Supaat
18-Oct-24 FX Weekly - Expect Volatility Ahead of US Elections Saktiandi Supaat
25-Oct-24 FX Weekly - Key Data Week Before US Elections Saktiandi Supaat
28-Oct-24 FX Flash - JPY and Election Concerns Saktiandi Supaat
30-Oct-24 FX Monthly - 2024, Issue 10: Navigating US Tail Risk Saktiandi Supaat
1-Nov-24 FX Weekly - The Binary Risks of US Elections Saktiandi Supaat
6-Nov-24 FX Flash - The Red Wave Saktiandi Supaat
16-Nov-24 FX Weekly - Focus Remains on Trump Saktiandi Supaat

ASEAN X Macro
Fixed Income
26-Apr-24 Malaysia Corporate Perps - Chugging Along Winson Phoon
29-Apr-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Mixed Drivers for IndoGB, SGS and MGS Winson Phoon
3-May-24 Indonesia Rates Strategy - Raise IndoGB Back to Mildly Bullish Winson Phoon
6-May-24 Fixed Income Weekly - BNM to Hold, Signs of Cooling in US Jobs Winson Phoon
9-May-24 Fixed Income Foreign Flows, Apr 24 - Sustained Inflow, Challenging Environment Winson Phoon
13-May-24 Fixed Income Weekly - 20y MGS and IndoGB Auctions Winson Phoon
14-May-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 20y MGS New Issue Winson Phoon
20-May-24 Fixed Income Weekly - SRBI Yields Eased, BI to Hold This Week Winson Phoon
21-May-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 15y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
27-May-24 Fixed Income Weekly - 7y MGS and IndoGB Auctions Winson Phoon
29-May-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 7y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
30-May-24 Indonesia Rates Strategy - Navigating Rough Waters Winson Phoon
3-Jun-24 Fixed Income Weekly - ECB and BOC to Cut Rate, US NFP Wildcard Winson Phoon
3-Jun-24 MYR Bond Analytics - Market Profile & Chartbook Winson Phoon
6-Jun-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 20y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
10-Jun-24 Fixed Income Weekly - FOMC Preview, IndoGB Auctions Winson Phoon
12-Jun-24 Fixed Income Foreign Flows, May 24 - Larger Inflows Winson Phoon
13-Jun-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 3y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
18-Jun-24 Fixed Income Weekly - IndoGB & BI Rate Update, Monitor KLIBOR Winson Phoon
21-Jun-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 30y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
21-Jun-24 MY Fixed Income Outlook 2H24 - Bumpy Road to Lower Yields Winson Phoon
24-Jun-24 Fixed Income Weekly - IndoGB Auction, Malaysia CPI Winson Phoon
1-Jul-24 Fixed Income Weekly - UST Curve Steepened, Payrolls Data Ahead Winson Phoon
1-Jul-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 5y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
8-Jul-24 Fixed Income Foreign Flows, Jun 24 - Taking A Breather Winson Phoon
8-Jul-24 Fixed Income Weekly - One Step Closer to Sep Rate Cut by Fed Winson Phoon
9-Jul-24 Genting Bhd - Nearing Rating Upside Trigger Winson Phoon
12-Jul-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 10y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
12-Jul-24 Indonesia Rates Strategy - Reiterate Tactically Mildly Bullish IndoGB Winson Phoon
15-Jul-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Likely Fed Easing Brightens IndoGB Outlook Winson Phoon
19-Jul-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 15y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
22-Jul-24 Fixed Income Weekly - 3M KLIBOR May Ease Further, Reduce SGS to Neutral Winson Phoon
4-Aug-24 US and Malaysia Rates Views - Fed Rate: Longer Wait, Bigger Cuts Winson Phoon
5-Aug-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Shifting Sands on Rates Expectations Winson Phoon
7-Aug-24 Fixed Income Foreign Flows, July 24 - A Rising Tide Winson Phoon
7-Aug-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 7y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
12-Aug-24 Fixed Income Weekly - A Wild Week Ended Calmer Winson Phoon
14-Aug-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 30y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
16-Aug-24 Malaysia Property Bonds - Credit Trends & Performance Winson Phoon
19-Aug-24 Fixed Income Weekly - BNM QRI, Indonesia Budget 2025 Winson Phoon
20-Aug-24 Indonesia Rates - Will BI Surprise With A Cut? Winson Phoon
21-Aug-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 5y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
26-Aug-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Reduce IndoGB to Neutral, 10y MGS and 5y SGS Auctions Ahead Winson Phoon
28-Aug-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 10y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
2-Sep-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Reduce UST and MGS to Neutral Winson Phoon
8-Sep-24 Fixed Income Foreign Flows, Aug 24 - Still A Rising Tide Winson Phoon
9-Sep-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Un-inverted UST Curve Brings More Concerns Than Cheers Winson Phoon
9-Sep-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 20y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
16-Sep-24 Fixed Income Weekly - The Fed Will Probably Cut 25bp Although 50bp Is Needed Winson Phoon
19-Sep-24 Indonesia Rates - BI Rate Cut Not Clear-cut Positive for IndoGB Winson Phoon
20-Sep-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 7y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
23-Sep-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Yields Mixed After 50bp Fed Rate Cut Winson Phoon
27-Sep-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 30y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
27-Sep-24 MY Fixed Income Outlook 4Q24 - Clipping Coupon Winson Phoon
30-Sep-24 Fixed Income Weekly - IndoGB Auction, KLIBOR Fixing Winson Phoon
7-Oct-24 Fixed Income Weekly - 3y MGS Auction Preview, Maintain Caution on IndoGB Winson Phoon
8-Oct-24 Fixed Income Foreign Flows, Sep 24 - A Mixed Bag Winson Phoon
14-Oct-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Eyes on Malaysia Budget, BI to Hold Winson Phoon
14-Oct-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 10y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
19-Oct-24 Malaysia Budget 2025 - Fixed Income Views Winson Phoon
21-Oct-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Higher 4Q MGS+GII Supply, Views on Malaysia Rating Winson Phoon
21-Oct-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 20y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
28-Oct-24 Fixed Income Weekly - 7y GII and IndoGB Auctions Winson Phoon
29-Oct-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 7y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
4-Nov-24 Fixed Income Weekly - Navigating US FOMC and Election Winson Phoon
7-Nov-24 US and ASEAN Rates Update - Clearing of US Election Brings More Uncertainties to Policy Winson Phoon
11-Nov-24 Fixed Income Foreign Flows, Oct 24 - Bumpy Ride Winson Phoon
11-Nov-24 Fixed Income Weekly - 15y MGS and IndoGB Auctions, US CPI Ahead Winson Phoon
11-Nov-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 15y MGS Reopening Winson Phoon
18-Nov-24 Fixed Income Weekly - 5y GII Auction, BI to Hold Winson Phoon
18-Nov-24 Government Bond Auction - Results: 5y GII Reopening Winson Phoon
18-Nov-24 Singapore Rates - SGS Auction Calendar 2025 Winson Phoon

ASEAN X Macro
Research Offices
ECONOMICS REGIONAL EQUITIES SINGAPORE INDONESIA
Suhaimi ILIAS Anand PATHMAKANTHAN Thilan WICKRAMASINGHE Head of Research Jeffrosenberg CHENLIM Head of Research
Chief Economist Head of Regional Equity Research (65) 6231 5840 (62) 21 8066 8680
Malaysia | Philippines | Global (603) 2297 8783 [email protected] [email protected]
(603) 2297 8682 [email protected] • Strategy • Consumer • Strategy • Banking & Finance • Property
[email protected] • Banking & Finance - Regional
WONG Chew Hann, CA Willy GOUTAMA
CHUA Hak Bin Head of ASEAN Equity Research Eric ONG (62) 21 8066 8688
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(65) 6231 5830 [email protected] [email protected] • Consumer
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(65) 6320 1371 Jade TAM [email protected] • Banking & Finance
[email protected] (603) 2297 8687 • Utilities
[email protected] Wasu MATTANAPOTCHANART
STRATEGY • Consumer Staples & Discretionary Ronalyn Joyce LALIMO (66) 2658 5000 ext 1392
(63) 2 5322 5009 [email protected]
Anand PATHMAKANTHAN Nur Farah SYIFAA [email protected] • Telcos • Technology (Software) • REITs
ASEAN (603) 2297 8675 • SMIDs • Property • Consumer Discretionary
(603) 2297 8783 [email protected]
[email protected] • Renewable Energy • REITs VIETNAM Surachai PRAMUALCHAROENKIT
(66) 2658 5000 ext 1470
FIXED INCOME LOH Yan Jin Quan Trong Thanh Head of Research [email protected]
(603) 2297 8687 (84 28) 44 555 888 ext 8184 • Auto • Conmat • Contractor
Winson PHOON, FCA [email protected] [email protected]
Head of Fixed Income • Ports • Automotive • Technology (EMS) • Strategy • Banks Suttatip PEERASUB
(65) 6231 5831 (66) 2658 5000 ext 1430
[email protected] Jeremie YAP Hoang Huy, CFA [email protected]
(603) 2297 8688 (84 28) 44 555 888 ext 8181 • Food & Beverage • Commerce
SOH Jing Ying [email protected] [email protected]
(603) 2074 7606 • Oil & Gas • Petrochemicals • Strategy • Technology Natchaphon RODJANAROWAN
[email protected] (66) 2658 5000 ext 1393
Nur Natasha ARIZA Le Nguyen Nhat Chuyen [email protected]
PORTFOLIO STRATEGY (603) 2297 8691 (84 28) 44 555 888 ext 8082 • Utilities • Property
[email protected] [email protected]
ONG Seng Yeow • Healthcare • Oil & Gas • Logistics Boonyakorn AMORNSANK
(65) 6231 5839 (66) 2658 5000 ext 1394
[email protected] Arvind JAYARATNAM Nguyen Thi Sony Tra Mi [email protected]
(603) 2297 8692 (84 28) 44 555 888 ext 8084 • Services (Hotels, Transport)
MIBG SUSTAINABILITY RESEARCH [email protected] [email protected]
• Technology (Semicon & Software) • Consumer Discretionary Nontapat SAHAKITPINYO
Jigar SHAH (66) 2658 5000 ext 2352
Head of Sustainability Research TEE Sze Chiah Head of Retail Research Tran Thi Thanh Nhan [email protected]
(91) 22 4223 2632 (603) 2082 6858 (84 28) 44 555 888 ext 8088 • Healthcare
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
• Retail Research • Consumer Staples Yugi TAKESHIMA
Neerav DALAL (66) 2658 5000 ext 1530
(91) 22 4223 2606 Amirah AZMI Nguyen Le Tuan Loi [email protected]
[email protected] (603) 2082 8769 (84 28) 44 555 888 ext 8182 • Technology (EMS & Semicon)
• Retail Research • Property
Amirul RUSYDY, CMT Nguyen Thanh Hai

(603) 2297 8694 (84 28) 44 555 888 ext 8081
• Chartist • Industrials
Nguyen Thanh Lam

(84 28) 44 555 888 ext 8086
[email protected]
• Retail Research

ASEAN X Macro
APPENDIX I: TERMS FOR PROVISION OF REPORT, DISCLAIMERS AND DISCLOSURES
DISCLAIMERS
This research report is prepared for general circulation and for information purposes only and under no circumstances should it be considered or intended as an offer to sell or a solicitation
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or recommendations contained herein are in form of technical ratings and fundamental ratings. Technical ratings may differ from fundamental ratings as technical valuations apply different
methodologies and are purely based on price and volume-related information extracted from the relevant jurisdiction’s stock exchange in the equity analysis. Accordingly, investors’ returns
may be less than the original sum invested. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. This report is not intended to provide personal investment advice and does
not take into account the specific investment objectives, the financial situation and the particular needs of persons who may receive or read this report. Investors should therefore seek
financial, legal and other advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in any securities or the investment strategies discussed or recommended in this report.
The information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but such sources have not been independently verified by Maybank Investment Bank Berhad, its
subsidiary and affiliates (collectively, “Maybank IBG”) and consequently no representation is made as to the accuracy or completeness of this report by Maybank IBG and it should not be
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Malaysia
Opinions or recommendations contained herein are in the form of technical ratings and fundamental ratings. Technical ratings may differ from fundamental ratings as technical valuations
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Thailand
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Exchange Commission. The survey of the IOD is based on the information of a company listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand and the market for Alternative Investment disclosed to the
public and able to be accessed by a general public investor. The result, therefore, is from the perspective of a third party. It is not an evaluation of operation and is not based on inside
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not confirm nor certify the accuracy of such survey result.
The disclosure of the Anti-Corruption Progress Indicators of a listed company on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, which is assessed by Thaipat Institute, is made in order to comply with the
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US
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ASEAN X Macro
UK
This document is being distributed by Maybank Securities (London) Ltd (“MSUK”) which is authorized and regulated, by the Financial Conduct Authority and is for Informational Purposes only.
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DISCLOSURES
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by the Financial Conduct Authority.
Disclosure of Interest
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may have assumed an underwriting commitment or deal with such securities and may also perform or seek to perform investment banking services, advisory and other services for or relating
to those companies.
Singapore: As of 24 Nov 2024, Maybank Research Pte. Ltd. and the covering analyst do not have any interest in any companies recommended in this research report.
Thailand: MST may have a business relationship with or may possibly be an issuer of derivative warrants on the securities /companies mentioned in the research report. Therefore, Investors
should exercise their own judgment before making any investment decisions. MST, its associates, directors, connected parties and/or employees may from time to time have interests and/or
underwriting commitments in the securities mentioned in this report.
Hong Kong: As of 24 Nov 2024, MIB Securities (Hong Kong) Limited and the authoring analyst do not have any interest in any companies recommended in this research report.
India: As of 24 Nov 2024, and at the end of the month immediately preceding the date of publication of the research report, MIBSI, authoring analyst or their associate / relative does not
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OTHERS
Analyst Certification of Independence
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Reminder
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Definition of Ratings
Maybank IBG Research uses the following rating system
BUY Return is expected to be above 10% in the next 12 months (including dividends)
HOLD Return is expected to be between 0% to 10% in the next 12 months (including dividends)
SELL Return is expected to be below 0% in the next 12 months (including dividends)
Applicability of Ratings
The respective analyst maintains a coverage universe of stocks, the list of which may be adjusted according to needs. Investment ratings are only applicable
to the stocks which form part of the coverage universe. Reports on companies which are not part of the coverage do not carry investment ratings as we do
not actively follow developments in these companies.

ASEAN X Macro
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November 24, 2024

Other things to watch include:

 China macro policy in response to Trump 2.0’s tariff threat. On top of

Our FX Research Team has extensively and comprehensively discussed the

Renminbi 7.24 7.12 7.18 7.20 7.20 7.2500

Singapore Dollar 1.35 1.3200 1.3350 1.3350 1.3250 1.3150

November 24, 2024 2

November 24, 2024 3

[email protected], (603) 2297 8682

Musings on Trump 2.0

Execution of Trump 2.0’s policies and priorities

Begin with stable administration by appointing aides, advisors, loyalists and

November 24, 2024 4

Figure 1: Trump 2.0's Key Appointments (as at 22 Nov 2024)

November 24, 2024 5

De-regulation, Immigration, Tariffs, Taxes… Once the process of assembling the

November 24, 2024 6

Figure 2: Path to Enacting Trump 2.0's Policies and Priorities

Deregulation and Immigration: Firsts among

“Deregulation” will be accompanied by the prospect of “hard and fast”

Further, speeding up the deportation of illegal immigrants and foreign workers

November 24, 2024 7

Tariffs: China first, Rest of the World later…?

Figure 3: US Tariffs Hikes on Selected China Products 2018-2026

Source: White House

November 24, 2024 8

Source: Cato Institute

November 24, 2024 9

Figure 5: - China and ASEAN

Country Net USD

China 247 1.2 0.3 to -1.5 Yes

November 24, 2024 10

Taxes: In time for the next fiscal year

 President traditionally outlines budget priorities in the State of the Union in

 President submits budget request to Congress on the first Monday of February

 Senate Budget Committee submits “concurrent resolution” on the budget by 1

 Congress to pass its Budget resolution on 15 April to guide decision-making for

 House begins formally approving annual appropriation bills drafts by 15 May.

 House Appropriation Committee submits last annual appropriation bill to

 Congress adopts “reconciliation legislation” if required by 15 June.

 House to approve annual appropriation bills by 30 June – although in practice

 If a final budget is not adopted on 1 Oct, Congress will pass “continuing

 “De-Regulation” and “Immigration” as soon as within the first three months;

Legal Challenges: Execution risk…?

Furthermore, aside from the appointment of “pro-Trump” Pam Bondi as Attorney

Other things to keep in sight

November 24, 2024 12

Source: CME FedWatch Tools (https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-

Figure 7: Fed Funds Rate vs 10-Year US Treasury Yield (% p.a.)

Sources: CEIC, Bloomberg

November 24, 2024 13

This baseline forecast or scenario of “slower and shallower” US Fed’s monetary

November 24, 2024 14

Figure 8: China’s Monetary and Fiscal Stimulus, Sep-Nov 2024

Source: Maybank IBG Research compilation

November 24, 2024 15

Appendix: Summary Tables

Table 1: China - Key Macroeconomic Indicators

Table 2: Indonesia - Key Macroeconomic Indicators