The Development of Children S Belief About Prayer

The Development of Children’s
Beliefs about Prayer

J ACQUELINE D. W OOLLEY¤ and K ATRINA E. P HELPS ¤¤
ABSTRACT
In this study we explored the development of children’s beliefs about the concept
of prayer. Three- to 8-year-old children were given a combination of tasks and structured
interview questions designed to assess a number of basic aspects of their concepts of prayer.
We also considered potential relations between children’s concepts of prayer and two
other explanatory systems — naïve psychology and magic — by probing understanding
of the roles of knowledge and thinking in prayer and by comparing beliefs in prayer to
beliefs in wishing. Results revealed signi cantly more sophisticated concepts of prayer than
found in previous studies, including an earlier understanding of its mentalistic nature. We
propose a new developmental trajectory for children’s understanding of prayer and discuss
interrelations between children’s religious beliefs and their developing ontologies.
Much empirical work in cognitive development addresses children’s beliefs

about the existence and operation of physical forces that operate in the
world. Even infants have been shown to have an understanding of basic
principles of physical causality (e.g., Cohen & Oakes, 1993; Leslie &
Keeble, 1987), and by the preschool age children are adept at using
sophisticated causal reasoning to predict and explain a variety of physical
events (e.g., Bullock, Gelman & Baillargeon 1982; Shultz 1982, Goswami
1991). From this body of work emerges a picture of children as scientists,
basing many of their everyday interactions on solid physical principles. Yet
there are a host of entities, forces, and processes of a different class that
also play a signi cant role in the thinking and daily activities of Western
children and adults. These are beliefs that fall outside the domain of
scienti c thought, and are not based in empirical evidence. In fact, in
many cases these beliefs actually violate these very causal principles that
¤ University
of Texas.
¤¤ Western
Kentucky University.
c Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001

° Journal of Cognition and Culture 1.2
140 JACQUELINE D. WOOLLEY AND KATRINA E. PHELPS
children are in the process of mastering. Thus, against the backdrop of

sophisticated “scienti c” naïve theories, the formation and existence of
these sorts of beliefs present somewhat of an enigma.
Two of the most common alternative belief systems are those of magic
and religion. Throughout history these two, along with science, have been
the dominant modes of explanation in most cultures. Sociologists, anthro-
pologists, historians, and theologians have for a long time examined the
interplay of science, magic, and religion in society. However, researchers
in psychology have only recently begun to try to characterize the develop-
ment of these alternative belief systems in children.
Investigation of these sorts of alternative beliefs in children is impor-
tant, in part because of the large role they play in their lives. Between
the ages of 3 and 8 almost all children in Western culture are exposed
to and take part in some form of magical or religious thinking. To fully
understand development, researchers need to address not just children’s
reasoning on the basis of physical principles but also their reasoning in
these alternative domains. Studies of these sorts of beliefs are also impor-
tant because of the information they can provide about children’s basic
ontologies. Boyer and Walker (2001) argue that “The ontological assump-
tions found in most religious systems: : : generally constitute direct violations
of intuitive expectations that inform everyday cognition” (p. 134). Thus, by
studying children’s magical and religious beliefs researchers may be able to
gain valuable information about general cognitive principles. Magical and
religious concepts also often involve the intersection of established domains
of thought. As Wellman and Gelman (1998) note: “Children’s distinctions
among physical, psychological, and biological phenomena are interesting
not only for how they carve up the world, but also for how children try
to reason across these ontological divides: : : For example, magic typically
entails human actions overriding physical laws; astrology entails physical
objects in uencing the thoughts, desires, or behaviors of humans; parapsy-
chology entails humans effecting physical consequences via mental means”
(p. 556, italics added).
Beliefs about religious phenomena represent a prime example of
reasoning across ontological boundaries. Within the Christian belief system,
for example, there are various non-physical entities, such as God, the
Devil, and angels. These beings are granted a number of physical
BELIEFS ABOUT PRAYER 141
(e.g., form and movement) and psychological (e.g., seeing and hearing)
human characteristics. At the same time they are granted a number
of abilities that violate our knowledge of what humans can do (e.g.,
invisibility, immateriality, and various psychological properties, such as
omniscience). Like religious entities, religious processes also have this mix
of characteristics. Prayer involves communication between a material being
— a person — and an immaterial being — God. It consists of thinking
about or, in some cases, saying something aloud, and directing that thought
or statement to God in a manner that does not involve normal methods of
communication. Importantly, the process of prayer is not based on physical
principles; it involves direct transmission of thoughts from one individual
to another. Thus focusing on children’s understanding of prayer provides a
perfect opportunity to study a concept that crosses ontological boundaries.
It is also arguably more important to document than children’s beliefs in
magical processes, in that beliefs in prayer among the adult population
in our culture are much more widespread than are beliefs in magic (cf.
Woolley 1997 re: adults’ superstitious beliefs).
Although there has been a recent upsurge in studies of children’s
beliefs about magic (see e.g., Chandler & LaLonde 1994; Phelps & Woolley
1994; Rosengren & Hickling 1994; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling & Gelman
1994; Subbotsky 1993, 1994), children’s early understanding of prayer is
an infrequently studied topic, even within the study of Western children’s
religious understanding. Goldman (1964), who was primarily interested in
the effectiveness of religious education, carried out a study on the religious
concepts of children aged 6 to 16. One of his foci was children’s beliefs
about prayer. He showed children a picture of a child praying, and asked
a series of questions about the contents and ef cacy of prayer. He found
that almost all the children he tested responded to the question “Does
what the child asks for in prayer ever come true?” in the af rmative. His
results reveal interesting potential commonalities with magical beliefs. In
soliciting children’s explanations for how the child might know that the
prayer came true, he suggests that the thinking of children up to the age
of 9 is characterized by a “magical stage.” This stage re ects what he
calls “magical concepts,” in which material results of prayers appear by
magical power. Goldman states that “Clearly there are strong elements
of magic here,” (p. 185) and likens children’s prayers to “shouting one’s
requests up the chimney to Santa Claus.” Later stages represent a gradual

decline in magical thinking and an increase in more “rational” concepts
and faith-based reasoning.
A few studies address prayer concepts in older children and adolescents
(e.g., Scarlett & Perriello 1991), but only one additional comprehensive
study of understanding of prayer includes young children. Long, Elkind,
and Spilka (1967) assessed elementary school children’s understanding
of the nature, content, and affect of prayer. Framed within a Piagetian
tradition, children’s understanding of the nature of prayer was assessed by
asking them to answer a number of semi-structured open-ended questions
such as, “What is prayer?”, “Do dogs and cats pray?”, and “Can you
pray for more than one thing?”. Children’s responses to these questions
were interpreted by the authors to indicate a stage-like progression in their
understanding. At the age of 5 to 7 years, children were found to have
a “vague and indistinct notion of prayer,” and a “dim awareness” that
prayers were somehow linked with the term “God” (p. 104). Between the
ages of 7 and 9, children were reported to conceive of prayer “in terms of
particular and appropriate activities” (p. 105). Children at this stage were
said to conceive of prayer in terms of its associated behaviors, and still were
not cognizant of its mental or affective aspects. Essentially, to children at
this age, prayer was synonymous with “verbal request.” As a consequence,
children of this age judged that animals cannot pray simply because they
cannot talk. Only by age 9 or 10 were children found to think of prayer
as a type of private conversation with God. At this age, according to the
authors, children made a distinction between what one thinks and what
one says; in other words, they recognized that prayer involves thought and
belief. Children at this stage still claimed that animals cannot pray, but
claimed that this was due to a lack of knowledge or intelligence rather
than verbal skills. Around this age children also began to associate praying
with believing in God. Interestingly the authors also state that there was an
increased recognition in these older children that “God [was] a helper and
not a magic genie who simply [made] one’s wishes come true,” (p. 107)
implying that this latter form was the way in which the younger children
conceived of God. If this is the case it would suggest interesting and
potentially important continuities between children’s wish concepts and
their early religious beliefs.
Finally Long et al. also asked children to speculate on where prayers

come from and where they go. Responses to these questions revealed some
interesting ideas about the type of causality involved in the transmission of
prayers. The youngest children seemed to view prayers as self propelled;
they often claimed that prayers “ oat,” “ y,” or “jump” to Heaven. Others
at this age stated that God brought prayers to Heaven by magical means,
again suggesting continuity between magical and early religious beliefs. The
intermediate age group most often claimed that prayers were carried to
God by messengers or intermediaries. Some children at this stage claimed
that God actually came to pick up the prayers. Finally, the oldest children
claimed that prayers are heard by God directly; that praying is a form of
direct communication.
In the present research we aim to go beyond these earlier studies in
a number of ways. First, we are interested in the origins of children’s
concepts, so we include preschool age children. Second, because we have
now accumulated a large body of work on children’s theories of mind, we
can view children’s developing concept of prayer in terms of its intersection
with their naïve theories. As stated earlier, the process of prayer itself
violates certain important assumptions in a child’s naïve psychology (e.g.,
that thought alone cannot have physical consequences). Thus we invest
considerable energy into probing the mentalistic nature of children’s prayer
concepts. Third, to allow comparison to children’s magical thinking, we
have structured a number of our questions and tasks to parallel those
asked in studies of children’s concepts of wishing. This decision was based
in part on the ndings from Goldman’s (1964) study, and in part on
comments from children in studies addressing their concepts of wishing. In
these studies, Woolley et al. (1999) observed “religious intrusions” in which
children explained wishing with reference to God. These together suggested
possible similarities between children’s early concepts of petitionary prayer
and their concepts of wishing. Finally, to address some of the problems
inherent in open-ended questioning (e.g., simple parroting back of religious
“facts”) we have included a variety of measures designed to encourage
spontaneous inference and reasoning.
Method
Participants
Participants in this study were 99 3- to 8-year-old children, with approx-

imately equal numbers of boys and girls. The sample consisted of 13 3-
year-olds (mean age D 3; 6, range D 3; 1-3; 10), 17 4-year-olds (mean age
4; 5, range D 4; 0-4; 11), 25 5-year-olds (mean age D 5; 8, range D 5; 0-5;
11), 15 6-year-olds (mean age D 6; 7, range D 6; 1-6; 11), 13 7-year-olds
(mean age D 7; 6, range D 7; 1-7; 10), and 16 8-year-olds (mean age D 8;
4, range D 8; 1-8; 9). Children were recruited from a southwestern city in
the United States. They were of middle- to upper-middle-class background
and predominantly Caucasian. Approximately two-thirds of the children
were from day care centers, one af liated with a Methodist church and
one af liated with an Episcopal church, and the remaining third were
recruited from birth announcements in local newspapers. Children were
tested individually either in a quiet room at their preschool or in a room
at the University Children’s Research Laboratory (C.R.L.).
Materials
Child interview. The interview questions addressed children’s knowl-

edge of and experience with prayer, their beliefs in the ef cacy of prayer,
and their understanding of the act or process of praying. The majority of
our tasks and questions addressed what is often referred to as “petitionary
prayer,” in which one asks for something, rather than, for example, thank-
ing God for something or simply “talking” with God in a general sense.
Children were rst asked if they knew what it meant to pray and if they
had ever prayed for something (see Questions 1 and 2 in Appendix A).
They were also asked several questions about when it was appropriate to
pray, for example: “Is before bed a good time to pray?” and “Can you
pray anytime, or just at special times?” (Questions 13-16). Regarding the
ef cacy of prayer, children were asked if they had gotten what they prayed
for in the past (Question 4) and if they expected their prayers to be granted
in the future (Question 24). They were presented with ve scenarios of pos-
sible things to pray for: candy; to have a friend; to get well; for someone
else to get well; and for someone to get hurt. For each option, children
were asked whether or not it was okay to pray for that item or event and
whether or not they thought the prayer would be granted (Question 7).
To investigate children’s beliefs about the process of prayer, children
were asked, “When prayers come true, is it because somebody makes
them come true, or because it just happens?,” and if they responded with
“someone,” then, “Who makes your prayers come true?” (Questions 8 and
9). Children were also asked, “How does God know what you’re praying
for?,” and “Does God hear your prayer with his ears or does he just know
what you’re thinking?” (Questions 10 and 11).
Entity task. The Entity task involved presenting children with a number
of entities and asking them to indicate which ones possessed the ability to
pray. Children were shown pictures of adults, children, babies, cats and
dogs, owers, and a table, and asked about each, “Can pray?”. The
entities were presented in random order.
Teaching task. This task involved asking children to instruct a naive

puppet how to pray. The puppet was presented as being ignorant of how
to pray, and as wanting to say a prayer. Children were rst asked, in
an open-ended fashion, to teach the puppet how to pray, and then were
asked speci cally about the importance of closing one’s eyes, holding one’s
hands together, saying something aloud, thinking, and believing in God
(see Appendix A for a complete list of questions).
Judgment task. The Judgment task was given to each child after the
interview and other tasks were completed. Children were told by the
experimenter that they would hear about some kids who were praying
and some who weren’t, and that their task was to gure out which kids
were praying and which kids were “doing something else.” After a brief
training, children were shown a series of six line drawings. In each story,
the character was described as wanting a certain outcome (e.g., his/her
grandfather to feel better) and possibly engaging in an activity related
to prayer, such as talking or thinking. The six judgment task scenarios
derived from three levels of activity (thinking only, thinking and talking,
not thinking and not talking) and two levels of knowledge about God
(knowledge of God, no knowledge of God). For example, in the thinking
and talking/no knowledge of God condition, children were told, “Here’s
Nancy. She wants her grandfather to feel better. She doesn’t know about
God. She’s just thinking about her grandfather feeling better and saying
‘I hope my grandfather feels better’.” As a memory check, children rst
were asked to recall whether the story character knew about God. If their
response was incorrect, the story was repeated. After each story, children
were asked to state whether the character was praying or doing something
else, and to explain how they could tell what the character was doing. The
Judgment task items are included as Appendix B.
Parent questionnaire. A brief questionnaire was given to parents of the
children participating in the study to evaluate the religiosity of their home
environments. Parents were asked, “Do you have a religious af liation?”
and if so, “How would you classify your level of involvement with your
religion?” and “What sort of religious activities do you engage in?” (see
Questions 1-3 in Appendix C). They also were asked whether they talk
with their child about religion, and in what type of circumstances they
bring up the topic of religion with their child or their child brings up the
topic of religion with them (Questions 4-6). Parents were asked to rate how
strongly they encourage their child’s involvement in religious activities, to
list the religious activities in which their child participates, and to state how
often their child engages in the activities (Questions 7-9). Lastly, parents
were asked if their child understands the word “pray” or “prayer” and if
their child uses these terms (Questions 10 and 11).
Results
Parent questionnaire
Parents of all but 3 children described their religious af liation as Christian
and most considered themselves moderately active in their religion. Parents
reported an average of two different types of religious activities in which
they regularly engaged at their home, and an average of two different
activities in which they regularly engaged at their place of worship.
These activities included praying, singing, Sunday school, and reading
Bible stories. Sixty-seven percent of parents reported that they prayed at
home, and 67% reported that they attended church regularly.1 Ninety-
four percent reported that they talked regularly with their child about
1
This is most likely a conservative estimate, as the majority of the remaining parents
left this question blank. Because there was no “none” option for parents to check, it is not
religion. Most parents reported moderate encouragement of their child’s

involvement in religious activities, which primarily involved prayer at home
(68%) and attendance at church or Sunday school (68%). Total scores
on the questionnaire were computed, and a median split was performed.
Children whose parents scored above the median were coded as being from
more highly religious households and children whose parents scored below
the median were coded as being from less religious households. Religiosity
score was unrelated to the location at which children were tested (CRL
M D 21, Methodist Church day care M D 20, Episcopal Church day care
M D 17, range D 6-40).
Children’s awareness of prayer

Children were asked two questions to assess their basic awareness of prayer:
(1) whether they knew what it meant to pray, and (2) whether they
themselves had ever prayed. Af rmative answers were scored as 1, and
negative responses were scored as 0. Scores on these two questions were
summed to yield a total “awareness” score ranging from 0-2. An analysis
of variance with age (3-8) and religiosity score (high, low) as between
participant variables revealed a signi cant effect of age on awareness,
F .5; 84/ D 10:04, p < :01. Children who answered af rmatively to
both questions were considered to have full awareness of prayer. Whereas
only approximately half of the 3- and 4-year-olds demonstrated such
awareness (58% and 47% respectively), by age 5 children demonstrated
full awareness close to 90% of the time. Post-hoc Sheffe tests revealed that
the 3- and 4-year-olds did not differ signi cantly from one another, but
did differ signi cantly from the other age groups (p ’s < .05). There were
no signi cant differences among the four older age groups.
The analysis also revealed a signi cant interaction between age and
religiosity, F .5; 84/ D 4:23, p < :01. Although religiosity had no effect on
the scores of the older groups, children with high and low religiosity scores
performed differently in the combined 3- and 4-year-old group. Simple
effects analyses revealed that this was mainly due to the performance
of 4-year-olds. Four-year-olds from more highly religious homes were
clear whether these parents truly did not engage in these activities or simply skipped this
item for some reason.
signi cantly more likely to report awareness of prayer (M D 1:40 out

of 2) than were children from less religious homes (M D 0:17), F .1; 14/ D
11:04, p < :01. Thus, if from a more religious home, even 4-year-olds
were aware of the concept of prayer.
In line with these ndings, children’s responses to the question asking
whether they could pray any time or whether it had to be at special times
revealed a rigidity in the youngest children’s concepts, and a shift at age
5 to more exibility. Very few 3- (8%) and 4- (33%)-year-olds endorsed
the suggestion that praying could be done any time, whereas most 5- to
8-year-olds claimed it could be done at any time (overall mean D 87%,
range D 76% in the 5-year-olds to 94% in the 8-year-olds).
Efcacy beliefs
Children were asked two questions about the ef cacy of their own prayers.
Results indicated that older children (6- to 8-year-olds, M D 70%) believed
their past prayers to have been more successful than did younger children
(3- to 5-year-olds, M D 48%), Â 2 .1/ D 4:58, p < :04. Similarly, older
children (M D 79%) were more certain than were younger children
(M D 59%) that their future prayers would be answered, Â 2 .1/ D 3:87,
p < :05. There were no effects of religiosity on how likely children were
to believe in the ef cacy of their prayers.
Not until age 6 did the type of prayer under consideration affect
children’s claims about whether prayers would be granted. Children were
presented with three stories in which the content of a prayer was considered
to be unambiguously acceptable — a prayer for oneself to recover from
illness, for someone to become one’s friend, and for someone else to recover
from illness. For each, they were asked whether it was “O.K.” to make this
sort of prayer and if so, whether it would “come true.” They were also
presented with two prayers of a questionable nature — praying for candy
and praying for someone to get hurt. Data were initially analyzed in a 6
(age group) £ 2 (religiosity) £ 5 (story type) repeated measures ANOVA.
Results revealed a signi cant effect of religiosity, F .1; 80/ D 5:37, p < :03,
with children from less religious families being more willing to endorse
the acceptability of prayers of all sorts. There was also an interaction
between age group and religiosity, F .5; 80/ D 2:67, p < :03, indicating
that the religiosity effect was primarily due to the performance of children
in the 3-year-old group. In addition, there was also an effect of story type,
F .4; 320 / D 107:86, p < :01, as well as a trend toward a main effect of
age, F .5; 80/ D 2:32, p D :05.
To explore these effects further, separate chi-square analyses were
performed on each of the different story-types. For all of the positive
items children of all ages almost unanimously endorsed the acceptability of
making such a prayer (M D 94% across all ages), and almost unanimously
said it would be granted (M D 98%). Regarding the “questionable”
prayers, the one involving praying for candy revealed a split between the
two oldest age groups (7- and 8-year-olds) and the younger children in
how acceptable this was deemed. Younger children (M D 65%) were
more accepting of such a prayer than were older children (M D 42%),
2
Â .1/ D 4:18, p < :05. A second type of prayer was clearly unacceptable
from an adult point of view — praying for someone to get hurt. Here, even
though the majority of children at all ages denied that this sort of prayer
was acceptable, younger children (M D 23%) again were more accepting
of this sort of prayer than were older children (M D 4%), Â 2 .1/ D 5:23,
p < :03.
Regarding whether, once having prayed for these questionable items
or events, the prayer would actually be granted, the majority of children
who deemed it acceptable to pray for candy believed that their prayer
would be granted. There was no signi cant difference between the younger
and older children, with the average response level at 83%. Regarding a
prayer for someone to get hurt however, of those children who agreed
that it was acceptable to make this sort of prayer (n D 32), there was a
signi cant decrease with age in the number who believed that it would
be granted. Three- and 4-year-old children claimed unanimously that it
would be granted (100%), whereas 60% of the 5-year-olds, 18% of the
6-year-olds, and none of the 7- and 8-year-olds responded in this fashion.
2
Â .5/ D 15:79, p < :01.
How does prayer work?
What does prayer involve for these young children? The rst question we
asked was whether responses to prayers “just happen” or whether someone
was responsible (“: : : does someone make them happen?”). Interestingly
many children responded that responses to prayers “just happen,” that
there wasn’t a speci c entity who granted them. The data were in the
form of a U-shaped curve however: both younger (3- to 5-year-old) and
older (8-year-old) children overwhelmingly responded that when a prayer is
granted it “just happens” (74% averaged across these age groups) whereas
the 6- to 7-year-olds more often claimed that someone was responsible for
prayers being granted (64%), Â 2 .5/ D 13:45, p < :02. Overall, 42 children
(of 99) responded that someone was responsible; when asked whom, all but
4 of these responded either “God” or “Jesus.”
Results of the Judgment task indicate that by the age of 4 knowing about
God is considered a necessary component of the prayer process. Children
heard 3 stories about characters who were said to know about God and 3
about characters who were said to not know about God, and were asked
to indicate which ones were praying. A 6 (age group) £ 2 (religiosity) £ 2
(story type) repeated measures ANOVA revealed signi cant effects of story
type, F .1; 81/ D 199:24, p < :01, as well as interactions between age
group and religiosity, F .5; 81/ D 3:77, p < :01, and between age group
and story type, F .5; 81/ D 4:08, p < :01. The main effect of story type
was due to children more often claiming that characters who knew about
God were praying (M D :67) than that characters who didn’t know about
God were praying (M D :19). The interaction between age group and
religiosity was due to 3-year-old children from less religious households
claiming more often that characters who didn’t know about God were
praying. Finally, the interaction between age group and story type was due
to a lack of a story type effect in the 3-year-olds, who overall performed at
chance on both types of stories. Results from the Teaching task also indicate
that by the age of 4 children believe that only a character who believes
in God can be considered to be praying. For all age groups except the
3-year-olds the majority of children said that in order to pray the puppet
must believe in God, Â 2 .5/ D 18:69, p < :01:
One focus of our investigation was the nature of transmission of a
prayer from a person to God. Speci cally, we were interested in whether
children endorsed some sort of telepathic process, in which thoughts were
directly transmitted to God, or whether they believed the process to involve
more common methods of transmittal such as God hearing a prayer with
his ears. In the two youngest age groups (3- and 4-year-olds) the modal
response to our initial open-ended question, “How does God know what
you’re praying for?” was “don’t know,” suggesting that this was probably
something to which they hadn’t given much thought. The majority of the
older children supported the telepathic view, with 64%, 53%, 62%, and
88% of the 5-, 6-, 7-, and 8-year-olds respectively offering a mentalistic
explanation (vs. a physical one), such as that God “just knows” (rather
than having to use his ears). When asked directly whether God hears
one’s prayers with his ears or “just knows what you’re thinking,” 69% of
children overall claimed that he knew what they were thinking; there were
no developmental differences, with the range from 60-81%. Supporting
this nding, few children claimed that prayers must be said aloud (vs. in
one’s head), with the largest number of these responses in the 3-year-olds
(50%), decreasing to 35% in the 4-year-olds, 13% in the 5-year-olds, and
0% in the 8-year-olds, Â 2 .5/ D 14:22, p < :02. Thus it appears that
beginning at age 4 children endorse a telepathic process in prayer.
We also attempted to probe children’s beliefs about the role played
by thinking in prayer. In the Judgment task, children heard 4 stories in
which characters were described as thinking and 2 in which characters
were said not to be thinking about anything. A 6 (age) £ 2 (religiosity) £
2 (story type) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a signi cant effect of
story type, F .1; 81/ D 96:44, p < :01. Children more often claimed that
characters who were thinking were praying (M D :53, averaged across the
4 thinking stories) than that characters who were not thinking were praying
(M D :23, averaged across the 2 not-thinking stories). Knowledge about
God was varied in these stories as well, as discussed above. Thus the .53
gure includes 2 stories in which the character was said to not know about
God. When characters who were said to be thinking and also to possess
knowledge about God are considered, the average score across age groups
was .86.
The ANOVA also revealed a signi cant interaction between age and
story type, F .5; 81/ D 8:58 p < :01. Analysis of this interaction indicated
that the main effect of story type was due entirely to the 5- to 8-year-olds.
As can be seen in Figure 1, whereas each of these age groups showed
a clear story-type effect, both the 3- and 4-year-old groups were equally
likely to say that a character who was not thinking and one who was
thinking were praying. Finally, the ANOVA also revealed a signi cant
effect of religiosity, F .1; 81/ D 4:50, p < :04, which was quali ed by an
Figure 1. Judgment task: Role of thinking in prayer.
Age £ Religiosity interaction, F .5; 81/ D 4:15, p < :01. As in previous

analyses, the effects of religiosity were primarily in the 3-year-old group,
with children from less religious homes being more willing to claim that
both types of characters were praying, regardless of whether they were
thinking.
The Teaching task revealed an interesting developmental progression
that complements the ndings from the Judgment task. As seen in Figure 2,
for the two youngest age groups, 3- and 4-year-olds, the physical aspects
of praying were more important than the mental ones. That is, 74% of
the time these children endorsed closing ones eyes and holding ones hands
together at a higher level than they endorsed thinking (34%). The middle
age groups, 5- and 6-year-olds, appeared to endorse the mental aspect
(thinking) and the physical ones approximately equally. Finally, the oldest
children, 7- to 8-year-olds, endorsed thinking 82% of the time and the
physical aspects 60% of the time. These patterns were con rmed in a
6 (age group) £ 2 (aspects: physical, mental) £ 2 (religiosity) repeated
measures ANOVA, which indicated a signi cant interaction between age
group and aspect type, F .1; 74/ D 3:25, p < :02. Follow-up t -tests for
each age group indicated that for the 4-year-olds, physical aspects were
endorsed signi cantly more than mental ones, t .13/ D 3:02, p < :01.
Figure 2. Teaching task: Components necessary for prayer.
For the 8-year-olds the reverse was true — these older children endorsed
mental aspects more than physical ones, t .12/ D ¡2:21, p < :05.
Lastly, the Entity task, in which children were asked to indicate which
sorts of entities have the ability to pray, was also designed to provide
information about children’s understanding of the nature of prayer. Across
ages, almost all children claimed that both children and adults could pray
(M D 98%). As is apparent in Figure 3, there was a clear decrease in
claims that an entity could pray as the entities became more different
from human adults and children. Human babies were judged as less
able to pray (M D 58%), cats and dogs even less so (M D 39%), and
owers (M D 20%) and tables (M D 17%) least so. A 6 (Age) £ 6
(Entity type) repeated measures ANOVA revealed that these differences
between entity types were signi cant, F .5; 485 / D 136:89, p < :01.
Post-hoc Scheffe tests indicated that adults and children were not judged
signi cantly differently, nor were owers and tables. All other comparisons
were statistically signi cant at p’s < .02.
Discussion
The purpose of the present study is to document the development of
children’s understanding of prayer. This goal is motivated in part by a
Figure 3. Entity task results.
desire to examine the possible presence in children’s conceptual repertoire

of a construct that violates or contradicts elements of their emerging
theories and ontologies. The results reveal considerable development in
the concept of prayer between the ages of 3 and 8. Children’s emerging
concept of prayer contains elements of their emerging theories of mind
and matter, yet also contains elements that violate basic principles in
those domains. Three important aspects of these ndings will be discussed
in turn. First, this study reveals a greater understanding of prayer than
was found in previous reports. We address reasons for this and present a
new view of children’s understanding. Second, our results reveal important
relations to related areas of interest — children’s theory of mind and their
beliefs about magic. Third, the ndings add to a growing literature on the
interplay between scienti c, magical, and religious explanations.
The results of the present study indicate an earlier awareness of the
concept of prayer than was found by Long, Elkind, and Spilka (1967). In
their study, their youngest participants, 5- to 7-year-olds, were found to
have a very vague understanding of prayer and limited knowledge of the

relation between praying and God. In contrast, children of this age in our
study were highly aware of the concept of prayer, had speci c beliefs about
how it works, and also believed that knowledge of God was critical to the
process of praying. This difference between their ndings and ours may be
due in part to the nature of our samples. The sample used in our study
could be considered a fairly religious sample, as it was largely drawn from
schools with religious af liations, whereas the participants in Long et al.’s
study were primarily drawn from private schools (Long et al. did not note
any religious af liation of these schools). Despite this, we suspect that it is
more likely that the nature of our procedures was the critical factor. Long
et al.’s procedures were open-ended Piagetian style interviews, which often
tend to underestimate the level of children’s knowledge. Our procedures
involved not only open-ended questions, but also forced choice response
options and a variety of tasks, most of which placed very minimal verbal
demands on the young children we tested. The minimal effects of religiosity
in our analyses also indicate that it probably was not a major determinant
of children’s performance.
Most importantly, our study revealed a signi cantly earlier mentalistic
understanding of prayer than we would have expected based on the
literature on prayer. Long et al.’s (1967) results indicated that children
do not conceive of the mental nature of prayer until age 9 or 10. Children
younger than 9 were reported to conceive of prayer only in terms of its
associated physical activities. This is the pattern we found in our youngest
group, the 3- to 4-year-olds. Our middle group, 5- to 7-year-olds, although
not valuing the mental aspects over the physical ones, were fully aware
of the mental aspects of prayer and appeared to consider them equally as
important as the physical ones. By 8 years of age children were showing a
strong and signi cant understanding that the mental components of prayer
are more important than the physical ones.
Our ndings also challenge to some extent Long et al.’s claim that
children’s concept of God is overwhelmingly anthropomorphic. Long et
al.’s ndings paint a picture of the child as simply applying everyday
principles to religious concepts in a very literal way. For example, God
is said to have a face, ears, etc., and prayer is said to work because of a
sort of physical conduit that allows God to hear people in the same way
that people normally hear one another. Although we didn’t investigate

children’s concept of God directly, we have some evidence that children
may not apply physical principles in this way. When children were asked
how God becomes aware of one’s prayers, by age 5 they rejected the idea
that he heard “with his ears” and instead endorsed the idea that he “just
knows” what one is thinking.
Independent of the relation of our data to Long et al.’s data, we found
clear and signi cant developmental changes throughout the span of ages we
included, which allows us to present a revised view of the development of
children’s prayer concepts. In our youngest group, 3-year-olds, we observed
a very vague and inconsistent awareness of prayer. Children of this age, if
they know anything about prayer, have a general idea that it works, but
have very little sense that their own prayers might work. They are fairly
non-discriminating regarding the content of prayers, viewing most types as
acceptable and effective, and are more attuned to the physical components
of prayer (closing ones eyes, holding ones hands together) than to the
mental aspects (thinking). As with many early concepts, their concept of
prayer is very limited in its exibility, as evidenced in the greater number
of claims in the younger age groups that prayer must be done in speci c
places or at speci c times versus at any time. An alternative way of viewing
these developments is that children come to understand what is important
or focal to prayer and what is not. Older children understood that the
location in which the prayer is made is unimportant. However they also
understood that the content of a prayer is important; praying for candy or
for someone to get hurt is unacceptable.
By the age of 4, children from more religious households evidenced
a stronger awareness of prayer than did children from less religious
households. At this age, children show a glimmering awareness of the
mental aspects of prayer. They understand that one must know about and
believe in God to be considered to be praying. However they appear to
lack an understanding that the act of praying involves thought. Despite this
they endorse a telepathic process in praying where God is aware of our
thoughts as communicated via our prayers. By the age of 5, regardless of
the religiosity of their household, children have a high degree of awareness
of and familiarity with the concept of prayer. Children of this age still do
not have a high degree of con dence in the ef cacy of their own prayers,
yet, as with the younger ages, they believe that prayers in general are
effective. At this age we see the beginnings of a differentiation between
“good” and “bad” prayers. Importantly, age 5 is the earliest age at which
we see a clear understanding that the act of praying involves thinking about
something. However, thinking is still not considered more important than
the presence of the physical concomitants. At this age children’s concept
also becomes more exible, as revealed in their claims that praying can be
done anywhere. Finally, by age 6, children judge their own prayers to be
an effective means of altering reality. They also are very clear that “bad”
prayers are not acceptable and are not effective. By the age of 7 children
begin to show an understanding of the greater importance of thinking over
the associated physical components, and by the age of 8 this difference
achieves statistical signi cance.
Our results also indicate that children consider the necessary qualities
for prayer to be primarily human qualities. For all ages there was a
signi cant drop from the number of children willing to say that humans
could pray to the number of children willing to grant animals the ability
to pray. Children’s responses also indicate that to pray one must have
something that humans and other animals have and that plants and
inanimate entities do not have, though what that quality might be is not
clear from our data. We also compared reactions to humans of different
ages. This comparison yielded suggestive information on children’s beliefs
about the cognitive prerequisites of prayer. That is, children of all ages
responded less often that babies could pray than that adults and children
could pray. It is possible that children believe that a certain level of
maturity, presumably representing cognitive development, is necessary for
one to be able to pray.
One of the goals of this study was to investigate potential interrelations
between children’s developing concepts of prayer and their developing
theories of mind. That, by age 5, children are aware of the role of thinking
in prayer, and have strong beliefs in its ef cacy, suggests that children
do view mental-physical causality of some sort as operating in prayer. By
the age of 3, children understand that thinking alone does not normally
have a physical effect on the world (Estes, Wellman & Woolley 1989).
Preschool-age children also know a good deal about how information is
normally transmitted. For example, Yaniv and Shatz (1988) have shown
that children by the age of 3 understand the differential effects of occlusion

on seeing and hearing; they know that if something is close by but blocked
by a barrier, it can’t be seen but it still can be heard. By the age of
5 children understand that if something makes a very soft sound it is
more dif cult to hear. Work by Mossier, Marvin, and Greenberg (1976)
indicates that by the age of 4 children understand that audible vocalizations
are necessary for one to obtain auditory information. A related study by
Marvin, Greenberg and Mossier (1976) similarly indicates that children
of the same age know that if one wants to communicate something to
someone one must talk aloud (vs. whispering). All of these pieces of
knowledge are violated in the claim that God “just knows” what we’re
thinking and does not need an audible verbal description to reach his
ears. Thus children’s belief in prayer can be said to demonstrate belief
in a concept that violates basic principles in their theory of mind (see
also Woolley, 2001, for a similar argument regarding children’s beliefs in
wishing).
An additional motivation for investigating children’s concepts of prayer
was to investigate potential interrelations between children’s developing
concepts of prayer and their beliefs about magic. Speci cally, we aimed
to determine whether children’s prayer concepts were similar to their
concepts of wishing. Conceptually, praying and wishing share a number
of similarities, most notably that both involve internal mental processes
aimed at bringing about external, often physical, changes in the absence of
intervening physical action on the part of the person wishing or praying. As
noted, Woolley et al. (1999) observed numerous “religious intrusions” into
children’s beliefs about wishing. Some children, when asked who makes
wishes come true, responded “Jesus,” or when asked to teach a puppet
to wish said that he “needs to ask God.” Some children even explicitly
confused wishing and praying, responding “say our prayers and then it will
come true” when asked if they knew what wishing was. Thus it seemed
conceivable that children’s early wish and prayer concepts might be very
similar if not synonymous, or even that early prayer concepts might arise
from concepts of wishing.
Our research revealed some interesting differences however between
children’s early wish and prayer concepts. One difference concerns initial
beliefs about mental aspects. In the present study, whereas only a minority
of 3- and 4-year-olds told the puppet he needed to think in order to

pray, the majority of 5- to 8-year-olds instructed the puppet this way.
In contrast, in Woolley et al. the majority of children in all age groups
told a puppet that in order to wish he needed to think of something. Thus,
whereas wishing appears to involve thinking from the start, children do not
conceive of prayer as involving mental activity until age 5. This suggests
that children do not immediately map prayer concepts onto their existing
wish concepts; prayers are not automatically given all the characteristics of
wishes.
Another difference between wish and prayer concepts concerns ef-
cacy, that is, the extent to which children believe prayers and wishes
“work” to effect change in the real world. When asked about the his-
tory of their own prayers, more older than younger children reported that
their prayers had indeed been granted. A similar pattern was observed re-
garding the ef cacy of future prayers. The opposite trend has been found
regarding children’s beliefs in wishing (Woolley et al. 1999); children’s be-
liefs regarding the ef cacy of their past wishes decreased with age. Boyer
and Walker (2001) have suggested that, “: : :while certain kinds of ‘magi-
cal’ explanations: : : may suffer a decline with age, the ‘magical’ thinking
that is part and parcel of speci c religious belief systems actually increases”
(p. 23). These ndings then offer support for Boyer and Walker’s thesis.
One possible interpretation for this difference between wishing and prayer
is that the basis for assessing ef cacy may shift from an early reliance
on empirical observations (e.g., noticing how many times one actually got
what one wished for) to a more faith-based method, in which “failed” at-
tempts are re-interpreted or explained away. Alternatively the contents of
children’s prayers may be more realistic than the contents of their wishes.
(For example, whereas children may often wish for extravagant material
objects, children may be more likely to pray for things like “good health”
or happiness.) It is also possible that these differences are due to differing
levels of cultural support for religious versus fantastical beliefs. Solicitation
of children’s explanations for unsuccessful prayers would help to discrimi-
nate between these possibilities.
Beyond comparisons of speci c concepts, documentation of children’s
beliefs about magic and religion can further our understanding of their
naïve theories. In particular, studies on these concepts can highlight the
robustness of children’s theories. Many concepts in both magic and religion

challenge basic tenets of children’s naïve theories. For example, around the
time that children begin to demonstrate consistent knowledge of important
causal relations between the mind and the world (see e.g., Pillow 1989;
Pratt & Bryant 1990), they are introduced to the concept of wishing
(Woolley et al. 1999). Shortly thereafter they are introduced to religious
concepts such as God and prayer (Woolley, 2001). Each of these cultural
constructs involves processes (e.g., direct mental-physical causality in the
case of wishing and possibly praying) or properties (e.g., immaterial beings
with powers to affect the material) that appear to run counter to guiding
principles in children’s developing knowledge of mind-world relations. As
Boyer (1995) puts it, “: : : religious assumptions in general seem to imply
particularly strange notions as concerns the causal properties of particular
objects or entities” (pp. 627-628). Yet children accept these notions, and
still maintain their beliefs in the basic tenets of their naïve theories. Thus
children’s ability to adopt beliefs in prayer as a telepathic process without
it threatening their beliefs about normal processes of communication might
be said to testify to the robustness of their theories of mind.
Knowledge we have accumulated about children’s naïve theories also
informs our understanding of the development of their religious and
magical thinking. Boyer and Walker (2001) state that, “: : : children’s
religious statements cannot properly be explained (nor can development
be adequately described) if we ignore the broader ontological background
against which they are formulated” (p. 16). That is, the kinds of things
children say, for example, that God “knows what we’re thinking,” are
much more informative and meaningful when we place such statements
in the context of children’s theory of mind knowledge. Thus, because we
have accumulated so much knowledge about children’s ontologies, we can
both investigate and describe the development of children’s religious and
magical concepts against a much richer conceptual background.
The research reported here is only a rst step in exploring the relations
between children’s religious beliefs and their developing ontologies. More
research should be conducted on relations between children’s developing
theories of mind and their religious beliefs. These data indicate that mental-
physical causality plays a large role in prayer for children 5 years of age and
older. Not only do children believe thinking to be involved in praying, but
their beliefs in the ef cacy of this form of mental-physical causality increase
with age rather than decrease as is the case with wishing. However praying
is clearly a more complex process than is wishing. More work needs to
be done to determine exactly how children conceive of the process of
praying, and, in particular, how it ts with their developing knowledge
about both the physical and mental worlds. For example, one of the major
developments in children’s theories of mind at this age involves learning
about communication. How do children conceive of the communication
with God that is involved in praying as tting with their developing
knowledge about ordinary communicative processes? Research should also
continue to probe interrelations between fantastical and religious beliefs.
There are numerous anecdotal observations in the literature that children’s
concepts of Santa Claus and God are related (Clark 1995; Rizzuto 1979).
Although we did not nd strong parallels between concepts of wishing
and prayer, it is still conceivable that religious concepts like God and
prayer develop from or are related to earlier belief in supernatural gures
like Santa Claus and magical concepts like wishing. Finally, Boyer and
Walker (2001) suggest that at about the age of 7 children’s religious
concepts become conceptually much more similar to those of adults, in part
because they recognize the distinction between “implausible” scenarios and
anomalous ones. This claim has yet to be evaluated. These are important
directions for future research on children’s developing concepts of prayer
and other religious concepts.
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Appendix A. Child Interview

1. Do you know what it means to pray?
2. Have you ever prayed for something?
3. What have you prayed for?
4. Did you get what you prayed for?
5. Do prayers always come true or just some of the time?
6. Let’s say we prayed for 5 things. How many of those prayers would come
true?
7. What are some things that are OK to pray for?
Is it OK to pray for:
a. candy?
(if Yes) Would your prayer come true?

(if No) Why is it not OK?
b. somebody to be your friend?
c. if you’re sick, that you’ll get better?
d. someone who’s sick to get better?
e. someone you don’t like to get hurt?
8. When prayers come true is it because somebody makes them come true, or
because it just happens?
9. (If someone) Who makes your prayers come true?
10. How does God know what you’re praying for?
11. Does God hear your prayer with his ears or does he just know what you’re
thinking?
12. Entity task. Who can pray?
a. Can kids pray?
b. Can grown-ups pray?
c. Can babies pray?
d. Can cats and dogs pray?
e. Can owers pray?
f. Can tables pray?
13. When is a good time to pray?
14. Is before bed a good time to pray?
15. Is when you’re in church/temple a good time to pray?
16. Can you pray anytime, or just at special times?
17. Teaching task.
This is Sweet Pea. His dog is sick. He’s never said a prayer. That’s because
he doesn’t know how. He really wants to pray today. He wants to pray for
his dog to get better. Can you teach him? Tell SP what to do so he can pray
for a his dog to get better.
18. Does he need to close his eyes or can his eyes be open?
19. Does he need to hold his hands together, or doesn’t he need to hold his hand
together?
20. Does he need to say something or doesn’t he need to say anything?

20a. IF “say something” ask: What does he need to say?
21. Does he need to think about something or doesn’t he have to think of
anything?
2la. IF “think” ask: What does he need to think about?
22. Does he need to believe in God, or does it not matter if he believes in God?
23. When you go home tonight, will you say a prayer before you go to bed?
23a. (If so) What will you pray for?
24b. Do you think your prayer will come true?
Appendix B. Judgment task items
Child’s task: To determine which children are praying and which are “doing
something else.”
1. Thinking only / Knows about God
Here’s Stuart. He wants . He knows about God. So he’s thinking for God
to .
2. Thinking C Talking / Knows about God
Here’s Emily. She wants . She knows about God. So she’s thinking for God
to . She’s saying “Please .”
3. Not thinking / Knows about God
Here’s Riley. He wants . He knows about God. But he’s not thinking for
God to . He’s just tired and he’s going to take a nap.
4. Thinking only / Doesn’t know about God
Here’s Jose. He wants . He doesn’t know about God. He’s just thinking .
5. Thinking C talking / Doesn’t know about God
Here’s Nancy. She wants . She doesn’t know about God. She’s just
thinking about and saying “I hope ”.
6. Not thinking / Doesn’t know about God
Here’s Rachel. She wants . She doesn’t know about God. And she’s not even
thinking about . She’s just tired and she’s going to take a nap.
Appendix C. Parent questionnaire

1. Do you have a religious af liation?
1a. If so, what is your religious af liation?
2. (If you said yes to #1) How would you classify your level of involvement with
your religion? (Very active, Moderately active, Inactive)
3. (If you said yes to #1) If you are active, what sort of religious activities do you
engage in? (At home, In your place of worship)
4. Do you talk with your child about religion?

4a. If so, how often do you and your child talk about religion? (Frequently,
Sometimes, Rarely)
5. In what type of circumstances have you brought up the topic of religion with
your child? (Please list as many as you can think of. If none, write none.)
6. In what types of circumstances, if any, has your child spontaneously brought
up religious concepts? (Please list as many as you can think of. If none, write
none.)
7. How strongly do you encourage your child’s involvement in religious
activities? (Very strongly, Moderately, Not at all)
8. Please list any religious activities in which your child participates. (At home,
At your place of worship)
9. How often would you say your child engages in the sorts of activities you listed
above? (Frequently (more than 5 times/week), Sometimes (1-5 times/week),
Infrequently (less than once/week))
10. Does your child understand the word ‘pray’ or ‘prayer’?
11. Does your child use the word ‘pray’ or ‘prayer’?

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The Development of Children’s

Beliefs about Prayer

Much empirical work in cognitive development addresses children’s beliefs

c Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001

children are in the process of mastering. Thus, against the backdrop of

requests up the chimney to Santa Claus.” Later stages represent a gradual

Finally Long et al. also asked children to speculate on where prayers

Participants in this study were 99 3- to 8-year-old children, with approx-

Child interview. The interview questions addressed children’s knowl-

Teaching task. This task involved asking children to instruct a naive

religion. Most parents reported moderate encouragement of their child’s

Children’s awareness of prayer

signi cantly more likely to report awareness of prayer (M D 1:40 out

How does prayer work?

Figure 1. Judgment task: Role of thinking in prayer.

Age £ Religiosity interaction, F .5; 81/ D 4:15, p < :01. As in previous

Figure 2. Teaching task: Components necessary for prayer.

Figure 3. Entity task results.

desire to examine the possible presence in children’s conceptual repertoire

have a very vague understanding of prayer and limited knowledge of the

that people normally hear one another. Although we didn’t investigate

that children by the age of 3 understand the differential effects of occlusion

of 3- and 4-year-olds told the puppet he needed to think in order to

robustness of children’s theories. Many concepts in both magic and religion

C HAND LE R , M.J. & L ALON DE , C.E.

R O SEN GREN , K.S. & H ICK LIN G , A.K.

Appendix A. Child Interview

(if Yes) Would your prayer come true?

20. Does he need to say something or doesn’t he need to say anything?

Appendix B. Judgment task items

Appendix C. Parent questionnaire

4. Do you talk with your child about religion?

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signi cantly more likely to report awareness of prayer (M D 1:40 out