INTEGRATED

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(MGMT 2)

C/M RICARDO O. LADINES

INSTRUCTOR
 TOPIC 1
DEVELOPMENT OF ISM CODE FOR
THE SAFE OPERATION OF SHIPS AND
FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION

-MS Herald of Free Enterprise disaster

- The 1994 amendments to SOLAS 1974
which introduced a new chapter IX to the
convention consequently making the ISM
Code mandatory.
- Structure of the of the ISM code.
- ISM Code Component and Objectives
 ➢ International Safety Management Code
• The International Safety Management Code provides an
international standard for the safe management and operation of
ships at sea.

➢ THE PURPOSE OF THE ISM CODE

• To ensure safety at sea and prevent damage to property, personnel
and environment.
• In order to comply with the ISM Code, the Company operating the
vessel has to be audited first (after they submit their Safety
Management System Manual (SMS) and is approved by Flag
Administration or Recognized Organization (RO)). Once a Company
is Audited, the Document of Compliance (DOC) will be issued
(validity 5 years). Every Company is subject to auditing every year
(three months before and after anniversary date and before DOC
expiration date). Upon issuing DOC to Company (or Managing
Company) each vessel can be audited to verify vessel compliance
with ISM Code. Each vessel will be issued SMC (Safety Management
Certificate) valid for 5 years and subject to verification of Compliance
with ISM Code between second and third years of certificate validity.
 • WHY IS THE ISM CODE MANDATORY?

• The main purpose of the new chapter is to make

the International Safety Management (ISM) Code
mandatory. By adding the ISM Code to SOLAS it is
intended to provide an international standard for the
safe management of ships and for pollution prevention.

WHY IS ISM CODE IMPORTANT?

• The International safety
management (ISM) code ensures the safety of life
and ship at sea by implementing various safe practices
on board ships. ISM code works with the motive of
satisfying three important goals: Safety of people on
board. Safety of ship and cargo.
➢ SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL CONSISTS OF THE
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

a) Commitment from top management

b) A top tier policy manual
c) A procedures manual that documents what is done on board the ship,
during normal operations and in emergency situations
d) Procedures for conducting both internal and external audits to ensure
the ship is doing what is documented in the procedures manual
e) A designated person ashore to serve as the link between the ships and
shore staff and to verify the SMS implementation
f) A system for identifying where actual practices do not meet those that
are documented and for implementing associated corrective action
g) Regular management reviews
h) Also, the ship must be maintained in conformity with the provisions of
relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements
which may be established by the company. Comments from the
auditor and/or audit body and from the ship are incorporated into the
SMS by headquarters.
➢ HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISM
CODE
• The ISM code was born out of a series of serious shipping accidents in the
1980s, the worst of which was the roll-on roll-off ferry Herald of Free
Enterprise which capsized at Zeebrugge in March 1987, killing 193 of its
539 passengers and crew. The cause of these accidents was a combination
of human error on board and management failings on shore. The Herald of
Free Enterprise public enquiry report concluded that ‘From top to bottom
the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness’.
• What followed was a much needed change in maritime safety
administration. In October 1989, the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) adopted new Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention giving operators a ‘framework for the
proper development, implementation and assessment of safety and
pollution prevention management in accordance with good practice’.
Following industry feedback, the guidelines became the ISM code in
November 1993 and were incorporated in a new chapter IX of the IMO’s
1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in
May 1994, and became mandatory for companies operating certain types of
ships from 1 July 1998.
• Meeting the requirements of the code is evidenced by ships’ flag states in
five-year ‘documents of compliance’ for ship operators and five-year ‘safety
management certificates’ for ships, both of which are subject to regular
audits.
➢ TWENTY YEARS OF THE ISM CODE
• Capt. Yves Vandenborn, AFNI, Director of Loss
Prevention at the Standard P&I Club, addresses
the ISM Code. 20 years after the Code came into
effect in 1998, Mr. Vandenborn examines the
course of it and what needs to be done in order to
become more effective.
• The International Maritime Organization (IMO)’s
Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation
of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM code)
first became mandatory in 1998. Twenty years and
five amendments later, we reflect on how the code
is doing and what still needs to be done.
➢ INDUSTRY IMPACT
• The ISM code requires nearly all the world’s ship operators to write and
implement on-board safety management systems (SMS) for their ships and
make a ‘designated person ashore’ responsible for every ship’s safe operation.
For many shipowners and operators, ISM was simply a new legal framework for
the safety systems they already had, but for others, it led to major and much-
needed changes in operating culture and organisation. It forced companies with
poor or weak management systems to create a formal, structured safety
management process for the first time – even if they saw it as just more ‘red
tape’.
• Certainly, the ISM code has made shipping safer and cleaner over the past two
decades. In 2005, the IMO maritime safety committee asked for a report on the
impact of the code from an international group of experts. Based on the data
collected, the group concluded that ‘where the code is embraced as a positive
step toward efficiency through a safety culture, tangible positive benefits are
evident’.
• The Standard Club has been assessing members’ management systems since
1993 through our member risk review programme. Linked to our ship risk
review programme, the review was formerly based on our ‘minimum operating
standards’, but since 1998, it has focused (among other things) on how ISM
requirements are being met from the perspective of a liability insurer.
• As such, we have seen at first hand the many positive changes the ISM code has
brought to the marine industry. Most of our members are now using ISM
effectively to increase safety on board their ships. This includes creating safe
working practices and working environments, making suitable safeguards
against potential risks and continuously improving the safety management
skills of personnel, as well as the development of emergency response plans for
both safety and environmental protection.
➢ ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
• But despite its success to date, we believe there is still scope for our members to improve the
effectiveness of ISM.
➢ PRODUCING MORE EFFECTIVE
• SMS documentation One issue we have noticed is the tendency for SMS
documentation to be too long. Making it bulky and difficult to read defeats its
purpose – it should be short, simple and easily understood. In addressing this
concern, we have witnessed a number of our larger members carrying out
major reviews of their systems to reduce the volume of text and replace it with
flow charts, diagrams and other visual signs to assist quick reference.
• SMS documentation should also be unique to the ship, even if it starts life as a
standard, ‘off-theshelf ’ manual. There is no point, for example, in having
tanker procedures in an SMS for a dry bulk cargo ship or having pre-
departure checks for bow thrusters where none exist.
• A key point to note in drafting SMS checklists is that they should balance the
need to remind crewmembers what to do and instruct them step-by-step on
how to do it. This will help make ISM more than just a paper exercise.
However, the longer the checklists, the less likely they are to be followed
properly.
• Furthermore, new procedures and checklists should not be added to an
existing SMS without properly reviewing older procedures – and removing or
consolidating them as necessary. This will ensure there is no duplication or
contradiction.
• Finally, the SMS documentation needs to be readily accessible to both office
staff and crewmembers on board. Crewmembers should know exactly where
the documentation is on a ship and how they can quickly find the procedures
and checklists they need.
➢ VALUE ISM REVIEW REPORTS
• We also believe ship owners and operators should pay more
attention to their masters’ SMS review reports.
• The 2008 update to the ISM code made masters responsible for
‘periodically reviewing the SMS and reporting deficiencies to
shore-based management’. In our experience, these vital
reports are very often incomplete (or say everything is
satisfactory) and certainly are not dealt with properly.
• Masters should be encouraged to discuss the SMS reviews with
crewmembers as they are the key users of the documentation
and should have the biggest input into any proposed changes.
The reports should be a priority for senior management, as
failure to act on what their masters tell them could lead to a
major casualty or major ISM non-conformance.
• Senior management should give similar attention to ship safety
committee meeting reports (SCMR), which are a requirement
under the International Labour Convention. These too are often
not filled in properly, particularly if the meetings focus on
welfare issues rather than safety.
➢ CONCLUSION
• In summary, masters and crew need to be educated in
what the SMS reviews and SCMR are for, and how best
to conduct discussions and meetings prior to writing
their reports. Equally, shore-based managers and staff
need to know how to review the reports properly and,
more importantly, how to improve the safety of their
ships as a result.
• By Capt. Yves Vandenborn, AFNI, Director of Loss
Prevention, Charles Taylor Mutual Management (Asia)
Pte. Limited, Managers of The Standard Club Asia Ltd.
➢ MS HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE DISASTER
• MS Herald of Free Enterprise was a roll-on/roll-o (RORO) ferry which
capsized moments after leaving the Belgian port of Zeebrugge on the night
of 6 March 1987, killing 193 passengers and crew.

Herald of Free Enterprise in Dover's Eastern Docks, 1984

 History
United Kingdom

Name: • Herald of Free Enterprise (1980–1987)

• Flushing Range (1987–1988)

Owner: • Townsend Thoresen (1980–1987)

• Compania Naviera S.A. (1987–1988)

Operator: Townsend Thoresen (1980–1987)

Port of registry: • Dover, UK
• Kingstown, Saint Vincent
Builder: Schichau Unterweser , Bremerhaven, Germany

Launched: 1980
Identification: IMO number: 7820485
Fate: • Capsized 6 March 1987
• Raised April 1987
• Scrapped in 1988
General characteristics
Class and type: RORO car and passenger ferry
Tonnage: 7951.44 gt ; 3439.05 net tonnage
Length: 131.91 m (432 ft 9 in)
Beam: 23.19 m (76 ft 1 in)
Draught: 5.72 m (18 ft 9 in)
Installed power: 23,967 bhp (17,872 kW)
Propulsion: 3 x Sulzer 12ZV 40/48 diesel engines

Speed: 22 knots (41 km/h; 25 mph)

Capacity: 1,400
Accident details: At a glance
Type of accident: Capsizing
Vessel(s) involved: Herald of Free Enterprise (RoRo Vessel)
Date: 6 March 1987
Place: Port of Zeebrugge
Fatalities: 193
Pollution: No significant environmental pollution was rep
➢ THE INCIDENT
• In the afternoon hours of the 6th March 1987, the UK-
registered Ro-Ro ferry ‘Herald of Free Enterprise’ sailed in the
inner harbor at Belgium’s Port of Zeebrugge, with 80 crew
members, 459 passengers, 81 cars, 47 freight vehicles and
three other vehicles onboard.
• Leaving for Dover, the ‘Herald’ passed the outer mole at 18.24.
She capsized about four minutes later. During the final
moments, the ferry turned rapidly to starboard and was
prevented from sinking totally because her port side took the
ground in shallow water.
• The ‘Herald’ came to rest on a heading of 136" with her
starboard side above the surface. Water rapidly filled the ship
below the surface level trapping people inside the hull.
• As a result, 193 people onboard (others say 188) lost their
lives, mostly from hypothermia. Many others were injured.
➢ PROBABLE CAUSES
• The immediate factor that led Herald to capsize is that it went to
sea with its inner and outer bow doors open, the official
investigation report reads.
• Namely, key factors included:
i. Negligence : The assistant bosun has accepted that it was his
duty to close the bow doors at the time of departure from
Zeebrugge and that he failed to carry it out. While he had
opened the bow doors on arrival in Zeebrugge, he went to his
cabin after completing his tasks, where he fell asleep and was
not awakened by the call announcement on the loudspeakers
that the ship was ready to sail. He remained asleep on his
bunk until he was thrown out of it when the HERALD began
to capsize. Meanwhile, the First Chief Officer and the Captain
also failed to check the doors were closed upon departure.
ii. Poor communication and lack of directions: The official
accident report highlighted that poor relationship between
ship operators and shore-based managers contributed to the
tragedy. In court hearings, an ambiguity became evident
regarding the definition of each one’s duties and
responsibilities.
III. Pressure to leave the berth: A significant question on the
aftermath of the incident was, why could not the loading
officer remain on G deck until the doors were closed before
going to his harbour station on the bridge? That operation
could be completed in less than three minutes. However, it
was revealed that the officers always felt under pressure to
leave the berth immediately after the completion of loading.
IV. Ship design: No. 12 berth at Zeebrugge was a single level
berth, not capable of loading both E and G decks
simultaneously, as at the berths in Dover and Calais for
which the ship was designed. The ramp at Zeebrugge was
designed for loading on to the bulkhead deck of single deck
ferries. In order to load the upper deck of the HERALD, trim
ballast tanks Nos. 14 and 3 were filled.
V. Squat Effect: Reports attribute the incident to a
hydrodynamic phenomenon known as the Squat Effect.
Under this phenomenon, a ship moving quickly in shallow
water creates an area of lowered pressure, shifting the ship
closer to the seabed than would otherwise be expected. This
means that the water that should normally flow under the
hull encounters resistance due to the close proximity of the
hull to the seabed and the ship is pulled down.
➢ LESSONS LEARNED

• A general culture of poor communication in the owner

company was highlighted soon after the accident. In
this respect, the Court stressed the need for:

i. Clear and concise orders.

ii. Strict discipline.
iii. Attention at all times to all matters affecting the
safety of the ship and those onboard. There must be
no “cutting of corners”.
iv. The maintenance of proper channels of
communication between ship and shore for the receipt
and dissemination of information.
v. A clear and firm management and command
structure.
➢ Additionally, shortly after the accident, the UK called IMO to
amend SOLAS, 1974. Starting from April 1988, the MSC
adopted SOLAS amendments, including among others:
i. a new regulation requiring indicators on the navigating
bridge for doors which, if left open, could lead to major
flooding
ii. a new regulation requiring monitoring of special category
and ro-ro spaces to detect undue movement of vehicles in
adverse weather, fire, the presence of water or
unauthorized access by passengers whilst the ship is
underway.
iii. provision of supplementary emergency lighting for ro-ro
passenger ships.
iv. the so-called "SOLAS 90" standard, relating to the stability
of passenger ships in damaged condition.
v. a new regulation requiring cargo loading doors to be locked
before the ship proceeds on any voyage and to remain
closed until the ship is at its next berth.
• Notwithstanding the fact that several measures were taken
following the accident, it cannot be ignored that a lot of
fatalities would have been avoided if safety culture had been
built into routine operational procedures.
➢ THE 1994 AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS
1974 WHICH INTRODUCED A NEW
CHAPTER IX TO THE CONVENTION
CONSEQUENTLY MAKING THE ISM
CODE MANDATORY
➢ (please read the ISM CODE PDF)

•
STRUCTURE OF THE
OF THE ISM CODE
(please read ISM CODE (pdf file)
page 16-22)
 ISM Code
Component and
Objectives
•
 OBJECTIVES
• The objectives of the ISM Code are to:
i. Ensure safety at sea;

ii. Prevent human injury or loss of life; and

iii. Avoid damage to the environment with focus on the

marine environment and on property The ISM Code
establishes the following safety management objectives
of the company:
iv. Provide safe practices in ship operation and working
environment;
v. Establish safeguards against all identified risks; and

vi. Continuously improve safety management skills of

personnel ashore and onboard ships. These skills
include the preparation for emergencies related to
safety and environmental protection.
 ➢ REQUIREMENTS
• The ISM Code requires every Company to develop,
implement and maintain a safety management system
(SMS) which includes these functional requirements:
i. A safety and environmental protection policy;

ii. Instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of

ships, and protection of the environment, in compliance
with relevant international and flag State legislation;
iii. Defined levels of authority and lines of communication
between, and amongst, shore and shipboard personnel;
iv. Procedures for reporting accidents and non-
conformities with the provisions of this Code;
v. Procedures to prepare and respond to emergency
situations; and
vi. Procedures for internal audits and management reviews
 TOPIC 2

SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (SMS)
FUNCTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
 ➢ WHAT IS SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (SMS) ON SHIPS?
• The safety management system (SMS) is an organized system
planned and implemented by the shipping companies to
ensure safety of the ship and marine environment.
• SMS is an important aspect of the International safety
management (ISM) code and it details all the important
policies, practices, and procedures that are to be followed in
order to ensure safe functioning of ships at the sea. All
commercial vessels are required to establish safe ship
management procedures. SMS forms one of the important
parts of the ISM code.
• The safety management system (SMS) therefore ensures that
each and every ship comply with the mandatory safety rules
and regulations, and follow the codes, guidelines,  and
standards recommended by the IMO, classification societies,
and concerned maritime organizations.
 ➢ WHAT IS INCLUDED IN THE SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)?
• Every safety management policy should satisfy some of the
basic functional requirements to ensure safety of every ship.
They are:
i. Procedure and guidelines to act in an emergency situation
ii. Safety and environmental protection policy
iii. Procedure and guidelines for reporting accidents or any
other form of non-conformities
iv. Clear information on level of authority and lines of
communication among ship crew members, and between
shore and shipboard personnel
v. Procedures and guidelines to ensure safe operations of ships
and protection of marine environment in compliance with
relevant international and flag state legislations
vi. Procedures for internal audits and management reviews
vii. Vessel details
• In short, a safety management system would consists
of details as to how a vessel would operate on a day to
day basis, what are the procedures to be followed in
case of an emergency, how are drills and trainings
conducted, measures taken for safe operations, who is
the designated person etc.

• Safety management plan is mainly the responsibility of

the owner of the vessel, or the designated person, or
the person appointed by the owner. However, the ship’s
master and the crew are the best people to make an
SMS as they know the vessel inside-out.
 ➢ SECTIONS
• An SMS is divided into sections for easy reference. They
are:
i. General
ii. Safety and environmental policy
iii. Designated person (DP)
iv. Resources and personnel
v. Master’s responsibilities and authority
vi. Company’s responsibility and authority
vii. Operational procedures
viii. Emergency procedures
ix. Reporting of accidents
x. Maintenance and records
xi. Documentation
xii. Review and evaluation
 ➢ SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION POLICY
• It is Company’s Policy to promote Safety at Sea, Prevention of Human
Injury or Loss of Life and avoidance of damage to the Environment, in
particular to the Marine Environment and to Property.

• The Company's objectives regarding Safety Management are:

 
i. To provide for Safe Practices in ship Operation and a safe working
environment.
ii. To prevent damage to the ship, her cargo and the environment.
iii. To establish safeguards against all identified risks.
iv. To prevent loss of human life and personal injury.
v. To continuously improve Safety Management skills of personnel
ashore and aboard ships, including preparing for emergencies related
both to Safety & Environmental Protection.
• In order to effectively implement its Safety & Environment
Protection Policy the Company :

i. Consistently follows all national and international rules

and regulations governing the Marine Industry.
ii. Takes into account applicable guidelines, standards,
 codes and publications, which are issued by
maritime organizations and are directed towards creating a
safe and pollution free environment.
iii. Continuously monitors all safety aspects of the managed
fleet
iv. Frequently inspects the managed fleet and carries out
necessary maintenance and repairs
v. Continuously improves its management system by taking
corrective & preventive action for identified problem areas.
vi. Provides adequate resources to effectively implement this
management system
vii. Has developed and implements a management system
which is "Safety & Pollution Prevention” oriented.
 END…
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