International Journal of Intelligence and

CounterIntelligence

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Israeli Intelligence, the Second Intifada, and

Strategic Surprise: A Case of “Intelligence to
Please”?

Avner Barnea

To cite this article: Avner Barnea (2021): Israeli Intelligence, the Second Intifada, and
Strategic Surprise: A Case of “Intelligence to Please”?, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2021.1994347

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2021.1994347

Published online: 23 Dec 2021.

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International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 0: 1–25, 2021
# 2021 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1521-0561 print/0885-0607 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2021.1994347

AVNER BARNEA

Israeli Intelligence, the Second

Intifada, and Strategic Surprise: A Case
of “Intelligence to Please”?

Abstract: The challenge of this article is on deciding the two-decade-old

controversy among Israeli intelligence scholars and practitioners over what
caused the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in October 2000. The
question remains: Was it preplanned by the Palestinian Authority or a
spontaneous response to the violence that ensued following the visit to the
Temple Mount by Israeli opposition leader Sharon, which was seriously
escalated by Israel’s excessive military response? Drawing on a theoretical
framework of two types of strategic surprises, the article clarifies the
controversy and explains the outbreak of what became a long and bloody
Israeli–Palestinian confrontation.

The different estimates produced by various Israeli intelligence agencies and

explanations for the immediate causes of the swift escalation of protest and
riots into a full-scale Israeli–Palestinian confrontation in October 2000
shortly encompassed Israel’s Arab citizens. The “official” estimate adopted
by Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI) blamed Yasser Arafat for premeditating

Dr. Avner Barnea is a Research Fellow at the National Security Study

Center at the University of Haifa, and a Lecturer at Netanya Academic
College and the Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yaffo in Israel. He is a
former senior member of the Israeli Security Agency. He received a Ph.D.
from the University of Haifa, and he is the author of We Never Expected
That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business
Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021). The author can be contacted at
[email protected].

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the eruption of violence. Conversely, the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and
the Mossad maintained that the eruption of riots was a popular response to
accumulating grievances ignited by the visit to the Temple Mount by
Member of the Knesset Ariel Sharon, the head of the opposition, on 28
September 2000. Differences emerged not only among Israeli intelligence
agencies but also among IMI senior figures, although the dominant view
presented to Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak focused all
along with Arafat as the culprit who pulled the strings behind the
violent events.
Beyond sheer differences among intelligence analysts, their significance
derives from the fact that the latter estimate was crucial in shaping, or rather
confirming, the political and military echelons’ perceptions of the events’
causes. Put differently, the dominant intelligence estimate legitimized the
excessive use of force by the Israeli military in response to the riots, with the
result of precipitating an escalation to a long and unprecedently bloody
confrontation in the following five years.
However, an examination of contemporary materials concludes that Arafat
was initially not responsible for the riots and even tried to curb them,
although later he joined and exploited them. The Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) had prepared for future violent confrontation since the Hasmonean
Tunnel in September 1996, and especially following the violent Palestinian
commemoration of the Nakba Day in May 2000, although the intifada’s
timing and definitely its rapid and intensive escalation were unexpected. The
riots quickly crossed the Green Line, and Israel was surprised by the active
solidarity of Israeli Arabs with the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and the
Gaza Strip.
The IMI estimates coincided with Prime Minister Barak’s attitude in the
aftermath of the Camp David summit of July 2000 that Israel had “no
partner” for negotiations with the Palestinians. Moreover, they confirmed
existing plans of the IDF General Staff to inflict heavy casualties among
Palestinian rioters should there be an uprising and undermine law and order
to suppress their violence to the extent of “burning their consciousness.”
The contending estimates between and within the intelligence organizations
possibly attest to a causal link between biased intelligence assessments,
provided by senior figures in the IMI to please the political and military
leadership that justified a preplanned excessive military response by the IDF
against the Palestinian rioters, which resulted in rapid escalation of events to
a countrywide confrontation.

THE SECOND INTIFADA AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE

The outbreak of the Second Intifada in the Palestinian Authority (PA)
territories (and immediately after that in Israel) enables us to examine two

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ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, THE SECOND INTIFADA, AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE 3

important aspects of intelligence research methodology: strategic surprises

and the interactions between intelligence and the decisionmakers.
Most academic research dealing with strategic surprises usually focuses on
a surprise attack. According to Barnea’s typology,1 such an event can be
defined as a concentrated surprise because it results from an effort directed by
one actor to prevent a rival actor from understanding their genuine
capabilities through concealment and deception to achieve a unilateral
advantage.2 Less research has been done on the diffused surprise, an
undirected, unorganized surprise attack, a spontaneous event that is difficult
to predict.3 Generally speaking, a diffused surprise is caused by a less well-
defined intelligence target. Sometimes the surprise results from spontaneous,
diffused societal and political processes that develop over time until they
explode, making it difficult to identify the threat beforehand. One hypothesis
for the lack of forewarning is that intelligence analysts operate according to
the patterns of concentrated surprises. Because it is difficult to identify the
threat, its capabilities, and its intentions in a diffused attack, sometimes focus
is mistakenly centered on intelligence targets familiar from concentrated
surprises, leading to assessments that are later seen to have been mistaken.
Examples of diffused surprises are popular uprisings such as the Iranian
Islamic Revolution (1979), the so-called Arab Spring (2011), the first
Palestinian intifada (1987), and even the Palestinian attack against the Jews
in Palestine in the Arab rebellion (1936), as well as the adventures of the
Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc (1991). More recently, there was the
revolution in Sudan.4 An analysis of the Prague Spring (1968) and the failed
revolutions in Poland and Hungary (1956) and East Berlin (1953) indicates
they also had diffused surprises for the American and Soviet intelligence
agencies. The East German (and Soviet) intelligence agencies were faced with
a diffused surprise when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.5
An example of a diffused surprise was given by Bar-Joseph, who explained
the success of Israeli intelligence in providing forewarning of the Iranian
Revolution (1979), as opposed to American intelligence, which failed to
predict it.6 That article discussed the degree to which intelligence
organizations can forewarn about a spontaneous, popular uprising. Diffused
surprises are difficult to identify because of the protracted development of
conditions and because intelligence agencies have an ingrained dislike of
issuing an alert when there are no clear signals, lest it turns out to be a false
alarm, which would damage the agency’s prestige. Bar-Joseph has examined
the transmission of biased intelligence assessment, stating that the
decisionmakers have political agendas and will often prefer an intelligence
product that supports their politics rather than one that contradicts it.7 He
added that internal political considerations are liable to make it difficult to
deal with a surprise attack.8 Harkabi claimed that intelligence as an

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institution could disagree with the government’s political line to the point of
conflicting with them if the intelligence is supported by facts.9
The interaction between the political leadership and intelligence, and the
politicization of their assessments, turning the latter into “intelligence to
please,” was examined at length concerning the American invasion of Iraq in
2003.10 Political influence on intelligence work was studied and defined as the
manipulation of intelligence to reflect political preferences.11 The American
military assessment that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), which was used as an excuse for the American invasion of Iraq,
later turned out to be false. The findings of two congressional investigating
committees indicated that the heads of American intelligence, especially
senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel (and not the CIA
analysts who claimed Saddam Hussein did not have WMD), had delivered
unfounded intelligence assessments, which turned out to be biased. That was
done to satisfy the political leadership (i.e., President George W. Bush and
his assistants). The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, which, after the 11
September 2001 attacks, was eager to retaliate against Iraq, claimed Saddam
was a danger to the civilized world and planned to attack using WMD.12

THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND INTIFADA

In July 2000, the Camp David summit conference was held under the aegis of
President Bill Clinton, where an Israeli delegation headed by Prime Minister
Barak met with a Palestinian delegation headed by Chairman Yasser Arafat.
Under discussion were the borders of the territories that would be turned
over to the Palestinians and the future of east Jerusalem, including the
Temple Mount. No agreements were reached, but negotiations continued
after the conference ended. Before the Israeli delegation left Camp David,
Barak received a report from the ISA stating that if the conference failed, the
Palestinians would set the territories on fire, something Arafat had hinted at
during the talks.13 However, that has not been verified by any other
intelligence source (not even in an in-depth interview with Ehud Barak
in 2020).14
The Second Intifada broke out on 29 September 2000, the day after
opposition leader Ariel Sharon went to the Temple Mount; it was later
dubbed the al-Aqsa Intifada by the Arabs. It is generally accepted that the
Second Intifada lasted until 2005. Palestinian terrorist attacks killed 1,030
Israelis and wounded 5,598; 138 suicide bombing attacks were carried out.15
About 70% of the fatalities were civilians, and the remaining 30% were
members of the Israeli security forces. On the Palestinian side, 4,907 people
were killed.16 According to a different source, 3,891 Palestinians were
killed.17 About 6,000 Palestinians were detained and 4,100 buildings were

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ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, THE SECOND INTIFADA, AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE 5

razed.18 During Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) the IDF took
control of a large area of Judea and Samaria, leading to a significant decrease
in terrorist attacks.
The Second Intifada gradually waned as the security fence was built on
Israel’s eastern border and Arafat died (November 2004), replaced by
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as PA chairman (January 2005). Abbas
caused the riots to subside by opposing violence on principle, and there were
local elected officials that forced Hamas to stop its terrorist attacks almost
completely. The disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria
(2005) signaled the end of the intifada.
On 25 September 2000, two days before Sharon’s visit to the Temple
Mount, Arafat, accompanied by a few aides, had dinner with Prime Minister
Barak. A spokesman for Barak later said, “[T]he general atmosphere had
been positive.”19 After dinner, Barak and Arafat had a private conversation
during which Arafat asked Barak to prevent Sharon from going to the
Temple Mount. He asked why Sharon had not gone when he was a foreign
minister or defense minister. Barak answered that it would have been
impossible.20 According to Shlomo Ben-Ami, in a recording in the TV
documentary “Shattered Dreams of Peace,”21 who was a cabinet minister at
the time, Barak and Arafat spoke in private for about 40 minutes (“like a
pair of lovebirds”).22 Ben-Ami also said Barak and Arafat called Clinton the
same evening and said they would work together to reach an agreement.
On 27 September, the day before, Sharon went to the Temple Mount. The
main reason for Sharon’s political initiative was to undermine Barak’s power
after the failure of the Camp David Summit and the loss of the Barak
government’s majority in the Knesset. Sharon saw it as a great political
opportunity to acquire the leadership of Israel. The IMI research division
assessment concluded the visit would cause riots, but for an unknown reason,
the warning never reached the ears of the decisionmakers or police.23 It is
unclear why the warning, which could have prevented the visit, was never
brought to the attention of the prime minister.
Recordings of deliberations held by the Israeli police department before
Sharon’s visit were given to the Orr Commission (the government
commission headed by Judge Theodor Orr). They showed the police thought
the visit would not cause riots the next day, during the Friday prayers,
relying on assurances from Yisrael Hasson, a senior official in the ISA, who
had spoken with Jibril Rajoub, head of Palestinian preventive intelligence.24
There was also information that several days before Sharon’s visit Tawfiq
Tirawi, commander of Palestinian general intelligence, told Hasson he
thought there would be violence.25
The ISA did not alert Barak to the danger of Sharon’s visit to the Temple
Mount because the assessment was that riots would not develop. Hasson

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believed the Palestinians would not riot, and ISA Director-General Avi
Dichter said there were no signs of an impending intifada.26 Barak testified
before the Orr Commission that it was his impression the visit had been
authorized by all the relevant agencies that had coordinated it with the
Muslim Waqf and the PA. No riots were expected, therefore there was no
reason for him to intervene.27 According to Barak, in the book Barak: My
Wars, “he had consulted with the ISA, which saw no problem with
authorizing [the visit]”; however, authorization was never found.28
On the Temple Mount, Sharon was heavily guarded by police who were
attacked by hundreds of Palestinians. About twenty policemen were injured,
and about ten Palestinians.29 The police considered their protection of
Sharon a success. They assumed that would be the end of the incident,
ignoring senior ISA official Yisrael Hasson’s prediction of “a strong
Palestinian response.”30
On Friday, 29 September, the day following Sharon’s visit and after the
prayers, a riot broke out, marking the beginning of the Second Intifada. The
police were surprised and responded harshly, and about 100 Palestinians were
killed and wounded. With the tension and anxiety felt by the Palestinians
after the Camp David failure, and in light of the Israeli–American
propositions to divide sovereignty over the Temple Mount between Israel and
the Palestinians and to allow Jews to pray there, the Palestinians regarded
Sharon’s visit as a provocation and an attempt to force them to accept what
Israel had not succeeded in doing at Camp David. Barak was surprised by
the violence of the riots. However, “[B]oth the prime minister and the IDF
did not doubt it was a popular uprising.”31
The IDF and Israeli police were not prepared to deal with large-scale
Palestinian riots, which spread from the Temple Mount throughout Judea
and Samaria to the Gaza Strip. The IDF reacted strongly with a previously
devised plan called “Burning Steel,”32 which included live ammunition and
nonlethal riot-dispersal weapons.33 It led to many Palestinian deaths and
contributed to spreading the conflict and the desire of the Palestinian terrorist
organizations to “balance the blood loss.”34
Immediately after the riots, on 30 September 2000, Colonel Yossi
Kuperwasser, the intelligence officer in command in the Central Command
(IDF), said, “[T]he Palestinians most likely did not want a general, ongoing
escalation because they did not want to have an impact on the peace
process.”35 The same day, Brigadier General Amos Gilad, head of the IMI
research division, said, “Arafat was exploiting the Temple Mount events to
create controlled confrontations as window dressing for promoting his
negotiating positions, and he did not want the situation to deteriorate, which
would pull the rug out from under his feet.”36 Barak Ben-Tsur, head of the
ISA’s research division, presented his assessment in a meeting with Deputy

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ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, THE SECOND INTIFADA, AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE 7

Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon the same day, saying, “[T]here was ‘hard
intelligence’ that Arafat had ordered a stop be put to the events, even if it
meant shooting at the rioters.”37 At that point, Gilad, the head of the IMI
research division, had not yet written what he was planning to present later
to the decisionmakers, which was that Arafat had planned the riots.
On 1 October, Palestinians rioted at Joseph’s Tomb, a Jewish shrine in the
eastern part of Nablus, and took control of the site. In the ensuing battle,
Madhat Yusuf, a border police fighter, was wounded and bled to death
because the Palestinians would not allow him to be evacuated to a hospital,
and the IDF could not make contact to save his life. That ended security
cooperation between Israel and the PA. The incident exacerbated mutual
Israeli–Palestinian distrust and further inflamed the riots, which had begun
two days earlier.
The same day, Gershon Baskin (chief executive officer of the Israeli think
tank the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information), who had
extensive PA contacts, tried to broker a ceasefire. Accompanied by Knesset
members Avshalom Vilan and Musi Raz, he met with Jibril Rajoub in his
office in Bitunia. Under Rajoub’s auspices, he organized a phone call
between Arafat and Barak to bring about a ceasefire. Arafat posed demands
in return that an international commission would be appointed to investigate
the events on the Temple Mount, which Barak refused. Arafat asked to meet
with Barak immediately; the latter refused.38 Baskin got the impression that
Arafat was genuine in his unsuccessful request for a ceasefire.39
During the first two weeks of the intifada, the IDF responded with
determination, firing 100,000 bullets a day for twelve days.40 Thirty
Palestinians were killed, and hundreds were wounded. Hussein al-Sheikh,
Fatah secretary-general in the West Bank, told Roni Shaked, a Yedioth
Ahronot correspondent in the PA territories, that at the beginning, the
Palestinians wanted a different type of intifada, but it quickly became clear
that they were paying heavily with their blood, while no one had been killed
or wounded on the Israeli side.41
On 7 October, amid the riots, Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz held a meeting
where Amos Gilad, head of the IMI’s research division, said, “Arafat was
responsible for the intifada because he had wanted to orchestrate a
struggle.”42 According to Gilad’s assessment, “[T]he intifada was not an
outbreak, a public disturbance or chaos.” Based on this assessment, the chief
of staff presented his conclusion for the IDF “to operate strongly and fiercely
according to [the] Burning Steel plan, including imposing economic sanctions
on senior PA figures.”43
Al-Jazeera broadcast the Temple Mount riots in real time to every
Palestinian house in the PA territories, showing a situation out of control.
Anarchy prevailed, and gangs of armed Palestinians carried out terrorist

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attacks on their initiative.44 Later on, the Palestinian terrorist organizations

joined them, including Fatah (employing the Tanzim, its military-terrorist
wing), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, as did operatives from the
Palestinian security forces. Marwan Barghouti used the opportunity to fan
the flames45 and later received support and financial assistance from
Arafat.46 At that stage, orders were already coming from Arafat’s office.47
According to Professor Sela,48 “No one in Fatah, neither Arafat nor
Bargouti, had any intention of ‘destroying Israel’ or in any situation
threatening its very existence as many have claimed, including Chief of Staff
Ya’alon who spoke of a strategic threat. ‘Arafat and many others in Fatah
were in [sic] the opinion to put pressure on Israel, and that too, not
necessarily with violence and terrorism, but with the tools of the first intifada:
civil uprisings, strikes, and demonstrations, stone-throwing,
and roadblocks.’”
Based on the evaluations of the head of the IMI’s research division, the
Israeli leadership (i.e., the prime minister, government ministers, the chief of
staff, and his second in command), were quick to claim that when the riots
broke out, they had received solid proof that Arafat had not planned to
reach an agreement on the two-state solution and had orchestrated the
intifada after having concluded that the best way to establish the Palestinian
state was employing a “war of independence.”49
When two IDF soldiers were murdered by a Palestinian mob in Ramallah
on 12 October, Israel’s response was massive. It included aircraft use, making
it clear the confrontation would be severe and protracted. Gilad, IMI’s head
of research, was of the opinion that Arafat had initiated the riots because he
could not accept the existence of the State of Israel, which was at odds with
the evaluation of Ephraim Lavie, head of the Palestinian desk at the IMI,
and his analysts and also the analysts of the ISA research division. However,
Gilad was supported by Chief of Staff Mofaz, and his opinion was repeated
at IDF forums and in briefings with the media.50 Major-General Amos
Malka, head of the IMI, claimed the assumption by Gilad was unfounded.51

THE ROOTS OF THE SECOND INTIFADA

Before Sharon visited the Temple Mount, which triggered the Second
Intifada, a number of events developed that prepared the ground for it.
The frustrations of the Palestinian populace had been building because no
progress had been made since the interim agreement of September 1995 to
transfer lands from Israeli control to the PA or to implement agreements
noted in the Wye Memorandum of 1998 beyond the first installment of
Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. September 2000 was supposed to
be the target date for reaching an agreement on the principles of the
permanent agreement, which centered around the declaration of a Palestinian

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ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, THE SECOND INTIFADA, AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE 9

state; nothing was done. In addition, the Palestinians’ support for Arafat and
Fatah was waning due to the security cooperation with Israel, the
deteriorating economic situation in the territories, and the restrictions on the
delivery of merchandise between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
Public opinion polls held by Fathi Shqaqi’s Palestinian Center for Policy and
Survey Research reflected an erosion of Arafat’s status.52
At the end of Yom Kippur, 23 September 1996, Prime Minister
Netanyahu announced the opening of the Western Wall tunnel. It was
met with riots because Israel had acted unilaterally and not coordinated
with the Muslim Waqf, which had jurisdiction over the Temple Mount.
In response, Arafat called on the Palestinians to use violence. Israel
Hasson, head of the ISA’s Judea and Samaria division, said the agency
had not held in advance a staff meeting to discuss the implications of
opening the tunnel.53 In response, Ami Ayalon, ISA managing director,
claimed his position had been that the tunnel could be open only under
certain conditions, which had not been met. As senior figures admitted,
the opening of the tunnel and subsequent riots caught the IDF unaware
and unprepared.54 The riots lasted for about a week and left seventeen
IDF soldiers and about 100 Palestinians dead.

NAKBA DAY RIOTS

Another event that can be seen as another background factor in the
outbreak of the intifada is a short and deadly wave of riots that took
place several months before the outbreak of the Second Intifada. On 15
May 2000 (Nakba Day), a general trade strike and two minutes of
silence began. Later, riots broke out in Judea and Samaria, initiated by
Arafat’s opponent, Marwan Barghouti,55 Fatah secretary in Judea, and
Samaria and Tanzim leader, which spread exchanges of gunfire between
the Palestinian police and IDF soldiers to the Gaza Strip. Eight
Palestinians were killed, and 250 civilians and several IDF soldiers were
injured.56 Following the events, Chief of Staff Mofaz decided on
preparations for a future confrontation with the Palestinians, which is the
plan: “Burning Steel.” The IDF withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000,
showing the Palestinians they could insist on a full Israeli withdrawal
from the territories to the Green Line. In 2001, Marwan Barghouti, the
Tanzim leader, said, “[T]he Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon” had
contributed to the intifada. “If it could be done overnight in Lebanon,”
he said, the withdrawal from Ramallah to Tel Aviv should not take
more than three nights. The sensitivities of an entirely new generation of
Palestinians were influenced by the experience of their “‘Hezbollah
brothers’ and the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon,” he added.57

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THE SECOND INTIFADA: SPONTANEOUS UPRISING OR ARAFAT

INSTIGATION?
Since 2000, the perception of the Israeli public and decisionmakers has been
that the Second Intifada was instigated by PA Chairman Yasser Arafat and
that Israeli intelligence knew about his intentions beforehand and had
warned Prime Minister Barak. That was the thesis propounded in the
memoirs of Amos Gilad58 and Moshe Yaalon.59 Gilad claimed he had said,
“Arafat was planning to begin a confrontation in September 2000 by
inflaming the Palestinians. I cannot elaborate but the information was
reliable.”60 According to claims made by analysts in the research divisions of
the IMI and the ISA who dealt with the issue, the specific reliable
information to which he referred is unknown.61
In June 2000, the IMI evaluated Arafat’s intentions. An intelligence report
was issued entitled “Arafat On the Brink of a Decision between Order and
Crisis.”62 It said, among other things, that

Arafat was approaching a crossroads where he would have to decide,

but he adhered to his basic positions. A failure in the negotiations
would not necessarily lead to a violent confrontation, and various
considerations might convince him to agree to “temporary
arrangements” that would make it possible to declare (with
Israeli–American approval) a Palestinian state. He would also receive
significant territory and an Israeli commitment to continue
negotiations within a specific timeframe based on UN Security Council
Resolution 242.63

Before Prime Minister Barak left for Camp David, he was told by the ISA
that if the conference failed, the Palestinians would set the PA territories on
fire.64 Israel Shrenzel, the senior ISA analyst, said the briefing sent to Barak
did not mention the Palestinians instigated the riots.65 The two months after
the Camp David conference were quiet, and both sides tried to renew the
negotiations.
Barak returned from Camp David and sent both the ISA and the IDF a
warning: prepare for an intifada.66 The move was exceptional in that the
primary consumer of intelligence (the prime minister) was also the one who
issued the warning, but without receiving an intelligence assessment to that
end. After Camp David’s failure and before the intifada outbreak, the IMI
research division assessed that the Palestinians did not want violence, but
rather political negotiations, regarding them as the main course of action,
concerned that deterioration of security in the field would hurt their
international image.67 Even Chief of Staff Mofaz, who took a militant line
against the Palestinians after the riots began, thought after Camp David that
“the Palestinians did not want violence.”68

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On 24 August 2000, about a month before the intifada began, a meeting

was held by the ISA’s research division, where its head, Barak Ben-Zur, said
he had just spoken with Amos Gilad, who thought the confrontation was
almost deterministic and that it would be a matter of time. An IMI analyst
present noted that they disagreed with Gilad. That is, a month before the
events began, both the IMI and the ISA held the similar position that a
confrontation was not on the horizon, and there are corroborating
contemporary ISA documents.69 The IMI Palestinian division, as opposed to
Gilad, believed that Arafat was not planning to initiate a confrontation.
Whether after Sharon went to the Temple Mount the riots broke out
spontaneously or were initiated by Arafat was raised by Colonel Ephraim
Lavie. He claimed “the IMI assessment delivered to Barak and the IDF, by
Gilad, that Arafat had initiated and planned a military confrontation as part
of a strategy designed to vanquish Israel, was unfounded but perceived by the
political and military leadership as reliable.”70
According to Lavie, in the assessment of the professional analysts, “the
intifada was a ground-roots movement,” and a manifestation of accumulated
Palestinian frustration, and Arafat exploited it to put a stop to internal
criticism and force Israel to be more flexible in its positions during political
negotiations. Lavie said the assessment there was “no one to talk to and
nothing to talk about” with the PA was a mistake, and “when that became
the basis for Israel’s actions it no longer distinguished between Hamas and
Fatah, and created a vacuum of rule, which was proved to be the case.” He
added that “instead of analyzing Arafat’s capabilities and intentions to
provide the decision-makers with the best tools for making policy, the head
of the IMI research division had become a cat’s paw in the hands of the
politicians’ propaganda machine.”71
Lavie also said that the head of IMI’s research division met the political
leadership halfway, sometimes in opposition to the written assessments of his
research division, and he (Lavie) had demanded a thorough examination of
the IMI Second Intifada intelligence failures and other Palestinian issues.72
He claimed the IMI had developed a doublethink culture. On the one hand,
information was delivered verbally for the needs of the political leadership.
On the other hand, written information for internal use was to be covered in
both directions depending on how events developed.
Three months after the outbreak of the intifada, in November 2000, Yossi
Ben-Ari, a respected veteran senior intelligence analyst, completed a study of
the month before the Second Intifada, based on information available to the
Intelligence Community (IC). His main conclusions appeared in an article
published publicly in October 2020. He said that

after sifting through all the intelligence material, he had found no

indication that the violence was preplanned by Arafat or anyone else

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in the Palestinian camp. The opposite was the case. During the
48 hours after the riots began, Arafat tried to restore calm and feared
losing control. Only when he realized that imposing order could lead
to a civil war, topple the PA institutions, destroy his security forces
and possibly mean his death did he choose to join and then exploit the
general chaos.73

This intelligence study had only limited distribution within the IC after it
was written and was not brought to the attention of the political or military
leadership (i.e., the prime minister and the defense minister or the chief of
staff). Ben-Ari criticized Gilad, whom he described as “a dominant presence
who shared the narrative prominent under Ehud Barak, that there was no
partner, and then later under Sharon, that Arafat was a murderer. Gilad
echoed those narratives, thereby drowning out other intelligence voices.”74
In his response to Ben Ari’s public article of October 2020, Yossi
Kuperwasser, who was head of military intelligence in the IDF Central
Command at the time, said that “if Ben-Ari had searched for an indication
that Arafat had orchestrated an organized terrorist campaign, then he did
not understand the issue.” Many people, he said, missed the warning, while
Gilad and Kuperwasser himself, who had not coordinated their positions,
understood the direction Arafat was going in and deployed for it.
“Without a doubt,” he said, “Arafat planned the terrorist campaign ahead
of time even if he did not know when it would develop, which depended on
circumstances.”75 Kuperwasser wrote that Mamdouh Nowfal, one of
Arafat’s advisors, said Arafat was behind both the spirit and message for
beginning the campaign, adding that in “his opinion the ISA evaluation that
there was no evidence the attack had been planned, was not correct. There
was nothing written or recorded, but the handwriting was on the wall for
anyone who wanted to read it.” Kuperwasser said he had no specific
information that Arafat had instigated the Second Intifada, echoing Gilad.
That was opposed to the opinion of many IC members who claimed the riots
were spontaneous. In his response, Kuperwasser strangely played down the
ISA’s recognition of events occurring in Palestinian society, saying that for
months before the riots, Central Command intelligence had talked about
Palestinian deployment for rioting. He did not mention that on 30
September, the day after the riots began, he had circulated an intelligence
report stating that the Palestinians did not intend to escalate the riots. Ben-
Ari insisted that a comprehensive contemporary investigation showed no
information indicating that Arafat planned or orchestrated the events and
hypothesized that Kuperwasser’s opinion was just a self-fulfilling prophecy.76
Nowhere in the IMI reports did it say that Arafat was not planning to
reach an arrangement or that his real agenda was to destroy the State of
Israel. The opposite was true, according to Pedezur.77 The IMI documents

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indicate that Arafat did intend to move forward the political process.
Immediately after the intifada broke out, in the IMI research division
assessment, Arafat had not instigated it and had tried to rein in the violence
on several occasions; that was also the ISA’s assessment.78 Pedezur claimed
that if Gilad presented a different position to the prime minister and the
cabinet, it would have been his own opinion. It was “the oral assessment,” as
described by one of his subordinates in the research division (Ephraim Lavie;
see above). The assessments Gilad did present to the government were not
supported by documents or based on precise intelligence.79

THE OPINION OF THE IMI HEAD, MAJOR-GENERAL AMOS MALKA

When the Second Intifada broke out, the IMI was headed by Major-General
Amos Malka, who claimed in an interview in 2004 that “Brigadier General
Amos Gilad, by distorting assessments of the situation, had convinced the
political leadership to falsely believe that Israel had no ‘Palestinian
partner.’”80 Malka added “that throughout my term as head of the IMI not
even one research division document supported the assessment Gilad
presented to the prime minister and the chief of staff.” Malka said that “only
after the talks in Taba ended, on the eve of the 2001 Israeli elections, did
Gilad retrospectively begin publicly to revise former the IMI assessments.”81
Similar opinions were expressed by Shrenzel82 and Lavie.83 Gilad responded
that “with oral statements on one side and written assessments on the other,
the oral statement would unequivocally tip the scales. That was because the
decision-makers were influenced by oral statements and did not read.”84
In 2004, Malka published an article titled “Amended in Retrospect” in
which he said, “[T]here was no unequivocal proof that Arafat had lit the
flames of September 2000, and it was more likely that the intifada had
broken out from below [the surface].”85 Gilad was quick to respond, calling
what Malka had written “empty claims” and saying that to his great sorrow,
his intelligence assessment turned out to be justified.86 He wondered where
Malka had been for the past four years. Malka, claimed Gilad, had only been
in intelligence for a short time, while he, Gilad, had decades of experience
with Arafat and was thoroughly familiar with him. He (Gilad) not only had
information about Arafat, he knew him, and had devoted thousands of hours
to studying him. Chief of Staff Mofaz supported Gilad’s position, saying he
had provided reliable assessments, and the claim there was no Palestinian
partner had repeatedly proved itself true over the years.87
Gilad did not note on what information he had based his assessments that
Arafat instigated the intifada when the IMI analysts and ISA assessments
completely contradicted him. It is unclear why Malka’s position, which was
different from Gilad’s, was never heard by the IDF or presented to Prime
Minister Barak. Malka did not relate to the issue of why he did not give his

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assessment directly to Barak and the chief of staff in the interview88 or in an

article he wrote for the daily Yedioth Ahronot.89 Yossi Ben-Ari noted that,
according to his research, the political and military leadership listened more
to Gilad because of his reputation and experience.90

DID ARAFAT INSTIGATE THE RIOTS?

In the book The Gatekeepers, and the documentary television program, the
ISA heads supported the view that the Second Intifada broke out
spontaneously and had not been instigated by Yasser Arafat, who was as
surprised by them as Israel.91 Dr. Matti Steinberg, an advisor to an ISA
head, said,

[T]he intifada was not the outcome of a decision made by the

Palestinian leadership, but rather of a change in mood that took
control of the Palestinian public, who felt the failure of Camp David
had brought them to a dead-end and whose personal, economic and
social lives were deteriorating. The PA, as a system, was failing,
corruption was rampant, the economic situation had been
deteriorating, and the underlying circumstances were only waiting to
be brought into action, especially after the failure of the Camp David
summit. Gilad’s incorrect assessment had fulfilled itself.92

When the Second Intifada broke out, Avi Dichter, head of the ISA, said,
“I was not familiar with intelligence materials beyond or signs indicating
there would be an intifada.”93 The Palestinians, he added, also had not been
aware. He added that

the confrontation between the ISA and the IMI lasted until Operation
Defensive Shield in 2002. The IMI research division claimed the
intifada had been initiated by Fatah in Judea and Samaria, and
perhaps in the Gaza Strip, while the ISA said there was no intelligence
to back up the claim, that it was all speculation. All the intifada
operatives who were detained in Operation Defensive Shield told their
ISA interrogators [was] how it began, and how surprised they had
been, how they saw they were heading towards an intifada, and how
they had grasped the bull by the horns to make political capital, just
as Marwan Barghouti had. During interrogation, they talked about
being dragged into it.

There was even someone, said Dichter, “someone high up in the IMI, who
said it was good the ISA was investigating because it could direct its
investigations to support its thesis. That was a low blow and certainly did not
do credit to the person who said it,” someone Dichter knew well and
respected. He was referring to Gilad, who was the most senior person in the

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IMI research division. Dichter made similar comments as recently as

February 2021, when he said that, according to Gilad, “[E]verything had
been planned by Arafat, and the ISA could find no sign of it. The Palestinian
detainees were interrogated and filmed and never said any such thing, rather
that it had not been organized.”94
Leading Israeli historian Emmanuel Sivan wrote an article for the daily
newspaper Haaretz, supporting that Arafat had not instigated the
intifada.95 He said, “[F]riends and students of mine who participated in
the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield had told me it was clear from
interrogations that the riots during the ten days after Sharon’s visit to
the Temple Mount had been completely spontaneous, an emotional
response to seeing the military boot of the Lebanon War stomping on
the shrines of Islam.”
Later, when the riots worsened, the ISA accepted the IDF position that
Arafat was no longer a partner for a political arrangement and on 15
October 2000, sent Barak its opinion, which was “that Arafat was a great
danger to the security of the State of Israel. The damage done by his removal
would be smaller than the damage done by allowing him to continue.”96 The
disagreement between the ISA and IMI over whether or not the riots were
spontaneous, as claimed by ISA and IMI analysts, as opposed to the
personal assessments by the head of the IMI research division that they had
been initiated by Arafat, continued long afterward.
Yuval Diskin, who was Dichter’s second in command, said

that the general opinion among the Palestinians, and the Israelis as
well to a certain extent, was that a confrontation was unavoidable.
According to the media, everyone was planning for an intifada, which
turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. There were also incidents at the
Tomb of Joseph and the IDF deployed for violence. No one thought
there would be so many years of suicide bombing attacks or so much
bloodshed.97

Diskin also referred to the internal events in Judea and Samaria causing
resentment of Arafat, noting that “Barghouti was a kind of opposition to
Arafat who had remained frustrated and it was not by chance that he, and
not Arafat, led the second intifada.” According to Diskin, “Arafat did not
propel the intifada forward. He rode the crest of its wave at a later date.
Young Fatah operatives began the riots, and Arafat was initially surprised by
the events. Although not very strongly, he even tried to rein in the riots
during the first two or three weeks. At a certain point, he decided that if he
couldn’t beat them, he would join them, and he did a good job of it.” In
2006, Diskin again said, “Arafat had not instigated the intifada, but that they
had been brainwashed with false assessments.” It was a fact, he said, “that

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the assessments of Amos Gilad, whom he called the ‘national assessor,’

overcame opposition and determined Israel’s official position.”98
ISA head Ami Ayalon confirmed that

there was no intelligence document stating that Arafat had planned the
intifada. The opposite was true. I knew documents confiscated during
Operation Defensive Shield and analyzed by the Agency’s research
division had proved the intifada surprised even the Fatah leadership,
including Marwan Barghouti and Qadoura Fares, who were very close
to Arafat. Only a few days after the riots broke out, they met to
examine how to exploit them for political purposes. Barghouti took it
upon himself to lead the Tanzim’s activities, which he did until he
was detained.99

Ayalon claimed in an address he gave entitled “The Broken Dream—An

Analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process” that “the al-Aqsa intifada
was initially a popular, unplanned phenomenon which did not have a defined
political objective. It was an uprising directed against Israel, against the entire
peace process and even against the Palestinian Authority.”100
Yazid Sayigh, an advisor to Arafat, specifically wrote that only after the
first stage of the intifada did Arafat aspire to exploit the events for his
advantage.101 Mamdouh Nowfal, also an advisor to Arafat, claimed that
after Sharon visited the Temple Mount, the decision was made to defend the
al-Aqsa mosque. The Palestinian security organizations were instructed to
protect the crowds that took to the streets but not initiate riots.102 However,
they were not instructed to begin an intifada, although the distance between
the intifada and loss of control was minimal.
Support for the claim that PA did not instigate the intifada was provided
by the Mitchell Report, which was prepared by George Mitchell, an
American senator and presidential envoy to the Middle East who studied the
circumstances of the beginning of the intifada. According to the report

Mr. Sharon visited the Temple Mount on 28 September accompanied

by over 1,000 Israeli police officers. Although Israelis viewed the visit
in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it as highly
provocative. On the following day, in the same place, many unarmed
Palestinian demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent
confronted each other. According to the U.S. Department of State,
“Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in
the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal
bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing four
persons and injuring about 200.” In the Israeli view, “Palestinian
violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at
‘provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining
the diplomatic initiative.’”103

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The report states, “[W]e have no basis on which to conclude that there was
a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first
opportunity.” The report also noted that “Sharon’s visit to the Temple
Mount might not have been the direct cause, but the Palestinians might have
considered its provocation.”104

OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND INTIFADA: DIFFERENCES IN

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
The research divisions of the IMI and ISA had both concluded that the
outbreak of the intifada was popular, and only after a week to ten days did
Arafat join it and lose control of the events, a claim also made by the heads
of the ISA. There was a significant discrepancy between analysts who based
their conclusions on intelligence material and the oral briefings Gilad
personally delivered to the political leadership, namely that Arafat had
instigated the intifada. According to Gilad, the latter had more influence
because “[The political leaders] don’t read.”105
There was nothing in intelligence analyses or other materials, whether from
the IMI or the ISA, to support the version put forward by Gilad and
supported by Yossi Kuperwasser, who replaced Gilad as head of the IMI.
Gilad delivered his unfounded version verbally to the political leadership,
stating Arafat had instigated, directed, and controlled the violence.106 That
served as the basis for decisions made by Israel that exacerbated the situation
and served the political leadership. The intelligence assessment that Arafat
had planned the intifada was convenient for Barak and reinforced his “no
partner” stance after the Camp David summit. The possibility that the
decisionmakers had been misinformed about the Second Intifada’s outbreak
circumstances was never examined or seriously discussed. The narrative
prevalent in Israel that Arafat instigated the intifada was incorrect.

THE SECOND INTIFADA CROSSES THE GREEN LINE INTO

ISRAELI TERRITORY
The riots rapidly spread from the PA territories into Israel proper. On 1
October, Israeli Arabs held mass demonstrations and riots to protest the
Palestinians killed in Judea and Samaria and show solidarity; they were
dubbed “the October riots.” For the first time in Israel’s history, it was a
general civilian uprising of Israeli Arabs, including the mixed Arab–Jewish
cities. It lasted about ten days, with the participation of thousands of Arabs,
simultaneously, in many cities, towns, and villages. There was no shooting by
the rioters; they threw rocks and blocked roads. The violence of the riots was
extreme, and the Israeli security forces, especially the police, found it difficult
to restore order. Thirteen Israeli Arabs were killed by the police, and one Jew

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was killed by a stone. The events were spontaneous and a strategic surprise
for the government, the police, and the ISA.
According to the Orr Commission, the riots in the Arab sector within
Israel’s borders were unprecedented and extraordinary.107 The commission
was severely critical of police actions during the events, determining that
using snipers was illegal and violated orders. It said that “live fire, including
sniper fire, was not considered [a] police crowd-dispersal measure.”108 The
commission was less critical of the ISA for not providing an alert and did not
find evidence that the Israeli Arab leadership had coordinated with the PA.
The commission also criticized the public leaders of the Arabic sector in
Israel and the Arab monitoring committee, which had not done enough to
stop the riots and Ra’ed Salah, the head of Israel’s Islamic Movement’s
northern branch.

NO WARNING OF THE INTIFADA IN THE ISRAELI ARAB SECTOR

Before the riots spread into Israel, the ISA assessed that “the Arab sector was
frustrated by its economic hardships and claimed it was deprived, ignored
and marginalized by the authorities, who were not doing enough, in Arab
opinion, to solve the fundamental problems plaguing the Arab sector. In
addition, according to the ISA assessment, the situation alienated the Arabs
to the point, in certain Arab circles, of delegitimizing the State of Israel.”109
The commission determined that, by the end of May 2000, there had been
alerts of impending riots after revelations that Israeli Arabs were being
radicalized.110 However, the ISA’s assessment regarding the outbreak of an
intifada inside Israel was “that none could be expected at that point, insofar
as the term intifada was familiar from the events of 1987–1991.” They did not
expect the Palestinians to wage a comprehensive popular uprising against
government institutions and the country in general that would involve the
establishment of alternative institutions. That was the substance of what the
head of the ISA’s northern division told the commission.111
On 26 September 2000, two days before Sharon went to the Temple
Mount, the National Security Council (NSC), headed by General Uzi Dayan,
correctly predicted the future developments in a document stating that “the
activities of the Israeli Arabs were liable to have features similar to but far
more intense than their activities during the first intifada.” The force of their
reactions depended, he said, on the situation as it evolved and was liable to
include riots, blocking roads, and attacks on institutions that symbolized the
government, such as police stations, banks, and post office branches. An
Israeli response was liable to be met with a Palestinian counterresponse,
escalation, and an extensive spread of riots. That might also inflame protests
and instigate other Israeli Arab activities, and the more Palestinian casualties

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there were, the greater Israeli Arab opposition would be, drawing more and
more moderates into rioting.112
The ISA did not raise the alarm regarding the groundswell of restlessness
among Israeli Arabs. The NSC did raise the alarm, but the IDF and the
police did not deploy in a way that responded to the intelligence it had
received. After the riots broke out, the ISA and Israeli police focused on self-
defense and restoring calm but found it difficult. The commission noted the
police had been taken unawares, and violence was extreme in at least some
parts of Israel, especially in the north. The commission report did not relate
to the lack of forewarning but rather dealt with police responses. The
commission dealt with the need to assign areas of responsibility between the
ISA and police. It was later determined that responsibility for intelligence
alerts of subversive, nationalist riots waged inside the Green Line was
assigned to the ISA while dealing with public order would be the
responsibility of the police. 113

CONCLUSIONS
The outbreaks of riots in both the PA territories and inside the Green Line
were spontaneous uprisings that had not been orchestrated. PA Chairman
Arafat was surprised by the outbreak of the Second Intifada in Judea and
Samaria and the Gaza Strip after Sharon went to the Temple Mount. He
tried to prevent the riots from spreading but was unsuccessful and eventually
gave up. The outbreak of the intifada in the Palestinian territories and the
riots in Israel were a diffused surprise for Israel.
In the Second Intifada, which broke out following the failure of the Camp
David summit and Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, the IMI assisted the
IDF and the political leadership to implement a policy that had no relevance
to the assessments of intelligence analysts in both the IMI and the ISA.
Gilad, the IMI research division head, provided a personal incorrect
intelligence assessment claiming that Arafat had orchestrated the Second
Intifada. Thus the political stance of “no partner” was developed and
promoted, even when it was clear the intifada was spontaneous, and the
intelligence analysts researching the Palestinians thought likewise.
The head of the IMI research division has the right to express an opinion
different from that of the analysts, but when he presents his opinion, he is
expected to note the difference, and in this case, it also varies from the
opinions of the IMI and ISA analysts. It can be hypothesized that if the
prime minister and the IDF had accepted the assessments written by the IMI
and ISA analysts and ignored the oral assessments presented by the head of
the research division, and if the political leadership had acted in a more
comprehensive way toward the uprising during its first stage, it is possible
that Arafat could have restored calm.

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The possibility that senior IMI senior figures presented assessments

opposite to those of the IMI and ISA analysts, which toughened the IDF’s
strong response, as planned according to an organized Palestinian initiative
scenario, has to be a source of serious worry. The literature on intelligence
politicization shows that it is more likely to occur when intelligence analysts
develop warnings for decisionmakers’ needs, as what likely happened in the
2002 Iraq WMD National Intelligence Estimate fiasco.114
Less frequently, we see the head of the research division distorting the
assessments by his analysts to please the highest political figure, as in this
case, the burst of the Second Intifada in Israel. The ISA erred in its
forewarning that the intifada might spread across the Green Line into Israel.
It had enough information to sound the alarm in time before riots broke out
in Israel.
A final word. This case study touches on the most challenging situations in
the national intelligence profession—the relationship between the senior
intelligence echelon and the decisionmakers. Experience shows that in
contrast to the senior ranks of intelligence agencies, those in the middle and
lower ranks usually tend to present professional opinions based on raw
information, while the proximity of senior officers to decisionmakers can
make it more difficult to tell the truth, especially when they know it is not in
correlation with the direction of the decisionmakers. Therefore, sometimes it
is more convenient to present more convenient estimates, especially in
situations of uncertainty, as happened in the CIA before the U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003.
The assessments the prime minister and minister of defense and the chief of
staff expected were evident. There is a wide range of options for deliveries
from “saying the truth to power”115 up to “intelligence to please,” due to
various considerations and psychological aspects, including the assessor’s
identity, the relationship within the intelligence organization, the interface
between the heads of the intelligence organization and decisionmakers, and
so on. Senior officers may be concerned that assessments that are not in the
spirit of the decisionmakers will endanger their position. Therefore,
sometimes there are attempts to avoid these situations by changing
assessments or adjusting them to the expectations of the decisionmakers.

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Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure (Oxford,
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ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, THE SECOND INTIFADA, AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE 21

3
Barnea, “Strategic Intelligence”; Avner Barnea, “Is it Possible to Break the
Ceiling Glass of the Discipline of the Strategic Intelligence?” Bein Haktavim,
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4
Yoav Gelber, The Roots of the Lillies: Intelligence in the Jewish Institution
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revolution-bashir/
5
Gary Bruce, The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi (New York: Oxford
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6
Uri Bar-Joseph, “Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of
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7
Uri Bar-Joseph, “Intelligence and Politics,” in Leaders and Intelligence,
edited by Pinchas Yehezkeli (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing.
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Politicization,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013),
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749064; John Gentry, The Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis
Misserves the Nation (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993),
pp. 23–24.
8
Uri Bar-Joseph, Sudden Attack: The Ultimate Test of Intelligence and
Leadership (Tel Aviv: Kineret Zmora Dvir Publishing, 2019) [in Hebrew], pp.
89, 99.
9
Yehoshfat Harkabi, “Interrelations between Intelligence and Decision
Maker.” See Zvi Ofer and Avi Kober (eds.), Intelligence and National
Security (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing, 1987) [in Hebrew],
p. 452.
10
John Gentry, “The New Politicization of the U.S. Intelligence Community,”
International Journal of intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 33, No. 4
(2020), pp. 639–665.
11
Joshoua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of
Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 29.
12
Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessment
on Iraq (2004). https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/ssci_iraq.pdf; The
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 March 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/politics/20050331_wmd_report.pdf
13
Ilan Kfir and Danny Dor, Barak: My Wars (Tel Aviv: Kineret, Zmora, Bitan,
2015) [in Hebrew], p. 251.
14
Uri Milstein, “An Interview with Ehud Barak: 20 Years to the Withdrawal
from Lebanon,” Maariv, 30 April 2020 [in Hebrew]. https://www.maariv.co.il/
news/politics/Article-762639

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15
Intelligence Heritage Center, “Four Years of Violent Conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians. Interim Summary.” (2005) [in Hebrew]. https://www.
terrorism-info.org.il//Data/articles/Art_286/H_286_1305340511.pdf
16
Betselem, “Number Palestinians killed in the Intifada,” [in Hebrew], https://
www.btselem.org/hebrew/statistics/fatalities/before-cast-lead/by-date-of-event
17
Barak Ravid, “30,000 Injured in the Intifada,” NRG, 29 September 2005
[in Hebrew].
18
Gideon Levi, “20 Years to the Second Intifada,” Haaretz, 25 September 2020
[in Hebrew].
19
Ali Waked and Tomer Shadmi, “Optimism in Both Sides after Barak Arafat
Meeting,” YNET, 26 September 2000 [in Hebrew]. https://www.ynet.co.il/
articles/0,7340,L-134248,00.html
20
Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, The Seventh War: How We Win and Why We
Lost the War Against the Palestinians (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Publishing, 2014),
p. 15.
21
“Shattered Dreams of Peace,” Frontline TV Program, 2002, https://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/
22
Shlomo Ben Ami, A Front without Rear: A Journey to the Peace Borders (Tel
Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot, 2004), p. 319 [in Hebrew].
23
Harel and Isacharoff, The Seventh War, p. 16.
24
Ibid., p. 18.
25
Ibid., p. 14.
26
Dror Moreh, The Gatekeepers (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Books. 2014), p. 263
[in Hebrew].
27
Orr Commission, The National Inquiry Commission to Investigate the Clashes
between Israeli Defense Forces and Israeli Citizens in October 2000 (2003).
Paragraph 144 [in Hebrew]. http://uri.mitkadem.co.il/vaadat-or
28
Kfir and Dor, Barak, p. 269.
29
Anat Roe and Ali Waked, “Sharon’s Visit in Temple Mount,” YNET, 28
September 2000 [in Hebrew]. https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-140848,
00.html
30
Harel and Isacharoff, The Seventh War, p. 18.
31
Kfir and Dor, Barak, p. 270.
32
Reuven Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect,” Haaretz, 28 October 2011 [in
Hebrew]. https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/1.1533202
33
Raviv Druker, Harakiri: Ehud Barak in the Test of Result (Tel Aviv: Yedioth
Publishing, 2002) [in Hebrew], p. 329.
34
Ben Caspit, “Two Years to the Intifada,” Maariv, 6 September (2002) [in
Hebrew], p. 13.
35
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect.”
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.; also, Yisrael Shrenzel, interview with the author, 22 October 2020.
38
Akiva Eldar, “How Rajob Almost Stopped the Intifada?” Haaretz, 22 May
2001 [in Hebrew], https://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.703026
39
Gershon Baskin, interview with the author, 1 November 2020.
40
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect.”

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41
Ronen Bergman, Authority Given (Tel Aviv: Yediot Publishing, 2002), p. 227.
42
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect.”
43
Ibid.
44
Ephraim Lavie, “Who Gave the Clearance?” Haaretz, 19 October 2011 [in
Hebrew]. https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.108203
45
Baskin, interview with the author. Also, Avraham Sela, written interview with
the author, 15 October 2020.
46
Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, “The Secrets from Marwan Barghouti
Investigation Reveal,” Haaretz, 12 April 2012) [in Hebrew]. https://www.
haaretz.co.il/magazine/1.1689831
47
Ronni Shaked, “In that Stage Orders were Already Coming from Arafat
Office,” Yedioth Ahronot, 13 October 2000 [in Hebrew].
48
Sela, interview with the author.
49
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect”; and Druker, Harakiri, p. 328.
50
Ibid.
51
Amos Malka, “The Regional System in Stability Test,” in Bar Siman Tov,
Yacov, ed., Generals Talk: The Collapse of Oslo Process and the Violent Israel
Palestinian Conflict. Davis Institute, edited by Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov
(Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2003) [in Hebrew], p. 16.
52
Ephraim Lavie, “Israel Challenge with the Intifada: A Critical View,”
Strategic Update Vol. 13, No. 3 (2010), p. 104.
53
Shai Gal, “Temple Mount Tunnels: Who Gave the Order?” Mako, 24
September 2016 [in Hebrew]. https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security-q3_
2016/Article-465345c8eba5751004.htm
54
Ziv Nevo, “The Police Warned, the Minister of Defense was not Updated, the
Head of ISA Got a Phone Call in the Last Minute, the Head of IMI Heard a
Day After in the Radio News: The Opening of the Western Wall Tunnels,”
Yediot Ahronoth, 22 September 2016 [in Hebrew]. https://www.yediot.co.il/
articles/0,7340,L-4858422,00.html
55
Ronni Shaked, “Aimed with Rifles toward Israel and Harmed Arafat,” Yedioth
Ahronot, 19 May 2000 [in Hebrew].
56
Raviv Druker, “We Did Not Learn Nothing from the Second Intifada,”
Haaretz, 23 November 2014 [in Hebrew]. https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.
premium-1.2492548
57
Ran Baratz, “Evil will be Opened from the North,” First Source, 15 May 2020)
[in Hebrew]. https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/229249
58
Shimon Shiffer, The One Gave Warning: talks with General Amos Gilad (Tel
Aviv: Yedioth Publishing, 2020) [in Hebrew], pp. 89–100.
59
Moshe Yaalon, A Long Short Way (Tel Aviv: Yedioth books Publishing, 2018)
[in Hebrew], p. 115.
60
Shifer, The One Gave Warning, p. 92.
61
Shrenzel, interview by author; Yossi Ben Ari, interview with the author, 25
October 2020;
Yossi Ben Ari, “The Skeleton in the Closet of the Second Intifada,” Haaretz,
27 September 2020).
62
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect.”

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24 AVNER BARNEA

63
Ibid.
64
Kfir and Dor, Barak, p. 251.
65
Shrenzel, interview with the author.
66
Ibid.
67
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect”; Akiva Eldar, “Operation Cast Lead: The IMI
Did Not Anticipate,” Haaretz, 9 January 2009 [in Hebrew]; Lavie, “Who Gave
the Clearance?”
68
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect.”
69
Shrenzel, interview with the author.
70
Ephraim Lavie, “Intelligence Work in the Palestinian Division: A Critical
Assessment.” Mabat Malam, Vol. 52 (2008) [in Hebrew], p. 107.
71
Ibid.
72
Eldar, “Operation Cast Lead.”
73
Ben Ari, “The Skeleton in the Closet of the Second Intifada.”
74
Ibid.
75
Yossi Kupperwasser, “Response to the Article by Yossi Ben Ari,” Geostrategy
website in Telelgram Application, 29 September 2020 [in Hebrew].
76
Ben Ari, interview with the author.
77
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect.”
78
Shrenzel, interview with the author.
79
Pedezur, “Thesis in Retrospect.”
80
Eldar, “The Former Head of IMI Malka.”
81
Ibid.
82
Shrenzel, interview with the author.
83
Lavie, “Israel Challenge with the Intifada.”
84
Eldar, “The Former Head of IMI Malka.”
85
Amos Malka, “Amended in Retrospect,” Yedioth Ahronoth, 30 June 2004 [in
Hebrew], https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-2940026,00.html
86
Daina Bechor-Nir, “Gilad: Unfortunately My Assessments Regarding Arafat
were Right,” YNET, 10 June 2004) [in Hebrew]. https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/
0,7340,L-2930071,00.html
87
Ibid.
88
Eldar, “The Former Head of IMI Malka.”
89
Malka, “Amended in Retrospect.”
90
Ben Ari, “The Skeleton in the Closet of the Second Intifada.”
91
Moreh, The Gatekeepers.
92
Yacov Bar Siman Tov, Ephraim Lavie, Kobi Michael, and David Bartal, The
Israeli Palestinian Conflict 2000–2004 (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Research, No. 101, 2005) [in Hebrew], p. 21; Matti Steinberg, “It Is Easy to
Blame Arafat,” Haaretz, 31 October 2020 [in Hebrew]. https://www.haaretz.co.
il/misc/writers/WRITER-1.1801143
93
Moreh, The Gatekeepers.
94
Avi Dichter, “An Interview with Dichter,” Mabat Malam, No. 88 (February
2021) [in Hebrew], p. 17.
95
Emmanuel Sivan, “What is Right for the General,” Haaretz, 14 June 2004
[in Hebrew].

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96
Druker, Harakiri, p. 330.
97
Moreh, The Gatekeepers, pp. 263–264.
98
Gideon Levi, “Revelation in Ali,” Haaretz, 11 February 2006 [in Hebrew].
https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1082033
99
Akiva Eldar, “Operation Cast Lead: The IMI Did Not Anticipate,” Haaretz,
9 January 2009 [in Hebrew].
100
Bar Siman Tov et al., The Israeli Palestinian Conflict 2000–2004, p. 21.
101
Yazid Sayigh, “Arafat and the Anatomy of Revolt,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3
(2001), pp. 47–60.
102
Jonathan Dahoh-Halevy, Testimonies about the Responsibility of the
Palestinian Authority to the Breaking Out of the Intifada (Jerusalem:
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Research, 2013); Mitchell Report, Sharm El-
Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report, 2001). [in Hebrew]. http://eeas.europa.
eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/mitchell_report_2001_en.pdf
See also Mohamad Nawfal, Al-Intifada: Infijar Amaliyyat al-Salam [The
Intifada: Explosion of the Peacemaking] (Amman: al-Ahliyya lil-Nashr wal-
Tawzi, 2002), p. 81.
103
Mitchell Report, Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report (2001), pp.
6, 7, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/mitchell_report_2001_
en.pdf
104
Ibid., p. 8.
105
Eldar, “The Former Head of IMI Malka.”
106
Lavie, “Israel Challenge with the Intifada”; Ben Ari, “The Skeleton in the
Closet of the Second Intifada”; Shrenzel, interview with the author.
107
Orr Commission, “The National Inquiry Commission to Investigate the
Clashes,” Chap. 4, Para. 32.
108
Ibid., Art. 6, Para. 32.
109
Ibid., Art. 1, Para. 29.
110
Ibid., Arti. 1, Para. 184–191.
111
Ibid., Para. 189.
112
Ibid., Para. 193.
113
Eli Bahar, Watching the Watchman: Security, Justice, Democracy Values and
the ISA (Jerusalem: Israeli Institute of Democracy, 2020), p. 45.
114
Rovner, Fixing the Facts; John Gentry, Strategic Warning Intelligence:
History, Challenges and Prospects (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2019), p. 216;
See also Uri Bar-Joseph, “The Politicization of Intelligence: A Comparative
Study,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (2013), pp.
347–369.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.742009; Richard Betts, “Politicization
of Intelligence Costs and Benefits,” In Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence,
edited by Richard Betts and Thomas Mahnken (London: Frank Cass, 2004),
pp. 59–79.
115
Edward Said, “The Basic Question for the Intellectual: How Does One Speak
the Truth?” Radio 4 Broadcast (UK), 21 July 1993.

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