THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 166508. October 2, 2009.]

NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION , petitioner,

vs . MARIO ABAYARI, MAY ALMINE, MA. VICTORIA ALPAJARO,
FLORANTE AMORES, ANGELINA ANCHETA, ANGELINE ODIEM-
ARANETA, CECILIA PACIBLE, MIRIAM BAJADO, EDUARDO BALAURO,
EVANGELINA BALIAO, LUISA BANUA, RIZALINA BENLAYO,
MARJORIE BINAG, CRESENCIA BISNAR, CARMELITA BREBONERIA,
JOSELYN BUNYI, EMILIO CABAMONGAN, JR., PAZ DIVINA
CABANERO, RAUL CABANILLA, LEONILA WYNDA CADA, CELSTINA
CASAO, ELIZABETH CASAS, ARNULFO CATALAN, FRANCIS DE LA
CHICA, JAIME CORTES, JAIME DE LA CRUZ, JHONNY CUSTODIO,
MA. BELINDA DAPULA, REMEDIOS DEBUQUE, REBECCA DECARA,
JOCELYN DIEGO, JAIME DUQUE, LUCIA ENRIQUEZ, MA. LUCIA
ESPEROS, HELEN EVANGELISTA, CELSO FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO
SAN GABRIEL, REYNALDO SAN GABRIEL, EDMUNDO GARAIS,
JENNILYN GOZADO, EVELYN GUEVARRA, MA. MAGDALENA
HIDONA, VICTORINO INDEFONSO, JR., GRACE CECILLE JAVIER,
MARIETA JOSE, MA. CECILIA KAPAW-AN, EVANGELINE LABAY,
SENORA LUCUNSAY, MILAGROSO ALLAN LAMBAN, VIOLETA DE
LEON, CHARITO LONTAYAO, REMEDIOS LOYOLA, NORA MALALUAN,
ALBERTO MALIFICIADO, DENNIS MANZANO, MA. CONCEPCION
MARQUEZ, REYNALDO MASILANG, MAGDALENA MENDOZA,
MELCHOR NANUD, MILAGROS NEPOMUCENO, ROSEMARIE
NEPOMUCENO, APOLO NISPEROS, ANNALIZA NOBRERA,
EVANGELINE NUESCA, YUMINA PABLO, GLORIA PANGANIBAN,
ROGELIO PAQUIZ, ROLANDO PAREDES, NORA PEDROSO, MARIA
HILNA DELA PEÑA VICTORIA, PEÑARADA, MELVIN PERALTA,
DOROTHY PEREZ, FREDERICK MICHAEL PORTACION, ROMMEL
RABACA, RODERICK REALUBIT, GWENDOLYN REMORIN, ANTONIO
DE LOS REYES, NERISSA REYES, NENITA ROBRIGADO, ALLAN
ROMERO, MA. ROSARIO ROMULO, LUIS DEL ROSARIO, CRISTINA
ROSAS, DEXTER SALAZAR, MAGDALENA SALOMON, OLIVIA
SALOMON, ELENITA SANCHEZ, ANGELINA SANTELICES, ANABELLE
SANTOS, SHARLENE SANTOS, JAIME SINGH DELMASINGUN,
EVELYN SO, MILAGROS SOLMIRANO, CHRISTINE TALUSIK, CYRIL
ROMUADO TEJA EFREN TESORERO, PENNYLANE TIONGSON,
CYPRIANO TOMINES, RONILO UMALI, MA. LOURSES VALDUAZA,
MA. ANTONIA VALENZUELA, EDWIN VANGUARDIA, CARLO VEGA,
ANNAMOR VELASCO, ESTEFANIA VILLANUEVA, CANDELARIA
YODICO , respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA , J : p

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 In this petition for review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation assails the August 20, 2004 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82637, which dismissed its petition for certiorari
from the October 14, 2003 3 and December 15, 2003 4 Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138. 5 The said Orders, in turn, respectively
granted the issuance of a writ of execution and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in Civil Case No. 99-1209 — a case for mandamus. SAHITC

The antecedents follow.

Petitioner, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), is a
government-owned and controlled corporation created under the authority of
Presidential Decree No. 1267 for the primary purpose of developing and providing a
secondary market for home mortgages granted by public and/or private home-
nancing institutions. 6 In its employ were respondents, 7 mostly rank-and- le
employees, who all profess as having been hired after June 30, 1989. 8
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as The Compensation
and Position Classi cation Act of 1989, was enacted and was subsequently approved
on August 21, 1989. Section 12 thereof directed that all allowances — namely
representation and transportation allowance, clothing and laundry allowance,
subsistence allowance, hazard pay and other allowances as may be determined by the
budget department — enjoyed by covered employees should be deemed included in the
standardized salary rates prescribed therein, and that the other additional
compensation being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into
the standardized salary rates should continue to be authorized. To implement the law,
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10. 9 Section 5.5 1 0 thereof excluded certain allowances and bene ts from
integration into the standardized basic salary but continued their grant to those who
were incumbents as of June 30, 1989 and who were actually receiving the bene ts as
of said date. These are the allowances involved in this case.
Respondents led a petition for mandamus with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
1 3 8 1 1 to compel petitioner to pay them meal, rice, medical, dental, optical and
children's allowances, as well as longevity pay, which allegedly were already being
enjoyed by other NHMFC employees as early as July 1, 1989. In its April 27, 2001
Decision, the trial court ruled favorably and ordered petitioner to pay respondents the
allowances prayed for, retroactive to the respective dates of appointment. 1 2 The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and
respondent is ordered to pay petitioners their meal allowance, rice allowance,
medical allowance, longevity pay and children's allowance retroactive to the dates
of their respective appointments up to the present or for the time that they were
employed by the respondent.

SO ORDERED. 1 3

In arriving at the conclusion that respondents were entitled to the prayed-for

benefits, the trial court explained, thus,
The use of the word "only" before the words July 1, 1989 in section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6758 appears to be the source of the dispute.

Section 12 is clear that other additional compensation being received by

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 incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 that are not integrated into the standardized
salary rates shall continue to be authorized. The law is prospective in effect and it
does not say that such additional compensation shall not continue to be
authorized for employees appointed after June 30, 1989. The use of the word
"only" before the words "as of July 1, 1989" quali es the additional compensation
which can be continued. The foregoing applies to all employees whether
permanent or casual. cSDHEC

DBM Circular No. 10, the Implementing Rules and Regulations particularly
section 5.5 thereof . . . use the word "only" for incumbents as of June 30, 1989
and by implication the same shall not apply to employees appointed after June
30, 1989. This is in effect another quali cation limiting the grant of bene ts to
those who are incumbents as of June 30, 1989, a condition not imposed by
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 for which reason it has to be strike (sic)
down. 1 4

Petitioner timely led an appeal with the Court of Appeals. 1 5 In its November 21,
2001 Decision, the appellate court a rmed the trial court's ruling. 1 6 No appeal was
taken from the decision and upon its finality, 1 7 respondents moved for execution. 1 8
However, the motion for execution was withdrawn when on May 12, 2002,
petitioner and respondents executed a Compromise Agreement in which petitioner
bound itself to comply with the decision rendered in the case, except that the payment
of the allowances adjudicated in favor of respondents would be made in four
installments instead. It was, likewise stipulated therein that the parties waive all claims
against each other. The trial court did not take any positive action on the compromise
except to note the same since the parties did not intend to novate the April 27, 2001
Decision. 1 9 On that basis, petitioner had started paying respondents the arrears in
benefits.
Con ict arose when the DBM sent a letter 2 0 dated July 15, 2003 to NHMFC
President Angelico Salud disallowing the payment of certain allowances, including
those awarded by the trial court to respondents. A reading of the letter reveals that the
disallowance was made in accordance with the 2002 NHMFC Corporate Operating
Budget previously issued by the DBM.
To abide by the DBM's directive, petitioner then issued a memorandum stating
that effective August 2003, the grant of bene ts to its covered employees, including
those awarded to respondents, would be curtailed pursuant to the DBM letter. 2 1 This
eventuality compelled respondents to le for the second time a motion for a writ of
execution of the trial court's April 27, 2001 decision. 2 2
In its October 14, 2003 Order, 2 3 the trial court found merit in respondents'
motion; hence, it directed the execution of the judgment. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration 2 4 but it was denied. 2 5 On February 16, 2004, the trial court issued a
Writ of Execution/Garnishment with a directive to the sheriff to tender to respondents
the amount of their collective claim equivalent to P4,806,530.00 to be satis ed out of
petitioners goods and chattels and if the same be not su cient, out of its existing real
property. 2 6 Respondents then sought the garnishment of its funds under the custody
of the Land Bank of the Philippines. 2 7
Bent on preventing execution, petitioner led a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82637. 2 8 In it, petitioner ascribed grave
abuse of discretion to the trial court in ordering the execution of the judgment. It
pointed out that the trial court disregarded the fact that the DBM's issuance amounted
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 to a supervening event, or an occurrence that changed the situation of the parties that
would make the continued payment of allowances to respondents impossible and
illegal, and disregarded the DBM's exclusive authority to allow or disallow the payment
of the bene ts in question. 2 9 It likewise faulted the trial court in ordering the
garnishment of its funds despite the settled rule that government funds may not be
garnished in the absence of an appropriation made by law. 3 0
The Court of Appeals, however, found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court; hence, in its August 20, 2004 Decision, it dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. 3 1
In its present recourse, petitioner, on the one hand, insists that it is di cult not to
consider the issuance of the DBM in this case as a supervening event that would make
the execution of the trial court's decision inequitable and/or impossible, since the
determination of entitlement to bene ts and allowances among government
employees is within the agency's exclusive authority. It argues that, hence, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals were in error to order the execution of the decision as
the same totally disregards the rule that issuances of administrative agencies are valid
and enforceable. 3 2 Again, it asserts that the garnishment of its funds was not in order
as there was no existing appropriation therefor. 3 3
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in the main that inasmuch as the core
issue of whether they were entitled to the schedule of bene ts under Section 12 of R.A.
No. 6758 had already been settled by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 99-1209 and
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66303, the DBM letter should not be allowed to
interfere with the decision and render the same ineffective. Since the said decision had
already attained nality, they posit that execution appeared to be the only just and
equitable measure under the premises 3 4 and that garnishment lies against petitioner's
funds inasmuch as it has a personality separate and distinct from the government. 3 5
There is partial merit in the petition. HCTAEc

To begin with, a writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of

competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior
court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of
a particular duty therein speci ed, which duty results from the o cial station of the
party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. 3 6 It is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty 3 7 which, as opposed to a
discretionary one, is that which an o cer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. 3 8
A favorable judgment rendered in a special civil action for mandamus is in the
nature of a special judgment. As such, it requires the performance of any other act than
the payment of money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property the execution
of which is governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court 3 9 which states:
SECTION 11. Execution of Special Judgment. — When the judgment
requires the performance of any act other than those mentioned in the two
preceding sections, a certi ed copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ
of execution and shall be served by the o cer upon the party against whom the
same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the
same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys
such judgment.
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 While the April 17, 2001 Decision of the trial court ordered petitioner to pay the
bene ts claimed by respondents, it by no means ordered the payment of a speci c
sum of money and instead merely directed petitioner to extend to respondents the
bene ts under R.A. No. 6758 and its implementing rules. Being a special judgment, the
decision may not be executed in the same way as a judgment for money handed down
in an ordinary civil case governed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
sanctions garnishment of debts and credits to satisfy a monetary award. Garnishment
is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one for payment of a sum of money.
It cannot be employed to implement a special judgment such as that rendered in a
special civil action for mandamus. 4 0
On this score, not only did the trial court exceed the scope of its judgment when
it awarded the bene ts claimed by respondents. It also committed a blatant error when
it issued the February 16, 2004 Order directing the garnishment of petitioner's funds
with the Land Bank of the Philippines equivalent to P4,806,530.00, even though the said
amount was not specified in the decision it sought to implement.
Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that execution by
garnishment could proceed in this case against the funds of petitioner, it must bear
stress that the latter is a government-owned or controlled corporation with a charter of
its own. Its juridical personality is separate and distinct from the government and it can
sue and be sued in its name. 4 1 As such, while indeed it cannot evade the effects of the
execution of an adverse judgment and may not ordinarily place its funds beyond an
order of garnishment issued in ordinary cases, 4 2 it is imperative in order for execution
to ensue that a claim for the payment of the judgment award be rst led with the
Commission on Audit (COA). 4 3
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, 4 4 as amended by P.D. No. 1445, 4 5 the COA,
as one of the three independent constitutional commissions, is speci cally vested with
the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held
in trust by the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. 4 6 To ensure the effective
discharge of its functions, it is vested with ample powers, subject to constitutional
limitations, to de ne the scope of its audit and examination and establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, to promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties. 4 7 Section 1, 4 8 Rule II of the COA Rules of Procedure
materially provides: EcaDCI

Section 1. General Jurisdiction. — The Commission on Audit shall have

the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned and
controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and o ces that have been granted scal
autonomy under the Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities;
(c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and
(d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or
indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
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 However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate,
the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-
audit, as are necessary or appropriate to correct the de ciencies. It shall keep the
general accounts of the Government, and for such period as may be provided by
law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
xxx xxx xxx

Speci cally, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not limited to
the following: . . . Money claims due from or owing to any government
agency . . . . 4 9

Clearly, the matter of allowing or disallowing a money claim against petitioner is

within the primary power of the COA to decide. This no doubt includes money claims
arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758. 5 0 Respondents' claim against
petitioner, although it has already been validated by the trial court's nal decision,
likewise belongs to that class of claims; hence, it must rst be led with the COA
before execution could proceed. And from the decision therein, the aggrieved party is
afforded a remedy by elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari 5 1 in
accordance with Section 1, Rule XI, of the COA Rules of Procedure. It states:
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. — Any decision, order or resolution
of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof in the
manner provided by law, the Rules of Court and these Rules.
When the decision, order or resolution adversely affects the interest of any
government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of the agency.

At this juncture, it is unmistakable that the recourse of respondents in CA-G.R. SP

No. 82637 as well as in the petition before us is at best premature. Thus, the Court
cannot possibly rule on the merits of the petition lest we would only be preempting the
action of the COA on the matter. Su ce it to say that the propriety or regularity of
respondents' claim under the judgment of the trial court may properly be addressed by
the COA in an appropriate action. And even if we endeavor to take great lengths in
deciding the merits of the case and determine the propriety of the DBM's issuance, its
su ciency to prevent the execution of the nal judgment rendered in this case, and the
entitlement or non-entitlement of each one of the respondents to the bene ts under
R.A. No. 6758, the same would nevertheless be a futile exercise. This, because after
having pored over the records of the case, we found nothing su cient to support
respondents' uniform claim that they were incumbents as of July 1, 1989 — the date
provided in Section 12 of R.A. 6758 — except perhaps their bare contention that they
were all hired after June 30, 1989.
With this disquisition, we nd no compelling reason to unnecessarily lengthen the
discussion by undeservingly proceeding further with the other issues propounded by
the parties.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED IN PART . The August 20, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82637 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE . The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 is DIRECTED to execute
the April 17, 2001 Decision in Civil Case No. 99-1209 in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED .

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 Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 9-36.
2. The decision was rendered by the Special Seventeenth Division and was penned by
Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and
Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa (now retired) concurring; rollo, pp. 40-47.
3. Records, Vol. I, p. 441.
4. Id. at 451.
5. Presided by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. (now Court of Appeals Associate Justice).
6. Presidential Decree No. 1267, which carried the title "Creating a National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation, Defining Its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes", was
signed on December 22, 1977.
7. Namely, Mario Abayari, May Almine, Ma. Victoria Alpajaro, Florante Amores, Angelina
Ancheta, Angeline Odiem-Araneta, Cecilia Apacible, Miriam Bajado, Eduardo Balauro,
Evangelina Baliao, Luisa Banua, Rizalina, Benlayo, Marjorie Binag, Cresencia Bisnar,
Carmelita Breboneria, Joselyn Bunyi, Emilio Cabmongan, Jr., Paz Divina Cabanero, Raul
Cabanilla, Leonila Wynda Cada, Celestina Casao, Elizabeth Casas, Arnulfo Catalan,
Francis dela Chica, Jaime Cortes, Jaime dela Cruz, Johnny Custodio, Ma. Belinda
Dapula, Remedios Debuque, Rebecca Decara, Jocelyn Diego, Jaime Duque, Lucia
Enriquez, Ma. Lucia Esperos, Helen Evangelista, Celso Fernandez, Edilberto San Gabriel,
Reynaldo San Gabriel, Edmundo Garais, Jennilyn Gozado, Evelyn Guevarra, Ma.
Magdalena Hidona, Victorino Indefonso, Jr., Grace Cecille Javier, Marieta Jose, Ma.
Cecilia Kapaw-an, Evangeline Labay, Senora Lacunsay, Milagroso Allan Lamban, Violeta
De Leon, Charito Lontayo, Remedios Loyola, Nora Malaluan, Alberto Malificiado, Dennis
Manzano, Ma. Concepcion Marquez, Reynaldo Masilang, Magdalena Mendoza, Melchor
Nanud, Milagros Nepomuceno, Rosemarie Nepomuceno, Apolo Nisperos, Annaliza
Nobrera, Evangeline Nuesca, Yumina Pablo, Gloria Panganiban, Rogelio Paquiz, Rolando
Paredes, Nora Pedroso, Maria Hilna Dela Peña, Victoria Penarada, Melvin Peralta,
Dorothy Perez, Frederick Michael Portacion, Rommel Rabaca, Roderick Realubit,
Gwendolyn Remorin, Antonio Delos Reyes, Nerrisa Reyes, Nenita Robrigado, Allan
Romero, Ma. Rosario Romulo, Luis Del Rosario, Cristina Rosas, Dexter Salazar,
Magdalena Salomon, Olivia Salomon, Elenita Sanchez, Angelita Santelices, Anabelle
Santos, Aurea Santos, Nelia Santos, Sharlene Santos, Jaime Singh, Delmasingun, Evelyn
So, Jeanne Socorro, Milagros Solmirano, Christine Talusik, Cyril Romuado Teja, Efren
Tesorero, Pennylane Tiongson, Cipriano Tomines, Ronilo Umali, Ma. Lourdes Valdueza,
Ma. Antonia Valenzuela, Edwin Vanguardia, Carlo Vega, Annamor Velasco, Estefania
Villanueva, Candelaria Yodico.

8. Records, Vol. I, p. 5.
9. It carries the title "Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System Prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 For
Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and Financial Institutions
(GFIs)". For lack of the requisite publication, the Circular was declared ineffective in the
case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 355 Phil. 584 (1998), but it was subsequently
re-issued on February 15, 1999 and published on March 1, 1999. See Magno v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 149941, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 339.
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 10. Section 5.5. The following allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs
pursuant to the aforementioned issuances are not likewise to be integrated into the basic
salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989
who are authorized and actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date at
the same terms and conditions prescribed in said issuances:
5.5.1. Rice Subsidy;
5.5.2. Sugar Subsidy;

5.5.3. Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;

5.5.4. Medical/dental/optical allowances/benefits;
5.5.5. Children's Allowance;
5.5.6. Special Duty Pay/Allowance;

5.5.7. Meal Subsidy;

5.5.8. Longevity Pay; and
5.5.9. Teller's Allowance.
11. Supra note 5.
12. Records, Vol. I, p. 207.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 206-207.
15. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66303.
16. See the Decision in CA G.R. SP No. 66303, CA rollo, p. 37.
17. Records, Vol. I, p. 392.

18. Id. at 395-398.

19. See Order dated May 20, 2002, records, vol. I, p. 391.
20. The letter was signed by then DBM Secretary Emilia Boncodin, CA rollo, pp. 40-42.
21. Records, Vol. II, p. 157.

22. Records, Vol. I, pp. 395-398.

23. Id. at 441.
24. Id. at 442-444.
25. Id. at 451.
26. Records, p. 157.

27. While petitioner claims that respondents had sought the garnishment of its funds, the
supposed notice of garnishment does not appear in the records.

28. CA rollo, pp. 2-16.

29. Id. at 7-13.
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 30. Id. at 135.
31. Id. at 147. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

32. Rollo, pp. 20-21.

33. Id. at 257.
34. Id. at 193, 195-197.
35. Id. at 194-195.
36. 34 Am Jur. Mandamus, $2.

37. Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301,
306.

38. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company Credit Union, Inc. v.
Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-25316, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 616, 621.
39. FERIA NOCHE, Civil Procedure Annotated, Vol. 2, 2001 ed. pp. 56, 501.

40. National Electrification Administration v. Morales, G.R. No. 154200, July 24, 2007, 528
SCRA 79, 88-89.

41. Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1267, dated December 21, 1977, provides:
Section 5. Powers of the Corporation. The corporation shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To adopt, alter and use a corporate seal; to sue and be sued ; and generally, to
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law which are not
inconsistent herewith . . . .

42. See National Electrification Administration v. Morales, supra note 40, 89-90, citing
National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo, 452 Phil 481, 495 (2003); Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v. De Castro, G.R. No. L-34548, November 29, 1988,
168 SCRA 49, 59; Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators, G.R. No. 84992,
December 15, 1989, 180 SCRA 171, 174-175; Philippine National Railways v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-55347, October 4, 1985, 139 SCRA 87, 91 and Philippine National
Bank v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 595, 601-602.
43. National Electrification Administration v. Morales, supra note 40, at 90, citing Parreno v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 162224, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 390. (2007).
44. Entitled "An Act Fixing the Time within which the Auditor General shall render His
Decisions and Prescribing the Manner of Appeal Therefrom".
45. Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Ordaining and Instituting a Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines). Signed on June 11, 1978.
46. National Electrification Administration v. Morales, supra note 40, National Irrigation
Administration v. Enciso, G.R. No. 142571, May 6, 2006; Commissioner of Internal
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 Revenue v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 101976, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 203,
211-212.

47. National Irrigation Administration v. Enciso, supra, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.

Commission on Audit, supra note 46.
48. This provision is also found in Section 2 (1), Article IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution.
49. Emphasis ours.
50. See National Electrification Administration v. Morales, supra note 40.
51. Public Estates Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 156537, January 24, 2007,
512 SCRA 428; Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466
SCRA 307; Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 100773, October
16, 1992, 214 SCRA 653, 660; Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 104217, December 4, 1994, 238 SCRA 714.

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