A Dadada

G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B.

TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes,
assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate
of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations,
specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan,
Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135
J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House
of Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate
is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she
is a permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the United States of America;5 and (5) that she is a Filipino
citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.6
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman
Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage between
them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a
religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it
void ab initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman
Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her.8 As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live
Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964.9 Lastly, petitioner notes that
the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not
supported by evidence.10
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a “Manifestation with Motion to
Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits”11 consisting of, among others: (1) a copy
of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled “Seeking and Finding the Truth about
Regina O. Reyes” with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document executed by its author
Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that
petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of
petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of
Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution12 cancelling petitioner’s COC, to wit: cralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is
not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC
First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district
of Marinduque.
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not
lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that
the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she is
a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted into dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still,
petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24
September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement prescribed by the
Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of
origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.
On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution15 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality16 declaring the 14 May 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days
have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution.17
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the following issues:19
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.
32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged “newly-discovered evidence” without the
same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence which became the basis for its
Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law.
33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency
requirement for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed
additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in
Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if
not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is asserting that it is the HRET
which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her eligibility and qualifications to be a
Member of the House of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It
appears then that petitioner’s recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing its final and executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053.
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the issues raised by petitioner. The
need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when
it was emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the House of Representatives begins on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications”
of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons: cra lavvonli nelawli bra ry
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred
that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: cralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member
of the House of Representatives, to wit: cralavvon linel awlib rary
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court ruled
that:cralavvonli nelawlib ra ry
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,25 wherein the Court, referring
to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that: cralavvon line lawlib rary
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit: cralavvon line lawlib rary
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of
his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns – were
transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these
cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only
taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.
For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET against
that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the
Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007, or after the start
of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit: cralavvon linelaw lib rary
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to Our attention
that on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had
already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives of the
First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very same day, he had taken his oath before
Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly.
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed office, and
hence, was already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she
has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.”28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken
before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers
membership to the House of Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides: cralavvo nli nelawlib rary
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively
or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains
unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s
lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there
was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument
of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four
days after the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by
such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the
COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was promulgated on 27 March 2013,
and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final
and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
provides:c ralavvo nline lawlib rary
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and
to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory, petitioner should
have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of
Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she failed to do so. She would file
the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued
a Certificate of Finality.
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year
residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of “newly-
discovered evidence” without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She
assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification
from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due
process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure
in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure “shall be
liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition
of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.” In view of the fact that the proceedings in
a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the “newly
discovered evidence” was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity
to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s petition was filed up to 27 March
2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:31
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First
Division, discoursed as follows: cralavvon line lawlib rary
“x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make
a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on
in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of proof regarding her American citizenship,
contending that it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has
become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to
use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA
9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore,
ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines.”32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US
passport, and that her status is that of a “balikbayan.” At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost
the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside
from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support
such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a
holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. 33 Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached said
Affidavit “if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a
superfluity.”35 We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If petitioner executed said
Affidavit “if only to comply with the rules,” then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to
her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the
assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: “This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of
office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born
Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath
of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and evidence in the present
case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon
by Respondent COMELEC.”36 This statement raises a lot of questions – Did petitioner execute an oath of
allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the
earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-
born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends
that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of
Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it
was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered
compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91,
Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial
Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner’s
citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born status, we
quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident
of Marinduque: cralavvon linelawl ibra ry
“Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no
proof that [petitioner] had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the one-year residency requirement of
the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is
not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her domicile
in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said
locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA.”37 (Emphasis supplied.)
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the
COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal
objective of determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in Mastura v. COMELEC:38
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when
there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with
greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election
by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
Time and again, We emphasize that the “grave abuse of discretion” which warrants this Court’s exercise
of certiorari jurisdiction has a well-defined meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on
Elections39 where the Court held: c ralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to
exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of
discretion exists.
Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of R.A.
No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives other than
those enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.
The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of Representatives who
have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have
one-year residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it
inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she
reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied the constitutional provision and
nothing more.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming
the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Carpio, Villarama, and Leonen, JJ. joins the dissent of J. Brion.
Velasco, Jr., and Mendoza, JJ., no part.
Brion, J., see dissent.
Peralta, J., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., no part due to voluntary inhibition.
Endnotes:
Rollo, p. 70.
1
cra lawlib rary
2
Id.. cralawlibrary
3
Id. at 71. cralawlibra ry
4
Respondent relies on the following facts: (a) [petitioner] was admitted to the California State Bar on June
12, 1995; (b) [petitioner] maintained a US address and earned her undergraduate studies in Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C.; (c) [petitioner] married an American citizen named Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio
in 1997, which marriage was subsequently dissolved; and (4) [petitioner] acquired properties and
established businesses in the U.S.; Comelec Resolution dated 27 March 2013. Id. at 44. cralawlib ra ry
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Id at 127-139. cralawlib rary
12
Id. at 40-51. cralawlib rary
13
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural- born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election. c ralawlib ra ry
14
15
16
17
Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to Par. 2, Sec. 8 of Resolution
No. 9523 provides that a decision or resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in special actions and special cases
shall become final and executory five (5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining order is issued by
the Supreme Court. Sec. 3, Rule 37, Part VII also provides that decisions in petitions to deny due course to
or cancel certificates of candidacy shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from
promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. cralawlibra ry
18
19
20
Id. cralawlibra ry
21
318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995). cralawli bra ry
22
G.R. No. 172131, 2 April 2007, 520 SCRA 166, 179. cralawlibra ry
23
G.R. No. 163756, 26 January 2005, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405. cralawl ibra ry
24
391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000). cralawli bra ry
25
G.R. Nos. 179240-41, 1 April 2009, 583 SCRA 1, 33. cralawlibrary
26
G.R. No. 192856, 8 March 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 798-799. cralawli bra ry
27
G.R. No. 179285, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 381, 390. cralawli bra ry
28
Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. cralawlib rary
29
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File.—Unless otherwise provided by law, or by any
specific provisions in these Rules, any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from its promulgation. cralawl ibra ry
30
Section 2. Mode of review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. cralaw lib rary
31
G.R. No. 201796, 15 January 2013. cralawlib rary
Rollo, pp. 47-48.

32
c ralawl ibra ry
33
34
35
36
37
38
G.R. No. 124521 29 January 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499. cralawli bra ry
39
G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The petition before us is a petition for certiorari1 with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction and/or status quo ante order, that seeks to annul: (1) the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) March 27, 20132 and May 14, 20133 Comelec Resolutions cancelling petitioner Regina Ongsiako
Reyes’ (petitioner or Reyes) Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative in the lone
district of Marinduque, and (2) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality4 declaring the May 14, 2013
Resolution final and executory in SPA Case No. 13-053(DC).
I. The Case and the Dissent in Context
I submit this Dissenting Opinion to express my strong reservations to the majority’s outright dismissal of
this most unusual case – a term I do not use lightly as shown by the reasons stated below.
I clarify at the outset that the present case is at its inception stage; it is a newly filed petition that the
Court is acting upon for the first time and which the majority opted to DISMISS OUTRIGHT after an
initial review, based solely on the petition and its annexes and its “finding [that there was] no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections.”
Subsequent to the Comelec’s rulings, however, intervening events occurred that might have materially
affected the jurisdictional situation and the procedural requirements in handling and resolving the case. The
petitioner was proclaimed as the winner by the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), and
she subsequently took her oath of office.
This Dissent is filed, not on the basis of the intrinsic merits of the case, but because of the outright and
reckless denial of the minority’s plea that the respondents be required to at least COMMENT on the petition
in light of the gravity of the issues raised, the potential effect on jurisprudence, and the affected
personal relationships within and outside the Court, before any further action can be made. The presented
issues refer to –
- the Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, which jurisdiction should now lie
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and
- the grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in handling the case that led to the assailed COMELEC
decision.
Viewed in these lights, it should be appreciated that the Court in effect did not rule on the merits of
the case after considering the parties’ legal and factual positions. The majority’s Resolution is in fact
only a ruling that the Court no longer wishes to review the Comelec’s rulings despite the issues raised and
the attendant intervening circumstances.
Despite its seemingly simple approach, the Court’s outright dismissal of the petition is replete with profound
effects on the petitioner on the indirect beneficiary of the ruling, and on jurisprudence, as it effectively
upholds the disqualification of petitioner and leaves the remaining candidate in Marinduque as an unopposed
candidate.5 What is not easily seen by the lay observer is that by immediately ruling and avoiding the
jurisdiction of the HRET on the matter of qualification, the majority avoids a quo warranto petition
that, if successful, would render petitioner Reyes disqualified, leaving the congressional position in
Marinduque’s lone district vacant.
Significantly, the Dissent is not a lonely one made solely by the undersigned; he is joined by three (3) other
Justices.6 Seven (7) Justices7 formed the majority with three (3) Justices inhibiting for personal
reasons,8 with one (1) Justice absent.9
II. Summary of the Dissent’s Supporting Positions
That this unusual case at least deserves further proceedings from this Court other than the OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL the majority ordered, is supported by the following considerations: c ralavvo nline lawlib rary
First, the questions raised in the petition are NOT too unsubstantial to warrant further
proceedings.
a. Under Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the Court may dismiss the petition if it was
filed manifestly for delay, or the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further
proceedings. In the present case, the majority dismissed the petition outright despite the
threshold issue of jurisdiction that Reyes squarely raised.
b. The due process issues Reyes raised with respect to the COMELEC proceedings cannot be taken
lightly, in particular, the COMELEC’s failure to accord her the opportunity to question the nature and
authenticity of the evidence submitted by the respondent Joseph Tan (Tan) as well as controverting
evidence the petition cited. In fact, no less than Comelec Chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr., echoed
this concern in his Dissenting Opinion from the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec en banc.
c. A third issue raised relates to the COMELEC’s imposition of a qualification for the position of
congressman, other than those mentioned in the Constitution. The Court’s Resolution glossed over
this issue and did not touch it at all. For this reason, this Dissent will similarly refrain from
discussing the issue, except to state that the issue raised touches on the Constitution and should
have at least merited a passing mention by the Court in its immediate and outright dismissal of the
petition.
Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be without basis and out of our sense
of delicadeza (which we should have), the Court should at least hear and consider both sides
before making a ruling that would favor the son of a Member of the Court.
To reiterate, the Comelec en banc ruling cancelling Reyes’ CoC means that: (1) Reyes’ CoC is void ab initio;
(2) that she was never a valid candidate at all; and (3) all the votes in her favor are stray votes.
Consequently, the remaining candidate would be declared the winner, as held in Aratea v. Commission on
Elections10 Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections11 and Maquiling v. Commission on Elections.12
Third, the majority’s holding that the jurisdiction of the HRET only begins after the candidate has assumed
the office on June 30 is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence; in fact, it is a major retrogressive
jurisprudential development that can emasculate the HRET. In making this kind of ruling, the Court
should have at least undertaken a full-blown proceeding rather than simply declare the immediate and
outright dismissal of the petition.
Note in this regard that the majority’s jurisprudential ruling –
a. is contrary to the HRET rules.
b. effectively allows the filing of any election protest or a petition for quo warranto only after the
assumption to office by the candidate on June 30 at the earliest. In the context of the present case,
any election protest protest or petition for quo warranto filed on or after June 30 would be declared
patently out of time since the filing would be more than fifteen (15) days from Reyes’ proclamation
on May 18, 2013.
c. would affect all future proclamations since they cannot be earlier than 15 days counted from the
June 30 constitutional cut-off for the assumption to office of the newly elected officials.
III. The Assailed Comelec Petition
A. The Petition Before the COMELEC
The present petition before this Court and its attachments show that on October 1, 2012, Reyes filed her
CoC for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque. On October 10, 2012, Tan filed
with the Comelec a petition to deny due course or to cancel Reyes’ CoC. Tan alleged that Reyes committed
material misrepresentations in her CoC, specifically: (1) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac
Marinduque when in truth she is a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa Quezon City or Bauan Batangas
following the residence of her husband; (2) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (3) that she is not a
permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (4) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964,
when in truth it is July 3, 1958; (5) that her civil status is single; and (6) that she is eligible for the office
she seeks to be elected to.
B. The COMELEC Proceedings
In her Answer, Reyes averred that while she is publicly known to be the wife of Rep. Hermilando Mandanas
of Bauan, Batangas, the truth of the matter is that they are not legally married; thus, Mandanas’ residence
cannot be attributed to her. She also countered that the evidence presented by Tan does not support the
allegation that she is a permanent resident or a citizen of the United States. With respect to her birth date,
her birth certificate issued by the NSO showed that it was on July 3, 1964. At any rate, Reyes contended
that the representations as to her civil status and date of birth are not material so as to warrant the
cancellation of her CoC.
On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and
Amended List of Exhibits consisting of, among others, a copy of an article published online on January 8,
2013 entitled “Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes.” This article provided a database
record from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) indicating that Reyes is an American citizen
and a holder of a US passport that she has been using since 2005. Tan also submitted a photocopy of a
Certification of Travel Records from the BID, which showed that Reyes holds a US passport No. 306278853.
Based on these pieces of evidence and the fact that Reyes failed to take an Oath of Allegiance and execute
an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225), Tan
argued that Reyes’ was ineligible to run for the position of Representative and thus, her CoC should be
cancelled.
C. The Comelec First Division Ruling
On March 27, 2013, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution granting the petition and cancelling
Reyes’ CoC. On the alleged misrepresentations in Reyes’ CoC with respect to her civil status and birth date,
the Comelec First Division held that these are not material representations that could affect her
qualifications or eligibility, thus cancellation of CoC on these grounds is not warranted.
The Comelec First Division, however, found that Reyes committed false material representation with respect
to her citizenship and residency. Based on the newly discovered evidence submitted by Tan, the
Comelec First Division found that Reyes was a holder of a US passport, which she continued to
use until June 30, 2012; she also failed to establish that she had applied for repatriation under RA 9225
by taking the required Oath of Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American
Citizenship. Based on these findings, the Comelec First Division ruled the Reyes remains to be an American
citizen, and thus, is ineligible to run and hold any elective office.
On the issue of her residency in Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque, the Comelec First Division found that Reyes
did not regain her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque after she lost it when she became a naturalized
US citizen; that Reyes had not shown that she had re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225,
there being no proof that she had renounced her US citizenship; thus, she has not abandoned her domicile
of choice in America. Citing Japzon v. Commission on Elections,13 the Comelec First Division held that a
Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-
acquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines
by positive acts and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of
choice.
Finally, the Comelec First Division disregarded Reyes’ proof that she met the one-year residency
requirement when she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18,
2011 to July 13, 2011 as it is not sufficient to satisfy the one-year residency requirement.
On April 8, 2013, Reyes filed her motion for reconsideration. Attached to the motion were an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 21, 2012 and a Voter Certification in Boac, Marinduque
dated April 17, 2012. In her Motion, Reyes admitted that she was married to an American citizen named
Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio in 1997 and thus, she acquired dual citizenship through marriage to an American
citizen.
D. The Comelec en banc Ruling
On May 14, 2013, the Comelec en banc promulgated its Resolution denying Reyes’ motion for
reconsideration and affirming the ruling of the Comelec First Division on the ground that the former’s motion
was a mere rehash of the arguments she raised against the First Division ruling.
D-a. Commissioner Lim’s Concurring Opinion
Commissioner Lim concurred in the result and held that Reyes failed to comply with twin requirements of RA
9225; she belatedly filed her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship but failed to submit an Oath of
Allegiance. She also failed to prove that she complied with the one-year residency requirement for lack of
evidence of any overt or positive act that she had established and maintained her residency in Boac,
Marinduque.
D-b. Chairman Brillantes’ Dissenting Opinion
Chairman Brillantes dissented from the majority and held that Tan failed to offer substantial evidence to
prove that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship. He noted that the internet article by a certain Eli Obligacion
showing that Reyes used a US passport on June 30, 2012 is hearsay while the purported copy of the BID
certification is merely a photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the original, thus similarly
inadmissible as evidence. Chairman Brillantes also emphasized that a petition to deny due course under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) cannot be a pre-election substitute for a quo warranto
proceeding. Under prevailing laws, there remains to be no pre-election legal remedy to question the
eligibility or lack of qualification of a candidate. Chairman Brillantes was of the view that a petition to deny
due course tackles exclusively the issue of deliberate misrepresentation over a qualification, and not the lack
of qualification per se which is the proper subject of a quo warranto proceeding.
Finally, he opined that the issues pertaining to Reyes’ residence and citizenship requires exhaustive
presentation and examination of evidence that are best addressed in a full blown quo warranto
proceeding rather than the summary proceedings in the present case.
IV. Events Subsequent to the Comelec Decision
A. On May 18, 2013, the Marinduque PBOC proclaimed Reyes as the duly elected member of the
House of Representatives for Marinduque, having garnered the highest number of votes in the total of 52,
209 votes.
B. On June 5, 2013, the Comelec en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring its May 14, 2013
Resolution final and executory citing paragraph b, Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure in
relation to paragraph 2, Section 8, of Resolution No. 9523 which provides that a decision or resolution of
the Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory five
(5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.
C. On June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before House Speaker Rep. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.
V. The Petition Before this Court
A. Positions and Arguments
In support of her petition before this Court, Reyes submits the following positions and arguments: cralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
(1) Comelec has been ousted of jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed the winner for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque;
(2) Comelec violated her right to due process when it took cognizance of
the documents submitted by Tan that were not testified to, offered
and admitted in evidence without giving her the opportunity to
question the authenticity of these documents as well as present
controverting evidence;
(3) Comelec gravely erred when it declared that petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and did not meet the one year residency requirement
despite the finding that he assumed and held office as provincial
administrator;
(4) Comelec gravely abused its discretion in enforcing the provision of
RA 9225 insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives other than those enumerated in the
Constitution.
B. The Issues Raised
As presented to this Court, the petition raised the following issues:

cralavvo nline lawlib rary
(1) Whether or not the Comelec is ousted of jurisdiction over the petition
who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath
of office for the position of Member, House of Representatives?
(2) Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
took cognizance of Tan’s newly discovered evidence without having
been testified to, as well as offered and admitted in evidence, in
violation of Reyes’ right to due process?
(3) Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
declared that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the
one-year residency requirement for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives?
(4) Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion when, by
enforcing RA 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the
qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives under
Section 6, Art. VI of the Constitution?
How the public respondent COMELEC views the issues presented, particularly the question of jurisdiction and
grave abuse of discretion are presently unknown elements in these proceedings as the COMELEC has not
been heard on the case. To be sure, it should have a say, as a named respondent, especially on the matter
of jurisdiction.
VI. The Majority Ruling
On the issue of the COMELEC’s

jurisdiction
Without the benefit of full blown arguments by the parties, the majority ruling ruled on the merits of the
jurisdictional issue and held that the Comelec has jurisdiction for the following reasons:
cralavvon linelaw lib rary
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes’ qualifications and the assailed Comelec
Resolutions unless a petition is filed with the tribunal.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. A candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives with the concurrence
of three requisites: (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath; and (c) assumption of office.
It went on to state that Reyes cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because she
had not yet assumed office; she can only do so on June 30, 2013. It pointed out, too, that before
Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013, the Comelec en banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
Reyes US citizenship and lack of residency; thus, there was no longer any pending case at that time. In
these lights, it held that Comelec continued to have jurisdiction.
On the issue of admissibility of the

evidence presented and due process
The majority emphasized that the Comelec is not strictly bound to adhere to the technical rules of
evidence. Since the proceedings to deny due course or to cancel a CoC are summary in nature, then the
newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by the Comelec. Also, there was no denial of due process
since Reyes was given every opportunity to argue her case before the Comelec.
On the issue of citizenship
Again ruling on the merits, the majority upheld the Comelec’s finding that based on the Tan’s newly
discovered evidence, Reyes is an American citizen and thus is ineligible to run and hold any elective
office. The majority likewise held that the burden of proof had been shifted to Reyes to prove that: (1) she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that (2) she re-acquired such status by properly complying with the
requirements of RA 9225, and that Reyes had failed to substantiate that she is a natural born Filipino citizen
and complied with the requirements of RA 9925. It emphasized that Reyes inexplicably failed to submit an
Oath of Allegiance despite belatedly filing an Oath of Renunciation and that her oath that she took in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator does not suffice to satisfy the requirements of
RA 9225.
On the issue of residency

The majority similarly affirmed the Comelec’s ruling that Reyes had not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the United States and thus did not satisfy the one-year Philippine residency requirement. It held that Reyes
effectively abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque when she became a naturalized US
citizen. In the absence of proof that she had renounced her American citizenship, she cannot be considered
to have abandoned her domicile of choice in the US. The majority also noted that Reyes’ service as
Provincial Administrator from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year
residency in Boac, Marinduque.
VII. Comments On The Majority’s Ruling
The majority’s unusual approach and strained rulings that already touched on the merits of substantial
issues raised should, at the very least, not be allowed to stand without comments. I call these “comments”
as a “refutation” implies a consideration on the merits of properly submitted and debated issues, which did
not happen in this case.
A. No basis exists to DISMISS the petition outright.
Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court14 merely requires that the petition be sufficient in form and
substance to justify an order from the Court to act on the petition and to require the respondents to file
their comments. The same rule also provides that the Court may dismiss the petition outright (as the
majority did in the present case) if it was filed manifestly for delay or if the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
In the present case, the petition is indisputably sufficient in form and substance; no issue on this point was
even raised. Thus, the question before the Court – if Rule 64, Section 6 were to be followed – is whether
the issues raised by Reyes were too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
I submit that the issues raised cannot be unsubstantial as they involve crucial issues of jurisdiction and
due process.
The due process issue, of course, pertained to the assailed COMELEC ruling that admittedly can be evaluated
based on the records. The matter of evaluation, however, is not simply a matter of doing it; it is the very
problem that I raise because it must be a meaningful one that fully appreciates the parties’ positions,
particularly in a situation where the petition raised arguments that are not without their merits. In this
situation, the Court cannot simply go through the motions of evaluation and then simply strike
out the petitioner’s positions. The Court’s role as adjudicator and the demands of basic fairness require
that we should fully hear the parties and rule based on our appreciation of the merits of their positions in
light of what the law and established jurisprudence require.
a. The Due Process Component
The determination of the merits of the petitioner’s claim point us, at the very least, to the need to consider
whether evidence attributed to a person who is not before the Court and whose statement cannot be
confirmed for the genuineness, accuracy and truth of the basic fact sought to be established in the case,
should be taken as “truth.” Even casting technical rules of evidence aside, common sense and the minimum
sense of fairness dictate that an article in the internet cannot simply be taken to be evidence of the truth of
what it says, nor can photocopies of documents not shown to be genuine be taken as proof of the
“truth.” To accept these materials as statements of “truth” is to be partisan and to deny the petitioner her
right to both procedural and substantive due process. Again, at the very least, further inquiry should
have been made before there was the judgment.
Some, to be sure, may label the denial of further inquiry to lack of prudence; others, not so charitably
minded, may however refer to this as partisanship.
b. The Jurisdictional Component.
The jurisdictional component of the petition is interesting because it involved matters that were not
covered by the assailed COMELEC rulings for the simple reason that they were intervening
events that transpired outside (although related with) the assailed rulings. In fact, they involved questions
of fact and law separate from those of the assailed COMELEC rulings. Yet, the majority, in its rush to
judgment, lumped them together with the assailed rulings under the dismissive phrase “did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion” in the dispositive portion of its ruling. Such was the haste the majority exhibited
in the desire to pronounce swift and dismissive judgment. I can only surmise that the majority might
have considered the jurisdictional issues raised “too insubstantial to warrant further
proceedings.”
Is this still lack of prudence?
Reyes’ proclamation divested the

Comelec of jurisdiction over her
qualifications in favor of the HRET
The profound effect of the majority’s ruling on HRET jurisdiction and on jurisprudence render comments on
this point obligatory, if only to show that the matter is not insubstantial and should further be explored by
the Court.
The majority held that the COMELEC still has jurisdiction because the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction
over the issue of the petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed resolutions unless a
petition is duly filed. The ponencia emphasizes that Reyes has not averred that she has filed such action.
This line of thought is, to say the least, confusing, particularly on the point of why Reyes who has garnered
the majority of the votes cast in Marinduque, who has been proclaimed pursuant to this electoral mandate,
and who has since taken her oath of office, would file a petition, either of protest or quo warranto, before
the HRET. Why she would file a petition for certiorari before this Court may be easier to understand – the
COMELEC, despite her proclamation and oath, has issued an order mandating her disqualification executory;
she may merely want to halt the enforcement of this COMELEC order with the claim that the arena for her
election and qualification has shifted now to the HRET and is no longer with the COMELEC.
In any case, to stick to election law basics, the matter of jurisdiction between the COMELEC and the HRET
has always constituted a dichotomy; the relationship between the Comelec and the HRET in terms of
jurisdiction is not an appellate one but is mutually exclusive.
This mutually exclusive jurisdictional relationship is, as a rule, sequential. This means that the Comelec’s
jurisdiction ends when the HRET’s jurisdiction begins. Thus, there is no point in time, when a vacuum in
jurisdiction would exist involving congressional candidates. This jurisdiction, of course, refers
to jurisdiction over the subject matter, which no less than the Philippine Constitution governs. Under
Section 17, Article VI, the subject matter of HRET’s jurisdiction is the “election, returns, and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives.”
Where one jurisdiction ends and the other begins, is a matter that jurisprudence appears to have settled,
but is nevertheless an issue that the Court should perhaps continue to examine and re-examine because of
the permutation of possible obtaining situations – which, to my mind, translates to the existence of a critical
issue that should be ventilated before this Court if it is to make any definitive ruling on any given situation.
I submit on this point that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers
the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate’s election, return and
qualifications. In other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the Comelec of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation and the party questioning the
qualifications of the winning candidate should now present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo
warranto) before the HRET who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving the election, returns and qualification of members of the House of Representatives.
The Court has interestingly rendered various rulings on the points which all point to the statement
above. In Limkaichong v. Comelec,15 the Court pointedly held that the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the Comelec of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation.16
The Court speaking through no less than Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad in the recent case
of Jalosjos, Jr. v Commission on Elections17 held that the settled rule is that “the proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of
the HRET”18
Based on these considerations, it appears clear that any ruling from this Court – as the majority ruled – that
the Comelec retains jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative who has been proclaimed but not yet assumed office is a major
retrogressive jurisprudential development, in fact, a complete turnaround from the Court’s prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter; such rule – if it becomes established – can very well emasculate the
HRET.
Thus, the Court should now fully hear this matter, instead of dismissively ruling on a new petition where the
respondent side has not been fully heard.
The ponencia’s holding on the Comelec’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis the HRET is inconsistent with the
HRET Rules
The view that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction of
the HRET is also supported by the HRET Rules. They state: cralavvon linelawl ibra ry
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
RULE 15. How Initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing of a verified petition of protest or a
verified petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. An election protest
shall not include a petition for quo warranto. Neither shall a petition for quo warranto include an election
protest.
RULE 16. Election Protest. – A verified petition contesting the election or returns of any Member of
the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of
the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party shall
be known as the protestee. x x x
RULE 17. Quo Warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member
of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall be filed by any registered voter of the district concerned within fifteen (15) days from
the date of the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the
petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent[.]
Based on the above Rules, it appears clear that as far as the HRET is concerned, the proclamation of the
winner in the congressional elections serves as the reckoning point as well as the trigger that brings any
contests relating to his or her election, return and qualifications within its sole and exclusive jurisdiction.
In the context of the present case, by holding that the Comelec retained jurisdiction (because Reyes,
although a proclaimed winner, has not yet assumed office), the majority effectively emasculates the HRET of
its jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto only after the
assumption to office by the candidate (i.e, on June 30 in the usual case). To illustrate using the dates of the
present case, any election protest or a petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more than fifteen (15)
days from Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for
having been filed out of time under the HRET rules.
Did the Comelec gravely abuse its discretion

when it declared its May 14, 2013 Resolution
final and executory?
By the petitioner’s theory, the Comelec en banc’s May 14, 2013 Resolution (cancelling Reyes’ CoC) did not
attain finality because Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013 divested the Comelec of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it relating to Reyes’ eligibility. Two material records are critical on this
point. First, the fact of proclamation on May 18, 2013 which came one (1) day ahead of the May 19, 2013
deadline for the finality of the May 14, 2013 Resolution pursuant to the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. The second is the COMELEC order of June 5, 2013 which declared its resolution of May 14,
2013 final and executory.
How these instruments will co-exist and be given weight in relation with one another is a matter that, at this
point and in the absence of research, deliberation, debate and discussion may not be easily be made. The
Court, to be sure, would want to hear the HRET, the COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor
General, on this point. Of course, this hearing and debate will not take place under the hasty
dismissive action the majority made.
Did the Comelec gravely abuse its discretion

in the appreciation and evaluation of the
evidence leading it to erroneously conclude
that Reyes is not a natural born Filipino
citizen and that she had abandoned and
lost her domicile of origin when she became
a naturalized American citizen
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the Comelec’s appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. However, exceptions to this rule have been established and consistently recognized, among
others, when the Comelec's appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly unreasonable as to turn
into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the Comelec's error.19
It is also basic in the law of evidence that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In
administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the
majority obviously believed, together with the COMELEC, that Tan did overcome this burden and that his
documentary evidence he submitted established that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. A major clash between
the parties exists, of course, on this point as Reyes, as expressed in her petition, is of the completely
opposite view. Even a quick look at Tan’s evidence, however, indicates that Reyes’ view is not without its
merits and should not simply be dismissively set aside.
First, Tan submitted an article published online (blog article) written by one Eli J. Obligacion (Obligacion)
entitled “Seeking and Finding the Truth About Regina O. Reyes.” This printed blog article stated that the
author had obtained records from the BID stating that Reyes is an American citizen; that she is the holder of
a US passport and that she has been using the same since 2005.
How the law on evidence would characterize Obligacion's blog article or, for that matter, any similar
newspaper article, is not hard for a law student answering the Bar exam to tackle: the article is double
hearsay or hearsay evidence that is twice removed from being admissible as it was offered to prove its
contents (that Reyes is an American citizen) without any other competent and credible evidence to
corroborate them. Separately of course from this consideration of admissibility is the question of probative
value. On top of these underlying considerations is the direct and frontal question: did the COMELEC
gravely abuse its discretion when it relied on this piece of evidence to conclude that Reyes is not a Filipino
citizen?
Second, Tan also submitted a photocopy of a “certification” issued by one Simeon L. Sanchez of the BID
showing the travel records of Reyes from February 15, 2000 to June 30, 2012 and that she is a holder of US
Passport No. 306278853. This photocopy also indicates in some entries that Reyes is an American while
other entries denote that she is Filipino. The same questions of admissibility and probative value of
evidence arise, together with the direct query on the characterization of the COMELEC action since the
COMELEC concluded on the basis of these pieces of evidence that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen because it is
not only incompetent but also lacks probative value as evidence.
Contributory to the possible answer is the ruling of this Court that a “certification” is not a certified copy and
is not a document that proves that a party is not a Filipino citizen.21
Interestingly, in its March 27, 2013 Resolution that the petitioner now also assails, the Comelec First
Division ruled:cra lavvonli nelawli bra ry
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to
use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to
do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her CoC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA
9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines.22
This ruling, undeniably, opens for Reyes the argument that in the absence of sufficient proof (i.e, other than
a photocopy of a “certification”) that she is not a natural born Filipino citizen, no burden of evidence shifts to
her to prove anything, particularly the fact that she is not an American citizen. Considering that Tan might
have also failed to prove by substantial evidence his allegation that Reyes is an American citizen, the burden
of evidence also cannot be shifted to the latter to prove that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 in
order to re-acquire her status as a natural born Filipino citizen.
It ought to be considered, too, that in the absence of sufficient proof that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship,
the twin requirements under RA 9225 for re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship should not apply to her. Of
course, Reyes admitted in her MR before the Comelec that she is married to an American citizen. This
admission, however, leads only to further arguments on how her admitted marriage affected her
citizenship. Jurisprudence is not lacking on this point as in Cordora v. Comelec,23 the Court held that the
twin requirements of RA 9225 does not apply to a candidate who is a natural born Filipino citizen who did
not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country, viz.: cralavvon linelaw lib rary
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano Valles v.
COMELEC, and AASJS v. Datumanong. Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present
case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their
birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings
in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for
those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result
of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person
with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes
a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit
renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after the
promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows: cralavvon linelawl ib rary
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with
the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino
citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall “meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath” aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3
of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, Velasco v.
COMELEC, and Japzon v. COMELEC, all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized
citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of
another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
As to the issue of Reyes’ residency in Boac, Marinduque, the Comelec First Division as affirmed by the
Comelec en banc held: cralavvon line lawlib rary
Accordingly, the more appropriate issue is whether respondent had regained her domicile of origin in the
Municipality of Boac, Marinduque after she lost the same when she became a naturalized American citizen.
xxxx
Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon
re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the
time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing that whatsoever that respondent had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the
Philippines. There being no proof that respondent had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that
she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by respondent to show that she has met the one-year residency requirement of
the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not
sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, respondent has never regained her domicile in Marinduque
as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact
that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.24
This COMELEC action again opens questions about its appreciation and evaluation of the evidence and
whether it overstepped the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, if indeed the
above-cited findings and conclusions have no basis in fact and in law.
To begin with, the evidence submitted by Tan, even assuming that it is admissible, arguably does not prove
that Reyes was a naturalized American citizen. At best, the submitted evidence could only show that Reyes
was the holder of a US passport. In Aznar v. Comelec,25 the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent
Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a
Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. In the present case, the fact that Reyes is a holder of a US passport does not portend
that she is no longer a natural born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship. In
addition, how the Comelec arrived at a conclusion that Reyes is naturalized American citizen can be seen as
baffling as it did not appear to have provided any factual basis for this conclusion.
VIII. Conclusions
All told, the COMELEC does not appear to have an airtight case based on substantial evidence on the
citizenship and residence issues, and much less a similar case on the jurisdictional issue, to justify a VERY
PROMPT OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL ACTION from this Court. Bolstering this view is that petitioner Reyes is
not lacking in arguably meritorious positions to support her cause, even if only to the extent of being fully
heard by this Court.
If this Court is indeed SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE or at least to BE SEEN TO BE

ADMINISTERING JUSTICE in the way described in the speeches of many a Justice of this Court, it should
not deliver the kind of hasty and imprudent action that it did in this case. The proper course of action, if
the Court indeed honestly wants to achieve this objective in the present case, is to require the Comelec to
COMMENT on the petition and to decide matters from that point.

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G.R. No.

207264, June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B.

The petition must fail.

Her contentions are incorrect.

Rollo, pp. 47-48.

I. The Case and the Dissent in Context

II. Summary of the Dissent’s Supporting Positions

Note in this regard that the majority’s jurisprudential ruling –

a. is contrary to the HRET rules.

III. The Assailed Comelec Petition

A. The Petition Before the COMELEC

B. The COMELEC Proceedings

C. The Comelec First Division Ruling

D. The Comelec en banc Ruling

D-a. Commissioner Lim’s Concurring Opinion

D-b. Chairman Brillantes’ Dissenting Opinion

IV. Events Subsequent to the Comelec Decision

V. The Petition Before this Court

A. Positions and Arguments

As presented to this Court, the petition raised the following issues:

VI. The Majority Ruling

On the issue of the COMELEC’s

On the issue of admissibility of the

On the issue of citizenship

On the issue of residency

VII. Comments On The Majority’s Ruling

A. No basis exists to DISMISS the petition outright.

a. The Due Process Component

b. The Jurisdictional Component.

Is this still lack of prudence?

Reyes’ proclamation divested the

Did the Comelec gravely abuse its discretion

Did the Comelec gravely abuse its discretion

If this Court is indeed SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE or at least to BE SEEN TO BE

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