The Commander's Handbook On The Law of Land Warfare - Army Field Manual FM 6-27 - Marine Corps Tactical Publication - MCTP11-10C
The Commander's Handbook On The Law of Land Warfare - Army Field Manual FM 6-27 - Marine Corps Tactical Publication - MCTP11-10C
The Commander's Handbook On The Law of Land Warfare - Army Field Manual FM 6-27 - Marine Corps Tactical Publication - MCTP11-10C
MCTP 11-10C
THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
AUGUST 2019
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 27-10/MCTP 11-10C,
dated 18 July 1956.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Foreword
The lessons of protracted conflict confirm that adherence to the law of armed conflict (LOAC) by the land forces,
both in international and non-international armed conflict, must serve as the standard that we train to and apply
across the entire range of military operations. Adhering to LOAC enhances the legitimacy of our operations and
supports the moral framework of our armed forces. We have learned th at we deviate from these norms to our
detriment and risk undercutting both domestic and international support for our operations. LOAC has been and
remains a vital guide for all military operations conducted by the U.S. Governm ent. This fi eld manual provides a
general description of the law of land warfare for So ldiers and Marines, delineated as statements of doctrine and
practice, to guide the land forces in conducting di sci plined military operations in accordance with the rule of law.
The Department of Defense Law of War Manual (June 20 15, updated December 2016) is the authoritative
statement on the law of war for the Department of Defense. In the event of a confli ct or discrepancy regarding
the legal standards addressed in this publication and th e DOD Law of War Manual, the latter takes precedence.
This fi eld manual has been over 20 years in the making and owes mu ch to the judge advocates, Soldiers, Marines,
and civi lian employees who have endeavored to update The Law of Land Warfare since its publication, as Field
Manual (FM) FM 27-10/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 11-lOB.l (changed in 201 7 to MCTP 11-
1OC), in 1956, and the change promulgated in 1976.
CHARLES N. PEDE
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
W. F. MULLEN III
MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING GENERAL
TRAINING AND EDUCATION COMMAND
i
Contents
Figures
Figure 1-1. Common Article 3 ........................................................................................................ 1-5
Figure 1-2. Martens Clause ............................................................................................................ 1-6
Figure 2-1. Special AP I sign for works and installations containing dangerous forces............... 2-20
Figure 4-1. The distinctive emblems .............................................................................................. 4-7
Figure 5-1. The distinctive emblem for the protection of cultural property ..................................... 5-7
Figure 5-2. The distinctive sign of civil defense ........................................................................... 5-11
Tables
Table Preface-1. Treaty name abbreviations ....................................................................................vi
Introductory table-1. New Army terms ............................................................................................. viii
Table 1-1. Application of basic LOAC principles ............................................................................ 1-6
Table 1-2. Treaties ....................................................................................................................... 1-20
This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and the U.S. Marine
Corps total force unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of this publication is the Future Concepts Directorate, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal
Center and School, U.S. Army. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028
(Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, The Judge Advocate
General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, ATTN: CTR-FC, 600 Massie Road, Charlottesville, VA
22903-1781. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to usarmy.pentagon.hqda-
[email protected]. Follow the DA Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form
2028.
Just as the Soldier’s Rules/Basic Principles provide general and sometimes more narrow guidelines than
might be allowed for as a matter of law in specific situations, this publication summarizes the law and practice
under LOAC for legal and operational practitioners of the Army and Marine Corps. It provides more detailed
guidance than what is provided for in the Soldier’s Rules/Basic Principles, but it does not go into the
extensive detail of the DOD Law of War Manual. This publication is not a definitive explanation of all LOAC
issues, but it should assist in developing other doctrine, tactical practices and training that will be understood
by individual Soldiers and Marines and units and lead to increased compliance with LOAC.
As a statement of Army and Marine Corps doctrine, this publication should not be interpreted as a source of
United States’ government views on customary international law, and, unless explicitly noted, the practices
described in the publication should not be understood to have been undertaken out of a sense of legal
obligation for the purposes of assessing customary international law.
This publication also discusses the relevant and applicable policies, regulations, and other issuances that the
Army and Marine Corps have followed in military operations. In discussing such issuances, this publication
does not create any policy for Army and Marine Corps forces as the cited document remains the source of
any such policy. Such policies, regulations, or other issuance should be reviewed for currency and
applicability because they are frequently updated.
Whenever possible, this publication should be used in conjunction with the appropriate treaties, as provided,
for example, in documents published by the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School,
which contain the text of those various treaties. The Appendix references major LOAC treaties, separately
referencing those treaties to which the United States is not a party (for example, Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions).
This publication cites applicable authorities within parenthetical references to facilitate quick reference. In
certain cases, this publication summarizes or paraphrases treaty provisions. In the event of a conflict or
discrepancy between this publication and a binding treaty provision, the treaty provision takes precedence.
This publication includes references to Additional Protocol I (AP I), which has not been ratified by the United
States and contains some provisions that the United States categorically rejects. These references to API are
intended to provide additional content to consider where its provisions are consistent with long-standing
practice or principles the United States has generally accepted or where the provision is based on a principle
that the United States supports, but is not necessarily militarily acceptable in all respects (API references are
noted with consider cites; see DOD Law of War Manual 19.20.1). Unless explicitly stated otherwise,
reference in this publication to any provision of a treaty to which the United States is not a party is not
intended to affirm the status of those provisions as customary international law or as otherwise binding on
the United States. The intent is to compare U.S. practice to provisions of those treaties, and to facilitate
understanding of likely positions of potential multinational partners who are parties to those treaties.
Based on recent doctrinal changes, certain terms are added for which the DOD Law of War Manual or
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C is a proponent. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. See introductory
table-1 for specific changes.
Introductory table-1. New Army terms
Term Remarks
distinction New definition.
environmental modification technique New definition.
general license New definition.
honor New definition.
humanity New definition.
international armed conflict New definition.
jus ad bellum New definition.
jus in bello New definition.
levée en masse New definition.
military necessity New definition.
military objective New definition.
military passport New definition
non-international armed conflict New definition.
opinio juris New definition.
parlementaire New definition.
proportionality New definition.
protecting power New definition.
reprisal New definition.
1-5. Although LOAC is part of international law, it is important to understand that different States may
have different LOAC obligations. Understanding where these differences may arise is often important in
dealing with an enemy; it becomes critical when working with allies and other foreign partners. Partner States
are often bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party (for example, Additional Protocol I).
Partner States may also have different interpretations of LOAC obligations even where the same treaty
provision is at issue. Consequently, those partners often adopt conditions or “caveats” during multinational
operations that express those States’ interpretations or their differences on issues of national policy.
1-6. DOD policy is that “[m]embers of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed
conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.” (DODD 2311.01E,
para. 4.1). Soldiers and Marines must comply with LOAC in all military operations (as well as with any
further restrictions imposed by the rules of engagement). Although reciprocity may play an important role in
encouraging LOAC compliance, DOD policy is to comply with LOAC even when enemy forces are engaged
in violations of their LOAC obligations (see DOD Law of War Manual, 3.6).
will come from higher authority regarding which rule set may apply; but, if no such guidance is forthcoming,
commanders must adhere to the LOAC rules for State-on-State conflict described in paragraph 1-14 below.
1-9. War may be described as the existence of armed hostility between States, between States and non-State
armed groups, or between non-State armed groups, although the specific legal definition of “war” may
depend on the legal purpose at issue (see DOD Law of War Manual, 1.5). For example, under the U.S.
Constitution, Congress has the power to declare war, which it last did formally in World War II. Of course,
the United States has often engaged in armed conflict or “war,” under international law, since that time, often
with congressional support or authorization. Even if parties involved in hostilities do not refer to such actions
as “war” or “armed conflict,” LOAC applies to the hostilities at issue. For this reason, and because the terms
“war” and “armed conflict” often are used interchangeably, this manual uses them as synonyms.
1-10. Whether a LOAC rule applies may depend on whether a war exists. Jus in bello treaties often provide
that they apply to cases of “declared war or of any other armed conflict,” even if a state of war is not
recognized by the parties (see Common Article 2, the Geneva Conventions of 1949). This standard has also
been understood to result in the application of the customary law of war. A case of “declared war or any other
armed conflict” for the purpose of determining whether parties must comply with jus in bello rules may be
understood as arising in two ways: (1) when a party intends to conduct hostilities; or (2) when parties are
actually conducting hostilities. What specific parts of LOAC apply as a matter of law to a given war may
depend on whether the war is characterized as an international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-international
armed conflict (NIAC).
Article 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a)violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b)taking of hostages;
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict.
Martens Clause
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience.
OVERVIEW
1-19. Three interdependent principles—military necessity, humanity, and honor—provide the foundation for
other derivative LOAC principles—most importantly, distinction and proportionality—as well as most of the
treaty and customary rules of LOAC. Paragraphs 1-23 through 1-48 explain the principles of military
necessity, humanity, honor, distinction, and proportionality. See table 1-1.
Table 1-1. Application of basic LOAC principles
Principle Alternate Names Paragraphs Summary
Military Necessity 1-23 to 1-27 Justifies the use of all measures
required to defeat the enemy as
quickly and efficiently as possible that
are prohibited by the law of armed
conflict.
Humanity Humanitarian Principle; 1-28 to 1-30 Basis of protection for civilians; forbids
Unnecessary Suffering; inflicting suffering, injury, damage, or
Superfluous Injury destruction unnecessary to accomplish
a legitimate military purpose.
Honor Chivalry 1-31 to 1-33 Demands a certain amount of fairness
and a certain mutual respect between
opposing forces.
Distinction Discrimination 1-34 to 1-43 Distinguishing between combatants
and military objectives on the one hand
and civilians and civilian objects on the
other in offense and defense.
Proportionality 1-44 to 1-48 Requires commanders to refrain from
attacks in which the expected loss or
injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects incidental to such
attacks would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military
advantage expected to be gained. It
also underlies the requirement to take
feasible precautions to reduce the risk
of harm to civilians, other protected
persons and civilian objects.
1-20. LOAC principles provide the foundation for the specific LOAC rules. These principles, however, are
not as specific as rules, and thus interpretations of how principles apply to a given situation may vary.
Nonetheless, understanding LOAC principles helps legal practitioners (1) interpret specific treaty or
customary rules, (2) apply these rules to novel or complex situations, and (3) understand how LOAC operates
as a coherent system to regulate the conduct of hostilities. This section therefore illustrates the operation of
the general principles by briefly discussing some specific rules. For information about applying the specific
rules, the reader should look to pertinent sections in later chapters that discuss those rules.
1-21. LOAC principles work as interdependent and reinforcing parts of a coherent system. Military necessity
justifies certain actions necessary to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not
prohibited by LOAC. Conversely, humanity forbids certain actions unnecessary to achieve that object.
Distinction underpins the parties’ responsibility to comport their behavior with military necessity, humanity,
and proportionality by requiring parties to a conflict to recognize and respect certain legal categories:
principally, the distinctions between combatants and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian
objects. Proportionality requires that even when actions may be justified by military necessity, such actions
cannot result in excessive civilian loss. Lastly, honor supports the entire system and gives parties confidence
in it, and provides legitimacy to the entire endeavor.
1-22. LOAC principles are consistent with military doctrine that are the basis for effective combat
operations, and the ethical standards of the military profession. Commanders can use LOAC principles to
guide them in making difficult decisions and judgments in military operations. For example, a commander
might consider whether there is a legitimate military purpose for an action; the proposed course of action is
unreasonable or excessive; or, are there precautions that can be taken to avoid unnecessary suffering.
MILITARY NECESSITY
Military Necessity
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount
and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible
expenditure of time, life, and money.
List Case, World War II
1-23. Military necessity is the principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy
as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by LOAC (see DOD Law of War Manual,
2.2; see Lieber Code, articles 15 and 16 for historical reference).
HUMANITY
1-28. Humanity is the LOAC principle that forbids inflicting suffering, injury, or destruction
unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. Humanity is sometimes referred to as the
principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering or the principle of avoiding superfluous injury. Commanders
should exercise leadership to ensure that Soldiers and Marines under their command know that cruelty and
the infliction of unnecessary suffering will not be tolerated.
HONOR
1-31. Honor is a core Army and Marine Corps value. Honor, also called chivalry, demands a certain
amount of fairness in offense and defense, and a certain mutual respect between opposing forces. While
the word “chivalry” is often associated with a specific historical context—a code of ethics or conduct for
knights in Europe during the Middle Ages—honor draws from warriors’ codes from a variety of cultures and
time periods (see DOD Law of War Manual, 2.6.1). Honor is a matter of carrying out, acting, and living out
other core values, such as respect, duty, loyalty, selfless service, integrity, and personal courage, in everything
Soldiers and Marines do. It has been vital to the development of LOAC and continues to give LOAC vitality
today. Honor also requires adherence to LOAC regardless of the enemy’s level of compliance.
must accept that certain limits exist on their ability to conduct hostilities (HR art. 22). The principle of honor
does not address what those limits are, as much as require that parties accept that certain legal limits exist.
Thus, honor gives rise to rules that help enforce and give effect to LOAC. Honor requires persons to make
good faith efforts to comply with LOAC. In addition to shaping the rules that require parties to a conflict to
make efforts to comply with LOAC, honor also underlies rules that require parties to refrain from taking
advantage of their opponent’s adherence to the law by falsely claiming the law’s protections. For example,
enemies must deal with one another in good faith in their non-hostile relations. Additionally, even in the
conduct of hostilities, parties may not engage in treacherous or perfidious killing or wounding of enemy
persons. As another example, misuse of a flag of truce is prohibited. If parties could take advantage of their
opponent’s adherence to LOAC, this would discourage parties from complying with LOAC. Honor, however,
does not forbid parties from using ruses and other lawful deceptions against which the enemy ought to take
measures to protect itself.
DISTINCTION
1-34. Distinction, sometimes called discrimination, is the LOAC principle that obliges parties to a
conflict to distinguish between combatants and the civilian population and to distinguish between
military objectives and protected property and places. Distinction is a principle that is derivative of both
military necessity and humanity.
1-35. Distinction developed over time as States increasingly departed from the practice of war between entire
peoples, and instead treated war as a contention between their professional military forces. Distinction
requires parties to a conflict to recognize and respect a framework of legal categories for persons and objects,
each category with different rights, duties, and liabilities. Principally, distinction separates those taking part
in hostilities (whom military necessity justifies as permissible to attack), such as the armed forces, and those
taking no active part in hostilities (whom military necessity and humanity protect as unnecessary to attack),
such as the civilian population. By requiring parties to recognize and respect different legal categories that
derive from military necessity and humanity, distinction seeks to confine the fighting between opposing
armed forces and thereby spare the civilian population as much as possible. Distinction also helps parties
comport with proportionality and thereby reduces incidental harm.
1-36. Distinction encompasses two interdependent sets of duties. Parties must recognize and respect
categories by discriminating in the use of force against the enemy, and by distinguishing a party’s own
persons and objects (See DOD Law of War Manual, 2.5).
Reinforcing Duties
1-43. Discriminating in conducting attacks against the enemy and distinguishing one’s own persons and
objects reinforce one another. A party is not relieved of its obligations to discriminate in conducting attacks
by the failures of its adversary to distinguish the adversary’s military objectives from protected persons and
objects. Nonetheless, the practical ability of a party to discriminate in conducting attacks often depends on
the degree to which its enemy has distinguished its military objectives from protected persons and objects.
For example, if enemy forces intermingle with civilians, an opposing party may be less able to avoid
incidentally harming the civilian population. Similarly, if enemy forces do not respect the Red Cross or other
distinctive emblem, but instead specifically attack persons wearing it, the party receiving these attacks is less
likely to distinguish its medical personnel and transports (see DOD Law of War Manual, 2.5.5).
PROPORTIONALITY
1-44. Proportionality is the LOAC principle requiring combatants to refrain from attacks in which the
expected loss or injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects incidental to such attacks would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. It also
underlies the requirement to take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians, other protected
persons and civilian objects. In other words, even when a party to the conflict is justified in targeting a
particular military objective, that party must not cause incidental harm to civilians or to civilian objects
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained from targeting the
military objective. The principle of proportionality complements the principle of distinction and, like
distinction, derives from and applies both military necessity and humanity.
1-45. Proportionality most often refers to the jus in bello (the law related to the conduct of hostilities)
requirement to avoid excessive harm to civilians incidental to attacks, often referred to as “collateral
damage.” It is this jus in bello proportionality principle, which underlies the requirement to take feasible
precautions, that is discussed here and addressed in this publication. It is a different standard from the
proportionality principle in the jus ad bellum (the law related to the use of force) principle of proportionality
(see para. 1-2), which is beyond the scope of this publication.
1-46. In war, incidental harm to the civilian population and civilian objects is unfortunate, but inevitable.
Thus, the proportionality standard does not require that no incidental harm results from attacks. Rather, the
combatants must determine whether, in engaging in offensive or defensive operations, his or her actions may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated to be gained (consider AP I art. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(b)). Under LOAC, judgments of proportionality
often involve difficult and subjective comparisons. Recognizing these difficulties, States have declined to
use the term proportionality in LOAC treaties because it could incorrectly imply that equilibrium or a precise
comparison between considerations is possible (see DOD Law of War Manual, 2.4.1.2).
Justification in Acting
1-47. Proportionality is implicated in cases in which one is justified in acting. For example, an attack on a
military objective that incidentally damages civilian property would raise proportionality considerations. On
the other hand, where there is no justification for acting, such as an unlawful attack directed against the
civilian population, a proportionality analysis would not be necessary to reach the conclusion that the attack
was unlawful (see DOD Law of War Manual, 2.4.1.1).
Excessive Harm
1-48. Proportionality generally weighs the justification for acting against the expected harms to determine
whether the latter is excessive compared with the former. In war, incidental harm to the civilian population
and civilian objects is unfortunate and tragic, but inevitable. Thus, the proportionality standard does not
require that no incidental harm results from attacks. Rather, combatants must refrain from attacks in which
the expected harm of loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated to be gained
(see DOD Law of War Manual, 2.4.1.2; consider AP I art. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(b)). Under LOAC, judgments of
proportionality often involve difficult and subjective comparisons. Often an equilibrium or a precise
comparison between considerations is not possible.
.
CLASSES OF PERSONS
1-49. This section addresses different classes of persons under LOAC. In the past, a citizen or national of a
State at war, as one of the constituents of a State that is engaged in hostilities, could be subjected to the
hardships of war by an enemy State (see “Lieber Code” arts. 21-24). As civilization has advanced and
certainly today, however, consistent with the principles of military necessity and humanity, military
operations generally may not be directed against civilians (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.2.2). Thus, under
the principle of distinction, LOAC recognizes that the population of a State that is a party to a conflict is
generally divided into two classes—combatants and civilians, which correspond generally to the armed forces
and the civilian population. Both classes have distinct rights, duties, and liabilities. No person can exercise
the distinct rights afforded both classes at the same time. For example, a person cannot exercise the
combatant’s right to attack enemy forces while also claiming the civilian’s right not to be made the object of
attack.
1-50. Thus, in order to help protect the civilian population from the effects of armed conflict, LOAC
distinguishes between combatants and civilians, as well as persons directly participating in hostilities and
persons taking no part in hostilities. The line between these classes is not always clear, and certain categories
of persons are not easily characterized as falling within one of these categories. Nonetheless, the principle of
distinction continues to be of the utmost importance in LOAC and underlies many of the rules discussed in
this section. This section discusses the identification as well as the rights, duties, and liabilities of various
classes of people under LOAC—primarily combatants and civilians, but also certain subcomponents within
each of these classes that are subject to rules different from the general treatment of each primary class, such
as certain humanitarian personnel, certain civilian supporters of the armed forces, two categories of
“unlawful” or “unprivileged” belligerents, and military attachés and diplomatic representatives of neutral
States.
LAWFUL COMBATANTS
1-51. Three classes of persons qualify as lawful combatants, often referred to as privileged combatants:
Members of the armed forces of a State party to a conflict, including members of the regular armed
forces of a de facto government or authority not formally recognized by the opposing power, aside
from certain categories of medical and religious personnel (GPW art. 4A(1) and 4A(3));
Members of militia or volunteer corps that are not part of the armed forces of a State but belong
to a State party to the conflict, and that meet the following four requirements: commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates; having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
carrying their arms openly; and conducting their operations in accordance with LOAC
(GPW 4A(2)); and
Inhabitants of an area who participate in a kind of popular uprising to defend against foreign
invaders, known as a levée en masse (GPW 4A(6)).
The United States does not accept the Additional Protocol I definition of lawful combatants. A principle U.S.
objection to the Additional Protocol I definition is the extent to which it would grant combatant status to
individuals who fail to comply with the requirements of GPW for status as a member of a militia or volunteer
corps that belong to a State (GPW art. 4A(2)) and thereby undermine the protection of the civilian population.
Many U.S. partners that are States Parties to Additional Protocol I, however, are bound by this definition of
lawful combatants (as defined in AP I art. 43-44), to the extent they have not taken a reservation, declaration,
or understanding limiting the application of this definition.
law does not prevent a State from punishing its nationals whom it may capture among the ranks of enemy
forces. For example, under U.S. law, not only may U.S. nationals who join enemy forces be subject to attack
or detention by U.S. forces, they may also be tried for treason (18 U.S.C. § 2381).
CIVILIANS
1-54. In general, a civilian is a member of the civilian population—that is an individual who is neither part
of nor associated with an armed force or group, nor otherwise engaging in hostilities. For example, any person
who belongs to any of the combatant categories referred to in GPW Article 4(A)(1), (2), and (3) (these
categories are discussed in paragraphs 3-16 to 3-25), are not civilians. For most purposes, the term “civilian”
does not include unprivileged belligerents.
1-55. Like combatants, members of the civilian population also have certain rights, duties, and liabilities
under LOAC. Civilians may not be made the object of attack, and feasible precautions must be taken to
reduce the risk of harm to them. Civilians are generally treated consistent with the GC and many qualify for
protections established for protected persons under the convention (GC art. 4). Civilians generally may be
temporarily detained when militarily necessary and may be interned for imperative reasons of security. In all
circumstances, they are entitled to humane treatment. Civilians lack the combatant’s privilege and may be
punished by an enemy State for engaging in hostilities against it.
MIXED CASES
1-59. Certain classes of persons do not fit neatly within the dichotomy of the armed forces and the peaceful
civilian population, that is, combatants and civilians. These classes may be classified into three groups:
certain humanitarian personnel; certain civilian supporters of the armed forces; and, unprivileged
belligerents. Each of these classes has some attributes of combatant status and some attributes of civilian
status; in certain respects these classes are treated like combatants, but in other respects they are treated like
civilians.
UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENTS
1-62. In addition to distinguishing between combatants and the civilian population, LOAC distinguishes
between privileged and unprivileged belligerents. Persons who are not members of the armed forces as
described in GPW (art. 4) but who engage in hostilities deprive themselves of many of the privileges attaching
to the members of the civilian population. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Ex Parte Quirin, “Lawful
combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful
combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.” (317 U.S. 1 [1942])
Unprivileged belligerents are persons who, by engaging in hostilities, have incurred the corresponding
liabilities of combatant status (for example, being subject to attack or detention), but who are not
entitled to the distinct privileges of combatant status (for example, combatant immunity and POW
status upon capture).
the object of attack by combatants of opposing armed forces. Nevertheless, unprivileged belligerents who are
hors de combat may not be made the object of attack and must be treated humanely.
so. While engaging in these activities, these persons forfeit entitlement to the privileges of combatant status
and may be punished after a fair trial if captured (see DOD Law of War Manual, 4.17).
Spies
1-76. A person may be considered a spy when, (1) acting clandestinely or under false pretenses, (2) in the
zone of operations of a belligerent, (3) he or she obtains, or endeavors to obtain, information, (4) with the
intention of communicating it to a hostile party (HR art. 29; see also Uniform Code of Military Justice
[UCMJ] art. 106). During war, any person—military or civilian—whose actions meet all of these elements
may be considered a spy under LOAC. The following discussion elaborates upon the elements of spying.
Saboteurs and Other Persons Engaging in Secretive, Hostile Acts Behind Enemy Lines
1-81. In addition to spies, other persons acting clandestinely or under false pretenses (for example, wearing
a disguise) with a hostile purpose behind enemy lines are treated like spies under LOAC. They, too, lose the
privileges of combatant status while engaged in those activities behind enemy lines. For example, saboteurs
acting clandestinely or under false pretenses in the zone of operations of a belligerent are treated as spies.
Activities besides sabotage that are helpful to one side’s war effort done behind the other side’s lines may be
punished as well, often under the rubric of war treason, secretly entering the lines, or activities hostile to the
security of the State. These kinds of activities almost necessarily take on the character of spying because the
person who conducts these activities would also take that opportunity to collect intelligence. Indeed, these
actions are often reported as spying even though the actual purpose of these activities may not be to gain or
transmit intelligence but to take other sorts of actions that would further the conflict. Thus, a belligerent’s
presence with a hostile purpose on territory controlled by an opposing State, while operating clandestinely
or under false pretenses, suffices to make that person liable to treatment as a spy under LOAC (see DOD
Law of War Manual, 4.17.3).
1-82. Under LOAC, belligerents may employ spies and saboteurs. Spying and sabotage are not prohibited
by LOAC. For example, spying and sabotage are not prohibited by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, nor defined
as a grave breach of those conventions. Similarly, spying and sabotage are not war crimes punishable under
the statutes of international criminal tribunals. In addition, LOAC treaties that regulate, but do not prohibit,
spying recognize implicitly that belligerents may use these methods of warfare (see HR art. 24, 29-31;
consider AP I, art. 46). Although spying and sabotage are not prohibited by LOAC, acting clandestinely or
under false pretenses (out of uniform) could, in some circumstances, constitute “feigning a protected status”
(such as that of a civilian), one of the elements of perfidy. Persons engaged in these activities and commanders
who employ them should take special care not to commit perfidy (i.e., wounding or killing the enemy while
engaged in “feigning a protected status.”).
persons who engage in hostilities risk undermining the protections afforded to civilians. Further, private
persons who engage in hostilities generally have not been trained in LOAC and are not subject to the same
disciplinary regime as members of the armed forces.
countries. Only if such personnel refuse to quit the theater of military operations may they be interned.
Commanders should work through command channels to ensure consultation with the Department of State
regarding the appropriate disposition of such persons.
TREATIES
1-96. A treaty is generally defined as an international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law. Treaties often go by different terms, such as Conventions or Protocols,
but regardless of how titled, all treaties in force are legally binding on States Parties as a matter of
international law. The Department of State publishes an annual listing of treaties that are in force for the
United States.
1-97. States sometimes need to enact domestic legislation to implement treaty provisions. Although such
implementing legislation is not international law, it may help interpret treaty provisions or reflect a State’s
interpretation of those provisions. A State’s domestic law, however, cannot excuse that State’s
noncompliance with a treaty obligation as a matter of international law.
1-98. If there is doubt as to the applicability of a specific U.S. treaty obligation, the commander should seek
legal advice from a judge advocate. Judge advocates should refer specific questions through their operational
chain of command for resolution to ensure that there are common understandings of the applicability of treaty
obligations during military operations. See table 1-2 for a non-exhaustive list of treaties.
Table 1-2. Treaties
Law of armed conflict treaties to which the United States is a party
Treaty Name Reference/Citation
Washington Convention Regarding the Rights of Neutrals at Sea of October 10 Stat. 1105, TS 300,
31, 1854 11 Bevans 1214
Hague Convention for the Exemption of Hospital Ships in Time of War, from 35 Stat. 1854, TS 459,
the Payment of all Dues and Taxes Imposed for the Benefit of the State of 1 Bevans 430
December 21, 1904
Hague Convention III of October 18, 1907, Relative to the Opening of 36 Stat. 2259, TS 538
Hostilities
Hague Convention IV of October 18, 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs 36 Stat. 2277, TS 539,
of War on Land (Hague IV), and the Annex thereto, entitled Regulations 36 Stat. 2295, TS 539
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (HR).
Hague Convention V of October 18, 1907, Respecting the Rights and Duties 36 Stat. 2310, TS 540
of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V).
Hague Convention VIII of October 18, 1907, Relative to the Laying of 36 Stat. 2322, TS 541,
Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague VIII). 1 Bevans 669
Hague Convention IX of October 18, 1907, Concerning Bombardment by 36 Stat. 2351, TS 542
Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX).
Hague Convention XI of October 18, 1907, Relative to Certain Restrictions 36 Stat. 2396, TS 544,
with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (Hague XI). 1 Bevans 711
Hague Convention XIII of October 18, 1907, Concerning the Rights and Duties 36 Stat. 2415, TS 545,
of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII). 1 Bevans 723
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I
1-99. Additional Protocol I is a significant LOAC treaty that the United States has not ratified. Adopted in
1977, Additional Protocol I contains rules on the conduct of hostilities during international armed conflict.
The United States signed Additional Protocol I in 1977 but decided not to ratify it. On January 29, 1987,
President Reagan informed the Senate he would not submit Additional Protocol I for the Senate’s advice and
consent to ratification. Although the United States expressed that Additional Protocol I “is fundamentally
and irreconcilably flawed” and there were major objections to certain provisions of Additional Protocol I
(for example, arts. 1(4), 43(1), 44(3), among others), President Reagan also noted “this agreement has certain
meritorious elements,” and the United States would support “the positive provisions of Protocol I that could
be of real humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed conflicts.” Letter of
Transmittal for Additional Protocol II, President Ronald W. Reagan, to the Senate of the United States, 23
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 91 (Jan. 29, 1987) (quoting a passage in the letter addressing
AP I). Consistent with this approach, for example, the Obama Administration announced, “[a]lthough the
Administration continues to have significant concerns with Additional Protocol I,” the United States
“choose[s] out of a sense of legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 [of AP I] as applicable
to any individual it detains in an international armed conflict[.]” New Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee
Policy Fact Sheet, March 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-
actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy.
1-100. While the United States is not bound by Additional Protocol I, U.S. practice is consistent with much
of the protocol and many of its provisions support principles that the United States espouses. Further, U.S.
Armed Forces have often fought as a multinational partner in armed conflicts alongside countries who are
parties to Additional Protocol I. In those conflicts, U.S. military forces, as a matter of practice, have acted
consistent with many of its provisions. In addition, later treaties to which the United States is a party have
incorporated some Additional Protocol I provisions. For example, Additional Protocol I’s definition of
military objective is essentially the same as the definition in CCW protocols. (Compare AP I art. 52(2) with
CCW Amended Protocol II art. 2(6) and CCW Protocol III art. 1(3)). This publication references AP I
provisions, some of which are consistent with U.S. practice. Unless explicitly noted, no determinations are
made about whether any of these provisions reflect customary international law. For more information about
DOD views with regard to particular AP I provisions, judge advocates should refer to the DOD Law of War
Manual (DOD Law of War Manual, 19.20.1).
PROTECTING POWERS
1-106. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain certain common provisions regarding the safeguarding of
the interests of belligerents by nations designated as “Protecting Powers” (GWS art. 8; GWS Sea art. 8; GPW
art. 8; GC art. 9).
APPOINTMENT
1-107. The appointment of a protecting power is a decision made by authorities at the national level. This
appointment requires agreement between the belligerent States. The protecting power should be a neutral or
non-belligerent with respect to the conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions contemplate that when
appointment of a protecting power is not possible, States will use the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) or other impartial humanitarian organizations to assume the humanitarian functions performed
by a protecting power (GWS art. 10; GWS Sea art. 10; GPW art. 10; GC art. 11). However, protecting powers
are rarely appointed specifically for the purposes of implementing the Geneva Conventions, and the ICRC
has often performed the humanitarian functions of a protecting power under the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
ACTIVITIES
1-108. A protecting power assists and verifies a belligerent’s compliance with the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, including with respect to detention. For example, delegates of the protecting power visit
interned persons and hear concerns that they raise. A protecting power also facilitates communication
between opposing belligerents regarding treaty implementation (GPW art. 11). The protecting power’s
activities are conducted with the consent of the State on whose territory it serves and the State whose facilities
it visits. In addition, the protecting power must ensure that its delegation does not exceed its humanitarian
responsibilities and takes into account the imperative necessities of security of the State wherein it carries
out its duties (GWS art. 8; GWS Sea art. 8; GPW art. 8; GC art. 9).
IMPARTIAL
1-111. The humanitarian organization must remain impartial; impartiality distinguishes these organizations
from humanitarian organizations that have an allegiance to a party to the conflict (such as the American Red
Cross, which is a voluntary aid society under GWS art. 26). Impartial humanitarian organizations must also
act within the terms of their humanitarian mission. In addition, these organizations must refrain from acts
harmful to either side, such as direct participation in the conflict. Performing their humanitarian function is
not direct participation, however, even if it assists one side or the other by providing medical relief.
ACCESS
1-112. States may control access to their territory, and belligerents may control access to their military
operations. The entry of the ICRC or other non-governmental organizations into a State’s sovereign territory,
or into a theater of military operations, is subject to the consent of relevant States and exceptions for
imperative military necessity (GWS art. 9; GWS Sea art. 9; GPW art. 9, 10; GC art. 10, 11; consider AP I
art. 71(1)). States may attach conditions to their consent, including necessary security measures. But
commanders have discretion, based on legitimate military reasons, to deny requests from impartial
humanitarian organizations for military support, including classified or sensitive information, or dedicated
security. Amended CCW Protocol II, for example, provides for protecting humanitarian organization
personnel from the effects of mined areas “so far as possible” (CCW Amended Protocol II art. 12).
This chapter addresses application of the basic LOAC principles of military necessity,
humanity, distinction, proportionality, and honor on the battlefield. Among other
things, it sets forth LOAC rules on the means and methods of warfare, targeting,
deception, perfidy, general rules related to the conduct of hostilities, and the process to
ensure the legality of U.S. weapons, weapon systems, and munitions.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
A fundamental objective of LOAC is to protect civilians—including individuals (if not taking a direct
part in hostilities) and the general population—from the harmful effects of hostilities. In general, civilians
may not be the object of direct (intentional) attack (DOD Law of War Manual, 5.5; consider AP I art. 51(2)).
LOAC attempts to protect civilians by requiring combatants to apply the principles of distinction and
proportionality, including by taking feasible precautions to avoid incidental harm to civilians when making
decisions during armed conflicts. Commanders and their staffs utilize the risk management process to make
informed decisions. Commanders should consider risk to mission, resources, and civilians.
members of the civilian population provide to their State’s war effort, such as working in a munitions factory
far from the battlefield or buying war bonds.
Whether an act constitutes taking a direct part in hostilities is likely to depend on the context. The
following considerations may be relevant (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.8.3):
The degree to which the act causes harm to the opposing party’s persons or objects, such as:
Whether the act is the proximate or “but for” cause of death, injury, or damage to persons or
objects belonging to the opposing party; or
The degree to which the act is likely to adversely affect the military operations or military
capacity of the opposing party.
The degree to which the act is connected to the hostilities, such as:
The degree to which the act is temporally or geographically near the fighting; or
The degree to which the act is connected to military operations.
The specific purpose underlying the act, such as:
Whether the activity is intended to advance the interests of one party to the conflict to the
detriment of the opposing party.
The military significance of the activity to the party’s war effort, such as:
The degree to which the act contributes to a party’s military action against the opposing party;
Whether the act is of comparable or greater value to a party’s war effort than acts that are
commonly regarded as taking a direct part in hostilities; or
Whether the act poses a significant threat to the opposing party.
The degree to which the activity is viewed inherently or traditionally as a military one, such as:
Whether the activity involves making decisions on the conduct of hostilities, such as
determining the use or application of combat power; or
Whether the act is traditionally performed by military forces in conducting military operations
against the enemy (including combat, combat support, and combat service support functions
of military forces).
CIVILIANS WHO TAKE A DIRECT PART IN HOSTILITIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT
Although the concept of direct participation in hostilities may be discussed in contexts besides
targeting, such as in the context of criminal liability or detention, “taking a direct part in hostilities” for
targeting purposes often differs significantly from the standards used for assessing whether a civilian may be
detained or prosecuted. For example, domestic criminal statutes prohibiting support to enemy armed groups
generally criminalize a much broader range of acts than those acts constituting “direct participation in
hostilities” for targeting purposes.
HUMAN SHIELDS
An adversary’s use of human shields can present complex moral, ethical, legal, and policy
considerations. The use of civilians as human shields violates the rule that protected persons may not be used
to shield, favor, or impede military operations (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.16; consider AP I art. 51(7)).
The party that employs human shields in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack assumes
responsibility for their injury, although the attacker may share this responsibility if they fail to take feasible
precautions in conducting its attack. If civilians are used as human shields, provided they are not taking a
direct part in hostilities, they must be considered as civilians in determining whether a planned attack would
be excessive, and feasible precautions must be taken to reduce the risk of harm to them. However, the enemy
use of voluntary human shields may be considered as a factor in assessing the legality of an attack. Based on
the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the commander may determine that person characterized as
voluntary human shields are taking a direct part in hostilities (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.12.3.4).
The use of human shields to intentionally shield military objectives should not be understood to
prohibit an attack under LOAC. LOAC should not be interpreted in a way that would perversely encourage
the use of human shields and allow violations by the defending force to increase the legal obligations of the
attacking force. Policy, practice, or mission-specific rules of engagement may provide additional guidance
in this area.
TARGETING
The LOAC principle of distinction obligates each party to a conflict, in its use of force and conduct of
military operations, to distinguish between military objectives on the one hand and the civilian population
and other protected persons and civilian objects on the other. The principle of distinction applies to each party
to a conflict, whether its armed forces are engaged in offensive or defensive operations.
The principle of distinction does not guarantee the safety of the civilian population or civilian objects.
The risk of injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects increases if either are intermingled with military
objectives, whether unintentionally or intentionally.
Military operations may range from operations occurring in regions nearly devoid of civilians or
civilian objects (such as deserts) to operations in urban areas, where members of the civilian population are
likely to be found and the presence of civilian objects is certain. Similarly, an area normally free of civilians
suddenly may become heavily populated due to an influx of displaced persons who are fleeing the effects of
military operations elsewhere.
Military commanders must be prepared for the possibility of an intermingling of civilians with military
objectives or that some military objectives (in particular, roads and bridges) are objects commonly used by
both the civilian population and military forces. Neither the mere presence of civilians nor intermingling or
common use renders a military objective immune from attack. An object used concurrently for civilian and
military purposes is liable to attack if it is a military objective (see paragraph 2-36 on “Dual-Use Objects”
and paragraphs 2-29 through 2-57 on “Military Objectives” generally). Nor does intermingling or concurrent
use preclude otherwise lawful military options under consideration by military planners. Intermingling or
concurrent use are factors, however, that military commanders and their staffs must consider in planning and
executing military operations through the LOAC principle of proportionality.
Military commanders based or operating in urban terrain, or in the vicinity of the civilian population,
should take reasonable steps to separate military units from the civilian population and civilian objects (see
DOD Law of War Manual, 5.14; consider AP I art. 58). This duty does not preclude positioning, locating, or
billeting military forces in urban terrain or other areas where civilians are present when the command has
legitimate military reasons for doing so. For example, troops may be housed in populated areas for health
and sanitation purposes, and to take advantage of pre-existing communications facilities.
In addition, an urban area may become a military objective if it has become a manmade obstacle to
impede or prevent enemy forces’ maneuver or advance. Civilian objects that combatants occupy or utilize
can become military objectives, and belligerent forces may target them lawfully while they are military
objectives. LOAC, however, prohibits positioning military forces among the civilian population when
military necessity does not warrant the increased risk to the civilian population or this positioning is
undertaken solely for the purpose of utilizing the civilian population to shield military forces from attack.
MILITARY OBJECTIVES
An attack may be directed only against a military objective (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.5). A
military objective refers to certain persons and objects during hostilities which, by their nature,
location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage. Military objectives may be attacked wherever they are located outside of neutral territory, subject
to other LOAC considerations, such as proportionality. Certain classes of persons and objects are
categorically recognized as military objectives, provided the persons are not hors de combat. Apart from
these classes that are categorically military objectives, other objects are assessed as to whether they meet the
definition of “military objective” (DOD Law of War Manual, 5.6).
Certain classes of persons are military objectives and may be made the object of attack. These classes
of persons include: combatants, such as personnel in military ground, air, and naval units, or unprivileged
belligerents, provided they are not hors de combat; and civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. The
following classes of persons are not military objectives: military medical and religious personnel, unless they
commit acts harmful to the enemy; military medical units, unless they have forfeited their protected status;
combatants placed hors de combat; and parlementaires (see paragraphs 7-17 to 7-40 on parlementaires).
“Military objective” is a treaty term synonymous with an object that constitutes a “lawful target.” A
military objective, in so far as objects are concerned, is defined in certain treaties as “any object which by its
nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage” (CCW Amended Protocol II art. 2.6; CCW Protocol III art. 1.3; consider AP I, art. 52(2)). The
components of this definition are examined more closely in paragraphs 2-39 through 2-57. This definition
may be viewed as a way of evaluating whether military necessity exists to attack an object. It may also be
applied outside the context of conducting attacks to assess whether the seizure or destruction of an object is
justified by military necessity.
Military objectives may be attacked in any manner consistent with LOAC. The definition sets forth
objective, simple criteria to consider whether an object is a lawful target that may be seized or attacked when
military necessity exists. By its language, the treaty definition of military objective is concerned only with
objects, not individuals. This definition of military objective is relevant and applicable to objects other than
military bases and equipment, which are per se military objectives. Military bases and equipment (other than
military medical and religious facilities) may be attacked at any time, wherever located, as lawful targets,
without analyzing whether they are military objectives (subject to targeting precautions to protect civilians
not taking a direct part in hostilities and civilian objects).
Likewise, a combatant (such as a member of a military ground, air, or naval unit, or an unprivileged
belligerent) is a military objective who may be attacked at any time (subject to targeting precautions to protect
civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities and civilian objects), wherever located, regardless of the activity
in which he or she is engaged at the time, provided he or she is not hors de combat. Civilians taking a direct
part in hostilities are also military objectives and similarly may be made the object of attack.
As seen in the list of traditional military objectives in paragraph 2-56, military objectives are not
limited to military bases, units, equipment, or forces, but can include other objects that make an effective
contribution to an opposing party’s ability to wage war.
The term “military target” is a more limited term, as well as redundant, and should not be used.
Moreover, the term “civilian target” is an oxymoron and should not be used inasmuch as a civilian object is
not a military objective and therefore is immune from intentional attack. If sufficient military necessity exists
to justify attacking an object because that objects meets the definition of military objective, then imperative
military necessity would also exist to justify seizing or destroying that object by measures short of attack (see
paragraphs 2-189 through 2-194).
Dual-Use Object
Sometimes, “dual-use” is used to describe objects that are used by both the armed forces and the
civilian population, such as power stations or communications facilities. From the legal perspective, however,
such objects are either military objectives or they are not; there is no intermediate legal category of “dual
use.” If an object is a military objective, it is not a civilian object and may be made the object of attack. When
the attack on a military objective will impact the civilian population or civilian objects, commanders must
conduct a proportionality analysis (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.6.1.2).
By Its Nature, Location, Purpose, or Use Makes an Effective Contribution to Military Action
The first part of the test is whether the object, by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes an effective
contribution to the enemy’s military action.
Nature, Location, Purpose, or Use. The nature, location, purpose, or use of the object may contribute
to the object making an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action. The issue is whether, in total,
an effective contribution is made; one factor alone need not provide the effective contribution. In addition,
nature, location, purpose, or use need not be viewed as mutually exclusive concepts; rather, these concepts
may be understood to overlap.
Nature refers to the type of object and may be understood to refer to objects that are per se military
objectives. For example, military equipment and facilities, by their nature, make an effective contribution to
military action. On the other hand, “nature” also may be understood to refer to objects that because of their
intrinsic nature may be used for military purposes.
Location includes areas that are militarily important because they must be captured from or denied to
an enemy, or because the enemy must be made to surrender or retreat from them. An area of land, such as a
mountain pass, or a like route through or around a natural or manmade obstacle, may be a military objective.
A town, village, or city may become a military objective, even if it does not contain military objectives, if its
seizure is necessary (for example, to protect a vital line of communications) or for other legitimate military
reasons.
Use refers to the object’s present function. For example, using an otherwise civilian building to billet
combatant forces makes the building a military objective. Similarly, using civilian equipment and facilities
for military purposes, such as using them as a command and control center or a communications station,
would result in such objects becoming military objectives because they provide an effective contribution to
the enemy’s military action.
Purpose means the intended or possible use in the future. A decision to classify an object as a military
objective does not depend on its present use. The potential or intended future use of an otherwise civilian
object for military purposes may make it a military objective. For example, runways at a civilian airport could
qualify as military objectives because they may be subject to immediate military use in the event runways at
military air bases have been rendered unserviceable or inoperable.
Makes an Effective Contribution to Military Action. The words “nature, location, purpose, or use”
allow for wide discretion, but whether an object is a military objective is subject to qualifications stated later
in the definition, that is, it “must make an effective contribution to military action” and its destruction,
capture, or neutralization must offer a “definite military advantage.” “Effective contribution” and “military
advantage” do not have to have a geographical connection between them. Attacks on military objectives in
the enemy rear and diversionary attacks away from the area of military operations as such (the “contact
zone”) are lawful.
Military action is used in the ordinary sense of the words and is not intended to encompass a limited
or specific military operation. Military action has a broad meaning and is understood to mean the general
prosecution of the war. To be a military objective does not require that the attack of the object provide
immediate tactical or operational gains or that the object make an effective contribution to a specific military
operation. Rather, the object’s effective contribution to the war-fighting or war-sustaining capability of an
opposing force is sufficient. Although terms such as war fighting, war supporting, and war sustaining are not
explicitly reflected in the treaty definition of military objective, the United States has interpreted the military
objective definition to include these concepts.
immediately (particularly if, at the time of the attack, no military traffic is in the area), but can be established
by the overall effort to deny the enemy use of bridges in order to isolate enemy military forces on the
battlefield.
Military advantage refers to the advantage anticipated from an attack when considered as a whole, and
not only from its isolated or particular parts. Similarly, military advantage is not restricted to immediate
tactical gains but may be assessed in the full context of war strategy. It may involve a variety of
considerations, including the security of the attacking force. The definite military advantage offered by
damaging, destroying, or neutralizing the object may result from denying the enemy the ability to use this
object in its military operations (that is, to benefit from the object’s effective contribution to the military
action). For example, the attack or capture of objects with a common military purpose, such as bridges used
or available for use in lines of communication, would offer a definite military advantage.
The military advantage from an attack is broader than only denying the enemy the benefit of that
object’s contribution to its military action. For example, in a diversionary attack, the military advantage to
be gained from attacking an object would result from diverting the enemy’s resources and attention. The
military advantage from an attack may involve a variety of other considerations, including improving the
security of the attacking force. The military advantage from an attack may result from harm to enemy forces’
morale. Diminishing the morale of the civilian population and their support for the war effort does not provide
a definite military advantage, but its incidental effect is not illegal.
Military ground, air, and naval units and army, air, and naval bases (other than medical facilities
and POW camps), whether used for training, billeting, or staging, or for offensive or defensive
purposes, to include headquarters, command and control centers, defense ministries, or
intelligence establishments.
Facilities used by enemy leaders as headquarters for military operations or otherwise to command
military operations. In some cases, enemy leaders themselves may be made the object of attack.
Communications objects (such as facilities, networks, and equipment), that could be used for
command and control of military operations or intelligence gathering.
Economic objects associated with military operations or with war-supporting or war-sustaining
industries, to include power sources and oil refining and distribution facilities and objects
associated with petroleum, oil, and lubricant products (including production, transportation,
storage, and distribution facilities).
Transportation objects, to include facilities (for example, port facilities and airfields) and
equipment that could be part of lines of communication (for example, highways, railroads,
waterways, and bridges connecting military forces with logistics depots and storage areas).
Geographic areas or features of land that are military significant, to include road networks; known
or suspected enemy avenues of approach or withdrawal; mountain passes, hills, defiles, and
bridgeheads; and villages, towns, or cities whose seizure or defense is militarily important.
The following persons and objects are not military objectives and so are protected from being made
the object of attack, so long as those protections have not been forfeited:
Individual civilians and the civilian population as such;
Military medical personnel and chaplains (see Chapter 4 for rules governing these personnel);
Individuals who are hors de combat;
Civilian objects or other protected objects, that is, all objects that are not military objectives;
Medical units, transport, and equipment (see Chapter 4 for rules governing these objects); and
Undefended villages, towns, and cities (see paragraphs 2-122 through 2-129).
COMBATANTS
In general, combatants, whether privileged or unprivileged, may be made the object of attack at all
times regardless of their activity, provided they have not been placed hors de combat.
ARMED FORCES AND GROUPS AND LIABILITY TO BEING MADE THE OBJECT OF ATTACK
Membership in the armed forces or belonging to armed groups, that is, affiliation with these groups,
makes a person liable to being made the object of attack regardless of whether he or she is taking a direct
part in hostilities. Moreover, the individual, as an agent of the hostile group, may be assigned a combat role
at any time, even if the individual normally performs other functions for the group. Thus, with limited
exceptions, combatants may be made the object of attack at all times, regardless of the activities in which
they are engaged. For example, enemy combatants who are standing in a mess line, engaging in recreational
activities, or sleeping remain the lawful object of attack. Exceptions include personnel who are hors de
combat (see paragraphs 2-106 through 2-116) and provisions for communication with the enemy and special
agreements with the enemy (see Chapter 7).
Dissociation or Renunciation
A person may not be made the object of attack based on affiliation with a non-State armed group if
that affiliation clearly has been severed. Relevant factors that may be used in determining when an individual
has unambiguously ceased to be a member of a non-State armed group may include:
Whether the individual has formally ceased to be a member of the group such as by filing relevant
paperwork or by otherwise formally renouncing any allegiance to the group;
Whether concrete and verifiable facts or persuasive indicia demonstrate that the individual has
affirmatively returned to peaceful pursuits, such as by participating in a reconciliation program or
swearing an oath of loyalty to the government; and
The amount of time that has passed since the person participated in the activities of the group in
question, if coupled with other indicia of dissociation or renunciation.
LEADERS
Military leaders may be subject to attack on the same basis as members of the armed forces. Leaders
of non-State armed groups are subject to attack on the same basis as members of the group. Enemy leaders
who are not members of an armed force or armed group (including Heads of State, civilian officials, and
political leaders) may be made the object of attack if their responsibilities include the operational command
or control of the armed forces or the armed group. For example, as the commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed
forces, the President would be a legitimate target in wartime, as is, for example, the prime minister of a
constitutional monarchy. Attacks against them would not constitute assassination. In contrast, the reigning
monarch of a constitutional monarchy with an essentially ceremonial role in State affairs may not be made
the object of attack.
In addition to leaders who have a role in the operational chain of command, leaders taking a direct part
in hostilities also may be made the object of attack. Planning or authorizing a combat operation is an example
of taking a direct part in hostilities. As a matter of practice, attacks on the national leadership of an enemy
State have often been avoided on the basis of comity and to help ensure that authorities exist with whom
peace agreements may be concluded.
and emotional harm to their family; such loss would not need to be considered in the proportionality analysis.
Similarly, the possibility that munitions might not detonate as intended and might injure civilians much later
after the attack would not need to be considered in the attacker’s proportionality analysis because the harm
is too remote (See DOD Law of War Manual, 5.12.1.2 and 5.12.1.3).
Excluded From Incidental Harm—Harm Resulting from Enemy Action, or Beyond the Control
of Either Party
The harm caused by the attacking forces’ actions in conducting the attack must be considered. Persons
or objects harmed through action directly attributable to enemy action, or beyond the control of either party,
would be excluded from the attacking force’s proportionality analysis. For example, civilians injured or killed
in the crash of an attacking aircraft downed by enemy air defenses or by enemy air defense measures, such
as spent surface-to-air measures or antiaircraft projectiles, would not be considered in the attacking force’s
proportionality analysis. Similarly, the risk to the civilian population from the legitimate deception activities
of the defending force, such as jamming, obscurants, or chaff, would need not be considered by the attacking
force, although the defending force should consider such risks as part of its obligations to take feasible
precautions in defense (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.12.1.4).
“EXCESSIVE”
Under the principle of proportionality, the potential attack against enemy combatants or other military
objectives is prohibited when the expected incidental harm is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage expected to be gained. The weighing or comparison between the expected incidental harm
and the anticipated military advantage does not necessarily lend itself to empirical analyses. On the one hand,
striking an ammunition dump or a terrorist training camp would not be prohibited because a farmer is plowing
a field in the area. On the other hand, an extraordinary military advantage would be necessary to justify an
operation posing risks of collateral death or injury to thousands of civilians (see DOD Law of War Manual,
5.12.3).
Failure of Defender to Separate or Distinguish Does Not Relieve Attacker of the Duty to
Discriminate in Conducting Attacks
A party that is subject to attack might fail to take feasible precautions to minimize the harm to civilians,
such as by separating the civilian population from military objectives. In some cases, a party to the conflict
might attempt to use the presence or movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to
shield military objectives from seizure or attack. When enemy persons engage in such behavior, commanders
should continue to seek to discriminate in conducting attacks and to take feasible precautions to reduce the
risk of harm to the civilian population and civilian objects. This enemy conduct, however, will diminish the
ability to discriminate and to reduce the risk of harm to the civilian population.
before carrying out an attack. In particular, the following practices are not prohibited: surprise attacks
(paragraph 2-97); attacks on retreating forces (paragraph 2-98); harassing fires (paragraph 2-99); and attacks
on specific individuals (paragraph 2-100).
Surprise Attacks
LOAC does not prohibit the use of surprise to conduct attacks, such as the use of surprise in ambushes,
sniper attacks, air raids, and attacks by special operations forces carried out behind enemy lines. LOAC does
not require that an enemy combatant be warned before being attacked. Rather, warning requirements only
apply with respect to the civilian population and other certain protected units, vessels, and facilities, such as
military medical facilities (see paragraphs 2-83 through 2-86).
Harassing Fires
Although attacks to terrorize the civilian population are prohibited, harassing fires against enemy
combatants are not prohibited. Harassing fires are delivered on enemy locations for the purpose of disturbing
enemy forces’ rest, curtailing their movement, or lowering their morale.
Siege
It is lawful to besiege enemy forces, i.e., to encircle them with a view towards inducing their
surrender by cutting them off from reinforcements, supplies, and communications with the outside world.
The conduct of a siege or encirclement may require the imposition of measures of control to ensure that
outsiders may not deliver supplies to the enemy. Thus, the right to conduct a siege or encirclement impliedly
recognizes the authority of the military commander to exercise control, such as stopping, searching, and
diverting traffic) over civilians and other persons in the immediate vicinity of military operations (DOD Law
of War Manual, 5.19.1).
A force besieging enemy forces may bar all communications and access between the besieged place
and the outside. LOAC, however, requires belligerent States to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to
conclude local agreements for the removal of wounded, sick, infirm and aged persons, children, and maternity
cases from the besieged or encircled area and to permit the passage of ministers of all religions, medical
personnel, and medical equipment to such areas (GC art. 17). In the past, it was permissible, but an extreme
measure, to refuse to allow civilians to leave a besieged locality and to use force to drive any who attempted
to flee back into the besieged locality. However, such actions are now prohibited because they are
inconsistent with the duty to take feasible precautions for the protection of civilians (see DOD Law of War
Manual, 5.19.4.1).
Persons in the Power of an Adverse Party. Persons in the power of an adverse party include all
persons detained by an adverse party, such as POWs, unprivileged belligerents, retained personnel, and
civilian internees. As with other categories of persons placed hors de combat, detainees must refrain from
hostile acts or attempts to escape in order to be considered hors de combat.
Persons Who Have Surrendered. Persons who are not in custody, but who have surrendered are hors
de combat and may not be made the object of attack. In order to make a person hors de combat, the surrender
must be genuine (paragraph 2-109); clear and unconditional (paragraph 2-110); and under circumstances in
which it is feasible for the opposing party to accept the surrender (paragraphs 2-111 through 2-112).
Genuine
The offer to surrender must be genuine. In addition to being legally ineffective, feigning the intent
to surrender can constitute perfidy if it is done to kill or wound the adversary.
unconditional (see HR art. 23(c)). A person who offers to surrender only if certain demands are met would
not be hors de combat until that offer has been accepted.
Figure 2-1. Special AP I sign for works and installations containing dangerous forces
Special Considerations
In light of the risks posed by attacks impacting these objectives, a commander should take additional
care when contemplating an attack on a facility, work, or installation containing dangerous forces, or even
an object located nearby. After determining whether the object under consideration for attack is a military
objective, the commander should consider the following as part of the analysis of the risks of incidental
damage to civilian objects and injury to the civilian population:
The risk of release of the potentially dangerous materials or forces contained within the objective
as a result of its attack, or of an attack on military objectives within its immediate vicinity;
The expected or anticipated risk to the civilian population in the event dangerous materials or
forces are released; and
Methods by which these two risks can be minimized in the event an attack is authorized.
The fact that the materials or forces contained within a military objective may be released as a result
of the attack does not immunize it from attack.
Conditions
The area in question must be open and accessible for immediate, unconditional physical occupation
by opposing military ground forces. The location may not be defended by artillery or naval gun fire from
the flanks or rear, by aircraft, minefields, or any other form of military resistance. A party to the conflict
may not declare a city or other population center to be undefended if it is far behind the area of ground
conflict and impossible for opposing ground forces to occupy physically. For a populated area to be entitled
to be regarded as undefended, each of the following criteria must be satisfied:
All opposing force combatants, as well as their mobile weapons and mobile military equipment,
must have been evacuated.
No hostile use of fixed military installations or establishments within the city, town, or village
may be made.
The local civilian authorities and the civilian population must not commit hostile acts against the
occupying military force.
No activities in support of military operations may be undertaken.
Loss of Status
A village, town, or city that fails to fulfill the conditions above will not be entitled to undefended
status, or, if granted, will lose that status if these conditions are not fulfilled. Persons and objects within that
city, however, may still receive other protections for civilians and civilian objects.
A locality designated as undefended does not lose that status due to the presence of civilian police
forces to maintain local law and order, enemy military medical units and medical personnel, or enemy
wounded and sick.
STARVATION
Starvation is a legitimate method of war, but it must be conducted in accordance with the principles
of discrimination and proportionality, as well as other LOAC rules. It is a legitimate method to starve enemy
forces in order to lead to the speedier defeat of the enemy or its submission with fewer friendly force
casualties. For example, it is not prohibited to destroy food intended as sustenance for enemy forces with a
view towards weakening them and diverting their resources. Enemy forces, for the purpose of this rule, means
those persons constituting military objectives (see paragraph 2-60 for categories of persons subject to attack).
Starvation specifically directed against the enemy civilian population, however, is prohibited (consider AP I
art. 54). For example, it would be prohibited to destroy food or water supplies for the purpose of denying
sustenance to the civilian population.
In this regard, it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to
the survival of the civilian population of an enemy nation, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations, and supplies for irrigation works, for
the purpose of denying their sustenance value to the civilian population (consider AP I art. 54(2)).
This rule would not prohibit attacks that are carried out for specific purposes other than to deny food
and water. For example, this rule would not prohibit the destroying of a field of crops to prevent it from being
used as concealment by the enemy forces or destroying a supply route that is used to move military supplies
but that is also used to supply the civilian population with food, subject to the principle of proportionality,
including taking feasible precautions.
These prohibitions may not apply if these objects may be, or are, used by enemy military forces.
Restrictions on starvation do not prohibit measures being taken if their purpose is to deny consumption of
food or water by enemy military forces. Military action intended to starve enemy forces must not be taken
when it is expected to result in incidental harm to the civilian population that is excessive in relation to the
military advantage expected to be gained pursuant to the principle of proportionality.
Similarly, public utilities (such as electric power grids) may be attacked to deny power to enemy
military forces and installations (for example, an integrated air defense system or national command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence assets) even though such attacks may adversely affect the
supply of power to the civilian population or civilian objects, or the provision of sustenance for the civilian
population (for example, water). Commanders authorizing such attacks should determine the anticipated
effect of those attacks on the civilian population to ensure that such effects are not excessive compare to the
military advantage expected to be gained. Commanders should also consider taking precautions to ensure
that the civilian population is not left with inadequate water supplies. The poisoning of the water supply is
prohibited under all circumstances (HR art. 23(a)).
Specific Prohibition
The poisoning of the water supply is prohibited under all circumstances (HR art. 23(a)).
GOOD FAITH
Absolute good faith between the parties to an armed conflict is essential. Breaches of good faith may
undermine the protections LOAC affords to protected persons and objects; impair non-hostile relations
between opposing belligerents; and damage or even destroy the basis for a restoration of peace short of the
complete annihilation of one belligerent by another.
Breaches of good faith may put civilians, persons who are hors de combat, or other protected persons
or objects at greater risk of harm from a practical viewpoint. This is so because an adversary will find it
difficult to respect such protected persons and objects if it believes or suspects its enemy is abusing claims
to protection under LOAC in order to achieve a military advantage.
Breaches of good faith also impair non-hostile relations between opposing belligerents during armed
conflict by diminishing the legitimate activities that depend upon a degree of mutual respect and trust between
hostile forces. Examples of these legitimate activities include effecting surrender or collecting the dead,
wounded, and sick (enemy or friendly) on the battlefield. Military commanders may find it more difficult to
ensure that their forces comply with LOAC when treacherous acts by the enemy have resulted in casualties
among their own forces.
Breaches of good faith also damage, and may destroy, the basis for restoration of peace short of the
complete annihilation of one belligerent by another. A degree of mutual respect and trust is essential for the
negotiation of cease-fires, truces, surrenders, and other agreements necessary to bring an end to hostilities.
The line between those acts that good faith permits and those that good faith prohibits may appear
indistinct and has varied according to State practice. Good faith prohibits: killing or wounding by resort to
perfidy; misusing certain signs, including, fighting in the enemy’s uniform; feigning non-hostile relations in
order to seek a military advantage; and compelling nationals of a hostile party to take part in military
operations directed against their own State.
PERFIDY
Acts of perfidy are acts that invite the confidence of enemy persons to lead them to believe that they
are entitled to, or are obligated to accord, protections under LOAC with the intent to betray that confidence.
Perfidy involves specific requirements: a killing or wounding of the enemy; the intent (mens rea) to act
treacherously (i.e., the intent to kill or wound) (HR art. 23(b)); an entitlement or obligation under LOAC;
and a nexus in time (that is, immediate tactical advantage) between the treacherous action and the killing or
wounding.
The key element in perfidy is the false claim to protections under LOAC in order to secure a military
advantage to kill or wound an opponent (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.22.1; consider AP I art. 37).
2-1. Examples of killing or wounding by resort to perfidy include:
Feigning of intent to negotiate under a flag of truce and then attacking the opponent.
Feigning surrender and then attacking in order to gain an immediate tactical advantage over enemy
forces.
Feigning that one is wounded, sick, or dead, and then attacking the opponent.
Feigning of civilian status to obtain an advantage over enemy forces to kill or wound them.
Any combatant feigning surrender and then attacking is taking advantage of the rule that their enemy must
give them quarter. Combatants, who feign death or injury to lure their enemy near them so they may attack
them, engage in acts of perfidy. However, any combatant who feigns death in the hope of evading capture
has not engaged in perfidy. That individual’s act is one of survival or avoidance of capture rather than an act
undertaken in order to kill or wound the enemy as a result of the enemy’s compliance with LOAC. A civilian
who may be regarded as taking a direct part in hostilities, such as a civilian authorized to drive a supply truck
in the area of operations, is subject to attack but has not engaged in perfidy. The criteria for determining when
a civilian is taking a direct part in hostilities are separate from determinations of perfidy.
Flag of Truce
A means of initiating negotiations between opposing forces is the display of a white flag, also called
a flag of truce. The white flag, when used by military forces, only indicates a desire to communicate with the
enemy and has no other significance in LOAC on land. Displaying the flag of truce may indicate the party
hoisting it desires to open negotiations with a view to an armistice or surrender. It is important to determine,
with reasonable certainty, whether the flag is hoisted by authority of the enemy commander, on behalf of the
entire force under his or her command, or whether the flag is hoisted simply by an individual or small party
of combatants. (HR art. 32-34; see also Chapter 7).
The mere display of a flag of truce, without more communication, does not necessarily mean that
the unit, or the person waving it, is prepared to surrender. Display of a flag of truce may simply indicate that
the party hoisting it desires to communicate with a view to negotiating a cease-fire, such as to enable forces
to collect the wounded off the battlefield.
An opposing force is not required to cease firing merely because a flag of truce has been displayed.
Nor is it necessarily a violation of LOAC if the individual displaying the flag of truce is wounded or killed
while endeavoring to communicate with opposing forces. The burden is upon the party displaying a flag of
truce to communicate their intentions clearly and unequivocally. To indicate that the hoisting of a white flag
is authorized by competent authority on behalf of the unit, its appearance must be accompanied or followed
promptly by a cessation of all hostile acts or resistance, or other manifestations of hostile intent. This includes
ceasing efforts to escape or to destroy items, documents, or equipment in the custody or charge of the party
hoisting the white flag. A commander authorizing the display of a flag of truce should promptly send a
representative (sometimes referred to as a parliamentary or parlementaire) to communicate the commander’s
intent (see paragraphs 7-17 through 7-40 on parlementaires).
The improper use of a flag of truce to feign an intention to negotiate, surrender, or otherwise suspend
hostilities is strictly prohibited and is an act of perfidy if used to then kill or wound the enemy. Improper use
of a flag of truce includes its employment while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favor, protect, or
otherwise impede military operations. Flags of truce may not be used surreptitiously to obtain military
information or merely to obtain time to effect a retreat or withdrawal, secure reinforcements or resupply, or
feign surrender in order to carry out a surprise attack on the enemy. Abuse of a flag of truce endangers its
future recognition and may justify subsequent rejection of a flag of truce. Isolated instances of abuse of a flag
of truce, however, generally will not permit rejection of subsequent displays of the flag absent an express
order by competent authority. For Army and Marine forces, this generally would be the theater commander.
Customary Practice
In general, the use of enemy flags, military emblems, insignia, or uniforms is prohibited during
combat, but is permissible outside of combat, such as when collecting intelligence in enemy territory or
seeking to evade detection by the enemy.
Spying
Soldiers or Marines captured by an opposing party behind its lines while wearing its uniform may
subject them to being treated as spies.
Ruses do not infringe on LOAC. Misusing a protected sign or symbol would not constitute a ruse
because it would violate LOAC. Similarly, although fighting in the enemy’s uniform would not be perfidy
because enemy military personnel are not generally protected by LOAC in this regard, fighting in the enemy’s
uniform also would not be a lawful ruse or deception because such action would infringe upon the rule against
improper use of the enemy’s uniform.
Ruses are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to
protection under LOAC with the intent to kill or wound that adversary.
Examples of Ruses
Often ruses of war operate by misleading the enemy as to the identity, strength, position, or
disposition of one’s own forces. Ruses of war include, but are not limited to:
Using decoys or dummy materials, such as dummy weapons, equipment, and buildings;
Feigning activity or inactivity, such as:
Simulating quiet; and
Feigning flights, retreats, attacks, marches, movements (for example, approaching a
destination indirectly), supply movements, operations, withdrawals, or camps;
Mimicking other types of forces, such as:
Using small forces to simulate larger units;
Units of one type pretending to be units of another type;
Removing unit identification from units, equipment, or personnel; and
Individuals or units dressing like and mimicking the appearance of enemy friendly forces
without engaging in combatant acts;
Using camouflage or deceptive lighting;
Removing or altering identifying information, such as moving identifying landmarks;
Planting false information in a manner that allows enemy forces to intercept it, such as through
the use of:
False messages among one’s own forces;
Intensifying or minimizing message traffic; or
Bogus messages, dispatches, or newspapers;
Lying in the course of a POW intelligence interrogation on questions when no obligation to answer
correctly exists;
Feigning enemy military status by using enemy flags, insignia, or military uniforms outside of
combat; or
Using enemy codes, signals, or passwords.
Moreover, POWs, retained personnel, and protected persons may not renounce this right (see, for example,
GPW art. 7).
This prohibition applies to attempts to “compel” enemy nationals; it does not apply to measures short
of compulsion, such as bribing enemy nationals or seeking to influence them through propaganda. LOAC
specifically prohibits, however, an Occupying Power from using propaganda that aims to secure voluntary
enlistment of protected persons in its armed forces or auxiliary forces (see GC art. 51).
This prohibition applies to nationals of a hostile party; LOAC does not prohibit States from
compelling their own nationals to serve in the armed forces. Similarly, this rule would not prohibit States
from compelling persons to betray an allegiance to a non-State armed group.
INFORMATION GATHERING
Employing measures necessary to obtain information about the enemy and its country is considered
permissible (see HR art. 24). Information gathering, however, must not violate specific LOAC rules. For
example, torture or abuse may not be used to question or interrogate detainees. Similarly, LOAC prohibits
the improper use of a flag of truce to obtain information (see paragraph 2-157). Some forms of deception
used to gather information, although not prohibited by LOAC, may put persons engaging in them at risk of
being treated as spies. For instance, combatants wearing civilian attire to collect intelligence in the zone of
operations of a belligerent, if caught before returning to friendly lines, jeopardize their status as POWs and
could be considered spies by the capturing enemy.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
In general, LOAC permits the use of counter-propaganda and information operations (IO), even if it
encourages acts that violate an enemy State’s domestic law or is directed towards civilians or neutral
audiences. Certain types of information operations, however, are prohibited.
Historically, permissible IO messages have been disseminated through a variety of communications
media, including printed materials, loudspeakers, radio and television broadcasts, aircraft, and the internet.
Information operations are sometimes used with financial or other incentives, if sanctioned and authorized.
They may support intelligence gathering, be directed at enemy civilians and neutrals, or encourage enemy
persons to commit acts that would violate the domestic law of the enemy State. For example, it is permissible
to encourage enemy combatants to defect, desert, or surrender. Similarly, it is permissible to encourage
insurrection among the enemy civilian population.
Information operations must not incite violations of LOAC. For example, information operations
intended to incite attacks against civilians is prohibited. Information operations also must not threaten the
commission of LOAC violations. For example, it is prohibited if the propaganda constitutes a measure of
intimidation or terrorism against the civilian population, such as threats of violence whose primary purpose
is to spread terror among the civilian population. Similarly, it is prohibited to threaten an adversary by
declaring that no quarter will be given. Information operations are also prohibited when they would violate
LOAC. For example, LOAC specifically prohibits an Occupying Power from using IO messages that are
aimed at securing voluntary enlistment of protected persons in its armed or auxiliary forces (see paragraphs
6-133 and 6-134). Similarly, information operations may not be used to subject a detainee to public curiosity
or other humiliating or degrading treatment. Additionally, the delivery of the information operations should
be consistent with other LOAC obligations.
This prohibition extends to offers of rewards for the killing or wounding of all enemies, including
specific individuals or a class of enemy persons (for example, officers). This rule, however, would not
prohibit offering rewards for the capture unharmed of enemy personnel generally or of particular enemy
personnel. Similarly, this rule does not prohibit offering rewards for information that may be used by
combatants to conduct military operations that attack enemy combatants.
PILLAGE PROHIBITED
Pillage is prohibited, both generally (HR art. 28, 47) and specifically with respect to the military
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked (GWS art. 15; GWS Sea art. 18); POWs (see GPW art. 18); and civilians
(see GC art. 16, 33). This applies in international armed conflict, occupation, and non-international armed
conflict. The same applies to cultural property, which is addressed in paragraphs 5-19 through 5-21 and 6-
104. LOAC imposes affirmative obligations to prohibit and prevent pillage (GWS art. 15; GWS Sea art. 18;
1954 Hague art. 4(3)).
Pillage is the taking of private or public movable property (including enemy military equipment) for
private or personal use (10 U.S.C. § 950t(5)). It does not include an appropriation of property justified by
military necessity. For example, if no time is available for ordinary requisitions to provide food and supplies,
or the local inhabitants have fled so that ordinary requisitions are unavailable, the taking of food does not
constitute pillage. In the medieval era, pillage served as a form of compensation for private armies, but it
ceased to be regarded as lawful with the widespread adoption of standing armies at the end of the 18th
century. The later prohibition of pillage was intended, in part, to maintain discipline among the armed forces.
Pillage is also referred to as looting (UCMJ art. 103) and plunder.
operations, whether such harm arises from attacks on military objectives within proximity to the damaged
property, maneuver damage, mechanical error, enemy countermeasures, human error (including mistake of
fact), or other actions resulting from the fog or friction of war or from the necessities of war. If time allows,
however, a record of the use or damage should be kept or given to the owner so that in the event either
belligerent provides funds at the close of hostilities to compensate the owners, evidence may be available to
assist the assessors. During certain operations and as a matter of policy not law, the U.S. practice has been to
provide ex gratia payments to alleviate the suffering of the civilian populace not involved in the conflict. All
enemy public movable property captured or found on a battlefield becomes the property of the capturing
State. Other than arms, military papers, military transportation, and other property that is susceptible to
military use, enemy private moveable property captured or found on a battlefield may be appropriated only
to the extent that such taking is permissible in occupied areas. In particular, receipts should be given and
compensation paid, when feasible (see paragraphs 6-95 through 6-128).
Note: The general legality of a weapon, weapon system, or munition discussed in this manual does
not obviate the requirement for a legal review of the acquisition or procurement of each new
weapon, weapon system, or munition.
For discussion of these weapons, refer to Chapter VI of the DOD Law of War Manual.
Certain types of weapons are subject to specific rules that apply to their use by the U.S. armed forces.
These rules may reflect U.S. obligations under international law or national policy. These weapons include:
mines, booby-traps, and other devices (except certain specific classes of prohibited mines, booby-
traps, and other devices);
cluster munitions;
incendiary weapons;
laser weapons (except blinding lasers);
riot control agents;
herbicides;
nuclear weapons;
explosive ordnance.
For more information, consult the DOD Law of War Manual and specific policies and guidance applicable
to particular types of weapons. It may be appropriate in the review of such weapons to advise on these types
of restrictions or obligations.
If there is no specific prohibition, the following questions are considered:
Whether the weapon is calculated to cause superfluous injury, in violation of the Hague
Regulations Article 23(e); and
Whether the weapon is inherently indiscriminate.
An objective in war is to impose destruction upon the military forces of the enemy and other military
objectives that contribute to its ability to wage war. The prohibition of weapons calculated to cause
superfluous injury is not intended to limit the legitimate pursuit of those objectives through the employment
of lawful weapons against lawful targets. This principle does not prohibit bringing a preponderance of force
on an opposing military force in order to subdue or destroy it.
In summary, in determining whether a weapon causes superfluous injury, a legal review includes all
of the following:
An evaluation of the military necessity of the weapon;
An analysis of the intended results of its use (including design, that is, what it is designed to do,
and intended employment, that is, how it is intended to be used in combat); and
A comparison of the weapon with lawful comparable weapons already in use.
This chapter addresses the protection of POWs, retained personnel, and other detainees
under LOAC, and as described below. The Hague Conventions of 1907 was one of the
international community’s first attempts to codify treatment of captured persons. The
1929 Geneva Convention relative to Prisoners of War provided more substantive
treatment than previous treaties and has been refined in the 1949 GPW and in AP I.
Since the United States is a party to the GPW, it is binding treaty law and the basis for
much of this chapter. This publication uses “POWs” to refer to both friendly and enemy
POWs. The treatment and protection of civilian internees are discussed in Chapter 5 of
this manual.
MILITARY PERSONNEL
3-17. Members of the armed forces of a State party to a conflict, other than military medical personnel and
chaplains attached to the armed forces are entitled to POW status based on their membership in the armed
forces. This includes members of militias or volunteer corps that form part of the armed forces (GPW art.
4A(1)).
Non-Standard Uniforms
3-18. Soldiers and Marines who fall within Article 4A(1) of the GPW, including special operations forces,
are expected to carry out their operations in standard uniform. However, the wearing of a non-standard
uniform, would not necessarily violate the law of war. For example, Soldiers and Marines wearing items of
indigenous clothing that represent the distinctive device of a non-standard uniform must be approved by
competent authority upon the demonstration of a military requirement. To be considered a “uniform,” even
a non-standard one, the clothing should distinguish military personnel from ordinary members of the civilian
population. Soldiers and Marines who are captured in non-standard uniforms while conducting operations in
enemy territory and fail to distinguish themselves from the civilian population may be treated as spies and
risk relinquishing their entitlement to POW status.
Civilian Clothing
3-19. Occasions may arise, such as a surprise attack, when military personnel may not have time to dress in
their uniforms before resisting an enemy assault. Soldiers and Marines in civilian clothing may resist an
attack so long as they do not kill or wound treacherously, such as by deliberately seeking to feign civilian
status or other protected status while fighting (see paragraph 2-153). Such military personnel remain entitled
to POW status if captured. Soldiers and Marines may be authorized by competent authorities to dress in
civilian clothing in order to engage in espionage and sabotage, but such persons may be treated as spies if
captured behind enemy lines.
3-27. Civil aircraft and merchant marine ship crew members of the parties to the conflict are entitled to POW
status (GPW art. 4A(5)).
3-28. A levée en masse involves inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, upon approach of the
enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, with no time to form into regular
armed units, provided that they carry their arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war. A
levée en masse may only be formed on the approach of the enemy to non-occupied territory. For example,
after an invading power effectively secures invaded territory and places that territory under its authority as
an occupying power (HR arts. 2, 42, 43; GPW art. 4A(6)), a levée en masse may not be formed.
RETAINED PERSONNEL
3-35. Military medical personnel and chaplains who are retained in the hands of the enemy to assist POWs
are not POWs. They are considered retained personnel, if they meet the criteria in the GWS including that
the organization in which they serve meets the criteria outlined in paragraphs 3-21 through 3-24. For example,
under the GWS, military medical personnel who exclusively engaged in medical duties would receive special
status as retained personnel upon capture and are not considered POWs. Retained personnel should be given,
as a minimum, the POW protections under the GPW and they must also be afforded the facilities necessary
to carry out their medical and chaplain duties in support of the POWs (GWS art. 28; GPW arts. 33, 35).
3-36. Retained personnel under the GPW must receive GPW protections from the time they fall into the
power of the enemy until their final release and repatriation.
3-37. Retained personnel must, at a minimum, be provided the same humanitarian care, respect, and
treatment as afforded POWs by the GPW. Retained personnel are subject to the same disciplinary
proceedings as POWs.
entitled to POW status. Unprivileged belligerents must be afforded the basic protections discussed in
paragraphs 3-4 through 3-13. In certain cases, treatment of detained persons who do not qualify for POW
status will be the same as civilian internees, as discussed in Chapter 5.
3-44. Spies and others acting clandestinely or under false pretenses, such as members of the armed forces
out of uniform, who have engaged in secretive and hostile activities behind enemy lines risk being deprived
of the privileges of combatant status (e.g., POW status) and are often treated as spies. Espionage and spying
are covered in Chapter 1.
PROHIBITED ACTS
3-49. Certain acts or omissions by the detaining power against POWs or retained personnel are expressly
prohibited (GPW arts. 3, 13, 23; consider AP I art. 75), and the detaining power has obligations to protect
POWs against the following acts or omissions:
Physical mutilation or medical or scientific experiments that are not justified by the medical,
dental, or hospital treatment of the POW concerned and carried out in his interest
Any unlawful act or omission by the detaining power that causes death or seriously endangers the
health of a POW.
Acts of violence or intimidation.
Exposure to insults or public curiosity. For example, POWs may not be paraded through city
streets and subjected to the insults of the populace; POWs may not be publicly displayed in a
humiliating fashion on television or on the internet. Custodians of POWs, such as escorts, must
protect POWs from acts of violence.
Improper photography and media exposure. For example, DOD policy has generally prohibited
the taking of photographs except for authorized purposes in order to protect POWs and other
detainees from public curiosity.
Using POWs as human shields to protect military objectives.
Acts of reprisal against POWs.
Bartering and other transactions between members of the forces of the detaining power and POWs
concerning the POWs personal effects are not considered proper.
Adverse discrimination based upon race, gender, nationality, religious belief, political opinions,
or any other similar criteria in regard to treatment of POWs. In some cases, however, the captor is
permitted, and sometimes required, to make distinctions between POWs or retained personnel as
to rank, state of health, age, or professional status, as well as to provide additional protection for
women. Also, as explained in paragraph 3-43, distinctions for security purposes are permissible
(GPW arts. 14, 16, 30, 43-45, 49, 109-110).
BEGINNING OF CAPTIVITY
3-50. Military commanders have an affirmative duty to take the measures within their ability and appropriate
to the circumstances, to protect POWs captured by their unit until they are properly transferred to higher or
other competent authority. Commanders may not execute POWs to preserve their unit or to facilitate their
unit’s movement.
ARTICLE 5 TRIBUNALS
3-51. If, during an international armed conflict, the detaining power has any doubt as to whether a captured
person is entitled to POW status or treatment, Article 5 of the GPW requires the detaining power to provide
POW treatment for such persons having committed a belligerent act until such time as his or her status has
been determined by a competent tribunal. This “Article 5 tribunal” would review the facts and circumstances
to determine the status of the individual in doubt. If the detaining power has no doubt regarding the
entitlement to POW status or treatment, then Article 5 does not require that the person be provided POW
treatment or a tribunal to adjudicate claims of POW status (for example, if the United States has determined
that a non-State armed groups does not meet the criteria for its members to be entitled to POW status, then
no members of that group may, by asserting membership in that group, assert a right to POW treatment under
Article 5 or to an Article 5 tribunal to adjudicate their claim to POW treatment).
3-52. Similarly, if a member of non-State armed group is captured in a non-international armed conflict, then
no “Article 5 tribunal” is required as a matter of international law, and POW status or treatment would not
be required. However, an administrative tribunal may be useful to determine whether a detainee is a peaceful
civilian or an unprivileged belligerent or whether there is a necessity for continued detention (DOD Law of
War Manual, 4.27.4).
3-53. If the detaining power has doubt as to whether a captured person is entitled to POW status or treatment
and the detaining power wishes not to treat the captured person as a POW, an Article 5 tribunal should be
convened within a reasonable period of time following capture, generally upon timely arrival at a corps or
higher level POW camp. A detaining power may decline to convene a tribunal only if military exigencies
prevent it.
3-54. The details of Article 5 tribunals, such as composition and procedures, are within the discretion of the
detaining power. In U.S. practice, tribunals have been three-person administrative boards. A captured person
is entitled to notice in a language he or she understands that a tribunal will be held and he or she will be given
the opportunity to testify or otherwise address the tribunal. The standard for reaching a determination has
been a “preponderance of the evidence.” (See details in AR 190-8/MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees.)
3-55. If a competent tribunal determines that a person who has committed a belligerent act is not entitled to
POW status or treatment, such person may still be entitled to protected person status under the GC or may be
determined to be an unprivileged belligerent who is not entitled to POW status or treatment nor protected
person status under the GC. In any event, the person will be treated humanely at all times. (See Chapter 5.)
EVACUATION
3-58. As soon as possible after capture, POWs must be evacuated to camps located sufficiently distant from
the combat zone so that they are out of danger. POWs must not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while
awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone. A POW may be temporarily kept near the danger zone only when
wounds or illness would make the evacuation more hazardous to the POW’s health. Furthermore, evacuation
should always be done in a humane manner and in conditions similar to those for the forces of the detaining
power. POWs must receive sufficient food and potable water, and necessary clothing and medical attention.
All feasible precautions must be taken to ensure POWs safety during evacuation. If POWs cannot be
evacuated as provided for in Part III, Section I, of the GPW, they may be released, provided that feasible
precautions are taken to ensure their safety (GPW arts. 19, 20; see DOD Law of War Manual, 9.9.2 and
9.9.3).
3-60. Personal items such as a ring, wrist watch, or family photographs may not be taken from a POW or
from dead enemy personnel except by authorized personnel, and then only for their safekeeping. Items taken
for safekeeping must be itemized, separated, and packaged in order to permit accountability, safekeeping,
and return upon a POW’s release (GPW art. 18).
3-61. Currency carried by POWs may not be taken except by order of an officer. The amount of currency
and the identity of the owner must be recorded in a special register, and an itemized receipt must be provided
to the POW (GPW art. 18). The unexplained possession by a POW of a large sum of money justifiably leads
to an inference that such funds are not his or her own property and are in fact either property of the enemy
government or property that has been looted or otherwise stolen.
3-68. POWs are entitled to the following protections and protective measures in a POW camp (GPW arts.
13, 17, 23).
POWs and retained personnel shall be protected against acts of violence, including assaults or
intimidation.
POWs and retained personnel shall be protected against insults and public curiosity.
POWs and retained personnel may not be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation not
justified by the medical, dental, or hospital treatment of the POW concerned and carried out in his
or her interest.
POWs and retained personnel are entitled to respect for their persons and honor. For example,
rapes and other sexual assault of POWs are forbidden.
POWs and retained personnel may be interned only in camps on land. POW camps should be
situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for POWs to be out of danger.
POWs and retained personnel may not be sent to or detained in areas where they may be exposed
to fire of the combat zone nor may his or her presence be used to render certain points or areas
immune from military operations.
Camps may not be located or designed for the purpose of using POWs or retained personnel as
human shields in order to prevent the attack of military objectives.
POWs and retained personnel must have shelters against bombardment and other hazards of war
to the same extent as the local civilian population. If there is a risk of air, missile, or chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons attack, POWs shall retain their personal protective
equipment (such as, helmets, body armor, and protective masks) or be provided comparable
equipment for personal protection.
QUARTERS
3-69. POWs and retained personnel must be quartered in camps or camp compounds according to their
nationality, language, and customs in order to minimize friction among POWs or groups of POWs, provided
that such POWs shall not be separated from POWs belonging to the armed forces with which they were
serving at the time of their capture, except with their consent (GPW art. 22). In any camps in which women
POWs, as well as men, are accommodated, separate dormitories and separate toilet facilities shall be provided
for women POWs. POWs may be segregated according to their known or suspected security risk level.
Subject to compliance with the GPW, officer POWs may be separated from enlisted POWs. Female POWs
will be under the immediate supervision of women (GPW arts. 21-25).
3-70. In addition to the requirements previously listed, POWs and retained persons shall be quartered under
conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the detaining power in the same area. Barracks should be
protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, and should include all necessary fire prevention
measures. Conditions in the quarters must make allowances for the habits and customs of the POWs. In
addition, conditions posing health risks should be identified and corrected to ensure that conditions in no case
are prejudicial to the POWs’ health (GPW art. 25).
3-71. POWs shall have shelter against aerial bombardment and other hazards of war to the same extent as
the local population (GPW art. 23).
CLOTHING
3-73. Adequate supplies of clothing, underwear, and shoes must be provided to POWs free of charge. If
available, uniforms of the armed forces to which POWs owe their allegiance should be made available to
clothe them. POWs who work shall be provided clothing consistent with their work, to include protective
items. Clothing must be suitable for the regional climate (GPW art. 27). Uniforms or other clothing may
contain markings denoting the individuals as POWs to help prevent escape, but the markings may not be
humiliating or degrading (DOD Law of War Manual, 9.13.4.1).
CANTEENS
3-74. Canteens are similar to a base or post exchange for POWs. They should be established in all permanent
POW camps within a reasonable period of time, such as after more basic camp facilities have been established
for U.S. forces in the area. The purpose of the canteen is to permit prisoners to purchase items, at a cost not
greater than local market prices, for daily use that the detaining power is not otherwise required to provide.
These may include, but are not limited to, items such as correspondence materials, foodstuffs, personal
hygiene articles, tobacco, soft drinks and other non-alcoholic beverages, and reading materials (see GPW art.
28). U.S. practice has been to provide these materials to POWs free of charge before a canteen can be
established (see DOD Law of War Manual, 9.17.1.1).
HYGIENE
3-75. POWs may only be interned in premises affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. POW
camps must have sanitary measures that will ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of the camps and that
will prevent epidemics. POWs interned in unhealthful areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall
be removed as soon as possible to a more favorable climate (GPW art. 22).
3-76. POWs shall have for their use, accessible day and night, toilets that conform to the rules of hygiene
and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. Where feasible, toilets should be appropriate for the
culture of the POWs. In addition, bathing and laundry facilities with sufficient soap and water are to be
provided. Individuals must be provided reasonable opportunity to make use of these facilities. Toilet, bathing,
and laundry facilities must be kept clean (GPW art. 29). POWs may be assigned cleaning duties. The
detaining power, however, has the ultimate responsibility for the camp’s sanitary conditions.
3-81. Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment administered (GWS art.
12).
3-82. POWs must receive a medical inspection at least once a month to check on each prisoner’s general
health, nutrition, and cleanliness, and to detect contagious diseases. Inspection includes checking and
recording of each POW’s weight (GPW art. 31).
Serious Injuries
3-83. Any serious injury (an injury requiring hospitalization) to or death of a POW will be the basis for an
official investigation to determine its cause (GPW art. 121). In addition, Army regulations and DOD policy
require reporting and investigation of potential detainee abuse.
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES
3-85. POWs are entitled to religious worship, including attendance at services, subject to the POW’s
compliance with camp disciplinary routine. Accommodation for religious services shall be provided (GPW
art. 34).
3-86. POWs may be ministered to by retained military chaplains or by other ordained chaplains or qualified
laypersons, if available. Retained chaplains shall be allocated to camps and labor detachments containing
POWs of the same forces, language, or religion.
PRISONERS’ REPRESENTATIVE
3-95. The role of the prisoners’ representative is to represent POWs before the military authorities, the
Protecting Powers, the ICRC, and any other organization that may assist them. The prisoners’ representative
shall also further the physical, spiritual, and intellectual well-being of POWs. The prisoners’ representative
facilitates much of the communication and shipments the GPW authorizes on behalf of POWs. If prisoners
decide to organize for mutual assistance, their organization will be within the purview of the prisoners’
representative. Prisoners’ representatives may not be held responsible for any offenses committed by POWs,
however, simply by reason of their duties. POWs may freely consult their prisoners’ representative. Any
POW correspondence limits as referenced in paragraph 3-93 shall not apply to correspondence to or from a
prisoner’s representative as such (GPW arts. 80, 81).
3-96. The highest ranking military POW officer acts as the prisoners’ representative, assisted by advisers
chosen by fellow POWs in the camp. In camps without officers, a representative is elected by secret ballot
every six months. An elected prisoners’ representative must be approved by the detaining power before
commencing duties as the representative. If the detaining power refuses to approve the elected representative,
it must inform the protecting power or the ICRC of the reason for such refusal and the prisoners are entitled
to hold a new election. A prisoners’ representative is to have the same nationality, language, and customs as
the POWs represented. Thus, a camp having different sections according to differing prisoner nationalities,
languages, or customs will have multiple prisoners’ representatives (GPW art. 79).
3-97. The detaining power must provide prisoners’ representatives all facilities necessary to communicate
with the detaining authorities, the protecting power, the ICRC, and those organizations given to assist POWs.
Other material facilities shall be granted prisoners’ representatives, particularly sufficient freedom of
movement to accomplish their duties, such as visits to those premises where POWs are detained, inspection
of labor detachments, and receipt of supplies. Prisoners’ representatives may appoint assistants they need
from among the POWs. The detaining power may not require prisoners’ representatives to perform other
work if doing so makes their duties more difficult (GPW art. 81).
3-98. Prisoners’ representatives who are transferred shall be allowed a reasonable time to acquaint their
successors with current affairs. The reasons for the dismissal of a prisoners’ representative must be
communicated to the protecting power (GPW art. 81).
THE CENTRAL PRISONERS OF WAR INFORMATION AGENCY AND THE CENTRAL TRACING
AGENCY
3-99. The GPW provides for the creation of a Central Prisoners of War Information Agency in a neutral
country for the purpose of collecting all the information it may obtain through official or private channels
respecting POWs, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the POWs’ country of origin or power on which
they depend (GPW art. 123). This role generally has been performed by the ICRC through its Central Tracing
Agency.
LEGAL DOCUMENTS
3-106. The detaining power must provide POWs all reasonable facilities for the preparation and execution
of legal documents in their civil capacity, and for their transmission through the protecting power or Central
Prisoners of War Information Agency (GPW art. 77).
RELIEF SHIPMENTS
3-107. POWs are allowed to receive relief shipments containing food, clothing, medical supplies, and
articles of a religious, educational, or recreational character and materials allowing POWs to pursue their
studies or cultural activities, free of import, customs, or other duties (GPW arts. 72, 74). Procedures for
collective relief shipments are delineated in Annex III to the GPW. States may arrange for relief shipments
by special agreement as long as the agreement neither restricts the prisoner representative’s right to take
possession of relief shipments and distribute or dispose of their contents on behalf of the POWs nor restricts
the protecting power, the ICRC, or other qualifying organization of their right to supervise shipment
distribution (GPW art. 73).
3-108. The only limits that may be placed on these shipments shall be those proposed by the protecting
power in the interests of the POWs themselves, or by the ICRC or any other organization giving assistance
to the POWs, in respect to their own shipments only, on account of the exceptional strain on transport or
communication (GPW art. 72). Relief shipments for POWs are exempt from any postal charges or duties.
LABOR
3-109. Subject to the conditions outlined in Section III of the GPW, the detaining power may employ POWs
and retained personnel (GPW art. 33, 49). Retained personnel, however, may not be employed other than for
work related to their medical or religious duties (GPW art. 33).
3-110. Labor assignments for physically fit POW’s must, nevertheless, take into consideration a POW’s
age, gender, rank, and physical aptitude, with a view to maintaining POWs in a good state of physical and
mental health. Officers may not be compelled to work. They may be permitted to work if they request to do
so and suitable work is available. Noncommissioned officers may be employed, but only in supervisory
positions (GPW art. 49).
3-111. POWs may never be employed in labor that places them at risk of violence, intimidation, insults, or
public curiosity, or that would be regarded as humiliating if performed by a member of the detaining power’s
military force. Additionally, unless they volunteer, POWs may not be compelled to perform labor that is
unhealthy or dangerous (GPW art. 52). They may not be compelled to take part in military operations directed
against their own country.
3-112. POWs may be compelled to engage in a broad range of work, to include camp administration,
installation, and maintenance. If they volunteer, POWs may work in a broader range of jobs, to include work
on military bases not directly connected with war operations. The following lists other permissible classes of
work in which POWs may be compelled to work (GPW art. 50):
agriculture;
industries connected with the production or the extraction of raw materials and manufacturing
industries, except metallurgical, machinery and chemical industries;
public works and building operations that have no military character or purpose;
transport and handling of stores that are not military in character or purpose;
commercial businesses, including arts and crafts;
domestic service; and
public utilities having no military character or purpose.
3-113. POWs shall be provided with appropriate food, clothing, equipment, conditions, and training for
performing their work (GPW art. 51). The treatment of POWs who work for private employers must not be
inferior to that provided for under the GPW (GPW art. 57).
3-114. POWs performing labor shall receive working pay at a fair rate established by the detaining power
within GPW guidelines (GPW arts. 54, 62). POWs permanently assigned to work for the administration,
installation or maintenance of POW camps, and POWs required to perform spiritual or medical duties for
their fellow POWs are also entitled to fair working pay (GPW art. 62). The duration of the POWs’ daily
routines should not be excessive and must comport with GPW standards, which in general require working
conditions that are safe and not inferior to those the detaining power affords its nationals (GPW art. 51).
Prisoners shall receive one hour of rest in the middle of the day’s work and 24 consecutive hours of rest each
week. For POWs held by the Department of Defense, further information is provided in chapter 4, AR 190–
8/Marine Corps Order 3461.1.
3-120. POWs are entitled to keep their rank insignia, nationality badges or devices, and decorations (GPW
art. 18). They must be treated with due regard to their rank and age (GPW art. 44). The detaining power must
recognize promotions of POWs during their captivity, when notified by the power on which such POWs
depend (GPW art. 43).
3-121. Non-lethal weapons may be used to control rioting or to prevent escape. Deadly force may be used
to prevent the escape of a POW or to restore discipline in certain circumstances, such as when POW actions
pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to camp personnel or other POWs.
3-122. The use of weapons against POWs, particularly against those who are escaping or attempting to
escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the
circumstances (GPW art. 42).
3-123. Pursuant to Article 91, GPW, a POW succeeds in an escape attempt if the POW rejoins the armed
forces of the power on which the POW depends or joins those of an ally; the POW leaves the territory under
the control of the detaining power or its allies; or the POW joins a ship flying the flag of the power on which
the POW depends or of an ally, in the territorial waters of the detaining power (provided that this ship is not
under the control of the detaining power). POWs who make good their escape and are recaptured may not be
punished in respect to their escape (GPW art. 91; DOD Law of War Manual, 9.25.1).
3-124. A POW who attempts to escape but does not succeed before recapture may only be subject to
disciplinary punishment, even if it is not a first attempt. If recaptured by civilians, the prisoner should be
turned over to local, State, or federal law enforcement authorities for safekeeping so that he or she may be
turned over to military custody as soon as possible (GPW art. 92). A recaptured POW must be handed over
without delay to the competent military authority. A recaptured individual remains a POW and the
responsibility of the detaining power and must be treated accordingly.
3-125. A POW who commits offenses with the sole intention of facilitating escape and whose offenses do
not involve violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of
self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, may be subject to
disciplinary punishment only. Similarly, a POW who aids or abets an escape or an attempt to escape may be
subject to disciplinary punishment only. Escape or attempt to escape may not be considered an aggravating
circumstance if the POW is subjected to trial by judicial proceedings in respect of an offense committed
during the POW’s escape or attempt (GPW art. 93).
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
3-129. POWs should normally be tried in military courts only. However, if the law of the detaining power
permits members of its own armed forces to be tried in civilian courts for particular offenses, then civil courts
may try POWs under the same conditions. All courts trying POWs must offer essential guarantees of
independence, impartiality as generally recognized and, in particular, must be guided by the procedures
provided for under the GPW related to the rights of the accused and to means of defense (GPW arts. 84, 105;
consider AP I art. 75).
3-130. In deciding whether proceedings with respect to an offense shall be judicial or disciplinary, the
competent authority should exercise the greatest leniency and adopt, where possible, disciplinary rather than
judicial measures (GPW art. 83).
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
3-131. A POW may not be punished more than once for the same act or on the same charge (GPW art. 86).
RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED
3-137. With respect to disciplinary proceedings, before any disciplinary punishment is announced, the
accused must be given precise information regarding the offenses of which the POW is accused and an
opportunity to explain the conduct and defend himself or herself. The accused must be allowed to call
witnesses and, if necessary, be given the services of a qualified interpreter (GPW art. 96). A record of
disciplinary punishments must be maintained by the camp commander and must be open to inspection by
representatives of the protecting power (GPW art. 96).
3-138. With respect to judicial proceedings, the detaining power must notify the POWs concerned, the
prisoners’ representative, and the protecting power of any plan to initiate judicial proceedings against any
POWs as soon as possible and at least three weeks before the opening of the trial. The notification must
contain the following information (GPW art. 104):
Surname and first names of the POWs, their rank, their army, regimental, personal or serial
numbers, their dates of birth, and their professions or trades, if any;
Place of internment or confinement;
Specification of the charge or charges on which the POWs are to be arraigned, giving the legal
provisions applicable; and
Designation of the court that will try the cases and the dates and places fixed for the opening of
the trials.
3-139. At trial, accused POWs are (GPW art. 105):
Assistance by fellow POWs;
Defense by a qualified advocate or counsel of the POW’s own choice;
The right to call witnesses; and
If necessary, the assistance of a competent interpreter (GPW art. 105).
PROHIBITED PENALTIES
3-143. No penalty may be imposed on POWs that is not authorized for members of the armed forces of the
detaining power who have committed the same acts. The following punishments are expressly prohibited
(GPW art. 87):
Collective punishments for individual acts;
Corporal punishment;
Imprisonment in premises without daylight;
Any form of torture or cruelty; or
Deprivation of rank or of the right to wear badges.
3-144. Courts or authorities assessing judicial or disciplinary penalties must consider that the accused does
not owe allegiance to the detaining power and may be, for example, under a duty to escape, and is in its
power through circumstances beyond his or her control . Consequently, such courts or authorities may reduce
the penalty below any minimum penalty prescribed for members of the armed forces of the detaining power.
(GPW art. 87).
DEATH PENALTY
3-145. The following are special rules regarding the death sentence for POWs (GPW art. 100):
A POW and the protecting power shall be informed, as soon as possible, of any offense that is
punishable by a death sentence under the laws of the detaining power. Other offenses shall not
thereafter be made punishable by the death penalty without the concurrence of the power on which
the POWs depend.
A death sentence may not be pronounced on POWs unless the attention of the court has been
drawn particularly to the fact that:
Since the accused is not a national of the detaining power, he or she is not bound to it by any
duty of allegiance; and
That he or she is in the power of the detaining power as the result of circumstances
independent of his or her own will.
If the death penalty is pronounced on a POW, the sentence shall not be executed for at least six
months after communication to the protecting power of the details related to the death sentence.
APPEALS
3-146. Every POW must be given the same rights of petition or appeal from any sentence pronounced
against him or her as members of the armed forces of the detaining power, with a view to the quashing or
revising of the sentence or reopening of the trial. A POW must be fully and immediately informed of those
rights and of any applicable time limits. The detaining power must also immediately communicate to the
protecting power the POW’s decision to exercise or to waive the right to an appeal (GPW arts. 106, 107).
deprived of liberty shall retain the benefit of complaints to and access by the ICRC and a protecting power,
and other benefits related to spiritual assistance, exercise, correspondence and parcels (GPW art. 108).
3-149. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men and women POWs undergoing punishment must not
be subjected to more severe treatment than members of the armed forces of the detaining power of equivalent
rank undergoing the same punishment (GPW art. 108).
3-150. Women are not to be awarded or sentenced to a punishment more severe, or treated more severely
while undergoing punishment, than a female or male member of the detaining power’s armed forces would
be for a similar offense (GPW art. 88). Women sentenced to confinement are to be confined in separate
quarters from men and must be under the supervision of women.
of the GPW in any important respect, the transferring power must, upon being notified by the protecting
power take effective measures to correct the situation or request the return of the POWs (GPW art. 12).
WILLS
3-158. Following the death of a POW, the detaining power must send without delay any will in its
possession to the protecting power and a certified copy must be sent to the Central Prisoners of War
Information Agency (GPW art. 120).
DEATH CERTIFICATES
3-159. A death certificate must be completed, including at a minimum the information contained in the
form annexed to the GPW, for all who die as a POW. It must be certified by a responsible officer and
forwarded, as rapidly as possible, to the information bureau. The required information includes (GPW art 120):
Service number, rank, full names, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal, or serial number,
or equivalent information;
Date and place of death;
Cause of death;
Date and place of burial;
Where applicable, the fact of and reason for, cremation; and
All information necessary in order to identify the grave or inurnment/columbarium location.
TERMINATION OF CAPTIVITY
3-161. POWs shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities (GPW
art. 118). Note that the GPW allows for the possibility of repatriation or release during hostilities based on
serious wounds or sickness, paroles, or exchanges.
3-164. In accordance with GPW, Article 110, the following are entitled to direct repatriation:
The incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely
diminished;
The wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one
year, whose condition requires treatment, and whose mental or physical fitness has been gravely
diminished; and
The wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have
been gravely and permanently diminished.
3-165. Such POWs repatriated before the end of hostilities may not be employed on active military service
(GPW art. 117).
PAROLE
3-167. The GPW allows parole for POWs subject to certain guidelines and procedures. Upon the outbreak
of hostilities, each party to a conflict shall notify the adverse parties of its laws or regulations allowing or
forbidding its armed forces to accept liberty on parole or promise (GPW art. 21). U.S. policy prohibits U.S.
service members from accepting parole or special favors from the enemy.
PROCEDURES
3-169. Repatriation is effected under conditions similar to those for the transfer of POWs during captivity
as outlined in paragraphs 3-153 and 3-156. Costs of repatriation at the end of hostilities are to be equitably
borne between the detaining power and the power on which the POWs depend, generally with the detaining
power bearing the costs of transport to its border or port of embarkation closest to the territory of the power
on which the POWs depend (GPW art. 118). If the two powers are not geographically contiguous, the
detaining power and the power on which the POWs depend shall agree between themselves as to the equitable
apportionment of the remaining costs of the repatriation (GPW art. 118). The detaining power may not delay
repatriation solely because the parties to the conflict have not agreed on an equitable allocation of costs (GPW
arts. 116, 118, 119).
3-170. Articles of value, and any currency that has not been converted into that of the detaining power,
must be returned to the POWs upon repatriation. Any items not returned must be sent to the information
bureau. Baggage limitations may be imposed similar to those allowed during the transfer of POWs outlined
in paragraph 3-139; those personal effects POWs cannot take with them are forwarded once the parties agree
regarding costs and procedures (GPW art. 119).
This chapter addresses the protection of the wounded and sick, medical units, facilities,
and transports. The 1864 Geneva Convention was one of the international community’s
earliest attempts to codify protections for the wounded and sick on the battlefield and
provide for the use of the Red Cross as a distinctive emblem. The later versions of the
Geneva Conventions relative to wounded and sick of the armed forces on land in 1906
and 1929, and the 1907 Hague Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of
the Principles of the Geneva Convention expanded the standards for the protection of
military personnel who are hors de combat, due to illness or wounds on the battlefield
or at sea. This standard of treatment was further refined in the GWS, and the GWS Sea,
both of August 12, 1949. Since the United States is a party to the two 1949 Geneva
Conventions, their provisions are binding on the United States and form the basis for
this chapter. Additional Protocol I of 1977 (AP I), though not binding on the United
States, also contains provisions for the care of wounded and sick that in certain cases
its provisions may reflect customary international law and be consistent with U.S.
practice. This chapter also addresses the principles related to the protection of medical
care provided by impartial humanitarian organizations during armed conflict.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
4-1. LOAC imposes certain obligations on parties to an international armed conflict regarding the wounded,
sick, and shipwrecked, some of which are summarized below. Also, United States Army and Marine Corps’
practice is to respect and protect military and civilian sick, wounded, and shipwrecked, as well as those
identified as exclusively engaged in collecting, caring for, or transporting them. Soldiers and Marines must:
Respect and protect wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military and other personnel to whom the
Geneva Conventions apply during an armed conflict (GWS art. 12, 15; GWS Sea art. 12, 18;
consider AP I art. 10(1)).
“Respect and protect” means that these persons generally may not be knowingly attacked, fired
upon, or unnecessarily interfered with (see DOD Law of War Manual, 7.3.3). Soldiers and Marines
have a positive duty to collect and care for the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, even if they are
enemy personnel.
Provide for the respectful recovery, accounting for, and disposal of enemy dead in a manner that
facilitates the identification and proper disposition of remains (GWS art. 16-18; GWS Sea art. 19,
20; consider AP I art. 32-34).
Respect and protect enemy military medical personnel, facilities, units, and ground transports in
the performance of their duties. It is prohibited to make them the object of an attack or unduly
interfere with their medical function, provided that those persons do not engage in, and those
objects are not used to engage in, acts outside their humanitarian duties that are harmful to the
enemy (GWS art. 19-21, 24-27, 35; GWS Sea art. 22-27; consider AP I art. 10, 12, 21).
4-2. The fact that an enemy force has violated its obligations by firing upon U.S. medical personnel
endeavoring to care for wounded U.S. military personnel does not provide a basis for U.S. military personnel
to respond by violating U.S. obligations by, for example, intentionally firing at enemy medical personnel, or
denying medical care to captured enemy military personnel. [For a discussion of reprisals, see para. 4-10 and
DOD Law of War Manual, 18.18.3.2.]
4-4. Soldiers and Marines who are members of the medical service should understand their special duties
and noncombatant status under the law of war. They must, for example:
Provide medical care to the wounded or sick, whether friend or foe.
Refrain from engaging in acts harmful to the enemy.
Continue to care for other members of the U.S. armed forces, if captured by the enemy (see
Chapter 3 for discussion of retained personnel).
4-5. Commanders must lead their units’ implementation of LOAC obligations related to the wounded, sick
and dead. If warranted by their assigned duties and operational context, they should:
Determine practical steps after combat to search for, collect, and protect the wounded, sick, and
dead, such as negotiating local truces to collect them.
Follow accountability procedures for enemy wounded, sick and dead, such as recording
identifying information and safekeeping of property.
Ensure medical units are not misused to commit acts harmful to the enemy, such as stationing
combat forces in a hospital.
Arrange for humanitarian organizations or other civilian volunteers to help collect and care for the
wounded and sick.
Ensure the appropriate display of the Red Cross.
SPECIAL AGREEMENTS
4-8. The GWS and GWS Sea provide for special agreements to be negotiated between the parties for
protection of the wounded and sick (see GWS arts. 6 and 15; GWS Sea arts. 6 and 18). Special agreements
may not adversely affect the situation of the wounded and sick or military medical personnel or chaplains,
nor can such agreements restrict the rights GWS and GWS Sea confer on them (GWS, art. 6; GWS Sea, art.
6). Wounded and sick and military medical personnel and chaplains will enjoy the benefits of any special
agreements so long as GWS or GWS Sea applies to them, except when express provisions in such agreements
or in subsequent agreements provide otherwise or when more favorable measures have been taken with regard
to them by one of the parties to the conflict (see GWS, art. 6; GWS Sea, art. 6).
NON-RENUNCIATION OF RIGHTS
4-9. Wounded and sick, as well as military medical personnel and chaplains, may not renounce, in whole
or in part, their rights secured to them by the GWS or GWS Sea or by special agreements (GWS, art. 7; GWS
Sea, art. 7).
PROHIBITION OF REPRISALS
4-10. During international armed conflict, reprisals against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings, or
equipment protected by the GWS are prohibited (GWS, art. 46; compare with GWS Sea, art. 47).
VOLUNTARY CARE
4-16. The military authorities may appeal for volunteers from the local inhabitants to assist with the
collection and care for, under the respective military authority’s direction, the wounded and sick under the
GWS. Once volunteers are identified, they are to receive necessary protection and facilities. Should the
adverse Party take or retake control of the area, that Party must likewise grant these persons the same
protection and the same facilities. No one must ever be molested or convicted for having given aid or care to
the wounded and sick (GWS art. 18; consider AP I art. 17). On the other hand, local inhabitants’ voluntarily
giving treatment to the wounded and sick do not relieve military authorities of their obligations to care for
the wounded and sick.
LOSS OF PROTECTION
4-18. If military medical units or facilities are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful
to the enemy, they may forfeit their special LOAC protections, but only after due warning (with, in all
appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit), and only after such warning has remained unheeded (GWS art.
21; DOD Law of War Manual, 7.10.3). Consistent with DOD policy, misuse of the protected status of any
military medical unit or facility, or medical ground transport, whether by U.S. forces, coalition forces, or
enemy forces, should be reported immediately through the chain of command to the appropriate combatant
commander (see DODD 2311.01E).
4-19. Acts harmful to the enemy by a person of a military medical unit or facility, or a medical ground
transport resulting in its loss of protected status do not necessarily warrant denial of respect and protection
to that person’s unit or facility, or medical ground transport or to other military medical units or facilities, or
medical ground transport.
4-20. The obligation to refrain from the use of force against a medical unit acting in violation of its mission
and protected status without due warning does not prohibit individuals or units from exercising their right of
self-defense (see DOD Law of War Manual, 7.10.3.2).
MEDICAL AIRCRAFT
4-25. Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked, and for the transport of medical personnel and equipment, must not be attacked, but must be
respected by the belligerents, while flying at heights and times, and on routes, specifically agreed upon by
the belligerents concerned (GWS art. 36). Such aircraft, while designated or operating as medical aircraft,
may not be used also for military purposes, such as to transport able-bodied combatants or to carry
ammunition to combat forces (see DOD Law of War Manual, 7.14.2). Medical aircraft must obey every
summons to land. In the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occupants may continue its
flights after examination, if any (GWS art. 36).
4-26. Military medical aircraft (i.e., aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked, and for the transport of medical personnel and equipment) must not be attacked, but are to be
respected by the belligerents, while flying at heights and times, and on routes, specifically agreed upon by
the belligerents concerned. The use of protected medical aircraft generally depends on an agreement between
belligerents. However, known medical aircraft, when performing humanitarian functions, must be respected
and protected. Such aircraft do not constitute a military objective that is liable to being made the object of
attack. Thus, even if not flying pursuant to an agreement, such aircraft shall not be deliberately attacked or
fired upon, if identified as protected medical aircraft. For example, if there is no agreement and a military
force happens upon a medical aircraft belonging to an enemy State, the aircraft must not be made the object
of attack until all other means of control (such as directing the aircraft to land and submit to search) have
been exhausted. A medical aircraft that is not flying pursuant to a special agreement that seeks to claim
protection as medical aircraft must make every effort to identify itself and to inform the enemy State of its
status and operation, such as its flight times and routes. For example, an unknown aircraft within a theater of
military operations would often be reasonably presumed to be a military objective, and the aircraft must take
affirmative steps to rebut this presumption. In order to maintain its entitlement to protection, such aircraft
must obey the directions of the enemy State, such as directions to land and to submit to search (GWS art. 36;
see DOD Law of War Manual, 17.14.1).
or captured, but must be respected and protected, provided their names and descriptions have been notified
to the parties to the conflict ten days before the ships are employed (GWS Sea, art. 22). Military hospital
ships are to have all exterior surfaces painted white with at least one large, dark red cross (or other protected
medical symbol as in paragraph 4-30) on each side of the hull and on the horizontal surfaces and distinctively
marked further as specified in Article 43 of GWS Sea. Military hospital ships, commissioned civilian hospital
ships, and authorized neutral civilian hospital ships that meet the applicable requirements must be respected
and protected and are exempt from capture (GWS Sea art. 24; DOD Law of War Manual, 7.12.4). Hospital
ships are exempt from capture and any hospital ship in a port that falls into the hands of the enemy is
authorized to leave the port and the religious, medical, and hospital personnel of the ship and its crew may
not be captured during the time they are in the service of the hospital ship, whether or not there are wounded
and sick on board (GWS Sea, arts. 29 and 36).
4-28. As long as they have been provided with an official commission by a Party to the conflict and the
proper certification from responsible authorities (see GWS Sea, art. 24), and their names and descriptions
have been provided to parties to the conflict ten days before they are employed (GWS Sea, art. 22), small
craft employed by a State or by the officially recognized lifeboat institutions for coastal rescue operations
must be respected and protected, so far as operational requirements permit (GWS Sea, art. 27).
4-29. The phrase “so far as operational requirements permit” acknowledges the risk to which small craft,
because of their small size, are exposed when working in a combat environment. Their small size may
increase the likelihood of misidentification by enemy or friendly forces, or it may not be feasible to avoid
incidental harm to them. They act at their own risk during or after any engagement (GWS Sea, art. 30).
Although small craft may be exposed to certain risks, if a party to a conflict has recognized the craft, it is
prohibited from making a deliberate attack on them (GWS Sea, art. 27).
4-30. Religious, medical, and hospital personnel under the GWS Sea who are retained to care for the
wounded and sick at sea and are later retained to care for the wounded and sick on land are subject to GWS
on landing (see GWS Sea, art. 37). Similarly, wounded and sick personnel put ashore who previously may
have been engaged in the land-sea battle are subject to GWS once put ashore (see GWS Sea, art. 4).
4-32. The display of the distinctive emblem is under the direction of the competent military or civilian
authority (GWS art. 39; GWS Sea art. 41; consider AP I art. 18 and AP II art. 12). The distinctive emblem
may be removed by competent authority for camouflage integrity or other tactical reasons. The fact that
medical personnel, land facilities, units, or transports are not displaying the distinctive emblem does not
entitle an opposing force to attack them if their status is apparent or otherwise has been established. They
retain their protections as long as their mission and use is consistent with their protected status. However, the
absence of the distinctive emblem may increase the risk that enemy forces will not recognize the protected
status of military medical and religious personnel and other protected persons and objects, and attack them
in error (see DOD Law of War Manual, 7.15.3.1).
DISPLAY BY PERSONNEL
4-33. Personnel entitled to wear the distinctive emblem, when authorized by competent authority, include:
Military medical personnel and chaplains (GWS art. 39, 40; GWS Sea art. 41, 42; consider AP I,
Amended Annex I, art. 5(4));
Auxiliary medical personnel, while carrying out their medical duties (GWS art. 41);
Members and medical staff of the Red Cross Movement; that is, official representatives of the
ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and national Red
Cross societies in accordance with the GWS (see GWS art. 44);
Staff of recognized aid societies of neutral countries (see GWS art. 27); and
Staff of national societies or other voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to, or assisting, the military
medical services in accordance with the GWS (see GWS art. 26).
4-34. Wearing of the Red Cross armlet by U.S. military medical personnel is subject to service authorization
and may be limited by tactical conditions. The emblem does not in itself confer protected status, but it
facilitates the identification of protected objects and persons (DOD Law of War Manual, 7.15.3.2). When
authorized, such military medical personnel, staff of national Red Cross societies, and staff of recognized aid
societies of neutral countries, may wear on the left arm an armlet displaying the appropriate distinctive
emblem and issued and stamped by competent military authority (see GWS art. 40). Such personnel are
required to bear an identity card that states in what capacity its possessor is entitled to protection under the
GWS and that is embossed with the stamp of the military authority (see GC art. 40). Auxiliary medical
personnel require similar authorization to wear an armlet in a similar manner and carry similar identification,
but such armlets are to bear a smaller distinctive emblem (see GWS art. 41).
military authorities must take the greatest care to remove all distinctive emblems as soon as the ground
transport or aircraft are no longer employed as medical transport (see GWS, arts. 35, 36).
military objectives from attack; or otherwise to shield or favor one's own military operations or to impede
the adversary's military operations.
4-43. Personnel belonging to impartial humanitarian organizations providing medical care must be granted
all available help in the performance of their duties, including by establishing appropriate channels of
communication with such organizations. They must not be subject to harassment or attacks for having
performed their humanitarian duties for the wounded and sick. They must not be compelled to carry out tasks
that are not compatible with their humanitarian mission. In the performance of their duties, they may not be
required to give priority to any person except on medical grounds.
4-44. Impartial humanitarian organizations may take appropriate measures to distinguish their personnel,
units, transports, and facilities from military objectives, including by marking such personnel, units,
transports, and facilities and, where feasible, by situating healthcare facilities away from military objectives.
Under the direction of the competent authority concerned, the distinctive emblem of the Red Cross or other
distinct emblem must be displayed by medical and religious personnel and medical units of impartial
humanitarian organizations, and on their medical transports. The distinctive emblem must be respected in all
circumstances and shall not be used improperly. If personnel, units, transports, and facilities that are entitled
to protection are recognized as such, they remain entitled to such protection even if the distinctive emblem
or other appropriate markings are not displayed.
This chapter addresses the protection of civilians in the hands of a party to the conflict
under the law of armed conflict. The protection of civilians is governed by the Geneva
and Hague traditions, customary international law, and recent practice consistent with
Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions. Certain provisions are
applicable only in the territory of a party to the conflict, others to belligerently occupied
territory, and a number to both or to civilian populations generally. Those relating
exclusively to occupied areas appear in Chapter 6, while the requirements of GC
having to do with the territory of a belligerent, with both such territory and occupied
territory, or with the general protection of civilians are set forth in this chapter. This
chapter will focus on detention and treatment standards from the Geneva tradition, with
some reference to civilian protections in the conduct of hostilities as outlined in
Chapter 2.
5-3. Commanders, at all levels, have a great responsibility to exercise the leadership necessary to reduce
the risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects. Accordingly, they should, for example:
Make the necessary judgments and decisions required by the principle of proportionality to ensure
that harm to civilians and civilian objects is not excessive compared to the expected military
advantage.
Determine the feasible precautions to take for the protection of civilians in planning and
conducting an attack, including canceling or suspending an attack based on new information
raising concerns of expected civilian casualties or determining whether it is feasible to provide
warnings or to use different types of weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of civilian
casualties) (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.11).
Administer civilian internment camps in accordance with the GC.
Arrange for passage of humanitarian relief.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
5-4. As described in Chapter 1 (see paragraph 1-54), a civilian is a member of the civilian population. That
is, a civilian is an individual who is neither part of nor associated with an armed force of a State or a non-
State armed group that is engaging in hostilities. For example, an ordinary inhabitant of the enemy State
would be a civilian, but a member of the enemy armed forces or a member of a terrorist group or a non-State
armed group would not be a civilian.
5-5. Like combatants, members of the civilian population have certain rights, duties and liabilities under
LOAC. Civilians may not be made the object of an attack, and feasible precautions must be taken to reduce
the risk of harm to them. Civilians are generally treated consistent with the GC, and most qualify for
protections established for protected persons under the convention (GC art. 4). In general, civilians may be
temporarily detained when militarily necessary and may be interned for imperative reasons of security. In
all circumstances, they are entitled to humane treatment. Civilians do not enjoy combatant immunity
(immunity from prosecution for engaging in hostilities) and may be punished by an enemy State for engaging
in hostilities against it. Further, civilians who take a direct part in hostilities forfeit their protection from being
made the object of attack (consider AP I art. 50, 51).
PROTECTED PERSONS
5-6. In general, the GC uses the term “protected person” to refer to those individuals who are entitled to
receive its protections. Principally, protected persons include persons of enemy nationality living in the
territory of a belligerent State and the inhabitants of occupied territory. Even if a person is not a protected
person under the GC, other rules may be applicable to them. For example, persons protected by the GPW,
the GWS, or the GWS Sea, are not considered protected persons under the GC (GC art. 4). Further, certain
baseline rules apply to the treatment of all detainees, including those who are not protected persons or POWs
(DOD Law of War Manual, 10.3).
5-7. The GC underlies most of the treaty rules applicable to the United States for the treatment of civilians
in the hands of a party to the conflict during international armed conflict and occupation. Although the GC’s
provisions should be interpreted in light of the principles that underlie the treatment of civilians, protected
persons do not simply refer to persons who are civilians. Protected persons may include certain unprivileged
belligerents, although certain rights and privileges that unprivileged belligerents receive are subject to
derogation for security reasons (see DOD Law of War Manual, 10.3.2.4). Subject to certain exceptions,
persons protected by the GC are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find
themselves, in the case of occupation or conflict, in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying State of
which they are not nationals (DOD Law of War Manual, 10.3.2). The GC term “protected person” does not,
under the framework of the GC, apply to non-international armed conflicts (conflicts against or between non-
State armed groups).
5-8. The phrase “in the hands of” is used in an extremely general sense. It is not limited to physical custody
or control, such as a prisoner. The mere fact of being in the territory of a party to the conflict or in occupied
territory implies the person is in the power or “in the hands of” the Occupying Power.
5-9. Certain individuals do not receive protected person status. Nationals of a State not bound by the GC
are explicitly excluded from protected person status. Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the
territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State (for example, an ally) are not regarded
as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the
State whose hands they are. Nationals of a neutral State in occupied territory, however, are considered as
protected persons under the GC (see DOD Law of War Manual, 15.6.4.1).
DEROGATIONS
5-11. The GC permits States to derogate from the GC’s requirements to provide certain rights and privileges
otherwise afforded to protected persons for security reasons. Such derogation may differ based on location
of the protected person, such as in occupied territory or in the belligerent’s home territory, and the conduct
of the civilian (GC art 5; DOD Law of War Manual, 10.4).
Other Areas
5-13. To the extent that the rights and privileges of protected persons afforded by the GC are applied outside
the home territory of a party to the conflict or outside occupied territory, it would be reasonable for such
rights and privileges similarly to be subject to derogation. Thus, if U.S. forces are satisfied that an individual
protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the United States
in other contexts, such person could be deemed not entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the GC
as would, if exercised in favor of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of the United States
(see DOD Law of War Manual, 10.4.3). In no case, however, may deviations be taken from the minimum
humane treatment standards outlined in paragraphs 5-16 through 5-18.
Authority to Punish
5-14. The derogation provisions of the GC implicitly recognize the power of a party to the conflict to impose
the death penalty and lesser punishments (after judgment by a properly constituted court) on protected
persons who are spies, saboteurs, and other persons not entitled to be treated as POWs, such as unprivileged
belligerents,, except to the extent that that power has been limited or taken away by the GC (see GC art. 68,
which limits application of the death penalty and other punishments in the case of protected persons, subject
to the U.S. reservation with respect to imposing the death penalty).
all military operations; (2) the principles in Article 75 of AP I during international armed conflict and
occupation; and (3) the principles in Articles 4-6 of AP II during non-international armed conflict (DODD
2310.01E). As a matter of U.S. law and policy, there are no situations in an armed conflict, however
characterized, in which individuals are not entitled to at least this humane care and treatment. Further, as a
matter of U.S. policy, such care and treatment will be accorded, at a minimum, to detainees in any military
operations not involving armed conflict.
Procedural Protections
5-19. Under DOD policy, detainees will receive certain procedural protections.
5-20. Detainees will be registered, and property in their possession will be inventoried. Records of their
detention and such property will be maintained according to applicable law, regulation, policy, and other
issuances. All detainee records will be maintained, safeguarded. Detainees will be assigned an Internment
Serial Number (ISN) normally within 14 days after their capture by, or transfer to, the custody or control of
DOD personnel, barring exceptional circumstances.
5-21. The ICRC will be promptly notified of all ISN assignments. The ICRC will be given access to all
DOD detention facilities and the detainees housed therein, subject to reasons of imperative military necessity.
(DODD 2310.01E).
5-22. Alleged detainee abuse must be reported in accordance with DOD policies (see DODD 2310.01E;
DODD 2311.01E; DODD 3115.09).
5-23. DOD personnel will review periodically the detention of all individuals in DOD custody or control
who do not receive the protections afforded POWs. Such reviews may include: (1) preliminary assessments
of the detainee’s status and threat; (2) formal determinations of the lawfulness and continued necessity of
detention; and (3) determination of the status of unprivileged belligerents held in long-term detention,
presided over by a military judge (DODD 2310.01E, para. 3i).
5-24. DOD personnel, including DOD contractors, must not accept the transfer of a detainee from another
U.S. Government department or agency, coalition force, multinational partner personnel, or other personnel
not affiliated with the DOD or the U.S. Government, except in accordance with applicable law, regulation,
policy, and other issuances (DODD 2310.01E, para. 3e). No detainee may be released or transferred from the
care, custody, or control of a DOD component except in accordance with applicable law, regulation, policy,
and other issuances (DODD 2310.01E, para. 3m).
Greater Protections
5-25. As a matter of law, persons who are entitled to treatment as either POWs or retained personnel under
the GPW, or as internees under the GC, are entitled to even greater protections than the minimum humane
care and treatment described above.
SPECIAL AGREEMENTS
5-26. Parties to a conflict may conclude special agreements for all matters concerning which they deem it
suitable to make separate provision, in addition to those specified by the GC (GC art. 7). No special agreement
may adversely affect the situation of protected persons nor restrict the rights the GC confers on them.
5-27. In no circumstances may protected persons renounce the rights secured to them by the GC and by any
special agreements negotiated under the GC (GC art. 8).
and direct military advantage expected to be gained (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.10). Such feasible
precautions can reduce the risk that civilians may become casualties as a result of their proximity to attacks
on military objectives.
5-32. Feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians must also be taken by the party subject to
attack. For example, military commanders and other officials responsible for the safety of the civilian
population must take reasonable steps to separate the civilian population, individual civilians, and civilian
objects under their control from military objectives and protect the civilian population from the effects of
combat. Other feasible precautions may include avoiding locating military objectives within or near densely
populated areas, removing civilians and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives, and other
necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their
control from the dangers resulting from military operations (consider AP I art. 58; see DOD Law of War
Manual, 5.14).
5-33. LOAC protects civilian property as well. Outside the context of attacks, certain rules apply to the
seizure and destruction of enemy civilian property. For instance, pillage is strictly prohibited (HR art. 28).
Enemy property, including enemy civilian property, may not be seized or destroyed unless imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war (DOD Law of War Manual, 5.17.2). In general, enemy private movable
property on the battlefield may be seized if the property is susceptible to direct military use, i.e., it is necessary
and indispensable for the conduct of war. This includes arms, ammunition, military papers, or property that
can be used as military equipment (e.g., as a means of transportation or communication) (see DOD Law of
War Manual, 5.17.3).
5-34. Enemy private movable property that is not susceptible to direct military use may be appropriated only
to the extent that such taking is permissible in occupied areas. In particular, receipts should be given and
compensation paid, when feasible (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.17.3.1). During occupation, other rules
relating to the treatment of enemy property apply (HR art. 43; see Chapter 6).
5-35. Cultural property is subject to special protection under LOAC. For example, in general, no use should
be made of cultural property, its immediate surroundings, or appliances in use for its protection, for purposes
that are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict. However, such use is
permissible when military necessity imperatively requires such use. Uses that would be likely to expose
cultural property to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict would include: (1) using cultural
property for military purposes; (2) placing military objectives near cultural property; or (3) using the cultural
property in such a way that an adversary would likely regard it as a military objective (HR art. 27; 1954
Hague art. 4; see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.18.3; consider AP I art. 53). Other feasible precautions should
be taken to reduce the risk of harm to cultural property, such as physically shielding cultural property from
harm and establishing refuges and evacuating movable cultural property to them (see DOD Law of War
Manual, 5.18.4).
5-36. In general, acts of hostility also may not be directed against cultural property, its immediate
surroundings, or appliances in use for its protection. Acts of hostility may, however, be directed against
cultural property, its immediate surroundings, or appliances in use for its protection, when military necessity
imperatively requires such acts (1954 Hague art. 4; see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.18.5).
5-37. Any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural
property are prohibited. These obligations are not subject to waiver for purposes of “imperative military
necessity.” Military commanders also have an obligation to take reasonable measures to prevent or stop any
form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property
(see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.18.6.1).
5-38. For the purpose of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and this publication, cultural property
includes, irrespective of ownership or origin: (1) movable and immovable property of great importance to
the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art, or history, whether religious or
secular; (2) buildings intended to shelter cultural property, such as museums and depositories of archives;
and (3) centers containing monuments
MARKINGS
5-39. It may be appropriate to identify protected persons and objects, as such, through the use of distinctive
and visible signs. For example, for cultural property, this may include use of the distinctive blue and white
shield described by 1954 Hague (1954 Hague arts. 6, 16) and displayed in figure 5-1 below. This may also
include identifying civilian hospitals (see paragraphs 5-41 through 5-43 concerning markings for civilian
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected). The parties to the conflict must, in so far as
military considerations permit, take the necessary steps to make the distinctive emblems clearly visible to the
enemy land, air, and naval forces in order to prevent intentional hostile action on the protected sites. Even if
not so marked, however, an attacking force may not knowingly target a building or other facility known to
enjoy special protection under LOAC. Similarly, attacking forces are not required to observe signs indicating
inviolability of buildings if such buildings are known to be used for military purposes, such as quarters for
military personnel, warehouses for military equipment and supplies, observation posts, or military
communications installations.
Figure 5-1. The distinctive emblem for the protection of cultural property
Civilian Hospitals
5-41. Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm, and maternity cases, may
in no circumstances be the object of attack but must at all times be respected and protected by the parties to
the conflict (GC art. 18; consider AP I art. 12). The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall
not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.
Civilian hospitals must avoid any interference, direct or indirect, in military operations, such as the use of a
hospital as a shelter for able-bodied combatants, as an arms or ammunition store, as a military observation
post, or as a center for liaison with combat forces (see DOD Law of War Manual, 7.17.1.1). However, the
fact that sick or wounded members of the armed forces are being cared for in these hospitals, or the presence
in these hospitals of small arms and ammunition taken from such combatants and not yet handed to the proper
service, are not to be considered acts harmful to the enemy (GC art. 19).
5-42. Protection for civilian hospitals may, however, cease only after due warning has been given, naming
in all appropriate cases a reasonable time, and after such warning has remained unheeded (GC art. 19;
consider AP I art. 13). The obligation to refrain from the use of force against a civilian hospital acting in
violation of its mission and protected status without due warning does not prohibit the exercise of the right
of self-defense (see DOD Law of War Manual, 7.17.1.2).
5-43. States that are parties to a conflict must provide all civilian hospitals with certificates showing that
they are civilian hospitals and that the buildings they occupy are not used for any purpose that would deprive
these hospitals of protection in accordance with Article 19 of the GC. They must also be marked with the
appropriate distinctive emblem provided for in Article 38 of the GWS (as described in paragraph 4-30), but
only if authorized by the State. The parties to the conflict must, in so far as military considerations permit,
take the necessary steps to make the distinctive emblems indicating civilian hospitals in a manner clearly
visible to the enemy land, air, and naval opposing forces in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile
action (see also figure 4-1, page 4-8). In view of the dangers to which civilian hospitals may be exposed by
being close to military objectives, it is recommended that such hospitals be located as far as possible from
military objectives (GC art. 18).
Medical Transport
5-45. Means of transport, including vehicles, convoys, and hospital trains, must be respected and protected
in the same manner as hospitals as long as they are exclusively engaged in the transport of wounded and sick
civilians; they must be appropriately marked (GC art. 21, 22; consider AP I art. 21). Civilian medical aircraft
are subject to the same restrictions as military medical aircraft, and should be respected and protected when
recognized as such (GC art. 22; consider AP I art. 24-28).
Special Zones
5-47. States may establish hospital and safety zones and localities to protect certain persons from the effects
of war, namely, wounded, sick, and aged persons, children under the age of 15, expectant mothers, and
mothers of children under the age of 7. Parties to a conflict may conclude agreements on the mutual
recognition of the hospital zones and localities they have created, drawing upon model agreements that are
annexed to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GC art. 14). The establishment of a zone only binds an adverse
party when it agrees to recognize the zone (see DOD Law of War Manual, 5.14.3.1).
5-48. Parties to a conflict may conclude similar agreements to establish neutralized zones to shelter: (1)
wounded and sick combatants and non-combatants; and (2) civilians who take no part in hostilities and who,
while they reside in the zones, perform no work of a military character (GC art. 15).
Women
5-55. In the territory of a party to the conflict and in occupied territory, all protected persons, including
women, are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their person, their honor, their family rights, their
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They are to be humanely treated at all
times, and are to be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and
public curiosity. Women must be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against
rape, forced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault (GC art. 27).
Journalists
5-56. In general, journalists are civilians and are protected as such under LOAC. Journalists do not form a
distinct class of persons under LOAC, but instead receive protection through the general protections afforded
civilians. Although journalism is regarded as a civilian activity, the fact that a person performs such work
does not preclude that person from otherwise acquiring a different status under LOAC, such as the status of
persons authorized to accompany the armed forces or of combatants (DOD Law of War Manual, 4.24). For
example, journalists authorized to accompany an armed force during an international armed conflict is a
POW upon capture. See paragraph 3-26 regarding the treatment standards of detained war correspondents as
“persons authorized to accompany the armed forces.”
of neutral States or other States not parties to the conflict that perform civil defense activities in the territory
of a party to the conflict, with the consent and under the control of that party.
party, must be allowed to continue to carry out duties whenever the cultural property for which they are
responsible has also fallen into the hands of the opposing party (1954 Hague art, 15). Such personnel are
analogous to medical and religious personnel who also are to continue to carry out their medical and spiritual
duties when they have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Certain Civil Affairs Soldiers and Marines may
have training in and assigned duties to help protect cultural property.
5-74. No protected person may be punished for an offense that he or she has not personally committed.
Collective penalties and, likewise, all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited. In addition to
this specific prohibition in the GC, collective penalties are prohibited as a general matter under LOAC (see
DOD Law of War Manual, 10.5.3.2).
5-75. Pillage is prohibited (GC art. 33). In addition to this specific prohibition in the GC, pillage is prohibited
as a general matter under LOAC.
5-76. Reprisal against protected persons and their property are prohibited (GC art. 33).
5-77. Protected persons must have every facility for applying to the protecting powers (if designated), to the
ICRC, to the national Red Cross or Red Crescent Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any
organization that might assist them. These several organizations must be granted full facilities for that
purpose by the authorities, within the bounds set by military or security considerations (GC art. 30). For
example, relief organizations generally may only access military operations areas or military facilities in
coordination with military authorities, and they can be barred from areas under military control if their
activities exceed the scope of their humanitarian missions or pose other security concerns.
5-78. Apart from the visits of the delegates of the protecting powers and of the ICRC, provided for by Article
143 of the GC, the detaining power must facilitate as much as possible visits to protected persons by the
representatives of other organizations whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief to such persons
(GC art. 30).
to in Article 30 of the GC (the national Red Cross or Red Crescent society of the country where they may
be) (GC art. 39).
5-82. Protected persons may be compelled to work only to the same extent as nationals of the party to the
conflict in whose territory they are. If protected persons are of enemy nationality, they may only be compelled
to do work that is normally necessary to ensure the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transport, and health of
human beings and that is not directly related to the conduct of military operations. In the cases mentioned in
the first two paragraphs of Article 40 of the GC (that are described in the preceding two sentences), protected
persons compelled to work must have the benefit of the same working conditions and of the same safeguards
as national workers, in particular as regards wages, hours of labor, clothing and equipment, previous training,
and compensation for occupational accidents and diseases (GC art. 40).
MEASURES OF CONTROL
5-83. Enemy aliens and other protected persons in the home territory of a party to the conflict when hostilities
break out between two States are not necessarily made prisoners or interned en masse. For example, all
protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of or during a conflict may be entitled to
do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interest of the State (GC art. 35).
5-84. Although the GC provides that the parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security
in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war, it does not list every measure that
may be implemented (see GC art. 27). Such measures can include many different types of measures. For
example, in the home territory of a party to a conflict, measures of control are normally taken with respect
to, at the very least, persons known to be active or reserve members of a hostile army (they would be the first
POWs), persons who would be liable to service in the enemy forces, and persons who would be expected to
furnish information or other aid to a hostile State..
5-85. Other measures may include, for example, requiring protected persons: (1) to register with and report
periodically to the police authorities; (2) to carry identity cards or special papers; (3) to refrain from carrying
weapons; (4) to refrain from changing their place of residence without permission; (5) to refrain from
accessing certain areas; (6) to have an assigned residence; and (7) to be interned.
5-86. Should the State, in whose hands protected persons may be, consider the measures of control
mentioned in the GC to be inadequate, it may not have recourse to any other measure of control more severe
than that of assigned residence or internment, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 42 and 43 of the
GC. The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security
of the detaining power makes it “absolutely necessary.” If any person, acting through the representatives of
the protecting power, voluntarily demands internment, and if his or her situation renders this step necessary,
he or she must be interned by the State in whose hands he or she may be (GC art. 42). All protected persons
subject to measures of control are to be provided treatment consistent with the minimum humane treatment
standards discussed in paragraphs 5-16 through 5-18.
5-87. Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence is entitled to have such
action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative tribunal designated by the
detaining power for that purpose. If the internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court
or administrative board must periodically, and at least twice yearly, consider his or her case with a view to
favorably amending the initial decision, if circumstances permit (GC art. 43).
5-88. Unless the protected persons concerned object, the detaining power must, as rapidly as possible, give
the protecting power the names of any protected persons who have been interned or subjected to assigned
residence, or who have been released from internment or assigned residence. The decisions of the courts or
boards mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 43 of the GC must also, subject to the same conditions, be
notified as rapidly as possible to the protecting power (GC art. 43).
TREATMENT OF INTERNEES
INTERNMENT GENERALLY
5-89. During an international armed conflict, parties to a conflict may not intern protected persons in a
belligerent’s home territory, except in accordance with the provisions of Articles 41-43, 68, and 78 of the
GC. Humane treatment standards of the GC for protected persons described in paragraphs 5-16 through 5-
18) also apply to interned protected persons.
Grouping of Internees
5-91. The detaining power must, as far as possible, accommodate the internees according to their nationality,
language, and customs. Internees who are nationals of the same country are not to be separated merely
because they speak different languages (GC art. 82). Internees must be accommodated and administered
separately from POWs and from persons deprived of liberty for any other reason (GC art. 84). Much like
internment of POWs, the internment of protected persons is a precautionary measure and should not be
confused with the penalty of imprisonment.
Additional Protections
5-93. If interned, expectant and nursing mothers, and children under 15 years of age must be given additional
food in proportion to their physiological needs (GC art. 89). The detaining power must encourage intellectual,
educational, and recreational pursuits among the internees, including child internees. The education of
children and young people must be ensured; they must be allowed to attend schools either within the place
of internment or outside. Like all internees, child internees must be given opportunities for physical exercise,
sports, and outdoor games. For this purpose, sufficient open spaces must be set aside in all places of
internment. Special playgrounds must be reserved for children and young people (GC art. 94).
Women Internees
5-94. Whenever it is necessary, as an exceptional and temporary measure, to accommodate women internees
who are not members of a family unit in the same place of internment as men, women internees must be
provided separate sleeping quarters and sanitary conveniences for their use (GC art. 85). Women internees
accused or convicted of offenses must be confined in separate quarters from men and must be under the
immediate supervision of women (GC arts. 85 and 126). Women internees undergoing disciplinary
punishment must be confined in separate quarters from male internees and under the immediate supervision
of women (GC art. 124). A woman internee must not be searched except by a woman (GC art. 97). Sick,
wounded, and infirm internees and maternity cases may not be transferred if the journey would be seriously
detrimental to them unless their safety imperatively so demands (GC art. 127).
PLACES OF INTERNMENT
5-95. The detaining power may not set up places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the dangers
of war. The detaining power must give enemy powers, through the intermediary of the protecting powers, all
useful information regarding the geographical location of places of internment. Whenever military
considerations permit, internment camps must be indicated by the letters “IC,” placed so as to be clearly
visible in the daytime from the air. The powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of
marking. No place, other than an internment camp, may be marked as such (GC art. 83). A detaining power
may refrain from marking a camp when it believes that such identification may enable an enemy power to
pose a security risk to the camp; for example, if such identification would enable an enemy power to instigate
a revolt, provide weapons to internees, or enable escape attempts.
Canteens
5-99. Canteens must be installed in every place of internment, except where other suitable facilities are
available (for comparison, see paragraph 3-74 for discussion of POW canteens). The purpose of the canteens
is to enable internees to make purchases, at prices no higher than local market prices, of food and articles of
everyday use, including soap and tobacco, in order to increase their personal well-being and comfort.
5-100. Profits made by canteens must be credited to a welfare fund to be set up for each place of internment,
and administered for the benefit of the internees attached to such place of internment. The internee committee
(described in paragraphs 5-134 through 5-137) has the right to check the management of the canteen and of
its welfare fund. When a place of internment is closed down, the balance of the welfare fund must be
transferred to the welfare fund of a place of internment for internees of the same nationality or, if such a place
does not exist, to a central welfare fund to be administered for the benefit of all internees remaining in the
custody of the detaining power. In case of a general release, the detaining power may keep the profits subject
to any agreement to the contrary between the powers concerned (GC art. 87). Internees are not entitled to
more favorable treatment than the population at large with respect to canteen facilities and are equally subject
to regulations, such as those pertaining to rationing, which are applied to the population generally.
MEDICAL CARE
5-105. Parties to the conflict who intern protected persons must grant them the medical attention required
by their state of health (GC art. 81).
5-106. Every place of internment must have an adequate infirmary under the direction of a qualified doctor
where internees may have the attention they require, as well as an appropriate diet. Isolation wards must be
set aside for cases of contagious or mental diseases. Maternity cases and internees suffering from serious
diseases, or whose condition requires special treatment, a surgical operation, or hospital care, must be
admitted to any institution where adequate treatment can be given. They must receive care not inferior to that
provided for the general population.
5-107. Internees must, for preference, have the attention of medical personnel of their own nationality.
Internees may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for examination. Upon
request, the medical authorities of the detaining power must issue to every internee who has undergone
treatment an official certificate showing the nature of his or her illness or injury, and the duration and nature
of the treatment given. A duplicate of this certificate must be forwarded to the central information agency for
protected persons as described in paragraph 5-139. Treatment, including the provision of any apparatus
necessary for the maintenance of internees in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances
and spectacles, must be free of charge to the internee (GC art. 91). Internees may receive individual parcels
and collective shipments containing medical supplies (GC art. 108). However, medical supplies should be
sent in collective shipments so they may be properly administered by the camp medical personnel (see DOD
Law of War Manual, 10.23.3.2).
Death of Internees
5-109. The death of internees must be certified by a doctor and a death certificate prepared showing the
cause of death and the conditions under which it occurred. An official record of the death, duly registered,
must be drawn up in accordance with the procedure relating thereto in force in the territory where the place
of internment is situated, and a duly certified copy of such record is to be transmitted without delay to the
protecting power and the central information agency for protected persons (GC, art. 129). Internees who die
while interned must be honorably buried, if possible, in accordance with the cultural and religious practices
of the religion to which they belong. Their graves must be respected, properly maintained, and marked in a
manner that ensures recognition (GC, art. 130).
breach of the GC provisions concerning employment of aliens in the home country (discussed in paragraph
5-81) or employment of civilians in occupied territory (discussed in paragraphs 6-129 through 6-145), or
would involve work of a degrading or humiliating character, is prohibited. After a working period of six
weeks, internees are free to give up work at any moment, subject to eight days’ notice.
5-115. These two paragraphs of Article 95 of the GC (as described above) do not affect the right of the
detaining power to employ interned doctors, dentists, and other medical personnel in their professional
capacity on behalf of their fellow internees, or to employ internees for administrative and maintenance work
in places of internment, or to detail such persons for work in the kitchens or for other domestic tasks, or to
require such persons to undertake duties connected with the protection of internees against aerial
bombardment or other war risks. This although internees generally may not be compelled to work, there is
an exception for tasks that benefit the internee community as a whole (see DOD Law of War Manual,
10.17.2). No internee may, however, be required to perform tasks for which he or she is, in the opinion of a
medical officer, physically unsuited (GC art. 95).
5-116. The detaining power must take entire responsibility for all working conditions, for medical attention,
for the payment of wages, and for ensuring that all employed internees receive compensation for occupational
accidents and diseases. The standards prescribed for said working conditions and for compensation must be
in accordance with national laws and regulations and with existing practice; they must in no case be inferior
to those obtaining for work of the same nature in the same district (GC art. 95).
Wages
5-117. Wages for work done must be determined on an equitable basis by special agreements between the
internees, the detaining power, and if the case arises, employers other than the detaining power, with due
regard being paid to the obligation of the occupying State to provide for free maintenance of internees and
for the medical attention that their state of health may require. Whether work is done for the occupying State
or for an outside employer, the wages are to be decided by agreement with the internees, bearing in mind the
latter have no living expenses to defray.
5-118. Internees permanently detailed for categories of work mentioned in paragraph 5-115, such as
doctors, dentists, and other medical personnel in the professional capacity on behalf of their fellow internees;
administrative and maintenance work in places of internment, must be paid fair wages by the detaining power.
The working conditions and the scale of compensation for occupational accidents and diseases to internees
thus detailed may not be inferior to those applicable to work of the same nature in the same district (GC art.
95).
Labor Detachments
5-119. All labor detachments must remain part of, and dependent upon, a place of internment. The
competent authorities of the detaining authority and the commandant of a place of internment are responsible
for observing the provisions of the GC in a labor detachment. The commandant must keep an up-to-date list
of the labor detachments subordinate to him or her, and must communicate the list to the delegates of the
protecting power, the ICRC, and other humanitarian organizations who may visit the places of internment
(GC art. 96).
keep on their persons a certain amount of money, in cash or in the form of purchase coupons, to enable them
to make purchases, such as at a canteen (GC art. 97).
5-122. Monies, checks, bonds, and other valuables in the possession of internees may not be taken from
them except in accordance with established procedures that include providing detailed receipts (GC art. 96).
Amounts taken from an internee are to be paid into the internee’s account, as discussed in paragraph 5-125.
Such amounts may not be converted into any other currency unless legislation in the territory in which the
owner is interned so requires, or the internee consents.
5-123. On release or repatriation, internees must be given all articles, monies, or other valuables taken from
them during internment and must receive in currency the balance of any credit to their internee accounts,
with the exception of any articles or amounts the detaining power withheld by virtue of its legislation in force.
If the property of the internee is withheld, the owner is to receive a detailed receipt (GC art. 97).
5-124. All internees must receive regular allowances sufficient to enable them to purchase goods and
articles such as tobacco or toiletries. Allowances may take the form of credits or purchase coupons.
Furthermore, internees may receive allowances from the power to which they owe allegiance, the protecting
powers, and any organizations that may assist them, or their families, as well as the income on their property
in accordance with the law of the detaining power. The amount of allowances granted by the power to which
an internee owes allegiance must be the same for each category of internees (such as infirm, sick, or
pregnant), but may not be allocated by that power or distributed by the detaining power on the basis of
discrimination between internees that is prohibited by Article 27 of the GC, such as race, religion, or political
opinion.
5-125. The detaining power must open a regular account for every internee, to which must be credited the
allowances discussed in the preceding paragraph, wages earned, remittances received, and with such sums
taken from the internee as may be available under the legislation in force in the territory in which he or she
is interned. Internees may draw from their accounts the amounts necessary for their personal expenses, within
the limits fixed by the detaining power. Internees must be granted all facilities consistent with the legislation
in force in such territory to make remittances to their families and to other dependents. Internees must at all
times be afforded reasonable facilities for consulting and obtaining account statements. A statement of
accounts must be furnished to the protecting power on request, and an account statement must accompany
the internee in case of transfer (GC art. 98).
Discipline of Internees
5-127. The disciplinary regime in places of internment must be consistent with humanitarian principles, and
may not include regulations imposing on internees any physical exertion dangerous to their health or
involving physical or moral victimization. Identification by tattooing or otherwise imprinting signs or
markings on the body is prohibited. Prolonged standing and roll-calls, punishment drill, military drill and
maneuvers, or the reduction of food rations are prohibited (GC, art, 100). Without prejudice to the
competence of courts and higher authorities, disciplinary punishment may be ordered by the commandant of
the place of internment, or by a responsible officer or official who replaces him or her, or to whom he or she
has delegated his or her disciplinary powers. Before any disciplinary punishment is awarded, the accused
internee must be given precise information regarding the offense of which he or she is accused, and given an
opportunity to explain his or her conduct and to defend himself or herself against the allegation (GC art. 123).
Disciplinary procedures are similar to those employed in POW camps (see, generally, paragraphs 3-126
through 3-128). Criminal proceedings against internees must comply with the procedures discussed in
paragraphs 6-171 through 6-201.
Report Allegations
5-133. Any credible allegation of a LOAC violation regarding internees must be reported to the chain of
command and the proper investigative authority, such as the service major criminal investigative organization
(such as the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division [CID]) (see DODD 2310.01E).
Internee Committees
5-134. In every place of internment, the internees are to freely elect, by secret ballot every six months, the
members of an internee committee empowered to represent them before the detaining power and the
protecting powers, the ICRC, and any other organization that may assist them. Members of the committee
are eligible for re-election. Internees so elected enter upon their duties after the detaining authorities approve
their election. The reasons for any refusals or dismissals must be communicated to the protecting powers
concerned (GC art. 102). Internee committee members who are transferred must be allowed a reasonable
time to acquaint their successors with current affairs (GC art. 104).
5-135. The duties of internee committees include, furthering the physical, spiritual, and intellectual well-
being of the internees, much like the duties of prisoners’ representatives for POWs (see paragraphs 3-81
through 3-84). These general duties imply that internee committees are to undertake a variety of activities to
ensure that internees receive proper treatment by the detaining power and to advance their welfare, even
activities that are not specified in the GC as constituting their duties. In case the internees decide, in particular,
to organize a system of mutual assistance among themselves, this organization would be within the
competence of the internee committees, in addition to the specific duties entrusted to them under other
provisions of the GC (GC art. 103).
5-136. Members of internee committees may not be required to perform any other work if the work will
hinder accomplishment of their duties. Members of internee committees may appoint from among the
internees such assistants as they require. All material facilities are to be granted to members of the internee
committees, particularly a certain freedom of movement necessary for the accomplishment of their duties
(such as visits to labor detachments or receipt of supplies). This freedom of movement does not require
complete freedom, however; for example, a camp commander may restrict movement for security reasons.
5-137. All facilities must likewise be accorded to internee committee members for communication by post
and telegraph with the detaining authorities, the protecting powers, the ICRC, and organizations that give
assistance to internees. Internee committee members in labor detachments are to enjoy similar facilities to
communicate with their internee committee in the principal place of internment. Such communications may
not be limited, nor considered as forming a part of the quota for letters and cards mentioned in article 107 of
the GC. Censorship of such communications with the protecting powers, the ICRC, or other organizations
dedicated to the welfare of the internees is not prohibited, but the detaining power should ensure that delays
do not occur to the disadvantage of the internees.
Internment Card
5-139. As soon as a person is interned, or at the latest no more than one week after his or her arrival in a
place of internment (normally the theater internment facility), and likewise in cases of sickness or transfer to
another place of internment or to a hospital, an internee must be enabled to send direct to his or her family
and to the central information agency for protected persons described in paragraph 1-111 an internment card
that is similar, if possible, to the model in Annex III to the GC, informing their relatives of his or her detention,
address, and state of health. The cards must be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in
any way (GC art. 106). In US practice, the National Detainee Reporting Center, described in paragraphs 3-
86 through 3-89, has served as the National Protected Person Information Bureau responsible under the GC
for various functions, including for receiving and transmitting information required by the GC to the Powers
concerned, through the intermediary of the protecting powers and the Central Information Agency for
protected persons (see DOD Law of War Manual, 10.31.2 and 10.31.4). The role of the Central Information
Agency for protected persons has been performed in many conflicts by the ICRC Central Tracing Agency
(GC art. 136, 137, 138, 139, 140; see DOD Law of War Manual, 10.31.3).
This chapter concerns the law of military occupation. It discusses when military
occupation applies, the duties of the Occupying Power, the administration of the
occupied territory, and the protection of the population within occupied territory. It
further discusses the rules applicable to relief organizations in occupied territory, the
rights and duties of the Occupying Power in regard to enemy property, the rules that
concern obtaining services of the inhabitants, public finance in the occupied territory,
and penal provisions in the occupied territory.
6-6. Commanders should be prepared to take the necessary actions to exercise the additional authorities
that occupation law confers with respect to the administration of the occupied territory. For example, there
are authorities to:
Enforce obedience from the inhabitants of the occupied territory as may be necessary for the
security of occupation forces, the maintenance of law of and order, and for the proper
administration of the country;
Restrict freedom of movement and control means of transportation within the occupied territory;
Suspend, repeal, or change municipal law applicable to occupied territory; and
Control property in occupied territory or control private businesses in order to address the needs
of the occupied territory.
Invasion or Intervention
6-14. Mere physical presence of a belligerent’s military in the territory of its enemy does not constitute
military occupation (see HR art. 42) and does not activate military occupation law. Air superiority alone does
not constitute an effective occupation. For example, a brief physical holding of enemy territory by a small
unit does not constitute military occupation. Capturing a military objective, such as a town or city in the
process of defeating enemy forces, and even holding it for an indeterminate period of time, by itself may not
constitute a military occupation, as the government of the invaded State may remain capable of exercising
its authority.
Law by Analogy
6-17. Although the law of military occupation does not apply as a matter of law to the foregoing situations,
it may be appropriate to apply rules from the law of military occupation in such situations (see DOD Law of
War Manual, 11.1.3). For example, the law of military occupation may provide appropriate rules to apply by
analogy after the liberation of friendly territory, pending a civil affairs agreement with the territorial State.
EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPATION
6-18. Military occupation must be actual and effective. The organized resistance must have been overcome,
and the Occupying Power must have taken measures to establish its authority.
6-19. It is sufficient that the occupying force can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of forces to
enforce its authority within the occupied district. Military occupation does not require the presence of military
forces in all populated areas, although those forces must control the most important places. The type of forces
used to maintain the authority of the Occupying Power is not material. For example, the occupation might be
maintained by permanently based units or mobile forces, either of which would be able to send detachments
of forces to enforce the authority of the Occupying Power within the occupied district.
6-20. Additionally, an occupation may be effective despite the existence of areas in the enemy State that are
temporarily controlled by enemy forces or pockets of resistance.
6-21. The fact that a defended location (such as a city or town) still controlled by enemy forces exists within
an area declared occupied by the Occupying Power does not render the occupation of the remainder invalid,
provided that continued resistance in such a place does not render the occupier unable to exercise control
over the remainder of the occupied territory.
COMMENCEMENT OF OCCUPATION
6-22. There is no specific legal requirement that the Occupying Power issue a proclamation of military
occupation. Due to the special relations established between the civilian population of the occupied territory
and the Occupying Power, the fact of military occupation and the territory over which it extends should be
made known to the citizens of the occupied territory and to other States. The general historical practice of
the United States has been to make the fact of occupation known by proclamation or similar notice.
6-23. However, the absence of a proclamation or similar notice, the exact time an occupation commences
may be difficult to fix.
LIMITATIONS OF OCCUPATION
6-24. Military occupation of enemy territory involves a complex, trilateral set of legal relations between the
Occupying Power, the temporarily ousted sovereign authority, and the inhabitants of the occupied territory.
Military occupation does not transfer sovereignty to the Occupying Power, but simply gives the Occupying
Power the right to govern the enemy territory temporarily.
6-25. The fact of a military occupation does not authorize the Occupying Power to take certain actions. For
example, the Occupying Power is not authorized by the fact of a military occupation to annex occupied
territory or create a new State. Nor may the Occupying Power compel the inhabitants of occupied territory
to become its nationals or otherwise swear allegiance to it (HR art. 45).
6-26. The U.N. Security Council may call upon Occupying Powers to comply with existing international
law. Acting under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council may also establish authorities or
limitations that might interact with those otherwise applicable under occupation law. For example, a U.N.
Security Council Resolution may provide additional authority for an Occupying Power to take action in
governing occupied territory that would otherwise not be permissible under the law of belligerent occupation,
including such actions related to modifying existing laws of the territorial State, and encouraging political
reforms.
TERMINATION OF OCCUPATION
6-27. Military occupation will cease when the conditions for its application are no longer met (see paragraphs
6-11 through 6-12). In particular, the military occupation would cease when the invader no longer factually
governs the occupied territory or when a hostile relationship no longer exists between the State of the
occupied territory and the Occupying Power. For example, an uprising of the local population may prevent
the Occupying Power from actually enforcing its authority. Similarly, the Occupying Power’s expulsion or
complete withdrawal from the occupied territory would also be sufficient to terminate the military
occupation.
6-28. Military occupation also may end when a hostile relationship no longer exists between the Occupying
Power and the State of the occupied territory. For example, if a new, independent government of the
previously occupied territory assumes control of the territory and consents to the presence of the previously
occupying forces, it would no longer be considered a military occupation. Similarly, if a peace treaty
legitimately transfers sovereignty of the territory to the Occupying Power, it would no longer be characterized
as a military occupation (DOD Law of War Manual, 11.3.1).
6-29. In the territory of the parties to the conflict, the application of the GC will cease on the general close
of military operations. In the case of occupied territory, the application of the GC will cease to apply to
occupied territory one year after the general close of military operations (GC art. 6). However, the Occupying
Power is bound for the duration of the military occupation, to the extent the Occupying Power continues to
exercise governmental functions in the occupied territory, by the following Articles of the GC: 1 through 12,
27, 29 through 34, 47, 49, 51 through 53, 59, 61 through 77, and 143 (see GC art. 6).
6-30. Additional Protocol I provides that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and AP I will cease to apply upon
the termination of occupation (AP I art. 3(b)). Occupying Powers who are party to AP I would be bound by
this rule. The United States is a not a party to AP I. In any case, individuals entitled to GC protection who
remain in the custody of the Occupying Power following the end of occupation retain that protection until
their release, repatriation, or re-establishment (GC art. 6).
PROTECTED PERSONS
6-31. The GC is concerned in large part with the welfare of “protected persons” located either in occupied
territory or the home territory of a party to the conflict. Subject to certain exceptions, persons protected by
the GC are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in the case of
conflict or occupation, “in the hands of” a party to the conflict or occupying State of which they are not
nationals (GC art. 4). The following persons are specifically excluded from being considered protected
persons under the GC, even though they may nonetheless receive the protection of the population against
certain consequences of armed conflict:
Nationals of any State that is not a party to GC;
A State’s own nationals;
Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals
of a co-belligerent State (for example, nationals of a State that is a multinational partner of the
Occupying Power in the armed conflict), while the State of which they are nationals has normal
diplomatic representation with the Occupying Power; and
Persons protected by the GWS, GWS Sea, or GPW (for example, those persons entitled to be
treated as POWs or retained personnel if captured by the Occupying Power).
art. 43; GC art. 27, 47, 64). The Occupying Power may suspend laws that constitute a threat to the Occupying
Power’s security or the security of the general population, or laws constituting an obstacle to application of
the law of occupation, provided it ensures protected persons are humanely treated (GC art. 27). In meeting
obligations regarding public order and safety, the Occupying Power will continue to enforce the ordinary
civil and criminal laws of the occupied territory, except to the extent authorized by the law of occupation to
alter, suspend, or repeal such laws (see HR art. 43; GC art. 64). The Occupying Power is prohibited from
arbitrarily exercising its authority to suspend, repeal, or change the municipal law applicable to occupied
territory (see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.5.2).
6-38. The Occupying Power’s obligations and authorities under the law of occupation are extensive. The
Occupying Power has, in particular, the positive obligation and authority to ensure the protection, security,
and welfare of the population living under occupation. This includes the obligation and authorities to ensure
that the civilian population has adequate food and access to essential medical services, and related to ensuring
the working of institutions for the care and education of children (GC arts. 50, 55, 56).
FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
6-43. The functions of the hostile government continue only to the extent they are sanctioned by the
Occupying Power. The Occupying Power may permit the government of the country to perform some or all
of its normal functions.
6-44. The compulsion of civil servants and other officials of local governments to continue to execute their
duties must be justified by military necessity and be consistent with applicable provisions of the GC.
concerned, unless changed by the Occupying Power. As a foreign State and as the paramount authority in the
occupied territory, the Occupying Power is not bound by the municipal law of the occupied territory.
6-46. The duty of the Occupying Power to respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country prohibits it from arbitrarily exercising its authority to suspend, repeal, or change the municipal law
applicable to occupied territory. As with other authorities under the LOAC, the Occupying Power must use
its power with respect to the municipal law of occupied territory in good faith and not for the purpose of
oppressing the population.
6-47. The Occupying Power may subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions: (1) that are
essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the GC; (2) to maintain the orderly
government of the territory; and (3) to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and
property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of
communication used by them (GC art. 64).
CENSORSHIP
6-58. For the purposes of security, an Occupying Power may establish censorship or regulation of any or all
forms of media (for example, press, radio, or television) and entertainment (for example, theater or movies),
of correspondence, and of other means of communication. For example, an Occupying Power may prohibit
entirely the publication of newspapers that pose a threat to security or it may prescribe regulations for the
publication or circulation of newspapers or, of other media for the purpose of fulfilling its obligations to
restore public order (see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.7.2).
be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats of violence, and against insults and public
curiosity (see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.6.1).
6-62. Other provisions for the humane treatment of protected persons set forth in Articles 27 through 34 of
the GC apply to the population of an occupied territory. For example, women must be especially protected
against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent
assault. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited. The taking of hostages is
prohibited. In addition, protected persons in occupied territory must have every facility for making
application to the protecting powers (if designated), to the ICRC, to the national red cross or red crescent
society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization that might assist them.
6-63. There are a number of protections for the population of occupied territory that are specific to
occupation. For example, specific provision exists for the protection of children in occupied territory. Specific
constraints exist on the authority of the Occupying Power to punish protected persons, direct their movement,
or compel them to perform labor. Provision also is made with respect to: (1) food and medical supplies of
the population; (2) public health and hygiene; (3) spiritual assistance; and (4) relief efforts and consignments
(see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.6.2).
6-64. Additionally, it is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
hostile State. No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, may be inflicted upon the population on account
of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible (HR art. 50).
Such penalties are prohibited, even if authorized under the law of the occupied territory (see DOD Law of
War Manual, 11.6.2.2).
6-65. Citizens of neutral States residing within occupied territory are generally treated the same as other
residents of occupied territory.
6-70. For security and other valid reasons, including those relating to its duties and responsibilities as an
Occupying Power, an Occupying Power may prohibit individuals from changing their residence, restrict
freedom of movement within the occupied territory, prohibit visits to certain areas, declare certain areas off
limits, prohibit emigration and immigration by protected persons who are nationals of the State whose
territory is occupied, and require all individuals carry identification documents.
Departure of Protected Persons Who Are Not Nationals of the State Whose Territory is
Occupied
6-71. Protected persons who are not nationals of the power whose territory is occupied may avail themselves
of the right to leave the territory, subject to Article 35 of the GC, and decisions thereon must be taken
according to the procedure that the Occupying Power must establish (GC art. 48). Article 35 of the GC sets
forth rules regarding the departure of protected persons from the home territory of a belligerent State and
provides protected persons with a right to depart. But, Article 35 allows a belligerent to prevent such
departure if such departure is contrary to the belligerent’s national interests, and Article 35 specifies certain
procedural requirements (see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.12.2). For example, persons permitted to leave
may provide themselves with the necessary funds for their journey and take with them a reasonable amount
of their effects and articles of personal use. If a person is refused permission to leave the territory, he or she
is entitled to have the refusal reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board
designated by the Occupying Power for that purpose (GC arts. 35, 48).
CHILDREN
6-75. In response to the acute deprivations that children suffered during the two World Wars, the GC places
particular emphasis on their safety and well-being. Although the GC does not set forth a specific age criteria
for the term “children,” for the purposes of article 50 of the GC and its obligations with respect to the
protection of children in occupied territory may be understood generally to refer to children under fifteen
years of age (GC art. 50).
6-76. The Occupying Power must, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the
proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children (GC art. 50). This obligation
goes beyond merely not interfering with such institutions, as it also includes the affirmative duty to support
them when the responsible authorities of the country fail to do so.
6-77. The Occupying Power must take all necessary steps to facilitate the identification of children and the
registration of their parentage (GC art. 50). The Occupying Power may not, in any case, change their personal
status, nor enlist them in formations or subordinate organizations (GC art. 50).
6-78. Should the local institutions be inadequate for the purpose, the Occupying Power must make
arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible by person of their own nationality, language and
religion, of children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the war and cannot be
adequately cared for by a near relative or friend (GC art. 50).
6-79. A special section of the National Protected Person Information Bureau is to be responsible for taking
all necessary steps to identify children whose identity is in doubt (see paragraph 5-33). Particulars of their
parents or other near relatives should be recorded if available. The Occupying Power must not hinder the
application of any preferential measures in regard to food, medical care and protection against the effects of
war that may have been adopted prior to the occupation in favor of children under fifteen years of age,
expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years of age (GC art. 50).
6-85. The Occupying Power may not requisition food, articles, or medical supplies available in the occupied
territory, except for use by the occupation forces and administration personnel, and then only if the
requirements of the civilian population have been considered. Subject to the provisions of other international
agreements, the Occupying Power must make arrangements to ensure that fair value is paid for any
requisitioned goods (GC art. 55).
SPIRITUAL ASSISTANCE
6-86. The Occupying Power must permit ministers of religion to give spiritual assistance to the members of
their religious communities. The Occupying Power must also accept consignments of books and articles
required for religious needs and must facilitate their distribution in occupied territory (GC art. 58).
COLLECTIVE RELIEF
6-87. If the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power must agree
to relief schemes on behalf of the affected population and must facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.
Such schemes may be undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations, such as the
ICRC, and consist, in particular, of food, medical supplies, and clothing (GC art. 59; consider AP I art. 69).
6-88. All parties to the GC must permit the free passage of the consignments and must guarantee their
protection. A State granting free passage to consignments on their way to territory occupied by an adverse
party to the conflict, must, however, have the right to search the consignments, to regulate their passage
according to prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied (through the Protecting Power) that
these consignments are to be used for the relief of the needy population and not to be used for the benefit of
the Occupying Power (GC art. 59).
DISTRIBUTION
6-90. The distribution of relief consignments referred to in Articles 59 and 60 of the GC must be carried out
with the cooperation, and under the supervision, of the protecting power. This duty may be delegated, by
agreement between the Occupying Power and the protecting power, to a neutral State, to the ICRC, or any
other impartial humanitarian body. Such consignments must be exempt in occupied territory from all charges,
taxes, or customs duties unless such are necessary in the interests of the economy of the territory. The
Occupying Power must facilitate the rapid distribution of these consignments. All parties to the GC must
endeavor to permit the transit and transport of such relief consignments free of charge on their way to
occupied territories (GC art. 61). Subject to imperative reasons of security, protected persons in occupied
territories must be permitted to receive the individual relief consignments sent to them (GC art. 62; consider
AP I art. 71).
ensuring the adequate living conditions of the civilian population by maintaining essential public utility
services, distributing relief, providing medical care, and organizing rescues (GC art. 63).
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
6-96. The general prohibitions against pillage and wanton destruction of enemy property that apply to
military operations also apply to the occupation of enemy territory. Further, any destruction by the Occupying
Power of real (immoveable) or personal (moveable) property belonging individually or collectively to private
persons, to the Occupied State, to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations is
prohibited except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations (GC art.
53). The GC identifies “extensive destruction . . . of property, not justified by military necessity and carried
out unlawfully and wantonly” as a grave breach (GC art. 147).
6-97. Although wanton destruction is prohibited, LOAC does not prohibit the destruction of property when
absolutely necessary or imperatively demanded for military reasons. The evaluation of whether destruction
of property is militarily necessary in occupation is undertaken by applying the standards that are applied in
combat operations. For example, the evaluation of whether the destruction of property is militarily necessary
is made by the responsible commander or other authority of the Occupying Power, based on good faith and
the information available at the time the decision is made (see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.18.2.1).
other watercraft, airfields, aircraft, depots of arms (whether military or sporting), documents connected with
the conflict, all varieties of military equipment (including that in the hands of manufacturers), component
parts of or material suitable only for use in the foregoing, and, in general, all kinds of war material.
6-114. If private property is seized on the grounds that it is susceptible to direct military use, a receipt should
be given to the owner, or a record made of the nature and quantity of the property and the name of the owner
or person in possession of it, in order that restoration and compensation may be made at the conclusion of
the armed conflict.
Property Control
6-116. Public and private property within occupied territory may be controlled to the degree necessary to
prevent its use by or for the benefit of hostile forces or in a manner harmful to the Occupying Power.
Conservators may be appointed to manage the property of absent persons (including nationals of the United
States and of friendly States) and of internees, property managed by such persons, and property of persons
whose activities are deemed to be prejudicial to the Occupying Power. When the owners or managers of such
property can resume control of their property and the risk of its hostile use no longer exists, it must be returned
to them.
6-117. Measures of property control must not extend to confiscation of private property. However, the
authority of the Occupying Power to impose such controls does not limit its power to seize or requisition
property or take such other action with respect to it as may be authorized by other provisions of law.
6-139. All measures aiming at creating unemployment or restricting the opportunities offered to workers in
occupied territory in order to induce them to work for the Occupying Power (GC art. 52).
OATH OF OFFICIALS
6-144. An Occupying Power may not require the inhabitants of occupied territory, including officials, to
swear allegiance to it (HR art. 45). However, the Occupying Power may require such officials who continue
in their offices to take an oath to perform their duties conscientiously and not to act to its prejudice. Any
official who declines to take the oath may be removed; but, even if the official does not take the oath, the
official is required to obey the legitimate orders of the Occupying Power as long as they remain in office.
OFFICIALS’ SALARIES
6-145. The salaries of civil officials of the hostile government who remain in the occupied territory and
continue the work of their offices, especially those who can properly continue their work under the
circumstances arising out of the war—such as judges, administrative or police officers, and officers of city
or communal governments—are paid from the public revenues of the occupied territory, until the military
government has reason wholly or partially to dispense with their services. Based on consistent practice,
salaries or incomes connected with purely honorary titles would be suspended.
PUBLIC FINANCE
6-146. As a result of assuming the functions of government of the occupied territory, the financial
administration of the occupied territory passes into the hands of the Occupying Power. During the occupation,
the fiscal laws of the occupied territory or State remain in effect, but may be amended or suspended by the
Occupying Power under certain circumstances, as discussed below.
6-147. If in the occupied territory, the Occupying Power collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the
benefit of the State, it must do so, as far as possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence
in force, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied
territory to the same extent as the ousted government was bound (HR art. 48). The first charge upon such
taxes would be for the costs of the administration of the occupied territory. The balance may be used for the
purpose of the Occupying Power. The Occupying Power may use tax revenue to defray the cost of
maintaining order in the occupied territory or for expenditures that benefit the local population (for example,
infrastructure improvements). Furthermore, the Occupying Power is not required to spend money for the
support of any activity opposed to either its military interests or to the restoration of order in the occupied
territory, even if the ousted government formerly allocated tax revenues to such activity.
6-148. The Occupying Power, as the paramount authority in the occupied territory, is exempt from
indigenous taxation in the occupied territory unless it waives its sovereign immunity and consents to be taxed.
Its personnel are also generally exempt from local taxation, as part of their immunity from local law. In
practice, the Occupying Power often issues an order to the effect that no taxes of any kind may be levied or
assessed within the occupied territory on the persons, agencies, property, instrumentalities, or transactions of
the Occupying Power.
CONTRIBUTIONS
6-155. If, in addition to continuing to collect taxes under the existing law of the occupied territory as
permitted by Article 48 of the Hague IV Regulations, the Occupying Power levies other money contributions
in the occupied territory, this may only be for the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory
in question (HR art. 49). The economy of an occupied territory may only be required to bear the expenses of
the occupation, and these expenses should not be greater than what the economy of the occupied territory can
reasonably be expected to bear.
Loans
6-156. The Occupying Power may seek contributions from the inhabitants of an occupied territory in the
form of forced loans. The Occupying Power is required to repay such loans. As forced loans are viewed as a
form of contribution, they are governed by the rules applicable to contributions.
Prohibited Purposes
6-157. Contributions may be levied only for the needs of the occupying forces and the administration of the
occupied territory, and may not be levied for the enrichment of the Occupying Power or for the payment of
war expenses generally. Furthermore, although fines or pecuniary penalties may be imposed on responsible
individuals and entities, contributions may not be levied against the general population for purposes of
collective punishment or impoverishing the population in order to pressure the enemy to sue for peace. No
general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, may be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of
individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible (HR art. 50).
CUSTOMS DUTIES
6-161. The Occupying Power has the right to continue to exact existing duties as part of its right to collect
existing taxes. Such collections must comply with the rules for the collection of taxes. The Occupying Power
may also exact new duties as a form of contribution levied against the enemy or its trade. Such new duties
must comply with the rules for contributions (see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.22.3). However, relief
shipments for POWs, relief shipments for internees, and other relief consignments for occupied territory are
exempt from customs duties, unless such duties on other relief consignments for occupied territory are
necessary in the interests of the economy of the territory (GPW art. 74; HR art. 16; GC arts. 61 and 110).
ENEMY DEBTS
6-162. Generally, the Occupying Power is not permitted to collect pre-occupation debts owed to the
sovereign of the occupied territory because it is not a party to the agreement originating the debt. However,
the Occupying Power may collect the debts owed to the sovereign provided that the debts may be legitimately
characterized as realizable securities that are strictly the property of the State, such as bearer instruments (see
HR art. 53; DOD Law of War Manual, 11.22.4.1).
6-163. The Occupying Power is under no obligation to pay the debts owed by the occupied territory
(although it may choose to do so as a matter of policy). The Occupying Power may prevent payments from
being made from occupied territory to a hostile belligerent.
6-164. In general, the Occupying Power may not contract new debts on behalf of the occupied territory or
collect taxes to pay interest on such debt. However, new debt may be undertaken on behalf of the occupied
territory if immediately necessary for the welfare of the inhabitants of occupied territory, and if undertaking
such debt constitutes a fair and reasonable transaction (see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.22.4.3). The
Occupying Power may refinance or consolidate already existing public debt of the occupied territory if it is
clearly in the interest of sound financial administration of that territory and therefore of direct benefit to the
inhabitants.
NO COLLECTIVE PENALTIES
6-174. A protected person may not be punished for an offense that he or she has not personally committed.
Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited (GC art. 33).
NO REPRISAL
6-175. Reprisals are measures that are otherwise prohibited taken by one State in response to another State’s
violations of LOAC in order to encourage future compliance. In occupied territory, reprisals against protected
persons and their property by an Occupying Power are prohibited (GC art. 33).
NO PILLAGE
6-176. Pillage involves the unlawful seizure or appropriation of private or public property. Pillage is strictly
prohibited under LOAC, including in times of occupation (GC art. 33).
NO HOSTAGES
6-177. The taking of hostages for any reason, including that of seeking to intimidate or otherwise pacify the
population of the occupied territory, is prohibited (GC art. 34).
the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals must be decided with the least possible delay. In the
event of the decision being upheld, it must be subject to periodic review, if possible every six months, by a
competent body set up by the said power. Protected persons made subject to assigned residence and thus
required to leave their home must enjoy the full benefit of Article 39 of the GC (GC art. 78). For example,
the internment standards in the GC should also be a guide for support to protected persons and their
dependents who are subject to assigned residence in occupied territory (DOD Law of War Manual, 10.6.4).
6-180. Further discussion of internment is provided in Chapter 5.
PENAL LEGISLATION
6-181. The penal laws of the occupied territory must remain in force, with the exception that they may be
repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an
obstacle to the application of the GC. Subject to the latter consideration and the necessity for ensuring the
effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory must continue to function in respect
of all offenses covered by these laws. The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the
occupied territory to provisions that are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations
under the GC, to maintain an orderly government over this territory, and to ensure the security of the
Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of
the establishment and lines of communication used by them (GC art. 64).
6-182. The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power may not come into force before they have
been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect of these
penal provisions must not be retroactive (GC art. 65).
APPLICABLE LAW
6-184. Properly constituted, non-political courts must apply only those provisions of law that were
applicable prior to the offense and that are in accordance with general principles of law, in particular the
principle that the penalty must be proportionate to the offense. The courts must also take into consideration
the fact that the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power (GC art. 67).
PENALTIES
6-185. Protected persons who commit an offense that is solely intended to harm the Occupying Power, but
that does not constitute an attempt on the life or limb of members of the occupying forces or administration,
nor a grave collective danger, nor seriously damages the property of the occupying forces or administration,
or the installations used by them, are liable to internment or simple imprisonment, provided the duration of
such internment or imprisonment is proportionate to the offense committed. The minor offense must have
been solely intended to harm the Occupying Power in order to trigger these restrictions. For example, an
offense such as travelling without a permit or violating exchange control regulations would not fall under
this restriction, but, nonetheless, may result in internment or simple imprisonment (see DOD Law of War
Manual, 11.11.4).
6-186. Furthermore, internment or imprisonment for such offenses that are solely intended to harm the
Occupying Power must be the only measure adopted for depriving protected persons of liberty (GC art. 68).
Penalties that do not deprive protected persons of liberty, such as fines, or less severe measures, such as
arrest, are not covered by this rule.
6-187. The GC provides that the penal provisions promulgated by the Occupying Power in accordance with
Articles 64 and 65 of the GC may impose the death penalty on a protected person only when the person is
guilty of espionage, of serious acts of sabotage against the military installations of the Occupying Power, or
of intentional offenses that have caused the death of one or more persons, provided that such offenses were
punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation began (GC art.
68). However, the United States has reserved the right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the
provisions of Article 68, paragraph 2, of the GC without regard to whether the offenses referred to in that
paragraph were punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation begins
(see DOD Law of War Manual, 11.11.5).
6-188. The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person unless the attention of the court
has been particularly called to the fact that because the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power, the
accused is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance. In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced
against a protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense (GC art. 68).
PENAL PROCEDURE
6-190. No sentence may be pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a
regular trial. Accused persons who are prosecuted by the Occupying Power must be promptly informed, in
writing in a language that they understand, of the particulars of the charges preferred against them and must
be brought to trial as rapidly as possible (GC art. 71).
6-191. The protecting power must be informed of all proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against
protected persons with respect to charges involving the death penalty or imprisonment for two years or more,
and must be enabled, at any time, to obtain information regarding the state of such proceedings at any time.
Furthermore, the protecting power must be entitled, on request, to be furnished with all particulars of these
and any other proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against protected persons (GC art. 71).
6-192. The notification to the protecting power, as provided for in the second paragraph of Article 71 of the
GC, must be sent immediately, and must in any case, reach the protecting power three weeks before the date
of the first hearing. The notification must include the following particulars (GC art. 71):
Description of the accused;
Place of residence or detention;
Specification of the charge or charges (with mention of the penal provisions under which it is
brought);
Designation of the court that will hear the case; and
Place and date of the first hearing.
6-193. Although the GC provides particular trial rights and protections for protected persons, it is important
to understand that the procedures applied in these courts must conform to international standards for a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as “indispensable by
civilized peoples” (see GC art. 3; consider AP I art. 75).
RIGHT OF DEFENSE
6-194. Protected persons accused of offenses shall have the right to present evidence necessary to their
defense and may, in particular, call witnesses. They shall have the right to be assisted by a qualified advocate
or counsel of their own choice, who shall be able to visit them freely and shall enjoy the necessary facilities
for preparing the defense (GC art. 72).
6-195. If the accused fails to choose an advocate or counsel, the protecting power may provide the accused
with an advocate or counsel. When the accused person is facing a serious charge and the protecting power is
not functioning, the Occupying Power, subject to the consent of the accused, must provide the accused with
an advocate or counsel. Accused persons must, unless they freely waive such assistance, be aided by an
interpreter, both during preliminary investigation and during the hearing in court. They shall have the right
at any time to object to the interpreter and to ask for the interpreter to be replaced (GC art. 72).
RIGHT OF APPEALS
6-196. A convicted person shall have the right of appeal provided for by the laws applied by the court. The
convicted person shall be fully informed of the right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within which
to do so. The penal procedures in Section III of the GC (which is the section of the GC pertaining to occupied
territories) is to apply, as far as they are applicable, to appeals. Where the laws applied by the court make no
provision for appeals, the convicted person shall have the right to petition against the finding and sentence to
the competent authority of the Occupying Power (GC art. 73).
DEATH SENTENCE
6-199. In no case may persons condemned to death be deprived of the right of petition for pardon or
reprieve. No death sentence may be carried out before the expiration of a period of at least six months from
the date of receipt by the protecting power of the notification of the final judgment confirming the death
sentence, or of an order denying pardon or reprieve. This six month period of suspension of the death sentence
may be reduced in individual cases in circumstances of grave emergency involving an organized threat to the
security of the Occupying Power or its forces, provided always that the protecting power is notified of such
reduction and is given reasonable time and opportunity to make representations to the competent occupying
authorities with respect to such death sentences (GC art. 75).
GENERAL BACKGROUND
7-1. War between nations may result in the termination of formal diplomatic relations and direct
communications and exchanges between opposing governments or between the territories occupied by
belligerent armies. This is not limited to communications and exchanges, but includes commerce,
transportation, and postal services. Termination of communications and exchanges (non-intercourse) may
occur with or without special proclamation. The traditional rule of non-intercourse reflects a belligerent’s
authority under LOAC to limit and regulate intercourse between persons and territory controlled by or
belonging to that belligerent and persons and territory controlled by or belonging to the enemy (see DOD
Law of War Manual, 12.1.1). Even in the midst of armed conflict, however, opposing forces often find they
need to communicate or exchange with each other. Communications and exchanges between opposing forces
may occur at the operational or tactical level, often as a result of actions or decisions at higher levels. The
mechanisms, legal principles, and rules for these are the subject of this chapter.
7-2. Exceptions to the general rule of non-intercourse during armed conflict have been granted on behalf
of individuals only with the approval of national authorities or a designated commander.
7-3. The laws of neutrality and occupation may affect a belligerent’s authority to regulate intercourse
between territory it controls and territory controlled by the enemy (see DOD Law of War Manual, 12.1.1.1).
For example, under the GC, protected persons in a belligerent’s home territory, or in territory occupied by a
belligerent, are entitled to leave unless such departure is contrary to the interest of the State (see DOD Law
of War Manual, 10.8.2, 11.12.2).
7-4. The conduct of military operations and the restoration of peace often necessitate the establishment and
maintenance of certain communications and non-hostile relations between belligerents. Traditionally, these
relations have been conducted through parlementaires, military passports, safe-conducts, safeguards, cartels,
armistices, and capitulations, all of which are discussed in this chapter.
7-5. Non-hostile relations may be conducted in other ways. For example, informal communication may
take place between opposing State parties to a conflict. These may occur through intermediaries, such as a
protecting power, neutral governments, an international organization such as the United Nations (for
example, through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), other envoys
recognized by the parties to the conflict, or impartial humanitarian organizations, such as the ICRC.
7-6. Although each of the types of communication mentioned in paragraph 7-5 may affect the missions of
tactical and operational commanders, their discussion is beyond the scope of this field manual. A
commander’s authority to control communication during belligerent occupation is the subject of Chapter 6,
Occupation.
7-7. This chapter summarizes several modes of communications and exchanges and the conditions for their
implementation. They are not necessarily precise, rigid communications “packages.” A “package” may be
tailored for the circumstances and mission at hand. Historic examples of communications packages described
below generally occurred at the operational level or higher. Communication at the tactical level was less
formal, ad hoc, and sometimes occurred without higher command knowledge or express authorization. For
example, during the Allied liberation of Italy in World War II, stories abound of the mayor of a town greeting
a single U.S. Soldier to declare the city “open.” Another example occurred during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, when a large group of Iraqi soldiers surrendered to a Marine traffic control unit. Commanders’
flexibility, ingenuity and familiarity with the concepts in this chapter are invaluable at such times.
7-8. Good faith is essential in all non-hostile relations between belligerents. The most scrupulous good faith
should be observed by both parties. Among other things, the principle of good faith in the context of non-
hostile relations requires that compacts between belligerents be faithfully adhered to, neither party to a
conflict take or attempt to gain an advantage not intended by the opposing party, and the means of conducting
non-hostile relations must not be misused (see DOD Law of War Manual, 12.2).
approaches an end, communication may also be necessary to arrange for temporary ceasefires leading to a
conclusion of hostilities, separation of forces, a formal cessation of hostilities, and repatriation of POWs and
retained personnel (see DoD Law of War Manual, 12.1.2.2).
7-15. Local communication between friendly and enemy forces is dependent on various factors, including
the commander’s mission, an ability to communicate with opposing forces, and a willingness of opposing
forces to communicate. A commander is not legally obligated to seek communication with opposing forces.
Moreover, a commander is not obligated to respond to an opposing force’s attempts to communicate if such
communication is inconsistent with the commander’s mission or military security (see HR art. 33).
DOCUMENTATION
7-16. Communication between belligerents may be facilitated by the use of military passports, safe conducts,
or safeguards (see paragraph 7-47 through 7-64; DOD Law of War Manual, 12.6).
PARLEMENTAIRES
7-17. Parlementaires ordinarily are agents or envoys employed by commanders in the field to go in
person within the enemy lines for the purpose of communicating or negotiating openly and directly
with the enemy commander. Derived from the same word from which the word “parley,” the term
parlementaire was adopted by governments at the First Hague Peace Conference (1899), and the 1907 Hague
IV Regulations provide that “a person is regarded as a parlementaire who has been authorized by one of the
belligerents to enter into communication with the other, and who advances bearing a white flag.” (HR art.
32).
7-18. Although the word parlementaire has been translated as a person bearing a flag of truce, a parlementaire
does not need to carry or be the physical bearer of the white flag. The main point is a parlementaire is a
representative of a government or its military forces authorized to engage in communication with an enemy
government’s representatives or its military forces.
7-19. A parlementaire may be civilian or military, and may come alone, or he or she may request to have
others, such as an interpreter, accompany him or her. A parlementaire may perform duties at the national
(strategic), operational, or tactical level. The Hague Regulations mention a white flag and accompanying
“trumpeter, bugler or drummer,” (HR art. 32) which emphasizes that the term historically referred primarily
to battlefield negotiations, such as to arrange a surrender or temporary ceasefire to collect wounded and sick.
claims to represent. The authorization should clearly specify the commander’s name, unit, and the scope of
the matters on which the parlementaire is authorized to speak. The receiving command is entitled to know
that the representative has the authority to negotiate on the matters on which the representative purports to
offer terms, The authorization could read, “I authorize these present [name and rank or title] to negotiate
[specifying type and scope of negotiations authorized (for example, a local armistice to collect wounded)]
[specifying authority]” and signed by the authorizing commander, identifying the commander’s name and
unit and, if appropriate, the authority for whom the commander speaks.
INVIOLABILITY OF PARLEMENTAIRE
7-35. Parlementaires have a right of inviolability in the execution of their functions. All members of the
parlementaire’s party have the same right to inviolability as the parlementaire (HR art. 32).
commander about whether and under what conditions they may wish to engage in non-hostile relations with
that force.
7-45. While it is not a legally recognized form of surrender, a white flag hoisted by an individual Soldier
may also express a genuine desire or intent to surrender. Its display, however, does not mean that a unit, or
the person waving it, is prepared to surrender—nor should this be assumed by opposing forces. Nor does it
mean that other enemy soldiers in the immediate area have the same intent. Friendly forces seeing a white
flag hoisted by an enemy soldier whom the friendly forces believe is genuinely attempting to surrender should
consider whether it is feasible to accept such surrender. Soldiers or Marines must not intentionally direct fire
against the person carrying the white flag or a person near him or her unless there is a clear manifestation of
hostile intent by those persons.
7-46. Prohibited uses of a white flag include use of a flag of truce to feign an intent to surrender or to
negotiate (HR art. 23(f)). To feign an intent to surrender or negotiate in order to kill or wound enemy
personnel is perfidy (HR art. 23(b)) (see discussion on perfidy in paragraphs 2-151 through 2-153). Improper
use of a flag of truce also includes its use while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favor, or protect
one’s own military operations, or otherwise to impede military operations (DOD Law of War Manual,
12.4.2.1). For example, forces may not use the bearer of a white flag as cover to advance or maneuver for
hostile purposes.
7-51. The term “safeguard” also refers to a written order left by a commander with an enemy subject, or
posted upon enemy property, for the protection of that person or property. Usually it is directed to the
succeeding commander and requests a continued grant of protection.
7-52. The effect of a safeguard is to pledge the honor of the nation that the person or property will be
respected by its armed forces. It does not commit the government to its protection or defense against attacks
by enemy armed forces or other hostile elements.
7-53. “Forcing a safeguard” means to perform an act or acts in violation of the protection of the safeguard.
Any trespass on the protection of the safeguard by persons subject to the UCMJ will constitute an offense
under Article 102 (Forcing a Safeguard), UCMJ, whether the safeguard was imposed in time of war or in
circumstances amounting to a state of belligerency short of a formal state of war.
REVOCATION
7-57. A military passport or safe-conduct may be revoked by the commander issuing them or by the
commander’s superiors for good reasons of military expediency. Until revoked, they remain valid according
to their specific terms. For example, if a time is specified in the document, it is valid only for that period.
7-58. Documents must not be revoked for the purpose of detaining the holder; such persons should be
permitted to withdraw in safety unless suspected of unlawful activities. In a case of violation of the terms of
the safe-conduct or military passport, the privilege may be revoked.
LICENSES TO TRADE
7-59. Licenses to trade must, as a general rule, emanate from the supreme authority of the State. In an
international armed conflict, a State controlling enemy territory may grant licenses to trade that relax its
prohibitions on trading with the enemy.
7-60. Licenses to trade issued by military authorities may be either general or special. A general license is
a document that generally or partially relaxes the exercise of the rights of war in regard to trade in
relation to any community or individuals liable to be affected by their operation. A special license is a
document that allows individuals to take a particular voyage or journey to import or export particular
goods.
CARTELS
7-61. In its narrower sense, a cartel is an agreement entered into by opposing belligerents for the exchange
of POWs (see Lieber Code, art. 106). A cartel is a statement commanders agree to at the tactical or operational
level (when authorized by higher authority), arranged either through parlementaires, negotiations conducted
during a truce, or exchange of letters.
7-62. In its broader sense, a cartel is an agreement concluded between belligerents for the purpose of
arranging or regulating certain kinds of non-hostile intercourse that would otherwise be prohibited by the
existence of the armed conflict. These are not limited to matters regarding exchanges of POWs and can
include, for example, postal communication or trade in certain goods or commodities.
7-63. Parties to a cartel are honor bound to observe its provisions with the most scrupulous care. A party
may void a cartel upon definite proof that the other party has violated it intentionally in an important particular
(see DOD Law of War Manual, 12.7).
ARMISTICE
7-65. An armistice is an agreed upon cessation of active hostilities between opposing forces for a period
agreed upon by the belligerent parties.
7-66. An armistice agreement must be concluded by authorities who are competent to agree to and enforce
its terms. Armistices that include more substantive and expansive terms must be concluded by more senior
authorities. If the armistice contains political terms, it must be made under authorization from the government
concerned or subject to approval by them (see DOD Law of War Manual, 12.11.2). An armistice is not a
partial or a temporary peace; it is only the suspension of military operations to the extent agreed upon by the
parties to the conflict (HR art. 36). War, as a legal state of hostilities between the parties, may continue,
despite the conclusion of an armistice agreement. In certain instances, for example the Korean War, armistice
agreements may be in place for a long time.
7-67. An armistice agreement may arrange for a variety of humanitarian activities, such as the recovery of
wounded or shipwrecked from the battlefield (land or sea) or the exchange of POWs.
7-68. Hostilities need not cease during the negotiation of an armistice.
7-69. The existence of an armistice agreement is not a reason to relax either the vigilance or readiness of
forces, or to expose positions to the enemy (see DOD Law of War Manual, 12.11.4.4).
TYPES OF ARMISTICE
7-70. An armistice may be general or local. A general armistice suspends military operations between the
belligerents everywhere. A local armistice only suspends military operations between certain fractions of the
belligerent armies and within a fixed area (HR art. 37). In practice, a local armistice can refer to a partial
armistice or a suspension of arms with the primary distinction between the two being the size of the units
involved as discussed in paragraphs 7-72 to 7-76.
7-71. Other terms have been and may be used for an armistice, to include truce, local truce, ceasefire,
cessation of hostilities, and suspension of arms. Other terms may also be used in other languages. Although
a tacit or implied suspension of fighting may precede an armistice, any form of armistice, whether a truce,
local truce, suspension of arms, requires agreement between competent authorities. Armistice can be used in
a general sense to encompass each of these terms.
General
7-72. A general armistice suspends all (ground, naval, and air) operations between opposing forces
throughout the theater of operations. It often is of a combined political and military character. It usually
precedes negotiations for peace. Due to its political importance, a general armistice usually is agreed to at
the national or diplomatic level, with implementation of the agreed terms by military commanders, such as
by the relevant combatant commander.
Local or Partial
7-73. A local or partial armistice suspends military operations between certain portions of opposing forces
and within a specified area (HR art. 37). It may suspend combat operations indefinitely or for a specified
period of time, ranging from hours to days. The primary distinction between a local or partial armistice and
a suspension of arms, discussed in paragraph 7-77, is the size of the units or area affected, and the broader
interests than the local military requirements that are addressed in a suspension of arms.
7-74. A partial armistice suspends operations between specified forces or within specified zones. It may
apply only to operations of ground forces, for example, or naval operations in an area specified by longitude
and latitude, or air operations above a specified parallel.
7-75. A unilateral suspension of operations is not a partial armistice. A unilateral but conditional suspension
of operations may be a partial armistice if there is tacit agreement by the opposing force. A partial armistice
requires express agreement between the opposing forces or governments.
7-76. A partial armistice may be a cessation of operations between two belligerents. A partial armistice
always includes a large number of the forces involved in an armed conflict and a considerable portion of the
conflict region. It is not an agreement merely to address some matter of local interest, as would be the case
with a suspension of arms, but one of a more general character.
Suspension of Arms
7-77. A suspension of arms, also referred to as a suspension of fire, is a form of local armistice
concluded between commanders of military forces for some local military purpose, such as to recover
and bury the dead, to collect and care for the wounded and sick, to arrange for exchange of prisoners,
or to enable a commander to communicate with his or her government or superior officer. A suspension
of arms is not intended to have, and does not have, any legal or other effect on the war generally, or its
political bases. It is intended to serve military interests of local importance only. An opposing commander
with the competence to do so can agree upon a suspension of arms.
FORM OF ARMISTICE
7-81. No special form for an armistice is prescribed. It should, if possible, be reduced to writing to avoid
misunderstandings and for reference should differences of interpretation arise. It should be drafted with the
greatest precision and clarity.
Duration
7-84. The duration of an armistice may be for a definite or indefinite period of time, and with or without a
period of notice prior to its expiration.
Indefinite
7-85. When duration of an armistice is indefinite, parties to the armistice may resume combat operations at
any time, subject to prior notice to opposing forces in accordance with the terms of the agreement (HR art.
36). An armistice of indefinite duration should include a provision specifying the agreed length of time
between the delivery of this notice and the subsequent recommencement of combat operations.
Recommencement of combat operations without prior notice (when notice is required by the armistice) in
order to gain surprise is inconsistent with the intent of an armistice and is prohibited under LOAC.
7-86. The requirement for notice prior to recommencement of combat operations does not, however,
preclude a party to the conflict from reacting to serious violations of the armistice by opposing forces,
including recommencing hostilities immediately (HR art. 40). When an armistice violation is not serious, and
perhaps the result of a mistake by one side or the other, commands affected by an enemy’s breach remain
subject to higher authority orders. Nevertheless, they retain the inherent right of self-defense.
Definite
7-87. A “definite” armistice is for an agreed specified, fixed period of time, such as “from 0900 GMT
[Greenwich Mean Time][specify local time] on [date] to 0700 GMT [specify local time] on [date].” If the
armistice is for a fixed period of time and no agreement has been made for prolonging it, hostilities may
recommence without prior notice the moment the period of time has elapsed.
Neutral Zone
7-89. Armistice elements may include a “neutral zone” situated between lines of demarcation sufficient in
breadth to minimize risk of unintentional confrontation between opposing forces. A neutral zone does not
exist absent express agreement between the relevant parties. One example of a neutral zone is the
Demilitarized Zone between North Korea and South Korea.
7-90. In the event of a general ceasefire, it may be sufficient to agree to a line rather than a zone. The line
may include a buffer zone of specified depth between forces. It may be necessary for one or both parties to
institute a partial withdrawal in order to establish a neutral zone. Whether a line or a zone, specificity as to
either (such as through use of maps or Global Position System) is essential in order to minimize the risk of
accidental breach or confrontation. For this purpose maps with the lines of the neutral zone indicated may be
attached to and made part of the armistice. The extent of the zone will vary according to the circumstances
and agreement of the parties. Historical examples have ranged from 1,000 yards to two miles, and in other
circumstances have made use of the respective sides of a natural boundary, such as a river.
7-91. A road or roads through the neutral zone should be identified by which communications between
opposing forces must pass during the armistice.
7-92. It is usually agreed that military personnel of either side may not encroach upon a neutral zone except
by parlementaires or other parties by special arrangement for specified purposes, such as to search for and
recover sick, wounded, or dead within the zone.
Signals
7-93. Signals may be agreed to for communication between opposing parties, whether for passage of
parlementaire, a start or cessation of an armistice, or for other reasons.
Language
7-94. Unless agreement is possible for an armistice to be drawn up in one language, an armistice should be
drawn up in the language of each belligerent force, with each side retaining a copy in its language. Each
belligerent should confirm the text in each version to ensure consistency in each language.
ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS
7-95. Occasionally, an armistice contains additional elements that may be appropriate, such as addressing
issues of a humanitarian nature.
7-98. An armistice does not alter commanders’ responsibilities and authorities to take all necessary measures
for the security of their forces and mission. As a state of hostilities continues to exist during an armistice,
commanders are entitled to weigh whether civilian movement may place the mission at risk through, for
example, the facilitation of espionage by the opposing forces. If nothing is stipulated, communication remains
suspended, as during actual hostilities. As a general rule, movement between the territories held by opposing
forces remains suspended in the same way as during actual hostilities.
Humanitarian Activities
7-99. Parties to the conflict affected by the armistice may agree to specific humanitarian activities, such as
searching for and collecting the sick and wounded from the battlefield or account for the missing (GWS art.
15; GWS (Sea) art. 18; consider API art. 33); providing medical care or food supplies intended only for the
civilian population (GC art. 23); seeking the assistance of local civilians to voluntarily collect and care for
the wounded and sick under the direction of the military of a State party to the conflict, (GWS art. 18; GWS
(Sea) art. 21); and exchanging or repatriating POWs or civilian internees (GPW art. 118; GC arts. 133 and
134). Operations of non-government organizations within an armistice area are subject to the express
authorization of the commander affected by their operations and to limitations the commander deems
necessary for reasons of military security (GWS art. 9).
Consultative Mechanism
7-102. The armistice agreement may provide for the establishment of a commission composed of
representatives of the opposing forces to supervise implementation of the armistice agreement. If appropriate
and agreed upon by all relevant belligerent parties, local authorities may be represented on the commission.
PROHIBITED ACTS
7-107. An armistice is a cessation of hostilities for the time period agreed upon by the parties. Belligerent
forces affected by an armistice are prohibited from engaging in any act expressly prohibited by the armistice,
any act contrary to the express terms of the agreement, and any other act inconsistent with the purpose for
the armistice. These acts would include any offensive military operations, such as conducting attacks or
seizing territory beyond its lines. For example, an overt penetration of opposing forces’ lines or territory or
neutral territory, including tunneling to penetrate enemy lines or positions or to escape a besieged position,
would constitute a violation of the armistice. Airborne penetration of enemy airspace is prohibited unless
expressly agreed otherwise. Each party, however, retains the right to resort to use of force in self-defense if
fired upon.
7-108. Absent express agreement, an armistice does not give authorities of a besieged place the right to
receive food, water, or other provisions for military forces or the civilian population beyond what LOAC
already requires concerning civilians. Obligations concerning the transport of medical supplies, religious
supplies, and food to civilians are outlined in Chapter 5 (GC art. 23).
PERMISSIBLE ACTS
7-109. In the absence of written agreement to the contrary, each belligerent is entitled to take steps that are
not offensive in character, but will tend to improve its situation. This includes, but is not limited to, troop
movement within its own lines; troop reinforcements; construction of new fortifications, installations, and
bases; construction and repair of transportation and communications facilities; intelligence collection;
movement of supplies and equipment; and in general, taking advantage of the time and means at its disposal
to prepare for possible resumption of hostilities.
7-110. Espionage or clandestine ground force reconnaissance behind opposing lines is not prohibited; but
individuals captured while engaged in espionage are subject to the risks entailed under LOAC the same as at
other times (HR art. 29; consider AP I art. 46).
INDIVIDUAL VIOLATIONS
7-111. An armistice violation by an individual Soldier, Marine, or a small group of Soldiers or Marines
acting on their own initiative does not constitute a serious violation of an armistice, nor does it provide a
basis for renunciation of the armistice. The injured party, however, is entitled to demand punishment of such
Soldiers or Marines for their unauthorized acts, or, if necessary, compensation for the losses sustained (HR
art. 41).
7-112. Deliberate violation of the terms of an armistice by individuals is punishable as a war crime. Such
violations by individual members of the armed forces or subordinate officers do not justify denunciation of
the armistice unless they are proved to have been committed with the knowledge and actual or tacit consent
of their own government or commander. Consent may be inferred in the event of a persistent failure to punish
such offenders (see DOD Law of War Manual, 12.13.2.2).
7-113. If Service Members acting in their individual capacity to violate the terms of an armistice are
captured, they remain entitled to POW status, provided such entitlement exists during general hostilities
(GPW art. 4). Deliberate violation of an armistice by an individual Service Member resulting in the killing
or wounding of any member of the opposing force is an act of perfidy, punishable as a war crime (consider
AP I, art. 37(1)). It does not, however, constitute a basis to deny the Service Member entitlement to POW
status (GPW art. 85).
ARMISTICE VIOLATIONS
7-114. The following are serious violations of an armistice:
A violation of the express terms of an armistice agreement.
An action taken by opposing forces to gain a military advantage it would not be able to gain but
for the armistice.
An overt manifestation of bad faith.
7-115. Depending on factors discussed above such as notification and the isolated nature of violations, the
following actions may constitute serious violations of an armistice:
movement beyond agreed lines.
encroachment or unauthorized entry into neutral areas.
physical seizure of objectives outside agreed lines.
direct attack of opposing forces.
DENUNCIATION
7-116. Any serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives an opposing belligerent the right
of denouncing the armistice and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately (HR art.
40).
7-117. A belligerent denounces an armistice when it notifies the opposing party of its intent to terminate
the armistice. Absent urgent necessity, a delay should occur between denunciation of the armistice and
resumption of hostilities. If compelling evidence exists of a serious violation and delay incident to formal
denunciation and warning seems likely to provide the violating party a substantial advantage of any kind, the
aggrieved party may resume offensive military operations without warning, with or without formal
denunciation.
7-118. A commander of a military unit faced with any suspected or apparent violation of an armistice
agreement, regardless of its severity, retains the right an obligation to use force in the exercise of unit self-
defense.
ARMISTICE EXTENSION
7-120. An armistice may be extended in the same manner as originally concluded or in any other manner
satisfactory to each belligerent.
CAPITULATIONS
7-121. A capitulation is an agreement, sometimes with certain conditions, entered into between the
commanders of belligerent forces for the surrender of a body of forces, a defended position, other defended
town or place, or a particular district of the theater of operations (See DOD Law of War Manual, 12.8.1).
Surrenders of territory sometimes include provisions for the withdrawal defenders from it and allowing the
victorious forces to enter into possession. A capitulation is a surrender by agreement; surrender can also
occur without capitulation (see paragraphs 7-124 and 7-125).
7-122. Capitulation differs from an armistice in that the former surrenders the capitulating unit, while the
latter suspends fighting between opposing forces. Further, a capitulation is permanent while an armistice is
temporary (at least in theory—the Korean armistice from 1953 is still in effect awaiting “a final peaceful
settlement”).
7-123. A capitulation may be of a small unit, such as a squad, platoon, company, or battalion, or of larger
forces, such as a division or corps. Commanders have the authority to conclude capitulation agreements only
with respect to areas under their control and forces or units under their command.
MILITARY HONOR
7-126. Capitulations agreed upon between belligerents must take into account the rules of military honor.
Once settled, they must be scrupulously observed by both parties (HR art. 35).
7-127. Executing a capitulation with honor and respect for the adversary is not only the professional way
to treat a defeated enemy, but one in which the psychological stigma of capitulation is diminished. Along
with humane treatment in accordance with LOAC, treatment with honor and respect provides incentive to an
enemy to capitulate rather than fight on without any chance of prevailing.
7-128. Just as a surrendering individual Soldier is to be treated professionally and humanely—but firmly—
by the captors, so, too, should acceptance of capitulation be executed.
7-129. Honorable treatment does not serve to diminish illegal acts, or criminal responsibility, by
capitulating forces. Military and other personnel entitled to POW status (GPW art. 4) suspected of criminal
acts, including violations of LOAC, remain POWs and, as such, remain entitled to protections afforded by
their status (GPW art. 85).
7-134. Commanders who surrender in violation of orders or the law of their own State may be punished by
their State. Under the Code of Conduct for U.S. armed forces, a commander must never surrender the
members of his or her command while they still have the means to resist. Under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, shameful surrenders are punishable. In addition, compelling or attempting to compel a commander
to surrender or striking colors or flag to an enemy without proper authority is punishable (for U.S. practice
regarding this type of prosecution, see UCMJ art. 99(2)) (for more information regarding a U.S. commander’s
authority to capitulate, surrender, and capture with respect to the U.S. Code of Conduct, see para. 7-137).
FORM
7-141. There is no specified form for a capitulation agreement. They may be oral or in writing. As in the
case of armistices, however, a written agreement is preferred to avoid misunderstandings and disputes over
the terms. The agreement should be as specific and precise as possible as to terms to be observed on either
side, excepting such conditions as are clearly imposed by LOAC. Details of time and procedure should be
prescribed in the most exact and unequivocal language.
PROHIBITED ACTS
7-143. Once a capitulation is settled, its terms must be scrupulously observed by all parties concerned (HR
art. 35). Personnel of the capitulating side must be handed over to the captor in accordance with the terms of
the capitulation. In other words, the capitulating party must maintain the status quo at the time of signature.
In turn, surrendering military forces and others entitled to POW status become POWs (or retained personnel).
Breaches
7-145. Once capitulation terms have been agreed upon, all parties must scrupulously comply with them
(HR art. 35). Breach of the terms of a capitulation agreement subjects the offender to trial for violations of
the laws and customs of war. In addition, if the violation is directed by the commander who capitulated or by
higher authority, the other belligerent may denounce the capitulation and resume hostilities. Individual
Service Member or groups of Service Members acting in violation of the capitulation agreement remain
entitled to POW status, but may be prosecuted for their illegal acts (GPW art. 85). For example, following
capitulation, a Service Member from the capitulated force no longer enjoys combatant immunity and may be
prosecuted for carrying out attacks on enemy military equipment or personnel. If captured, he may be tried
for misconduct as a POW in addition to any violation of LOAC (UCMJ art. 105 (10 U.S.C. 905)).
Command Responsibility
7-146. Capitulating units remain military units, subject to LOAC, and commanders remain responsible for
the units under their command and for military personnel over whom they exercise authority. As such,
commanders remain responsible for criminal misconduct of capitulating forces. Prevention of acts of looting
and destruction by capitulating forces, whether of military equipment or civilian objects, remains a
responsibility of commanders, for which they may be held criminally accountable.
DENUNCIATION
7-147. A capitulation agreement may be denounced if a party to it violates it based on directions by the
commander who capitulated or by higher authority. The other belligerent may denounce the capitulation
agreement and resume hostilities. Likewise, a denunciation action may also be taken if the capitulation was
obtained through a breach of faith. It may not, however, be denounced because one of the parties has been
induced to agree to it by a means consistent with LOAC, such as by a ruse, or by that party’s own incapacity,
such as by mistake of fact.
ANNULMENT
7-148. A capitulation is null and void if it takes place following the agreement of a general armistice of
which the parties to the capitulation had no knowledge, unless the terms of the armistice stipulate that the
cessation of hostilities occurs from the time when notification reaches the forces concerned, rather than from
the date and time of signature.
This chapter addresses war crimes and enforcement of LOAC from a U.S. perspective,
largely by specifying how U.S. law authorizes criminal prosecution of conduct that
also constitutes LOAC violations. Thus, this chapter discusses violations of LOAC
generally, what constitutes war crimes, criminal prosecution of war crimes, and
remedies available in response to LOAC violations.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
8-11. Each State Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is obligated “to respect and to ensure respect” for
the Conventions “in all circumstances” (Common Article 1 of GWS, GWS Sea, GPW and GC). Although
this provision does not reflect an obligation to ensure implementation of the conventions by other States or
parties to a conflict, the United States, as a matter of policy, often seeks to promote adherence to LOAC by
others (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.1.2.1). Additionally, a State is responsible for ensuring that its
armed forces and others acting on its behalf comply with LOAC (Hague IV art. 3; consider AP I art. 91).
Compensation referred to in these references is a matter to be determined between States; compensation of
individual victims is not an obligation of LOAC (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.9, 18.16). Note that the
ex gratia payments that commanders may be authorized to provide in accordance with DOD policy and
domestic fiscal authorities are not payments that are required by LOAC. The obligation to ensure LOAC
compliance applies even if the enemy fails to comply with LOAC.
ENFORCEMENT
8-12. International law authorizes an injured State to seek redress for violations of LOAC against it (see
Hague IV art. 3; DOD Law of War Manual, 18.10). States are not limited solely to judicial redress and may
avail themselves of the full panoply of enforcement mechanisms, including reprisals, reparation payments,
diplomatic negotiations, arbitration, and voluntarily constituted claims commissions. Individuals may, in
certain circumstances, also be prosecuted for LOAC violations, as discussed in greater detail below.
WAR CRIMES
8-13. For purposes of this publication, war crimes are serious violations of LOAC that are punishable by
criminal sanctions. The definition of “war crimes” often depends on the legal purpose at issue, and different
definitions of “war crimes” are used. Under the Geneva Conventions, States have a responsibility to search
for and prosecute those alleged to have committed “grave breaches,” of the Conventions. In addition, the
United States interprets the penal sanction provisions of the Geneva Conventions (see GC arts. 146, 147) in
accordance with its longstanding practice. In order for commanders to exercise appropriate command
supervision, prompt reporting and investigation of alleged war crimes and other LOAC violations are
essential. These other LOAC violations may not necessarily merit characterization as “war crimes,” but the
conduct may still be subject to criminal prosecution under U.S. law. In addition to obligations with respect
to grave breaches, the United States is responsible for taking all measures necessary to suppress other
violations of the Geneva Conventions (see, for example, GC art. 146).
unlawfully deporting, transferring, or confining a protected person; compelling a protected person to serve
in the forces of a hostile power; willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;
taking of hostages; and causing extensive destruction or appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (GWS art. 50; GWS Sea art. 51; GPW art. 130; GC art.
147; consider AP I art. 85). Under the Geneva Conventions, grave breaches involve violations against the
person or property of persons specifically protected by the four conventions. Though not binding on the
United States, under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the concept of a grave breach is
expanded to include violations against civilian persons and property generally. As a matter of international
law, the grave breach regime (with its obligation to search for and prosecute) only applies in an international
armed conflict, as defined by Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions (see GWS art. 2, GWS Sea art.
2, GPW art. 2 and GC art. 2).
Other Violations
8-16. Other LOAC violations that are punishable and may be serious enough to merit characterization as
“war crimes” include, but are not limited to, using poisonous weapons or weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering; attack or bombardment of undefended cities, towns or villages; pillage of public or
private property; maltreatment of dead bodies; poisoning of wells or streams; resorting to perfidy (for
example, using a white flag to conduct an attack treacherously); abusing or intentionally firing on a flag of
truce; intentionally targeting protected places, objects, or protected persons (HR art. 23a, 23g, 25, 28, 47;
War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441; consider AP I art. 85).
To enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or
ordering to be committed and of the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions;
To search for persons alleged to have committed, or have ordered to be committed, grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions, and bring such persons regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts;
To take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions other than grave breaches;
To provide persons accused of violations of the Geneva Conventions the safeguards of a proper
trial and defense (GWS art. 49; GWS Sea art. 50; GPW art. 129; GC art. 146); and
To pay compensation, when appropriate, for violations of LOAC for which the United States is
responsible (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.16).
8-21. The United States has enacted domestic laws to help meet these obligations (see generally paragraphs
8-22 to 8-56, “Reporting and Investigating LOAC Violations”). U.S. law provides general courts-martial
with the requisite authority to try, convict, and punish individuals who commit conduct punishable under
LOAC, including war crimes. In addition, the 1996 War Crimes Act establishes federal jurisdiction over
certain war crimes when the alleged perpetrator or victim is a U.S. person or member of the U.S. Armed
Forces.
Reportable Incidents
8-23. A “reportable incident” is defined as “a possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war for
which there is credible information, or conduct during military operations other than war that would
constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict” (DODD 2311.01E para. 3.2;
CJCSI 5810.01D para. 5b). Supplemental Service guidance provides for reporting of war crimes, or serious
LOAC violations, as well as other “serious” incidents that may generate adverse publicity or have serious
international consequences (see, for example, AR 190-45 para. 8-1; MCO 3300.4A, Enclosure 6). A
commander need not determine that a potential violation occurred, but only that credible information merits
further review of the incident. Commanders should consult with their assigned judge advocate for advice as
to whether an alleged violation is a reportable incident.
Investigations
8-24. Department of Defense policy requires that reportable incidents be thoroughly investigated. Under
DOD policy, commanders receiving an initial report of a reportable incident are also required to request a
formal investigation by the appropriate military criminal investigative organization (“MCIO,” for example
CID, Air Force Office of Special Investigations [OSI], or the Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS]).
If, in the course of the investigation, it is determined that U.S. persons are not involved in a reportable
incident, any U.S. investigation continues only at the direction of the appropriate combatant commander.
Even when U.S. personnel are not involved, reporting of the information through the chain of command may
nevertheless be required by DODD 2311.01E.
Command Response
8-25. Commanders receiving information about an alleged LOAC violation involving a member of their
command, either as a victim or a perpetrator, may conduct an informal or formal administrative investigation
to collect evidence and assess the credibility of the allegations and the involvement of U.S. personnel (AR
15-6; Chapter II of the Manual of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy [JAGMAN]). A commander’s
decision to direct such an investigation, however, should not delay further reporting up the chain of command
or, when appropriate, referral to CID or the NCIS. Further, if a commander’s investigation determines there
is credible evidence a crime has been committed, the commander should consult the command’s judge
advocate for advice on determining the appropriate disposition of the charges (Rules for Courts-Martial
[RCM] 303, 306).
Individual Responsibility
8-28. Any person who commits an act that constitutes a crime under international law, who aids, abets, or
counsels such a crime, or orders the commission of, conspires to commit, or attempts to commit such a crime
is responsible for the crime and is liable to punishment (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.22.1). Even if the
act is not punishable as a crime in the person’s own State, the individual is not relieved from criminal
responsibility under international law (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.22.2). Further, a person acting
pursuant to an order of their government or of a superior is not relieved from responsibility under international
law for acts that constitute a crime under international law, provided it was possible in fact for the person to
make a moral choice (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.22.4; but see para. 8-67(describing when superior
orders might constitute a legitimate defense)).
Command Responsibility
8-29. Commanders have a duty to maintain order and discipline within their command and to ensure
compliance with applicable law by those under their command or control. Commanders, therefore, may be
liable for the criminal acts of their subordinates or other persons subject to their control even if the
commander did not directly participate in the underlying offenses (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.23.3).
In order for the commander to be liable, however, the commander’s personal dereliction must have
contributed to or failed to prevent the offense; the commander is required to take necessary and reasonable
measures to ensure that their subordinates do not commit violations of LOAC.
8-30. For instance, if soldiers commit massacres or atrocities against POWs or against the civilian population
of occupied territory, the responsibility may rest not only with the actual perpetrators, but also with the
commander if the commander’s dereliction contributed to the offense. If the commander concerned ordered
such acts be carried out, then the commander would have direct criminal responsibility (UCMJ, Art. 77: “Any
person punishable under this chapter who – commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or… commands…
its commission… is a principal.”).
8-31. Under international law, criminal responsibility may also fall on commanders or certain civilian
superiors with similar authorities and responsibilities as military commanders if they had actual knowledge
or constructive knowledge of their subordinates’ actions and failed to take “necessary and reasonable”
measures to prevent or repress those violations. That is, commanders may be held responsible if they knew
or should have known, through reports received by them or by other means, that troops or other persons
subject to their control were about to commit or have committed a war crime and did nothing to prevent such
crimes or punish the violators. Once established that a commander has knowledge (actual or constructive) of
a subordinates’ actions, the commander may be liable under international law only where failure to supervise
subordinates properly constitutes criminal negligence on the commander’s part. That is, the commander may
be criminally liable where there is personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action
of the commander’s subordinates that amounts to acquiescence in the crimes.
Conspiracy
8-33. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a criminal offense and at least one of
the persons does something to effect the agreed-upon offense while the agreement exists. Under U.S. law,
conspiracy can take one of two forms. First, it can be based on a completed crime, such as the murder of
civilians. Conspiracy entails intentional participation in a common plan to complete a war crime. The
individual need not engage in the physical act of the war crime. He or she must intentionally participate in
the common plan, although the role can be relatively minor. To be found guilty under U.S. law, an accused
need not have prior knowledge of a particular crime, as long as the accused intended to aid acts of similar
character, such as the murder of civilians. Second, conspiracy can be charged as a separate, stand-alone
offense requiring only an agreement and some overt act furthering the agreement (also known as inchoate
conspiracy).
8-34. The crime of conspiracy can be found in a number of statutes applicable to war crimes, including the
War Crimes Act, other sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the UCMJ, and the Military Commissions Act
(MCA). Defendants have argued in litigation that the Constitution does not allow for the offense of
conspiracy to be tried by military commission because it is not an offense under the international law of war.
The Government has responded to that argument by, among other things, noting that U.S. military
commissions tried and convicted a number of defendants on conspiracy charges during the Civil War and
World War II. Current appellate litigation in the Military Commissions may afford U.S. practitioners with
clarity on this issue. (Compare UCMJ art. 81, 10 U.S.C. § 881, with 10 U.S.C. § 950t (29)).
criminal enterprise or “JCE.” In other words, under JCE, every person of the joint enterprise may be held
equally liable as a conspirator, even if his or her actions are distant from the actual execution of the crimes.
It is not a violation itself, but rather a theory upon which an individual can be liable for violations committed
by others.
Universality of Jurisdiction
8-40. In respect to grave breaches, the State’s obligation under the 1949 Geneva Conventions is to prosecute
or, under certain circumstances, to transfer to another State for prosecution, alleged perpetrators regardless
of their nationality (see, for example, GPW art. 129). Historically neutral or non-belligerent States have
generally not exercised jurisdiction in relation to alleged war crimes, and such efforts in recent years have
sometimes met strong objections and generally have not been successful without the consent of belligerent
States. The jurisdiction of U.S. military tribunals in connection with war crimes is not limited to offenses
committed against U.S. citizens, but extends to offenses committed against nationals of allies, co-belligerents,
and stateless persons. Persons subject to the UCMJ who commit LOAC violations are usually prosecuted for
offenses under the UCMJ via courts-martial, and the UCMJ explicitly “applies in all places” (10 U.S.C. §
805). Violations of LOAC committed in the United States or committed by other U.S. persons usually
constitute violations of federal criminal law and would ordinarily be prosecuted under such laws.
Commanders of U.S. service members and civilians must ensure that members of their command who commit
war crimes are promptly investigated and, when there is sufficient evidence, adequately punished (see
paragraphs 8-13 to 8-18).
flexibility in prosecuting individuals for crimes committed on the battlefield and in occupied territories.
Courts-martial can be (and often are) convened outside the territorial limits of the United States by employing
military judges and other qualified military personnel who can handle cases in austere environments.
8-42. Long-standing U.S. practice is to charge war crimes as offenses under the UCMJ rather than as separate
“war crimes” offenses. Offenses under the UCMJ that could be used to punish conduct that violated LOAC
include, but are not limited to:
Article 81 (10 U.S.C. § 881), Conspiracy;
Article 93 (10 U.S.C. § 893), Cruelty and maltreatment;
Article 108 (10 U.S.C. § 908), Military Property of United States – loss, damage, destruction, or
wrongful disposition;
Article 108a (10 U.S.C. § 908a), Captured or abandoned property;
Article 109 (10 U.S.C. § 909), Property other than military property of United States – waste,
spoilage, or destruction;
Article 118 (10 U.S.C. § 918), Murder;
Article 119 (10 U.S.C. § 919), Manslaughter;
Article 119a (10 U.S.C. § 919a), Death or injury of an unborn child;
Article 120 (10 U.S.C. § 920), Rape and sexual assault generally (including Forcible Sodomy);
Article 120b (10 U.S.C. § 920b), Rape and sexual assault of a child;
Article 120c (10 U.S.C. § 920c), Other sexual misconduct;
Article 125 (10 U.S.C. § 925), Kidnapping;
Article 126 (10 U.S.C. § 926), Arson;
Article 128 (10 U.S.C. § 928), Assault;
Article 128a (10 U.S.C. § 928a), Maiming; and
Article 130 (10 U.S.C. § 920), Stalking.
8-43. Conduct that violates LOAC can also be charged using the UCMJ’s provision against disobedience of
lawful orders or general regulations (UCMJ art. 92; 10 U.S.C. § 892), as well as under the UCMJ’s general
prohibition against conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline in the Armed Forces (UCMJ art. 134; 10
U.S.C. § 934).
8-46. Other laws criminalize acts of torture, attempts to commit torture, and conspiracy to commit torture
outside the United States when the offender is a U.S. national or is located within the United States (18 U.S.C.
§ 2340A). Other relevant provisions of the law allow for the prosecution of:
Genocide (18 U.S.C. § 1091);
Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons
(18 U.S.C. § 1116);
Piracy (18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1661);
Terrorism and material support to terrorists (18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339D); and
Various acts involving biological weapons, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction, or
nuclear weapons (18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 229, 832, 2332a).
A number of these provisions limit their application to offenses committed within the United States, or by or
against citizens of the United States; but others, such as piracy, apply regardless of the location of the offense
or the nationality of the offender or victim(s).
Prosecution of Civilians, Former Military Members, Prisoners of War, and Enemy Belligerents
8-47. While the discussion on jurisdiction and venue thus far applies to U.S. Service Members who commit
war crimes, the next sections discuss U.S. jurisdiction over and venue for trying non-U.S. service members—
civilians, former military members, enemy POWs, and enemy belligerents.
who engage in conduct constituting criminal offenses shall be held accountable for their actions, as
appropriate (DODI 5525.11).
8-52. When an offense alleged to have been committed by a civilian that violates U.S. federal criminal law
occurs, DOD policies may provide for notification of responsible DOJ authorities to afford DOJ the
opportunity to pursue prosecution of the case in federal district court (Secretary of Defense Memorandum,
“UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving
With or Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations,”
March 10, 2008). While the notification and decision process is pending, commanders and military criminal
investigators should continue to take appropriate action to address the alleged crime. Commanders should
also ensure that any preliminary military justice procedures that would be required in support of the exercise
of UCMJ jurisdiction continue to be accomplished during the concurrent DOJ notification process.
Commanders should be prepared to act, as appropriate, should possible U.S. federal criminal jurisdiction
prove to be unavailable to address the alleged criminal behavior.
International Tribunals
8-57. On a number of occasions since the beginning of the 20th century, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and crimes against peace were prosecuted by special international tribunals. These
tribunals were established to address crimes committed during specific periods or in connection with specific
conflicts. In general, these tribunals have applied international law, including the Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols, as well as the HRICR. The statute governing each tribunal typically stipulates the
specific types of crimes addressed by the tribunal and the standards for culpability. The decisions of these
tribunals do not bind the United States and its courts. Their decisions, however, provide useful examples of
the application of international law. An example of a special international tribunal, created by Great Britain,
France, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was the International Military
Tribunal. This tribunal conducted the landmark Trial of Major War Criminals, with 21 Axis defendants, in
Nuremberg, Germany, from November 1945 to October 1946. Another post-war tribunal was established in
Tokyo to try war criminals in the Pacific Theater of World War II. The jurisprudence of the ICTY, established
by the UN Security Council in 1993, also provides numerous examples of war crimes prosecutions.
8-60. The Rome Statute generally only confers jurisdiction on the ICC when the accused is a national of a
Rome Statute Party; when the conduct occurs on the territory of a Rome Statute Party; or when the conduct
occurs in a situation that has been referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council. The ICC will not prosecute
an individual when a State has exercised or is in the process of exercising jurisdiction over the matter, unless
that State is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute the case (Rome Statute art. 17). While
the ICC purports to exercise jurisdiction over non-State Parties to the Rome Statute, the United States has a
longstanding and continuing objection to any assertion of jurisdiction by the ICC with respect to nationals of
States not Party to the Rome Statute in the absence of consent from such States or a referral by the Security
Council (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.20.3.1). Further, the U.S. Government has negotiated SOFAs and
other agreements with many countries, which under a provision of the Rome Statute (art. 98) clarify that U.S.
personnel may not be turned over to the ICC by those countries absent U.S. consent. Moreover, in
multinational operations or peace operations U.S. personnel may be asked to cooperate with ICC prosecutors
who are investigating allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Any requests for
cooperation by the ICC should be forwarded to DOD because such requests implicate U.S. policy toward the
ICC and U.S. law, including the American Service Members’ Protection Act, imposes certain restrictions on
any support to the ICC.
8-63. An accused who is not a U.S. citizen and who meets the definition of an unprivileged enemy belligerent
under the terms of the MCA is subject to trial before a military commission or in Federal court pursuant to
U.S. law (see paragraph 8-55).
PENALTIES
8-65. Penalties vary depending on the war crime committed and the law pursuant to which the crime is being
prosecuted. Authorized punishments can range from fines or letters of reprimand to death. For instance, for
the offense of murder under the UCMJ, the accused may be subject to death or life imprisonment (UCMJ,
art. 118). Crimes under the War Crimes Act, the MCA, or other U.S. law also carry significant penalties.
Generally, violations of the War Crimes Act that result in the death of a victim may be punishable by death
(18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)). Grave breaches that authorize the death penalty include willful killing, torture,
inhumane treatment, or willfully causing great suffering or injury (GWS art. 50; GWS Sea art. 51; GPW art.
130; GC art. 147).
DEFENSES
8-66. The availability of legal defenses to charges of war crimes may depend on the specific jurisdiction and
forum in which charges are brought. The following general information regarding affirmative defenses that
negate criminal responsibility under general principles of criminal law and war crimes may be helpful, but
commanders should request legal advice if they have specific questions.
Justification
8-68. A death, injury, or other act caused or done in the proper performance of a legal duty is justified and
not unlawful. This includes a privileged belligerent’s killing of an enemy combatant in combat and other acts
that would otherwise be offenses under local criminal law (RCM 916(c) Discussion; MMC, pt. II, Rule
916(c)).
Self-Defense
8-69. Self-defense generally requires the accused to demonstrate an apprehension, on reasonable grounds,
that death or bodily harm was about to be wrongfully inflicted and that the force used by the accused was
necessary for protection against such death or bodily harm (RCM 916(e)). The plea of self-defense has been
recognized in war crimes trials under much the same circumstances as in trials held under ordinary criminal
law (see, for example, MMC pt. II, Rule 916(e)).
Accident
8-70. Death, injury, or damage that occurs as the unintentional and unexpected result of doing a lawful act
in a lawful manner (for example, conduct of military operations in accordance with LOAC) is an accident
and is excusable. The defense is not available when the act that caused the death, injury, or damage was a
negligent act (RCM 916(f); MMC pt. II, Rule 916(f)).
Lawful Reprisals
8-74. Reprisals are acts taken against a party that are otherwise unlawful under LOAC in order to persuade
that party to cease violating the law. A reprisal is considered lawful, provided that the stringent conditions
for lawful reprisal have been met, including complying with any applicable prohibitions against reprisal. The
fact that the conduct was part of a lawful reprisal action thus means that would not need to part of a valid
defense (see paras. 8-80 to 8-86 for additional information).
Superior Orders
8-75. The fact that a person acted pursuant to orders of his or her Government or of a superior does not
relieve that person from responsibility under international law, provided it was possible in fact for that person
to make a moral choice (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.22.4). Under the RCM and MMC, it is a defense
to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the orders to be
unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful (RCM
916(d); MMC pt. II, Rule 916(d)). An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be
inferred to be lawful, and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a
patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime (for example, an order directing the
murder of a civilian, a noncombatant, or a combatant who is hors de combat, or the abuse or torture of a
prisoner) (see, for example, MCM pt. IV, para. 14c(2)(a)(i)). The fact that an offense was committed pursuant
to superior orders may also be considered as mitigation to reduce the level of punishment (see, for example,
United States v. Sawada, V U.N. Law Reports 7-8, 13-22; ICTY art. 7(4)).
Government Officials
8-76. The fact that a person who committed an act that constitutes a crime under international law acted as
Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him or her of responsibility under
international law (see DOD Law of War Manual, 18.22.3). Most war crimes tribunals have held that the fact
a person acted as a Head of State or as a government official is not a defense to prosecution and punishment
for war crimes, nor has acting as such been considered as a factor in mitigating punishment (see, for example,
Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7). Although status as a government official is not a
substantive defense to liability under international law, government officials may receive immunities or other
procedural protections from a foreign State’s exercise of jurisdiction. For example, a Status of Forces
Agreement could provide that it is for the sending State to exercise jurisdiction, rather than the host State, in
respect of allegations that the sending State’s forces had committed war crimes.
has yet to conduct an inquiry. The United States, which is not a party to AP I has not recognized the
competence of this Commission.
REPRISALS
8-80. Reprisals are acts that are otherwise not permitted by LOAC in order to persuade a party to the
conflict to cease violating LOAC. They are taken in response to a prior act in violation of LOAC that was
committed by or is attributable to that party. This could include, for example, the use of weapons forbidden
by the Hague Regulations to counter the use of the same weapons by an enemy on combatants who have not
yet fallen into the hands of the enemy. Reprisals are extreme measures that are only adopted as a last resort
to induce the party to desist from violations of LOAC.
Proportionality in Reprisal
8-83. To be legal, reprisals must respond in a proportionate manner to the preceding illegal act by the party
against which they are taken. Identical reprisals are the easiest to justify as proportionate, because subjective
comparisons are not involved. However, the acts resorted to by way of reprisal need not be identical nor of
the same type as the violations committed by the enemy. A reprisal should not be unreasonable or excessive
compared to the enemy’s violation (for example, considering the death, injury, damage, or destruction that
the enemy’s violation caused).
Combatant personnel who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked (GWS art. 46; GWS Sea art. 47);
Medical and religious personnel, medical units and facilities, and hospital ships (GWS art. 46;
GWS Sea art. 47);
POWs (GPW art. 13);
Persons protected by the GC and their property (GC art. 33;); and
Cultural property (1954 Hague art. 4(4); consider AP I art. 53).
8-88. Additional Protocol I specified additional restrictions on reprisals that are
applicable to AP I Parties that have not taken reservations to these restrictions, including
protections against reprisal for:
Civilians and civilian objects (consider AP I art. 52(1));
The natural environment (consider AP I art. 55(2));
Objects “indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” (consider AP I art. 54(4));POWs
(GPW art. 13); and
Public works and installations containing dangerous forces (such as dams, dykes, and nuclear
power stations) (consider AP I art. 56(4)).
Some States in ratifying AP I have taken reservations from the additional limitations on reprisal provided for
in Additional Protocol I. The U.S. position is that Additional Protocol I’s reprisal provisions are counter-
productive and remove a significant deterrent that protects civilians and war victims on all sides of a conflict.
Reprisals are generally extraordinary measures, and, therefore, generally reserved for decision at the national
level.
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of June 17, 1925 (26 UST 571, T.I.A.S. 8061, 94
LNTS 65) (1925 Geneva Gas Protocol).
Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of April 10, 1972 (26 UST 583, T.I.A.S.
8062, 1015 UNTS 163) (BWC).
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques of May 18, 1977 (31 UST 333, TIAS 9614) (ENMOD Convention).
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction of January 13, 1993 (CWC).
A-3. Law of Armed Conflict Treaties Signed but Not Ratified by the United States:
Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of June 8, 1977 (AP I).
Protocol (II) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of June 8, 1977 (AP II).
A-4. Law of Armed Conflict or Relevant Arms Control Treaties to Which the United States Is Neither a
Signatory Nor a Party:
Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets of July 29, 1899.
Hague Convention VI Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of
Hostilities of October 18, 1907.
Hague Convention VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships of October
18, 1907.
First Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954.
Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction of September 18, 1997.
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict of March 26, 1999.
Convention on Cluster Munitions of May 30, 2008.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1988 (Rome Statute)
A-5. Law of Armed Conflict or Relevant Arms Control Treaties or Documents of Mainly Historical Value:
St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grams Weight of December 11, 1868 (1868 St. Petersburg Declaration).
Hague Declaration IV, 1 to Prohibit for the Term of Five Years the Launching of Projectiles and
Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of a Similar Nature of July 29, 1899.
Hague Declaration IV, 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases of July 29, 1899.
Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of
Regulations of July 29, 1899 (32 Stat. 1803, TS 403, 1 Bevans 247) (1899 Hague II).
Hague Convention X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention of October 18, 1907.
Hague Declaration XIV Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons of
October 18, 1907.
Washington Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare of February
6, 1922 (1922 Washington Treaty).
Hague Rules of Air Warfare of February 17, 1923 (1923 Hague Air Rules).
Geneva Convention Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the
Field of July 27, 1929 (47 Stat. 2074; Treaty Series 847) (1929 GWS).
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of July 27, 1929 (47 Stat. 2021;
Treaty Series 846) (1929 GPW).
Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments of April
15, 1935 (49 Stat. 3267, TS 899, 3 Bevans 254, 167 LNTS 279) (Roerich Pact).
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Terms for which
FM 6-27 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for
other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION II – TERMS
Armed Forces of the United States
A term used to denote collectively all components of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and
Coast Guard (when mobilized under Title 10, United States Code, to augment the Navy). (JP 1).
cartel
An agreement entered into by opposing belligerents for the exchange of POWs (see Lieber Code, art.
106).
civilian internee
A civilian who is interned during armed conflict, occupation, or other miltary operation for security
reasons, for protection, or because he or she committed an offense against the detaining power. Also
called CI. (DODD 2310.01E) (ADP 1-02)
collateral damage
A form of collateral effect that causes unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or
objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. (JP 3-60)
detainee
Any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel.
(JP 3-63)
displaced person
A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively. (JP 3-29)
*distinction
The LOAC principle that obliges parties to a conflict to distinguish between combatants and the
civilian population and to distinguish between military objectives and and protected property and
places.
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADP 3-0)
enemy combatant
In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an
armed conflict. (DODD 2310.01E)
*environmental modification technique
Any method of warfare for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the
dynamics, composition, or structure of the Earth (to include its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and
atmosphere) or outer space.
*general license
A document that generally or partially relaxes the exercise of the rights of war in regards to trade in
relation to any community or individuals liable to be affected by their operation.
*honor
The LOAC prinicple that demands a certain amount of fairness in offense and defense and a certain
mutual respect between opposing forces. Also called chivalry.
*humanity
The LOAC principle that forbids inflicting suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish
a legitimate military purpose. Also called unnecessary suffering or superflous injury.
*international armed conflict
Any declared war between States, or to any other armed conflict between States, even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of them.
intelligence interrogation
The systematic process of using approved interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained
person to obtain reliable information to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable
law. (JP 2-01.2)
*jus ad bellum
That part of international law that regulates the circumstances in which States may resort to the use of
force in international relations.
*jus in bello
That part of international law relating to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims,
from combatants who are wounded and out of combat, to prisoners of war and civilians.
law of armed conflict
See law of war. (JP 3-84)
law of war
That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of
armed conflict. (JP 3-84)
*levée en masse
Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, upon approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms
to resist the invading forces, with no time to form into regular armed units, provided that they carry
their arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
military deception
Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist
organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that
will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. (JP 3-13.4)
*military necessity
The principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and
efficiently as possible that are not forbidden by the law of armed conflict.
*military objective
Certain persons and objects during hostilities which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, makes
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
military occupation
A condition in which territory is under the effective control of a foreign armed force. See also occupied
territory. (JP 3-0)
*military passport
A document issued by order of a commander of belligerent forces that authorizes a person or persons
named therein and residing or sojourning within territory occupied by such forces to travel unmolested
within the territory, with or without permission to pass, or to pass and return, by designated routes,
through the lines, subject to conditions or limitations imposed by the commander.
National Detainee Reporting Center
The national-level center that accounts for all persons who pass through the care, custody, and control
of the Department of Defense and that obtains and stores information concerning detainees and their
confiscated person property. Also called NDRC. (JP 3-63)
nongovernmental organization
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or
promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and
conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.
Also called NGO. (JP 3-08)
*non-international armed conflict
An armed conflict not between States, such as a conflict between a State and a non-State armed group
or a conflict between two non-State armed groups.
objective
1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed. 2. The
specific goal of the action taken which is essential to the commander’s plan. See also target. (JP 5-0)
occupied territory
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. The
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be
exercised. (HR art. 42)
*opinio juris
A statement of customary international law resulting from a general and consistent practice of States
followed from a sense of legal obligation.
*parlementaire
Agents or envoys employed by commanders in the field to go in person within the enemy lines for the
purpose of communicating or negotiating openly and directly with the enemy commander.
pillage
Intentionally and in the absence of military necessity appropriating or seizing property for private or
personal use, without the consent of a person with authority to permit such appropriation or seizure.
(10 U.S.C. § 950t(5)). Also called looting and plunder.
prisoner of war
A detained person (as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949) who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her
government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. Also called POW. (JP 3-50)
*proportionality
The LOAC principle requiring combatants to refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage expected to be gained.
protected emblems
The red cross, red crescent, and other symbols that designate that persons, places, or equipment so
marked have a protected status under the law of war. Also called the distinctive emblems. (JP 3-60)
protected persons/protected places
Persons (such as enemy prisoners of war) and places (such as hospitals) that enjoy special protections
under the law of war and which may or may not be marked with protected emblems. (JP 3-84)
*protecting power
A neutral or non-belligerent State having a humanitarian role in armed conflict.
repatriation
1. The procedure whereby American citizens and their families are officially processed back into the
United States subsequent to an evacuation. See also evacuation. (JP 3-68) 2. The release and return of
enemy prisoners of war to their own country in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. (JP 1-0)
*reprisal
Acts that are otherwise not permitted by LOAC in order to persuade a party to the conflict to cease
violating LOAC.
retained personnel
Detainees who fall into one of the following categories: a. Designated enemy medical personnel and
medical staff administrators who are engaged in either the search for, collection, transport, or treatment
of the wounded or sick, or the prevention of disease; b. Staff of National Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies and that of other volunteer aid societies, duly recognized and authorized by their
governments to assist medical service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are
exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in
the prevention of disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and
regulations; c. Chaplains attached to enemy armed forces. Also called RP. See also personnel.
(JP 3-63)
safeguard
A detachment, guard, or detail posted by a commander for the protection of persons, places, or
property of the enemy, or of a neutral affected by the relationship of belligerent forces in their
prosecution of war or during circumstances amounting to a state of belligerency (see Manual for
Courts-Martial (2016), part IV, para. 26 (art. 102)).
*safe-conduct pass
A document issued by a commander of belligerent forces, but to persons residing or traveling outside
territory occupied by such forces, to enter and remain within or pass through areas occupied by such
forces.
*special license
A document that allows individuals to take a particular voyage or journey to import or export particular
goods.
*suspension of arms
A form of local armistice concluded between commanders of military forces for some local military
purpose, such as to recover and bury the dead, to collect and care for the wounded and sick, to arrange
for exchange of prisoners, or to enable a commander to communicate with his or her government or
superior. Also called a suspension of fire.
target
An entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other
action. See also objective area. (JP 3-60)
targeting
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them,
considering operational requirements and capabilities. See also joint targeting coordination board;
target. (JP 3-0)
*unprivileged belligerent
A person who, by engaging in hostilities, has incurred the corresponding liabilities of combatant status
(for example, being subject to attack or detention), but who is not entitled to the distinct privileges of
combatant status (for example, combatant immunity and POW status upon capture).
weaponeering
The process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target.
(JP 3-60)
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. June 2019.
ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Unless otherwise indicated, Army publications and regulations are available on the Army Publishing
Directorate (APD) website: https://armypubs.army.mil/.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
AR 15-6. Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers. 1 April 2016.
AR 27-53. Review of Legality of Weapons Under International Law. 1 January 1979.
AR 190-8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461.1. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees. 1 October 1997.
AR 190-45. Law Enforcement Reporting. 27 September 2016.
AR 195-2. Criminal Investigation Activities. 9 June 2014.
AR 350-1. Army Training and Leader Development. 10 December 2017.
FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006.
FM 3-24. Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. 13 May 2014.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Carter, Ash, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum re: Principles Related to the Protection of Medical
Care Provided by Impartial Humanitarian Organizations During Armed Conflict, 3 October
2016. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Principle-Promulgation-Memo.pdf.
Convention on Cluster Munitions of May 30, 2008. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of April 10, 1972.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction of January 13, 1993.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques of May 18, 1977.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of October 10, 1980,
its Protocols I, II, III, IV, and V, its Amended Protocol II, and its extended scope of
application (CCW). https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Executive Order 10631 (1955), Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United
States, as amended by Executive Order 12017 (1977) and Executive Order 12633 (1988).
https://www.federalregister.gov/
Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations (2009). https://www.federalregister.gov/.
First Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Gates, Robert M., Secretary of Defense, Memorandum re: UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian
Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving With or Accompanying
the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations, 10 March
2008. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-hrsp/legacy/2011/02/04/03-10-
08dod-ucmj.pdf.
Geneva Convention Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field of
July 27, 1929. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of July 27, 1929.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, August 12, 1949. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Geneva Convention, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949. https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Geneva Convention, Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of June 17, 1925 (1925 Geneva Gas Protocol).
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Rules of Air Warfare of February 17, 1923. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Hague Convention for the Exemption of Hospital Ships in Time of War, from the Payment of all Dues
and Taxes Imposed for the Benefit of the State of December 21, 1904.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of
Regulations of July 29, 1899. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Hague Convention III of October 18, 1907, Relative to the Opening of Hostilities.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Convention IV of October 18, 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague
IV), and the Annex thereto, entitled Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (HR). https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Convention V of October 18, 1907, Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V).
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Convention VI Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities of
October 18, 1907. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Hague Convention VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships of October 18,
1907. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Hague Convention VIII of October 18, 1907, Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines (Hague VIII).
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Convention IX of October 18, 1907, Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of
War (Hague IX). https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Convention X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention of October 18, 1907. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Hague Convention XI of October 18, 1907, Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (Hague XI).
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Convention XIII of October 18, 1907, Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War (Hague XIII). https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Declaration XIV Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons of
October 18, 1907. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14,
1954 (1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention).
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets of July 29, 1899.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Hague Declaration IV, 1 to Prohibit for the Term of Five Years the Launching of Projectiles and
Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of a Similar Nature of July 29, 1899.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Hague Declaration IV, 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases of July 29, 1899.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders 100,
(Lieber Code), April 24, 1863. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110.
Korean War Armistice Agreement, Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953.
http://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf
Letter of Transmittal, President Ronald W. Reagan, to the Senate of the United States, 23 Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, 91 (Jan. 29, 1987).
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/protocol-II-100-2.pdf
Manual for Courts-Martial (2019).
https://jsc.defense.gov/Military-Law/Current-Publications-and-Updates/
Marine Corps Law of War Program, Marine Corps Order 3300.4A (MCO 3300.4A), 9 January 2014.
https://homeport.usmc.mil/sites/mcdoctrine/SitePages/Home.aspx
Military Commissions Act of 2006. 10 USC §948-50; 18 USC § 2441; and 28 USC § 2241(c)-(e).
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf
Military Commissions Act of 2009. 10 USC § 47A.
http://www.mc.mil/portals/0/mca20pub20law200920.pdf
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000. 18 USC § 3261.
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscode.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and Their Destruction of September 18, 1997.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations. 22 U.S.C. § 288f-3.
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscode.
Procès-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London
of April 22, 1930 (London Protocol). https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977. https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977. https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of
An Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), December 8, 2005. https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.
http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict of March 26, 1999. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400
Grams Weight of December 11, 1868. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
New Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee Policy Fact Sheet. March 2011.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-
and-detainee-policy.
Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments of April 15,
1935. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Washington Convention Regarding the Rights of Neutrals at Sea, October 31, 1854, 10 Stat. 1105, TS
300, 11 Bevans 2114. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Washington Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare of February 6,
1922. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/.
War Crimes Act of 1996, as amended. 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscode.
WEBSITES
JAGCNet at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/
JAGU at https://jagu.army.mil/
The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School Publications at
https://tjaglcspublic.army.mil/publications
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA Forms are available on the APD website: https://armypubs.army.mil/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
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