Enrile v. People, G.R. No. 213455
Enrile v. People, G.R. No. 213455
Enrile v. People, G.R. No. 213455
PEOPLE
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Courts jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enriles Office, both public officers, committing the offense
in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES,
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts.
Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the
plunder case against the accused.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he
filed a motion for deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical examination at the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayans
order and his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza), Enriles counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a 10-minute recess to deliberate
on the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Courts denial of
Enriles motion for bill of particulars essentially on the following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are substantial reiterations of the arguments he
raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for
dismissal of information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging accused
Enrile, among other persons, with the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It
finds no cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling.
Moreover, the desired details that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to provide are
evidentiary in nature, which need not be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated
during the trial of the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration of the denial of his motion
for bill of particulars which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared another
ten-minute recess to deliberate on the said motion for reconsideration. After deliberation
thereon, the Court likewise resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce Enriles
motion for reconsideration there being no new or substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant
thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile shall now proceed as
previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enriles arraignment. The
Sandiganbayan responded by directing the doctors present to determine whether he was
physically fit to be arraigned. After he was declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with
Enriles arraignment. Enrile entered a no plea, prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a not
guilty plea on his behalf.
II.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of
particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against him. Enrile
maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime
of plunder had been. He posits that the Information should have stated the details of the
particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led
to the charge of plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the details desired that he sought in his
motion for bill of particulars, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Enrile posits that his desired details are not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts that
should be clearly alleged in the Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges
against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context
different from his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the
resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and did not bar the submission of the
same issue in subsequent proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.
Enrile thus prays that: (a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by way of an
interim measure, the Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from holding the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal
Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 during the pendency of the present petition; (c) the Court expedite
the proceedings and set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of the
proceedings, the Court annul and set aside the Sandiganbayans July 11, 2014 resolution and his
arraignment.
In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines13 counters that the Sandiganbayan did not
exercise its discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the
Sandiganbayans denial of Enriles motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did not
amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan
rulings were arrived at based on the procedures prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate facts; matters of
evidence do not need to be averred.
B. Enriles Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of particulars is ancillary
to and in implementation of an accuseds rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the Sandiganbayans
denial of his motion for bill of particulars is not a mere denial of a procedural right under the
Rules of Court, but of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in
the trial of the offense charged. Enrile also adds that there could only be a fair trial if he could
properly plead to the Information and prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the Peoples Comment did not dispute the relevance of the details
sought in the motion for bill of particulars. He likewise claims that the desired details could
not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution during the
preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that his motion for bill of particulars was not
dilatory.
III.
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under the terms
outlined below.
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 14 This right has long been
established in English law, and is the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution.
This right requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to inform
the accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his
defense.15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained the purpose of informing an
accused in writing of the charges against him from the perspective of his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was First. To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.)
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of
law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint
with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances.
In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances
necessary to constitute the crime charged. x x x.17[Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully appraise the
accused of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to
injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at
all.18redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a persons constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an
accused should be given the necessary data on why he is the subject of a criminal proceeding.
The Court added that the act or conduct imputed to a person must be described with sufficient
particularity to enable the accused to defend himself properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty, and property of individuals; to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private rights and distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal and
impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct underlying root of the right to
information in criminal proceedings Section 14(1), Article III which provides that No person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Thus, no doubt exists
that the right to be informed of the cause of the accusation in a criminal case has deep
constitutional roots that, rather than being cavalierly disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the Court, in sustaining the
Sandiganbayans grant of the motion for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that
the facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of
excesses against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of
particulars, so that respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so
that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously as possible.22 The Court additionally stated
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting
aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and
the law requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all
about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents'
minds that they are being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process of
law.23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.26redarclaw
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not
necessarily need to be in the language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is charged and what qualifying and
aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment. 27 The Rules
do not require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the commission of the
offense, unless the date and the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the
offense, or are necessary for its identification.
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary
and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the
trial.28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term
does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established. It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove
at the trial.29redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on
whose existence the cause of action rests;30 they are also the essential and determining facts on
which the court's conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in
essential particulars.31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts;
they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. 32They are facts supporting
the existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two concepts in relation to a
particular criminal case, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis
of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions
of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish
said ultimate facts. x x x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information,
matters of evidence as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense do
not need to be alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be
determined based on the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes. 36redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned
so that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to
face, to be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted
the opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully
aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the
crime imputed to him.38redarclaw
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime
imputed to him in the Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly
committed.39 It is likewise at this stage of the proceedings when the accused enters his plea, 40 or
enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged.41redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide
the accused with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to
make an intelligent plea and prepare a defense.42Moreover, the Information must provide
some means of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in
fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by
the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence.43Likewise, it must
indicate just what crime or crimes an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid
subsequent attempts to retry him for the same crime or crimes. 44 In other words, the
Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only
on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and
inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime
charged. If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the
ground that it fails to charge an offense.45Of course, an Information may be sufficient to
withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific
details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused
to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for
trial.46redarclaw
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the
Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to
enable an accused: to know the theory of the governments case; 48 to prepare his defense and
to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for
the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering
evidence.49redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise
the accused of the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what the Information means.50redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard
against surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of
particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the
offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in
the bill of particulars.51redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the applicable rules for criminal
procedure was still General Order No. 58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill
of particulars in criminal cases. This recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision
in General Order No. 58 setting out the rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of particulars was available in a
criminal case for estafa after the accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially
ruled that there was no specific provision of law expressly authorizing the filing of specifications
or bills of particulars in criminal cases, and held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the laws existing prior thereto
which requires the Government to furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that
it was not error on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the existence and applicability of a
bill of particulars in criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging
Basilio Cernias with several counts of brigandage before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In
overruling the accuseds objection, the Court declared that the prosecutions act of specifying
certain acts done by the conspirators in the Information did no more than to furnish the
defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the trial x x
x.56redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or information is not objectionable,
and that the details it contains may be properly considered as specifications or bill of
particulars.57redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of particulars, as a right that the
accused may ask for from the court. In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph
Arcache with the crime of treason before the Peoples Court. The Information filed against the
accused contained, in counts 2 and 3, the phrase and other similar equipment.
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the Peoples court to order the prosecution to
make more specific [the] phrase and other similar equipment, which request the Peoples
Court granted. The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, but the Court
dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the Peoples Court, the Court ruled that in the absence of specific
provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases,
their submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the
accused. On the contrary, they will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed
against them, and thus enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they
might have.59redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of particulars in criminal cases, stating
that x x x inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused
may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the
true charges against them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be
detrimental to their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be
permitted in criminal complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has been included
therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order
either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an
amendment in mere matters of form.60redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide for a bill of
particulars in criminal cases. A specific provision granting the accused the right to move for or
demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars was not incorporated as a formal rule
until the 1964 Rules of Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial provision later became
Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure 62and Section 9 of Rule 116
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. 63redarclaw
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a
valid Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit
under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only
formal amendments to the complaint or Information.
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details
desired deprives him of the right to object to evidencethat could be introduced and
admitted under an Information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently
charges the accused with a definite crime.66redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
court67 it should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the
nature of the crime charged in each case and the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him. As articulated in the case of People
v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to be informed of the
charges against him so that he will be able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise
careful surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this right by an overzealous
prosecutor attempting to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in
ignorance of the substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This
is especially so where the indictment itself provides a paucity of information. In such cases, the
court must be vigilant in safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to
effective discovery. Should the prosecutor decide to use an indictment which, although
technically sufficient, does not adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may
well run afoul of the defendant's right to be informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its
granting69 and order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the accuseds
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts
through the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends
to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. 71The
accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair
verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries with
it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several
predicate criminal acts involving a great number of transactions spread over
a considerable period of time.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in the information are not
vague because the Information needs only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for
which the accused stands charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged
were committed. In support of his position, Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v.
Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75 among others,
to support the superfluity of the details requested by Enrile.
Justice Carpios reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve the issue of quashal of
an information on the ground that the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a
request for bill of particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical issue of the validity of
an information, and not a request for specificity with request to an offense charged in an
information.
Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court mentioned that the
proper remedy, if at all, to a supposed ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is
merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which
sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.85redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid information for it
merely fills in the details on an otherwise valid information to enable an accused to
make an intelligent plea and prepare for his defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of discretion for denying
Enriles request for a bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash.
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the
accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of
particulars is the proper remedy.87redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate
remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an
offense.88redarclaw
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be
reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave
abuse of discretion is shown.89redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that
amounts or is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 90 For the extraordinary writ
of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motion for bill of particulars on two
grounds, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial;
and
(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought in his supplemental
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Enriles motion for a bill of particulars and
his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were evidentiary requires an
examination of the elements of the offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic
Act No. 7080.
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enriles requested details on Who among the
accused acquired the alleged ill-gotten wealth are not proper subjects for a bill of
particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, conspiring with
one another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x
expressly charges conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with x x x. The term connivance suggests an agreement or consent to commit
an unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with
another.91It implies both knowledge and assent that may either be active or passive. 92redarclaw
Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and
the Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one
another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is
unnecessary to specify, as an essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the
accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each
accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed,
acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million.
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as
the mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars
in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought
under the questions
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of
the Priority Development Assistance Fund identified as that of a member of
Congress, in this instance, as ENRILEs, to be found? In what amount for each year is
ENRILEs Priority Development Assistance Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the
findings that each of Enriles PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or
spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enriles PDAF was used to
fund fictitious or nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had
indeed been made available to Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in what
amounts are evidentiary matters that do not need to be reflected with particularity in the
Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enriles yearly PDAF allocations, if any, from
2004 to 2010 need not be pleaded with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for his defense. In fact, Enrile may be in a better position to know these details than the
prosecution and thus cannot claim that he would be taken by surprise during trial by the
omission in the Information of his annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enriles PDAF allocations have been specified or not, Enrile has
been sufficiently informed that he stands charged of endorsing Napoles non-government
organizations to implement spurious or fictitious projects, in exchange for a percentage of his
PDAF.
The details of the COA audits or field investigations only support the ultimate fact that the
projects implemented by Napoles NGOs, and funded by Enriles PDAF, were nonexisting or
fictitious. Thus, they are evidentiary in nature and do not need to be spelled out with
particularity in the Information.
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would amount to asking for
evidentiary information that the latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion
on the prosecution to disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it will use in proving the
charges alleged in the indictment.
We also deny Enriles plea for details on who the others were (aside from Napoles, Lim
and De Asis) from whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons
do not stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly,
either as specific individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecutions
reason for not divulging the identity of these others who may potentially be witnesses for the
prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to meet and examine the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information, subject to the defenses right to cross-examine
them.96Making these others known would in fact be equivalent to the prosecutions premature
disclosure of its evidence. We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of particulars is not
meant to compel the prosecution to prematurely disclose evidentiary matters supporting its
case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the Combination or Series under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following
questions
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the combination? What are the
particular overt acts which constitute the series? Who committed those
acts? [Emphasis ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50
million by means of a combination or series of overt acts. 97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient
to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million;
the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth whether through a combination or series of
overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 is an important element that must be
alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of combination, it refers to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids
on the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d),
subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a series there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)].98redarclaw
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase combination or series of overt or criminal acts.
Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a
person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single
criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from the congressional
deliberations.99redarclaw
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder,
the various overt acts that constitute the combination and series the Information alleged, are
material facts that should not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so
that the accused would know what he is specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so
that he could properly defend himself against the charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy
must not be generally stated; they should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his
co-accused) to be able to prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged
overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been repeatedly done (although this
may constitute a series if averred with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted
in the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as
in this case. The Information should reflect with particularity the predicate acts that underlie the
crime of plunder, based on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution
made little or no effort to particularize the transactions that would constitute the
required series or combination of overt acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner
Enrile and his co-accused allegedly operated, thus describing its general view of the
series or combination of overt criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or commissions amounting
to at least P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enriles preparation for trial is
obviously hampered. This defect is not cured by mere reference to the prosecutions attachment,
as Enrile already stated in his Reply that the desired details could not be found in the
bundle of documents marked by the prosecution, which documents are not integral
parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of informing
Enrile what these overt acts were by simply pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the combination or series of
transactions constituting plunder, it stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their
ball park figures, should be stated; these transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount,
and cannot simply collectively be described as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without
hampering Enriles right to respond after receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific sum based on
a number of different acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown
reinforces the required specificity in describing the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the chance to object to
unalleged details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is
given the opportunity to play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million
requirement of law.
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and
commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or
otherwise, to disprove the allegations against him. We point out that the period covered by the
indictment extends from 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, of which, we again stress that different
overt acts constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved six years will pose difficulties to Enrile in the
preparation of his defense and will render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left
guessing and speculating which one/s from among the numerous transactions involving his
discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are covered by the indictment.
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly
funded coupled with the name of Napoles NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to
sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular transactions referred to. 100redarclaw
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his co-accused,
the project identification was what started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after
a project has been identified could Enrile have endorsed Napoles NGO to the appropriate
government agency that, in turn, would implement the supposed project using Enriles PDAF.
Note that without the project identification, no justification existed to release Enriles PDAF to
Napoles allegedly bogus NGO.
In these lights, the identified project and Napoles NGO are material facts that should be
clearly and definitely stated in the Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense
evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. The omission of these details will necessarily
leave Enrile guessing on what transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have
funded other projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not
referred to or covered by the Informations ultimate facts.
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles NGOs are also material facts that
must be specified, since they served a necessary role in the crime charged the alleged
conduits between Enrile and Napoles NGOs. They were indispensable participants in the
elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions, need not
anymore be named in the Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The
identification of the particular agency vis--vis Napoles NGO and the identified project, will
already inform Enrile of the transaction referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos,
Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill
of particulars essentially alleging that the complaint was couched in general terms and did not
have the particulars that would inform him of the alleged factual and legal bases. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion on the ground that the particulars sought are evidentiary in
nature. Tantuico moved to reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again denied his
motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayans ruling and directed the prosecution to prepare and
file a bill of particulars. Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as:
names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of
property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals
and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. The Court
explained that those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in
the complaint so that the defendant may be fairly informed of the claims made against him and
be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters are not easy to
distinguish. While Tantuico was a civil case and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Courts
ruling nonetheless serves as a useful guide in the determination of what matters are
indispensable and what matters may be omitted in the Information, in relation with the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that
are indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he stands accused.
Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the allegations are
incomplete or are unclear to him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the
language of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.102redarclaw
The term overall unlawful scheme indicates a general plan of action or method that the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve their
common criminal goal. In the alternative, if no overall scheme can be found or where the
schemes or methods used by the multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form
part of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal goal.103redarclaw
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set of acts has
been repeatedly done (thereby showing a pattern of overt criminal acts), as has been done in
the present case, we point out that this section does not dispense with the requirement of
stating the essential or material facts of each component or predicate act of plunder; it merely
prescribes a rule of procedure for the prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to mean that [w]hat the
prosecution needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series that would constitute a pattern involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There was no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth. 105redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing public funds on twenty
different (20) occasions, the prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if
a number of these acts of malversation can be proven with moral certainty, provided only that
the series or combination of transaction would amount to at least P50,000,000.00.
Nonetheless, each of the twenty transactions should be averred with particularity, more
so if the circumstances surrounding each transaction are not the same. This is the only
way that the accused can properly prepare for his defense during trial.
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the details of the allegation
under paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several
occasions, of their official position, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines) in the following manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Was this because he received any money from the government? From whom and for
what reason did he receive any money or property from the government through which he
unjustly enriched himself? State the details from whom each amount was received,
the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enriles desired details specifically, the particular overt act/s alleged to constitute
the combination and series charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the
kickbacks and commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was
arrived at; a brief description of the identified projects where kickbacks and commissions were
received; the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects; the name of Napoles non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the
alleged recipients and/or target implementors of Enriles PDAF projects; and the government
agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles NGOs renders it unnecessary to
require the prosecution to submit further particulars on the allegations contained
under paragraph (b) of the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the combination or series required by
the crime of plunder, coupled with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated
above, already answer the question of how Enrile took undue advantage of his position,
authority, relationships, connections and influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely for public purposes. Since
the Information stated that Enrile, as Philippine Senator, committed the offense in relation to
his office, by repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions from Napoles and/or her
representatives through projects funded by his (Enriles) PDAF, then it already alleged how
undue advantage had been taken and how the Filipino people and the Republic had been
prejudiced. These points are fairly deducible from the allegations in the Information as
supplemented by the required particulars.
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayans denial of the
petitioners motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be
itemized or specified are all evidentiary without any explanation supporting this
conclusion constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable
the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have
diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary
determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile
stated in his Reply that the desired details could not be found in the bundle of documents
marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the
presence of these desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from
these voluminous documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is
precisely made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an
intelligent defense.
Justice Carpios reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsmans resolution (which found
probable cause to indict the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of plunder, but
also for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his
argument that Enrile was already aware of the details he seeks in his motion for a bill of
particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive position that the Information for plunder
filed against Enrile was ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper plea
and to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill
of particulars in criminal cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it
serve the purpose of a bill of particulars.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the
scope of the proof;106it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the
matters alleged in the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that
the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to
evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less
general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written account of the
inquisitorial process when the fiscal determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a
person for a particular crime. The record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does
not even form part of the records of the case.107 These features of the record of investigation are
significantly different from the bill of particulars that serves as basis, together with the
Information, in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused pleaded to
during arraignment.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes
that span a period of time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an effective
flexibility of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the
Information, but is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently
discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards
against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the nature of an action
from an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense to an initiatory
pleading alleging a cause of action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases
is designed to achieve the same purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In
fact, certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and
criminal, and is more especially needed in the latter where conviction is followed by penal
consequences.108redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not mean that it is unnecessary
to allege such facts in connection with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the
accused on full notice of what he is called upon to defend, and establish such a record as will
effectually bar a subsequent prosecution for that identical offense. 109redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for
this reason, more process is due, not less. When a persons life interest protected by the
life, liberty, and property language recognized in the due process clause is at stake in the
proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpios argument that Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not
previously find vague the Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in 2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt act that constituted the
series or combination and corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been
averred with sufficient particularity so that there was no doubt what particular transaction
was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following matters had been
averred with sufficient definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder;
the breakdown of how the alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived
at; the participants involved in each transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth
amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the indictment of President
Estrada via a motion for bill of particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present Information
for plunder filed against Enrile is not vague and ambiguous.
That Enriles cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to issuance of
a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of informationand in his motion for bill of particulars were
identical. He argues, however, that the mere reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground
for the denial of his motion for bill of particulars, since the context in which those questions
were raised was entirely different.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved
the right of an accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in
Enriles supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the
prism of their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he
can be convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter,
he already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and
lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially
alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the
nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the
motion for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the
allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not
allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does
not preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts
or omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the
function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime
an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to
properly plead and prepare for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the details sought
by Enrile in his motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for
his arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayans action in one would bar Enrile from essentially
invoking the same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.112 Simply put, the judge determines whether the
necessity exists to place the accused under immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of
justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a
bill of particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or
matters that had not been averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of
his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or omissions in relation
with the crime charged, to limit the matters and the evidence that the prosecution may
otherwise be allowed to use against him under a more or less general averment, and to meet
the charges head on and timely object to evidence whose inadmissibility may otherwise be
deemed waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest against an accused, is separate and distinct from the issue of whether the
allegations in the Information have been worded with sufficient definiteness to enable the
accused to properly plead and prepare his defense. While the grounds cited for each may
seemingly be the same, they are submitted for different purposes and should be appreciated
from different perspectives, so that the insufficiency of these grounds for one does not
necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other. Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable
cause should not bar Enrile from seeking a more detailed averment of the allegations in the
Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely abused its discretion: it
used wrong and completely inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET ASIDE the
Sandiganbayans resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied Enriles motion for bill of
particulars and his motion for reconsideration of this denial.
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles NGOs. The
particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need
not be named as a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary