3L\epublic of tbe

~bilippines

~upreme ~ourt

;JManila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188931

JUANITO M. GOPIAO,
Petitioner,

Present:

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERALTA,
VILLARAMA, JR., ** and
LEONEN, JJ.

versus -

METROPOLITAN
TRUST CO.,

BANK

.&

Promulgated:

x----------------~-~~:-~~-~~~~~-------------------~~:.Z~~-------x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution2 dated March 10, 2009 and May 29, 2009, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106705, which affirmed the
Orders 3 dated September 18, 2008 and November 27, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga in LRC Case No. 666.
Designated Acting Member, per Raffle dated February 17, 2010, in lieu of Associate Justice Jose
Catral Mendoza who penned the Court of Appeals Decision.

Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014, in view of the
vacancy in the Third Division.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose l ") . 1 r-.-Jendoza (now a member of the Supreme Court), with
Associate Justices Portia Alino-Hormachuelos ~: . .. 1mon M. Bato, Jr. concurring; Annex ' 1A" to Petition,
rollo, pp. 31-38.
2
Id. at 65.
Penned by Judge Carmelita S. Gutierrez-Fruelda; Annexes "F" and "H" to petition, id. at 52-53
"'d 59-61, '"P"dvely.

ti

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G.R. No. 188931

The antecedents are as follows:

This case stemmed from LRC Case No. 666, a Petition for the
Issuance of Writ of Possession of real properties, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 489198-R, 489199-R, and 489200-R of the
Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, filed by respondent
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.4 In said case, the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga issued, on November 5, 2007, a writ of possession in favor of
respondent Bank when it purchased the subject properties at a public auction
and registered the same in its name on October 1, 1998. Consequently, on
January 4, 2008, a Notice to Vacate was served on Green Asia Construction
and Development Corporation, represented by the spouses Renato and Delia
Legaspi (the Spouses Legaspi).5
Upon learning of the notice to vacate, petitioner filed an Affidavit of
Third Party Claim6 on January 8, 2008 and a Very Urgent Motion for
Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the Enforcement/Implementation of
the Writ of Possession January 9, 2008.7 In said actions, petitioner alleged to
be in actual occupation of the subject properties and claimed ownership
thereof by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated May 20, 1995 executed by the
Spouses Legaspi in his favor.
On September 18, 2008, the trial court denied petitioners claims in its
Order,8 the pertinent portions of which read:
Juanito M. Gopiaos motion for intervention is too late in the day
to entertain. His resurfacing now puts his action in doubt. It has been
twenty-three (23) long years ago since the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed and yet he has not registered the properties in his name. His
motion tries to resurrect a dead horse. This is a ruse to disallow the taking
over the properties by Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. This alone
militates against this motion of intervention. Juanito M. Gopiaos legal
interest in these properties is, thus, beclouded.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or
Stop the Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of Possession is
DENIED for lack of merit.9

When the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the

above-quoted decision, petitioner elevated his claim to the CA via petition
for certiorari alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
4
5
6
7
8
9

Supra note 1.
Rollo, p. 93.
Id. at. 41.
Id. at 43.
Supra note 3.
Id. at 53. (Emphasis in the original)

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G.R. No. 188931

amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. On March 10, 2009,

however, the CA dismissed said petition in the following wise:
In this case, the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop
the Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of Possession. To
substantiate his claim of ownership over the subject properties, petitioner
offered in evidence an un-notarized and unregistered deed of sale. As
pointed out by the private respondent bank in its Comment, petitioner even
failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the said deed of
absolute sale.
On the other hand, the respondent bank was a mortgagee in good
faith. It has shown that prior to the approval of the loan application of the
borrowers, it checked the records of the properties offered as collaterals at
the Registry of Deeds and verified that the titles were clean. Moreover, it
inspected the premises and found no occupants. Thus, it approved the loan
secured by the mortgage over the subject properties which they caused to
be registered. When the borrowers defaulted, it foreclosed the mortgage,
purchased the property at the public auction and registered the Certificate
of Sale on October 1, 1998. The real properties are now covered by TCT
No. 489198-R, TCT No. 489199-R and TCT No. 489200-R registered in
its name. Thus, a writ of possession was issued in its favor.10

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise subsequently

denied in a CA Resolution11 dated May 29, 2009. Hence, this petition filed
by petitioners raising the following errors:
I.
THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RTC COMMITTED NO
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS
INTERVENTION EVEN IF THE RTC VIOLATED EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
II.
THE CA ERRED IN RULING ON A NON-ISSUE: THE ALLEGED
GOOD FAITH OF RESPONDENT AS A MORTGAGEE.
III.
THE CA ERRED IN RULING ON THE EXISTENCE OF DOUBLE
SALE INSTEAD OF THE PREFERRED RIGHT OF PETITIONER.

Petitioner posits that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
failed to recognize his right as a third party adverse possessor. He explains
that while the issuance of a writ of possession after a foreclosure sale is
ministerial, it ceases to be a ministerial duty of the court if there is a third
party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.12 He claims
10
11
12

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 14.

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G.R. No. 188931

that since he has been in possession of the subject properties by virtue of a

Deed of Sale executed by the Spouses Legaspi in his favor, the RTC
exceeded its powers in denying its intervention. In support of his claim,
petitioner cited rulings of this Court wherein we prevented the enforcement
of writs of possession against adverse third-party possessors.
Petitioner further maintains that the CA erred in ruling that there
exists a double sale in this case and, thus, the good faith of respondent Bank
is material.13
The petition is bereft of merit.
We agree with the CA when it found that the RTC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioners Affidavit of Third-Party Claim
and Very Urgent Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of Possession.
A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a
judgment to recover the possession of land.14 It commands the sheriff to
enter the land and give its possession to the party entitled under the
judgment. Under Sections 6 and 7 of Act 3135,15 as amended by Act 4118,16
a writ of possession may be issued in favor of a purchaser in a foreclosure
sale of a real estate mortgage either (1) within the one-year redemption
period, upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after the lapse of the redemption
period, without need of a bond.17
It is a well-established rule that the issuance of a writ of possession to
a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial function of the court, which
cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale.18
Once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyers name
upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year
13

Rollo, p. 20-27.
LZK Holdings and Development Corp. v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 167998, April 27,
2007, 522 SCRA 731.
15
Entitled An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to
Real-Estate Mortgages (approved March 6, 1924).
16
Entitled An Act to Amend Act Numbered Thirty-One Hundred and Thirty-Five, Entitled An Act
to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages.
(Approved December 7, 1933).
17
Spouses Tolosa v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 183058, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA
138, 145.
18
Nagtalon v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 172504, July 31, 2013; National Housing
Authority v. Basa, Jr., G.R. No. 149121, April 20, 2010, 618 SCRA 461, 485-486; The Parents-Teachers
Association (PTA) of St. Mathew Christian Academy, et al. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No.
176518, March 2, 2010, 614 SCRA 41, 45.
14

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G.R. No. 188931

redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right

belonging to the buyer. Its right to possession has then ripened into the right
of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a
ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the courts
discretion.19
Moreover, a petition for a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary
in nature. As one brought for the benefit of one party only and without
notice by the court to any person adverse of interest, it is a judicial
proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom
the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. Since the judge to whom the
application for writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of
the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, it has been ruled that the
ministerial duty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the
filing of a complaint questioning the mortgage.20 Corollarily, any question
regarding the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and the resulting
cancellation of the writ may, likewise, be determined in a subsequent
proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135.21
The foregoing rule, however, admits of a few exceptions, one of
which is when a third party in possession of the property claims a right
adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor, as this Court has time and again
upheld in numerous cases, consistent with Section 3322 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. As such, petitioner claims that since the following rulings
squarely apply to the instant case, the writ of possession should not be
enforced against him.
Petitioner first cites our ruling in Heirs of the Late Domingo N.
Nicolas v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank)23 wherein we
applied the exception rather than the general rule. In said case, when the
surviving spouse of decedent Domingo mortgaged certain conjugal lots
wherein the family home was situated to Metrobank, which had successfully
purchased the same in a public auction, we ruled that the subsequent writ of
possession may only be enforced against the share of the surviving spouse
and not against the share of the other heirs of decedent Domingo. This is
19
20
21
22

Id.
Spouses Tolosa v. United Coconut Planters Bank, supra note16, at 146-147.
Supra note 14.
Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed

or given.
xxxx
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted
to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of
the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same
officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Emphasis
supplied)
23
558 Phil. 649, 652 (2007).

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G.R. No. 188931

because the other heirs are strangers or third parties therein whose rights
cannot be determined as they were not impleaded by in the foreclosure
proceeding. Thus, we held that they should not be deprived of their legitime
by the enforcement of the writ of possession.
Petitioner next cites our ruling in Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company
(Phils.), Inc.24 wherein we held that the trial court was without authority to
grant the ex-parte writ of possession in favor of petitioner Dayot since
respondent Shell had been indisputably in possession of the subject lots
since 1975 and that it had in its premises bulk plant and fuel storage
facilities for the purpose of conducting its business. It was proven therein
that petitioner Dayot even had knowledge of respondent Shell's prior
possession of the disputed properties. Yet, instead of pursuing an
independent civil action where respondent Shell will be given a chance to
substantiate its claim of ownership, petitioner insisted on obtaining a writ of
possession pursuant to its alleged right as purchaser of the properties which
had been extrajudicially foreclosed. Such was a procedural shortcut this
Court could not sanction.
Finally, petitioner refers to our ruling in Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals25 wherein we opined that it was not a ministerial duty of
the trial court under Act No. 3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster
of private respondents from the subject property since they were the actual
occupants thereof. There was no question on the actual possession of the
private respondents who were third parties adversely holding the subject
property. In fact, petitioner Banks representative actually testified to the
knowledge thereof. According to petitioner Bank, they even invited private
respondents to a conference to discuss the ownership of the foreclosed
property. However, instead of bringing an action to court for the ejectment
of private respondents, it chose to simply file an ex-parte petition for a writ
of possession pursuant to its alleged right as purchaser in the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. For this reason, we held that the ex-parte writ could only be
rightfully recognized against the judgment debtors but not against private
respondents who assert a right adverse to the judgment debtors.
Relying on the foregoing rulings, petitioner contends that since he is
likewise a third party in possession of the subject properties claiming a right
adverse to that of the mortgagor-spouses Legaspi, the writ of possession
issued by the lower court should not be implemented against him.
Petitioner is mistaken. The present case cannot be said to be
identically analogous to any of the exceptions discussed above. While the
facts of the foregoing rulings are similar to that of the instant case, there
24
25

552 Phil. 602 (2007).

424 Phil. 757 (2002).

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G.R. No. 188931

remains one crucial difference: the certainty of possession. In all three cases
cited by the petitioner, the fact that the subject property was actually in the
possession of the adverse third party is undisputed. In fact, it was proven that
the mortgagee-banks therein even had actual knowledge of the third parties
adverse possession. But in spite of this, the mortgagee-banks insisted on
obtaining writs of possession instead of pursuing independent actions to
assert their claims.
In contrast, petitioners possession of the subject properties in this
case is questionable. As correctly observed by the courts below, petitioner
failed to substantiate his possession with sufficient evidence. On its face,
the Deed of Absolute Sale26 relied upon by petitioner is neither complete nor
in due form. Certain essential details are missing therein, such as the tax
account numbers of the interested parties and the names of the witnesses.27
More importantly, the same was not notarized. As pointed out by the CA,
petitioner even failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the
document.28 Apart from the unnotarized and unrecorded Deed of Absolute
Sale, petitioner did not present other convincing evidence to bolster his
claim of ownership and/or possession.
Equally telling is that the titles covering the subject properties depict
no trace of petitioners claim. The findings of the trial court reveal that the
unnotarized Deed of Sale is nowhere to be found on the dorsal side of the
titles.29 There is likewise no notice or adverse claim annotated or inscribed at
the back of the same.30 Upon verification at the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Pampanga, Municipal Assessor and Treasurers
Office, respondent bank found out that the subject titles and latest tax
declarations covering the disputed properties were still registered under the
names of the Spouses Legaspi without any annotation on the same as to the
existence of a sale between said spouses and petitioner.31
If petitioner had really purchased the subject properties from the
Spouses Legaspi back in 1995, why is it that he has not, up until now, taken
any steps in obtaining the titles thereto? If petitioner really believed himself
to be the true owner of the disputed properties, he should have at least
registered the document that evidences his ownership thereof and paid real
estate taxes thereon under his name. Petitioner, however, failed to provide
evidence of any attempt in registering his ownership much less any reason
for his failure to do so.

26
27
28
29
30
31

See Annex E of Petition, rollo, pp. 49-51.

Id.
Supra note 1.
Supra note 3.
Id.
Id.

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G.R. No. 188931

To cast more doubt on petitioners claim of possession, the RTC and

CA are in agreement as to the fact that respondent Bank found no occupants
in the subject properties when it inspected the same before approving the
loan applied for by the Spouses Legaspi.32
All told, we observe that there is nothing that would indicate that the
lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners intervention. Had petitioner properly
substantiated his claim of possession with sufficient evidence, the lower
court could have applied the exception instead of the general rule, permitted
his intervention, and prevented the implementation of the subject writ of
possession. Yet, as previously mentioned, not only did petitioner present an
un-notarized and unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale but there exists no
trace of petitioners claim of ownership on the titles of the subject properties.
Verily, the exception cannot be made to apply in the instant case as
petitioner failed to establish his actual possession of the same. Measured
against established parameters, the rejection by the lower court of
petitioners intervention was not without basis and, hence, could not have
been arrived at capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically.
Going now to the contention of the petitioner that the CA erred in
ruling that there exists a double sale in this case and thus, the good faith of
respondent Bank is material. According to the petitioner, the rule on double
sales under Article 154433 of the Civil Code is inapplicable herein since
there is no double sale to speak of; the first transaction, a sale and the
second, a mortgage.34 As such, the CA erred in giving credence to the good
faith of respondent Bank, which is really a non-issue herein.
We disagree. On the contrary, jurisprudence is replete with rulings
that apply the double sales rule to cases where one of the two sales was
conducted in a public auction.35

32

Rollo, pp. 36 and 60.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art.1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
34
Rollo, pp. 22 and 129.
35
Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Alfredo and Annabelle
Lumo, 443 Phil. 56 (2003); Lu v. Spouses Manipon, 431 Phil. 569 (2002); Campillo v. Court of Appeals
and Zenaida Diaz Vda. De Santos, 214 Phil. 452 (1984).
33

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G.R. No. 188931

In fact, in Express credit Financing Corporation v. Spouses Velasco,36

the facts of which are strikingly similar to the case at hand, we applied the
rule on double sales in determining the party who has preferential right over
the disputed property in question. In said case, the subject property was sold
first, to respondent spouses by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and,
second, to petitioner corporation in a foreclosure sale of a real estate
mortgage. We ruled, however, in favor of respondent spouses due to the bad
faith of petitioner corporation as records reveal that they were well aware of
the earlier sale to respondent spouses.
In contrast, the CA aptly noted the good faith of respondent Bank in
this case. In its decision, it ruled that respondent Bank has sufficiently
shown that prior to the approval of the loan application of the Spouses
Legaspi, it checked the records of the properties offered as collaterals at the
Register of Deeds and verified that the titles were clean.37 Moreover, it
inspected the premises and found no occupants.38 Thus, respondent Bank
cannot be said to have acquired the subject properties in bad faith as to
negate its right of possession thereof.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the CAs discussion on double sale
and good faith was based on an assumption, for the sake of argument, that
the Spouses Legaspi actually sold the subject properties to both petitioner
and respondent Bank. The same is on the supposition that the first sale to the
petitioner had indeed taken place. However, as mentioned above, there is
doubt as to whether petitioner had truly purchased the properties subject of
this case. What can be derived from the CAs discussion is that even if
petitioner is able to establish his possession, he would still have to overcome
the rule on double sale wherein the good faith of respondent Bank is
material.
To be sure, considering the ex-parte nature of the proceedings
involved in the issuance of the writ of possession, and should petitioner still
choose to further vindicate his claim of ownership over the subject
properties despite the findings of the courts below, an independent civil
action is an available remedy.39
In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC and the CA. The RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying petitioners Affidavit of Third-Party Claim and Very
Urgent Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of Possession, since petitioners
36
37
38
39

510 Phil. 342 (2005).

Supra note 1.
Id.
China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Ordinario, 447 Phil. 557 (2003).

G.R. No. 188931

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Decision

alleged possession of the subject real properties has not been adequately
proved. Thus, the general rule, and not the exception, applies to the instant
petition. Likewise, the CA did not err in invoking the rule on double sale and
appreciating the good faith of respondent Bank, the same being material
herein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

DENIED. The Orders dated September 18, 2008 and November 27, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga in LRC Case No. 666,
and the Decision and Resolution, dated March 10, 2009 and May 29, 2009,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106705, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITER

J. VELASCO, JR.

T~.~oifE ~o ~s. VILL~J~.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MARVIC MA IO VICTOR F. LEONE

Associate Justice

Decision

G.R. No. 188931

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ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

J. VELASCO, JR.
As ciate Justice
Chairg rson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation. before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice