




International Migration Outlook 2023

47TH EDITION



International Migration Outlook 2023

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Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union

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Foreword

This publication constitutes the 47th report of the OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration. The report is divided into six chapters plus a statistical annex. Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of recent trends in international migration flows. It also analyses recent changes on the labour market inclusion of immigrants in OECD countries. Chapter 2 monitors recent changes in migration policies, while Chapter 3 looks at the recent changes in policies that support the integration of immigrants and their children.

Chapter 4 explores fertility patterns among migrant populations in OECD countries and the limits of the measures commonly used to describe them. It analyses the factors shaping fertility gaps between native- and foreign-born women, as well as those driving convergence over time. Chapter 5 looks at the relationship between family formation and labour market outcomes among migrant women. It analyses the short- and longer-term effects on employment outcomes and reviews some of the policies to support the employment of migrant mothers and the role of institutional arrangements.

Chapter 6 presents succinct country-specific notes and statistics on developments in international migration movements and policies in OECD and selected non-OECD countries in recent years. Lastly, the statistical annex includes a broad selection of recent and historical statistics on immigrant flows, asylum requests, foreign and foreign-born populations, and naturalisations.

This year's edition of the *OECD International Migration Outlook* is the collective work of the staff of the International Migration Division in the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Chapters 4 and 5 were drafted by Alicia Adsera (Princeton University) and Marcela Valdivia (OECD). The preparation of these chapters has benefited from the financial support of the German Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, and the Swedish Ministry of Employment. Jean-Christophe Dumont edited the report. Statistical work was carried out by Philippe Hervé and Veronika Strain-Fajth and coordinated by Cécile Thoreau. Editorial assistance was provided by Dominika Andrzejczak and Charlotte Baer as well as Lucy Hulett.

Editorial

We need to pay more attention to the gender dimension of migration

On top of what was already the largest inflow of new permanent immigrants on record, Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine has led to the largest refugee surge to the OECD area since the end of World War II. One of the most striking features of this mass displacement is the disproportionate share of women who represent around 70% of all adult refugees. This stands in stark contrast to inflows of asylum seekers recorded in past crises, which predominantly consisted of men. The gendered nature of displacement from Ukraine has given new impetus for taking a gender lens when reviewing migration and integration policies, largely absent in most discussions on these topics.

Beyond the current Ukrainian crisis, the lack of a gender focus is surprising, as women have for a long time accounted for the majority of immigrants across the OECD. While immigrant men often arrive through labour market or humanitarian channels, women tend to arrive through other channels – with family migration being by far the predominant category. This has far-reaching consequences, as family migrants are often the blind spot in migration and integration policies. They often do not benefit from structured integration programmes, such as those available for humanitarian migrants, nor from a job offer as do labour migrants. In addition, whenever family migrants are taken care of by their sponsor and do not rely on benefits, they are often not the target of integration measures.

In this context, it is not surprising that immigrant women tend to face a “double disadvantage” – as women and as migrants – when migrating to OECD countries. Migrant and gender-specific challenges interact and often reinforce each other. As a result, in most OECD countries, the gender gap in migrant employment is twice as large as the gender gap among the native-born.

As countries are increasingly looking into the potential contribution of working-age migrants to help addressing widespread labour shortages, it is more important than ever to consider the gender dimension of migration and integration policies. The two special chapters in this year's *International Migration Outlook* take a close look at the underlying issues. As Chapter 5 shows, gender differences among immigrants in employment are largely driven by the often very low employment of immigrant mothers. The latter have an employment rate that is a staggering 20 percentage points below that of their native-born peers.

Migration and integration policies have too often been gender-blind, if not implicitly focussing on men. Individual and cultural preferences of immigrant women are often considered as main obstacles to their labour market integration, but the evidence in this year's *Outlook* suggests that they are frequently trapped in involuntary inactivity. What is more, these presumed preferences have often shaped stereotypes and misconceptions, including on the policy side.

Paying more attention to the needs of immigrant women, especially mothers, has several implications for policy. First, gender-specific challenges like childcare need to be considered, including in the provision of integration measures. Compared to native-born mothers, the employment of immigrant mothers is more sensitive to the number and age of children, suggesting that they face higher childcare constraints.


Second, specific vulnerabilities of migrant women need to be identified and addressed. This is an extensive agenda, ranging from fighting human trafficking of women and combatting domestic violence to more general issues like the transmission of values of gender equality.

Third, it implies that admission of new labour migrants needs to take a whole-of-family perspective. Immigration is often a family decision, and previous OECD work has shown that retention of labour migrants hinges on the employment of their spouses. In the context of likely increases in labour migration, a key driver of the record inflows currently observed, OECD countries are thus bound to consider the needs of migrant spouses in their attraction and retention strategies.

Finally, it is important to carefully consider the timing of integration policies. As Chapter 4 in this year's *International Migration Outlook* shows, fertility rates tend to peak just after arrival. Proposing integration measures at this stage may therefore not be the best timing. Yet, all too often, integration policy focuses on new arrivals.

Against this backdrop, a growing number of countries are proposing “second chance” offers for immigrant women who have been resident in their OECD host countries for many years but never got a real foothold into the labour market. These are promising tools, but more needs to be done, for example by removing obstacles hampering equal access to employment-supportive measures, such as childcare services and parental leave schemes. Migrant women are sensitive to policy incentives, just as their native-born peers.

The benefits of addressing gender issues in migrant integration are large. Just reducing the immigrant gender gap in employment to that of the native-born in OECD countries would bring an additional 5.8 million immigrant women into employment. What is more, migrant mothers are key drivers in the education of their children and play an important role in the transmission of values. The labour force participation of migrant mothers has also positive implications for the outcomes of their children. With growing numbers of immigrants and their children in our societies, it is time to take action to reap these benefits.



Stefano Scarpetta,

Director for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs,

OECD

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Executive summary

Migration flows are at a record high

Migration to OECD countries is at unprecedented levels. With more than 6 million new permanent immigrants (not including Ukrainian refugees), permanent-type migration to OECD countries reached a record level in 2022. This was driven by increases in humanitarian and managed labour migration, along with accompanying family members. More than one in three OECD countries registered their highest levels in at least 15 years, with several countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, reporting the highest figures on record. Temporary labour migration, especially of the seasonal kind, also registered a strong increase. The number of admissions of international students neared 2 million for the first time.

On top of these figures come the inflows of refugees from Ukraine. As of June 2023, there were around 4.7 million displaced Ukrainians in OECD countries. Germany, Poland and the United States host the highest number of refugees from Ukraine in absolute terms, while Estonia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania have received the highest number as a share of the population.

Asylum applications in the OECD were also at a record high in 2022. Over 2 million new applications were lodged in OECD countries in 2022, the highest number recorded so far, well above the 2015/16 previous record of 1.7 million and twice the 2021 level. The increase was largely driven by soaring applications in the United States, at 730 000 compared with less than 190 000 in 2021.

In the meantime, acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries also reached a new high in 2022, at 2.8 million, according to preliminary data.

Labour market outcomes of immigrants are at the highest levels since the beginning of the millennium

Between 2021 and 2022, the employment rate of migrants improved in all OECD countries except Poland – which had high inflows of refugees from Ukraine – and reached the highest level on record, OECD-wide. There was a particularly strong improvement in the labour market outcomes of migrant women, diminishing the gender gap in several countries.

In light of growing labour needs, labour migration is high on the policy agenda, while trends in integration were marked by the specific needs of refugees from Ukraine

The recorded increases in both new labour migration and the employment rate of resident migrants are linked to the fact that many countries in the OECD are experiencing labour shortages. This has pushed labour migration high on the policy agenda. Several countries, including Australia and Germany, are planning significant changes in their labour migration frameworks, while others have increased their targets for labour migration.

In reaction to record numbers of asylum seekers, increasing exits from origin countries and movements through transit countries, several OECD countries have introduced stricter asylum and border policies and reduced quotas for resettlement. Temporary approaches to protection – without a direct pathway for permanent or long-term residency – are increasingly being applied to address protection needs. At the same time, there is also a trend towards more diversification in the international protection and humanitarian admission responses, including through new complementary pathways such as private sponsorship programmes, and labour and education pathways for refugees.

Developments in integration policies have been marked by the challenges arising from the massive inflow of refugees from Ukraine, with a disproportionate share of highly educated women with small children. This exacerbated some prior trends, notably broader consideration of the specific needs of women and mothers in integration policy, as well as improvements in the procedures for the recognition of foreign qualifications.

Immigrant mothers face specific challenges

The childbearing behaviour of migrants plays a rather limited role in population dynamics. While migrant women tend to have more children than their native-born peers, their total fertility rate is still below the replacement rate (2.1 children per woman) in most OECD countries. Since female migration is often associated with family formation or reunification, the likelihood of childbearing is frequently elevated immediately after arrival. As the total fertility rate typically measures what happens at a destination and in a given year, it tends to overestimate fertility differentials between native- and foreign-born women, as the latter often go through a phase of low fertility and high fertility before and after migration, respectively. Migrant women also tend to have children at earlier ages, with potential negative consequences for their labour market insertion in their host countries.

On average, differences in the employment rates among women between mothers and non-mothers are twice as high for migrants as for the native-born. Individual and cultural preferences are often cited as main obstacles to their labour market integration, but the evidence suggests that migrant women do not choose inactivity voluntarily. Migrant mothers also report higher levels of underemployment and involuntary part-time employment.

Migrant women who emigrate for family reasons often do not benefit from structured integration programmes, such as those available for humanitarian migrants, nor from a job offer as do labour migrants. Integration measures which focus on new arrivals may also be ill-timed for this group. Against this backdrop, a growing number of OECD countries now allow for parental leave schemes in integration programmes, have extended the time limit for eligibility or have invested in programmes targeting those who have remained inactive for a prolonged period after arrival.


Key findings

- Permanent-type migration to OECD countries increased by 26% in 2022 compared with 2021. Preliminary figures for 2023 suggest a further increase.
- Family migration remained the primary category of entry for new permanent-type migrants, representing 40% of all permanent-type migration, while managed labour migration and free mobility both accounted for 21% each.
- The top origin countries for asylum applicants within the OECD in 2022 were Venezuela (221 000), Cuba (180 000), Afghanistan (170 000) and Nicaragua (165 000).
- In more than half of OECD countries, the employment rate of migrants is at the highest in more than two decades.
- Immigrant mothers face a disproportionate disadvantage, both compared with immigrant women without children and vis-à-vis their native-born peers. On average across the OECD, the gap in employment rates between immigrant and native-born mothers is 20 percentage points.

Infographic 1. Key facts and figures

Migration to OECD countries is at a record high


Permanent migration to the OECD, 2018-22, in millions



With more than 6 million new permanent immigrants (not including Ukrainian refugees), permanent-type migration to OECD countries reached a record level in 2022.

The Ukrainian refugee crisis is the largest displacement in Europe since WWII


Total number of refugees from Ukraine, June 2023, millions



OECD countries have provided refuge to about 5 million people fleeing Ukraine.

Increase in labour migration in response to labour shortages in many countries

Permanent migration to the OECD
By category of entry, in millions



Labour migration comprised 21% of all migration in 2022, a rise of 36% since 2021. Family migration also increased by 15%.

Migrant employment rates are at the highest levels in over two decades


Migrant employment rates are at their highest ever levels in more than half of OECD countries and the gap with the native-born is also narrowing.

Employment rates, 2022

	Foreign-born	Native-born
New Zealand	82.7	78.3
Australia	77.2	77.6
UK	75.8	75.5
Canada	75.2	75.8
US	72.6	69.4
Korea	67.8	69.3
EU 27	66.8	70.3

Migrant fertility has little effect on overall population levels in majority of countries


Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 2020 or latest year available



The fertility rate among migrant women is higher than among native-born women in most OECD countries, but below the replacement rate (2.1) in two-thirds of them.

Immigrant mothers face greater challenges compared to native-born mothers

Employment rates across OECD countries, 2021



Across OECD countries, the gap in employment rates between immigrant and native-born mothers is 20 percentage points.

1 Recent developments in international migration movements and labour market inclusion of immigrants

This chapter provides an overview of recent developments in international migration movements and labour market inclusion of immigrants in OECD countries. The first section analyses the evolution of international migration flows over the last decade, up to 2022. It covers both permanent-type and temporary migration, as well as the category of migration. The chapter then examines international student mobility and recent trends in asylum requests and international protection grants in OECD countries. It then looks at the demographics of migration flows (gender and origin), the evolution of the share of the foreign-born in the population and the acquisition of nationality in OECD countries. The second section of the chapter examines trends in the labour market outcomes of immigrants over the past two decades. Detailed analysis by sociodemographic characteristics and region of origin is provided.

In Brief

Key findings

Migration trends

- Permanent-type migration to OECD countries reached an all-time record in 2022 at 6.1 million new permanent immigrants. This represents a 26% year-on-year increase and a 14% increase compared to 2019. Most of the increase was driven by the increase in humanitarian migration (excluding Ukrainian refugees) and labour migration.
- In many OECD countries, permanent-type migration was higher in 2022 than in any of the previous 15 years. This was the case in Canada and New Zealand, and in many OECD European countries (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
- Family migration remained the main category of permanent migration to OECD countries, accounting for 40% of the total. The growth in family migration was driven by accompanying family of labour migrants.
- Free movement within EU/EFTA and between Australia and New Zealand remained below the 2019 level, just over 1.1 million.
- As of June 2023, there were around 4.7 million displaced Ukrainians in OECD countries. Germany, Poland and the United States host the highest number of refugees in absolute terms, while Estonia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania have received the highest number of refugees as a share of their population.
- Temporary labour migration to OECD countries went slightly over pre-pandemic levels. More than 2.4 million work permits and authorisations were granted in OECD countries (excluding Poland) representing a 77% year-on-year increase. Meanwhile, Poland registered about 2 million requests for different types of work authorisations (including renewals), which also correspond to a record high.
- While arrivals of working holiday makers and intra-company transferees are still below pre-pandemic levels, the number of seasonal workers and other temporary labour migrants in 2022 was larger than in 2019.
- 3.6 million workers were posted within the EU/EFTA in 2021, including 2.1 million under Article 12 (-9% compared to 2020).
- Approximately 1.9 million residence permits were issued for international tertiary-level students across the OECD in 2022. This is 42% more than in 2021, 24% more than in 2019 and the highest number ever registered. In 2020, 4.3 million international students were enrolled in the OECD area.
- The number of new asylum seekers to OECD countries nearly doubled in 2022 compared to the previous year, reaching over 2 million – the highest figure on record. The surge was driven primarily by the United States, which received over 700 000 applications in 2022. Across the OECD, the main origin countries were Venezuela, Cuba, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Syria.
- Humanitarian admissions also grew rapidly over the year, with 625 000 people granted protection in OECD countries in 2022. This is the highest annual level since 2017.

- In 2022, in the OECD, 145 million people lived outside their country of birth, a quarter more than ten years earlier. The foreign-born represented about 10.6% of the total population of OECD countries compared with 8.9% in 2012.
- Having replaced China as the main country of origin of new migrants to OECD countries in 2020, India maintained first place in 2021 and, according to partial data, in 2022.
- Acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries reached a record level in 2022, at 2.8 million, according to preliminary and partial data. More than 100 000 Syrian citizens acquired their host country's nationality in 2021.
- Canada contributed a third of this increase, with a record 375 000 new Canadian citizens in 2022 (+174% compared to 2021 and +50% compared to 2019).

Labour market integration

- Labour market outcomes for immigrants continued to improve strongly in 2022, following a sharp decline in 2019-20 and an increase in 2021. In more than 80% of OECD countries, migrants have either returned to or surpassed their pre-crisis level of employment.
- Between 2021 and 2022, the employment rate of migrants improved in all OECD countries except Poland – which had high inflows of refugees from Ukraine – and reached the highest level on record, OECD-wide.
- On average in 2022, almost 80% of migrants were economically active, with more than 70% being employed and less than 8% being unemployed.
- In more than half of OECD countries, the employment rate of migrants is the highest in more than two decades.
- Overall, there was a more rapid increase in both employment rates and labour participation rates among migrant women than among men, diminishing the gender gap in a number of countries.
- While improvement in labour market outcomes is observed across origin regions, strong disparities persist in this regard.


Recent trends in international migration

Permanent-type migration to OECD countries

The number of new permanent-type immigrants in the OECD, reached an all-time high of 6.1 million in 2022 (Figure 1.1). This is about 26% more than in 2021 and 14% more than in 2019.¹ Note this is excluding Ukrainians under temporary protection which are not included in this section due to the temporary nature of the international protection they receive (see Box 1.1).

All top four destination countries (The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain) registered large year-on-year increases, between 21 and 35%. The increase was smaller in Canada (8%) the fifth destination country (Table 1.1). The United States alone accounted for 1.05 million new permanent-type migrants, and the other four countries for between 440 000 and 650 000 each.

In all top five countries, permanent-type migration was higher in 2022 than in 2019, pre-pandemic. This is notably the case in the United Kingdom, Spain and Canada (between 19 and 38%). In these countries, permanent-type migration was at a higher level than in any of the previous 15 years.

Figure 1.1. Permanent-type migration to the OECD, 2013-22

Note: Sum of standardised and unstandardised figures (refer to Table 1.1, excluding Türkiye, Colombia and Costa Rica), including status changes and migration within free-circulation areas. Data for 2022 are partly estimated based on growth rates published in official national statistics.

Source: OECD International Migration Database (available upon request).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/as7c1t>

This is also the case for several European OECD countries such as Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Luxembourg as well as Mexico. New Zealand experienced the largest year-on-year percentage increase in permanent-type migration, counting a total of 155 000 new permanent-type migrants, almost triple the record of the past 15 years. This increase was due to an exceptional pathway to permanent residence for temporary labour migrants in 2021 – the “2021 residence visa”- which accounted for 50% of permanent-type migration in 2022.²

Only a few countries (Australia, Sweden, Japan, Korea, Norway, Estonia and the Czech Republic) received fewer permanent-type migrants in 2022 than in 2019. Australia represents a special case in this list. Australian figures are for Australian fiscal years (July of the previous calendar year through June) and reflect decisions under the annual planning levels. Border closures meant that effective entries were delayed during the pandemic, while the increase in planning levels from mid-2022 are not yet apparent in this series.

According to unstandardised national data, several other European countries experienced record levels of migration, such as Hungary, Iceland, Latvia and Poland.

Table 1.1. Permanent-type migration to selected OECD countries, 2014-22

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 (estimates)	2022/21 change	2022/19 change
	Thousands									%	
Standardised statistics											
United States	1 017.2	1 051.0	1 186.9	1 103.7	1 089.6	1 031.0	581.5	835.4	1 048.0	+25.5	+1.7
Germany	572.5	684.4	1 051.9	861.0	633.5	620.4	499.5	531.5	641.1	+20.6	+3.3
United Kingdom	357.7	390.2	374.9	353.5	357.2	377.9	233.7	385.8	521.2	+35.1	+37.9
Spain	268.1	269.6	292.1	321.8	339.6	397.8	324.2	370.4	471.8	+27.4	+18.6
Canada	261.5	275.8	296.7	286.5	321.0	341.2	184.5	406.0	437.5	+7.8	+28.2
France	257.9	262.3	259.9	260.8	282.5	292.0	232.0	278.1	301.1	+8.3	+3.1
Italy	244.6	223.1	214.0	220.1	206.6	194.0	126.5	241.2	271.6	+12.6	+40.0
Netherlands	111.8	126.8	138.5	148.0	147.7	163.1	132.8	170.8	207.5	+21.4	+27.2
Australia	234.7	227.9	229.4	220.5	195.2	195.7	165.5	169.4	166.1	-1.9	-15.1
New Zealand	49.9	54.5	55.7	47.2	45.1	38.3	35.7	35.4	154.7	+337.4	+303.7
Switzerland	127.6	124.3	118.2	118.5	120.3	122.3	118.5	123.4	143.9	+16.6	+17.7
Belgium	101.0	103.7	105.5	108.1	109.9	114.0	92.3	112.2	122.3	+9.0	+7.3
Portugal	30.8	33.6	39.2	51.3	78.7	106.7	84.7	93.7	120.8	+28.9	+13.2
Japan	80.8	97.5	109.0	114.2	130.6	149.6	105.4	67.1	105.8	+57.7	-29.3
Sweden	116.6	120.5	154.4	132.3	123.1	99.4	79.7	91.2	94.1	+3.1	-5.3
Austria	79.5	102.4	105.2	98.6	86.9	81.5	62.8	73.6	89.2	+21.2	+9.5
Israel	24.1	27.9	26.0	26.4	28.1	33.2	19.7	25.5	74.3	+191.3	+123.4
Mexico	43.5	34.4	35.9	32.6	37.0	40.5	58.4	67.7	74.1	+9.4	+82.8
Denmark	50.7	62.3	56.1	52.6	52.0	49.6	41.8	55.4	70.3	+26.7	+41.6
Ireland	27.6	36.6	42.4	40.4	45.5	51.4	42.5	38.1	67.3	+76.4	+30.9
Korea	67.3	70.0	77.6	75.3	81.2	78.1	57.3	53.8	61.7	+14.7	-20.9
Czech Republic	23.5	27.8	29.2	40.2	55.4	62.3	55.6	63.9	45.6	-28.6	-26.8
Norway	68.1	61.5	65.1	55.3	46.3	46.6	33.2	38.6	43.5	+12.6	-6.6
Finland	19.9	22.1	27.8	26.1	24.9	27.6	24.0	29.5	40.2	+36.4	+45.9
Estonia	2.2	5.8	6.6	13.5	24.8	35.6	26.3	37.1	32.2	-13.2	-9.6
Luxembourg	20.7	21.7	21.9	23.9	24.5	25.7	21.4	25.5	28.6	+12.3	+11.5
All countries	4 259.8	4 517.7	5 120.2	4 832.5	4 687.4	4 775.4	3 439.6	4 420.4	5 434.4	+22.9	+13.8
EU countries included above	1927.5	2 102.6	2 544.7	2 398.7	2 235.7	2 321.1	1 846.2	2 212.4	2 597.9	+17.7	+12.2
National statistics (unstandardised)											
Türkiye	273.9	364.6	466.9	578.5	242.5	615.1	399.6	-35.0	-30.9
Poland	32.0	86.1	107.0	128.0	137.6	163.5	163.5	224.2	335.3	+49.5	+105.1
Chile	83.5	101.9	135.5	207.2	339.4	254.1	154.6	76.5	198.4	+159.2	-21.9
Hungary	26.0	25.8	23.8	36.5	49.3	55.3	43.8	49.1	55.6	+13.2	+0.5
Colombia	104.5	217.9	225.8	74.8	40.7
Lithuania	4.8	3.7	6.0	10.2	12.3	19.7	22.3	21.1	29.1	+37.5	+47.9
Slovenia	11.3	12.7	13.8	15.5	24.1	27.6	24.8	19.7	21.9	+11.4	-20.5
Costa Rica	..	15.7	6.6	8.6	9.2	7.8
Iceland	4.3	5.0	7.9	11.8	11.5	9.5	7.6	8.5	13.2	+54.8	+38.6
Latvia	4.5	4.5	3.4	5.1	6.5	6.6	4.6	6.5	7.3	+13.3	+11.1
Greece	29.5	34.0	86.1	80.5	87.3	95.4	63.4	28.7	44.4	+54.5	-53.5
Slovak Republic	2.4	3.8	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.5	2.8	2.0	1.8	-13.9	-28.3
Total (except Türkiye, Colombia and Costa Rica)	198.4	277.4	387.1	497.7	670.9	634.1	487.2	436.4	707.0	+62.0	+11.5


Note: Includes only foreign nationals. Data refer to the fiscal year ending in the year of reference for Australia (Jul-Jun) and Ireland (Apr-Mar). For the United States, data refer to fiscal years (Oct-Sep) until 2015 and calendar years from 2016 on. The inflows include status changes, namely persons in the country on a temporary status who obtained the right to stay on a longer-term basis, and migration within free circulation areas. Series for some countries have been significantly revised. EU averages cover countries stated in the table, excluding the United Kingdom. Source: OECD International Migration Database (data available upon request).

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In 2022, OECD countries received on average 10 new permanent-type migrants per thousand inhabitants (Figure 1.2). This ratio is above 15 per thousand only in the three OECD countries with the smallest populations (Estonia (24), Iceland (36) and Luxembourg (44)), as well as in New Zealand (30) and Switzerland (17). The Slovak Republic and Mexico are the OECD countries where the ratio is the lowest, at 0.6 per thousand.


In most OECD countries, permanent-type migration relative to population was higher in 2022 than over the period 2013-19. This is particularly true in Estonia and Iceland, which received increasing inflows in the last years, and New Zealand, due to the exceptional increase in permanent-type migration in 2022.

Figure 1.2. Permanent-type migration to OECD countries as a percentage of the total population, 2022 compared with the 2013-19 average



Note: Light blue columns are unstandardised data. Estimates for 2022.

Source: OECD International Migration Database (data available upon request).

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
Permanent-type migration by main categories

In 2022, family migration remained the primary category of entry for new permanent-type migrants, representing 40% of all permanent-type migration, a relatively stable share over time (Figure 1.3). The share of labour migration has increased over time. While in 2022, labour migration represented 21% of permanent-type migration, it accounted for only 16% in 2019. Conversely, the share of free movement migration (within the EU-EFTA and between Australia and New Zealand) has decreased since 2020. It accounted for 21% of permanent-type migration in 2022, compared with 28% in 2019.

Family migration has been the largest category of entry of permanent-type migrants in the OECD over the last decade, and represented between 1.7 and 2 million new permanent migrants per year before COVID-19. While family migration suffered the largest fall in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it recovered quickly in the following two years. In 2022, OECD countries received almost 2.2 million family migrants, 200 000 more (9%) than in 2021.

The United States remains the primary OECD destination for family migrants. In 2022, 723 000 migrants obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States for family reasons, a 14% increase compared with 2021 but still 8% below 2019, and lower than in any year since 2005. Family migration to the United States accounted for one-third of total family migration to the OECD in 2022, down from 39% pre-pandemic.

Figure 1.3. Permanent-type migration to the OECD area, by category of entry, 2013-22



Note: Includes only receiving countries for which standardised data are available (see first panel of Table 1.1). Data for 2022 are estimates on the basis of preliminary data covering two-thirds of OECD countries.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ec3iua>

Family migration increased significantly relative to 2021 and to 2019, in the United Kingdom and Canada, the second and third destination countries for family migration, respectively. Canada admitted 217 000 permanent residents under the different family categories, +32% compared to 2021 and +18% above the previous record of 2019. The United Kingdom received 242 000 family migrants in 2022, one-fifth more than in 2021, and 72% more than in 2019. Family migration increased also significantly in New Zealand (+229% relative to 2019), Mexico (+78%), Finland (+51%) and Estonia (+29%).

The increase in family migration observed in 2022 was mostly driven by the increase in the number of accompanying family members of labour migrants (Annex Table 1.A.1). While accompanying family members represented 27% of all family migration in 2022, they only accounted for 17% in 2019. This is visible notably in the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand.

Migration movements within free-circulation areas (within the EU/EFTA, and between Australia and New Zealand) were affected by the COVID-19 crisis and the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU but the total remained above 1 million in 2021, rising to 1.1 million people in 2022. Within the EU/EEA, free mobility flows increased by around 13% in 2022, suggesting a pickup in the pace of the post-2020 rebound.

The top destination for flows under free mobility agreements within Europe remained Germany, which received 29% of all internal movements (321 000, +3% compared to 2021). Other key destinations saw substantial growth in intra-EU inflows in 2022, including Switzerland (+20%), Denmark (+19%), Austria (+16%), Sweden (+29%) and Ireland (+38%). Iceland registered a jump of 56% (10 000) over the past year. By contrast, several OECD countries in Central and Eastern Europe saw inflows decrease in 2022, including the Czech Republic (-20% compared to 2021), Hungary (-14%) and Estonia (-15%).

In Oceania, migration flows under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (between Australia and New Zealand) doubled in 2022 led by a surge in arrivals from New Zealand to Australia (+174%). Nevertheless, free-movement migration remained significantly lower than in 2019 (-44%).

Humanitarian migration in OECD permanent-type migration flows includes recognised refugees under the 1951 UNHCR convention or other forms of protection but does not include Ukrainians under the Temporary Protection Directive in the EU or similar schemes in other OECD countries (see Box 1.1).


Box 1.1. The Ukrainian refugee crisis is the largest displacement in Europe since World War II with an increasingly global impact

Amidst the ongoing devastation caused by Russia's large-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, more than 10 million people have become either internally displaced or refugees in the OECD region. As of June 2023, there were around 4.7 million displaced Ukrainians in OECD countries. Germany, Poland and the United States host the highest number of refugees in absolute terms, while Estonia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania have received the highest number of refugees as a share of the population (Figure 1.4). The general mobilisation in Ukraine prevents most men aged 18 to 60 from leaving the country, so most refugees are women (about 70% of all adult arrivals) and children (about 30% of all arrivals) (OECD, 2023^[1]).

Most OECD countries have implemented specific schemes and policies to facilitate the influx of refugees from Ukraine. In the European Union, the Temporary Protection Directive was activated, leading to a significant number of Ukrainian refugees registering for temporary protection across EU member states. Outside of the EU, various countries have developed their own programmes to facilitate the arrival of Ukrainians. For instance, Canada introduced the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET), the United States established the Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) programme, and the United Kingdom implemented three parallel schemes: the Ukraine Family Scheme, the Ukraine Extension Scheme, and the Homes for Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme. Alternative legal grounds for stay are also used alongside these pathways.

The migration patterns from Ukraine have undergone some changes over time. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries were at the forefront of receiving the initial waves of refugees from Ukraine, but new registrations for temporary protection began to slow down there from the second quarter of 2022. In contrast, certain non-neighbouring countries, such as Germany, continued to experience an increase in new registrations during this period (Figure 1.5). Since the third quarter of 2022, there has been an overall slowdown in new entries from Ukraine to the EU, and the anticipated second wave of migration during the winter months did not materialise. Instead, there has been a decrease of approximately 12% in the overall stock of Ukrainian refugees in EU countries compared to the peak levels. This decline is attributed to both return movements to Ukraine and onward migration, particularly to non-EU OECD countries, where the total number of Ukrainian refugees stands at approximately 1 million and continues to rise.

Figure 1.4. Number of refugees from Ukraine in OECD countries, absolute numbers and per thousand of total population, June 2023




Note: These figures reflect refugees from Ukraine recorded in country as of June 2023, including those who have been granted refugee status, temporary protection or similar statuses, or other forms of stay (from 24 February 2022). The figure for Canada includes only those who have arrived under the CUAET programme.

Source: UNHCR, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>; Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_ASYTPSM/default/table?lang=en; Home Office (United Kingdom), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukraine-family-scheme-application-data/ukraine-family-scheme-and-ukraine-sponsorship-scheme-homes-for-ukraine-visa-data-2>; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures/key-figures.html>; OECD Secretariat.

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Figure 1.5. Decisions granting temporary protection in the EU and selected member states



Source: Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_ASYTPFQ/default/table?lang=en; OECD (2023_[1]), "What are the integration challenges of Ukrainian refugee women?", <https://doi.org/10.1787/bb17dc64-en>.

StatLink <https://stat.link/7h85tc>

Independently of the large inflow of Ukrainians fleeing the war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine, humanitarian migration to the OECD increased by 40% in 2022 to 580 000. Humanitarian migration was the least affected category during the COVID-19 crisis, and it had already increased by 13% in 2021. The number of new humanitarian migrants was second only to the record levels of 2016 and 2017.

Due to the delay in asylum application processing, taking into account the record high level of asylum applications registered in 2022 (see below), it is likely that the number of humanitarian migrants will reach a new historical high in 2023.

Germany and the United States were the top two destinations for humanitarian migrants, granting international protection to over a third of all new humanitarian migrants in the OECD, 128 000 and 92 000 migrants respectively. Canada and the United Kingdom received an additional 74 000 and 54 000 humanitarian migrants. All top four countries registered significant year-on-year increases: nearly double for Germany and the United States and a 25% increase for Canada and the United Kingdom.

Humanitarian migration increased in Australia and New Zealand relative to 2021, bringing levels back to the mid-2010s levels. In Austria and the Netherlands, humanitarian migration more than doubled relative to 2019. In the Netherlands, the number of humanitarian migrants was second only to the 2015 and 2016 levels. Humanitarian migration was stable in Mexico although at a level 2.5 times higher than in 2019 and earlier. In contrast, Sweden and Norway received fewer humanitarian migrants. Humanitarian migration was at a 15 year low in Sweden.

Permanent-type labour migration to OECD countries continued to increase following a trend since the mid-2010s. There were over 1.1 million new permanent-type labour migrants in OECD countries for which statistics are harmonised in 2022. This represents a 36% year-on-year increase and a 53% increase relative to 2019.

Labour migration increased in almost all OECD countries. While the increase in labour migration relative to 2021, in Australia, Japan or Korea, meant a return to pre-pandemic levels, in most OECD European countries and in the United States, labour migration in 2022 was at a 15 year record level. Year-on-year increases in the primary destination countries were striking: the number of new permanent-type labour migrants doubled in the United Kingdom and increased by 59, 39 and 26% in Germany, the United States and France. The ten-fold increase in labour migration in New Zealand was driven by the exceptional pathway to permanent residence created in 2021 mentioned earlier in this chapter. Canada is among the few countries where permanent-type labour migration slightly decreased in 2022. Nevertheless, the level remained higher than in any year prior to 2021.

Temporary labour migration to the OECD

Several million temporary labour migrants are migrating to the OECD every year. These flows tend to reflect short-term changes in demand for labour and skills. There is a large diversity in temporary migration channels and programmes across the OECD, targeting different types of workers and sectors and offering quite different duration of stay and entry conditions.


The statistics presented in this section aim to be as exhaustive as currently available data allow. They include categories such as seasonal workers, working holiday makers, trainees and intra-company transferees but also other country-specific temporary foreign worker programmes.

Annex Table 1.A.2 and Annex Table 1.A.3 list the national temporary labour migration programmes presented in this section. The specific case of posted workers within the EU/EFTA free movement area is considered in the next section.

More than 2.4 million work permits and authorisations were granted in OECD countries (excluding Poland) representing a 77% year-on-year increase.³ Temporary migration was 14% above 2019 levels, after an unprecedented fall due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.6. Total temporary foreign workers, 2019-22

Thousands



Source: Calculations by the OECD Secretariat.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/gmy72v>

Data for Poland are not fully comparable as they include a number of work authorisations that may not lead to entries and cover a large number of “notifications of entrusting work” (Law of March 2022) which are made by the employer within 14 days of hiring the employee (mostly of Ukrainian nationality). Adding Poland would however bring the total inflow of temporary workers to over 4 million (Box 1.2).

The United States became the top destination, receiving approximately 40% of all temporary labour migrants bar Poland. In all top receiving countries, the number of permits issued increased significantly, with levels twice as large or more in Australia, Canada and Japan. In the EU, temporary labour migration increased by 18% and 4%, relative to 2021 and 2019, respectively.

Box 1.2. Evolution of the trends in temporary workers to Poland since 2019

Types of work authorisations delivered to temporary workers

Since 2004, foreigners are authorised to work in Poland if they meet two conditions: first, they need to have a work permit or another type of authorisation to work; second, they must reside legally in Poland and the basis of their stay must allow to work.

The so-called “statement on entrusting work” is a simplified procedure in place for foreigners from five specific countries: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Russian citizens were excluded from this procedure in October 2022). This procedure applies to economic sectors not related to seasonal work. The authorised length of work has been extended from 6 to 24 months in January 2022. The condition for using the simplified procedure is that the employer obtains an entry in the local register of declarations and that foreigners have documents confirming their right to residence in Poland.


In March 2022, a new type of notification of “entrusting work” (employment) was introduced to support Ukrainians fleeing the conflict and those already in Poland allowing them to work. This procedure has become the primary channel used by most Ukrainians coming to and staying in Poland.

Grants of work authorisations have continued to rise sharply in 2022

After three consecutive years of registering at least 1.5 million workers annually (including short-term work permits and renewals), Poland experienced in 2022 a significant decline in flows of temporary workers (-26% compared to 2021) that affected all types of work authorisations. Total numbers of “statements of entrusting work” valid for more than 90 days decreased by 21%; work permits by 27%; and seasonal work permits by 78%. This overall significant decrease can partly be attributed to the extension of the validity period for “entrusting work” declarations from 6 to 24 months, which came into effect in January 2022. The other reason is that workers fleeing the Ukrainian conflict as well as Ukrainians already residing in Poland can now obtain a separate document that allows them to work. When accounting for this new type of notification of “entrusting work”, numbers of new work authorisations (including renewals) increased by 16% in 2022.


Ukrainian workers continue to make up the majority of new workers, accounting for approximately 50% to 67% of the total, depending on whether the specific notifications introduced in 2022 are accounted for or not. Declarations of entrusting work for Belarussians doubled in 2022 and the composition by origin of new work permit holders changed dramatically. Despite a 73% decrease in the grants of work permits, Ukraine remained the main origin country in 2022. Flows from India (+172%), Uzbekistan (+122%) and Türkiye (+240%) rose sharply, putting these three countries as primary countries of origin place after Ukraine. The share of female workers increased from 36% in 2021 to 43% in 2022 (Figure 1.7). This evolution is mainly driven by flows of Ukrainian women who now constitute the majority of Ukrainian workers (55% of total flows of Ukrainian workers compared with 41% in 2021).

Figure 1.7. New work authorisations granted in Poland, 2019-22



Note: Grants of work authorisations (including renewals). Some of the workers have not yet obtained a residence permit or have not entered Poland.

Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on national sources.


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Temporary labour migration by main categories

Seasonal migration programmes constitute the main category of temporary foreign workers across the OECD. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the recruitment of seasonal workers from abroad – crucial for harvesting activities in OECD countries – was less disrupted than other categories of temporary workers. Seasonal migration flows declined by 12% in 2020 and increased significantly in 2021 (50% year-on-year increase). In 2022, recruitment of seasonal workers in the OECD (excluding Poland) increased again by 40% to nearly 630 000 (Figure 1.8).

Figure 1.8. Inflows of temporary labour migrants to the OECD, main programmes and top five receiving countries, 2019-22

Thousands



Note: US H-2B visas are presented separately (in shaded dark blue) on top of H-2A seasonal visas (agricultural activities) as they also partly relate to seasonal activities. Refer to Figure 1.9 for a full list of OECD countries considered in this graph (excludes Poland). Excludes renewals except in France (seasonal).

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

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The United States was by far the largest recipient of foreign seasonal workers (300 000 new H-2A issued in the agriculture and 123 000 H-2B for non-agricultural activities), followed by Canada (37 000) and the United Kingdom (34 000). The United States increased its H-2A visa for agricultural seasonal workers (+15%) and its cap on the H-2B visa for temporary non-agricultural workers for seasonal needs and other temporary needs (such as one-time occurrence, peak-load or intermittent needs) (+30%). Similarly, Canada and the United Kingdom recorded significant increases in the intake of seasonal agricultural workers (+9% and +17% respectively). Other OECD countries, with smaller programmes, also experienced significant changes in 2022 – Austria (+30%), France (+68%), Norway (+104%) – but also Australia (+69%) and New Zealand (+6%). Korea introduced a new seasonal programme in 2022 with an intake of 8 200 foreign workers.

Working holiday maker (WHM) programmes are exchange programmes that allow young individuals to travel and work in the destination country. In some OECD countries, WHMs contribute significantly to selected sectors, such as agriculture or in accommodation and retail trade services.

In 2022, the number of WHMs in the OECD increased four-fold, to a total of 420 000. Nevertheless, given the sharp decrease in WHMs in 2020 and 2021, the 2022 level remains lower than in 2019 (-12%). This was the case in all major receiving OECD countries (Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom), except for New Zealand, where 2022 levels are above 2019. In France, inflows of WHMs remain lower than in 2019, by about half.

Trainee programmes, aiming to facilitate short-term skills transfers and promote familiarity with specific processes or equipment. The primary objective of these programmes is not to employ trainees as regular workers, but rather to enhance their knowledge and capabilities. Even if many countries have such programmes, Japan is by far the main destination country for foreign trainees.

Recruitment of foreign trainees has been heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and border closure. Despite a more than fourfold increase in 2022, overall trainee flows were still 8% below 2019 levels. This trend is driven by flows to Japan, which receives more than 9 out of 10 international trainees, virtually all under Japan's "Technical Intern Trainee" Programme (183 000 in 2022, 9% below its 2019 level).

Intra-company transferee programmes enable multinational companies to move key staff across borders between different entities. To be eligible, migrants are generally required to have been working in the company for at least one year. They may be allowed to stay in the host country for several years (one to three years in the framework of the EU Directive; up to seven years with a L-1 visa in the United States; unlimited time in Japan and Korea).

Mobility within multinationals has been markedly reduced because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The number of permits to ICTs in 2022 was twice that in 2021. However, levels remained 11% below those of 2019. Canada and Germany stand out as exceptions with 2022 Levels 17% and 31% higher than in 2019, respectively.

Although the United States receives the largest number of ICTs (81 000 in 2022), the United Kingdom, followed by Canada, Germany and Japan are also major destinations.

Other national **temporary foreign worker programmes** cover a variety of skills profiles and sectors. In 2022, the number of permits issued under these programmes increased by 84% year-on-year, to a Level 23% higher than in 2019. The top three receiving countries – the United States, Australia and Canada – account for more than 700 000 permits issued in 2022, around two-thirds of the total across the OECD.

In 2022, the number of permits issued more than doubled in Australia, Canada and the United States. In the United States, three-quarters of visas issued to temporary foreign workers (referred to as non-immigrant visas) were H-1B visas for specialty occupations. The number of new foreign workers in the H-1B programme is capped. While the cap is set at 65 000 (regular cap) plus an additional 20 000 for

foreigners who have earned a US master's degree or higher, there are also exceptions for foreigners hired by certain categories of public and non-profit employers. The number of initial approvals of H-1Bs was 123 000 in US FY2021 and 132 000 in FY2022, but due to visa issuance delay, there were only 105 300 H-1B visas issued abroad in calendar year 2021 compared with 241 500 in 2022.

Canada has two main streams for temporary migrants: the International Mobility Programme (IMP) and the Temporary Foreign Worker Programme (TFWP). This section covers all relevant sub-streams of these programmes, except programmes for WHMs, seasonal workers and ICTs, which were covered above, and a couple of humanitarian categories, notably the IMP programme dedicated to Ukrainians fleeing war. After a fall in the number of permits issued to new migrants in 2020 and 2021, the numbers increased in 2022 to a total 22% larger than in 2019. This is mainly driven by the easing of highly skilled migrants' recruitment, notably in the health sector.

In Australia the increase is partly due to former students who found a job at the end of their studies as well as other status changes towards "Temporary Resident Skilled" and "Temporary Resident – other employment".


In Korea, the number of permits issued to temporary foreign workers doubled year-on-year. This increase was driven by the six-fold increase in the number of permits issued under the Employment Permit System (EPS, or E-9 visa) which accounts for two-thirds of temporary foreign worker admissions in Korea. Under EPS, foreign workers are employed in non-professional jobs, mainly in the manufacturing sector. Almost 65 000 permits were issued under EPS, 20% more than in 2019 and more than any prior year.

The number of participants in temporary foreign worker programmes also increased in other OECD countries. An example is Japan, which admitted over 20 000 foreigners for employment under the Specified Skilled Worker Programme (SSW). The SSW, designed to address labour shortages in 12 eligible industries, was introduced in 2019 but border closure and slow roll-out of SSW testing in origin countries due to the COVID-19 pandemic limited arrivals from abroad.

In the EU countries covered in Figure 1.9, the number of permits issued to other temporary foreign workers increased 24% year-on-year to a total 14% larger than in 2019. The largest annual growth rates were registered in Spain (+48%) and France (+68%). In the United Kingdom, numbers nearly doubled in 2022, mainly because of entry clearances delivered to overseas domestic workers and through the government Authorised Exchange Programme.


Figure 1.9. Inflows of temporary labour migrants, top OECD receiving countries

2019-22



Note: * H-2B visas are included on the top of H-2A seasonal visas (agricultural activities) as they also partly relate to seasonal activities. Other EU includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

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Posted workers within the OECD-Europe area

Inside the EU/EFTA countries, posted workers are defined as salaried or self-employed workers who generally carry out their activity in another member country while staying affiliated with the social security system of their home country. When workers are posted in one single country, the posting cannot exceed 24 months (EC No 987/2009 Article 12), whereas there is no time limit for workers posted in two or more countries (EC No 987/2009 Article 13), taking place mostly in road freight transport. Note that the United Kingdom is still included in 2021 data, in accordance with the Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) signed by the EU and the United Kingdom at the end of 2020.


2019 saw a large increase in posting, largely due to change in the registration method. Data are not directly comparable with previous years. Since then, there has been a sharp decline in posting. This was very clear in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, but contrary to other permanent and temporary migration flows posting did not fully bounce back in 2021.

In 2021, 2.1 million postings under Article 12 (posting in a single country) were registered in Europe which correspond to a decline of 9% compared to the previous year. Another 1.3 million postings were issued to workers covered by Article 13 (+8.7% in 2021). Finally, an additional 91 000 fell under other regulations: primarily civil servants, workers under Article 16 (governed by multilateral agreements) and sailors, accounting for 2.5% of the total.

The main receiving country of posted workers under Article 12 remained Germany followed by France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands (Figure 1.10 and Table 1.2). The overall decline observed in 2021 was primarily due to a sharp decrease in the Netherlands (- 61%) and to a lesser extent to Switzerland (-14%). Posting slightly declined in Austria (- 5%) and increased in Germany (7%) and to Southern Europe. Flows to Norway more than doubled in 2021, placing postings at a similar level as in Sweden.

On average, in the 19 countries that reported data, postings in one single country lasted 106 days and workers were sent abroad 1.7 times, implying that workers have spent 181 days away on average in 2021. The duration of postings per worker varies widely across countries, from less than 70 days in Belgium and France to more than 200 days in Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Iceland and Norway and 484 days in Croatia.

Figure 1.10. Posting of workers active under Article 12 in selected European OECD countries, 2016-21



Source: De Wispelaere, F., L. De Smedt and J. Pacolet (2022^[2]), *Posting of workers – Report on A1 Portable Documents issued in 2021*, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/199888>.

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In 2021, 60% of (single country) postings were issued to provide services in industry (24% in construction alone) and one-third in services (half in the financial and insurance sectors, half in the education, health and social sectors). Agriculture accounted for less than 1% of total Article 12 postings.


Although its share in total employment is modest (0.4% in full-time equivalent) in 2021, postings have a significant impact on some national labour markets. For instance, Slovenia sent abroad more than 1% of its employed population (3.2%). This share is also high in Luxembourg (3.0%), the Slovak Republic (2.0%), Croatia (2.0%), and Poland (1.1%).

Table 1.2. Postings of workers active under Article 12 in selected European OECD countries, by destination country, 2011-21

Destination	2011-14 annual average	2015-18 annual average	2019	2020	2021	2021/11	2021/20	Average duration per individual person involved, 2021
	Thousands					Change in percentages		Days
European OECD countries								
Germany	358.8	428.8	505.7	410.9	429.7	+38	+5	..
France	172.9	222.8	450.2	307.7	308.0	+90	+0	57
Austria	85.6	122.4	320.5	232.0	220.6	+189	-5	..
Belgium	136.1	164.7	218.2	168.9	174.2	+39	+3	68
Netherlands	98.4	104.5	219.3	390.0	153.2	+45	-61	..
Switzerland	73.3	105.4	247.0	177.1	152.8	+144	-14	..
Italy	53.2	64.8	173.7	90.9	107.8	+68	+19	148
Spain	46.3	56.0	177.1	82.3	88.3	+85	+7	..
Poland	15.2	20.8	93.6	59.0	58.0	+262	-2	225
Portugal	12.1	21.3	50.5	29.2	58.0	+335	+99	146
Sweden	28.2	43.6	85.5	61.5	57.9	+137	-6	132
Norway	21.7	24.6	38.2	25.0	57.9	+90	+131	215
Czech Republic	17.7	24.2	101.5	60.5	54.3	+217	-10	187
Luxembourg	21.6	29.4	52.9	47.5	43.9	+81	-8	107
United Kingdom	43.0	58.0	132.5	62.4	38.3	+3	-39	186
Hungary	9.4	12.7	20.8	29.5	38.3	+286	+30	..
Denmark	10.9	16.2	46.3	35.2	31.1	+183	-12	128
Finland	17.8	20.4	35.5	24.9	14.4	-35	-42	174
Slovak Republic	7.0	11.4	33.2	18.1	14.4	+110	-20	142
Slovenia	4.3	6.6	17.2	11.3	12.8	+378	+13	248
Greece	6.0	7.8	17.4	11.4	6.1	-21	-46	..
Ireland	5.1	5.9	17.2	8.2	6.1	+1	-25	226
Lithuania	2.5	2.4	10.1	4.7	4.4	+96	-5	..
Estonia	2.5	3.1	5.0	2.7	2.6	+35	-6	278
Latvia	1.5	1.5	5.2	2.6	2.2	+23	-16	243
Iceland	0.4	1.2	2.1	0.9	1.1	+89	+21	261
Total	1 251.5	1 580.4	3 076.3	2 354.2	2 136.7	+79	-9	181
Selected non-OECD European countries								
Bulgaria	3.7	3.8	13.8	6.0	6.5	..	+8	..
Croatia	3.2	9.9	20.8	11.7	13.0	..	+11	484
Romania	10.6	12.2	38.8	18.0	18.5	..	+3	..

Note: Total weighted average duration per PD A1 issued multiplied by the average number of times sent abroad.

Source: De Wispelaere, F., L. De Smedt and J. Pacolet (2022^[2]), *Posting of workers – Report on A1 Portable Documents issued in 2021*, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/199888>.

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International students

After a strong decline in permits issued to international students in 2020, due to partial or full border closures across all OECD countries, international student flows bounced back. Over 1.9 million residence permits were issued for international tertiary-level students across the OECD in 2022 (Table 1.3). This is 24% more than in 2019 and the highest number ever registered.

The number of permits issued to international students in the OECD increased by 42% relative to 2021, and by 30% across OECD European countries. The increase was particularly large in countries where border closures were lifted more recently, such as in Japan or New Zealand.


Table 1.3. Inflows of international tertiary-level students in OECD countries, 2012-22

Number of first residence permits issued

	2012	2019	2020	2021	2022	2022/21	2022/19
	Thousands					Change (%)	
Australia	77.7	159.8	76.5	62.2	193.2	+211	+21
Austria	4.7	3.6	2.2	4.0	4.1	+1	+13
Belgium	5.3	8.0	5.5	9.0	9.0	0	+12
Canada	71.7	171.3	50.7	215.2	276.4	+28	+61
Czech Republic	3.1	4.1	6.1	5.0	7.4	+49	+80
Denmark	6.2	7.5	4.5	4.7	8.9	+88	+18
Estonia	0.5	1.5	0.7	1.2	0.6	-48	-58
Finland	..	5.2	3.2	5.8	8.4	+44	+60
France	57.8	86.5	70.9	85.3	91.6	+7	+6
Germany	32.3	49.2	12.4	18.7	54.9	+193	+12
Greece	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	+10	+13
Iceland	0.3	0.4
Ireland	7.7	16.9	8.8	11.1	17.8	+60	+5
Italy	18.5	12.7	4.9	10.3	15.0	+46	+19
Japan	57.6	121.6	49.7	11.7	167.1	+1 334	+37
Korea	15.4	35.3	28.3	38.6	57.2	+48	+62
Lithuania	0.4	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	+5	+33
Luxembourg	..	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	+11	-5
Mexico	5.1	5.8	2.9	4.6	7.0	+53	+22
Netherlands	10.7	20.2	11.6	19.6	21.9	+12	+8
New Zealand	19.5	23.7	5.7	0.8	10.3	+1 161	-57
Norway	3.4	3.8	2.0	3.4	3.9	+16	+3
Portugal	8.4	13.4	12.3	10.9	9.7	-11	-27
Slovenia	0.6	1.8	1.4	1.2	1.8	+48	+3
Spain	26.3	43.4	20.5	41.6	49.2	+18	+13
Sweden	7.1	10.8	6.6	8.5	9.1	+6	-16
Switzerland	11.3	6.1	5.5	6.1	6.4	+4	+5
United Kingdom	250.3	376.1	221.9	367.5	477.7	+30	+27
United States	486.9	363.6	102.9	399.0	409.2	+3	+13
OECD Europe Total	455.7	673.0	402.8	616.3	799.8	+30	+19
OECD total	1 189.5	1 554.2	719.5	1 348.4	1 920.2	+42	+24

Note: Data refer to international tertiary-level students, including students enrolled in language courses (excluding intra-EU international students). The data do not include professional training courses.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/6aoz3r>

International student flows have reached in 2022 their highest level ever in about half of OECD countries. In some countries however, such as Estonia, Portugal, Sweden, Luxembourg or New Zealand, the number of permits granted is still below pre-pandemic levels.

For the fourth consecutive year, the United Kingdom is the top receiving country of new international students, ahead of the United States. Canada, Australia and Japan complete the top five receiving countries.

Compared to 2012, the number of first permits issued to international students in 2022 has increased by 61% in the OECD, and more than doubled in Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Japan, Korea, Lithuania and the Netherlands.

In 2021, 4.3 million international students were enrolled in OECD countries, of which 49% (2.1 million) in a European OECD country (Table 1.4). Almost one-fifth of international students in the OECD are hosted by the United States. The United Kingdom hosts 14% of all international students, followed by Australia (9%). Outside English-speaking countries, Germany and France are the primary destination countries and host about 15% of all international students in the OECD, and 30% of international students in European OECD countries.

Most international students in OECD countries come from Asia. In 2021, close to 60% of international students in the OECD came from Asia, mostly from China and India. Compared to 2014, the share of international students from Asia has increased, while the share from Europe has decreased. This increase was particularly strong in the European OECD countries, where the share of Asian students increased from 30% to 36%.

The top countries of origin of international students in OECD countries are China (885 000 students), India (424 000), Viet Nam (133 000), Germany (123 000) and France (101 000) (Figure 1.11). Outside of Asia and Europe, Latin America is the largest region of origin of international students in Spain, Portugal and OECD Latin American countries, whereas Africa is the main continent of origin in France only.

Many Asian countries of origin have seen strong increases in the number of international students to OECD countries between 2014 and 2021. The number of students from India, Viet Nam and Nepal has more than doubled. Furthermore, the number of Syrian students increased almost ten-fold, partly driven by international study as a complementary migration pathway for displaced populations.

International students accounted for 6% of tertiary students in 2021 in the OECD. The top destination countries, as a share of the total number of students, are Luxembourg, where international students account for 49% of all students, Australia (22%) and the United Kingdom (20%).

The concentration of international students increases with level of study in most countries. Exceptions are Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Türkiye and Australia, where international students account for higher shares of master-level than doctoral-level students (Table 1.4). In more than three-quarters of countries, there are at least twice as many international students at doctoral level than at tertiary level. In Luxembourg, Switzerland, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, more than 40% of doctoral students are international students, compared with 24% in the OECD as a whole.

Table 1.4. International students enrolled in OECD countries, 2021


	2021 (thousands)	Share of all students in 2021 (%)			First region of origin in 2021	Top three countries of origin in 2021
		Total tertiary education	Master's level	Doctoral level		
Australia	378	22	38	33	Asia	China, India, Nepal
Austria	82	19	25	39	Europe	Germany, Italy, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Belgium	53	10	17	26	Europe	France, the Netherlands, Cameroon
Canada	313	17	18	35	Asia	India, China, France
Chile	17	1	4	24	LAC	Venezuela, Peru, Colombia
Colombia	5	0	1	2	LAC	Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru
Czech Republic	51	16	19	24	Europe	Slovak Republic, Ukraine, Kazakhstan
Denmark	31	10	20	36	Europe	Germany, Norway, Sweden
Estonia	5	12	17	29	Europe	Finland, Nigeria, Ukraine
Finland	25	8	11	26	Asia	Viet Nam, China, India
France	253	9	13	37	Africa	Morocco, China, Algeria
Germany	376	11	17	22	Asia	China, India, Syria
Greece	24	3	1	2	Asia	Cyprus, Albania, Germany
Hungary	38	13	21	28	Asia	Germany, China, Romania
Iceland	2	8	11	39	Europe	United States, Germany, Philippines
Ireland	23	9	16	37	Asia	China, India, the United States
Israel	13	5	Europe	United States, France, Palestine
Italy	72	3	4	10	Asia	China, Iran, India
Japan	216	6	11	22	Asia	China, Viet Nam, Nepal
Korea	119	4	10	17	Asia	China, Viet Nam, Uzbekistan
Latvia	10	13	27	13	Asia	India, Uzbekistan, Germany
Lithuania	8	7	13	9	Europe	Belarus, Ukraine, India
Luxembourg	4	49	76	91	Europe	France, Germany, Belgium
Mexico	51	1	3	8	Northern America	..
Netherlands	136	14	20	48	Europe	Germany, Italy, China
New Zealand	31	12	23	47	Asia	China, India, Australia
Norway	13	4	7	22	Asia	China, Sweden, Germany
Poland	74	5	5	10	Europe	Ukraine, Belarus, India
Portugal	47	12	14	33	LAC	Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau
Slovak Republic	15	11	13	12	Europe	Ukraine, Czech Republic, Germany
Slovenia	8	9	10	21	Europe	..
Spain	81	4	9	19	LAC	France, Colombia, Italy
Sweden	33	7	12	36	Europe	China, India, Germany
Switzerland	61	18	30	57	Europe	France, Germany, Italy
Türkiye	224	3	8	7	Asia	Syria, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan
United Kingdom	601	20	39	41	Asia	China, India, Nigeria
United States	833	5	11	22	Asia	China, India, Korea
OECD Europe total	2 125	8	12	24	Europe	China, Germany, India
OECD total	4 324	6	14	24	Asia	China, India, Viet Nam

Note: Data for Canada, Colombia, Hungary, Korea, the Slovak Republic, Türkiye and the United States refer to foreign students instead of international students.

Source: OECD Education at a Glance Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/edu-data-en>.


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Figure 1.11. Top 20 nationalities of international students enrolled in OECD countries, 2014 and 2021



Note: Statistics refer to stocks of international students and exclude Erasmus students in European countries.

Source: OECD Education at a Glance Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/edu-data-en>.


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Asylum applications and international protection grants in the OECD

Asylum applications in the OECD were at a record high in 2022. The number of new asylum seekers to OECD countries nearly doubled (+91%) from 2021 to 2022. Over 2 million new applications were lodged in OECD countries in 2022, the highest level recorded so far and larger than the 2015/16 previous record of 1.7 million (Figure 1.12).

The EU27 also saw a considerable year-on-year increase of 64%, with nearly 900 000 new applicants. This was the third highest level on record, after 2015 and 2016. Early EU figures for the first quarter of 2023 suggest a continuing increase in applications, which are 36% over those for the corresponding period in 2022.

Figure 1.12. New asylum applications since 1980 in the OECD, European OECD countries and the United States




Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR and Eurostat.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/me5rzl>

The remarkable surge in demand for asylum in OECD countries was driven by soaring applications in the United States. In 2022, the United States alone received over 730 000 new asylum applications, approximately as many as the next five countries combined (Table 1.5). This represented almost a four-fold increase relative to 2021, and a 2.4-fold increase relative to 2019. The United States has been the main OECD destination country for asylum seekers since 2017. While in 2021, asylum applications in the United States comprised 17% of all asylum applications in the OECD, in 2022 they accounted for 35%.

The largest number of applications in the United States was from citizens of Cuba (157 000) and Venezuela (139 000), whose numbers surged by a factor of 12 and 5, respectively, relative to 2021. Together, the two nationalities accounted for over 40% of all asylum applications to the United States. Arrivals from Cuba were at their highest level in decades with many migrants arriving by land through Nicaragua – which stopped requiring an entry visa for Cubans at the end of 2021. Next, citizens of Honduras, Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Colombia accounted for between 43 000 and 32 000 applications each, all of them sharply up from 2021 (+600% for Nicaraguans). Applications by Afghans also jumped, counting 25 000 in 2022 compared with an average in the hundreds in previous years. Some of these sudden increases in asylum applications led to the establishment of special humanitarian parole processes for selected nationalities, including Afghans, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans (see Box 1.3).

Figure 1.13. New asylum applications in top OECD receiving countries, 2019-22

Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR and Eurostat.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/vbrknw>

Germany, the OECD country with the second-most asylum applications, received nearly 220 000 applications in 2022. This is well below the record levels of 2015/16, when Germany received over 1 million applications in 2 years, but above the number of applications received in any other year. In 2022, asylum applicants came mainly from Syria (71 000, +30% relative to 2021), Afghanistan (36 000, +55%) and Türkiye (24 000, +240%), whose citizens have become the third-largest group of applicants, surpassing Iraqis.

France nearly received 140 000 asylum requests in 2022 catching up to pre-pandemic (2019) levels (Figure 1.13). Afghanistan remained the main country of citizenship among applicants (23 000, +40%), but numbers for several other groups have also shown a rapid increase, including citizens of Bangladesh (10 500, +70%) and Türkiye (10 000, +100%).

Costa Rica and Mexico complete the top five OECD receivers of asylum requests in 2022, with nearly 130 000 and 120 000 applications respectively, continuing the upward demand trend for international protection in Central and South America in recent years. In Costa Rica, 92% of asylum applicants come from Nicaragua. In Mexico, there was a marked increase in the number of applications by Cubans (+118% relative to 2021), Venezuelans (+140%) and Nicaraguans (+208%).

Similar to the United States, Canada experienced a four-fold increase in asylum applications in 2022 relative to 2021, with a record level of 94 000 applications. Applications primarily came from citizens of Mexico, Haiti and Türkiye, with record levels for each of these top three origin countries.

Table 1.5. New asylum applications by country where the application is filed, 2019-22

	2019	2020	2021	2022	% change: 2022 vs		Asylum seekers per million population (2022)	Top three origins of asylum seekers (2022)
					2019	2021		
Australia	27 405	19 220	14 155	19 305	-30	+36	741	Iran, India, Afghanistan
Austria	11 010	13 415	37 830	106 405	+866	+181	11 851	Afghanistan, India, Syria
Belgium	23 140	12 930	19 605	32 140	+39	+64	2 766	Afghanistan, Syria, Burundi
Canada	58 340	19 045	23 365	94 375	+62	+304	2 465	Mexico, Haiti, Türkiye
Chile	770	1 675	2 500	5 055	+556	+102	258	Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba
Colombia	10 620	11 920	15 940	5 530	-48	-65	107	Venezuela, Cuba, Ukraine
Costa Rica	59 180	21 125	108 425	129 480	+119	+19	25 059	Nicaragua, Venezuela, Colombia
Czech Republic	1 575	795	1 060	1 335	-15	+26	127	Türkiye, Ukraine, Russia
Denmark	2 645	1 435	2 015	4 505	+70	+124	767	Ukraine, Afghanistan, Syria
Estonia	100	45	75	2 940	+2 840	+3 820	2 208	Ukraine, Russia, Belarus
Finland	2 455	1 455	1 365	4 835	+97	+254	871	Ukraine, Russia, Afghanistan
France	138 290	81 735	103 810	137 605	0	+33	2027	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Türkiye
Germany	142 510	102 580	148 235	217 775	+53	+47	2 616	Syria, Afghanistan, Türkiye
Greece	74 915	37 860	22 660	29 135	-61	+29	2 785	Syria, Afghanistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip
Hungary	470	90	40	45	-90	+13	5	Afghanistan, Iran, Russia
Iceland	805	625	865	4 530	+463	+424	12 040	Ukraine, Venezuela, West Bank and Gaza Strip
Ireland	4 740	1 535	2 615	13 645	+188	+422	2 697	Georgia, Algeria, Somalia
Israel	9 445	1 885	1 925	3 915	-59	+103	430	Russia, Belarus, India
Italy	35 005	21 340	45 200	77 200	+121	+71	1 308	Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt
Japan	10 375	3 935	2 415	3 770	-64	+56	30	Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Türkiye
Korea	15 430	6 665	2 330	11 540	-25	+395	223	Kazakhstan, India, Türkiye
Latvia	180	145	580	545	+203	-6	291	Russia, Afghanistan, Belarus
Lithuania	625	260	3 905	905	+45	-77	323	Belarus, Russia, Iraq
Luxembourg	2 200	1 295	1 370	2 395	+9	+75	3 711	Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan
Mexico	70 365	41 205	131 420	118 735	+69	-10	928	Honduras, Cuba, Haiti
Netherlands	22 540	13 720	24 755	35 530	+58	+44	2020	Syria, Afghanistan, Türkiye
New Zealand	540	435	415	335	-38	-19	65	India, China, Malaysia
Norway	2 205	1 340	1 615	4 650	+111	+188	857	Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan
Poland	2 765	1 510	6 240	7 700	+178	+23	204	Belarus, Ukraine, Russia
Portugal	1 735	900	1 350	1 980	+14	+47	191	Afghanistan, India, Ukraine
Slovak Republic	215	265	330	505	+135	+53	93	Ukraine, Türkiye, Morocco
Slovenia	3 615	3 465	5 220	6 645	+84	+27	3 154	Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh
Spain	115 190	86 385	62 065	116 150	+1	+87	2 449	Venezuela, Colombia, Peru
Sweden	23 150	13 630	10 180	14 075	-39	+38	1 347	Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan
Switzerland	12 600	9 765	13 295	23 130	+84	+74	2 647	Afghanistan, Türkiye, Eritrea
Türkiye	56 415	31 335	29 255	33 245	-41	+14	393	Afghanistan, Ukraine, Iraq
United Kingdom	44 315	36 025	56 465	89 395	+102	+58	1 326	Albania, Afghanistan, Iran
United States	301 070	250 940	188 860	730 400	+143	+287	2 192	Cuba, Venezuela, Honduras
OECD total	1 288 950	853 930	1 093 750	2091 385	+62	+91	1 519	Venezuela, Cuba, Afghanistan
<i>Selected non-OECD countries</i>								
Brazil	51 619	22 145	7 755	50 330	-2	+549	234	Venezuela, Cuba, Angola
Bulgaria	6 750	3 460	10 890	20 260	+200	+86	2 962	Syria, Afghanistan, Morocco
Croatia	1 245	1 540	2 730	12 750	+924	+367	3 301	Iraq, Russia, Burundi
Peru	122 701	52 530	1 515	1 430	-99	-6	42	Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia
Romania	2 739	6 025	9 065	12 065	+341	+33	634	Ukraine, India, Bangladesh

Note: Figures for the United States 2016-20 refer to "affirmative" claims submitted to the Department of Homeland Security (number of cases, multiplied by 1.5 to reflect the estimated number of persons) and "defensive" claims submitted to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (number of persons).


Source: UNHCR; Eurostat; OECD International Migration Database.

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The OECD as a whole received about 1 500 new asylum requests per million population in 2022, a 10% increase year-on-year. As in previous years, Costa Rica saw by far the highest numbers of asylum seekers relative to its population (25 000 per million). The next main recipients relative to population size were Iceland and Austria (both with over 10 000 asylum seekers per million inhabitants), followed by Luxembourg (4 000).⁴ Slovenia, Greece, Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland and Germany all received around or under 3 000 asylum requests per million inhabitants. Sweden, which was in the top three until 2019, ranked 17th in 2022 with a ratio of 1 400 asylum requests per million inhabitants.

The top origin countries for asylum applicants within the OECD in 2022 were Venezuela (221 000), Cuba (180 000), Afghanistan (170 000), Nicaragua (165 000) and Syria (126 000) (Figure 1.14). There was a notable year-on-year increase in the number of asylum-seekers from all top 10 origin countries. Cuba rose from 12th to second place as the number of Cuban applicants to OECD countries surged by a factor of seven. Venezuela became the top asylum origin country in 2022 as the number of Venezuelan applicants tripled. The number of asylum seekers from Colombia (88 000), and Türkiye (72 000) also tripled compared to the previous year. Finally, India became tenth-largest origin country for asylum in the OECD in 2022 through a five-fold increase in numbers.

Figure 1.14. Top 20 origin countries of asylum applicants in OECD countries, 2021-22



Source: UNHCR; Eurostat; OECD International Migration Database.

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Following a slow rebound in 2021, grants of international protection rose in 2022 to reach their highest level since 2017, with a nearly 50% increase (Table 1.6). The two main hosts, Germany (133 000) and the United States (102 000) each granted protection to twice as many refugees as in 2021. Canada, the third top host, welcomed 74 000 new refugees (+23%), followed by the United Kingdom with 54 000 (+23%) and France 39 000 (+8%). In Spain, the number of positive decisions reached 36 000, an increase of 73% compared with 2021. Several countries showed a notable increase over the year in the number of protection grants issued (Table 1.6). For some of these, including Australia (13 000), New Zealand (4 000) and the United States, the increase constituted a return to pre-pandemic levels. For others, such as Japan (2000), Iceland (950) or Estonia (2 100), these relatively higher figures are more novel.

Table 1.6. Humanitarian admissions, including positive decisions on applications for international protection and resettlement arrivals, 2013-22

	2013-17 average	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	% change 2019/22	% change 2021/22
Australia	17 414	16 250	18 762	13 171	5 947	13 307	-29	+124
Austria	16 889	15 020	7 425	6 835	12 105	16 560	+123	+37
Belgium	10 923	10 560	6 770	5 885	10 120	11 005	+63	+9
Canada	36 140	45 493	48 533	25 485	60 235	74 340	+53	+23
Chile	66	173	20	5	15	60	+200	+300
Colombia	18	37	337	351	550	131	-61	-76
Costa Rica	307	185	1 365	3 435	682	3 956	+190	+480
Czech Republic	356	155	135	105	260	325	+141	+25
Denmark	5 897	1 315	1 575	450	830	665	-58	-20
Estonia	73	50	50	25	50	2 100	+4 100	+4 100
Finland	3 981	3 010	2 555	1 815	1 955	2 325	-9	+19
France	22 370	38 290	33 740	20 470	35 810	38 740	+15	+8
Germany	180 493	79 140	75 210	63 865	66 530	133 240	+77	+100
Greece	3 934	15 210	17 350	34 325	16 575	19 245	+11	+16
Hungary	606	365	60	130	40	30	-50	-25
Iceland	76	155	380	385	290	950	+150	+228
Ireland	622	1 345	1 760	1 140	1 930	3 955	+125	+105
Israel	168	506	130	68	15	20	-85	+33
Italy	26 888	31 850	19 730	11 935	21 805	25 740	+30	+18
Japan	136	104	101	91	654	1 997	+1 877	+205
Korea	346	648	295	221	114	237	-20	+108
Latvia	103	30	35	25	90	230	+557	+156
Lithuania	156	155	90	80	435	305	+239	-30
Luxembourg	526	1 010	705	765	860	975	+38	+13
Mexico	1 251	5 406	8 228	19 997	20 403	20 843	+153	+2
Netherlands	13 620	4 845	6 720	9 045	12 535	16 585	+147	+32
New Zealand	3 767	4 191	3 618	2 283	1 572	3 864	+7	+146
Norway	9 040	3 940	4 590	2 670	4 755	4 225	-8	-11
Poland	570	375	265	370	2 155	3 870	+1 360	+80
Portugal	299	660	545	315	320	675	+24	+111
Slovak Republic	118	45	35	40	45	70	+100	+56
Slovenia	89	135	85	85	15	205	+141	+1 267
Spain	3 215	3 725	39 230	51 420	20 940	36 235	-8	+73
Sweden	38 335	15 600	11 070	8 015	9 325	8 405	-24	-10
Switzerland	13 100	16 310	11 795	10 800	10 075	10 500	-11	+4
Türkiye	17 126	4 934	5 445	8 753	13 227	12 857	+136	-3
United Kingdom	21 239	26 607	23 415	32 057	43 562	53 738	+130	+23
United States	143 590	175 004	88 915	63 487	48 332	102 452	+15	+112
All countries	593 848	522 833	441 069	400 399	425 158	624 962	+42	+47
All European countries	373 518	269 902	265 320	263 052	273 412	390 898	+47	+43


Note: Some data presented may differ from statistics published previously due to retroactive changes or the inclusion of previously unavailable data.

Source: UNHCR; Eurostat; OECD International Migration Database.


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Looking over the decade, trends in the volume of international protection granted across the main host countries and regional country groups echo some of the trends for asylum applications (Figure 1.15). From a regional perspective, the overall surge in international protection grants by European OECD countries in 2022 was largely driven by Germany, although excluding Germany there was still a 25% increase in the rest of the region.

Figure 1.15. Grants of international protection (positive decisions and resettlement) in the OECD, 2013-22




Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR, Eurostat and OECD International Migration Database.

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Resettlement programmes for refugees are designed as a durable solution and a responsibility-sharing mechanism among the international community. They are designed to transfer the most vulnerable refugees from a country of first asylum to another country that grants them long-term protection. On average, since 1982, 105 000 refugees per year have been resettled to OECD countries. During the worst of the pandemic, transfers could not take place, so these programmes came to a halt, and resumed in 2021. Resettlement transfers continued to rebound in 2022 (+87% relative to 2021, +239% 2020), reaching 117 000, slightly above the 2019 pre-pandemic level (Figure 1.16).

Canada remained the top OECD resettlement country, receiving over twice as many refugees (48 000) through this pathway as in 2021, and accounting for over 40% of all resettlement arrivals to OECD countries in 2022. Resettlement figures also grew considerably in the next two countries, the United States (29 000, +112%) and Australia (+17 000, +418%), the latter returning to third place after a particularly strong drop in 2020-21. However, resettlement arrivals decreased in some of the main European host countries, such as Sweden (5 000, -21%), Germany (4 800, -29%) and Norway (3 100, -14%). France is the main exception, with 3 200 (+65%) resettled refugees in 2022.

Figure 1.16. Refugees admitted to OECD countries under resettlement programmes, 1981-2022

Note: Some data presented may differ from statistics published previously due to data revisions or the inclusion of previously unavailable data.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR and Eurostat.

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Box 1.3. Humanitarian parole programmes in the United States

Since 2021, the US administration has relied on *humanitarian parole* to grant relief to asylum seekers at the US border who might otherwise have been denied entry based on border policies such as Title 42. In some cases, the administration has implemented special humanitarian parole programmes for selected nationalities, with specific conditions (e.g. in terms of length or work authorisation – see below).

Immigration parole is a long-standing legal mechanism within the United States that allows certain non-citizens to enter the country temporarily without fear of deportation (USCIS, 2023^[3]). Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of Homeland Security (and its sub-agencies) can grant parole status for urgent humanitarian reasons or reasons pertaining to public interest, terms that leave the US Government with a broad discretionary power for determining eligibility.

Humanitarian parole generally allows entry with a limited stay of one to two years and does not include work authorisation. Importantly, parole is not equivalent to a visa, nor an immigration status, and it does not provide official admission into the United States – it merely provides temporary protection from deportation. Once in the United States, parolees can apply for asylum, another visa (e.g. work), or for permanent residence on family grounds if they have immediate family in the United States. The current historically large backlog in immigration applications – including an estimated five-year wait time for asylum cases – means that parolees may have to remain in this status for a long time before obtaining another status or an asylum court decision.

Humanitarian parole for Afghans

In August 2021, the United States turned to parole authorisation as a special measure to provide emergency safe passage for Afghan evacuees in the midst of the Taliban takeover. The high volume of applications added to an already large administrative backlog. Based on government and congressional records, between January 2020 and April 2022, nearly 45 000 Afghans had applied for humanitarian parole, but grants were only in the hundreds.

Uniting for Ukraine

In April 2022, the US administration announced a special sponsorship process for Ukrainians fleeing the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) allows eligible individuals to enter the United States to join their sponsors, private US citizens who volunteered to provide financial and social assistance to newly arrived Ukrainian nationals fleeing the war. Ukrainians paroled under U4U are allowed to stay in the United States for up to two years, during which they have authorisation to work.

Between March 2022 and late June 2023, nearly 139 000 Ukrainians were paroled into the United States via the U4U programme, surpassing the original goal of 100 000 U4U arrivals. The programme garnered widespread offers of support, with USCIS receiving over 250 000 applications from potential sponsors by late June 2023. The programme has also been credited with dramatically reducing the number of irregular entries by Ukrainians at the southern border of the United States, which had surged after the start of war.


Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans (CHNV)

In October 2022, a new humanitarian parole programme addressed Venezuelans experiencing dangerous conditions, violence, or severe economic hardship in their home country. In January 2023, the process was expanded to include nationals of Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua. The programme allows citizens of these countries to apply for parole to enter the United States under the condition that they have a US sponsor with legal status and financial means to support them. Those approved for parole can enter and legally reside and work in the United States for up to two years (USCIS, 2023^[4]). Admissions via this parole programme are capped at 30 000 parolees per month. Official statistics on the beneficiaries of the CHNV processes have not been released, but one recent study estimates a total of 102 000 CHNV parolees admitted between October 2022 and April 2023, including around 38 000 Venezuelans, 22 000 Cubans, 29 000 Haitians, and 13 000 Nicaraguans. Similarly to U4U, the CHNV parole processes have also been credited with dramatically reducing encounters at the southern borders (a proxy for irregular migration). As of June 2023, both parole programmes (U4U and CHNV) are active.

Demographics of migration flows to the OECD

In 2021, six OECD countries received more migrant women than men. The share of migrant women was highest in the United States, Australia, Ireland and Israel. In these countries, the share of women in migration flows remains relatively stable, reflecting the predominance of family migration (Figure 1.17). The share of women is however lower, close to 40%, in Germany, Austria, and in most Central and Eastern European countries.

Figure 1.17. Correlation between the share of women in total migration and the share of family migration, 2021



Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/4itj5x>

In 2021, the composition of migration flows by country of origin returned to its pre-COVID-19 rankings, although China (227 000) has not reached its previous level and remains far behind India (407 000) (Table 1.7). The third country is again Romania (215 000) just before Ukraine which was already the fifth country of origin in the OECD with around 189 000 entries recorded, excluding all temporary Ukrainian workers who were employed in Poland.


Major increases were recorded for Iran (+140%), Uzbekistan (+120%) and to a lesser extent for Iraq (+100%). Conversely, important declines were registered for Venezuela, Viet Nam and the United Kingdom.

Obviously, variations between 2020 and 2021 need to be considered with some caution as they partially reflect changes in the reopening of borders in major destination countries and not only relative change in push factors in countries of origin.

Table 1.7. Top 50 countries of origin of new immigrants to the OECD, 2020-21

	Number	Number	Share of total flows	2021/20 absolute change	2021/20 change (%)	Difference with 2020 rank	Expatriation rate
	2020	2021	2021 (%)				(per '000 population) in 2021
India	220	407	7.5	188	86	0	0.3
China	205	283	5.2	78	38	1	0.2
Romania	211	215	4.0	4	2	-1	11.1
Ukraine	141	189	3.5	48	34	1	4.3
Germany	119	141	2.6	22	18	3	1.7
Syria	74	140	2.6	67	90	14	6.7
Morocco	100	132	2.4	32	33	6	3.6
Mexico	114	128	2.4	14	12	2	1.0
Afghanistan	69	126	2.3	57	82	13	3.2
Poland	116	121	2.2	5	4	-1	3.2
Italy	111	121	2.2	9	8	0	2.0
Iran	48	115	2.1	67	141	14	1.3
Brazil	108	113	2.1	6	5	-1	0.5
Iraq	51	107	2.0	55	108	11	2.5
Pakistan	70	106	2.0	36	51	6	0.5
United States	75	102	1.9	27	36	3	0.3
France	84	100	1.9	17	20	-2	1.6
Russia	78	97	1.8	19	24	0	0.7
Philippines	83	91	1.7	9	11	-2	0.8
United Kingdom	124	88	1.6	-36	-29	-13	1.3
Venezuela	193	82	1.5	-110	-57	-17	2.9
Bulgaria	83	82	1.5	-1	-2	-6	11.8
Colombia	94	77	1.4	-17	-18	-9	1.5
Viet Nam	130	74	1.4	-57	-44	-18	0.8
Spain	58	73	1.4	15	26	-2	1.5
Türkiye	53	71	1.3	18	34	-2	0.8
Nigeria	45	69	1.3	24	52	0	0.3
Albania	41	52	1.0	11	28	2	18.2
Bangladesh	38	49	0.9	11	29	5	0.3
Portugal	39	47	0.9	8	21	2	4.5
Uzbekistan	21	46	0.9	26	125	23	1.4
Egypt	31	44	0.8	14	45	9	0.4
Cuba	31	40	0.7	9	31	6	3.6
Algeria	33	40	0.7	7	22	3	0.9
Hungary	39	39	0.7	0	0	-2	4.0
Netherlands	31	38	0.7	7	23	4	2.2
Korea	41	37	0.7	-4	-11	-8	0.7
Dominican Republic	39	36	0.7	-3	-7	-7	3.3
Croatia	37	35	0.6	-2	-6	-4	8.5
Canada	31	35	0.6	3	10	-2	0.9
Honduras	36	34	0.6	-2	-5	-5	3.3
Argentina	26	33	0.6	8	31	5	0.7
Tunisia	24	33	0.6	9	39	8	2.7
Somalia	18	33	0.6	14	77	14	1.9
Peru	42	32	0.6	-10	-23	-18	1.0
Azerbaijan	13	32	0.6	19	141	30	3.1
Serbia	30	32	0.6	2	6	-5	4.3
Belgium	25	30	0.6	5	19	0	2.6
Belarus	19	29	0.5	10	53	7	3.1
Kazakhstan	16	29	0.5	12	76	17	1.5

Source: OECD International Migration Database.


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Foreign-born population in OECD countries

In 2022, 145 million people in the OECD area lived outside their country of birth, a quarter more than ten years earlier. The foreign-born represented about 10.6% of the total population of OECD countries in 2022 compared with 8.9% in 2012.


Most immigrants lived in North America (38%) and in European OECD countries (37%) (Figure 1.18). The United States alone hosted a third of the total. Germany was the second main destination country with 14 million immigrants (10%), followed by the United Kingdom (9.6 million, 7%), France and Canada (6% each).

Figure 1.18. Distribution of the foreign-born population in OECD countries, 2022



Note: Data for Asia refer to the foreign population. "Other" includes Israel and Türkiye.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.


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The two OECD countries in Oceania, Australia and New Zealand, accounted for over 6% of immigrants in the OECD area, while the four Latin American OECD countries hosted 5.1 million foreign-born residents (4%), and the two Asian OECD countries 4.6 million (3%). Türkiye is home to 3.2 million immigrants (excluding most Syrian refugees however) and Israel to 1.8 million.


In the decade to 2022, the share of immigrants in the population increased in almost all OECD countries (Figure 1.19). Immigrants account for more than 10% of the population in two-thirds of OECD countries. The OECD countries with the highest shares of immigrants were Luxembourg (50%), Switzerland (31%), Australia (29%), New Zealand (26%), Canada (22%), Austria (21%), Ireland and Sweden (20% in both).

In 2012, the foreign-born represented less than 3% of the population in seven OECD countries. In 2022, this is only the case in three countries: Mexico (1%), Japan (2.2%) and Poland (2.5%).

Figure 1.19. Foreign-born population as a percentage of the total population in OECD countries, 2012 and 2022



Note: Data refer to 2012 or the closest available year, and to 2022 or the most recent available year. The OECD average is a simple average based on rates presented on the figure. For Japan and Korea, the data refer to the foreign population rather than the foreign-born population. Source: OECD International Migration Database, Eurostat, UNDESA.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/0qpkhz>

Large increases were observed in Iceland (8.4 percentage points) and in Luxembourg (8.3 percentage points). The increase in the share of the foreign-born population in Luxembourg follows a longer-term trend. Iceland has received large inflows of free movement migrants driven by Iceland's economic growth and has in the last few years received also humanitarian migrants.

The share of immigrants multiplied by 10 in Colombia over the period and more than tripled in Chile mostly due to the inflow of Venezuelans. By the end of 2022, 2.5 million Venezuelans had completed a pre-registration for temporary protection in Colombia. Venezuelans have become the largest immigrant community in Chile. Estimates from the Chilean National Statistics Institute indicate that the number of foreigners almost doubled between 2017 and 2021 alone.

Acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries


Record acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries in 2022

Partial data for 2022 suggest that the number of acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries was at record levels. Indeed, at an estimated 2.8 million, they are well above the 2.2 million observed in both 2021 and 2019 (Figure 1.20).

This represents a 25% increase, and a major departure from the relatively stable figures registered since 2010, which fluctuated between 1.8 and 2.2 million acquisitions per year. Canada accounted for a third of this increase, with a record 375 000 new Canadian citizens in 2022 (+174% compared to 2021 and +50% compared to 2019). The main countries of birth of new Canadians were India (60 000), the Philippines (42 000), Syria (20 000) and Pakistan (15 000).

The second largest absolute increase was observed in the United States, which granted citizenship to 970 000 people in 2022 (155 000, +19%), the highest level since 2008. More than 180 000 persons were granted Spanish citizenship in 2022, and 167 000 German citizenship (+37 000 and +28%), more than in any year since 2001.

Figure 1.20. Acquisitions of citizenships in OECD countries, 2000-22




Note: The estimation for 2022 is based on preliminary data for 21 OECD countries accounting for 87% of the 2021 total.

Source: OECD International Migration database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

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The acquisitions of citizenship relative to the size of the foreign population was stable on average across the OECD at 2.3%. Sweden remained the top country, with a ratio of 9.5% up from 8.6% in 2021 (Figure 1.21), Norway ranked second with 6.8% double that in 2021, followed by the Netherlands (5.3%), Canada (4.5%) and Portugal (4.2%). On the other hand, the Slovak Republic, Baltic countries and Asian OECD countries granted citizenship to less than 1% of their foreign population.

Figure 1.21. Acquisitions of citizenship as a percentage of foreign population, 2020-21



Note: The OECD average is the average of the countries featured in the figure above.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.


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More than 100 000 Syrian citizens acquired the nationality of an OECD country

India has been the main origin country of new citizens in OECD countries since 2019. This was despite a recent drop of -15% compared to 2019. In 2021, 133 000 Indian citizens acquired the nationality of an OECD country (Figure 1.22). As in previous years, these acquisitions took place mostly in the United States (56 000), Australia (24 000) and Canada (21 000). Mexico again ranked second in 2021, with 118 000 of its nationals granted nationality of another OECD country, virtually all of them becoming US citizens.

Philippines and China were replaced by Syria and Morocco as third and fourth countries of origin. Many of the Syrian citizens who left their country during the war in the mid-2010s have reached the required duration of residence in the host country to apply for citizenship. More than 100 000 Syrians were granted citizenship of an OECD country in 2021 (+154%), of which 31 000 were in Sweden, 27 000 in the Netherlands and 19 000 in Germany. The 2022 total of acquisitions of citizenship by Syrian citizens will exceed 100 000 with in particular 48 000 new German citizens. In 2021, 91 000 Moroccan citizens acquired an OECD citizenship: 42 000 acquired Spanish citizenship (55 000 in 2022), 19 000, French and 17 000 Italian citizenship.

Figure 1.22. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries: Top 20 countries of former nationality, 2019 and 2021



Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/mb41qx>

Recent trends in labour market outcomes for migrants

It is well established that migrants' labour market outcomes are more sensitive to the business cycle and that, despite an over representation in some key front-line workers, migrants were disproportionately negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in most OECD countries compared to their native-born counterparts (OECD, 2020^[5]).

However, the impact of the health crisis on migrants' labour market situations has come to an end and OECD economies have rebounded sharply in 2021 with labour and skills shortages apparent in many sectors and countries. In most countries the total employment rate was higher at the end of 2022 than before the COVID-19 pandemic, end 2019 (OECD, 2023^[6]).

As a signal of strong recovery after a sharp decline, which was already evident in late 2021 (OECD, 2022^[7]; OECD, 2022^[8]), the labour market outcomes for migrants continued to improve in almost all OECD countries. The average employment rate of migrants in OECD countries increased from 69.9% in 2021 to 72.3% in 2022, with 25 out of 30 OECD countries (with data available for both 2019 and 2022) surpassing their pre-crisis levels.

What is more, in 17 out of OECD 32 countries with available data, employment rates reached the highest level recorded for at least two decades (see Annex Figure 1.A.1 for selected countries). The positive trend was both observed in major migrant-hosting countries such as Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as in Central Eastern European countries including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia. It was also observed in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). Notably, Australia, Canada and Ireland achieved employment rates of over 75% for the first time, while the Czech Republic and Hungary maintained their high migrant employment rates above 80%. Along with the increase in employment, migrants' unemployment rate decreased substantially, from an average of 9.3% in 2021 to 7.6% in 2022 (Table 1.8).

In two-thirds of OECD countries, the gap in employment rates between migrants and native-born individuals narrowed significantly in 2022. As a result, at 72.3%, the average employment rate of migrants in OECD countries almost caught up with that of the native-born population (72.7%). However, the average unemployment rate for migrants remained 2.4 percentage points higher. This narrowing of the gap in labour market outcomes seems at least partly due to a mix of cyclical effects which disproportionately benefits occupations in which migrants are overrepresented, an increase in return migration among recent migrants with weaker labour market attachment, and greater job mobility across sectors for settled migrants (OECD, 2019^[9]; OECD, 2022^[8]).

While migrants in most OECD countries have experienced a favourable evolution of their labour market situation, the degree of improvement has varied, partly depending on the domestic labour market situation and the composition of the immigrant population. Despite an overall reduction, a gap in the employment rate between migrants and the native-born still persists, particularly in Western European countries such as the Netherlands (-13.7 percentage points), Germany (-9.1 percentage points), and France (-7.6 percentage points), in contrast to other OECD countries such as the United States (+3.2 percentage points) and Latin American countries where migrants have higher employment rates than the native-born. For example, the employment gap in Chile and Costa Rica was +15.1 and +7.6 percentage points, respectively. The employment rates of both groups are now at roughly equal levels in Australia (-0.4 percentage points), Canada (-0.6 percentage points), Japan (+0.7 percentage points), and the United Kingdom (0.3 percentage points). In the EU-27 overall, the employment rate of the native-born remains 3.5 percentage points lower than that of migrants.

In most OECD countries, migrants are also more likely to be unemployed than the native-born, except for the United States (-0.4 percentage points) and Australia (-0.3 percentage points). While the employment rate of the native-born population increased and unemployment rates decreased in 33 OECD countries with available data for both 2021 and 2022, the employment rate of migrants showed an increase in all countries, with the exception of Poland. In Poland, the decrease of -5.3 percentage points seems attributable to the high inflow of refugees from Ukraine. In fact, the number of migrants from Non-EU/EFTA countries captured by the labour force survey in Poland has increased by 69% from 2021 and 2022.

While it is not clear to which degree these recent arrivals are already captured in the labour force survey, as Ukraine is not individually identified as an origin country, they appear to be included at least in part. Available evidence however suggests that most Ukrainian refugees, mostly women, found in 2022 a first job in their host country, demonstrating a much faster labour market integration than most other refugee groups (see Box 1.3).

Employment rates for migrants between 2021 and 2022 increased the most in Greece (+6.0 percentage points), Iceland (+5.9 percentage points), and Ireland (+5.2 percentage points). The native-born in these countries also experienced the particularly high increases in employment rates, reflecting more favourable labour market conditions than the year before.

Three-fourths of OECD countries recorded an increase in the foreign-born employment rate compared to the pre-COVID situation, and 80% of these countries also experienced a simultaneous decrease in the unemployment rate. The increase in the employment rate of the immigrant population since 2019 is particularly significant in Greece (+7.6 percentage points), Denmark (+6.9 percentage points), and Finland (+6.2 percentage points). Only in a few countries, such as Germany, the improvement in the employment rate of immigrants in 2022 was not sufficient to offset the negative impact of the crisis.

Among Latin American countries with 2022 data available, Chile (+1.5 percentage points) and Costa Rica (+4.8 percentage points) experienced growth in immigrant employment rates that were higher than those of the native-born. Finally, the employment rate of migrants residing in Korea, where labour migration has been limited due to long border closures (ADB/OECD/ILO, 2023^[10]), has not yet recovered to pre-crisis levels.

The labour force participation rate of migrants in OECD countries, which had declined in 2020 due to limited access to the labour market for migrant workers and subsequent return migration to their countries of origin, also continued to increase in 2022, reaching an average of 78.2%, almost 2 percentage points higher than that of the native-born population. While almost half of OECD countries have a higher participation rate among migrants than among the native-born, this gap is particularly significant in Chile (+15.1 percentage points), Luxembourg (+10.5 percentage points), Portugal (+8.5 percentage points), and Costa Rica (+7.5 percentage points). On the other hand, the gap is negative in the Netherlands (-12.0 percentage points) and Germany (-7.1 percentage points).

Table 1.8. Labour market situation of migrants in 38 OECD countries in 2022

	2022		Change in 2022-21		Gap with the native-born in 2022	
	Percentages		Percentage points		Percentage points	
	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate
Australia	3.6	77.2	-1.8	+3.0	-0.3	-0.4
Austria	8.5	70.2	-2.8	+2.6	+5.0	-5.1
Belgium	9.5	61.5	-1.5	+2.1	+4.9	-6.3
Canada	5.9	75.2	-2.6	+2.3	+0.9	-0.6
Chile*	6.7	75.5	-0.7	+1.5	-1.5	+15.1
Colombia**	6.0	65.5	-11.4	+4.1	-0.2	+5.1
Costa Rica	11.3	66.9	-6.7	+4.8	-1.5	+7.6
Czech Republic	2.6	81.0	-0.7	+1.2	+0.4	+5.8
Denmark	7.5	72.6	+0.2	+2.6	+3.4	-4.8
Estonia	8.1	74.7	-1.6	+3.5	+2.5	-1.9
Finland	11.3	70.4	-2.4	+4.2	+4.9	-4.4
France	11.5	61.6	-0.9	+0.5	+4.7	-7.6
Germany	5.6	69.8	-0.9	+1.5	+3.0	-9.1
Greece	19.0	60.9	-4.0	+6.0	+7.0	+0.2
Hungary	4.0	80.6	+0.6	+0.3	+0.4	+6.4
Iceland	6.6	82.9	-4.1	+5.9	+3.3	-0.4
Ireland	4.9	77.0	-2.6	+5.2	+0.5	+5.2
Israel**	4.6	77.9	+0.3	-0.4	+0.0	+13.8
Italy	10.8	62.4	-2.3	+3.1	+3.0	+2.6
Japan***	5.0	77.3	-	-	+1.0	+0.7

	2022		Change in 2022-21		Gap with the native-born in 2022	
	Percentages		Percentage points		Percentage points	
	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate
Korea	4.1	67.8	-1.8	+0.2	+1.2	-1.5
Latvia	8.1	68.3	+0.1	+1.2	+1.1	-3.3
Lithuania	8.7	70.6	-1.3	+2.4	+2.6	-3.3
Luxembourg	4.9	74.2	-1.1	+1.4	+0.8	+9.5
Mexico**	5.4	51.7	-1.1	+4.3	+1.1	-9.4
Netherlands	5.8	70.3	-2.1	+3.5	+2.7	-13.7
New Zealand	2.7	82.7	-0.6	+1.9	-1.2	+4.4
Norway	5.9	73.2	-3.0	+3.0	+3.3	-5.8
Poland	5.7	75.1	+0.6	-5.3	+2.8	+3.8
Portugal	7.5	77.8	+0.5	+0.9	+1.6	+6.7
Slovak Republic	5.2	78.3	-2.9	+4.5	-1.0	+7.0
Slovenia	5.8	69.8	-0.9	+2.2	+2.1	-3.9
Spain	18.2	63.5	-3.4	+3.0	+6.5	-1.2
Sweden	16.0	68.8	-3.4	+3.9	+11.3	-11.3
Switzerland	7.0	75.3	-1.1	+0.1	+3.9	-6.4
Türkiye***	15.8	40.1	+1.2	-4.1	+2.5	-7.6
United Kingdom	4.9	75.8	-0.7	+0.4	+1.4	+0.3
United States	3.5	72.6	-2.1	+2.6	-0.4	+3.2
OECD average	7.6	72.3	-1.8	+2.3	+2.4	-0.4
OECD total	6.0	71.0	-2.3	+2.3	+1.2	+0.5
EU27	10.0	66.8	-1.8	+2.3	+4.4	-3.5

Note: Gap with the native-born refers to the difference between the corresponding rates of the foreign-born and native-born populations. The OECD total is a weighted average. The OECD average is calculated as a simple average of all countries with available data for both years.

([†]) The data for Chile include the first 11 months of the year 2022.

(^{**}) The data for Colombia, Israel and Mexico refer to 2021 instead of 2022, and the change refers to the comparison between 2020 and 2021.

(^{***}) The data for Türkiye and Japan refer to 2020 instead of 2022, and the change refers to the comparison between 2019 and 2020.

Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15-59 and refer to foreigners and immigrants who have been naturalised in the past 5 years, compared to nationals. Rates for Japan refer to foreign nationals.

The OECD average excludes Colombia, Israel, Japan, Mexico and Türkiye, as 2022 data for these countries are not available.

Source: European countries and Türkiye: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Japan: Population Census; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socio-económica Nacional (CASEN); Colombia: Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH); Costa Rica: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHOG); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE); United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/0uygt9>

Box 1.4. The labour market entry of Ukrainian refugees has been fast, but skills mismatches are common

Relative to previous waves of refugees, the new arrivals from Ukraine have been able to seek employment at an earlier stage. Within the European Union countries, the Temporary Protection Directive allows refugees to immediately engage in employment or self-employment, and many non-EU OECD countries have implemented similar provisions (OECD, 2022_[11]). This immediate access, coupled with higher levels of formal qualifications compared to other refugee groups and the presence of sizeable diaspora networks in several host countries, has facilitated the integration of Ukrainian refugees into the labour market.

In several European OECD countries, such as Poland, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands and Estonia (Table 1.9) over 40% of working-age Ukrainian refugees are already employed. Although rates may be lower in some countries, Ukrainian refugees are overall integrating into the labour markets of their host countries at a significantly faster pace than other refugee groups. On average, it has taken five to ten years for at least half of refugee arrivals to secure employment (OECD/European Commission, 2023_[12]).

Despite their relatively rapid entry into the labour market, the current employment patterns of Ukrainian refugees can be attributed, at least partially, to the networks available to them rather than their actual skill profiles (OECD, 2023_[13]). A considerable portion of initial employment opportunities for Ukrainian refugees has been concentrated in low-skilled jobs, leading to widespread skills mismatches. Despite their above-average educational levels, most Ukrainian refugees find employment in sectors with low entry barriers. Additionally, due to childcare responsibilities, Ukrainian refugees are more likely to engage in part-time and other non-standard employment arrangements (OECD, 2023_[11]).

Table 1.9. Estimated employment rates of refugees from Ukraine and main sectors of employment

	Employment rate	Main sectors of employment	Date	Source
Poland	65%	N/A	Nov-22	Narodowy Bank Polski
United Kingdom	61%	Hospitality; other sectors; information technology and communication sector	Mar-23	ONS
Sweden	56%	Services; construction; ICT	May-23	IOM
Lithuania	53%	Elementary occupations (including cleaning); services and sales	Jul-23	Lithuanian Employment Service
Czech Republic	51%	Unskilled/manual labour	Dec-22	PAQ Research
Denmark	46%	Cleaning; catering; warehousing	Apr-23	Integration barometer
Netherlands	46%	Business services sector (including employment agencies); trade, transport and accommodation and food services.	Nov-22	Statistics Netherlands
Estonia	46%	Manufacturing; administrative and support service activities; wholesale and retail trade.	Jul-23	Statistics Estonia
France	33%	N/A	Apr-23	Ministry of Labour
Ireland	28%	Wholesale, transport and accommodation	Jun-23	Central Statistics Office
Italy	19%	Domestic services, construction, catering	Dec-22	UNHCR
Switzerland	19%	Other sectors; hotel/catering; planning/consulting/IT	Jul-23	SEM

Note: The employment rates for Poland, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Italy are calculated based on survey results.
 Source: OECD (2023_[11]), "What are the integration challenges of Ukrainian refugee women?", <https://doi.org/10.1787/bb17dc64-en>; OECD (2022_[11]), *Rights and Support for Ukrainian Refugees in Receiving Countries*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/09beb886-en>;
 OECD (2023_[13]), "What do we know about the skills and labour market integration of refugees from Ukraine?"; <https://doi.org/10.1787/c7e694aa-en>; OECD/European Commission (2023_[12]) "Settling in", <https://doi.org/10.1787/1d5020a6-en>.

Long-term unemployment continues to disproportionately affect immigrants, despite improvements

Among unemployed migrants, the share of those who have been unemployed for 12 months or more decreased in several European OECD countries, Canada and the United States. The most significant decreases were observed in Portugal (-11.5 percentage points) and Ireland (-7.8 percentage points). However, the reverse was observed in several Central and Eastern European countries such as the Slovak Republic (+18 percentage points), Hungary (+10 percentage points) and Slovenia (+9.8 percentage points).

Immigrants remain more at risk of long-term unemployment than their native-born counterparts. In six out of ten OECD countries, long-term unemployment rates for immigrants exceed those of the native-born. The gap was particularly significant in Sweden (+20.2 percentage points), Luxembourg (+18.9 percentage points), and Belgium (+16.7 percentage points).

In the EU27 countries, the prevalence of long-term unemployment for immigrants decreased from 4.6% in 2021 to 3.7% in 2022, still a higher share than that of the native-born population. Migrant women are more likely to be in long-term unemployment than their male peers.

While the decrease in long-term unemployment rates was mostly driven by migrant women in the Czech Republic (-14.9 percentage points for women only), Norway (-9.7 percentage points), and Latvia (-8 percentage points), the opposite was observed for Portugal (-21.6 percentage points for males only), Ireland (-15.6 percentage points), Poland (-11.3 percentage points), and Greece (-8.8 percentage points). In the United States, 16.8% of unemployed foreign-born individuals were unemployed for more than 12 months in 2022, a decrease of 6.4 percentage points compared to 2021. In Canada, the long-term unemployment rate improved more significantly for migrants (-6.5 percentage points) than for their native-born counterparts (-4.8 percentage points).


Migrant women often benefitted disproportionately from the improvement in labour market outcomes

Figure 1.23 illustrates the changes in employment rates by gender, age, level of education, and duration of stay in the EU27, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Regarding differences by gender, the employment rate of migrant women increased more than that of men in non-European OECD countries, while the reverse was true in OECD-Europe despite some improvement in the labour market inclusion of migrant women. The increase in the employment rate of migrant women was particularly significant in the Nordic countries, such as Finland (+7.3 percentage points), Iceland (+8.6 percentage points) and Denmark (+4.2 percentage points), and in some Eastern European countries. Only Poland experienced a decrease in employment rates (-7.7 percentage points), attributable to the high inflow of refugee women from Ukraine.


Foreign-born women in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have reached their highest employment rates on record. However, the gender gap in employment rates persists even in these countries (Annex Figure 1.A.2). That said, the migrant gender gap in employment has been diminishing in these three countries, while this is not the case in Europe.

Figure 1.23. Changes in the employment rate by demographic group and place of birth in selected OECD countries, between 2021 and 2022



Note: The reference population is the working-age population (aged 15-64). Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15-59 (Youth: 15-29; Prime-age: 30-49; Old-age: 50-59) and refer to foreigners and to immigrants who have been naturalised in the past five years, compared to nationals. "Low-educated" refers to individuals with less than upper secondary education, "Medium" refers to those with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education, and "Highly" refers to individuals with tertiary education. Calculations have been made by the Secretariat using the adjusted series for the whole population provided by Eurostat.


Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; United States: Current Population Surveys.

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Looking at labour participation rates, the gender pattern is even more apparent (Figure 1.24). The labour market participation rate of migrant women has increased in virtually all OECD countries, except Korea, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The rate for migrant men has also increased, but in a smaller number of countries and to a lesser degree. Overall, the labour market participation rate growth of migrant women was higher than that of migrant men in two-thirds of the OECD countries considered.


While Poland experienced a significant decline in participation rates of migrant women, Denmark and Finland each saw the participation of migrant women increase by 4 percentage points or more, resulting in a notable reduction of the migrant gender gap in participation in these countries. In Finland, the rise in the participation of migrant women was accompanied by a decline in the participation of migrant men.

Figure 1.24. Change in the labour force participation rate between 2021 and 2022, by place of birth and gender, population aged 15 to 64



Note: Gap with the native-born refers to the difference between the corresponding rates of the foreign-born and native-born populations. The OECD average is calculated as a simple average and can be different from the previous year's average due to the different country coverage. Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15-59 and refer to foreigners and to immigrants who have been naturalised in the past five years, compared to nationals.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/o6deks>

The improvement in the labour market situation for young migrants was more uneven

While the employment rate of young migrants was still below the pre-crisis level in 2021, by the end of 2022 it had fully recovered, surpassing pre-crisis 2019 levels in most countries (Panel B of Figure 1.23). In the EU, the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand and Australia, young migrants' employment rates increased faster than those of their native-born peers. The exceptions to this trend were Canada, where employment rates increased for both foreign- and native-born youth, but more so for the native-born, and Korea, where the employment rates of young migrants decreased (from 54% to 50%).

In the EU, at 37%, the employment rate of foreign-born youth exceeds that of native-born youth (34%). In Korea, the substantial foreign-born advantage in youth employment rates decreased (from +10 to +3 percentage points) between 2021 and 2022. In both the United States and New Zealand, migrant youth's employment rates (at 47% and 62% respectively) slightly surpassed the rates of native-born youth in 2022. In the United Kingdom and Australia, migrant youth had lower employment rates than their native-born counterparts in 2022, although with a narrower gap in both countries (a gap of 10 percentage points and 6.5 percentage points respectively) than in 2021. In Canada, the gap in employment rates between young migrants and their native-born peers widened in 2022 (from -5 to -7 percentage points).

That said, for youth the most relevant indicator is the share of young people not in education, employment, or training (NEET rate). This rate stayed similar between 2021 and 2022 among native-born youth (at over 10%) while decreasing slightly (from 19% to 17%) among migrant youth, resulting in a slightly narrowing gap between the two groups (Figure 1.25).


Within Europe, the NEET rate among young migrants decreased the most in Italy (31% to 25%), which nevertheless remains the country with the highest NEET rates overall. Migrants' NEET rates also decreased in Germany (from 18% to 15%), although both countries maintain a gap of nearly 10 percentage points between foreign- and native-born youth. In some European countries, migrants' NEET rates worsened in 2022, including Greece (12% to 19%) and Switzerland (18% to 24%), widening the gap with native-born youth as a result. In the United Kingdom, the NEET rate of migrants stayed around 8%, while that of native-born youth increased to 10%. In the United States, after improving in 2021, the NEET rate for young migrants increased slightly in 2022 (from 15% to 16%), while decreasing for their native-born counterparts. In Canada, NEET rates decreased slightly for both migrant and native-born youth, though more slowly for the former (13% to 12%).

In the EU, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, the employment rates of highly educated migrants had already nearly recovered in 2021 and went on to surpass their pre-crisis 2019 levels in 2022 (ranging from 78% in the EU to 86% in the United Kingdom). The employment rates of low-educated nearly reached 2019 levels in the United Kingdom and Canada, and surpassed those in the United States and the EU (where they grew from 53% to 55%). As shown in (Panel C of Figure 1.23), in most countries the employment rates of migrants improved faster than those of the native-born population across levels of education, save for the medium-educated in the United Kingdom, and the low-educated in Canada. Among the low-educated in the United Kingdom and the highly educated in Canada, employment rates increased for migrants while decreasing for the native-born. Overall, in 2022, the employment rates of low-educated grew more strongly than those of their native-born counterparts grew further in the EU, the United Kingdom and the United States, while New Zealand achieved parity.

Canada, Korea and the United States recorded an increase of 3.2, 2.4, and 2.9 percentage points, respectively, in the employment rate of settled immigrants in 2022. However, among these countries, the employment rate of recently arrived migrants improved only in Canada while it declined in Korea and the United States (Panel D of Figure 1.23).

Figure 1.25. Share of young people not in education, employment or training (“NEET”), by place of birth, in selected OECD countries, 2019-22

Population aged 15-24



Note: Compulsory military service is excluded from the calculation. NEET rates of the native-born and foreign-born populations in the EU27 countries in 2019 and 2020 have been subject to adjustments for a break in series caused by a change in the methodology of the European Labour Force Survey in 2021. Calculations were made by the Secretariat taking into account the adjusted series for the whole population provided by Eurostat.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada and the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/2gnxmy>

While improvement was visible across origin regions, strong disparities persist

Migrants' labour market situation varies significantly depending on their region of origin for a variety of reasons. Migration category, gender composition, levels of education, size of the diaspora community and seniority of migration tend to vary significantly by country and region of origin across key OECD destination countries.

Table 1.10 shows changes in employment, unemployment, and participation rates by migrants' region of origin in 2022. In most OECD countries, the employment situation of migrants generally improved over the year. That said, the direction and extent of change varied also considerably depending on migrants' regions of origin. Looking at general trends across host contexts, employment rates improved for almost all groups in almost all destination countries considered.

Table 1.10. Employment, unemployment and participation rates by region of origin in selected OECD countries in 2021 and 2022, percentages

	Region of birth	Employment rate		Unemployment rate		Participation rate	
		2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Australia	Other Oceania	77.3	79.9	4.8	3.7	81.2	82.9
	Europe	78.3	79.8	3.6	2.8	81.2	82.1
	North Africa and the Middle East	56.7	58.8	9.8	8.3	62.9	64.1
	Sub-Saharan Africa	79.2	81.9	5.2	3.6	83.6	85.0
	Asia	72.8	76.8	5.8	3.5	77.4	79.6
	Americas	80.1	82.7	4.9	2.7	84.2	85.0
	Foreign-born (total)	74.2	77.2	5.3	3.6	78.3	80.0
Native-born	75.7	77.5	5.2	3.9	79.8	80.6	
Canada	Sub-Saharan Africa	73.1	74.6	9.7	7.9	81.0	81.0
	North Africa	70.1	71.7	10.5	9.4	78.4	79.2
	Middle East	64.7	66.9	11.9	8.6	73.4	73.3
	Asia	72.5	75.7	8.4	5.3	79.2	79.9
	Europe	77.4	78.3	6.4	4.7	82.7	82.1
	Oceania	80.5	78.6	4.4	4.3	84.2	82.2
	Other North America	69.5	71.7	7.6	6.8	75.2	77.0
	Central and South America and Caribbean	75.3	77.2	8.5	5.9	82.3	82.0
	Foreign-born (total)	72.9	75.2	8.5	5.9	79.6	79.9
	Native-born	73.4	75.8	7.0	5.0	78.9	79.8
EU27 countries	EU27 + EFTA	72.1	74.4	8.1	6.7	78.4	79.8
	Other European countries	64.5	66.2	9.4	8.2	71.2	72.2
	North Africa	51.5	53.5	19.0	16.6	63.6	64.2
	Sub-Saharan Africa	61.8	64.6	16.2	14.1	73.7	75.2
	Middle East	56.2	58.4	15.2	13.0	66.2	67.1
	North America	66.5	70.3	9.1	5.7	73.2	74.6
	Central and South America and Caribbean	64.1	67.9	17.8	14.6	78.0	79.5
	Asia	63.5	66.2	10.2	8.0	70.7	72.0
	Other regions	68.4	70.6	9.4	7.1	75.5	76.0
	Foreign-born (total)	64.5	66.8	11.9	10.0	73.2	74.3
Native-born	69.0	70.3	6.4	5.6	73.7	74.5	
United Kingdom	EU27	82.4	82.6	3.5	3.1	85.4	85.3
	Other European countries	73.6	71.2	5.1	7.0	77.6	76.6
	North Africa	63.6	60.2	14.2	12.9	74.2	69.2
	Sub-Saharan Africa	75.0	76.1	7.3	5.6	81.0	80.6
	Middle East and Central Asia	55.1	54.9	16.1	8.2	65.7	59.8
	North America	77.0	76.5	4.8	4.4	80.8	80.0
	Central and South America and Caribbean	75.9	76.2	6.5	7.2	81.3	82.1
	Asia	67.3	71.2	6.2	5.6	72.7	75.5
	Other regions	86.7	84.9	2.8	3.5	89.2	88.0
	Foreign-born (total)	75.5	75.8	5.6	4.9	79.9	79.7
Native-born	75.4	75.5	4.5	3.5	78.7	78.3	
United States	Mexico	68.3	70.8	5.3	3.5	72.1	73.4
	Other Central American countries	71.1	74.0	5.9	3.6	75.5	76.8
	South America and Caribbean	70.3	73.7	6.7	4.0	75.4	76.9
	Canada	75.6	74.7	3.4	2.4	78.3	76.6
	Europe	73.6	74.6	4.9	3.4	77.4	77.2
	Africa	69.8	74.3	7.1	5.1	75.2	78.3
	Asia and the Middle East	70.0	72.1	5.1	2.8	73.7	74.1
	Other regions	65.7	69.6	6.0	2.4	69.9	71.3
	Foreign-born (total)	70.0	72.6	5.6	3.5	74.2	75.2
	Native-born	67.8	69.4	5.5	3.9	71.7	72.2

	Region of birth	Employment rate		Unemployment rate		Participation rate	
		2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Korea	China (Ethnic Korean)	74.5	77.3	7.2	3.9	80.3	80.4
	China	35.8	37.6	10.9	7.3	40.2	40.5
	Viet Nam	54.5	54.5	6.1	5.1	58.0	57.4
	Other Asia	77.8	76.0	3.4	3.1	80.5	78.4
	Other regions	66.3	66.5	6.7	5.0	71.0	70.0
	Foreign-born (total)	67.6	67.8	5.9	4.1	71.8	70.7
	Native-born	67.3	69.3	3.5	2.9	69.8	71.4
Japan*	China		68.8		5.3		72.7
	Viet Nam		93.7		1.3		94.9
	Korea (including PRK)		71.6		6.7		76.8
	Philippines		78.0		5.8		82.8
	Brazil		78.7		9.1		86.6
	Other regions		79.6		4.8		83.6
	Foreign-born (total)		77.3		5.0		81.4
	Native-born		76.6		4.0		79.8

Note: The population refers to working-age population (15-64) for the employment and participation rates and to active population aged 15-64 for the unemployment rate. Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15-59 and refer to foreigners and to immigrants who have been naturalised in the past 5 years, compared to nationals. *Rates for Japan refer to foreign nationals and to the year 2020. The regions of birth could not be made fully comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the Secretariat are coded.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force, Japan: Population Census 2020; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/58esdn>

Employment rates of migrants from Asia improved more than those of other migrant groups in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Foreign-born from Europe generally saw an improvement in employment rates during 2022, with the exception of non-EU European-born migrants in the United Kingdom. For migrants from Central and Southern America and the Caribbean, employment rates improved in all major OECD host countries or regions (EU27, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada). Employment rates of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East improved in most examined contexts (Australia, Canada, EU27, the United States, and partly in the United Kingdom), although migrants from these regions still tend to have much lower employment rates than migrants from other regions of origin. Moreover, in both Korea and Japan, migrants from China have the lowest employment rates among the groups examined.

In the United States, all migrant groups had higher average employment rates than the native-born population in 2022, ranging from approximately 75% for Canadians and Europeans to around 71% for Mexicans. All groups saw an improvement in their employment rates, save for Canadians, who nevertheless remained the group with the highest employment levels. African-born migrants saw the strongest improvement, from below 70% in 2021 to over 74% in 2022.

In Canada, immigrants from Oceania, Europe and Central and South America remained above the native-born in terms of their employment rates (despite a slight decrease for Oceanian immigrants). Meanwhile, despite improvements overall, employment rates of immigrants from Africa (75-72%), the United States (72%) and the Middle East (67%), remained below native-born levels.

Within the EU27, intra-EU migrants continued to show the highest employment rates, at nearly 75%. Migrants from North America reached an employment rate similar to that of the native-born (70%), while migrants from Central and South America, Asia and non-EU/EFTA countries had rates in the range of 68-66%. Despite improvements over the year, migrants from the Middle East and North Africa region remained the groups with the lowest employment rates, at 58% and 54%, respectively.

In the United Kingdom, nearly 83% of EU-born migrants of working-age were employed. Employment rates of migrants from the Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa were also above those of the native-born, at around

76% each. While several groups experienced a decrease in employment rates in the United Kingdom, North African immigrants experienced the largest decline in employment rates of all groups examined in Table 1.10, from 64% in 2021 to 60% in 2022.

In Australia, migrants born in the Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa, other Oceanian countries and Europe retained employment rates higher than the native-born population, reaching around or over 80% each in 2022. The only group with a substantial disadvantage in this regard were migrants from North Africa and the Middle East, whose employment rates remained below 60%.

In Japan, migrant employment rates ranged from 94% for migrants from Viet Nam to 69% for those from China, while native-born employment was at 77%. In Korea, employment rates improved the most for China-born ethnic Koreans, who emerged as the origin group with the highest employment rate (77%). In contrast, other China-born migrants remained the group with the lowest employment rate, with a rate below 38%, despite a slight improvement since 2021.

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Annex 1.A. Supplementary tables and figures

Annex Table 1.A.1. Permanent-type flows to OECD countries by category, 2021 and 2022

Thousands and percentage change

	Work			Accompanying family of workers			Family			Humanitarian			Free movements			Total		
	2021	2022	%	2021	2022	%	2021	2022	%	2021	2022	%	2021	2022	%	2021	2022	%
Australia	36.1	41.0	14	43.5	48.0	10	80.4	54.3	-32	5.9	13.3	124	3.4	9.3	174	169.4	166.1	-2
Austria	2.1	3.3	60	1.8	2.2	21	10.8	12.7	17	12.1	16.6	37	46.3	53.9	16	73.6	89.2	21
Belgium	5.7	7.2	27	32.7	33.3	2	10.1	11.1	10	63.6	70.6	11	112.2	122.3	9
Canada	169.9	135.8	-20	83.1	119.8	44	81.4	97.3	20	60.2	74.3	23	406.0	437.5	8
Czech Republic	37.2	22.5	-39	11.4	10.7	-6	0.3	0.5	55	14.6	11.7	-20	63.9	45.6	-29
Denmark	12.4	17.8	44	4.5	6.8	52	4.8	5.5	16	1.4	1.4	3	32.0	38.1	19	55.4	70.3	27
Estonia	30.1	24.1	-20	2.9	3.2	11	0.0	1.4	2928	4.1	3.5	-15	37.1	32.2	-13
Finland	8.0	13.1	63	9.8	15.5	57	3.0	3.2	7	8.3	8.1	-2	29.5	40.2	36
France	54.1	68.2	26	97.1	94.9	-2	37.2	36.1	-3	62.6	72.8	16	278.1	301.1	8
Germany	56.6	89.9	59	86.0	95.0	10	69.8	128.5	84	312.1	320.8	3	531.5	641.1	21
Ireland	12.9	31.6	145	0.0	0.0	0	2.6	4.0	55	1.7	2.8	62	20.9	28.8	38	38.1	67.3	76
Israel	6.8	4.8	-29	25.5	74.3	191
Italy	48.6	64.2	32	120.5	131.3	9	21.8	25.7	18	45.0	44.3	-2	241.2	271.6	13
Japan	32.5	45.8	41	21.4	35.4	66	8.5	10.9	28	0.7	2.0	205	67.1	105.8	58
Korea	4.8	5.5	16	5.6	6.9	24	10.0	11.9	19	0.1	0.2	49	53.8	61.7	15
Luxembourg	2.2	3.6	61	5.1	6.0	18	0.9	1.2	28	17.1	17.8	4	25.5	28.6	12
Mexico	10.7	10.1	-5	27.7	32.2	16	20.4	20.8	2	67.7	74.1	9
Netherlands	20.8	32.4	56	34.5	45.9	33	24.7	29.6	20	90.8	99.6	10	170.8	207.5	21
New Zealand	6.9	74.8	987	8.4	63.0	652	15.3	9.0	-41	1.6	3.9	146	3.3	4.0	24	35.4	154.7	337
Norway	4.1	5.7	38	10.2	11.5	13	4.8	4.1	-14	19.5	22.1	14	38.6	43.5	13
Portugal	38.7	53.2	38	23.2	30.3	31	0.3	0.7	121	26.5	30.1	13	93.7	120.8	29
Spain	39.2	57.2	46	149.0	156.5	5	24.9	40.4	62	113.3	142.8	26	370.4	471.8	27
Sweden	16.3	17.6	8	14.2	14.1	0	24.1	20.8	-14	11.4	9.1	-21	25.2	32.6	29	91.2	94.1	3
Switzerland	2.4	3.0	29	14.5	14.8	2	8.1	8.0	-1	94.5	113.8	20	123.4	143.9	17
United Kingdom	81.6	170.3	109	91.4	154.9	69	107.4	86.8	-19	43.6	53.7	23	385.8	521.2	35
United States	104.8	145.7	39	102.0	141.9	39	533.2	580.9	9	48.3	92.0	90	835.4	1 048.0	25
OECD	838.5	1 143.8	36	375.8	593.0	58	1 510.1	1 579.9	5	413.5	580.5	40	1 003.0	1 124.5	12	4 420.4	5 434.4	23
EU	384.8	505.9	31	20.4	23.1	13	614.6	665.5	8	219.8	308.1	40	882.4	975.3	11	2 212.4	2 603.6	18

Note: EU totals do not include the United Kingdom. 2022 data are partly estimated.

Source: OECD International migration database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/mig-data-en>.StatLink  <https://stat.link/tya7zx>

Annex Table 1.A.2. Permits considered in the statistics on temporary labour migration and their characteristics

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Australia	Seasonal workers: Temporary resident (other employment) Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP); Pacific Labour Scheme; Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme (PALM)		
	Working holidaymakers: subclasses 417 and 462	Up to 1 year.	Subclass 417: uncapped. Subclass 462: capped except for the United States.
	Trainees: The Training visa (subclass 407) introduced in 2016.	Up to 2 years.	
	Intra-company transferees: Temporary resident Skilled programme	Up to 4 years.	
	Other workers: Temporary resident Skilled programme (except ICT); Temporary Resident (Other Employment) excl. "Invited for Other Social and Cultural Activity"; Entertainment; Family (Temporary); Religious Work		
Austria	Seasonal workers: Number of work permits issued (quota and out of quota workers)	Up to 9 months.	
	Intra-company transferees		Uncapped.
	Other workers: Posted workers. Researcher. Researcher (intra-EU mobility). Self-employed. Specific cases of gainful employment. Au Pair. Voluntary work/social work		Uncapped.
Belgium	Working holidaymakers: top 10 countries of origin (estimation)		
	Trainees (estimation)		
	Other workers: Au pair; Researchers		
Canada (TFWP and IMP programmes – initial permits)	Seasonal workers: Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme (TFWP): effective entries	Not renewable.	
	Working holidaymakers: International Experience Canada Working Holiday and International Youth Program (IMP)	Not renewable.	Uncapped.
	Intra-company transferees: International Mobility Program (IMP) Work Permit Holders by year in which Initial Permit became effective (Trade – ICT; NAFTA – ICT; GATS professionals; significant benefits ICT)	Varies.	
	Other workers: Temporary Foreign Workers with LMIA (excl. Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme – TFWP); International Mobility Program Participants (excl. Working Holiday (IEC); ICT; Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel; Spouses of skilled workers; Spouses of students PR Applicants in Canada; Humanitarian reason; Haiti special measures)	IMP: varies; Live-in caregivers: unlimited; other TFWP: not renewable.	Uncapped.
Denmark	Working holidaymakers: Residence permits for education – WHM		
	Trainees: Residence permits for education – Interns		
	Other workers: Residence permits for education: Au Pair; Volunteers.		
Estonia	Seasonal workers: Registration of short-term employment as a seasonal worker		
	Intra-company transferees: Temporary residence permits issued to ICTs		
	Other workers: Other registration of short-term employment and temporary residence permits		

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Finland (decisions on first residence permits)	Seasonal workers: Seasonal work visas; Seasonal work requiring a LM test	Up to 9 months.	
	Trainees: Internship		
	Intra-company transferees: ICT ; ICT (mobile)		
	Other workers: Volunteering; National researcher; Scientific research	Up to 12 months.	
France (first permits issued)	Seasonal workers: work authorisations issued for each seasonal work contract, including renewals – OFII statistics	Up to 9 months per year (3-year authorisation).	
	Working holidaymakers: <i>Programme vacances Travail</i>	Up to 12 months.	
	Trainees: <i>Stagiaires</i>	Up to 1 year initially (extension up to 3 years in total).	
	Intra-company transferees: <i>Salarié en mission / Salarié détaché ICT</i>	Up to 3 years.	
	Other workers: Temporary economic migration (visa “ <i>salarié</i> ” < 12 months)	Up to 12 months (renewable).	
Germany (grants of first residence permits)	Seasonal workers: § 15a Abs.1 Nr. 1 BeschV (Saisonbeschäftigung – Arbeitserlaubnis bis 90 Tage)		
	Trainees: Berufsausbildung (§ 16a AufenthG)		
	Intra-company transferees: § 8 BeschV (Praktische Tätigkeiten als Voraussetzung für die Anerkennung ausländischer Berufsqualifikationen), § 10 BeschV (Internationaler Personalaustausch, Auslandsprojekte), § 10a BeschV (ICT-Karte / Mobiler-ICT-Karte)		
	Other workers: “Au pair (§ 19c Abs. 1 AufenthG in conjunction with § 12 BeschV)”; European Voluntary Service (§ 19e AufenthG)		
Ireland	Working holidaymakers: Working holidaymaker visas		
	Trainees: Internship employment permit		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers: Contract for Services; Exchange Agreement		
Israel (entries excl. Palestinian workers, and stock of Jordanian daily workers working in uncapped sectors)	Working holidaymakers		
	Other workers: Construction: Jordanian workers (daily workers in capped sectors); Tel Aviv city rail project; Sea ports projects; Jordan Valley irrigation project; Foreign Construction Workers (bilateral agreements with Bulgaria, China, Moldova, Romania, Türkiye, Ukraine)	Daily workers: unlimited; other workers: renewable up to 63 months.	Capped.
	Tourism: Jordanian daily workers in hotel industry and construction in Eilat	Unlimited.	Capped.
	Agriculture	Not renewable.	Capped.
	Home care	Renewable up to 63 months (or up to 7 years if no employer change between 5 and 7 years of stay).	Uncapped.
	Specialists and skilled (experts working visa)	Unlimited.	Uncapped.
Italy (entry visa data)	Seasonal workers		Capped.
	Working holidaymakers: “Vacanze lavoro” programme		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers: Researchers; volunteering	Up to 12 months.	

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Japan (new visas, excl. re-entry)	Working holidaymakers: Working holidaymaker visas		
	Trainees: Trainees and Technical intern training		
	Intra company transferees Other workers: Professor; Researcher; Instructor; Specified Skilled Worker; Designated activities_ Researcher and IT engineer; Designated activities_Housekeeper; Designated activities_EPA candidates	1 to 5 years, renewable.	Uncapped.
Korea (Visas issued)	Industrial trainees: D-3		
	Working holidaymakers: H-1		
	Intra-company transferees: D-7		
	Other workers: Speciality Occupations (E-5); Unskilled Employment (E-9); Visiting & Employment (H-2); Foreign Language Instructor (E-2); Research – (E-3); Professors (E-1)		
Luxembourg (first residence permit issuances)	Trainees: “Stagiaires”		
	Intra-company transferees: Transfert intragroupe – expert/cadre; employé-stagiaire; mobile expert cadre; Travailleur transféré ; Mobilité à long terme du travailleur transféré – expert/cadre		
	Other workers: Posted workers; Researcher; Prestataire de service Communautaire; Volunteer; Au pair	Up to 12 months.	
Mexico	Seasonal workers: Cards of visiting border-worker (<i>Tarjetas de Visitante Trabajador Fronterizo</i>)	Up to 5 years.	
	Other workers: Temporary residence permit (<i>Tarjetas de Residente Temporal</i>) for work		
New Zealand (excludes Australian citizens)	Seasonal workers: Recognised Seasonal Employer Limited Visa; Supplementary Seasonal Employment (extensions)	Up to 7 months (or 9 months for citizen-residents of Tuvalu and Kiribati); extensions possible up to 6 months.	Capped.
	Working holidaymakers: Working Holiday Scheme	Up to 12 months (or 23 months for citizens of the United Kingdom or Canada).	Capped for some countries.
	Trainees: Work experience for student; Medical & dental trainee; NZ racing conference apprentice; Religious Trainees	Practical training for students not enrolled in New Zealand (or enrolled for 3 months maximum): up to 6 months; Religious trainees: up to 3 years; Apprentice jockeys: up to 4 years.	Uncapped.
	Other workers: Essential Skills; Essential Skills – current employment; Essential Skills – Skill Level 1; China Special Work Talent (Accredited Employer); Long Term Skill Shortage List Occupation; Specialist skills; Exchange Work; Skilled Migrant Accredited Employer; AEWV transitional; ASEAN Special Work Chef from Thailand; China Skilled Workers		
Norway (Education and work permits)	Seasonal workers: Work permits – seasonal	Not renewable.	
	Working holidaymakers		
	Trainees: Education permit – Interns (Praktikant eller gjestearbeider)		
	Intra-company transferees Other workers: Other granted work permits for third-country nationals		

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Poland	Other workers: Declarations >90 days; Total work permits (A, B, C, D, E); Notifications of entrusting work (March 2022 Law)		
Spain (residence permits)	Seasonal workers: Residence of limited duration: salaried and self-employed; agriculture and selected other sectors; GECCO programme		
	Intra-company transferees: EU and national programmes Other workers: America's Cup Sailing Barcelona 2024 Residence permit; Digital nomad; <i>Fixed-term residence:</i> Employment for others. Civil servants or military officials of foreign state administrations who come to Spain to carry out activities by virtue of co-operation agreements with the Spanish Administration; Foreign management staff and teaching staff of cultural and teaching institutions dependent on other States, or private institutions of accredited prestige, officially recognised by Spain, who carry out cultural and teaching programmes of their respective countries in our country, as long as they limit their activity to the execution of such programmes; <i>Researchers EU / national:</i> agreement with research organisations (EU and national): Research staff, scientific and technical staff; Professor; <i>Temporary residence:</i> Employed, Exception to the work authorisation; Self-employed; <i>Temporary residence – Exception to the work authorisation:</i> Foreign technicians and scientists, invited or contracted by the State, the Autonomous Communities or local authorities or bodies whose purpose is the promotion and development of research promoted or majority-owned by the aforementioned; Members of international scientific missions carrying out work and research in Spain, authorised by the State.		
Sweden	Seasonal workers: Berry pickers		
	Working holidaymakers: Working holiday visas		
	Other workers: Researchers		
Switzerland	Trainees	Up to 18 months.	Capped.
	Other workers: "Titulaires d'un permis de courte durée > 4 à < 12 mois" Permis de courte durée (L) >= 12 mois / Etats tiers		
United Kingdom (entry clearance visas granted)	Seasonal workers in horticulture (from 2019 on)	Up to 6 months.	
	Working holidaymakers: Tier 5 – pre PBS Youth Mobility	Up to 24 months (multi-entry visa).	
	Intra-company transferees:		
	Tier 2 – Intra Company Transfers Short Term (closed on 6 April 2017)		
	Tier 2 – Intra Company Transfers Long Term	Maximum 5 years (9 years if salary > GBP 120 000 per year).	
	Senior or Specialist Worker (Global Business Mobility)		
	Other workers: ECAA Businessperson; Tier 1 – Post Study; International Graduates Scheme; Minister of Religion, Missionary or Member of a Religious Order; Overseas Domestic Worker Private Servants in Diplomatic Households; Government Authorised Exchange (previously Tier 5); International Agreement (previously Tier 5); Secondment Worker (Global Business Mobility); Service Supplier (Global Business Mobility); UK Expansion Worker (Global Business Mobility); Other permit free employment		

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
United States (non-immigrant visa statistics)	Seasonal workers: H-2A – Temporary worker performing agricultural services; H-2B – Temporary worker performing non-agricultural services	Up to 3 years.	Uncapped (H-2A). Capped (H-2B).
	Working holidaymakers: J-1 – Exchange visitor, Summer Work Travel Programme	Up to 4 months.	
	Trainees: H3	Up to 2 years.	
	Intra-company transferees: L-1 – Intra-company transferee (executive, managerial, and specialised personnel continuing employment with international firm or corporation)	Maximum initial stay of one year (3 years for L-1A employees). Extended until reaching the maximum limit of seven years (5 years for L-1B).	
	Other workers:		
	H-1B – Temporary worker of distinguished merit and ability performing services other than as a registered nurse	Up to 3 years initially. Maximum limit of six years in total (with some exceptions).	Capped.
	H-1B1 – Free Trade Agreement worker (Chile/Singapore)		
	O-1 – Person with extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics	Up to 3 years (extension up to 1 year).	
O-2 – Person accompanying and assisting in the artistic or athletic performance by O-1	Up to 3 years (extension up to 1 year).		
TN – NAFTA professional	Up to 3 years.		

Annex Table 1.A.3. Inflows of temporary labour migrants (selected categories), 2013-22

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2022/19	2022/21
	Thousands										% change	
Seasonal workers												
AUS	1.6	2.6	3.8	5.3	7.4	10.5	14.5	4.6	14.6	24.7	+71	+69
AUT	15.1	7.2	6.9	6.7	6.9	7.6	15.2	14.1	16.9	22.0	+45	+30
CAN	27.6	29.8	30.8	34.2	35.2	35.8	36.9	31.2	34.3	37.2	+1	+9
ESP	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.8	6.6	14.0	12.2	18.7	15.5	15.4	+26	-1
EST	1.0	2.5	4.6	3.2	4.7	2.5	-45	-47
FIN	0.9	1.6	1.7	2.0	1.3	-16	-35
FRA	6.1	6.6	6.7	6.8	7.2	8.1	10.3	6.0	11.0	18.5	+80	+68
GBR	2.5	7.2	29.6	34.5	+1 285	+17
ITA	7.6	4.8	3.6	3.5	3.6	5.6	4.2	1.8	2.0	2.0 (e)
KOR	0.5	8.2	..	+1 393
MEX	15.2	14.7	15.9	14.9	12.4	10.7	10.0	3.7	3.7	4.4	..	+17
NOR	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.4	2.4	1.4	2.9	-16	+104
NZL	8.6	8.9	9.6	10.5	11.3	12.2	13.9	15.3	19.4	20.5	+48	+6
SWE	4.9	6.2	3.5	5.5	6.5	+6	+18
USA (H-2A)	74.2	89.3	108.1	134.4	161.6	196.4	207.5	216.6	302.3	298.4	+44	-1
USA (H-2B)	57.6	68.1	69.7	84.6	83.6	83.8	100.1	59.2	119.5	123.4	+23	+3
Total	219.5	237.9	260.5	306.2	339.4	396.7	444.3	390.7	585.9	623.5	+48	+6
Working Holidaymakers (WHM)												
AUS	255.4	226.9	222.9	213.2	210.5	211.2	198.3	65.4	41.4	186.3	-6	+350
BEL	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
CAN	44.9	43.2	39.6	44.7	55.8	56.6	55.5	15.8	14.2	44.1	-20	+211
DNK	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.5	1.8	3.7	1.0	0.0	0.7	-81	+3 171
FRA	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.8	4.3	5.0	5.2	2.0	2.5	2.6	-49	+7
GBR	20.9	23.5	25.3	22.3	21.6	20.8	20.1	8.0	8.3	17.0	-16	+104
ITA	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.2	0.2
JPN	9.1	8.1	10.4	11.9	13.8	15.9	18.0	3.3
KOR	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.9	2.4	2.7	0.9	0.3	2.0	-24	+541
NOR	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.5	+91	+190
NZL	51.9	58.1	63.5	69.8	69.2	65.9	59.2	14.8	0.9	74.9	+27	+8 115
USA	86.4	90.3	95.0	101.1	104.9	104.5	108.8	5.0	39.6	92.6	-15	+134
Total	475.6	458.0	465.8	473.3	488.0	485.2	475.5	118.2	108.0	420.7	-12	+290

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2022/19	2022/21
	Thousands										% change	
Trainees												
AUS	1.2	2.0	3.5	2.0	1.4	3.6	+4	+167
BEL	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	..	0.2	0.0	0.0
CHE	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-4	+14
DEU	3.9	3.8	4.3	3.9	4.0	4.6	5.1	3.1	5.3	9.3	+80	+73
DNK	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.9	2.3	2.4	1.6	2.0	2.0	-14	-1
FIN	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	-60	-27
FRA	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.5	3.1	4.2	2.5	3.3	3.5	-16	+7
JPN	83.9	98.7	112.7	121.9	144.1	163.6	201.9	86.2	23.6	182.9	-9	+675
KOR	1.6	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.1	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.4	-54	-3
LUX	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	+33	+83
NOR	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	-92	+1 700
NZL	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.2	0.3	0.0	0.2	-85	+714
USA	2.7	2.2	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.3	0.6	0.7	-30	+29
Total	97.4	111.6	126.0	134.7	158.5	179.7	220.8	96.6	36.9	202.9	-8	+450
Intra-company transferees												
AUS	8.9	..	7.8	8.1	7.6	4.7	2.8	1.8	1.5	2.6	-4	+66
AUT	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-30	+40
CAN	11.5	11.4	9.8	9.8	11.0	13.0	14.6	6.0	11.3	17.1	+17	+51
CZE	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	+24	-17
DEU	7.8	9.4	9.1	7.5	7.3	8.0	6.7	6.7	6.4	8.8	+31	+37
ESP	0.0	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.8	1.0	1.4	0.6	1.4	1.4	+5	-1
EST	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-76	-20
FIN	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-3	+87
FRA	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.8	3.4	3.7	3.6	0.6	1.0	1.6	-55	+68
GBR	33.2	36.6	36.4	36.0	32.8	31.7	27.1	8.8	12.9	20.7	-24	+61
IRL	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.2	0.7
ITA	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1
JPN	6.2	7.2	7.2	7.7	8.7	9.5	10.0	3.2	0.5	7.8	-22	+1 469
LUX	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	-21	+13
NLD	4.1	4.5	4.4	1.9	2.3
NOR	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.6	0.9	1.4	1.3	-21	-7
USA	66.7	71.5	78.5	79.3	78.2	74.4	77.0	18.6	39.4	80.7	+5	+105
Total	138.8	149.1	154.8	155.7	156.4	153.5	151.6	50.2	79.0	146.5	-3	+85


	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2022/19	2022/21
	Thousands										% change	
Other temporary workers												
AUS	114.7	116.4	124.6	133.9	137.0	147.3	151.2	89.6	106.9	255.0	+69	+139
AUT	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.0	1.0	0.6	1.5	1.6	+54	+5
BEL	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.0	-2	+14
CAN	70.8	59.4	43.1	48.6	71.5	86.5	108.1	48.6	65.6	132.1	+22	+101
CHE	94.4	79.4	84.2	73.4	74.3	74.6	57.9	44.6	47.8	54.9	-5	+15
CZE	0.7	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.6	0.5	0.7	-31	+37
DNK	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.8	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.0	0.7	-40	-23
ESP	3.0	2.8	2.8	6.3	7.8	8.9	11.7	8.2	10.8	16.1	+38	+48
EST	0.8	1.2	1.5	2.0	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.3	-56	-26
FIN	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.2	+17	+24
FRA	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.7	3.9	4.4	5.6	3.3	4.8	8.1	+44	+68
GBR	23.4	24.5	25.7	27.3	28.7	30.0	33.4	14.4	20.9	29.8	-11	+42
IRL	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
ISR	35.6	38.2	42.6	52.6	57.3	65.8	68.4	26.0	41.6	67.8	-1	+63
ITA	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.7
JPN	5.9	6.3	7.3	7.4	7.5	8.0	8.6	6.8	5.9	27.5	+218	+363
KOR	138.4	152.3	124.6	116.1	110.7	114.1	104.8	43.0	57.5	118.0	+13	+105
LUX	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	+40	+14
MEX	..	21.5	24.0	24.0	25.9	21.7	14.5	10.3	19.0	19.5	+34	+3
NOR	2.0	2.2	2.6	2.2	2.6	2.4	2.4	1.4	1.8	2.1	-13	+17
NZL	27.2	31.0	34.3	36.8	42.4	49.2	64.7	38.8	53.8	45.1	-30	-16
SWE	1.2	1.1	..	-4
USA	182.3	192.4	206.5	219.5	221.6	224.4	255.1	78.1	151.6	313.0	+23	+106
Total	707.9	737.2	734.2	759.6	798.0	844.0	893.6	418.0	595.6	1 096.2	+23	+84

Note: Totals include data for countries not shown in this Table. Excluding Poland. US data prior to 2019 are fiscal year.

Source: OECD International Migration Database (data available upon request).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/rswi4m>


Annex Figure 1.A.1. Employment rates by place of birth, 2002-22



Note: The reference population is the working-age population (aged 15-64). In the EU27, years between 2010 and 2020 have been subject to adjustments for the break in series caused by the change in the methodology of the European Labour Force Survey in 2021. Calculations have been made by the Secretariat using the adjusted series for the whole population provided by Eurostat.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.

Annex Figure 1.A.2. Evolution of the gender gap in employment rates, by place of birth, 2002-22



Note: The reference population is the working-age population (aged 15-64). In the EU27, years between 2010 and 2020 have been subject to adjustments for the break in series caused by the change in the methodology of the European Labour Force Survey in 2021. Calculations have been made by the Secretariat using the adjusted series for the whole population provided by Eurostat.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.

Annex Table 1.A.4. Employment rates of persons aged 15-64 by place of birth and education level, OECD countries, 2022

	Foreign-born			Native-born		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austria	52.1	74.1	80.2	46.0	76.6	87.6
Belgium	40.7	60.3	80.0	32.9	66.0	86.1
Canada	46.3	69.1	81.2	48.6	74.0	83.8
Chile	73.7	81.7	85.1	61.2	74.1	82.2
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic	58.7	83.9	85.1	23.7	81.0	86.3
Denmark	62.0	84.2	94.5	55.4	81.4	89.3
Estonia	54.6	73.2	78.7	42.8	79.8	89.7
Finland	49.7	75.6	82.1	41.9	75.8	88.7
France	49.7	60.5	73.9	35.8	69.2	86.4
Germany	58.0	76.8	78.7	51.7	81.7	91.2
Greece	57.7	58.9	71.0	38.5	58.8	78.9
Hungary	57.0	82.1	87.1	38.3	78.5	91.6
Iceland	75.5	81.8	88.9	69.4	84.0	92.4
Ireland	47.8	80.7	87.6	38.6	72.1	88.7
Israel	65.8	76.7	85.0	41.9	69.2	87.4
Italy	57.4	66.0	70.1	41.6	65.8	81.7
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-
Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-
Latvia	38.4	67.4	73.7	32.2	72.8	87.9
Lithuania	-	67.5	82.3	23.9	71.9	90.0
Luxembourg	57.0	63.6	85.1	35.9	67.1	85.2
Mexico	70.1	64.1	71.2	65.6	71.6	79.7
Netherlands	56.0	72.2	81.6	71.2	84.6	90.5
New Zealand	62.2	79.5	86.3	62.2	83.0	89.3
Norway	56.8	75.7	83.1	56.7	80.5	90.5
Poland	-	76.0	83.8	24.2	72.1	90.4
Portugal	71.4	81.1	91.1	59.9	71.4	87.8
Slovak Republic	-	81.8	85.6	15.1	76.3	86.9
Slovenia	44.9	75.6	82.6	28.7	72.6	90.1
Spain	55.9	64.7	74.2	48.8	59.6	82.4
Sweden	46.5	74.0	83.5	43.0	82.1	91.6
Switzerland	63.9	76.2	82.8	55.0	81.4	91.3
Türkiye	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	69.6	76.5	86.2	53.5	77.8	87.3
United States	60.9	71.1	79.7	30.2	67.6	83.1
EU27	55.1	70.0	78.0	43.4	72.6	87.2
OECD average	55.8	73.3	81.9	45.5	74.8	87.7

Note: For Chile data refers to 2017. For Mexico, data refers to 2019. For Israel, data refers to 2020. The OECD average excludes Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Türkiye as data are not available for at least levels of education in these countries.

“Low-educated” refers to individuals with less than upper secondary education, “Medium” refers to those with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education, and “Highly” refers to individuals with tertiary education.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada, Israel, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE); United States: Current Population Surveys.


Annex Table 1.A.5. Employment of foreign-born persons by industry, 2022

	Agriculture and fishing	Mining, manufacturing, and energy	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade	Hotels and restaurants	Education	Health	Activities of households as employers	Admin. and ETO	Other services	Total	Total foreign-born employed (thousands)	Foreign-born in total employment
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		(%)
Australia	1.3	11.0	7.4	11.8	9.0	6.7	14.8	-	9.0	29.1	100	14	30.3
Austria	0.9	18.9	10.0	14.3	11.2	5.5	10.5	-	9.6	19.0	100	1 001	23.9
Belgium	-	11.9	8.5	11.4	6.4	5.6	12.8	-	22.2	21.1	100	882	18.8
Czech Republic	1.1	34.4	11.2	13.7	6.3	4.7	7.1	0.6	5.8	15.0	100	250	5.2
Denmark	2.1	13.7	4.6	16.8	8.9	8.8	21.0	-	9.8	14.3	100	267	9.9
Estonia	-	31.3	9.2	11.0	-	10.1	-	-	7.7	30.7	100	53	8.9
Finland	1.9	13.2	7.3	9.3	9.9	9.7	14.9	-	12.3	21.6	100	245	10.3
France	1.2	10.8	10.9	12.6	7.5	6.7	13.7	2.2	12.2	22.2	100	3 235	12.2
Germany	-	23.4	7.7	13.3	7.2	4.7	12.7	0.7	11.1	19.2	100	7 906	20.1
Greece	8.6	16.3	12.6	13.6	17.6	2.5	4.0	5.0	8.0	11.8	100	310	7.9
Hungary	3.5	24.4	10.9	13.6	5.4	8.3	9.1	-	8.6	16.3	100	147	3.3
Iceland	-	16.1	5.6	11.1	11.6	12.6	13.6	-	9.5	20.0	100	34	17.9
Ireland	-	14.9	6.1	13.5	11.1	5.6	17.5	-	9.4	21.9	100	567	25.5
Israel	0.5	15.5	3.7	10.6	3.2	8.5	16.1	5.3	10.6	26.0	100	801	27.8
Italy	5.8	20.9	10.0	10.4	9.6	2.5	5.8	13.1	7.3	14.6	100	3 224	14.8
Japan	3.6	39.9	6.8	11.2	9.2	3.9	4.8	2.2	0.2	18.2	100	957	2.0
Latvia	-	26.0	12.5	20.5	-	12.3	-	-	-	28.6	100	47	6.0
Lithuania	-	26.8	-	15.9	-	12.6	12.6	-	-	32.1	100	40	3.1
Luxembourg	-	4.1	6.6	10.3	4.9	3.8	9.1	2.5	21.4	37.4	100	166	59.3
Netherlands	1.2	13.0	4.6	14.4	7.2	6.9	14.7	-	14.1	23.9	100	1 171	13.6
Norway	1.1	11.8	10.5	11.4	9.0	7.4	20.2	-	11.2	17.4	100	541	20.8
Poland	-	28.3	17.1	16.3	12.7	-	-	-	-	25.6	100	97	0.6
Portugal	-	14.9	6.7	14.0	9.2	11.0	9.6	3.7	12.7	18.1	100	461	10.3
Slovak Republic	1.0	21.4	8.0	19.5	6.1	4.0	7.7	-	9.3	22.9	100	23	1.0
Slovenia	-	27.1	16.3	10.8	5.9	5.9	6.4	-	11.1	16.6	100	102	11.1
Spain	5.8	10.1	9.6	14.1	16.4	3.1	6.3	9.1	8.6	16.9	100	3 732	19.3

	Agriculture and fishing	Mining, manufacturing, and energy	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade	Hotels and restaurants	Education	Health	Activities of households as employers	Admin. and ETO	Other services	Total	Total foreign-born employed (thousands)	Foreign-born in total employment
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		(%)
Sweden	0.5	10.8	4.8	9.3	6.5	13.3	20.3	-	13.2	21.3	100	1 060	22.8
Switzerland	0.6	15.4	7.9	11.9	6.6	6.2	15.1	2.3	8.6	25.3	100	1 160	32.4
United Kingdom	0.2	9.5	5.0	10.0	6.5	8.8	16.2	0.3	10.0	33.7	100	8 059	19.4
United States	1.7	11.6	12.4	12.1	8.9	6.3	12.7	-	9.2	25.4	100	23 799	19.3
EU 27	2.3	17.1	8.6	12.8	9.2	5.2	11.1	3.7	10.8	19.1	100	25 559	13.5
	Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	Mining and manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade and hotels and restaurants	Electricity, transport, communication and finance	Business, personal, public and others services					Total	Total foreign-born employed (thousands)	Foreign-born in total employment
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)					(%)	(thousands)	(%)
Korea	5.7	46.6	11.1	18.7	3.2	14.6					100	801	3.6

Note: A dash indicates that the estimate is not reliable enough for publication. ETO stands for extra-territorial organisations. The population refers to the employed population aged 15 to 64. Data for Australia and Japan refer to 2017 and 2020, respectively. Data for Israel and the Slovak Republic refer to 2020. Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15-59 and refer to foreigners and to immigrants who have been naturalised in the past 5 years, compared to nationals.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Israel, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Japan: Population Census; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/aoqd9p>

Notes

¹ Permanent-type migration data presented in this section includes new entries but also in-country changes of status from a temporary to a permanent status. The terms “permanent-type migration”, “permanent inflows/immigration”, and “admissions” are used interchangeably.

² The pathway allowed temporary labour migrants in New Zealand in 2021 to apply for permanent residence if they fulfilled one of three criteria (having been residents of New Zealand for over three years, meeting a wage threshold or working in an occupation with shortages).

³ The unprovoked war of aggression of Russia had a major impact on the volume and composition of temporary labour flows to Poland that required a special focus. Therefore, totals in this section exclude figures for Poland which are presented and discussed separately in Box 1.2.

⁴ In Estonia, Ukrainian citizens are included in the number of asylum seekers.

2 Recent developments in migration policy

This chapter provides an overview of the changes in the immigration policies of OECD countries during the period 2022-23, with a particular focus on major trends and policy changes related to labour migration and international pathways and protection.

In Brief

Key findings

- Most countries in the OECD are experiencing labour shortages and a lack of skilled workers, which has pushed labour migration higher on the policy agenda.
- New and ongoing wars and geopolitical conflict around the world have also led to record high levels of displacement and created a need to strengthen and expand current policy approaches to provide international protection, but also pilot new initiatives for persons in need of international protection.
- Several OECD countries have announced larger changes and reforms to the legal migration policy framework in the past year, often with the aim to increase migration to address labour and skill shortages. A few countries are instead explicitly looking at ways to reduce inflows.
- Besides measures to expand labour migration more generally, OECD countries are increasingly looking at making labour migration more skill-selective and/or focused on specific occupations and sectors.
- In the face of fast-growing numbers of persons in need of international protection, increasing exits from origin countries, and movements through transit countries, several OECD countries have introduced stricter asylum and border policies and reduced quotas for resettlement.
- Temporary approaches to protection – without a direct pathway for permanent or long-term residency – are increasingly being applied to address protection needs in multiple current protracted displacement situations.
- At the same time, there is a trend towards more diversification in the international protection and humanitarian admission responses. This includes the expansion of existing development of new complementary pathways such as private sponsorship programmes and labour and education pathways for refugees, to strengthen and extend national asylum and resettlement frameworks.

Introduction

Two years after the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing labour and skills shortages has become a top priority in national migration policy agendas in a majority of OECD countries. Part of this is related to short-term effects of the reduction in international mobility during the pandemic as well as widespread and persistent backlogs in processing applications. Part is due to a growing number of unfilled job vacancies. In the background, long-term demographic shifts are also shaping labour migration policy decisions. Many policy changes in 2022-23 thus focused on strengthening and expanding existing labour migration pathways as well as developing new policies and favourable pathways to admit labour migrants in specific occupations and sectors.

2022-23 was also marked by increased migration pressure in key origin and transit countries, driven by the lifting of pandemic travel restrictions, multiple and protracted refugee situations and escalation of geopolitical conflict. This has resulted in record high levels of displacement globally, as well as a sharp increase in irregular arrivals and asylum applications in many OECD countries. Against this background, a few, partly contradictory, trends in the provision of international and humanitarian protection have emerged in the OECD area. On the one hand, several countries have tightened their asylum policies,

lowering resettlement quotas and imposing stricter eligibility conditions for asylum seekers. On the other hand, policy responses have become more diversified, with a growing number of programmes established as a complement or alternative to traditional international protection pathways.

Major policy trends in 2022-23

Several OECD countries have announced sweeping changes or reform to the migration policy framework in the past year. Some have gone as far as announcing a migration policy “paradigm shift” (Sweden, Finland and Germany), although the purpose and intended impact on net migration of these reforms varies. While many countries are focusing on attracting immigrants to address labour and skills shortages, several committed to decrease overall migration levels.

Following elections, both Sweden and Finland are translating into stricter migration policies. The new government which took office in Sweden in October 2022 announced a series of changes with the overall aim to reduce net migration. The proposed reforms include stricter asylum legislation as well as stricter conditions for low-skilled labour immigration – including a higher salary threshold – and family reunification. The new coalition government in Finland following the elections in April 2023 announced its intention to cut refugee quotas and family reunification, raise the bar for work-based immigration and apply stricter language and residence requirements for foreigners to obtain citizenship. The post-Brexit immigration system in the United Kingdom aimed to make migration more selective, in particular limiting low-skilled migration, and reduce irregular border crossings. In the face of record-high immigration numbers in 2022 – due in part to a fast-growing number of dependants of international students, which increased by 750% between 2019 and 2023 – the government announced restrictions to student visa routes in May 2023. Only international students in post-graduate research routes will be able to bring family members.

Other countries are instead focusing on facilitating legal migration, notably to fill labour gaps, through for example more flexible admission conditions, increased quotas, and streamlining of immigration procedures and processes. Spain has reformed its General Immigration Law to streamline migration policy procedures with the overall aim to address persistent labour shortages and attract legal labour migrants into needed occupations. The reform facilitates and expands access to work permits and streamlines migration processes for different categories of migrants, including students and seasonal workers. The German Government adopted the bill to reform the German Immigration Act for Skilled Workers in March 2023. The reform, which passed legislation in July, will broaden the eligibility criteria for the EU Blue Card (e.g. by lowering the statutory salary requirements), relax several of the requirements for labour immigration of skilled workers, and facilitate temporary low-skilled labour migration. A new points-based job-search visa is also foreseen. The Australian Government is currently reviewing its immigration system and has identified a rebalance in temporary and permanent programmes as a key area to attract and retain global talent. In line with this, the government has announced an aim to create more pathways for permanent residency for skilled migrants in the future. Other policy changes include reforming the occupational shortage and streamlining intra-company transfers.

Strengthened regional migration management collaboration

At the EU level, Member States have agreed on significant parts of the long-negotiated New Pact on Migration and Asylum. A critical topic in the negotiations has been how to distribute asylum seekers more evenly across member countries. How and where an asylum application is processed is currently set out in the Dublin Regulation, but some countries have shouldered a greater burden, and asylum seekers are treated differently across the EU. The core of negotiation was the need to strike a balance between responsibility and solidarity. In June 2023, the European Council reached an agreement on two central legislative acts of the proposal affecting the distribution of asylum applications between Member States.

Two other main components of the pact include simplified asylum procedures and procedures for labour migration.

Migration management collaboration is also expanding in the Americas, notably with the adoption of the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection in June 2022, signed by 21 countries. The non-binding declaration focuses on addressing the root causes of migration, expanding legal pathways, combatting human trafficking and other dangerous activities, and creating an early-warning system for large-scale crises. Since adoption, governments in the region have launched important initiatives, including expanded refugee resettlement programmes, family reunification and labour mobility schemes and other safe legal pathways to protection and immigration into the United States and other countries. In parallel, several bilateral migration-related agreements have also been concluded. The United States signed bilateral migration-related agreements with Costa Rica and Panama, and five mobility agreements were signed in different subregions within the Americas.

Electronic Travel Authorisation to be introduced in Europe

New requirements to travel to Europe will come into effect in 2023 through the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS). ETIAS is an electronic travel authorisation system that requires people from over 60 visa-exempt countries to seek travel authorisation to enter the Schengen zone. The authorisation does not apply to EU countries that are not part of the Schengen Zone. The system is expected to be fully operational in 2024. Similarly, the United Kingdom is implementing an Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) for people travelling to the country without a visa. The ETA is an electronic permission linked to the passport and is required for various visit purposes, including tourism, visiting family or friends, business, study, and transit through the United Kingdom without going through border control. Applications can be made through the UK ETA, with a decision usually provided within three working days. The ETA is valid for a maximum of two years and can be used for multiple visits. Individuals entering the United Kingdom under the ETA will continue to be subject to the same restrictions which currently apply to all visitors under the UK Immigration Rules. The scheme will initially be rolled out at the end of 2023 and beginning of 2024 for nationals from certain countries (Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), followed by a roll out for all other nationalities, except Irish nationals, during 2024.

The return of labour migration policy

While 2022 was marked by weakened economic conditions with high energy and food prices and turbulent financial markets, the global economy showed signs of slow recovery and improving prospects for growth in the first quarter of 2023. Despite weak economic conditions, labour markets in the OECD area remain strong, with record high employment rates and steadily falling unemployment rates. Many OECD countries are struggling to fill labour vacancies due to labour shortages and a lack of skilled labour. Attracting mid- and high-skilled migrants from abroad to support economic recovery and address labour shortages has thus become a priority in migration agendas in many countries. This is manifested in an increase in national targeted levels of labour immigration, more skill-selective policies, and efforts to facilitate immigration processes more generally.

Attracting talent continues to be a top priority in many OECD countries

A focus on increasing overall labour migration...

Several OECD countries have raised the national quotas or targeted number of immigrant workers to ease workforce and skills shortages and support economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, Australia and Canada have announced increased immigration targets in their latest migration

plans. Canada aims to progressively increase immigration over the coming three years. The 2023-25 Immigration Levels Plan targets an admission of 465 000 permanent residents in 2023, 485 000 residents in 2024, and 500 000 residents in 2025. The 2023 target is 4% higher than in the 2022-24 Immigration Levels Plan. Italy and Norway increased quotas for third-country national workers compared to 2022 quotas. Italy further introduced a new law to issue future quotas every three years instead of annually and extend the validity of residence permits issued for family reasons, indefinite contract work, and self-employment from two to three years. In July 2023, Italy announced sharply higher quotas for 2023-25, of about 150 000 entries annually, as well as 40 000 additional seasonal entries open to those who were excluded from the 2022 quota. Austria, among other changes aimed at facilitating labour migration, increased its quota for seasonal workers by about 15% (from 5 035 in 2022 to 6 568 places in 2023). Finland – prior to the change in government – adapted its immigration legislation to spur work-based annual immigration to address skilled labour shortages, and introduced a fast-track plan for specialists by extending the long-term D visa to students, researchers, and employees with a certified employer and their family members. The H-2B programme in the United States, which allows employers to hire migrant workers for temporary and seasonal jobs, reached record numbers in 2022 as the government raised the fiscal year 2023 allocation with 64 716 supplemental visas for businesses who would suffer “irreparable harm” if unable to secure the workers requested.

New visa streams to attract workers have also been put in place. In July 2022, the Australian Government introduced the Temporary Residence Transition (TRT) stream under the Employer Nomination Scheme visa. This stream is designed for Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa holders whose employers wish to sponsor them, and the eligibility for the TRT stream was reduced from three years to two years of employment with the sponsoring employer and enables employers to address skills shortages by ensuring a permanent employer-sponsored pathway is available for a wider range of occupations.

Slovak Republic and Slovenia have adopted new laws to facilitate labour migration procedures. Slovenia made amendments to the law on the employment of foreigners in March 2023 to address labour shortages by speeding up the recruitment of immigrant workers from abroad or through status changes while ensuring adequate working conditions and fair remuneration. Employer or job changes will now be possible without any further administrative procedure beyond a consent of the public employment service and during the validity of the single permit. The simplified rules do not apply to foreign workers in the public sector. Furthermore, access to the labour market for asylum seekers will be shortened from nine to three months after the application has been registered. In the Slovak Republic, a new law adopted in January 2023 expands the categories of workers who are exempt from labour market testing and allows non-EU nationals on Single Permits to remain employed while their renewal application is pending.

Other measures to enable immigrants to fill labour shortages include facilitating legalisation processes of undocumented workers. The French Government has put forward a new immigration bill that will facilitate the legalisation process for undocumented workers already in the country who are active in sectors with labour shortages, while at the same time providing for swifter deportations. As part of a larger reform of its immigration system, Spain is introducing a regularisation programme to allow those who have lived in Spain for at least two years to regularise their situation in order to fill positions that are in demand, subject to training. The eligibility requirements and geographical scope for self-employment have also been relaxed.

In Germany, in addition to the significant overhaul of its labour migration system outlined above, a further new law, effective as of January 2023, allows migrants with long-term “tolerated status”¹ to obtain a temporary residence permit for 18 months, subject to certain conditions such as having resided in the country for the past five years. During this time, they are given a chance to fulfil the legal requirements for longer-term residence.

In contrast to the policies above, there are also policy changes that will increase the barriers for immigration, and particularly for low-skilled migrants. While Sweden has announced measures to promote

high-skilled migration through a new model for more efficient processing of work permit applications and the establishing of international recruitment units, the government also aims to cut low-skilled migration by raising the minimum salary requirement. As of October 2023, the minimum threshold salary requirement will double, from SEK 13 000 to SEK 26 560 which corresponds to 80% of the median salary. Australia has also announced an increase in the minimum threshold salary. As of July 2023, Australia increased the Temporary Skilled Migration Income Threshold (TSMIT) from AUD 53 900 to AUD 70 000. The TSMIT had remained constant since 2013, and the new income threshold corresponds to the threshold if it had been indexed to inflation and wages growth over the past decade. About 21 000 current workers on temporary skill shortage visas are currently paid less than AUD 70 000.

...and making it more skill and sector selective

Rapid technological development, growing specialisation in human capital and digitalisation in OECD economies has led to an increased need to design policies to attract immigrants with specific skill sets to support growth and innovation in key sectors. A common approach is to design labour policies to favour certain attributes, such as high wages, advanced qualifications, or specific sectors and occupations.

Australia has launched an international marketing campaign targeting skilled workers overseas in key sectors and occupations and prioritised processing for skilled visa applications in healthcare and teaching occupations. Austria has extended the occupation shortage list from 66 occupations in the 2022 list to 100 occupations in 2023. In Belgium, Flanders added four occupations to its shortage occupation list, while Wallonia expanded its shortage occupations list from 42 to 75 occupations in October 2022. Switzerland has relaxed the rules for highly skilled immigrants, including exemption from labour market tests for migrant workers in industries with skills shortages.

Visas to attract specific groups of immigrants with in-demand skills or experiences, such as start-up and talent visas, have also been on the rise in OECD in the past decade, but saw mixed developments in 2022-23. Canada has launched a Tech Talent Strategy to strengthen its position in global tech talent recruitment and attraction. The approach focuses on four key pillars. These include a new innovation stream under the International Mobility Program to attract highly talented individuals; improvements to existing programmes for workers in high-skilled tech occupations, including the Global Skills Strategy and the Start-up Visa Programme; and promoting Canada as a destination for digital nomads. Spain has created a one-year digital nomad visa, renewable for up to five years. Spain also extended the maximum initial validity of its start-up permit from two to three years and eased permit requirements by broadening the definition of “highly qualified professionals” and “entrepreneurial activity”. Japan improved rules for digital nomads. Italy’s plans to introduce a one-year digital nomad visa in the second half of 2022 were however put on hold. On the other hand, the United Kingdom has decided to phase out its start-up visa, while Australia is scaling down on the number of visas issued for its Global Talent Visa – which includes start-ups – from 15 000 in 2019 to 5 000 2023.

Migration and mobility agreements as a tool to recruit immigrant workers in key origin countries

To step up efforts to actively recruit immigrant workers, several OECD countries continue to sign bilateral agreements and advance migration and mobility partnerships with selected origin countries. Portugal, Germany and Austria have recently concluded agreements on migration and mobility with India. This is the first time Germany has signed such a bilateral agreement, and the agreement is intended to serve as a model for potential future similar agreements with other countries. India previously also concluded bilateral migration and mobility agreements with Finland, France and the United Kingdom. Portugal has also concluded a bilateral agreement on Moroccan workers staying and working in Portugal. Spain has signed a circular migration agreement with Guatemala to attract seasonal agricultural workers and launched a new edition of its wider bilateral programme with origin countries² with the aim to recruit more

than 16 000 seasonal workers from Morocco to the Spanish agriculture sector. Spain also admitted workers from Honduras, Ecuador and Senegal on a pilot basis.

Other measures to attract foreign talent include Germany's placement agreements with Jordan and Brazil for care workers, and the extension of an earlier placement agreement with Mexico to include hotel and restaurant workers. Workers recruited under these agreements can initiate the procedure for the recognition of their qualifications at the same time as they take up employment in Germany.

Australia is expanding the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme (PALM) through the consolidation of two provisions under one streamlined scheme and an aim to increase the number of PALM scheme workers to around 350 000 by June 2023. The PALM scheme also allows workers to bring immediate family members, who are allowed to live, work and study in Australia.

At the EU level, the Talent Partnerships launched in the context of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum aim to address skills shortages in the EU, strengthen mutually beneficial migration partnerships with third countries, and combat irregular migration. The talent partnerships will be open to all skill levels, various types of mobility (temporary, long-term, or circular), and economic sectors. In a first phase, the EU intends to conclude agreements with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

Addressing labour market matching issues

One barrier to international recruitment is friction in matching, which may be due to information shortfalls and processing delays. To reduce this friction, some OECD countries have allowed migrants to enter the country with the main purpose of seeking a job through a specific job-search visa. Job-search visas offer an opportunity for employers to meet potential candidates prior to making employment decisions and accelerates and simplifies the hiring process once a decision is taken. However, only a limited number of OECD countries currently offer job-search visas (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1. Job search visas in the OECD

At present, at least nine OECD countries offer a job-search visa: Austria, Chile, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. A few of these countries have introduced more than one type of job-search visa or permit (Chile, Germany and Japan). The duration and eligibility criteria of job-search visas vary significantly across countries. Most job-search visas implemented in OECD countries have focused on highly qualified workers and/or shortage occupations. The Portuguese job-search visa stands out as the only visa without explicit skills requirements. Job-search visas are initially issued for between 6-24 months, sometimes with the right to renewal. A job-search visa often allows the holder to work, but some countries (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Portugal) require a change of permit once the job seeker receives a job offer.

Several OECD countries have also experimented with job-search visas in the past but decided to phase them out. The reasons for cancelling the programmes vary, including difficulty in assessing likelihood of success, extended processing times, low number of applications, or overlap with other legal labour migration channels.

Source: OECD Secretariat based on information provided by the OECD Working Party on Migration.

Retaining talent through permit transitions

Australia is planning to improve access to permanent residence for skilled migrant workers to attract more highly skilled immigrants and move away from temporary labour migration. Following a comprehensive review of the Australian immigration system, the government announced that it plans to amend and expand the Temporary Residence Transition (TRT) stream of the Employee Nomination Scheme (ENS) by the end of 2023. All Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa holders will be eligible for ENS visas. Sponsored foreign nationals who hold a valid visa will be eligible for the ENS TRT stream after two years of employment instead of three years, and the limit on short-term TSS visa applications that can be made onshore will also be removed. Australia will further introduce a new Permanent Engagement Visa (PEV) to boost Pacific permanent migration, with an annual limit and distribution by lottery.

International students constitute an important pool of current and future workforce. Spain has improved the conditions for students to work during their studies and to stay and work post-graduation to encourage employment and self-employment among international graduates from Spanish universities. The changes allow foreign students to work 30 hours per week, up from 20, to gain more work experience in the Spanish labour market during their studies and more easily transition from a study permit to a work permit after graduation, including for self-employment. Australia has extended post-study work rights for international graduate students from an Australian higher education provider in targeted sectors (health, teaching, engineering, and agriculture). Korea has launched a fast-track programme for permanent residence and naturalisation of outstanding foreign scientific and technological talents to retain international top students and promote their integration.

International protection and humanitarian pathways

The global level of forced displacement reached new record levels in 2022. Much of the increase in the past year was driven by the war in Ukraine, but war and conflicts in other parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Syria, Myanmar and Sudan, also contribute to the unprecedented numbers of displaced persons. Besides the inflow of Ukrainian nationals, the EU also saw a sharp increase in asylum applications from other nationalities in 2022. In the Americas, an increasing number of migrants from the region and beyond looked to cross from Mexico into the United States.

Several OECD countries have introduced reforms and policy changes to tighten the asylum system. Two additional trends related to international protection have emerged in the past years. The first is increased resort to temporary rather than permanent protection status for those in need of protection. Beyond the activation of the EU Temporary Protection Directive for Ukrainian nationals, similar approaches are increasingly being applied to other nationalities and protracted displacement situations. The second is the diversification of humanitarian responses, with the development of a broader set of pathways applied to respond to international protection needs. Countries are increasingly looking at complementary approaches, such as private sponsorship programmes and labour migration pathways, alongside national asylum and resettlement frameworks.

Recent changes in asylum-related policies

Several OECD countries have introduced stricter asylum-related policies in the past year. In November 2022, Costa Rica signed two decrees establishing stricter conditions for asylum seekers, to alleviate pressure on the asylum system that is suffering from heavy backlogs. The new policies limit the ability of asylum seekers to obtain a work permit while their application is pending approval, restricts the time between entry to submission of the application to one month, and requires a justification. Sweden is also introducing more strict asylum legislation, phasing out permanent residence permits in favour of

temporary restrictions. The Swedish Government is further planning to limit the possibility to grant residence permit on humanitarian grounds.

A few countries are also introducing policies to prevent people entering the country through irregular channels from seeking asylum. In the United States, the Title 42 public health order border restrictions introduced under the Trump administration, which allowed for the expulsion of asylum seekers to prevent cross border spread of COVID-19, were lifted in May 2023. The Biden administration instead ordered a transition back to Title 8 border processing, individuals who unlawfully cross the border are considered ineligible for asylum – unless they can demonstrate an exception – and will be removed and barred from reentry for a least five years. In 2022, the United Kingdom announced its aim to send irregularly arriving asylum seekers to Rwanda, and Denmark has signed a declaration with Rwanda to enable a mechanism for the transfer of asylum seekers from Denmark to Rwanda.

Finally, policy responses to displacement directly and indirectly impacted by climate change has been gaining interest from policy makers and the international community in recent years. Few OECD countries have introduced explicit policies to respond to climate-induced displacement. One exception is Colombia. In April 2023, Colombia's Congress began discussing a bill to recognise climate-induced displacement, the first of its kind in Latin America. Adopting a broad definition of climate-displaced people, it seeks to prioritise access to housing, health services and education and to establish a national register of climate-displaced people. The bill has received approval in the first out of four rounds of discussion required to pass.

Resettlement programmes are picking up after the COVID-19 pandemic, but several countries have reduced annual quotas

Most refugees and forcibly displaced persons are hosted in neighbouring countries and regions. Many OECD countries are currently receiving refugees through resettlement programmes, which can help alleviate pressure in countries of first asylum.

The United States has historically resettled more refugees annually than any other country. In recent years, resettlement declined in both commitments and actual numbers due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stricter policies introduced by the Trump administration, including a historically low cap of 15 000 in fiscal year 2021. The Biden administration has announced a substantial increase in the total resettlement admissions caps for US Fiscal Years 2022 and 2023 to 125 000, the highest quota in several decades.

Some countries in OECD Europe, such as Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Ireland have long-standing resettlement programmes going back several decades. Other countries only recently started receiving refugees through resettlement, often around or just after 2015 when the EU Resettlement Programme was launched (EMN, 2023^[2]). Several OECD European countries reduced the annual quota for resettlement during 2022-23, including Belgium, Germany and Sweden. Finland was one of the few countries to increase the quota between 2021 and 2022, but the new government that came into power in June 2023 has announced a future reduction in refugee resettlement quotas.

At EU level, the European Commission proposed a Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework in 2016, to secure a more permanent and predictable EU policy on resettlement that can complement national resettlement programmes. The European Council and Parliament reached a final agreement on the Regulation in December 2022, which is still awaiting formal adoption.

Besides refugee resettlement programmes, some OECD countries are also providing humanitarian admission programmes as a complement for displaced people that do not meet the requirements for resettlement. Such programmes have for example been applied in the evacuation of Afghan nationals following the fall of the prior government in 2021.

International protection responses are increasingly of temporary nature

The response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis reveals an emerging trend to provide temporary humanitarian protection. Recent examples include responses to mass displacement of not only Ukrainian but also Afghan, Venezuelan and Syrian nationals. Temporary protection approaches have the advantage of being flexible and offering fast access to protection in critical situations such as mass displacements. On the other hand, temporary approaches sometimes come with limited rights and are often designed to remain temporary, providing no direct pathway to permanent or more long-term residence. Beneficiaries are left in an uncertain and sometimes vulnerable situation.

In Europe, the EU Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) has now been extended to grant protection status to Ukrainians until March 2024. Finland and Poland have recently started offering Ukrainians under temporary protection status an opportunity to apply for a residence permit for work, to provide greater stability for employment and other rights. Uptake in both countries has however been low.

Other OECD countries also offer similar temporary protection approaches as the TPD. The United States offers humanitarian parole under Uniting for Ukraine (U4U). Humanitarian parole does not grant a pathway to permanent residence. Canada grants two-year temporary protection to Ukrainians through the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel for overseas Ukrainians (CUAET). The application deadline for CUAET has been extended to mid-July 2023, while those already in Canada with a visa under CUAET have until end of March 2024 to apply to extend or change their temporary status in Canada.

The United States has extended humanitarian parole to Afghan nationals that have been evacuated from Kabul since 2021. A re-parole process providing for a two-year renewal for qualifying Afghan nationals was announced in June 2023, enabling Afghan nationals to continue to live and work in the United States. However, the US Congress has so far declined to take up the Afghan Adjustment Act, which would grant a path to permanent residence. Similarly, new parole programmes granting temporary protection status have also been introduced for up to 30 000 nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela, to address pressing protection needs and pressure at its southern border.

Temporary residence permits and visas are also being issued to asylum seekers and displaced people already residing in the country of destination. The United States Temporary Protected Status (TPS) allows migrants whose countries of origin are considered unsafe the temporary right to live and work in the United States. During 2022-23, TPS was designated or extended for nationals of South Sudan, Ukraine, Sudan, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Syria, Venezuela, Burma, Ethiopia, Haiti, Yemen, Somalia, El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal and Nicaragua. Costa Rica has created a temporary special labour pathway for asylum seekers from Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Asylum-seekers from these countries with a pending or rejected application can now apply for a two-year temporary work and residence permit, provided that they waive their asylum application and renounce the claim to refugee status.

In the Americas, Venezuelans have been granted temporary protection in several countries across the continent, often without a pathway to permanent or long-term residency. Temporary Protection Status (TPS) remains the main protection and regularisation instrument for Venezuelan migrants in Colombia and has set a historic precedent in the region. It grants legal status to stay in the country for an initial ten years, with the possibility to apply for a permanent resident visa after ten years. However, Venezuelans have faced increasing challenges to obtain TPS, as well as barriers to access education, healthcare, or other services. To address this, in January 2023, the migration authorities developed a new temporary identification document/certificate for TPS applicants, to facilitate access to public services and temporarily enter and leave the country. Throughout 2022 and 2023, Colombia has also issued measures aimed at extending protection to those in an irregular situation.

Complementary pathways

The global increase in displacement has led to the development and expansion of innovative approaches to increase access to protection. Complementary pathways constitute a complement to refugee resettlement and other forms of access to asylum by offering safe and legal admission avenues to refugees residing outside their country of origin seeking opportunities in a third country (OECD/UNHCR, 2023^[3]). Advancing complementary pathways for refugees to safely move to third countries is a key objective of the Global Compact on Refugees. Complementary pathways can include pathways through education, employment opportunities, family reunification and humanitarian and sponsorship schemes. In recent years, there have been efforts to lift the barriers preventing refugees from reuniting with their families, moving to work or study, or being sponsored to move to a new country.

Family continues to be the most important complementary pathway (OECD/UNHCR, 2023^[3]). Recent policy developments to move towards more temporary approaches to protection may have the effect of limiting family reunification opportunities as they often do not entail family reunification entitlements. Some recent policy development has however moved in the direction of lifting restrictions for family reunification. In January 2023, Australia lifted a previous ban on refugee family-reunification for refugees arriving by boat. The decision does not however apply to refugees holding a Temporary Protection visa. In August 2022, the Netherlands suspended refugee family reunification to reduce pressure in the asylum system and ease overcrowded asylum-seeker centres and shortage of housing. In February 2023, the highest administrative court in the country ruled that the restriction on the right to family reunification of people with asylum status was unlawful and the measure was suspended.

Private sponsorship programmes are on the rise

Sponsorship programmes refer to initiatives by individuals or communities to assume responsibility for providing financial and social support to a resettled person or family for a predetermined period. Sponsorship programmes can be part of the overall national resettlement system to strengthen and expand the capacity to provide resettlement.

The United States has recently put in place several sponsorship programmes, such as the Sponsor Circle Program for Afghans, a community-based sponsorship programme to help vulnerable Afghans resettle, and the sponsorship-based parole programme Uniting for Ukraine, a pathway for Ukrainian citizens and their immediate family members to temporarily resettle in the United States during a two-year period of parole with the help of a sponsor. The most recent sponsorship programme is Welcome Corps, which was launched in early 2023 and builds on lessons learned from previous national sponsorship programmes. The first year of the programme will be carried out in two phases. The first phase includes matching sponsors with refugees whose cases are already approved for resettlement under the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), while the second phase will allow private sponsors to identify refugees to refer to USRAP for resettlement and support. The target for the first year of the programme is 10 000 persons sponsoring 5 000 refugees. Canada, whose long-standing private sponsorship programme has served as a model for other countries, has announced an increase in the number of sponsored refugees by sponsorship agreement holders to 13 500 in 2023.

Among EU countries, several countries have introduced sponsorship programmes and schemes in recent years. The schemes in Belgium and Spain are still in a pilot stage, while Germany and Ireland have transitioned from pilot to established sponsorship programmes. Community sponsorship schemes are generally not considered a separate pathway but part of national resettlement or humanitarian admission and supplement government programmes. Beneficiaries are typically selected from the pool of refugees participating in resettlement programmes selected by UNHCR. The scale of the programmes in terms of persons admitted is so far very limited. To date, France is the European country with the highest total number of admitted persons, with 531 agreements issued between 2017-21 targeting Syrian and Iraqi refugees hosted in Lebanon (EMN, 2023^[2]).

Unlocking skilled migration pathways for refugees and displaced persons

Skilled migration pathways are generally very difficult to access for refugees and displaced persons, despite many having skills that are in high demand in potential destination countries. Against the background of skills shortages in the OECD area, several countries have started to explore possibilities to offer legal labour pathways to skilled people in need of international protection. Many of these programmes have been initiated by the organisation Talent Beyond Boundaries, whose mission is to open up access to skilled migration pathways for refugees and displaced people (Box 2.2).

In OECD Europe, Displaced Talent for Europe (DT4E) offers a legal labour pathway for displaced persons in Jordan and Lebanon to connect with employers to find employment in Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom. A key feature of the programme is that it is driven by employer needs and applies to all sectors with labour shortages. In February 2023, the Nursing and Midwife Council in the United Kingdom announced a new policy to support forcibly displaced persons who want to register as healthcare professionals with flexibility on documentation requirements.

Canada has announced new funding of CAD 6.2 million to expand the Economic Mobility Pathways Pilot (EMPP), a complementary pathway for skilled refugees overseas. Canada is aiming to welcome 2 000 skilled refugees through this pathway in the years to come. In March 2023, an additional pathway was launched under the EMPP to offer a more flexible approach to eligibility by allowing other displaced people in need of protection to apply. Australia's Skilled Refugee Labour Agreement Pilot is a two-year complementary labour mobility pathway pilot for skilled refugees and displaced persons initiated in 2021. The programme applies more flexible requirements related to skills assessments, English language skills, age, and provision of travel documents, to enable skilled refugees to access employer-sponsored skilled migration pathways with eligibility criteria that are otherwise impossible for refugees to fulfil due to their status.

Box 2.2. Talent Beyond Boundaries matches employers with skilled refugees and displaced people

The global non-profit organisation Talent Beyond Boundaries (TBB) works with governments and local and national organisations to promote and expand skilled migration pathways for refugees that can benefit individuals, family members, communities, and the economy. TBB is focused on facilitating the matching of refugee skills in countries of first asylum with the demand from employers in destination countries. Programmes initiated by TBB have been successfully implemented in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.

The TBB Talent Catalog is the first online platform of its kind to collect comprehensive data on the professional backgrounds of thousands of refugees and displaced people. Over 50 000 displaced people have registered on the platform to date, and more than 300 have found skilled pathways to destination countries. The registrants represent a wide range of occupations, including software developers, healthcare professional, engineers, and skilled trade workers.

TBB collaborates with UNHCR in several regions, and at the end of 2022 TBB entered an official partnership with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to further scale its activities.

Source: IOM (2022^[4]), "IOM and Talent Beyond Boundaries Join Forces to Strengthen Labour Mobility Pathways for Refugees and other Displaced Populations", <https://www.iom.int/news/iom-and-talent-beyond-boundaries-join-forces-strengthen-labour-mobility-pathways-refugees-and-other-displaced-populations>; Talent Beyond Boundaries (2023^[5]), <https://www.talentbeyondboundaries.org/>.

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Notes

¹ The tolerated status permit (*Duldung*) is a temporary residence permit granted in situations when deportation is deemed impossible due to humanitarian or technical reasons.

² Collective Management of Hiring in Origin (GECCO).

3

Recent developments in migrant integration policy

This chapter first provides an overview of the main changes in integration policy in OECD countries during the period 2022-23, against the context of new developments following the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian refugee crisis, triggered by Russia's full scale war, with a specific focus on gendered aspects of integration policy, the recognition of foreign qualifications, and the role of subnational governments in migrant integration.

In Brief

Key messages

- In many OECD countries, changes to integration policies have been made to ensure the integration of refugees from Ukraine, notably with respect to gendered aspects of integration policy and the recognition of foreign qualifications as well as the role of subnational governments in migrant integration.
- Citizenship reforms have again emerged as a main area for policy action. While some countries, such as Germany, Australia and the United States are relaxing and introducing flexibility to citizenship legislation, others are considering or implementing measures to tighten immigrants' access to citizenship, as is the case in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
- Civic integration continues to be an increasingly important pillar of integration. Countries are notably enhancing tailor-made civic integration programmes combined with language learning, as well as expanding the groups of newly arrived migrants for which civic integration is mandatory.
- Heightened attention is paid to language training, especially to its vocational element. Many countries including Austria, Germany, Korea, Spain and Switzerland establish vocational language courses in specific sectors where demand is high.
- Countries are stepping up their efforts to combat discrimination, notably through implementing National Action Plans and adopting an intersectional approach. This issue is also emerging in countries with more recent immigration, such as in Latin America.
- Migrant women are increasingly in the policy focus. In addition to care responsibilities, growing attention has been paid to the particular risk faced by migrant women who suffer from gender-based violence (GBV), which can have far-reaching consequences on their ability to access education, work, or housing stability.
- With growing labour shortages and high inflows of highly educated immigrants, better valuing the qualifications of immigrants is high on the policy agenda. OECD countries have increasingly focused on speeding up the process of foreign credential recognition, streamlining the recognition system and making sure migrants are aware of the existence of such procedures and accompanied in the process. Digitalisation and online tools have played an important role in reducing the administrative burden.
- OECD countries are increasingly adopting a whole-of-society approach to integration, which has led to a growing prominence of local and regional governments in integration processes.
- Housing is a particularly pressing issue faced by municipalities in the context of migrant integration. Subnational authorities are taking steps to expand reception facilities and access to affordable housing for immigrants, but central governments are key for funding, regulation, and dispersal.
- Subnational authorities have also been establishing new fora for co-operation in the field of integration to share good practices, pool resources, and to act in a co-ordinated manner.

Introduction

Over the past year policy developments have been shaped by the Ukrainian refugee crisis triggered by Russia's full-scale war, which further highlighted three crucial integration challenges examined in this chapter. Countries have increasingly focused on the integration of migrant women, recognising their specific integration needs. The assessment and recognition of foreign qualifications has been pushed to the top of the integration policy agenda, as it constitutes one of the main barriers to skilled migrants' integration into the labour market, especially in a context of unprecedented labour market shortages across the OECD. Finally, as OECD countries are increasingly adopting a whole-of-society approach to integration, the role of subnational governments has gained prominence. Notably, housing challenges have further emphasised the need for efficient co-ordination and communication between national and subnational governments. Before turning to each of these particular challenges in more detail, this chapter first provides an overview of other key developments in integration policy.

Main developments in integration policy

Several countries are relaxing citizenship legislation while others are making it more restrictive

In 2022/23, there has been renewed interest in citizenship policies. Most countries view the acquisition of citizenship as a catalyst for the economic, social, and political integration of immigrants, by incentivising them to invest in a future in the country and providing them with rights that contribute to bridging the gaps with the native-born. Opposing perspectives consider naturalisation as the ultimate reward for successful integration. The latter view implies designing rigid and restrictive naturalisation policies based on long residency requirements and demanding language and civic tests. While most OECD countries share the first view, several countries have made important legislative changes to tighten immigrants' access to citizenship.

Germany's government published in 2023 a draft legislation aimed at significantly facilitating the acquisition of citizenship for immigrants. If adopted, the reform will allow the acquisition of multiple citizenship to provide greater incentives for immigrants to become German citizens. Native-born children of foreign-born parents will also be granted birthright citizenship provided at least one parent has lived in Germany for five years or more and has unlimited right of residence. Furthermore, the required duration of residence will be lowered from eight to five years for those with a qualified right of residence, or to three years under certain conditions, particularly for those well integrated. In addition, language requirements should be eased for certain groups of immigrants. Following adoption of the legislation, naturalisation campaigns should be organised at the Länder level.

Some countries choose to ease citizenship acquisition for certain groups of migrants. For example, Australia facilitated pathways to naturalisation for New Zealand citizens. Under an amendment enforced in January 2023, New Zealand citizens arriving in Australia holding a Special Category visa will no longer need to apply for a permanent visa before becoming eligible for citizenship.

A few countries introduced flexibility in their naturalisation processes. The United States recently introduced an automatic 24-month extension of green card validity for candidates who have filed an application for citizenship. In addition, the United States announced in 2023 the expansion of the Citizenship and Integration Grant Programme, which will provide up to USD 25 million in grants to programmes aimed at preparing immigrants for naturalisation and promote civic integration through civic courses, language, and history courses. Ireland introduced a scorecard approach further clarifying what information applicants must provide to establish their identity and residence history in Ireland. Immigrants

can now use a variety of documents and be sure they have enough evidence to prove their identity and residence before sending their application.

While the general trend among OECD countries has been to offer facilitations regarding the naturalisation process, a few countries are moving towards tightening the access to citizenship. In 2022, Norway raised the residence requirements from seven to eight years for all immigrants except refugees. Depending on immigrants' income, this required duration may be lowered to six years. In addition, the level of Norwegian language knowledge required to be naturalised was raised from A2 to B1. Similarly, the Swedish Government is currently considering harshening the naturalisation requirements, including by extending the residence duration requirement as well as tightening the language requirements.

Estonia and Latvia have taken steps to allow for the revocation of citizenship from naturalised citizens who present a threat to public order or national security.

Civic integration continues to gain importance

Civic integration is an increasingly important aspect of integration policy among OECD countries. Measures fostering the civic integration of immigrants serve to ensure immigrants know, understand, and respect the host country's history, institutions, and shared values (OECD, 2023^[1]). Civic integration further promotes social cohesion and allows immigrants to better take part in the functioning of the host society. The spectrum of civic integration measures is broad, from providing civic courses to fostering cultural and social contacts with the native-born population, as well as allowing migrants to participate in elections. For example, Luxembourg recently amended its Electoral Law to abolish the five-year residency requirement for foreign nationals wishing to register on the electoral rolls for communal elections.

Countries also emphasise the importance of designing tailor-made integration programmes. The new Integration and Civic Integration Act adopted in Flanders (Belgium), in force since March 2022, includes a fourth pillar focused on enhancing immigrants' social networks and participation in society. It offers newly arrived migrants a 40-hour tailor-made programme which may take various forms: a buddy programme, a language internship in a company, association or local government, volunteer work, and community work. In the Netherlands, the new Civic Integration Act, which came into force in January 2022, proposes three different civic integration pathways provided by Municipalities and tailored to individuals based on a comprehensive intake process. Each pathway combines language learning and civic courses and is adapted to migrants' language level and educational attainment.

To make sure migrants who need it the most do receive integration services, some countries are making integration programmes accessible or mandatory to new groups of migrants. In the Netherlands, refugees and family migrants are obliged to follow an integration programme provided by the municipality. The Brussels region of Belgium recently made civic integration courses obligatory for family members of employment-based permit holders who have been staying in the region for over three months. They are also required to enrol in a course within six months of receiving their permit.

In Germany, several programmes are implemented to promote democracy, prevent radicalisation, or encourage young immigrants or descendants of immigrants to promote political participation. In Austria, the compulsory values and orientation courses were extended to three days from January 2022.

Heightened attention is paid to language training, and especially to its vocational element

The importance of providing language training to migrants is acknowledged by all OECD countries as it improves access to the labour market, to social services and helps building social ties. However, countries increasingly perceive the added value of combining language courses with vocational training. Vocational language training is sometimes difficult to implement, as the number of migrants interested in a particular

occupation or sector may be too low for providers to invest in such regular trainings (OECD, 2023^[1]). Yet, growing labour market shortages often resulting from skills mismatches have, among other factors, led OECD countries to pay attention to vocational aspects of language training and of integration measures in general.

In Germany, language and vocational language courses used to be accessible to asylum seekers who came from countries with a protection rate of at least 50%, thus excluding most asylum seekers from integration courses. The new Act on the Introduction of Opportunity Residence now provides immediate access to Federal-funded modular language and vocational language training, up to level C2 of the Common European Reference Framework (CEFR) to all asylum seekers regardless of origin. These courses may also be combined with vocational qualifications and practical work placement. Similarly, Austria expanded the range of German courses to include specialised language courses for specific sectors with labour shortages, i.e. restaurant and catering, hotel, tourism, and retail trade sectors.

A further trend is to facilitate access to vocational training, sometimes combined with general language training. Switzerland for example increased the funding allocated to integration through committing a further CHF 250 million for language courses and apprenticeships for foreigners from 2024 to 2027. In Spain, recent legislative changes opened the possibility for undocumented migrants who have been living in the country for at least two years access to access temporary residence if they complete vocational training courses and possess minimum knowledge in Spanish.

In Korea, the government announced plans to provide long-term vocational training courses for E-9 visa holders (non-professional visas) combined with language courses to enhance their technical skills and knowledge of the Korean language and culture. Currently, E-9 visa workers only benefit from a three-day vocational course. A pilot programme in the shipbuilding industry was launched in 2023.

Countries are also raising target levels in terms of language knowledge. The Netherlands for example raised the expected language level for newcomers to level B1 of the CEFR. Australia enhanced the resources allocated to the *Adult Migrant English Programme (AMEP)* to include English Ready Booklets to assist individuals with little or no educational experience, as well as the AMEC Digital Literacies Framework to activate digital literacies in adult English. The government will provide close to USD 20 million in additional funding over four years from 2022-23 to the AMEP to support adult learners with innovative learning solutions. Finland has renewed and adopted its core curriculum for integration training in 2022, placing higher emphasis on language awareness.

Countries adopted new National Action Plans to address racism and discrimination

Countries continue combatting discrimination notably through adopting National Action Plans. As part of the EU-wide initiative led by the European Commission to fight racism, several EU countries implemented National Action Plans Against Racism (NAPAR). The EU Action Plan Against Racism explicitly highlighted the need to foster an intersectional approach to antiracism and antidiscrimination policies. In July 2022, Belgium approved a new NAPAR for 2021-24 which comprises over 70 measures within the field of equal opportunities, work, economy, asylum and migration, health, justice, police, foreign affairs, media and mobility. France introduced a new plan for 2023-26 aimed at fighting racism, antisemitism and discrimination related to origin. The Plan pursues five major ambitions: (i) measuring the reality of racism antisemitism and discrimination, (ii) naming the reality of hate, (iii) better educate and train, (iv) sanctioning the perpetrators, and (v) supporting the victims. This plan places particular emphasis on youth and on protecting young people from hateful messages. Among the 80 measures exposed in the Plan, several intend to fight discrimination on the labour market, notably by generalising correspondence tests, an experimental method to assess the extent of discrimination in firms.

Ireland also took important steps in the fight against discrimination and launched its National Action Plan Against Racism in 2023, the first one in 15 years, aimed at “eliminating racism in all its forms in Ireland”.

Main objectives include protecting victims from racism and hate crimes, addressing ethnic inequalities, ensuring minorities' participation in all areas of society, measuring the impacts of racism through efficient data collection, and implementing policies, programmes and legislation combatting racism.

In Germany, the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency was strengthened through the appointment in 2023 of a Federal Anti-Discrimination Officer.

Colombia presented a new National Development Plan 2022-26 which places emphasis on implementing campaigns to prevent xenophobia and discrimination. In 2023, Canada, the United States and Mexico together signed the Declaration on the North American Partnership for Equity and Racial Justice, by which the three countries committed to each affirmatively advance equal and racial justice, by rooting out the barriers to equal opportunity that marginalised communities continue to face. They also committed to enhance co-operation, notably through establishing a Trilateral Racial Equity and Inclusion Expert Network to facilitate exchange of information, good practices, and innovative strategies.

Fundamental overhaul of integration frameworks

A number of OECD countries enacted more global changes to their integration legislation, some of which occurred following delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The new Integration and Civic Integration Act in Flanders (Belgium), includes in addition to the aforementioned changes regarding civic integration, also a number of significant modifications regarding the composition of, and eligibility for, integration measures. Notably, asylum seekers no longer qualify for integration measures. The integration track is expanded by two new pillars: in addition to civic orientation and Dutch L2 language learning, migrants will have to register at the Flemish PES (third pillar) and enrol in a social networking and participation project (fourth pillar). This individualised integration programme is no longer free of charge and immigrants are expected to pay up EUR 360 for integration measures.

In light of high immigration intakes in recent years, several OECD countries in Latin America have recently been moving forward with new strategic frameworks on integration. Costa Rica adopted the third National Integration Plan 2023-27 based on the following pillars: education, health, diversity, fighting vulnerability and strengthening institutional co-operation. Chile's President approved in June 2023 a new law on migration that places emphasis on the long-term integration and socio-economic inclusion of immigrants. The National Planning Department of Colombia approved in July 2022 the new "Strategy for the integration of the Venezuelan migrant population as a development factor for the country" to adapt the institutional response to the social, economic, and cultural integration needs of millions of Venezuelan migrants in the country and harness their long-term economic contribution. The strategy emphasises seven lines of action including (i) increasing the supply of integration services, (ii) strengthening the prevention strategies related to vulnerabilities, (iii) focussing on the economic integration of Venezuelan migrants, (iv) fostering environments promoting social and cultural integration, (v) expanding the capacity of institutions in charge of the care and integration of migrants, (vi) defining a financing strategy to guarantee their integration and impact on development and (vii) reinforce the data infrastructure, information exchange and evaluation processes. About USD 13.3 million is allocated to implement this strategy.

Several OECD countries announced important plans and proposals to pass new legislation on migration and integration. In Finland, a comprehensive reform of the Integration Act is planned for 2025, providing early-stage integration services including customised integration plans, multilingual orientation, education, and other services aimed at facilitating and reinforcing transition to work. Luxembourg presented its draft law on "intercultural living together" that will repeal the law on "the integration of foreigners". Four instruments are put forward: (i) the National Action Plan providing strategic orientation, (ii) the Citizen's Pact for intercultural living together, (iii) the Programme for intercultural living together and (iv) the Municipal Pact for intercultural living together. The fight against racism and all forms of discrimination at the local level is a crucial aspect of the law. The development of a new Migrant Integration Strategy is currently underway in Ireland by 2024.

Welcoming and integrating Ukrainian refugees

A major integration challenge across OECD countries in 2022/23 has been providing support to the large numbers of people fleeing Ukraine. In the European Union, the Temporary Protection Directive grants holders of temporary protection immediate access to education and to employment and self-employment. Other non-EU OECD countries have enacted similar emergency plans allowing refugees to access the same rights. These exceptional measures make it easier for Ukrainian refugees to access the labour market compared to other refugee groups. In this context, most OECD countries have utilised their existing integration systems and simply extended the coverage of integration support provided to refugees to include displaced Ukrainians on the same basis, with some exceptions (e.g. Sweden, France). Several countries put specific emphasis on language courses and vocational language training. For example, the United Kingdom allocated GBP 11.5 million to provide intensive English courses to around 10 000 Ukrainians.

The majority of Ukrainian refugees are tertiary educated, as first administrative data collected in OECD receiving countries can attest (OECD, 2023^[2]). In this context, early assessment of their skills and recognition of their qualifications is critical to allow them to continue working in their field, further enhancing their skills to contribute both to the host economy and to Ukraine's future reconstruction efforts. In addition to the obstacles to recognition detailed above, many Ukrainian refugees were working in regulated professions prior to migration, especially in the health and education sectors, which require official recognition of foreign qualifications. To better match the characteristics and needs of the Ukrainian refugee population, some OECD countries have taken steps to make adjustments to their recognition systems, while others have implemented targeted new measures for this group.

Several countries have streamlined and accelerated the recognition of qualification procedures for beneficiaries of temporary protection, usually by shortening processing times and removing some requirements for specific occupations. For example, Italy, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Spain to the processing time for the recognition of qualifications for medical professionals from Ukraine. Germany and the Czech Republic have implemented fast-track procedures to facilitate the recognition of foreign qualifications for Ukrainian teachers. Iceland and Norway have taken steps to speed up the recognition of academic qualifications by introducing automatic approval of qualifications recognitions for Ukrainians with a tertiary education degree. Portugal has allowed authorities to conduct case-by-case assessments and exempt beneficiaries of temporary protection from the obligation to provide an academic diploma, certificate, or licence. Official translation of documents is no longer required. To facilitate access to regulated professions, some countries have removed qualification requirements or have implemented expedited evaluations. In Lithuania, Ukrainian refugees are exempt from mandatory language requirements for several jobs, leaving evaluation of the knowledge of the language to the employers' discretion. Similarly, Austria and Germany eased the requirements to hire teachers. Some countries have additionally waived the fees associated with recognition of qualifications for Ukrainian refugee beneficiaries of temporary protection. This is for example the case in Hungary, Portugal and Spain.

At the same time, many countries are unsure how to proceed in connection to integrating Ukrainians. The displacement of Ukrainians is still perceived as temporary by host countries, Ukraine, and the refugees themselves. This creates a situation where conventional integration systems, which are designed to support longer-term settlement, may not adequately meet the needs of Ukrainians in host countries. Consequently, there is a need to explore alternative frameworks for approaching integration in the context of Ukrainian refugees (Box 3.1).

Box 3.1. Dual intent approach gives Ukrainian refugees access to integration support without hampering a possible return to Ukraine

As Russia's full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine continues into its second year, host societies are looking for ways to better support displaced Ukrainians in the longer term. At the same time, the nature and scope of support provided may not align with their usual integration practices as many Ukrainians are still expected to return to home when the situation permits. Moreover, their return is also widely seen as critical for the reconstruction of Ukraine and there are concerns that wrong types of integration support may undermine refugees' return potential.

Adopting a dual intent integration approach could offer a solution to balance these conflicting needs and circumstances. This means that support measures and activities aim to facilitate rapid socio-economic inclusion, enabling Ukrainian refugees to become self-sufficient, rebuild their lives, and develop their human capital to improve their future prospects, regardless of their country of residence. At the same time, this consideration actively seeks to minimise potential barriers to their return in both host and home countries. Close co-operation between host countries and Ukraine will be essential to develop and implement relevant and appropriate measures to achieve this.

While there have been isolated instances of similar approaches in the past, such as Norway implementing integration measures with a focus on return for Bosnian refugees in the 1990s, these are relatively new considerations for most OECD countries. Some potential examples of dual intent measures between host countries and the Ukrainian Government include investing in the human capital development of displaced Ukrainians, facilitating the recognition of skills and qualifications, providing Ukrainian language training for children and youth in host countries, establishing financial and digital connections with Ukraine, and ensuring the availability of remigration and mobility pathways.

Successive crises further highlighted the need to focus on gendered aspects of integration policy

Migrant women face specific integration challenges, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian refugee crisis, which have prompted specific policy actions

While women make up just over half of all migrants in OECD countries, they face additional and persistent barriers hindering their social and economic integration in the host society. Foreign-born women overall exhibit lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than foreign-born men and native-born women. Refugee women, who face additional challenges, fare even worse on the labour market than other foreign-born women. OECD work has shown that they suffer from a "triple disadvantage" reflecting challenges related to gender, migrant status and forced displacement that add up and reinforce each other (Liebig and Tronstad, 2018^[3]).

Several factors can explain this disadvantage. Although women migrate on increasingly diverse grounds, 60% of migrants who come to OECD countries for family reasons are women. Family migrants are less likely to immediately have a job or enrol in an educational programme and therefore have less prior attachment to the labour market and tend to have lower language skills and social networks (OECD, 2020^[4]). They may also experience more difficulties to benefit from integration support measures for new arrivals. Care responsibilities and family constraints primarily drive gender gaps in immigrants' integration (see Chapter 5 for more details). OECD work has also shown that improving the socio-economic integration of migrant women is also crucial to prevent inter-generational transmission of labour market disadvantage (OECD, 2017^[5]).

The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian refugee crisis further highlighted gender-specific integration challenges. During the COVID-19 pandemic immigrant women were overrepresented in sectors hard hit by the crisis. School closures and quarantines placed a disproportionate burden on women, especially on those from disadvantaged backgrounds with small children, who are often those whose spouse could not telework. Quarantines also increased their risk of being exposed to intimate partner violence (OECD, 2022^[6]).

More recently, the unusual gender profile of Ukrainian refugees – women and children make up close to 90% of refugees – has entailed specific labour market integration challenges for this group. While high education levels and the exceptional support provided by temporary protection schemes strengthen Ukrainian women’s integration prospects compared to other refugees, other factors may at the same time hinder their labour market integration. These include care burdens further exacerbated by the separation of family units, risks of exploitation and uncertainties about the length of stay (OECD, 2023^[7]).

While most OECD countries have adopted integration policies towards migrant women in some way, recent crises have pushed the issue on top of the integration policy agenda. Currently, about half of OECD countries include gender aspects in their mainstream integration policies. This move towards gender mainstreaming has been ongoing for many years for a few countries such as Sweden or Canada, while it is more recent for others. Italy adopted in 2020 a gender mainstreaming approach in its integration policies.

Conversely, national policies that promote gender equality may also take into account the specific challenges faced by migrants. For example, Australia recently adopted the National Plan to End Violence against Women and Children 2022-32, which incorporates appropriate responses to support women from diverse ethnic backgrounds.

Several countries also designed integration measures or programmes specifically targeted towards migrant women. For example, Germany developed the programme “MY TURN”, tailored specifically for women with a migration experience. The programme primarily aims at reducing their integration barriers and providing them with skills and vocational training, counselling, and networking services etc. Such measures are also being implemented in some countries that do not specifically refer to gender in their national integration policy, for example through targeting vulnerable groups more broadly.

Several countries recently took steps to reflect on integration barriers faced by migrant women and on the potential ways to take them into account in integration policy plans. The Finnish Comprehensive Reform of the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration aims at strengthening the labour market integration and the attachment of migrant women to Finnish society. In Italy, following a serious deterioration of the situation of migrant women in the society prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has been pushing the integration of migrant mothers on top of its integration policy agenda. In Ireland, the specific needs of migrant women will be fully integrated into the new upcoming Migrant Integration Strategy. Switzerland will also pay increased attention to the integration of migrant women in the next phase of the Cantonal Integration Programmes 2024-27. OECD countries intervene in many areas to promote migrant women’s integration. These especially include language, skills and vocational training and active labour market policies targeted towards migrant women. Recognising that care responsibilities and family constraints are often the main barriers to the integration of migrant women, countries have been primarily focused on alleviating care-related barriers to labour market participation and to stable and quality employment. Chapter 5 of this report provides detailed policy developments regarding the labour market integration of migrant mothers in OECD countries.

Preventing gender-based violence is gaining prominence in integration policy

Migrant women, and especially refugees, may face a particular risk of gender-based violence and exploitation. During the migration journey, some migrants face situations where they are more vulnerable

to violence (Calderón-Jaramillo et al., 2020^[8]). This can seriously hinder their long-term integration prospects, through long-lasting consequences on their physical and psychological state. OECD countries have established various types of measures to protect migrant women against gender-based violence (GBV) and are progressively increasing the integration budgets dedicated to such initiatives.

Several countries provide women with information and integration courses focused on gender-based violence against migrant women. Through its Settlement and Engagement and Transition Support, Australia aims at identifying and supporting migrant women at risk and provides information and training sessions about respectful relationships, legal rights, and sources of support. In Austria, comprehensive advice for migrant women is offered through Protection Against Violence Centres and Intervention agencies. In 2022, Austria increased by EUR 1 million the budget dedicated to national integration specifically to implement 14 projects combatting violence against women. Canada created in 2017 the federal Gender-Based Violence Strategy to address gaps in support for diverse populations including immigrant women. In this framework, the Gender-Based Violence Settlement Strategy Project aims at building capacity and networks to better support newly arrived immigrant women through raising awareness, providing online courses entitled “Bridges to Safety”. In 2022, the Strategy received an additional USD 2 million funding for five years. In France, the Ministry of Interior funds associations that support newly arrived foreign national women victims of gender-based violence and provides specific training to social workers responsible for accompanying these groups.

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, gender-based violence against migrant women has increased in a number of OECD countries. As a result, several initiatives were implemented, such as the creation of multilingual helplines and counselling services. In Finland, for example, a new telephone helpline and chat services were created to support migrant women victims of domestic violence.

Forcibly displaced women face additional risks of being exposed to gender-based violence. Against this backdrop, Colombia made policy efforts to address gender-based violence against Venezuelan refugee women. The lack of medical insurance access for migrants is an additional barrier for migrant women’s integration. The Colombian Ministry of Health and Social Protection issued a decree making the migrant population a priority medical insurance affiliation population and had provided as of 2022 more than 18 million services to Venezuelan migrants, focusing on care for pregnant women, early childhood and gender-based violence. Following the adoption of the new Migration Act, which places emphasis on the special protection for victims of gender-based violence, Chile’s National Migration Service has taken steps to raise awareness and provide information to migrant women on their rights and on the prevention of domestic violence.

In the case of Ukrainian refugees, the risk of being exposed to gender-based violence has notably been exacerbated by the atypical role private citizens play in hosting Ukrainian refugees in their homes. Countries have been vigilant since the beginning of the crisis. For example, Poland developed a framework in co-operation with the national police to screen private organisations and individuals volunteering to support Ukrainian refugees. In Luxembourg, house visits are organised in cases of suspected labour or sexual exploitation.

Countries are increasingly aware of the necessity to improve the recognition of foreign qualifications

Efficient recognition of foreign qualifications is crucial to ensure migrants’ long-term integration in the labour market and full utilisation of skills

In OECD countries, around two in three immigrants have obtained their diplomas abroad. Yet, evidence shows that immigrants with foreign qualifications face substantial barriers on the labour market, notably, finding stable and quality jobs that match their skills. While educational attainment improves access to the

labour market, immigrants with tertiary degrees are less likely to be employed than their native-born counterparts, while the opposite is true among low educated individuals. They are also more likely to occupy a job that requires skills below their level of education: more than one-third of highly skilled immigrants in OECD countries are overqualified for their occupation. Within the European Union, 47% of highly educated immigrants are either overqualified or not in employment, against 30% of the native-born population (OECD/European Commission, 2023^[9]). In almost all OECD countries, immigrants who graduated in the host country are much more likely to be employed than immigrants with foreign degrees. Even controlling for differences in performances of education systems, this difference in labour market outcomes still holds (OECD, 2017^[10]).

The difficulties for immigrants to have their qualifications valued and recognised contribute to immigrants' overqualification and lower employment. This has far-reaching consequences on long-term integration, but also comes at an economic cost to the host society.

Yet, while virtually all OECD countries have established some possibility for immigrants to have their foreign qualifications recognised, processes to assess skills and recognise foreign qualifications remain complex and often lack efficiency, transparency, and universal access. In regulated professions and trades, holding a foreign qualification represents a significant barrier to employment as a specific registration, certificate or licence awarded by the relevant professional licencing body is generally required and varies significantly across countries. In non-regulated professions, holding a foreign qualification is still an implicit barrier, especially because employers are less familiar with foreign education curriculums and institutions.

Recent policy efforts primarily aim at speeding up and streamlining the recognition of foreign qualifications while raising awareness about procedures

Against this backdrop, the assessment and recognition of foreign qualifications has been high on the integration policy agenda for several years (OECD, 2017^[10]). Countries continue to focus on speeding up and streamlining the recognition system. Greece passed a law in 2022, making the process for recognition of foreign degrees faster and more efficient. The recognition of academic degrees from a list of more than 3 500 foreign higher education institutions is now automatic and the recognition process should not take more than two months for basic degrees. In Chile, three institutions are responsible for the recognition of foreign qualifications – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Employment, and the University of Chile. Each of these institutions have different approval rates and processing times. In an effort to improve the low rate of migrants applying to recognition of foreign degrees, the new Migration and Aliens Act, adopted in 2021 grants the possibility for other higher education institutions to participate in the process.

The current context of persisting labour shortages pushed OECD countries to facilitate the recognition of foreign qualifications. Improvements made to the process are often targeted and restricted to certain (shortage) professions. To address important labour shortages in the medical sector, Germany passed a draft of the Nursing Studies Strengthening Act, which includes a simplification and standardisation of the recognition of foreign nursing qualifications and training. More specifically, the government plans to regulate the list of required documents for the recognition process and propose alternatives to equivalence tests, such as adaptation courses or knowledge-based assessments. Austria issued a decree in 2022 by which qualified healthcare professionals can go through an accelerated approval procedure to have their qualifications validated.

Digitalisation plays an important role in simplifying recognition processes and relieving immigrants from administrative burden. The COVID-19 crisis further highlighted the importance of online tools. In 2022, the Spanish Government launched an online platform dedicated to foreign degree recognition. Foreign nationals are now able to submit their documents online to prove the equivalence of their qualifications with Spanish standards. Similarly, Denmark has established an online competence portfolio (“My Competence Portfolio”) to help migrants describe and document qualifications.

Increasing awareness and transparency regarding recognition procedures and making sure immigrants are accompanied in the process is also crucial to ensure efficiency. Information about how to obtain recognition is often not accessible to migrants. To foster transparency, Germany established in 2020 a Service Centre for Professional Recognition (ZSBA) which support applicants abroad in the recognition procedure.

Countries also rely on bilateral agreements to improve skill mobility and reduce barriers linked to the skills recognition process. For example, Australia signed in 2023 an agreement with India establishing a mechanism for the mutual recognition of qualifications. In 2022, the United Kingdom's Cabinet also approved a MoU with India on mutual recognition of some academic qualifications.

Subnational governments are key partners to national governments in migrant integration

For nearly a decade now, OECD countries have increasingly adopted a whole-of-society approach to integration, emphasising that migrant integration is a multi-level and multi-stakeholder process (OECD, 2020^[11]; 2023^[1]). This has led to the growing prominence of local and regional governments in migrant integration across the OECD, which is likely to continue in the coming years. In 2023, for instance, the Finnish Parliament passed a comprehensive reform of the Integration Act that will over the coming years transfer much greater overall responsibility for integration services to municipalities than ever before. Similar trends can be also seen elsewhere, including in Luxembourg where the new draft law on intercultural living together attributes a more central role to municipalities to promote access to information, civic participation, and community life at the local level.

Recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian refugee crisis, have highlighted both the benefits and challenges of subnational governments being at the front line of migrant integration (Box 3.2) In the context of the pandemic, it was often easier and more cost-effective to transition into online service provision – notably language training – in countries where there are strong centralised integration frameworks in place, such as Germany, than in countries where integration support is strongly decentralised, for instance, Norway (OECD, 2022^[12]). Local and municipal autonomy without a centralised framework creates further challenges, such as major disparities in content and availability of integration support nationwide (OECD, 2023^[1]). Furthermore, there is a significant variation in past experiences with providing integration support among municipalities, resulting in differing levels of skills and know-how across cities and regions. For instance, during the Ukrainian refugee crisis, a considerable number of smaller cities and regions in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which had little to no prior experience in offering integration support to foreigners, suddenly found themselves faced with a significant influx of refugees.

In turn, some OECD countries, such as Colombia, have tried to strengthen centralised integration management to balance responsibilities better and to minimise regional differences in integration support. These recent developments point to the value of complementary national and subnational integration frameworks and structures to be in place concurrently to provide optimal integration support for migrants and refugees.

Box 3.2. Cities supporting refugees during the Ukrainian refugee crisis

From the start, cities and municipalities have been leading the response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis. This has been in part out of necessity as the inflow of Ukrainian refugees has impacted metropolitan areas disproportionately. In Poland, for example, the refugee flows prompted a rapid expansion of cities during the first two months of the crisis: the population of Warsaw grew by 15%, Kraków by 23%, Gdańsk by 34%, while the population of Rzeszów increased by 53% (Wojdat and Cywiński, 2022^[13]). Other countries, including Germany and France, have also noted the tendency of Ukrainian refugees to take residence in cities, despite centralised efforts to promote wider dispersal (OECD, 2022^[14]).

Reaching the new Ukrainian arrivals and ensuring their access to good quality information as soon as possible has been a priority in most cities. During the first months of the crisis, one-stop-shops became a common practice across cities in the OECD. Many cities of different sizes, including Dublin (Ireland), Nantes (France), Paris (France), Regina (Canada), Stockholm (Sweden) and Tampere (Finland), established them and similar reception hubs to co-ordinate information-provision to arriving Ukrainians, register them, and to ease access to the different support services. In some instances, cities were also able to leverage existing digital platforms and tools to reach Ukrainian refugees. In Germany, several cities used the Integreat app to reach the new Ukrainian arrivals and to offer integration support. Nuremberg, for instance, uses the app to provide direct and easy access to a wide range of information, including on how to apply for social benefits, cultural events and recreational activities, and German language classes.

Local authorities' knowledge of their communities solidified their role as providers of vital frontline services. Within days following the start of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, the city of Tallinn (Estonia) opened a refugee welcome centre to address immediate needs such as primary assistance, emergency housing, legal aid, psychological and other medical support, and offered adaptation counselling to facilitate refugees' stay in the city. In Belgium, cities were particularly closely involved with organising and co-ordinating access to private housing, including screening host families, matching displaced people with suitable hosts, and carrying out home visits. In most Polish cities, municipalities worked closely with local private partners to repurpose existing facilities to accommodate the large numbers of Ukrainian arrivals. The city of Rzeszów, for instance, partnered with hotels and the owners of other large commercial properties to open temporary shelters.

Yet their involvement has not been limited to reception-related support and cities have continued to take an active role also in medium-to-longer term response, especially in connection to facilitating access to employment. The local authorities in Salzburg, Austria, are working closely with the local employment agency, local businesses, employers' organisations, and the Chamber of Commerce to identify job needs, simplify the rules, and facilitate the matching process for available jobs. Meanwhile, in 2022, the city of Riga (Latvia) organised 14 job fairs at the Riga Support Centre for Ukrainian Residents, bringing together local employers and Ukrainians looking for a job.

Housing remains a challenge for municipalities across the OECD

One of the most pressing challenges faced by municipalities in the context of migrant integration is housing. Safe, secure, and affordable housing is a fundamental human need and essential to health and overall well-being, providing a base for newcomers from which to seek employment, pursue educational opportunities, and make connections with the wider community. Yet when it comes to housing, migrants often find themselves in a disadvantaged situation compared to the native-born population and many live in bad housing conditions. More than one in six immigrants live in overcrowded accommodation in OECD countries – a rate that is 70% higher than that of the native-born in the EU – with the disparities being widest in Colombia, Korea, Southern European countries (particularly Italy and Greece), and Nordic

countries (OECD/European Commission, 2023^[9]). Housing quality, distribution and accessibility can also directly impact migrant concentration and segregation, which is associated with poorer overall integration outcomes longer term (Liebig and Spielvogel, 2021^[15]). While the affordability-related challenges are not necessarily specific to immigrants and impact wide segments of the society, in most OECD countries, immigrants tend to spend more of their disposable income on rent and are less likely to own their homes. In the EU countries, for instance, one in five immigrants pay over 40% of their disposable income on rent, compared to roughly one in eight among the native-born (OECD/European Commission, 2023^[9]). Recent crises have deepened housing pressures, especially the demand for affordable housing.

Following Russia's full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine refugee flows often disproportionately impacted countries and communities with severe pre-existing housing issues. For example, Poland, the main host country, had already seen increases in rental prices of approximately 10% per year for several years prior to the refugee crisis (OECD, 2022^[14]).

Municipalities often play a direct role in determining housing policies and the situation has prompted them to explore ways in which to improve the housing situation of immigrants and refugees. Cities and local governments have been trying to expand reception capacities in their communities as needed but are also looking to address longer-term housing challenges for immigrants. The latter is often done through wider affordable housing programmes, but sometimes special dedicated funds are made available to improve housing for immigrants.

In Portland in the United States, the state of Maine and local city authorities have partnered to fund new affordable housing projects specifically for asylum seekers. In recent years, subnational authorities in the United States have been increasingly looking to work with private individuals, businesses, and the civil society to ease housing pressures. For instance, the Rent to Refugee Campaign was created to encourage landowners and property owners in Albuquerque to rent their available spaces to refugees. Across the OECD, the role of private households in housing provision increased significantly in response to the Ukrainian inflows (OECD, 2022^[14]).

Subnational authorities have been meanwhile also more vocal in calling for additional support from central government to address housing pressures, especially during periods of increased inflows. In the United States, cities like Chicago and New York City have called for federal financial aid to shelter migrants crossing the US-Mexico Border, and asked the US Government to speed up work authorisations to people seeking asylum in order to facilitate their transition to independent housing.

Central governments have sought to ease the strain on local accommodation capacities. As part of a recent Refugee Summit in Germany, the federal government, federal states and local governments agreed to the extension of a special rule in the German Building Code until 31 December 2027, which allows to bypass parts of the planning law for the construction of accommodation for refugees. Provisions were also made to ease municipalities' access to relevant funding, including allowing the use of urban development grants for building community and other relevant facilities, including for counselling services.

In other cases, central governments have tried to implement dispersal policies to address regional housing pressures. The housing-led dispersal policies, mainly for humanitarian migrants, are being used in about a third of OECD countries, including Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States. Some countries, such as Australia, Canada and Korea, have incentives also in place for labour migrants to settle outside of segregated areas or urban centres. In recent years, OECD countries have also sought to expand their existing policies. In 2022, the central government in the United Kingdom announced that all local authorities in England, Scotland and Wales will be expected to be asylum dispersal areas moving forward (in contrast to less than half of all municipalities previously), allowing asylum seekers to be more easily moved to more cost-effective accommodation to mitigate regional pressures. Housing, however, should not be the only consideration as past research indicates that refugees resettled through dispersal policies that consider labour market conditions have significantly better earnings and less welfare dependency than those resettled based on available housing alone (OECD, 2016^[16]).

Co-operation between stakeholders is improving

While immigration policies are set at a national level, migrant integration policies are generally implemented at a local or regional level, turning effective co-ordination and resource flows between central and subnational administrations into a challenge. In recent years, however, there have been growing efforts to improve co-operation, communication, and partnership between the different parties. Several OECD countries, including Canada, Germany and New Zealand, have been undertaking consultations to further enhance engagement between central and subnational authorities as it relates to migration and integration systems. Australia, for instance, has established several collaborative forums, including the Ministerial Forum on Multicultural Affairs and the Senior Officials Settlement Outcomes Group (SOSOG), to advance inter-governmental co-operation by bringing together Commonwealth, state and territory and local governments to discuss a range of settlement and integration related issues.

Subnational governments are emerging as key partners not only in connection to integration, but are also increasingly influencing immigrant selection, especially in Australia and Canada. This will enhance co-operation and working relationships between central and regional authorities even further.

Significant efforts have been also made to improve the communication and consultation channels between subnational authorities themselves to share good practices, pool resources and act in a co-ordinated manner. Some of the different platforms that have been gaining momentum in recent years across the OECD include the Mayors Migration Council, the Global Mayoral Forum, and Eurocities network. In 2023, the first-ever Cities Summit of the Americas was held, bringing together mayors from the Western Hemisphere to share city-led solutions on a wide range of issues, including migration and integration. Alongside cities, other subnational stakeholders are also active in this sphere. The Office of New Americans (ONA) State Network brings together state officials from different US states to share good practices and to promote the labour market integration of migrants and refugees.

To ease funding flows and make them more suitable for local needs, subnational authorities are establishing their own financial instruments to support their work on integration. In 2021, the Mayors Migration Council launched the Global Cities Fund for Migrants and Refugees (GCF) to channel international funding directly to cities to implement inclusive programmes of their own design as they support migrants, refugees, and internally displaced people (IDPs). Some of the on-going projects funded through the instrument include supporting the work of the Opportunities Centre in Barranquilla, Colombia, to help Venezuelan and other migrants to access employment, expanding housing assistance provision to migrants in Medellin, and growing a municipal income protection programme to provide direct cash assistance for internally displaced persons in Mexico City.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian refugee crisis has further accelerated existing trends in integration policy in OECD countries, notably placing the integration of migrant women and the recognition of foreign qualifications at the forefront of policy responses. These trends had already been reinforced by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the unprecedented labour shortages prevailing in virtually all OECD countries. In light of growing migration flows and the rising salience of migration issues, countries have also increasingly focused on civic integration, and especially on reforming access to citizenship, either towards relaxing or tightening access to naturalisation. Furthermore, the massive inflows of refugees from Ukraine have also put the issue of housing at the forefront, and with it the crucial question of co-ordination between local and national governments. Combatting discrimination is also gaining importance in migrant integration strategies, notably in Latin America where countries are stepping up efforts in that area in light of the recent high migration into countries with little prior exposure to immigration. Elsewhere in the OECD, this issue is also gaining new impetus, often in the context of anti-racism strategies.

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4

Migrant family building: Recent evidence and implications

Alicia Adsera, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Marcela Valdivia, OECD

This chapter explores fertility patterns among migrant populations in OECD countries and the limits of the measures commonly used to describe them. It analyses the factors shaping fertility gaps between native- and foreign-born women, as well as those driving convergence over time. The chapter also assesses the indirect and direct contribution of migrants to the total number of births in OECD countries and their drivers – namely, the share of migrants in the total population, their age and sex composition, as well as the migration channel through which they arrive. Finally, it points to some of the implications of these trends for population dynamics and the labour market integration among migrants in OECD countries.

In Brief

Key findings

- Against the backdrop of ageing populations in most OECD countries, the childbearing behaviour of migrants plays a more limited role in population dynamics than often suggested.
- In most OECD countries, migrant women exhibit somewhat higher fertility rates than their native-born peers, but their total fertility rate (TFR) is still below replacement rate (2.1 children per woman) in two-thirds of the countries.
- Fertility gaps – differences between the native- and foreign-born – are substantial and highly vary across countries. Costa Rica displays the highest differential with a TFR of 3.7 among migrant women, compared to 1.4 among their native-born peers (a gap of 2.3). The Netherlands displays the lowest gap at 0.04, with a TFR of 1.6 among both the native- and foreign-born.
- Yet, migrants’ “net contribution” to the TFR remains relatively small, ranging from +0.2 in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, to -0.3 in Australia. In almost half of the countries, the size of the foreign-born population is too small to significantly influence these rates (neutral net effect) and in few countries – Australia, Iceland and Denmark – migrant women even display relatively low fertility and decrease national rates (negative net effect).
- Fertility differences between native- and foreign-born populations reflect, to varying degrees, the importance of childbearing patterns from the origin country; the role of cultural norms and institutions to which migrants are gradually exposed at destination; the self-selection of migrants; the relation between migration and family formation, especially for women; and the effect of the migration process itself, which might temporarily alter fertility behaviour. Among the native-born with migrant parents, their fertility behaviour is shaped simultaneously by the influence of their parents’ culture and the socio-economic context at destination.
- Since female migration is often associated with family reunification, the likelihood of childbearing is frequently elevated immediately after arrival. As the TFR is typically based only on what happens at destination and at a given year, it may overestimate fertility differentials between native- and foreign-born women as the latter often go through a phase of low fertility and high fertility before and after migration, respectively. In France, an adjusted measure that accounts for the lower incidence of pre-migration births lowers the estimated TFR of migrants by 0.6.
- With the gradual adaptation of migrants to the practices of receiving societies, the fertility behaviour of migrants and that of their native-born peers tends to converge over time and across generations. Strongly declining fertility rates in origin countries over the last two decades have also contributed to closing these gaps.
- Given the fact that many female migrants arrive during their childbearing years and through family reunification channels, they may contribute substantially to the total number of births in many OECD countries despite their decreasing fertility rates.
- Even if the direct contribution of migrants to overall fertility rates is relatively small, their indirect contribution is likely higher because their employment in the care and domestic occupations allows many women, especially the most educated, to reconcile paid work and childrearing.
- Migrant women tend to have children at earlier ages, with potential negative consequences for their labour market insertion.

Introduction

Fertility rates have declined drastically over the past decades in all OECD countries. The pace of this decline differs across countries and responds to economic and financial security, the availability of family policy supports, labour market opportunities, as well as shifting values among younger women regarding their role in society (D'Addio and Mira d'Ercole, 2005^[1]; OECD, 2023^[2]). Declining fertility rates coupled with increases in life expectancy contribute to ageing populations, wherein the shares of elderly among the overall population increase. Ageing populations have important implications on economic and social outcomes such as rising fiscal pressure, decreasing productivity levels, lower savings and higher government spending (Nagarajan, 2015^[3]). It is not clear, however, to what extent rising fertility rates alone can avert these scenarios (OECD, 2023^[2]).

Against this backdrop, the childbearing behaviour of migrants is an important component of population dynamics that must be analysed, particularly in countries with large migrant inflows. Although their contribution to the total fertility rate is minor, migrants' children (both those born at destination, as well as those that arrive with their parents) may play an important role in deterring population decline (González-Ferrer et al., 2017^[4]). Yet, migration inflows would need to be unrealistically large and their fertility sustainedly high to offset ageing processes in most developed countries as the share of migrants remains modest with respect to the overall population, on the one hand, and largely depend on the composition of migrant cohorts, on the other¹ (Fihel, Janicka and Kloc-Nowak, 2018^[5]). Further, as discussed in this chapter, migrants' fertility rate is currently below replacement level² in most OECD countries and shows high levels of convergence to the native-born population over time, which means that its long-term effect.

- First, the fertility behaviour of migrants impacts their overall socio-economic integration in the country of destination. Indeed, childbearing and labour market participation are closely interrelated (see Chapter 5): on the one hand, the economic needs of households and, consequently, their members' need to enter the labour market increase with the presence of children. On the other, childbearing might delay or reduce labour supply, as will be discussed in the next chapter. At the same time, labour market conditions can influence women's decision to start a family depending on their education and/or career aspirations. At the aggregate level, female employment (and participation) have become positively associated with fertility across the OECD since the 1990s (Adserà, 2005^[6]), but this strongly depends on the vitality of the economy and supportive family policy which vary across countries. Family policy, in turn, is not always accessible to migrant women (see Chapter 5) making the relation between fertility and employment more complex. Overall, the evidence on the relationship between migrants' employment and fertility remains highly context-dependent. In some countries, migrant women with poor employment prospects and low career aspirations might opt for childbearing as an alternative to labour market participation. In others, they might postpone childbearing until employed (Alderotti et al., 2022^[7]).
- Second, since norms and behaviour relating to family and childbearing are often socialised very early in life, a change in fertility preferences – and more specifically, convergence with the preferences of the native-born population – may signal profound cultural shifts among migrants resulting from the influence of the receiving society (Carlsson, 2023^[8]). Not surprisingly, researchers have recognised the importance of looking at fertility behaviour as a key dimension of integration (Adserà and Ferrer, 2015^[9]; Milewski and Mussino, 2019^[10]).
- Third, fertility preferences and behaviour are closely linked to attitudes regarding female labour market participation and the role of women in society, more generally. Because these attitudes might differ across countries of origin and destination – and, in some cases, persist among children of migrants – fertility and labour market attachment differentials between the native- and foreign-born may lead to enduring social inequalities (Milewski and Adserà, 2022^[11]).

This chapter seeks to provide facts to nuance the public debate about migrants' fertility and their consequences.

Evidence on the fertility of migrants

Migrants may display different fertility patterns than their native-born peers, but most fertility measures provide only a partial view of their reproductive lives

Three questions have mainly guided research on the fertility patterns of migrants: how different childbearing behaviours between migrant and native-born populations are; whether these behaviours converge over time; and how the migration process affects fertility behaviour (Del Rey and Parrado, 2012^[12]). To answer these questions researchers have relied on a wide array of measures, but most of them are imperfect and only provide a partial view of migrants' reproductive lives (Tønnessen and Wilson, 2020^[13]).

To understand whether migrant women have more children than their native-born peers, researchers often use the total fertility rate (TFR), defined as the number of children a woman *would* have if she were to give birth according to the prevailing age-specific fertility rates. These rates are calculated by dividing the total number of births from women of a given age over the population of women belonging to the same age group. Importantly, the TFR is not the result of observing individuals longitudinally over their lifetime, but instead provides a synthetic measure based on the annual number of births from an artificial generation of women. The strengths of TFR are that it is relatively easy to calculate, gives an overall picture of the fertility trends of both native-born and migrants, provides timely information on differentials between native- and foreign-born populations and can shed light on the contributions of the latter to the national TFR (Sobotka, 2008^[14]). Its limitations, however, are significant and described further below (Box 4.1).

Besides TFR, event-history analyses are used to study the timing of births for specific parities (first-born, second-born, etc). Their advantage is that they shed light on the timing of birth and distinguish between different birth events. The main disadvantage is that they do not answer questions about the number of children ever born, and, most importantly, for the case of migrant women, differences in the number of children born before and after migration (Tønnessen and Wilson, 2020^[13]).

Completed fertility is another common fertility indicator that measures the number of children ever born to women of a particular cohort at the end of their reproductive lives. The advantage of this indicator is that it provides information on the *actual* number of children women have had and is not affected by time distortions. The disadvantage is that it does not distinguish between the children born before and after migration and, thus, does not allow to see how fertility varies after arrival (Tønnessen and Wilson, 2020^[13]). In addition, it does not provide information about current migrant fertility trends, but of a given generation of women (who have already completed childbearing).

Box 4.1. Childbearing and migration: The limits of TFR as a fertility measure


The TFR has been criticised for providing a misleading estimate of fertility differences between the native- and foreign-born. Overall, there is a consensus that TFR should be interpreted with caution and some even suggest that it should not be used at all since it does not reflect migrants' lifetime propensity to have children (Kulu et al., 2019^[15]). The reason is that TFR is not an actual account of lifetime fertility, but a hypothetical measure based on information from one point in time and in the case of migrant women, from one country in time (the host country). In other words, the TFR only captures the fertility behaviour of migrants after they arrive at destination. Since female migration is often associated with family reunification, it is possible to assume that the likelihood of childbearing will be elevated after arrival, as has often been observed in country studies. Therefore, the TFR may overestimate migrants' fertility because it ignores their low fertility prior to arrival and the stabilisation after years in the country. By focusing on recent arrivals, the TFR assumes that migrant women will continue to behave like new arrivals throughout their reproductive life (Volant, Pison and Héran, 2019^[16]).

In Spain, the fertility of women has proven to be low before migration and elevated shortly after arrival. The extent of disruption relates to family dynamics and spousal separation associated with the migration process (Del Rey and Parrado, 2012^[12]). Similar evidence has been found in Sweden, where migrants show relatively elevated levels of births after migration due to the links between migration, marriage and family formation (Andersson, 2004^[17]) (Figure 4.1). In Spain and Italy, childbearing propensities are not only higher after arrival, but they also vary by whether women migrated for employment or family-related reasons (Castro Martin and Rosero-Bixby, 2011^[18]; Mussino and Strozza, 2012^[19]). In Belgium, changes in migration patterns – from mainly labour migration in the 1960s and 1970s to marriage migration in the 1980s – have also influenced the timing of family formation, wherein migrant women from outside Europe, who tend to arrive in the context of family migration, experience elevated fertility during the first years after arrival (Marynissen, Neels and Wood, 2022^[20]). Using a specialised survey on migrants (TeO), (Reynaud, 2023^[21]) uses complete fertility histories to adjust the TFR of migrant women in France. When including the children born prior to migration, the TFR of migrant women falls significantly: in 2021, it averages 2.3 children per woman, compared to 2.9 when only the births in France are considered (e.g. -0.6).

A main implication of all these studies is that the failure to recognise the relation between migration and family formation, age at migration and duration of stay may lead to overstating the level of migrant fertility and, in consequence, their contribution to population growth.

Figure 4.1. In Sweden, migrant women exhibit disproportionately elevated fertility within years of arrival

Conditional first-birth probability by age at arrival and years since migration in Sweden



Note: Data cover all female immigrants to Sweden who were born outside Sweden in 1975-80, censored for death, first emigration, and all years after first birth including prior to arrival.

Source: Swedish register data (collections accessed and analysed by SUDA, Stockholm University).



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Figure 4.2 shows the probability of having a first child among childless women of a given age and a given number of years at destination. The results for Belgium show that first birth probabilities vary by age, and even more so by duration of residence, particularly among non-European women. Clearly, when measuring fertility in migrant groups, both dimensions should be considered simultaneously to avoid bias. In periods of increasing migration, conventional fertility measures which only consider age (e.g. period TFR) will typically overestimate fertility as they erroneously sum fertility of recently immigrated women across age groups.


Figure 4.2. Migrant women also exhibit elevated fertility in Belgium immediately after arrival

Conditional first-birth probability by age at arrival and years since migration in Belgium



Note: First birth hazards by duration of residence and age group based on retrospective information from the 2011 Belgian census, for migrant women from non-European and European origin.

Source: Marynissen, L., K. Neels and J. Wood (2022^[20]), *Fertility of Immigrants: Patterns of Family Formation around Migration of Immigrant Women in Belgium*, <https://repository.uantwerpen.be/desktop/irua>.

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In most OECD countries, migrant women exhibit higher fertility rates than their native-born peers, but the net effect on the total fertility rate remains low...


Figure 4.3 shows differences in TFR between native- and foreign-born women according to the most recent data available. Despite higher fertility levels, in two-thirds of the OECD countries, migrants' TFR is below the replacement rate (2.1 children per woman), which is the level at which a population exactly replaces itself from one generation to the next in the absence of migration.

The “net effect” of migrant women on the TFR at the country level – the difference between the observed national TFR and the TFR of the native-born – remains small, ranging from +0.2 in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, to -0.3 in Australia for an OECD average of 0.04.³ In fact, in more than half of the OECD countries for which there are data, the size of the foreign-born population is too small to influence these rates by more than 0.1 (*neutral* net effect). And in a few countries, such as Australia, Denmark and Iceland, migrant women tend to lower national rates rather than increase them (*negative* net effect).

On the other hand, the fertility gaps between native- and foreign-born women are more substantial and vary considerably across countries. Costa Rica displays the highest differential: among migrants, the TFR is 3.7 children per woman, compared to 1.4 among their native-born peers (a gap of 2.3). Conversely, the Netherlands displays the lowest gap at 0.4 and in nine countries – Israel, Japan, Hungary, Iceland, Türkiye, Estonia, Australia, the Slovak Republic and Denmark – the TFR of native-born women is higher than among their foreign-born peers. It is important to note that fertility differentials across countries reflect, to a large extent, different composition of migrant populations concerning national origin, reason for migration, age and sex structure.

Figure 4.3. In two-thirds of the OECD countries, migrants' fertility rates are below replacement rate

Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of native- and foreign-born women, 2020 or latest year available



Note: Data for all countries are from 2019, except for Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Israel, Japan, Korea, the United States (2020), France (2021) and the United Kingdom (2018). Data for Japan refer to the nationality of the mother. Biases associated with TFR as a fertility measure, explained above, are particularly strong for France given the relative importance of family (spouse) migration.

Source: Australia: ABS (2021_[22]), "Births, Country of birth of parent", <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/births-australia/latest-release>; Canada: Statistics Canada (2020_[23]), "Live births, birth weight indicators, by characteristics of the mother and child", <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/220928/dq220928d-cansim-eng.htm>; Chile: CEPALSTAT (2019_[24]), "Tasa global de fecundidad", <https://statistics.cepal.org/portal/cepalstat/dashboard.html?theme=1&lang=es>; INE (2019_[25]), *Anuario de Estadísticas Vitales*, https://www.ine.gob.cl/docs/default-source/nacimientos-matrimonios-y-defunciones/publicaciones-y-anuarios/anuarios-de-estad%C3%ADsticas-vitales/anuario-de-estad%C3%ADsticas-vitales-2019.pdf?sfvrsn=97729b7b_5; Costa Rica: INEC (2020_[26]), "Nacimientos", <https://inec.cr/acercar-inec>; Korea: Yoo, S., B. Sulki Choi and L. Jun Gyeong (2022_[27]), *Developing New Fertility Indicators on Subpopulations*; Israel: Weinreb, A. (2023_[28]), *Estimated migrant and non-migrant TFR in Israel using Labour Force Survey and Israel Social Survey*; Japan: Statistics of Japan (2020_[29]), "Live births by nationality of father and mother", <https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00450011&tstat=000001028897&cycle=7&year=20200&month=0&tclass1=000001053058&tclass2=000001053061&tclass3=000001053064&tclass4val=0>; United States: CDC (2020_[30]), "Natality, 2016-21", <https://wonder.cdc.gov/>, the United States Census Bureau (2020_[31]), *American Community Survey*, <https://data.census.gov/mdat/#/>; Rest of countries: Eurostat (2020_[32]), "Live births by mother's age and country of birth", https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_FACBC_custom_3116674/default/table?lang=en, Eurostat (2020_[33]), "Population on 1 January by age, sex and group of country of birth", https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_POP4CTB_custom_3116883/default/table?lang=en.

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Differences in TFR between native- and foreign-born women, but also between foreign-born women and women in the origin country may reflect:

- the importance of cultural norms and fertility behaviour from the origin country, usually learnt or socialised during childhood (socialisation hypothesis). In Norway and Italy, for instance, there is evidence that migrants from certain regions tend to exhibit higher levels of third births when the first and second births are girls, which resembles cultural preferences in origin populations⁴ (Lillehagen and Lyngstad, 2018_[34]; Ambrosetti et al., 2022_[35]).
- the importance of social norms and institutional contexts at destination to which migrants are gradually exposed (adaptation hypothesis). Women from Türkiye, for example, exhibit relatively higher fertility rates than their native-born peers, but they also display somewhat lower first-birth rates in countries of lower fertility – Germany and Switzerland – than in higher fertility contexts like France. These differences offer support to the adaption hypothesis (Milewski, 2011_[36]).

- the self-selection of migrants, whose fertility patterns might differ from the average observed in the origin country (selectivity hypothesis). Selectivity may respond to observed characteristics of migrants – education and occupation in the origin country – but unobserved ones as well – mobility aspirations or family orientation. Mexican migration to the United States, for example, is selective of individuals with relatively higher fertility than Mexican non-migrants which results in higher fertility rates among migrants than those observed in the average Mexican woman (Choi, 2014^[37]). Conversely, Ghanaian migration typically consists of relatively higher educated individuals that postpone their first childbirth compared to Ghanaians in origin (Wolf and Mulder, 2018^[38]).
- the disruption that migration might induce in family dynamics, particularly in the short term, such as spousal separation, with potential consequences for childbearing behaviour (disruption hypothesis). In most cases, this disruption has proven to be temporary, but migrant women who arrive in Spain before starting a family, for instance, seem to delay their first childbirth even more so than native-born women, and the majority do not compensate for this migration-related disruption at a later stage (González-Ferrer et al., 2017^[4]).
- the overall interrelatedness of migration and family formation – especially for women – wherein migration coincides with other changes in family dynamics such as marriage, family reunification, and union/household formation (life-course hypothesis). Women who migrate to join their partner in the receiving country have much higher propensities to give birth after arrival compared to women who migrate for employment reasons. This phenomenon can be observed in Italy, for instance, where there is a clear association between the timing of childbearing and the share of residence permits for family reasons (Mussino and Strozza, 2012^[19]).

All these processes are not mutually exclusive and directly point to migrant specificities to consider when studying fertility patterns.

Box 4.2. Explaining migrant-native differentials in selected countries

Costa Rica

More than two-thirds of the foreign-born population in Costa Rica were born in neighbouring Nicaragua. In 2020, the TFR of Nicaragua-born women averaged 3.9 children per woman, significantly raising the fertility gap compared to their native-born peers (1.4). Earlier research attributed these large differentials to a lower-educational attainment and labour force participation rate among Nicaraguan women, on the one hand, and to their higher representation in unmarried unions, on the other. The same research found no evidence of adaptation: Nicaraguan migrants who had arrived in the country within five years behaved similarly to those who had resided there for longer periods (Rosero-Bixby, Brenes Camacho and Chen Mok, 2002^[39]). Nicaragua currently records high levels of cohabitation, which often result in high union instability and multiparter fertility. Further, eight in ten adult Nicaraguans in Costa Rica had not completed high school in 2019. Data from 2020 confirm that fertility levels among Nicaragua-born women in Costa Rica highly vary by partnership status and educational attainment, with a TFR of 3.8 and 2.1 among single and married women, respectively; and a TFR of 6.1 and 2.1 among lower and tertiary-educated, respectively.

Japan

Earlier research showed that the lower fertility rates observed among migrant women in Japan were due to the composition of migration flows (mostly from low-fertility countries, except for the Philippines), the disruption effect of international migration in the short term, a highly challenging environment for childrearing, and unstable marriages among international couples. International marriages in Japan peaked in 2006, representing slightly more than 6% of total marriages, but have declined since, due to

a tightening in spousal visas. In 2010, the TFR for Japanese women was 1.3, compared to 0.9 for Chinese women, 1.5 for Philippine women, 1.0 for Thai women, and 1.3 for Brazilian women. Only Philippine women showed a higher TFR than Japanese women, and all migrant women displayed lower fertility rates than in origin countries (Korekawa, 2017^[40])

Israel

There are several atypical patterns in Israeli's fertility levels: not only are they higher than in all other developed countries, but pronatalist norms cut across all educational, cultural and religious backgrounds. Further, fertility has been increasing alongside a higher age at first birth and education. Migrants from former Soviet countries account for roughly half of the foreign-born population in Israel. Research has attributed their lower fertility levels to the economic uncertainty and occupational downgrading caused by migration, as well as postponement to achieve greater social mobility at destination (Weinreb and Chernichovsky, 2018^[41]; Okun and Kagya, 2012^[42]).

France

Since the end of the 1990s, France has consistently displayed some of the highest fertility rates among European countries, attributed to high public spending on family benefits (at 3.5% of GDP, it is the highest across OECD countries) and a diverse and stable set of policies to support child raising (parental leave, childcare services and family allowances). While standard measures to account for the migrant fertility gap suffer from the same biases explained above, the availability of specialised and longitudinal surveys on migration has allowed to better capture the actual difference between migrants and the French-born. Using the 2011 Family and Housing Survey and an alternative measure – completed fertility – Volant, Pison and Héran (2019^[16]) estimate that migrant women born between 1961 and 1965 had 2.4 children over their reproductive lifetime. Using the survey *Trajectoires et Origine*, which allows counting all children ever born and not just those born in France, Reynaud (2023^[21]) calculates a slightly lower complete fertility (2.2 children) among migrant women born between 1965 and 1970. The data also confirm strong variation across origin, generation, educational attainment and age at arrival (Figure 4.9).

...and there is high variation by migrants' origin

The overall differences in the TFR of migrants described above hide substantial heterogeneity across countries of birth. Fertility in sub-Saharan Africa is well above the replacement rate at an average of 4.6 births per woman in 2020, while it is closer to or at replacement level in most other regions (UNDESA, 2020^[43]). Because people bring with them components of their origin culture and behaviour, migrants originating from Africa and other high-fertility regions, such as Asia, tend to display comparatively higher fertility rates than those from Europe, North and South America.

Fertility differences by origin region or country also reflect the main pathways that women use to emigrate (family, work, humanitarian reasons, etc). In Germany, women outside the EU are especially likely to migrate while married and to start a family shortly after migration. Similarly, in Italy, the highest share of family migrants come from the Indian subcontinent, Northern Africa and Senegal. In turn, family migrants marry at a younger age and display a higher completed fertility compared to independent and first migrants (those who arrived single or unpartnered) (Cristina Samper and Kreyenfeld, 2021^[44]; Ortensi, 2015^[45]). In Spain, migrant women from Latin America exhibit lower fertility rates than those prevailing in their countries of origin, which has been partially attributed to selective migration and to the fact that some children are left behind in their origin countries. Moroccan women, conversely, maintain a higher fertility level than the native-born, associated with distinct migration patterns as most women come to Spain as marriage migrants (González-Ferrer et al., 2017^[4]).

Table 4.1 provides an example of differences in fertility rates by origin region for selected OECD countries for which there are data available: Australia, Spain and the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland and Norway. Across all destinations, migrants from Africa have traditionally displayed the highest fertility levels, but they have also experienced a significant decline in recent years. In 2021, the TFR for migrant women from Africa was 2.2 in Norway compared to 3.0 a decade earlier. Similar trends are evident in the rest of destinations. In 2021, migrants from Asia also display relatively higher fertility rates than the native-born population but the region hides large heterogeneity with the highest rates recorded in Southern and Central Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, in descending order) and the lowest in North-East Asia (Korea, Japan, China, in ascending order). Migrants from North and South America, finally, exhibit fertility rates that are below the replacement rate across all destinations and lower than EU migrants.


Table 4.1. Migrants from high-fertility regions, like Africa, display the highest fertility rates across OECD destinations, but they also show declining levels across time

Total fertility rate in selected destination countries by region of birth, 2011 and 2021

	Denmark		Finland		Norway		Sweden		Australia		Spain	
	2011	2021	2011	2021	2011	2021	2011	2021	2011	2021	2011	2021
Native-born	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.4	-	1.5	1.9	1.6	-	1.7	-	1.2
EU-27	1.4	1.4	1.8	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.8	1.4	-	1.7	-	1.4
North Africa and Middle East	2.6	2.4	3.3	2.5	3.0	2.2	3.1	2.6	-	2.2	-	2.6
Sub-Saharan Africa									-	1.9		
North America	1.0	1.1	1.7	1.3	1.8	1.5	-	-	-	1.2	-	0.9
South and Central America	1.4	0.9			2.1	1.3	-	-				1.1
South-East Asia	1.7	2.1	1.9	1.6	2.0	1.7	2.2	1.9	-	1.4	-	1.4
North-East Asia									-	1.1		
Southern and Central Asia									-	1.7		

Note: EU27 refers to Europe for the case of Finland; in the case of Norway, Asia includes Türkiye.

Source: Denmark: Statistics Denmark (2021^[46]), "Births", <https://www.statbank.dk/20017>; Norway: Statistics Norway (2021^[47]), "Fertility Rates", <https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/fodte-og-dode/statistikk/fodte>; Sweden: Statistics Sweden (2021^[48]), "Births and deaths", <https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/population-composition/population-statistics/>; Finland: StatFin (2021^[49]), "Births, vital statistics and population", <https://www.stat.fi/en/statistics/synt>; Australia: ABS (2021^[22]), "Births, Country of birth of parent", <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/births-australia/latest-release>; Spain: INE (2021^[50]), "Estadística de nacimientos", https://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/categoria.htm?c=Estadistica_P&cid=1254734710984.


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In France, migrant women from sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb and Türkiye also exhibit a higher number of children at the end of their reproductive lives (completed fertility) compared to French-born women (Figure 4.4). Conversely, migrant women from Southern Europe (Italy, Spain and Portugal) show similar fertility histories. Within a period of ten years, completed fertilities are lower for all origins, but the most notable reductions are observed in migrants from Africa and Southern Europe (-0.7 and -0.6 children, respectively).

In Sweden, completed fertility of native-born women (born between 1975 and 1980) averages 1.9 children. Except for three of the main origin countries – Thailand, Iran and Poland – foreign-born women display an overall higher number of children at the end of their reproductive lives than their native-born peers. Women from Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria and Somalia, who are likely humanitarian migrants, display a completed fertility that is above replacement rate (Figure 4.5). It must be noted too that data refer to a generation of women who have completed their fertility lifetime. Younger cohorts are likely to have lower completed fertilities.

Figure 4.4. The number of children born to migrant women in France varies by origin and declined over cohorts

Completed fertilities in France by woman's region of origin for women born between 1960-64 and 1970-74



Note: Completed fertilities are the average number of children born to women from the same generation at the end of their reproductive lives. The Maghreb includes Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia only.

Source: Reynaud, D. (2023^[21]), *Fecondité et migration. Comment mesurer la fécondité des immigrées?*, <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6802839>.



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Figure 4.5. The number of children ever born to migrant women in Sweden highly varies by origin

Completed fertilities in Sweden by woman's country of birth for women born between 1975-80



Note: These are the ten largest origin countries based on the size of the foreign-born population in these birth cohorts (1975-80) who were resident in Sweden from ages 16-40 (based on person-years).

Source: Swedish register data (collections accessed and analysed by SUDA, Stockholm University).

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From cross-sectional data, it is not possible to understand what is driving the evolution of TFR across time and origin regions, but declining rates might be simultaneously related to three main factors, which are explained in more detail in the next section:

- **Duration of stay:** the fertility of migrant women often declines with years of residence at destination. This means that, other things equal, migrant women that have been living at these destinations for longer periods will have lower fertility than those who recently arrived. In Norway, for instance, (Tønnessen, 2019^[51]) shows that in 2000 recently arrived migrants (0-2 years since migration), from Africa and Asia had a TFR above 4 children per woman, while women from the same regions who had entered the country more than ten years earlier had a TFR of around 2. Several reasons may account for the role of duration of stay such as the relatively elevated fertility immediately after arrival, the progressive adaptation to local norms or hurdles in combining work and family that slow down progression to later parities.
- **Declining fertility rates across origins:** even when coming from the same regions and countries, the fertility of recent arrivals might also differ from that of earlier cohorts. In most cases, there is a trend towards declining fertility among recent cohorts of migrants. This is linked to lower fertility in origin countries driven by factors such as family planning programmes, changes in preferences or higher education levels among women which, in turn, also affect both the shares of women who migrate and the reasons for their migration (Tønnessen, 2020^[52]).
- **Selection effects:** the socio-demographic profiles of migrant women from the same country may also be changing over time. If cohorts are composed of lower-educated women and/or originating from rural areas, their fertility levels might be higher compared to cohorts composed of urban origin and highly-educated women. In the US-Mexico corridor, for example, Mexican women who emigrated after a large-scale amnesty process (IRCA in 1986) exhibited higher fertility rates than earlier cohorts, in part, because they were more likely to migrate after their fathers and husbands acquired legal status, which is more conducive of family building (Frank and Heuveline, 2005^[53]).

Adaptation and convergence of fertility behaviour

Fertility patterns among migrants and the native-born often converge over time due to the composition of migrants' cohorts and the context at destination...

The fertility levels of native- and foreign-born populations have proven to converge over time, though generally with a remaining gap and with important variations across countries (Sobotka, 2008^[14]). This convergence can happen at the individual level (adaptation) or a generational level (convergence) (Wilson, 2019^[54]). When fertility levels change on a short-time horizon, it might be more proper to think of it as an adaptation process that does not necessarily reflect a process of “acculturation” but rather an adaptive process to the general context wherein the political, social and labour market conditions, as well as family policies may influence childbearing behaviour. Given the importance of these factors in shaping fertility decisions for both native- and foreign-born women, one cannot expect permanently high fertility differentials among both populations. In Sweden, migrants display elevated births within the first two years of arrival, but the fertility levels of those who have been residing in the country for at least five years are already similar to the levels of the Swedish-born population (Andersson, 2004^[17])

There is evidence of adaptation among migrants from high-fertility countries lowering their fertility over time, as well as among migrants from low-fertility countries, increasing their fertility some years after migration (Adserà et al., 2012^[55]; Mussino and Cantalini, 2022^[56]). It must be noted, however, that many factors mediate the pace of adaptation. Some of these relate to the characteristics of migrant cohorts such as country of origin, age at arrival, language fluency, and educational attainment. For instance, the fertility behaviour of migrants who arrived in Canada before adulthood (up to age six) has proven to be either


somewhat lower or indistinguishable from that of the native-born, compared to those who migrated in their late teens whose fertility behaviour differs from that observed in the host country (Adsera and Ferrer, 2013^[57]). One of the mechanisms to explain these differences across cohorts is language proficiency. There is similar evidence from the United States, where migrants arriving at earlier ages – with higher English proficiency in consequence – are more likely to assimilate socially, meaning they tend to have fewer children compared to those with lower English proficiency (Bleakley and Chin, 2010^[58]). Overall, when accounting for age at migration, evidence points towards adaptation of fertility behaviour: with few exceptions, women who migrated at the youngest ages have fertility rates that are most similar to native-born women (Adserà and Ferrer, 2015^[9]).

Other factors mediating fertility adaptation relate to social and institutional contexts at destination country. The propensity to have children is influenced by macroeconomic conditions, labour force participation and gender norms, but also by family and migration policy. For instance, there is evidence that migrants' fertility might have fallen more pronouncedly in response to the Great Recession compared to their native-born peers indicating a stronger response of migrants' fertility intentions to economic uncertainty (Sobotka, 2017^[59]; Alderotti et al., 2022^[7]). In Colombia, a large-scale regularisation process of Venezuelan migrants decreased childbearing propensities among them, which can be attributed to better access to public services (including healthcare and contraception) and better employment opportunities (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2023^[60]). Thus, convergence in fertility levels over time must be understood against the backdrop of evolving conditions in origin and destination countries, as well as differences across migrant cohorts.

Most research on adaptation focuses on cross-sectional data where it is not possible to distinguish between the effect of duration at destination and cohort effects. Figure 4.6 shows fertility behaviour in Sweden over the past 20 years. While the TFR of Swedish-born, and migrants from Asia and EU/Nordic countries, on the one hand, has remained relatively stable, the TFR of migrants from Africa displays higher variation, partly reflecting shifts in origin countries, but also economic downturns and labour market changes at destination (including the 2008 financial crisis).

Figure 4.6. Fertility levels in Sweden vary by origin of migrants and across time

Total Fertility Rate (TFR) by woman's region of birth in Sweden, 2000-21




Source: Statistics Sweden (2022^[61]), *The future population of Sweden 2022-70*, <https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/population-projections/population-projections/pong/publications/the%1efuture%1epopulation-of-sweden%1e2022%1e70/>.

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Germany is an interesting case as different migrant cohorts and their relative weight in total population influence the fertility gaps between the native and the foreign-born, on the one hand, and the country's overall TFR, on the other (Figure 4.7).⁵ The TFR, however, may be subject to interpretation issues as there is a strong link between migrants' fertility levels and duration of stay or age at arrival, which is not shown here (Sobotka, 2008_[14]). Nevertheless, some trends are noteworthy: the TFR of foreign women dropped below replacement level as early as the mid-1990s. Decreasing fertility rates since then led to a narrowing gap with German women, reaching a minimum level in 2008/09, when it averaged 0.2, possibly reflecting an overall economic downturn affecting fertility intentions. Since 2010, the TFR of foreign women increased gradually reaching a peak in 2016 when it averaged 2.3 children per woman and widening the gap with nationals to its maximum (0.8), possibly reflecting large inflows of humanitarian migrants. The TFR of German women has varied less significantly but the overall trend since the mid-1990s has been upwards. Finally, the net contribution of migrants to the country's TFR has varied considerably across years and is close today to what it was in the mid-1990s (0.10 versus 0.09, respectively).

Figure 4.7. The fertility gap between German and foreign women has varied considerably across years

Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of German and foreign women in Germany, 1991-2021



Note: Data refer to mother's nationality, not country of birth.

Source: Destatis (2023_[62]), "Total fertility rate (per woman): Germany", <https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Population/node.html>.


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...but also, due to lowering fertility rates in most origin countries


Most of the research on migrants' fertility has focused on understanding the processes that influence fertility behaviour, but there has been less emphasis on changes across migrant cohorts, which can evidence changes in fertility behaviour at origin. In the past decades, fertility has dramatically declined globally and at a faster pace in many important origin countries (Figure 4.8). Fertility rates in Türkiye and Mexico, for instance, have steadily declined from around five and seven children per woman in the early 1970s, respectively, to 1.9 by 2020.

Figure 4.8. Lowering fertility rates in the past five decades are closing the gaps between regions

Total Fertility Rate (TFR) by women's region of origin, 1950-2021



Source: United Nations (2023^[63]), *World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision*, <https://population.un.org/wpp/>.

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This means that although newly arrived migrants grew up in the same country as those who emigrated earlier, they grew up with different fertility norms, patterns and expectations (Tønnessen, 2019^[51]). As previous high-fertility countries experience births decline, the expected trend would be towards diminishing fertility rates among recent migrants compared to earlier cohorts over time. Table 4.2 shows the TFR in the top origin countries of migrants to the OECD (based on stocks). In most of them, TFR has fallen below replacement, with a few notable exceptions such as Pakistan (3.4), Algeria (2.9), Morocco (2.4) and Suriname (2.4).

Table 4.2. Fertility rates in the main origin countries of migrants to the OECD have fallen significantly in the past two decades

Total Fertility Rate in top destination countries and in main origin countries, 1980 and 2020

Main destination countries	Year	Main origin countries		
United States		Mexico	India	China
	1980	4.8	4.8	2.7
	2020	1.9	2.2	1.7
Germany		Poland	Türkiye	Russia
	1980	2.3	4.4	1.9
	2020	1.4	1.9	1.5
United Kingdom		India	Poland	Pakistan
	1980	4.8	2.3	6.7
	2020	2.2	1.4	3.4
France		Algeria	Morocco	Portugal
	1980	7.0	5.7	2.3
	2020	2.9	2.4	1.4
Canada		India	China	Philippines
	1980	4.8	2.7	5.1
	2020	2.2	1.7	2.5
Australia		United Kingdom	India	China
	1980	1.9	4.8	2.7
	2020	1.7	2.2	1.7
Spain		Morocco	Romania	Colombia
	1980	5.7	2.4	3.9
	2020	2.4	1.6	1.7
Italy		Romania	Albania	Morocco
	1980	2.4	3.6	5.7
	2020	1.6	1.3	2.4
Switzerland		Germany	Italy	Portugal
	1980	1.4	1.6	2.3
	2020	1.5	1.2	1.4
Türkiye		Bulgaria	Iraq	Germany
	1980	2.0	6.6	1.4
	2020	1.6	3.5	1.5
Netherlands		Türkiye	Suriname	Morocco
	1980	4.4	3.9	5.7
	2020	1.9	2.4	2.4

Note: Main destination countries by average stock between 2015 and 2021.

Source: OECD (2023^[64]), *OECD International Migration Statistics* (database), <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>; Colombia, Chile and Mexico: CEPALSTAT (2019^[24]), "Tasa global de fecundidad", <https://statistics.cepal.org/portal/cepalstat/dashboard.html?theme=1&lang=es>; EU countries and the United Kingdom: Eurostat (2023^[65]), "Total fertility rate", https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics; Australia: ABS (2021^[22]), "Births, Country of birth of parent", <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/births-australia/latest-release>; United States: United States Census Bureau (2020^[31]), *American Community Survey*, <https://data.census.gov/mdat/#/>; CDC (2020^[30]), "Nativity, 2016-21", <https://wonder.cdc.gov/>; Japan: Statistics of Japan (2020^[29]), "Live births by nationality of father and mother", <https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00450011&tstat=000001028897&cycle=7&year=20200&month=0&tclass1=000001053058&tclass2=000001053061&tclass3=000001053064&tclass4val=0>; Rest of countries: United Nations (2023^[63]), *World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision*, <https://population.un.org/wpp/>.

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Fertility between the native- and foreign-born tends to converge across generations

While the fertility of migrants has received considerable attention, the fertility patterns of their children are less understood. These tend to be influenced by the social norms of their host country but may also be affected by the behaviour of their parents to the extent that it differs durably from the social norms of the host country. The “subculture hypothesis” assumes that the latter effect dominates the former. There is indeed evidence that ideas about the appropriate timing and sequencing of family formation among migrants’ children differ from those prevailing among the native-born population. Alternatively, the “adaptation hypothesis” assumes that the effect of the host society dominates: children of migrants are influenced by the prevailing conditions and norms in destination to which they are gradually exposed, through schooling, the media and social contacts outside the family (Pailhé, 2017^[66]).


Studying migrants’ fertility in eight European countries – United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain and Estonia – Kulu et al. (2015^[67]) find that the childbearing behaviour of the descendants of migrants falls in between the fertility pathways experienced by their parents’ generation and the native-born populations.

In France, the fertility behaviour of most children of migrants is converging towards that of native-born: the completed fertility of native-born women with migrant parents (1.9) is significantly lower than that of migrant women (2.3) and similar to that of French-born women with native-born parents (1.9). Further, there is not only high variation across origin groups, but the various patterns of adaptation are highly dependent on access to a higher level of education. Among native-born women with parents from Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb and Türkiye the propensity of a first birth is higher among the low-educated. For tertiary-educated women with parents from Maghrebi and Southeast Asian countries, conversely, the propensity of a first birth is even lower compared to French-born women (Pailhé, 2017^[66]). More recent data confirm that higher educational levels mediate fertility differences among children of migrants in France: among those with an educational degree above the *baccalaurat* (upper secondary), the gaps in completed fertilities between those with and without migrant parentage are lowest (Figure 4.9) (Reynaud, 2023^[21]).

In the United States, the fertility of Mexican migrants and their children points to convergence across generations. Research by Choi (2014^[37]) suggests that Mexican migrants have higher fertility than native-born women and that their fertility levels resemble those of rural Mexican women, which is unsurprising since Mexican migrants tend to come from rural communities where women generally have more children. Choi also finds evidence of accelerated fertility among Mexican women after migration that partially compensates for lower fertility prior to migration, and a general tendency for Mexican-American fertility to decrease across generations, offering support for the convergence hypothesis. Using data from the Centre for Disease and Control Prevention (CDC) and the American Community Survey, Figure 4.10 offers support to this hypothesis, showing that the TFR of women of Mexican origin born in the United States closely resembles that of native-born women.

Figure 4.9. Age at arrival and educational attainment mediate fertility levels among children of migrants in France

Completed fertility in France of native- and foreign-born women born between 1960-74 by selected characteristics (Panel A) and by selected characteristics and educational attainment (Panel B)




Note: Completed fertilities are the average number of children born to women from the same generation at the end of their reproductive lives. Data cover women born between 1960 and 1974.

Source: Reynaud, D. (2023^[21]), *Fecondité et migration. Comment mesurer la fécondité des immigrées?*, <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6802839>.

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Figure 4.10. In the United States, the fertility of migrants' children is already similar to that of the native-born population without immigrant parentage

Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in the United States of native-born, native-born of Mexican origin, and Mexico-born women, 2020



Source: United States Census Bureau (2020^[31]), *American Community Survey*, <https://data.census.gov/mdat/#/>; CDC (2020^[30]), "Natalidad, 2016-21", <https://wonder.cdc.gov/>; INEGI (2020^[68]), "Natalidad y fecundidad", https://www.inegi.org.mx/temas/natalidad/?fbclid=IwAR10OHRUvb0P_GtodJFUO8D6_0s2q1hOEiShQKLwwntKoOYaNfSvL0s2b4#informacion_general.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/cmsy0v>

Box 4.3. The role of migrants in shaping fertility trends in origin countries

Both financial remittances sent by migrants as well as ideas and behavioural patterns brought back into the country of origin by returnees may speed up fertility changes in countries of origin. On the one hand, financial remittances are instrumental to smoothing consumption and increasing savings. In that regard they reduce uncertainty, improve living conditions and encourage educational investments that usually come hand in hand with later and lower fertility. On the other hand, social remittances in the form of transfers of information, skills, and social capital from receiving communities are another important enabler of improved socio-economic conditions and associated fertility changes (Levitt, 1998^[69]). Both returnees and transnational migrants play an important role in the transmission of new values to their communities of origin. The use of social media, the internet and continuous contact with migrants' relatives likely accelerates the transmission of fertility patterns in destination to the origin countries and, with it, the convergence of social norms and the promotion of gender roles that are more supportive of women's empowerment in the form of higher female labour market participation and educational levels. (Beine, Docquier and Schiff, 2013^[70]) show some degree of convergence in fertility levels between many sending countries across the world and major destinations of their migrants. Work by Bertoli and Marchetta (2015^[71]) is also consistent with those findings. Interestingly, Fargues (2006^[72]) and Fargues (2011^[73]) show how, depending on the fertility levels at destination countries, migrants from similar origins in northern Africa bring back very different fertility norms to their countries of origin.

Source: Adserà, A. (2020^[74]), "International political economy and future fertility trends", <https://doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2020.deb01>; Beine, M., F. Docquier and M. Schiff (2013^[70]), "International migration, transfer of norms and home country fertility", <https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12062>; Levitt, P.; (1998^[69]), "Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion", <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791839803200404>; Fargues, P. (2006^[72]), *The Demographic Benefit of International Migration: Hypothesis and Application to Middle Eastern and North African Contexts*, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/508301468280735279/The-demographic-benefit-of-international-migration-hypothesis-and-application-to-the-Middle-Eastern-and-North-African-contexts>; Fargues, P. (2011^[73]), "International Migration and the Demographic Transition: A Two-Way Interaction", <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2011.00859.x>; Bertoli, S. and F. Marchetta (2015^[71]), "Bringing It All Back Home – Return Migration and Fertility Choices", <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.08.006>.

Migrants' contribution to births in OECD countries


Migrant women directly contribute to the share of births in OECD countries due to their age composition and migration channel....

The proportion of births to migrants provides a basic indication of their importance for population dynamics. This measure is a function of past migration levels, the age composition of migrants, and their fertility rates (Sobotka, 2008^[14]). Births to the foreign-born population generally refer to foreign-born mothers giving birth, which means that if, for instance, a native-born man has a child with a foreign-born woman in the country of the man, this counts as a foreign-born offspring. In general, the number of births to the foreign-born population does not significantly differ when foreign-born mothers or fathers are considered⁶ (Bagavos, 2022^[75]).

As shown in Figure 4.11 migrants contribute substantially to the total number of births in many OECD countries. This is not surprising, as foreign-born women tend to be younger than native-born women, are likely to arrive at childbearing ages, display higher fertility and come in the context of family reunification (Figure 4.12). In 2020, six in ten babies in Luxembourg, for example, were born to foreign-born women. There is, however, substantial variation in the area: at the lower extreme, one in a hundred births in Japan were from migrant women.


Figure 4.11. Despite their small contribution to the total fertility rate, migrants contribute significantly to total number of births in OECD countries

Share of live births from foreign-born mothers among total number of births (2011 and 2020) and share of foreign-born population among total population (2020)



Note: Data for the United Kingdom and Chile are from 2018 and 2019 (not 2020), respectively; data for Switzerland are from 2015 (not 2011); data for Australia and the United States are from 2010 (not 2011). Data for Japan refer to nationality, not the mother's country of birth.


Source: Eurostat (2020^[32]), "Live births by mother's age and country of birth", https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_FACBC_custom_3116674/default/table?lang=en; INEC (2020^[26]), "Nacimientos", <https://inec.cr/acerca-inec>; United States Census Bureau (2020^[31]), American Community Survey, <https://data.census.gov/mdat/#/>; CDC (2020^[30]), "Natality, 2016-21", <https://wonder.cdc.gov/>; Statistics Canada (2020^[23]), "Live births, birth weight indicators, by characteristics of the mother and child", <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/220928/dq220928d-cansim-eng.htm>; ABS (2021^[22]), "Births, Country of birth of parent", <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/births-australia/latest-release>; INE (2019^[25]), *Anuario de Estadísticas Vitales*, https://www.ine.gob.cl/docs/default-source/nacimientos-matrimonios-y-defunciones/publicaciones-y-anuarios/anuarios-de-estad%C3%ADsticas-vitales/anuario-de-estad%C3%ADsticas-vitales-2019.pdf?sfvrsn=97729b7b_5; DANE (2021^[76]), "Nacimientos", https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/poblacion/pre_estadisticasvitales_IIItrim_2022pr.pdf; Statistics of Japan (2020^[29]), "Live births by nationality of father and mother", <https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00450011&tstat=000001028897&cycle=7&year=20200&month=0&tclass1=000001053058&tclass2=000001053061&tclass3=000001053064&tclass4val=0>; KOSTAT (2021^[77]), *Vital Statistics of Immigrants in 2021*, https://kostat.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20108030000&bid=11743&act=view&list_no=421965&tag=&nPage=1&ref_bid=

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To better understand the dynamics of family formation and the proportion of births to migrant women, it is useful to look at the female migrant population by age composition and their migration channel (the self-declared reason for migration from the 2021 EULFS is used as a proxy here). Across the European OECD countries, every four out of ten native-born women are in their fertile years (15 to 49 years old), compared to six in ten of their foreign-born peers. In addition, in 2021, six out of ten women (15 years and older) migrating to the European OECD countries declared to so for family reasons (Figure 4.12). It is possible to assume that for female family migrants, the migration event and family formation are interrelated events.

Figure 4.12. Six in ten women migrated to the European OECD countries for family reasons

Women's self-declared reasons for migration, 2021



Note: Data cover women who are 15 years and older.

Source: Eurostat (2021^[78]), *EU Labour Force Survey*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>.StatLink  <https://stat.link/a6zhip>**...but their indirect contribution to births is also significant**

Even if the direct contribution of migrants to overall fertility is relatively modest, their indirect contribution is probably significant. The employment of migrant women in household and care services has proven to increase the availability of these services and allow (highly educated) mothers to return to work after childbirth (see next chapter). This is especially true in contexts of high-income inequality or where social and family policies are less developed. In Spain and Italy, given the shortage of childcare services, women's labour force participation and childrearing are usually reconciled via the unpaid care of grandparents and the care work of migrants (Farré, González and Ortega, 2011^[79]; Tobío, 2001^[80]).

Similarly, college-educated women in the United States are increasingly having children, as migrant inflows are associated with reductions in the cost of childcare and other household services. The impacts are strongest among women whose fertility decisions are the most likely to be affected by changes in childcare markets: married women and women with a graduate degree. This makes sense in that highly educated women are more likely to use market-provided childcare. Previous research had already shown that a reduction in the cost of household services – led by low-educated migrants – allowed tertiary-educated native-born women to reconcile childbearing and paid work; e.g. to increase their labour force participation. In tandem, both findings suggest that while the predominant impact of low-skilled migration is to increase the labour supply of high-skilled native-born women, some women respond by having an additional child (Furtado and Hock, 2010^[81]; Furtado, 2015^[82]).

Age at childbirth

Migrant women tend to have children at an earlier age, with potential consequences for their labour market insertion


Migrant women tend to have children at an earlier age than their native-born counterparts. While most research has emphasised the importance of culture in early onset of fertility, there is evidence that institutional factors as well as education and employment-related factors critically influence childbearing behaviour. Andersson and Scott (2007^[83]) for example, find that most groups of migrants in Sweden (from ten different origin countries) give birth earlier than native-born women and much of the differences are driven by time since migration and labour market attachment. Women (both migrants and non-migrants) who are not established in the labour market have a reduced propensity to become a mother, which the authors attribute to Sweden's parental leave system in which financial benefits are based on previous earnings. The similarity in patterns across widely different national groups supports the notion that various institutional factors affecting all subgroups are crucial in influencing childbearing behaviour.

Kulu et al. (2015^[67]) found that poor employment prospects among migrant populations may promote early onset and high completed fertility. Migrant women with poor employment prospects may decide on the “motherhood track”, particularly if family policies encourage women to stay at home with children. In contrast, low educational segregation between population subgroups and family policies that encourage women's employment and support the compatibility of employment and parenthood, in turn, may explain a lack of high fertility among ethnic groups in a country (Kulu et al., 2017^[84]).

In Spain, the TFR has remained relatively stable since 2011, at 1.3. The long-term decline in fertility has been associated with a progressive postponement of childbearing as both men and women increasingly wait to be established in the labour market before childbearing, but rather than foregone motherhood what explains the country's fertility levels is the low rates of progression to second births (González-Ferrer et al., 2017^[4]). Although the net contribution of migrants to overall fertility was modest in 2020 (+0.07), Figure 4.13 shows that migrant women tend to have children at earlier ages. In 2021, the first child was born at 32.1 years among native-born women versus 29 among the foreign-born (a 3.1-year difference). The age gaps only begin to decrease by the third order and reverse at fourth orders and higher, with migrant women registering an average age of 35.6 compared to 34.6 among the native-born. This is consistent with findings from Kraus and Castro-Martín (2017^[85]) which show, on the one hand, a decline in the fertility levels of Latin American migrants (the largest origin), especially after the 2008 crisis, leading to a convergence in fertility levels with the native-born population. On the other, the fact that such convergence has not been observed with regard to the fertility calendar, with Latin American women entering motherhood, on average, three years earlier than their native-born peers.

Figure 4.13. Foreign women in Spain tend to have their first child at earlier ages compared to national women

Age at childbirth by birth order and woman's nationality in Spain, 2002-21



Note: Data refer to mother's citizenship, not country of birth.

Source: INE (2021^[86]), "Edad media a la maternidad por orden del nacimiento según nacionalidad de la madre", <https://www.ine.es/dynt3/inebase/es/index.htm?padre=2043&capel=2044>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/8qwr5>

In Sweden, migrant women from a selected cohort (born between 1975 and 1980) exhibit earlier family formation compared to the native-born. Age at first birth for migrant women ranges from 23.6 among women from Somalia to 28.6 among women coming from Iran (compared to 28.9 among Swedish-born women) (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3. On average, native-born women in Sweden tend to have their first child approximately three years later than foreign-born women

Average age at first birth by woman's country of birth, women born between 1975 and 1980, Sweden

Country of birth	Age at first birth
Somalia	23.6
Yugoslavia	24.0
Syria	25.1
Türkiye	25.3
Iraq	25.5
Chile	25.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	26.0
Thailand	26.4
Poland	26.7
Iran	28.6
Native-born	28.9

Note: These are the ten largest origin countries based on the size of the foreign-born population in these birth cohorts (1975-80) who were resident in Sweden from ages 16-40 (based on person-years).

Source: Swedish register data (collections accessed and analysed by SUDA, Stockholm University).

Early family formation can translate into lower capacity among women to pursue training or employment due to family responsibilities (see Chapter 5). In other cases, conversely, children of migrants may postpone family formation to a greater extent than the native-born due to high educational and employment aspirations (Pailhé, 2017^[66]).

Desired fertility

Fertility behaviour may be the result of individual preferences but may also reflect the socio-economic context in which fertility decisions are made. Fertility differences between migrants and the native-born, therefore, may expose social inequalities and not necessarily differences in norms or preferences (Milewski and Mussino, 2019^[10]). Indicators on fertility intentions and migrants' ideal family size can shed light on fertility norms limiting the interference of economic conditions and the disruptions related to the migratory process (Mussino and Ortensi, 2019^[87]). In this sense, they are likely closer to personal norms than actual fertility behaviour (Carlsson, 2019^[88]).

Research shows that as with actual fertility, fertility ideals are mediated by several factors including age at migration as well as educational attainment, residential segregation, among other factors. Those emigrating as children or adolescents tend to display fertility ideals farther from their country of origin compared to those who emigrate at later ages (Alderotti et al., 2022^[7]).

Carlsson (2019^[88]), for example, finds that in Sweden there is adaptation at the ideational (or preference) level of fertility across generations. However, the pace and extent of convergence vary by gender – with clearer patterns among women – and origin – with a clear convergence pattern among migrants from Eastern Europe and no clear pattern among migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. The fact that the process of convergence is observed both in actual fertility as well as fertility intentions suggests that the fertility adaption of migrants not only responds to the influence of the institutional and socio-economic context, but to the influence of norms.

In the Netherlands, de Valk (2013^[89]), studying families from different origins, finds that there are differences regarding the preferred timing for family formation and the ideal family size, but there is also evidence of socialisation as children prefer smaller families and later childbearing compared to their parents and these intergenerational differences are not greater among immigrant families. In Spain, the desired number of children does not differ between adolescents of Latin American origin who migrated as children and Spanish-born adolescents, but the former would like to start their family earlier. Yet, compared to their parents, age at family formation is considerably lower, showcasing that adaptation and socialisation processes are both at work for migrants who arrived young. Social integration into the host society – measured by the number of native-born best friends – reduces the gap in expected age at first birth, while age at migration exerts no significant influence (Kraus and Castro-Martín, 2017^[85]).

Table 4.4 shows ideal fertility and ideal and actual age of family formation among migrants and native-born individuals in Spain. In line with the findings of Kraus and Castro-Martín (2017^[85]), migrants prefer to start their family earlier than the native-born, and the difference is particularly high among migrants from Africa and Eastern Europe. Regarding family size preferences, there are no large differences between migrants and the native-born, except for migrants from high-fertility regions such as Africa. This similarity in family preferences cannot be attributed to an adaptation process to social norms, as the preferred number of children among younger cohorts in certain origin regions already hovers around two. Finally, there is a significant variation in fertility ideals depending on the age at arrival, with migrants who arrived at earlier ages showing greater convergence to the fertility preferences of the native-born population.

Because many factors contribute to materialising fertility expectations, the actual age at first birth does not always correspond to the ideal age. Among Spanish-born and migrants from Western Europe, there is only a slight average gap, perhaps reflecting a more accurate perception of the economic situation and

aspirations in other (competing) life domains such as education or the labour market. In the case of migrants from Eastern Europe and Latin America, the onset of family formation is, on average, earlier than desired (Bueno, Lozano and Adsera, forthcoming^[90]).


Table 4.4. There are differences in ideal fertility and timing among migrants and the native-born in Spain, but these tend to be lower among migrants who arrived before adolescence

Ideal family size and age at family formation among migrants and native-born women in Spain, 2018

	Mean ideal number of children	Mean ideal age at first birth	Actual age at first birth
Spain	1.9	28.2	28.7
Western Europe	2.0	28.0	28.2
Arrived before 13	1.8	28.1	28.3
Arrived at 13 and older	2.2	27.8	28.0
Eastern Europe	2.0	26.1	24.2
Arrived before 13	1.9	27.0	22.0
Arrived at 13 and older	2.0	26.0	24.2
Africa	2.8	24.6	25.1
Arrived before 13	2.3	25.5	25.8
Arrived at 13 and older	2.9	24.5	25.1
Latin America	2.1	27.2	24.5
Arrived before 13	2.1	27.3	23.8
Arrived at 13 and older	2.2	27.2	24.6

Note: Total sample includes 14 369 women aged 18-55, of which 12% are migrants. Among the sample, 8 154 are mothers, of which 13% are migrant mothers.

Source: INE (2018^[91]), "Encuesta de fecundidad 2018", https://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736177006&menu=ultiDatos&idp=1254735573002.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/jwqe97>

Conclusion

The fertility of migrants is an increasingly important element in the population dynamics of receiving countries. However, most fertility measures tend to provide only a partial view of their childbearing patterns and are prone to overestimating differences between migrant and native-born women. This happens for a couple of reasons. First, fertility tends to be relatively high immediately after migration as in many cases is related to family reunification or marriage. Second, the fertility of migrants preparing to move to another country tends to be relatively lower than otherwise. As a result, measures only looking at the behaviour of migrants in their destination fail to account for the relatively low fertility in origin just before migration. This chapter provides a detailed explanation of these facts. In addition, the chapter refers to recent studies (France, in particular) in which researchers calculate how different the TFR of migrants is when it is possible to have complete information on the childbearing behaviour of migrants both in origin and destination. Overall, fertility patterns among migrants and the native-born tend to converge over time and across generations. The substantial decrease in fertility across most origin countries is an important reason for the convergence.

While the net contribution of migrants to overall fertility levels is relatively small, their immediate contributions in terms of shares among births are substantial. This is in part explained by the fact that many migrants arrive in OECD countries precisely during their childbearing years. More importantly, the fertility behaviour of migrants – both in terms of fertility levels as well as age at family formation – has important implications for their integration process as it impacts their labour market attachment and outcomes, as

will be seen in the companion chapter. Early childbearing and, particularly, childbearing that happens immediately after arrival when women lack pre-birth labour market experience in destination hinders their continuous attachment after childbirth. As the next chapter discusses, policy makers should consider those patterns of childbearing in designing policies that enable women to enter or re-enter the labour market.

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Notes

¹ Fertility, mortality and international migration directly determine changes in a population's age structure. The effect of fertility is clear and immediate in changing the size of the youngest group, but the effects of mortality and migration are far more complex. First, death, immigration and emigration can occur at any age (as opposed to births). Second, while emigration and deaths are comparable in terms of population reduction, the parallel between migration and birth as a way of increasing population is not as straightforward as the composition of migrants is heterogeneous (Fihel, Janicka and Kloc-Nowak, 2018^[5]).

² Replacement level is the level of fertility at which a population exactly replaces itself from one generation to the next. In developed countries, replacement level fertility can be taken as requiring, under the current mortality conditions and barring out- and in-migration, an average of 2.1 children per woman.

³ Earlier research provides similar results. In 2014, the net effect of migrants to the overall TFR of 18 EU countries was 0.05, ranging from a high 0.17 in France to 0.04 in Norway (Sobotka, 2017^[59]).

⁴ Many studies in different settings have suggested that migrants from countries with skewed sex ratios at birth tend to adjust the sex of their offspring to ensure the birth of at least one male child. Using 2001 and 2006 Canadian census, Adsera and Ferrer (2020^[92]) find that South Asian women have an abnormally high share of boys after a first-born girl, resembling cultural preferences and patterns of their origin countries.

⁵ It must be noted, however, that Germany only publishes fertility data by citizenship (nationality) and, thus, the statistics presented here should be seen as an approximate measure of migrant's fertility rates.

⁶ According to calculations by Bagavos (2022^[75]), the share of births to foreign-born fathers to the total number of births in France and in the United Kingdom would have been higher by less than 1 percentage point as compared to the corresponding share to foreign-born mothers.

5

Labour market integration of migrant mothers

Marcela Valdivia, OECD

Alicia Adsera, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

This chapter explores the relationship between family formation and labour market outcomes among migrant women. After analysing the short- and longer-term effects on employment outcomes, it presents the factors shaping these results: from individual characteristics to institutional arrangements (parental leave, formal childcare and part-time arrangements). Finally, the chapter reviews some of the policies to support the employment of migrant mothers, focusing on the best practices.

In Brief

Key findings

- Gender gaps in labour market outcomes persist despite educational gains among native- and foreign-born women. The effect of children – known as motherhood or child penalties – largely accounts for the remaining gaps and tends to be more pronounced for migrant women.
- Roughly half of migrant mothers with small children (0-4) are employed in OECD countries, a 20 percentage point gap compared to their native-born peers. Belgium, France, Germany and Slovenia display the highest employment gaps, exceeding 30 percentage points; Hungary, the Czech Republic, Chile and Costa Rica, the lowest, and not exceeding 10 percentage points.
- The employment of migrant mothers is more sensitive to the age and number of children compared to their native-born peers, suggesting that childcare constraints are higher for the former. Migrant mothers also report higher levels of involuntary part-time employment: one in four would like to work more hours, compared to one in seven of their native-born peers. While individual preferences and cultural factors are often cited as main barriers to maternal employment, these indicators suggest that migrant mothers are often trapped in inactivity due to childcare responsibilities.
- Migrant mothers' labour supply responds to various factors: family formation immediately after arrival limits the accumulation of human capital and time spent in the labour market before childbirth which, in turn, restricts access to parental leave policies. Once employed, elementary occupations – in which they are overrepresented – offer little financial incentive or institutional support to return to work after childbearing.
- Migrant mothers tend to use formal childcare at lower rates than their native-born peers and often face barriers to access, including financial costs, lack of institutional knowledge and language barriers, shortage of publicly subsidised spaces and/or lack of culture-sensitive provision. As family networks are more limited for them, migrant mothers also rely less on informal childcare arrangements.
- The employment of migrant mothers has positive implications on the labour market outcomes of their children, showcasing the importance of role modelling. For native-born women with at least one parent born outside the EU, having a working mother during adolescence is associated with an increase of 13 percentage points in their employment rate. The positive association is particularly large in Germany (18 percentage points).
- The employment of migrant mothers (and migrant women, more generally) in domestic and care services also increases the availability of these services, allowing parents – both foreign – and native-born – to reconcile family responsibilities and paid work, and raising female employment.
- As family formation and migration tend to be intertwined processes for many female migrants, it is essential to account for both processes simultaneously when thinking of integration. Pre-departure counselling as well as targeted support immediately after arrival are complementary measures towards facilitating employment.
- Countries can remove obstacles faced by migrant mothers to participate in integration programmes, notably through flexible modalities, extended timelines, the provision of childcare services and/or lowering the threshold of participation. Several countries also offer integration support in preschool settings, targeting both parents and children simultaneously.

Introduction

The inclusion of women in the labour market is an important objective for equity considerations alone, but improved female labour market outcomes are also needed to ensure continued economic growth (OECD, 2023^[1]). Ageing populations and declining fertility rates – as evidenced in the previous chapter – mean that many countries will face a shrinking labour force in the coming years. In this context, women – and migrant women in particular – represent a significant, under-utilised source of skills.

In recent years, the educational achievement of girls has taken over that of boys in most OECD countries, but women's position in the labour market severely lags behind that of men (OECD, 2018^[2]). Recent OECD work shows that remaining gender gaps can be significantly attributed to the effect of children (OECD, 2023^[1]). Women who are mothers are more likely than childless women to work fewer hours, earn less than men, or opt out of the workforce entirely. The effect of children on labour market outcomes – often known as child or motherhood penalty – is also more pronounced for migrant women, but thus far research and attention from policy makers have been limited.

Across OECD countries, about half (52%) of foreign-born women with small children (0-4) are employed, a 20 percentage point gap compared to native-born mothers of the same age group (25-54). The employment gap between mothers and childless women is also twice as large for migrant women than for their native-born peers (-19 percentage points versus -9, respectively). While low employment among migrant mothers may reflect general factors affecting migrant labour market outcomes – lack of country-specific human capital and labour market experience, limited information and social networks, discrimination – the intersection of gender, migration and family formation also shapes specific constraints that require attention.

The labour force participation of migrant mothers responds to various factors such as the connection between migration and family formation, which may lead to childbearing immediately after arrival, restricting women's ability to acquire country-specific human capital and experience (see previous chapter); lower access to and uptake of family policies; lack of family networks, often critical in the provision of childcare; different social and gender norms influencing fertility choices and female employment; and lower socio-economic status or labour market attachment before childbirth. All these factors, explored across this chapter, contribute to explaining the large variation in how women respond to labour market incentives and enter and exit the labour market upon family formation.

Removing barriers to the reconciliation between paid work and family responsibilities is particularly important for migrant women and society as a whole as:

- Reduced labour market participation among mothers translates into foregone wages and experience at the individual level, as well as reduced household income and underutilised human capital at the societal level. This is especially true for migrant women who, on average, are more educated than their male counterparts across the OECD area (OECD, 2020^[3]).
- Despite the emphasis on the role of origin culture in the public debate,¹ evidence shows that institutional arrangements and job opportunities are also important in explaining how migrant women adapt their labour supply to family circumstances. In Canada, six in ten migrant mothers (with children under six) report willingness to work but not being able to do so due to childcare responsibilities. In the European OECD countries, the same is true for one in five migrant mothers of children under 14.
- Time use is more gendered among migrants than among the native-born, meaning migrant women tend to spend more time doing housework than their native-born peers. The relationship between housework and earnings is key to understanding migrants' integration as this type of work significantly contributes to decreasing wages for migrant women (Fendel, 2021^[4]).

- Language plays a key role in the creation of community and a sense of belonging, but migrant women who remain in the household to attend to family responsibilities can find themselves in isolation, with few opportunities to learn or practice the host language (OECD, 2021^[6]).
- Migrant women's access to the labour market is critical for their children's educational success and future labour market outcomes. Mothers' employment decisions can positively influence attitudes within their own families and lead to a more gender egalitarian division of work.

The key questions this chapter seeks to discuss are the following: what is the relationship between childbearing and labour market outcomes of migrant women in the short and long term? How do these trends differ from native-born mothers? What factors shape maternal employment rates among migrant women? What are the main factors hindering access to family policy among migrant families? What mainstream and other policies are in place to support the employment of migrant mothers and what do we know about their impact?

The first and second parts summarise the short- and longer-term effects of family formation on the labour force participation of migrant mothers, respectively, and how these effects compare to those observed among their native-born peers. The third part looks at factors shaping labour market outcomes for migrant mothers: human capital, sector and quality of jobs, migration channel and individual preferences. The fourth section describes how migrant women fare in terms of access to and uptake of family policy, focusing on parental leave and formal childcare. Finally, the chapter reviews some of the policies implemented by OECD countries to support the employment of migrant mothers focusing on the best practices.

Labour force participation of mothers

Earlier research emphasised the role of human capital in explaining gender inequality in the labour market (both in terms of participation and earnings), but educational gains for women in the latest part of the 20th century have put alternative explanations at the centre (Blau and Kahn, 2017^[6]). Persistent gender gaps in employment are now largely attributed to the effects of children on women's careers (Kleven, Landais and Sogaard, 2019^[7]). The so-called child or motherhood penalty can be understood as the impact of children on the labour market trajectories of women relative to men or relative to women with no children.

This impact may translate into lower employment, a reduction in the number of hours worked, and/or loss of earnings. The latter result from mothers' reduced labour force participation, but the penalty has proven to persist even after controlling for forgone work experience, education, training and reduced hours (Budig, Misra and Boeckmann, 2012^[8]). The mechanisms to explain the motherhood penalty range from loss of human capital due to prolonged periods of leave, employers' discrimination and choice of sectors or job types that allow more flexibility for family care at the expense of higher wages. All these effects are not short-lived and tend to have enduring consequences spanning a woman's career (Bazen, Joutard and Périvier, 2021^[9]).

The extent to which mothers participate in the labour market responds to a combination of observable sociodemographic characteristics at the individual level, as well as unobservable individual preferences. In addition, whether a mother works also depends on the support of family policies, which tend to have a broad set of objectives, among which raising female employment may be only one. In this regard, the effectiveness of family policies depends on their degree of coherence with other policies. Access to formal childcare, for instance, boosts maternal employment when taxation and parental leave policies are also supportive (Adema, Clarke and Thévenon, 2020^[10]).

This chapter compares the labour market participation of migrant mothers with that of their native-born peers. It considers sociodemographic differences and how both groups fare in different domains of family policy – access to early childhood education and care (ECEC), parental leave and part-time arrangements. Given that the chapter focuses on cross-country variation in maternal employment rates, it mostly employs cross-sectional data, which can be informative about women's situation in the labour market at different times in their careers and allow comparing sub-populations across various dimensions of labour force participation. The influence of family structures and roles are not analysed in this chapter.

Box 5.1. Challenges in calculating the child penalty

Calculating the actual effect of childbirth on employment outcomes among migrant women, and among women in general, poses methodological challenges. In general, the negative association between labour force participation and childbearing may be driven by causal influences in either direction or by additional factors that affect both, such as gender norms that may increase childbearing preferences and discourage maternal employment (see section on individual determinants for a definition of gender norms). Research that has tried to control for many of these factors and establish a “causal” impact of motherhood found that it is sizeable and has not decreased over recent years despite gains of women on other margins (Cortes and Pan, 2020^[11]; Kleven, Landais and Sogaard, 2019^[7]; Kleven et al., 2019^[12]; Holland and de Valk, 2017^[13]).

For migrant women, gender norms comprise not only those prevailing at destination but also those from their origin country because socialisation occurs from a very young age and migrants tend to carry with them the norms and values from their home countries. In addition, a proper analysis of mothers’ career paths would ideally involve observing their complete working lives and comparing them with those of childless persons with otherwise similar individual characteristics. This exercise would allow one to observe career path dependencies and the causal effect of children. But due to data limitations, such as lack of longitudinal data, most studies use cross-sectional approaches comparing parents with childless peers, where the effect of family formation can be confounded with selection effects or with structural factors that already determine employment positions before parenthood (Kil et al., 2017^[14]).

Overall, the limited research on motherhood and migration has attempted to explain differences between native- and foreign-born populations through the role of policies and institutions; gender norms influencing fertility behaviour and the allocation of time between unpaid care and paid work; or path dependencies determined by the timing of family formation, socio-economic status or unstable labour market trajectories before childbirth. Few studies use longitudinal data, explore the role of partner’s employment or distinguish between full- and part-time employment (Maes, Wood and Neels, 2021^[15]). To try to overcome this shortage of suitable data, a new line of research has recently introduced an event-study approach around the birth of the first child to estimate the motherhood penalty employing cross-sectional data. The approach consists in creating a synthetic population of “future parents” who are observably similar to the observed parents and analysing the change in employment and earnings of men and women after childbirth (Kleven, 2022^[16]).

Short-term effects of family building among migrant women

Family formation is associated with lower employment rates for women overall, but the penalty is higher for migrant women

Economic theories dating back to the 1970s suggest that within couples, women tend to increase their participation in household-related activities at the expense of their labour force participation due to implicit comparative advantages of men and women in these two spheres. Intra-household specialisation increases particularly upon childbearing (Becker, 1985^[17]). Because individual (potential) earnings tend to determine the allocation of time within a household, family formation and labour force participation have often been viewed as competing paths in the life course of a woman (Andersson and Scott, 2007^[18]).

However, increased access to subsidised formal childcare and paid parental leave, among other things, have gradually enabled the combination of paid work for women and family formation. In parallel, educational gains among women have increased their potential wages and consequently the costs of


dropping out of the labour force after childbearing (Kleven, 2022^[16]). Indeed, across OECD countries, both native- and foreign-born women are, on average, more educated than their male peers, especially among the younger cohorts (OECD, 2019^[19]; OECD, 2020^[3]). Despite this, mothers – and migrant mothers in particular – still display lower employment rates than childless women.

Reduced labour market participation among mothers translates into foregone wages at the individual level, increased costs at the household level and underutilised human capital at the societal level. According to data from the 2019 EU labour force surveys, if barriers to work were removed among migrant mothers who report willingness to work and are unable to do so, European OECD countries could gain an additional 1.5 million workers. The number would increase to approximately 5 million if the employment rates of migrant mothers (with children under 14) rose to the levels of their native-born peers.

Figure 5.1 provides a first assessment of the role of childbearing in women’s careers by showing differences in employment rates between childless men and women, on the one hand, and parents of small children, on the other. Differences are not adjusted by age, education or number of children as these factors are explored below. Data only refer to partnered individuals, as the constraints faced by single women when making labour market decisions are likely to differ from those in a couple.


Figure 5.1. Having young children disproportionately affects the employment of migrant women

Differences in employment rates between partnered men/women with at least one child aged 0-4 and childless partnered men/women for native-born (Panel A) and foreign-born (Panel B) individuals, 2021 or latest year available



Note: Partnered individuals refer to those either married or in union. Parents are individuals with children aged 0-4 in EU countries, 0-6 in Canada, and 0-5 in the United States. Positive values mean higher employment rates for parents.

Source: Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; Statistics Canada (2019^[21]), *Labour Force Survey (LFS)*, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data>; INEC (2021^[22]), *Encuesta Continua de Empleo (ECE)*, <http://sistemas.inec.cr/pad5/index.php/catalog/REGECE>; US Census Bureau (2019^[23]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.

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In the great majority of countries,² mothers consistently display lower employment rates than their childless peers regardless of their migration status. In the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary, for example, employment gaps exceed 30 percentage points for both native- and foreign-born women. Yet, the overall penalty is highest for migrant mothers: on average, their employment rate is 19 percentage points lower than for migrant women with no children, compared to an employment gap of 9 percentage points between native-born women with and without a child. In contrast, the employment rate of men is either virtually not affected by paternity and, in most cases, is associated with a premium, regardless of migration status.³

Box 5.2. Maternal employment: Definition and comparability

Unless otherwise specified, maternal employment is defined as employment-population ratios for women of prime working age with at least one child aged 0-4. The employment gap is an approximate measure of the effect of having a child on women's employment and allows comparing employment rates for native-born mothers relative to migrant mothers in the same country. The analysis focuses on mothers with small children because the migrant-native differentials around this age group tend to be the widest: the demand for care is particularly high at this stage of the child's development; gender norms regarding working mothers are arguably the strongest when children are very young; and women, in general, do not appear to anticipate the associated costs of motherhood. The focus on prime-working age allows to observe women during a period when they are likely to have completed formal schooling and may face childcare obligations, while ruling out a substantial outflow from employment into retirement.

There are, however, important methodological issues to consider in cross-country comparisons of maternal employment rates. Up until 2021 when harmonised data became available, many OECD countries followed ILO guidelines and counted individuals on full-time statutory (legal or contractual) maternity leave and those on full-time statutory (legal or contractual) parental leave as employed, as long as they were either expected to be on leave for a three-month period or less or continued to receive 50% of their wage and salary. Some countries, however, followed other rules: in Sweden, for instance, all parents on parental leave were counted as employed regardless of the length of the leave as long as they had a (regular) job to return to. Norway set an upper limit in the length of leave (12 months), after which women in leave were counted as employed only if they received at least 50% of their salary. Conversely, in Estonia, all individuals on parental leave were considered inactive (see OECD Family Database). Because this chapter mostly relies on 2019 data, these differences must be considered when interpreting data.

Across the OECD area, approximately half of migrant women with young children are employed, a gap of 20 percentage points compared to native-born mothers

The literature shows that the “child effect” varies across high-income countries and such differences have been mainly attributed to the structure of the labour market and institutional arrangements (namely, the provision of formal childcare and access to other family policies). But the effect has also proven to diverge across women with different educational backgrounds, household composition, and migrant or ethnic origin, suggesting that institutions critically interact with individual preferences.

On average across OECD countries, 52% of migrant women with small children are employed, compared to 72% of their native-born peers (Figure 5.2). While in more than half of the countries, the difference between these two groups exceeds 20 percentage points, there is significant cross-country variation. At one extreme, Belgium, France, Germany and Slovenia exhibit the largest differentials: the employment rate of migrant mothers is, respectively, 41, 35 and 32 percentage points lower than that of their native-born peers. Conversely, countries from Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, the Czech Republic and Latvia – and Latin America – Chile and Costa Rica – display the smallest native-migrant gaps. Overall, gaps persist when controlling for age, education and number of children (Annex Figure 5.A.1 in Annex 5.A).


In Hungary and the Czech Republic, small gaps are also associated with low maternal employment rates for native-born women. Even though Central and Eastern European countries have been distinguished by high, full-time employment rates among women since the late 1950s, maternal employment rates in Hungary and the Czech Republic have consistently remained low (Javornik, 2016^[24]). Both countries are characterised by policies that support family caregiving: long parental leaves⁴ and family cash benefits,

which encourage the second earners in the household (usually mothers) to leave the workplace for prolonged periods and care for children at home (OECD, 2016^[25]). Not surprisingly, enrolment rates in ECEC for very small children (0-2) are some of the lowest among OECD countries (6 and 12% for the Czech Republic and Hungary, respectively). Further, highly educated mothers in Hungary with very small children only fare slightly better than their low-educated peers, thus contributing to reducing the migrant-native gap as well (OECD, 2022^[26]).

In Chile and Costa Rica, as in most Latin American countries, mothers find in informal jobs the flexibility needed for family-work balance, at the cost of poor employment conditions and prospects (Berniell et al., 2019^[27]). Job opportunities in the informal sector, where migrant women are generally overrepresented, contribute to lowering the employment gaps between native- and foreign-born mothers.⁵

Figure 5.2. The employment gap between native- and foreign-born mothers averages 20 percentage points across OECD countries

Employment rates of native- and foreign-born mothers with at least one child aged 0-4, 2021 or latest year available



Note: Data cover women aged 25-54 (15-64 in Switzerland). Mothers are defined as women with at least one child aged 0-4 (0-5 in the United States and 0-6 in Canada and Switzerland). For Costa Rica, data only cover mothers who are reported as the head of the household or the spouse/partner of the head of the household.

Source: ABS (2019^[28]), *Labour Force Status of Families*, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-status-families>; Statistics Canada (2019^[21]), *Labour Force Survey (LFS)*, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data>; Government of Chile (2020^[29]), *Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN)*; INEC (2021^[22]), *Encuesta Continua de Empleo (ECE)*, <http://sistemas.inec.cr/pad5/index.php/catalog/REGECE>; Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; FSO (2021^[30]), *Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS)*, <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/work-income/surveys/slfs.html>; US Census Bureau (2019^[23]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.

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Conversely, in Belgium, France, Germany and Slovenia, low maternal employment rates among migrants contrast with above-average rates for native-born mothers, suggesting that women face migrant-specific challenges in these labour markets. A combination of factors, explored across the chapter, include:

- frequent shortages in the supply of public places in ECEC, particularly for very young children (Germany and France), which disproportionately affect lower income families;

- financial incentives in the form of home care allowances (Belgium, Germany,⁶ Slovenia), to which individuals with low labour market integration and higher barriers to accessing formal childcare may be more sensitive;
- compositional factors, including relatively higher shares of women who migrate for family reasons (France and Belgium), humanitarian protection (Germany),⁷ as well as higher shares of low-educated women in the migration stocks (France, Belgium, Germany);
- some of the highest inactivity rates among migrant women (Belgium, France and Germany). In the face of poor employment prospects, migrant women and especially those with low human capital, may choose the “motherhood track”;
- well-paid maternity leaves and employment-related criteria to access it (Belgium, France, Germany, Slovenia). The latter has been associated with higher migrant-native gaps in access.

Employment rates decrease with an additional child in the household, but the effect of the first child is larger for migrant mothers

The age and number of children in the household also influence women’s decision to participate in the labour market. Because the number of children tends to differ between native- and foreign-born households, these compositional differences are also important when explaining maternal employment rates among both groups (Khoudja and Fleischmann, 2017^[31]). For instance, foreign-born women are, on average, twice as likely to have a small child compared to their native-born peers of the same age.

In most OECD countries, employment rates of both native- and foreign-born women decrease with the number of children present in the household, but the effect is larger for the latter with the birth of the first child. Figure 5.3 shows the employment rates of women with one child and two or more children, relative to women with no children. The employment gap between childless women and women with one child is five times as large for migrant women compared to their native-born peers (on average, 16 versus 3 percentage points, respectively). When comparing childless women with mothers of two or more children, the employment gaps increase for both foreign- and native-born women to 27 and 9 percentage points, respectively, but the effect is only slightly stronger for the native-born given the low initial base.


Migrant mothers of one child display relatively positive employment outcomes in Luxembourg, Denmark and Sweden, which are considered family-friendly countries in general. Further, longitudinal studies have shown that the likelihood of having a first child in Sweden are positively correlated with higher income, for both men and women, showing that labour market stability increases childbearing. Conversely, in Germany, Finland⁸ and Italy having one child introduces significant employment gaps for migrant women. Finland is an interesting case in that it provides the longest parental leave among OECD countries and a Child Home Care Allowance (CHCA), which is granted when a child under three is looked after at home. Migrant women – and refugees in particular – have been shown to use the CHCA at higher rates, which can be partially explained by the concentration of these women at the lower end of the income distribution, meaning that their opportunity cost of providing home care is lower (OECD, 2018^[32])

With more than one child, employment penalties increase the most for migrant women in Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and France. The former two countries are interesting cases in that the employment of native-born mothers is virtually not affected by the presence of children. Two interrelated trends, documented in the literature, can explain this: on the one hand, in Southern Europe – Italy, Spain and Greece – the negative impact of children on female activity is much smaller for highly educated women. On the other, European women are becoming mothers later in life, meaning native-born women tend to have children once they have reached a stable position in the labour market, which gives them better opportunities to privately organise family matters and externalise childcare responsibilities (González, 2006^[33]). This is particularly important in Italy and Spain, which report lower-than-average public spending on family benefits and ECEC, short supply of part-time employment and where employment instability is commonplace among women (Spain displaying the highest rate of temporary contracts among the foreign-

born in 2019 across EU-24 countries). Not surprisingly, migrant mothers, overrepresented at the bottom of the occupational spectrum and with more limited sources of family support, are less capable of balancing family and employment in these countries.

Figure 5.3. Employment penalties increase with the number of children, but at higher rates for migrant mothers

Differences in employment rates (%) between childless women and women with children (aged 0-4), by number of children and country of birth, 2019



Note: Data refer to women of prime working age (25-54). Mothers refer to women with children aged 0 to 4 (0-5 in the United States and 0-6 in Canada). Positive values mean higher employment rates for childless women.

Source: ABS (2019^[28]), *Labour Force Status of Families*, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-status-families>; Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; US Census Bureau (2019^[23]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.

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Medium and long-term effects of family formation among migrant women

The employment of migrant mothers increases with the age of the children and does so at higher rates than for their native-born peers suggesting that childcare constraints are higher for the former


Maternal employment rates tend to increase along with the age of the youngest child. As the latter rises to five at least, employment rates increase for both native- and foreign-born mothers. This is not surprising as most OECD countries provide free access to ECEC to all children for at least the year before entering primary school and enrolment rates for children aged 3 to 5 average 83%, compared to 27% for children under three (OECD, 2022^[34]). In addition, as seen in the previous chapter, migrant women who arrive as adults tend to display elevated fertility after arrival, which may affect insertion into the labour market. In these cases, the duration of stay in the country is also associated with higher ages among children.

When the age of children rises from 0-4 to 5-9 and 10-14, the employment rates of migrant mothers increase, on average, more significantly than for their native-born peers (partially, because the employment rate of the native-born is already high). There is, however, significant variation across countries (Figure 5.4). As the youngest child turns at least five, the largest employment gains for both native- and

foreign-born mothers are observed in countries of Central and Eastern Europe – Estonia, Hungary and the Czech Republic –, Finland and Germany. These countries have in common some of the longest paid parental and home care leave available to mothers,⁹ suggesting that both native- and foreign-born mothers respond to policies that incentivise childcare at home. Employment rates continue to rise for foreign-born mothers when the youngest child is at least ten in countries of Central and Eastern Europe – Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic – and Canada (+19 percentage points compared to children aged 5 to 9).

Figure 5.4. As children age, employment rises at higher rates for migrant mothers compared to their native-born peers

Employment rates of native- and foreign-born women by age of children, 2019



Note: Data cover women aged 25-54. Mothers are defined as women with at least one child aged 0-4, 5-9 (6-12 and 6-13 for Canada and the United States, respectively) or 10-14 (13-17 and 14-17 for Canada and the United States, respectively).

Source: ABS (2019^[28]), *Labour Force Status of Families*, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-status-families>; Statistics Canada (2019^[21]) a, *Labour Force Survey (LFS)*, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data>; Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; US Census Bureau (2019^[23]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.


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Across all age groups, the largest migrant-native gaps are observed in Belgium and France. The employment rates among migrant mothers of elder children (aged 10 to 14) in those countries average 50 and 52%, respectively, and rank among the lowest, along with the countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Italy and Spain with employment rates of 42, 48 and 56%, respectively).

An alternative way to show employment evolution is through pseudo-cohorts that allow observing stable groups of individuals, rather than individuals over time (Figure 5.5). Data show that the employment of native-born mothers, already relatively high when children are below 4 years old, increases little as children grow up (ages 5 to 9). Conversely, the employment situation of migrant mothers, whose initial base is substantially lower across all countries, improves more significantly over time.

Figure 5.5. The employment of migrant mothers is more responsive to the age of children

Employment rate of native- and foreign-born mothers by age of children, 2015 and 2020



Note: The chart follows a synthetic cohort of mothers with children 0-4 in 2015 and 5-9 in 2020. Data cover women aged 25-40 in 2015 and aged 30-44 in 2020. A cohort groups individuals with the same attributes. If these attributes do not vary over time, changes in the behaviour of cohort members can be assessed by the difference in the cohort between periods.


Source: Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>.

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Using longitudinal data available for Germany, Figure 5.6 shows that native-born and migrant mothers reduce their labour force participation following childbirth and experience a similar recovery as children age. After ten years, the employment gap between them is even lower than the observed one before childbirth. Significantly, intergenerational disadvantages persist with native-born women of migrant parentage displaying lower employment rates prior to and following childbirth, compared to native-born women with no migrant parentage.

Figure 5.6. As children age, the employment of migrant mothers recovers, but the level of employment is always higher for native-born women

Female employment around childbirth in Germany, 1990-2020



Note: Sample is restricted to women aged 16-50. Native-born refers to German-born women with German-born parents. Foreign-born refers to women born in a country other than Germany and children of migrants refer to native-born women who have at least one foreign-born parent. Employment includes full- and part-time employment, apprenticeship/education, minimal/irregular employment and workshop for disabled.

Source: Calculation by Pia Schilling based on DIW Berlin (2022^[35]), *German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)*, https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.678568.en/research_data_center_soep.html.


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Age at family formation and labour market attachment pre-childbirth – which is more unstable among migrants – is highly predictive of labour market outcomes after childbearing

In understanding the magnitude of “motherhood penalties” employment trajectories before childbirth emerge as a key explaining factor. Figure 5.7 shows the proportion of women who were employed in each quarter from one year before until three years after the birth of their first child in Belgium,¹⁰ distinguishing women who were employed (Panel A) and women who were not employed (Panel B) one year before the birth of their first child. In the former, the proportion of employed women decreases in the quarters preceding the first birth, drops to low values in the quarter of the birth (maternity leave) and recovers as the child becomes older, but typically remains lower than one year before motherhood. There are strong differences between origin groups: the proportion of employed women decreases more strongly after family formation among native-born women of migrant parents – particularly of non-European origin – than among women without a migrant parentage. For women who were not employed one year before parenthood, Panel B shows that the proportion of employed women increases for all origin groups, but less so among native-born women of migrant parents – especially of non-European origin. The results seem to suggest that the birth of a first child has a stronger impact on the labour market participation of women with migrant origin than is the case among women without it, with the largest difference emerging for women of non-European origin.

Figure 5.7. After family formation, employment decreases more sharply for Belgium-born women with migrant parents than for women with no migrant parentage

Share of women employed around the birth of their first child by origin group and observed pre-birth employment position



Note: Proportions of women employed were estimated separately for women who were employed and women who were not employed one year before the birth of their first child.


Source: Belgian Administrative Socio-demographic Panel based on Social Security registers, 1999-2010, calculations by Maes, J., J. Wood and K. Neels (2021^[15]), "Path dependencies in employment trajectories around motherhood: Comparing native versus second-generation migrant women in Belgium", <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00801-1>.

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Alternatively, the pattern may reflect the lower employment stability that is typical of women with migrant parentage in the Belgian labour market, which implies that they are more likely than their native-born peers to drop out of employment and less likely to re-enter employment regardless of family formation. Figure 5.8 distinguishes between women in terms of their pre-birth employment probabilities – their probability of being employed given current age and socio-demographic profile estimated among all women who do not (yet) have children¹¹ – which offers a more robust indicator of women's pre-birth labour market attachment than observed employment positions at an arbitrary point in time. The proportion of employed native-born women with migrant parents – particularly of non-European origin – is already lower before the birth of their first child compared to native-born women with similar pre-birth employment probabilities. As the proportion of employed women largely follows the same patterns around the transition to parenthood among native-born women with and without migrant parentage, the impact of parenthood on employment seems similar across groups. In sum, differences between native-born women with native-born parents and native-born women with migrant parents in their employment trajectories around the transition to parenthood can largely be traced back to women's differential pre-birth labour market attachment.

Figure 5.8. Employment differences between women with and without migrant parentage can be largely traced to their labour market attachment before childbirth

Share of women employed around the birth of their first child by origin group and pre-birth employment probability



Note: Among women with low pre-birth employment probabilities, native-born women of EU-born parents are excluded from the analysis due to small sample size. Shares of women employed were estimated separately for women with low, medium and high employment probabilities one year before the birth of their first child. Among native-born-women (n=6 890), 88% were employed before the birth of the first child; among those with migrant parents from the EU (n=972) and those with migrant parents outside the EU (n=703), 79% and 61% were employed, respectively. Source: Belgian Administrative Socio-demographic Panel based on Social Security registers, 1999-2010, calculations by Maes, J., J. Wood and K. Neels (2021^[15]), “Path dependencies in employment trajectories around motherhood: Comparing native versus second-generation migrant women in Belgium”, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00801-1>.

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Box 5.3. Childbearing and accumulated disadvantages among migrants in Belgium

Belgium not only exhibits the largest migrant-native employment gap among mothers, but one of the largest employment gaps overall, and the two trends are closely linked. Research shows that labour market inequalities shape childbearing decisions and employment transitions for migrant women leading to cumulative disadvantages over time. While Belgium-born women perceive a stable foothold in the labour market as a precondition to childbearing and consequently postpone the transition until this condition is fulfilled, migrant women – especially from non-EU countries – are more likely to have their first child in response to unemployment or inactivity. Once children are present, labour market inequalities result in strong migrant-native gaps in the uptake of family policies such as parental leave and formal childcare, which would potentially raise their labour force participation.

On the one hand, difficult access to stable employment for migrants severely limits their access to parental leave which is strongly conditioned on labour force participation. On the other hand, formal childcare is more accessible to parents with stable employment amplifying the migrant-native gap in the uptake of these services. In turn, migrant families are more likely to resort to alternative work-family strategies that will likely reinforce gender roles within the household.

Source: Maes, J., J. Wood and K. Neels (2021^[15]), “Path dependencies in employment trajectories around motherhood: Comparing native versus second-generation migrant women in Belgium”, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00801-1>; Kil, T. et al. (2017^[14]), “Employment after parenthood: Women of Migrant Origin and Natives Compared”, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-017-9431-7>.


The motherhood penalty not only implies lower employment rates around childbirth and thereafter, but also lower earning profiles. Figure 5.9 displays mean earnings until age 40 in Sweden (in SEK 2020 prices) of both men and women according to the age at which they had their first child (ages 25, 30, 35 or none for the childless). Each figure displays the profile for Swedish-born of native-born parents; Swedish-born of two foreign-born parents and foreign-born who arrived in Sweden before age 16. Each profile includes both individuals who either had or did not have more children after that first birth.

The earning profiles of women who had their first child at the same age (or who remained childless by age 40) are remarkably similar regardless of their migration origin. Differences, however, are substantial depending on the age at first childbirth: those who became mothers at age 25 portray the lowest earnings. This is not surprising as the charts pool women with various educational levels and those with lower attainment (and lower earnings potential) are bound to be overrepresented among young mothers.

The similarity of the paths indicates that, for mothers, the age at birth is more important in the lifetime earnings than other factors. In the case of men, figures show much higher earnings levels than those of women and somewhat larger differences by migrant origin. Native-born men who become fathers in the late thirties also display a small dip in earnings around one year after birth which is likely due to the parental leave period.


Figure 5.9. In Sweden, the earnings profiles of mothers vary more by the age at first childbirth than by their migration origin

Mean real earnings (in thousand SEK, 2020 prices) of women and men with different migration origin, by whether they have a child and their age at first birth



Note: The figure only displays earnings and does not include allowances. Native-born with no migrant parentage refers to Swedish-born with two Swedish-born parents. Native-born with migrant parentage refers to Swedish-born with two foreign-born parents. Foreign-born refers to individuals who arrived in Sweden before age 16.

Source: Calculations by Stockholm University Demography Unit (SUDA), Stockholm University based on Swedish register data.

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
The employment of migrant mothers has positive implications for the labour market outcomes of their children

Migrant mothers can also be agents of change. Migration might propel female employment, as part of a family investment strategy to ensure financial security, particularly in the first years of arrival. Previous research emphasised the role of women as “tied migrants”; that is, they join the labour market mostly as a response to family income shocks and remain marginally attached to support their partner’s investment in local skills (Adsera and Ferrer, 2014^[36]). The family investment theory, however, has been contested as recent behaviour of migrant women in the labour market more closely resembles that of their native-born peers than often assumed.¹² Whether labour market attachment after arrival is driven by economic considerations or by a reversal of traditional gender roles, migrant women’s decision to work can drive attitudinal changes and redefine gender dynamics within families, with implications for later generations.

Migrant mothers’ labour market participation seems to have an important impact on the employment outcomes of their children, more so than for the latter’s peers with native-born parents. While this is observed for both genders, the association is particularly strong for women whose parents came from non-EU countries. Figure 5.10 shows employment rates of native-born individuals with different migration origin (children of native-, non-EU and EU-born parents). These individuals were asked what the employment status of their mother was when they were 14 years old (i.e. the mother was either fulfilling domestic tasks or care responsibilities, or was employed). It can be observed that while the male employment rate remains relatively stable regardless of their mother’s employment status, for women, having a working mother translates into higher employment rates. For women with parents born outside the EU, in particular, having a working mother is associated with an increase of 13 percentage points in the employment rate. In Germany, among women with at least one migrant parent, having a working mother is associated with an increase of 18 percentage points.

Figure 5.10. In EU countries, having a working mother at age 14 has a positive impact on the employment of migrants’ children, and daughters in particular

Employment rates of men and women by country of birth of their parents and working status of their mother when they were 14 years old, 2019



Note: Data cover population aged 25-54. Only financially non-vulnerable households are considered.

Source: Eurostat (2019^[37]), *EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions>.

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Individual and social factors contributing to maternal employment

Any analysis of maternal employment among migrant mothers must consider the origin, migration channel, household and skill composition, employment trajectories before childbirth and age at migration, which is closely related to age at family formation (Vidal-Coso, 2018^[38]).


Education, skills and sector

In most countries, employment gaps between native- and foreign-born mothers are smaller among the low-educated


Women's educational attainment is negatively associated with motherhood gaps in the labour market, which may be the result of higher opportunity costs of dropping out of the labour market. Higher education has also been associated with more egalitarian gender role attitudes (Steiber, Bergammer and Haas, 2016^[39]). This is evident in Figure 5.11, which shows that highly educated native- and foreign-born mothers display significantly higher employment rates than their low-educated counterparts (+35 percentage points among the native-born and +25 percentage points among migrant mothers).

Figure 5.11. Migrant mothers have lower occupational returns on education, compared to their native-born peers

Employment rates of native- and foreign-born mothers with at least one child aged 0-14 by educational attainment, 2019



Note: Mothers are defined as women with at least one child aged 0-14 (0-17 in Canada and the United States). Data cover women aged 15-64. Source: Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; Statistics Canada (2019^[21]), *Labour Force Survey (LFS)*, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data>; US Census Bureau (2019^[23]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.

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
However, migrant mothers have lower occupational returns on education compared to their native-born peers, meaning that their employment rates do not increase as much with a higher education. This is consistent with overall employment trends among migrants. In general, low-educated migrants have either comparable or higher employment rates than their native-born peers across OECD countries. Conversely, highly educated migrants, in virtually all OECD countries, display lower employment rates, especially if they hold foreign diplomas. Panel A of Figure 5.12 shows that indeed in almost two-thirds of the OECD countries, low-educated migrant women display higher employment rates than their native-born peers.

Upon childbearing, however, the comparative advantage of low-educated migrant women reverses: in eight out of ten countries, migrant mothers with only an elementary education display lower employment rates than their native-born peers (Panel B, Figure 5.12). The employment gap is as high as 35 percentage points in the Netherlands. This is likely related to their occupation segregation, as will be explored further below: low-quality jobs, where migrant mothers with a lower education are overrepresented, increase the likelihood of labour market exits upon childbearing (Piasna and Plagnol, 2018^[40]).

Employment gaps also increase for highly educated migrant women upon childbearing, but they increase at lower rates than among the low educated. Again, high-educated mothers may be able to self-select into high-quality jobs in terms of job security, career progression and working time, allowing them to better reconcile childcare responsibilities and paid employment. Further, outsourcing care responsibilities is more common among highly educated women so even in the absence of public subsidised childcare or family networks, highly educated migrant mothers are more able to outsource care.


Figure 5.12. Employment gaps with the native-born increase for both low and high-educated migrants upon childbearing

Differences in employment rates between native-born and foreign-born women (Panel A) and mothers with at least one child aged 0-14 (Panel B), by educational attainment, 2019



Note: Data cover women aged 15-64. Mothers are defined as women with at least one child aged 0-14 (0-17 in the US and Canada). Positive values mean higher employment rates for native-born women/mothers.

Source: Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; Statistics Canada (2019^[21]), *Labour Force Survey (LFS)*, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data>; US Census Bureau (2019^[23]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.

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Sector and quality of jobs

One in five migrant mothers are employed in an elementary occupation, where conditions are particularly negative to reconcile family responsibilities

Overall, women experience greater concentration in a more limited number of occupations than men and this is also true for migrants. There is also evidence that the occupational gap between migrants and the native-born is driven by factors other than age and education and that the unexplained occupational segregation is higher for migrant women than men (Frattoni and Solome, 2022^[41]; Palencia-Esteban, 2022^[42]).

“Female occupations” often include those that provide relatively better working conditions rather than better pay, like public sector jobs, which tend to have generous benefits like flexible hours and long parental leaves. In European OECD countries, however, migrant mothers (of children less than 14) are less likely to be employed in the public sector (-12 percentage points). The gap can be as high as 40 percentage points in Luxembourg and exceeds 20 percentage points in Southern Europe (Italy, Spain and Greece) and the Netherlands.


In European OECD countries, one in five migrant mothers are employed in elementary occupations,¹³ among which the most common is cleaners/helpers (on average 17%). This is particularly evident in Belgium and Southern Europe, where the share of this occupation in employment exceeds 25%. Not only are migrant mothers overrepresented in elementary occupations, but they are also twice as likely to hold temporary contracts in these occupations compared to their native-born peers (32% versus 15%, respectively).

While this occupational concentration does not differ for migrant women with no children, the implications for mothers are much more significant. Employment conditions in these types of occupations are detrimental in terms of labour market attachment after childbirth. Cleaners and helpers, for example, are a particularly low-paid job, even among the generally low pay elementary occupations and are generally excluded from contributory social insurance schemes, which might prevent migrant mothers from accessing parental leave.¹⁴ Low-paying occupations are also associated with lower opportunity costs of dropping out of the labour market upon childbearing. Further, casual or temporary contracts, which are twice as common among migrant mothers, may come to an end while a mother is on maternity leave, thus contributing to the postponement of motherhood or exit from employment (Piasna and Plagnol, 2018^[40]) (Figure 5.13). In the United States migrant mothers are slightly overrepresented in cleaning, personal care and production occupations compared to their native-born peers. In Canada, the same is true in sales and services occupations (Figure 5.14).

The second most common occupation among migrant mothers in European OECD countries is as personal care workers (both in health services and as childcare workers/teachers’ aides). Their shares in employment in these occupations are highest in the Nordic countries and the native-migrant gaps are smaller, averaging only 2 percentage points. Importantly, the availability and affordability of childcare and care services in health settings in these countries has counteracted the development of an informal market, which is distinct from several European countries. The implication is that migrants who become child and healthcare workers in Sweden, Norway, Finland or Denmark are generally formally employed, which allows them to benefit from better work conditions and entitlement to insurance benefits (Puppa, 2012^[43]). This contrasts with the case of Italy where the private care market is characterised by low wages, hard working conditions, high insecurity and limited chances of job mobility (van Hooren, 2014^[44]).

Figure 5.13. In European OECD countries, one in five migrant mothers are employed in an elementary occupation

Employment in elementary occupations as a share of total employment of native- and foreign-born mothers, 2019



Note: Mothers are defined as women with at least one child aged 0-14 (0-17 in Canada and the United States). Data cover women aged 15-64. In Panel A, temporary refers to temporary contracts as a share of total contracts in elementary occupations. Elementary occupations comprise those in ISCO one-digit category 900; cleaners and helpers correspond to ISCO three-digit categories 911. Personal care workers comprise those in ISCO three-digit categories 531 (childcare workers and teachers' aides) and 532 (personal care workers in health services).


Source: Eurostat (2019_[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>.

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There are two important implications of this occupational distribution: first, these occupations are associated with poor working conditions for migrant women in most countries given the prevalence of informal and private care markets. Second, the employment of migrant mothers (and migrant women, more generally) in household and care services has proven to increase the availability of these services and allow native-born mothers to return to work after childbirth. This is especially true in contexts of high-income inequality or where social and family policies are less developed. Estimates by Farré, González and Ortega (2011^[45]) in Italy, for example, show that immigration can account for one-third of the increase in the employment rate of college-educated women by providing child and elderly care (before 2008). In the United States, Furtado and Hock (2010^[46]) find that a reduction in the cost of household services – led by low-educated migrants – allow tertiary-educated native-born women to reconcile childbearing and paid work.

Figure 5.14. In the United States and Canada, migrant mothers are overrepresented in cleaning and sales and services occupations, respectively

Employment by occupation (as a share of total employment) of native- and foreign-born mothers, 2019



Note: Mothers are defined as women with at least one child aged 0-17. Data cover women aged 15-64.

Source: Statistics Canada (2019^[21]), *Labour Force Survey (LFS)*, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data>; US Census Bureau (2019^[23]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.

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
Both native- and foreign-born mothers opt for part-time employment but for migrant women, this is more often involuntary and precarious

In many OECD countries, mothers are less likely to work long hours and they frequently use part-time employment as a means of combining work with family responsibilities. Part-time employment, for instance, has been associated with higher fertility in Europe during the mid-90s (Adsera, 2011^[47]). However, part-time employment is highly gendered as it is usually women who take up part-time employment, especially after childbearing. As such, the effects of this type of arrangement on gender equality are disputed. On the one hand, it may allow women to combine family responsibilities and paid work instead of dropping entirely out of the labour force. But it can also marginalise them into low-end market niches (OECD, 2017^[48]). Part-time work is often associated with slower career progression, lower earnings and earnings-related pensions, and overall, lower job quality (OECD, 2019^[49]).

The quality of part-time employment can be affected by the skill set of workers in part-time jobs – as they are often related to lower-educated and -skilled positions – and whether it is “involuntary” or “voluntary”.¹⁵ A key issue for the labour market integration and career progression of migrant mothers (and migrant parents overall) is that they are unwillingly stuck in part-time work. In the EU, foreign-born mothers are more likely than their native-born peers to be unable to find a full-time job, even if they report wanting to work more. Across OECD countries, 25% of foreign-born mothers with at least one child aged 0-14 find themselves in this situation compared to 15% of their native-born peers (Figure 5.15). Involuntary part-time employment may result in lower wages, lower training opportunities, poorer career prospects for women and lower social security contributions which translate in higher vulnerability when facing unemployment, health problems and financing retirement (ILO, 2016^[50]).


Figure 5.15. Part-time employment is common among mothers, but it is more often involuntary among migrant women

Part-time employment (as a share of total employment) and involuntary part-time employment (as a share of total part-time employment) of native- and foreign-born mothers, 2022



Note: Mothers are defined as women with at least one child aged 0-14 (0-17 in Canada and the United States). Data cover women aged 15-64 (women aged 25-54 in Switzerland).


Source: Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; FSO (2021^[30]), *Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS)*, <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/work-income/surveys/slfs.html>; Statistics Canada (2019^[21]), *Labour Force Survey (LFS)*, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data>; US Census Bureau (2019^[20]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.

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Part-time employment is also more precarious for migrant mothers since it is often associated with temporary contracts: in 2019, one in four migrant mothers working part-time in European OECD countries had a temporary contract, compared to one in seven native-born mothers. This is also related to the occupational segregation of migrant women: for them, part-time employment is mostly concentrated in elementary occupations (Figure 5.16), whereas for their native-born peers, it mostly takes place within professional occupations. Because the cost of adjusting to part-time work is absorbed by the firms, this type of arrangement is only possible when the employment status is protected (Guirola and Sánchez-Domínguez, 2022^[51]). In this regard, low-skilled workers display less bargaining power than their higher-skilled peers (Adema, Clarke and Thévenon, 2020^[10]). Not surprisingly, professionals and managers¹⁶ are much more likely to access secure and protected part-time employment. Migrant workers, overrepresented in lower-skilled sectors, are less likely to benefit from the latter.

Figure 5.16. Part-time employment for migrant mothers is mostly concentrated in elementary occupations

Part-time employment as a share of total employment by occupation, native-and foreign-born mothers aged 15-64 with at least one child aged 0-14, 2019



Note: "Other occupations" include armed occupations, "Managers", "Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers", "Craft and related trades workers" and "Plant and machine operators and assemblers."

Source: Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>.

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Migration channel

Different migration channels are highly predictive of women's family and employment trajectories: Women who arrive as family migrants tend to display lower employment outcomes

Migrant women are highly heterogeneous regarding their reasons for migration and self-select into different migration channels. Migration category, in turn, is highly predictive of women's family and employment trajectories after arrival (Samper Mejía, 2022^[52]). Most women arrive in the OECD countries as family migrants (see previous chapter), which comprise very different types of profiles: persons marrying a

resident national or foreigner and joining him or her in the host country (that is, family formation), families joining a migrant who had migrated earlier (that is, family reunification) and family members accompanying a newly admitted economic migrant, student or refugee.

Research shows that, in general, the employment outcomes of women who arrive as family migrants tend to be less favourable than those of labour migrants. Their employment rates generally improve over time but often take many years to reach the employment rates observed for other migrant categories or for native-born individuals.

Lower employment outcomes among family migrants may be driven by several factors:


- Family formation before labour market insertion: women who arrive for family reasons may display elevated fertility patterns compared to their native-born peers, particularly after arrival, as the migration event and family formation are often temporally interrelated events (see previous chapter on fertility). Their employment and fertility trajectories might also differ from those of women who migrate for employment reasons, who may need more time to adjust and decide whether to have children (and even find a partner) in the host country (Mussino and Strozza, 2012^[53]).
- The effect of a spouse: if the principal migrant is a labour migrant, family migrants might also be less compelled to seek their income from employment compared with other migrants, who cannot rely on a steady spousal income. The vast majority of married migrants live with their spouse in host countries. The share of migrants whose spouse is absent in the host country remains below 20% in almost all OECD countries, and it falls with duration of stay (OECD, 2019^[54]).
- Family migrants might choose not to participate in the labour market of the host country but rather raise children or care for other family members. Survey results indicate that, among female family migrants in Australia and Germany, for example, caring for children is the main reason not to work. Such dynamics within couples and households are likely an important contributor to the slow labour market integration of family migrants. When planning to migrate to a particular country, couples likely divide such roles such that the person who has higher chances to be admitted as a labour migrant, international student, or refugee assumes the role of principal migrant (OECD, 2017^[55]).
- Administrative or legal obstacles to access the labour market: across OECD countries, there has been a general trend to facilitate labour market access to family migrants but some – albeit few – categories, mostly with temporary status, still find themselves locked out of the labour market, at least initially. Frequently these are spouses of temporary labour migrants with no prospects of remaining in the country. However, in a few countries, restrictions also apply to family migrants who are likely to remain¹⁷ (OECD, 2017^[56]).

Figure 5.17 shows that women who migrate for family or humanitarian reasons to the EU display similar employment trajectories, regardless of whether they have children or not: their employment rates are low within the first five year of arrival but improve significantly over time. Their employment rates, however, never attain the same levels as those displayed by women who emigrate for employment. When considering childbearing, employment rates fall for all categories of female migrants, including for those who migrate for employment, and the gap is particularly evident during the first five years of arrival.

In Australia, the employment rate of female migrants with a skilled stream visa was 76% in 2021, 18 percentage points higher than the employment rate registered for female family migrants (57%). The employment rate of female humanitarian migrants was substantially lower at 33%.¹⁸

Figure 5.17. Women who migrate for family reasons tend to display lower employment rates but their outcomes improve over time

Employment rates by declared reason for migration and duration of stay, 2021



Note: Data cover the OECD countries of the European Union and men and women aged 15-64. Chart shows employment rates with no controls and pooling countries.

Source: Eurostat (2021^[57]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>.

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Individual and social preferences

Social and gender norms, which differ across countries and between migrants and the native-born, influence fertility choices and female labour market participation

Fertility choices and the participation of women in the labour market not only reflect institutional arrangements in a given country but prevailing social and gender norms as well. Social norms are rules of action shared by people in a given society or group and define what is considered acceptable behaviour for members of that group (Cislaghi and Heise, 2020^[58]). Gender norms can be considered as the beliefs commonly held about the role of women in society (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005^[59]).


The unequal effects of children on their parents' careers, the persistence of these effects across generations, as well as the fact that, on average, women are more educated than men, make these norms an important element to consider in the explanation of child penalties (Kleven, Landais and Sogaard, 2019^[7]). Previous research suggests that family policies are shaped by their cultural context. Policies do not shape employment choices in a cultural void but, instead, interact with societal attitudes regarding the role of women. For example, very long parental leaves may reflect the notion that mothers *should* provide for young children at home. In this regard, gender norms may mediate the effect of family policies: parental leave policies and public childcare, for instance, are associated with higher earnings for mothers when cultural support for maternal employment is high (Budig, Misra and Boeckmann, 2012^[8]).

Figure 5.18 shows the correlation between progressive gender norms and female employment in selected OECD countries. Following Kleven (2022^[16]), a Gender Progressivity Index (GPI) is created using data from the joint European and World Value Survey (2017-21). The responses to five questions on the role of women in society are standardised. The questions are the following: Do you agree with the following statement: a) when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women; b) there is a duty

towards a society to have children; c) when a mother works for pay, the children suffer; d) on the whole, men make better business executives than women do; e) university is more important for a boy than for a girl. The standardised response is then indexed such that higher values correspond to stronger gender progressivity. The chart shows that there is a positive correlation between progressive gender values and female employment and that there is high cross-country variation regarding gender norms. The Nordic OECD countries, followed by those of Western Europe, display the highest levels of female employment and gender progressivity. There is also a positive relation between progressive gender values and maternal employment, as shown in Figure 5.19.

Figure 5.18. At a country level, there is a positive correlation between progressive gender values and female employment

Cross-country relation between gender progressivity and female employment rates, 2017-21



Note: Data refer to women of working age (aged 15-64). Northern Europe includes Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Norway; Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Switzerland; Central and Eastern Europe includes Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia; Southern Europe includes Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain; LAC includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica; and other OECD countries include Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Türkiye, Israel.

Source: EVS/WVS (2022_[60]). *European Values Study and World Values Survey: Joint EVS/WVS 2017-22 Dataset (Joint EVS/WVS)*, <https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.21>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/q7v5i3>


Finally, it is acknowledged that gender norms are learned in childhood in a process known as socialisation and are later reinforced or contested in family and the larger societal context. This means that the prevailing culture in the origin country likely influences attitudes and preferences within migrant families at the destination. Figure 5.19 shows that, indeed, maternal employment for migrant women is less sensitive to country-level gender norms, suggesting that, for them, the influence of gender norms in their country of origin are probably more significant.

However, cross-sectional data do not allow to understand how gender norms interact with institutional and economic incentives over time, but earlier research suggests that the transmission of these norms can happen vertically – from one generation to the next – or horizontally – through social interactions with peers and colleagues. In line with the theory of vertical transmission, Fernandez and Fogli (2005_[59]) find, for the United States, that the average labour force participation among children of migrants is predicted by the

average participation in the origin country of their parents and that similar patterns emerge for fertility rates. Similarly, Blau, Kahn and Papps (2008^[61]) show that, in the United States, female labour force participation among migrants and their children is strongly correlated with female labour force participation in the country of origin.

Figure 5.19. The employment of migrant mothers is less sensitive to country-level gender norms

Cross-country relation between gender progressivity and maternal employment rates, selected European countries



Note: Maternal employment rates for women aged 15-64 with at least one child aged 0-4.

Source: Eurostat (2021^[57]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; EVS/WVS (2022^[60]), *European Values Study and World Values Survey: Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2022 Dataset (Joint EVS/WVS)*, <https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.21>.

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Boelmann, Raute and Schonberg (2021^[62]) find evidence of both channels of transmission when analysing differences in the labour force participation of women who grew up in East and West Germany, respectively. These two settings differed in female labour market participation, fertility patterns, and gender norms but institutions and economic conditions converged after reunification. The authors find that the child penalty in terms of female labour supply is smaller among East German mothers relative to their Western counterparts in similar institutional settings.

The influence of normative contexts has implications for migrant-native activity gaps. Analysing the labour market outcomes of the same origin group, children of Turkish migrants, across different destinations, Holland and de Valk (2017^[13]) conclude that employment gaps between native-born women with two native-born parents and daughters of at least one Turkish-born parent are smaller in countries with strong normative contexts – Sweden’s institutionalised culture of gender equality – whereas countries with family policies that do not explicitly support any single-family model – France and the Netherlands – amplify the gaps with daughters of Turkish-born parents.

Institutional determinants: Paid parental leave, formal childcare

Individual choices regarding maternal employment respond to individual preferences and macroeconomic conditions but are also mediated by the broader policy context. While there is a great variation in the role

and approach of family policy across countries, since the early 2000s, many OECD countries have increased their support to balancing work and family life, with a focus on facilitating women's employment and encouraging a more equal division of labour (Adema, Clarke and Thévenon, 2020^[10]). To achieve these objectives, countries have relied on a combination of instruments: ECEC provision, paid parental leave, and flexible work time regulations. However, family policies may also have unintended consequences such as reinforcing gender job segregation or increasing social inequalities between different groups of parents. For instance, part-time employment is an attractive option for mothers and fathers wishing to reconcile work and family responsibilities, but it is rarely a stepping stone to full-time employment and many mothers work part-time on a long-term basis (OECD, 2019^[49]). Similarly, parenting leave systems with stringent employment-related criteria may exclude recent immigrant parents who either had a child immediately after arrival or, simply, have had little time to gain relevant local experience, settle in the labour market and pay associated contributions to the insurance system.

Parental leave

Family policies may exacerbate inequalities: the design of parental leaves may exclude many migrant parents increasing social inequalities between parental groups

Paid parental leave is considered employment supportive, helping women remain attached to the labour market following childbirth. The positive employment effects are strongest when the period of leave is relatively short as long leaves may lead to human capital depreciation and facilitate employers' discrimination against women (OECD, 2016^[63]).

OECD countries generally offer three types of paid and unpaid family-related leave around childbirth: maternity leave, paternity leave and parental leave (used by one or both parents), which in some countries is complemented with homecare leave of prolonged duration (Adema, Clarke and Frey, 2015^[64]). Even if there is a positive correlation between generous parental leave policies and women's labour market participation after childbearing, leave policies may create incentives for specific groups to stay out of the labour market. While research on access to and uptake of parental leave among migrant parents is limited, previous studies show lower uptake in the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain where eligibility criteria are related to labour market participation (Mussino, forthcoming^[65]).

Overall, migrant parents – and recent migrants, in particular – may be excluded from parental leave systems on account of their design and, specifically, due to their employment status or occupation, income level or their residency status in a country (Duvander and Koslowski, 2023^[66]). The use of parental leave is also mediated by the individuals' own financial resources with disadvantaged parents displaying lower take-up rates overall.¹⁹ In addition, there is evidence that migrants may lack knowledge about their parental leave rights and regulations, and this is particularly true among recent arrivals.

Employment histories

Most OECD countries link child and family income support with parental earnings and employment meaning that access to parental leave is often conditioned on periods of employment and/or contributory records (Daly, 2020^[67]). In this sense, the use of parental leave becomes a reflection of labour market participation (Mussino and Duvander, 2016^[68]). However, when pre-birth labour market integration is low or outside formal employment, the same policy may have a negative impact, resulting in a low benefit or no benefit at all during leave and a more disadvantaged situation afterwards given the extended period outside the labour market and the lack of income (Mussino and Duvander, 2016^[68]).

As seen in Chapter 4, migrants tend to display elevated fertility after arrival and have children at a younger age than the native-born. These patterns may lead to low pre-birth employment history, excluding parents

from parental leave systems, especially if they have not formally entered the social insurance system, have not formally been employed, or been registered as unemployed at destination. The longer the qualifying period – particularly if it is meant to be uninterrupted –, the less accessible it becomes to migrant parents with unstable careers (working under temporary contracts, on a part-time basis, or as self-employed). Migrants also tend to be underrepresented in the public administration, where benefits tend to be more generous in certain countries.

An alternative to employment-based criteria to access parental leave are universal benefits or tiered systems. In the former, leave rights are available to all parents residing in the country. In the latter, universal benefits are usually lower and more generous benefits are available to those meeting employment-related criteria (Duvander and Koslowski, 2023^[66]) (Table 5.1). Universal benefits might promote a more gendered use of leave (claimants are predominantly mothers as low benefits provide little incentives for fathers to claim them) but they reduce ethnic disparities in accessing parental benefits.²⁰ Tiered systems, on the other hand, might amplify social inequalities among groups of parents. In Sweden, where parents can receive an income-related benefit for 390 days or a parental benefit at the basic level when they cannot meet the employment criteria, roughly 12% of women and 4% of men received the latter in 2018. Among them, approximately three-fourths of recipients were migrants (Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2019^[69]).

Type of employment and occupation

Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain exclude self-employed workers from parental leave benefits. Although self-employment rates do not differ significantly between native- and foreign-born individuals, a non-negligible share of migrant parents might be excluded on this account. Finally, Italy excludes domestic workers from parental leave, among which migrant women are overrepresented.

Residency status

While entitlement to parental leave most often derives from employment (as opposed to nationality), some countries restrict access through residency criteria or waiting periods. Australia, for example, includes a newly arrived residents waiting period of two years, which applies to holders of permanent residence as well.

Lack of institutional knowledge

Overall, migrants may face challenges in accessing parental leave due to language barriers and lack of institutional knowledge. In Sweden, Finland and Norway, there is evidence of lack of information about parental leave rights and application procedures among native-born parents (Ellingsæter, Hege Kitterød and Misje Østbakken, 2020^[70]). Lack of information is likely to be more pronounced among their migrant peers. In Sweden, Mussino and Duvander (2016^[68]) also find different patterns of parental leave use among native- and foreign-born mothers, suggesting lack of knowledge of parental leave regulations, especially regarding the different options for flexibility. Migrant mothers tend to exhaust their leave immediately following childbirth, whereas Swedish-born mothers exploit the flexibility of the parental leave system to a larger extent and stay connected to the labour force when taking leave.²¹

Two features have proven to increase uptake of leave among migrant parents:

- **Earmarking:** Despite the increasing availability of paid leave options for fathers, their uptake of paternity and parental leave remains low. To encourage increased parental leave take-up by men, some countries have reserved non-transferable periods of parental leave for exclusive use by mothers and/or fathers (Fluchtmann, 2023^[71]). The so-called father's quota increases fathers' incentives to take leave in situations where the mother would generally be prone to take leave

(such as when the mother's earnings or work potential are lower than the father's). Because employment probabilities and wage potential are more polarised between migrant parents compared to their native-born peers, the earmarking of parental leave has a stronger economic incentive for the former. In Sweden, a reform that introduces a second quota month increased the uptake among foreign-born fathers at higher rates than among their native-born peers (Tervola, Duvander and Mussino, 2017^[72]).

- Flexibility: Parental leave systems that offer the possibility of using it at a part-time rate or postponing leave have also proven to be advantageous if the parent has an insecure labour market attachment as it provides continuity in employment, which can be particularly beneficial for migrant populations (Tervola, Duvander and Mussino, 2017^[72]).

Table 5.1. Typology of parental leave systems, 2022

	Employment-related criteria	Universal benefits	Tiered system	Exclusions on the self-employed, casual workers or part-time employees
Maternity leave	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, United Kingdom	Finland	Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden	Japan, Mexico
Parental leave	Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain	Austria, Czech Republic, Finland	France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden	Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain

Note: Tiered systems refer to those that provide universal benefits or employment-related benefits (or top-ups).

Source: OECD Policy Questionnaire 2022; Koslowski, A. et al. (eds.) (2022^[73]), *18th International Review on Leave Policies and Related Research*, <https://doi.org/10.18445/20220909-122329-0>; EIGE (2021^[74]), *Who is eligible for parental leave in the EU-28?*, <https://eige.europa.eu/publications-resources/publications/who-eligible-parental-leave-eu-28>; OECD (2023^[75]), "Family Indicators", *OECD Social and Welfare Statistics* (database), <https://doi.org/10.1787/efd30a09-en>.

Childcare

Children of migrant mothers tend to display lower participation rates in formal childcare both due to obstacles in access but also to lower uptake

In many OECD countries, access to affordable ECEC services is recognised as a crucial tool to reconcile paid work and family life, and thus support maternal employment and reduce gender inequalities (Alajääskö and Fluchtmann, 2023^[76]). High-quality ECEC has also positive effects on children's cognitive


and social development and the effects are particularly strong for children from disadvantaged backgrounds (Balladares and Kankaraš, 2020^[77]). In the context of migration, research has shown that time spent in preschool helps children of migrants to improve their language skills, with positive effects on their long-term integration (Van Lacker and Pavolini, 2022^[78]).

Overall, children from less advantaged backgrounds are much less likely to participate in ECEC than their better-off peers. Gaps in participation across socio-economic groups are often widest in countries that rely largely on private service provision (Adema, Clarke and Thévenon, 2020^[10]). Indeed, whether it pays off for a mother to work depends on her potential earnings and the costs of formal childcare/level of subsidies. Consequently, market-oriented childcare solutions may strengthen the inequalities in terms of labour force participation between native-born and migrant mothers (Steiber et al., 2015^[79]). Research also shows that children of migrant families are less likely to participate in ECEC but data on this group is more difficult to collect (European Commission, 2020^[80]). Aside from migrants' lower socio-economic status recent studies emphasise migrants' unfamiliarity with the receiving country's childcare system as a major barrier to formal childcare access (Seibel, 2021^[81]).

Figure 5.20 shows participation rates of children between 0 and 2 years old in formal childcare services by their mother's country of birth. While the average gap is small (52% among children of native-born mothers versus 46% among children of foreign-born mothers), countries like France, Ireland, Norway, Slovenia and the Netherlands exhibit differentials over 10 percentage points. Use of formal childcare increases for both groups as children age. Nine in ten children aged 3-5 use formal childcare services and the gap between those with foreign- and native-born parents is virtually non-existent in this age cohort.

Figure 5.20. Migrant mothers are less likely to use formal childcare

Use of formal childcare services by native- and foreign-born mothers for children aged 0-2 (Panel A) and aged 3-5 (Panel B), 2019



Note: Share of children enrolled in formal childcare during a typical week. Formal childcare services include preschool, compulsory school, centre-based services, day-care centres, and professional childminders. For Canada (2017 GSS Survey) data refer to children aged 1-3.

Source: Eurostat (2019^[37]), *EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions>; Statistics Canada (2017^[82]), *General Social Survey (GSS)*, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data>.

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In France, despite the public provision of childcare, centre-based services are in short supply and private childminders dominate the sector, particularly for children under three.²² This limits the use of private childminders by those with low earnings (Adema, Clarke and Thévenon, 2020^[10]). An empirical assessment of a 2004 reform that increased childcare subsidies shows that the effect on labour force participation was significant albeit small, given that the number of available spaces remained unaltered. Yet, the effect was larger among mothers of more than two children and among very low-earning mothers (Givord and Marbot, 2015^[83]). In addition, proficiency in French has proven to be a significant predictor in the use of formal childcare, associated both with better access to information as well as closer cultural proximity to French institutions. The working status of parents has been a key determinant as well, as public and private institutions prioritise dual-working families when granting places (Eremenko and Unterreiner, 2022^[84]).

In Ireland, the main provider of childcare is still the private sector. While costs partially explain the migrant-native gap in the use of childcare, Röder, Ward and Frese (2017^[85]) also conclude that more negative views of non-parental care, lack of knowledge and even mistrust in the childcare system are important elements to consider. Similar factors contribute to the migrant-native gap in the use of childcare in Germany. In a survey among parents of one and two-year-old children, intercultural barriers were the main obstacle to accessing childcare cited by migrant parents (Expert Council on Integration and Migration, 2013^[86]). These two cases support the notion that many migrant parents prioritise language instruction and cultural sensitivity for their children when choosing childcare arrangements (Obeng, 2006^[87]).


In a national study conducted in Canada, differences in the use of formal childcare by migrant and native-born parents were mostly explained by income and educational differences. Migrant parents were more likely to report high costs, personal preference to stay home with the child or unemployment as the main reasons for not choosing formal childcare. In Quebec, which introduced a universal childcare policy in 2001, differences in usage between migrant and native-born families are not significant, suggesting that when affordable, migrants use formal childcare at similar rates than their native-born peers (Kingsbury et al., 2021^[88]).

In Belgium, Biegel, Wood and Neels (2021^[89]) have shown that employment opportunities were an important factor in explaining migrant-native differentials in the uptake of formal childcare. Migrants' overrepresentation in flexible work arrangements and underrepresentation in full-time employment explain their lower uptake of formal care and higher uptake of informal care. Local availability of formal care had limited effects in accounting for migrant-native differentials.

In Germany, despite recent reforms²³ to increase childcare coverage, the market is still characterised by excess demand – particularly for children under three – and high variation across federal states, which has limited the effectiveness of such reforms (Boll and Lagemann, 2019^[90]; Muller and Wrohlich, 2014^[91]). Migrant-specific obstacles to accessing childcare include the decentralised and complex system that migrant parents must navigate. Recent research has also documented that because there are no mandatory standardised criteria to allocate slots in childcares and no accountability system to track enrolment decisions, there is a great amount of discretion when allocating slots, which may hamper migrant families' access to childcare (Hermes et al., 2023^[92]). Figure 5.21 shows that while take-up of formal childcare has increased for both native- and foreign-born children under three, it has done so at higher rates for native-born children, increasing the gap between both groups in the last decade.

Figure 5.21. The enrolment rate of migrant children in Germany is particularly low among very small children and the gap with their native-born peers has increased in the past decade

Use of childcare services in Germany by native- and foreign-born parents for children aged 0-2 (Panel A) and aged 3-6 (Panel B), 2011-20



Note: Share of children in day-care facilities plus children in publicly funded day care who do not also attend a day care facility or all-day school as a percentage of all children in the same age and population group. Foreign-born refers to children with at least one foreign-born parent.


Source: Ländermonitor (2020^[93]), "Kinder nach Migrationshintergrund in Kindertagesbetreuung", <https://www.laendermonitor.de/de/vergleich-bundeslaender-daten/kinder-und-eltern/migrationshintergrund/kinder-nach-migrationshintergrund-in-kitas-und-kindertagespflege-4>.

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Sweden, like Denmark, Iceland and Norway, provide ECEC through large-scale publicly operated and/or publicly subsidised ECEC systems. Unlike other countries with direct public provision but with frequent public shortages, in Sweden, affordability is not an issue: only 2% of low-income households say they would like to make more use of childcare but cannot afford to do so (OECD, 2020^[94]). Available data reveal that, in this context, children of migrants participate in public services at high rates and display a low gap compared to children of Swedish parents (averaging 5% in 2021) (Figure 5.22). This trend has also been evident since the late 1990s. Children with migrant parents are more likely to be enrolled in municipal preschools, as opposed to private establishments. Longitudinal data suggests that a key enabler of participation in childcare among migrant families was not necessarily the expansion of services, but universal coverage. Early expansion of ECEC primarily benefited high-income and highly educated groups of parents, but improved availability reduced the migrant utilisation gaps.


Figure 5.22. In Sweden, preschool enrolment rates among migrant families are high

Enrolment rates of children in childcare, 2021



Note: Foreign-born children refers to children born abroad or children born in Sweden with both parents born abroad.

Source: *Skolverket* (2023^[95]), "Statistics on preschool, school and adult education", <https://www.skolverket.se/skolutveckling/statistik/sok-statistik-om-forskola-skola-och-vuxenutbildning>.

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Migrant mothers of small children are less likely to rely on family sources of childcare


Where subsidised public childcare is unavailable, many mothers are only able to work if they can draw on their family and social networks for support. Research since the 1970s has repeatedly shown that mothers in Europe and the United States return to work sooner if they live close to a grandmother who can provide childcare (Buening, 2017^[96]). Similar findings emerge for migrant populations with migrants' parents – and especially mothers – helping out with housework and childcare and allowing migrants to work more hours in the United States and Canada (OECD, 2019^[54]).

Previous research by the OECD has shown that for migrants with children, the presence of a (grand) parent has positive effects on employment: in both European OECD countries and the United States, migrant women's employment probability is 6 percentage points higher than for comparable migrant women whose parents are not present in the household. Migrants also appear to work more hours per week when parents are present, in both European OECD countries and the United States. Hours worked appear higher by between 1% and 4%, where the largest effects again arise for women (OECD, 2019^[54]).

Migrant mothers, however, are not always capable of relying on social and family networks for childcare as shown in Figure 5.23, where approximately a third of native-born mothers report relying on informal and family childcare arrangements, compared to a tenth of their foreign-born peers. Several qualitative studies describe the strategies used by migrant families to balance work and care: bringing grandparents to live with the family, delegating the care to family members in the origin country, relying on the nuclear family or on informal childminders found via ethnic networks at destination (Röder, Ward and Frese, 2017^[85]).

Figure 5.23. Migrant mothers of small children are less likely to rely on informal childcare arrangements

Use of informal childcare by native- and foreign-born mothers for children aged 0-2, 2019



Note: Share of children relying on informal childcare during a typical week. Informal childcare refers to care by grandparents, other household members and relatives.

Source: Eurostat (2019^[37]), *EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions>.

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To increase access to ECEC, several OECD countries target disadvantaged families through financial subsidies and implement specific measures to increase uptake among migrant families

To support the enrolment of younger children, in recent years many governments have lowered the age of mandatory enrolment or expanded the right to preschool education for younger children (Alajääskö and Fluchtman, 2023^[76]). But growing inequity in the economic, social and cultural backgrounds of children in ECEC centres is becoming a challenge in many OECD countries. While most countries have put in place policies and programmes to increase access among socially disadvantaged children, there are fewer examples of migrant-specific policies (Table 5.2).

To increase access, some countries have prioritised increased provision of childcare, either through investments in infrastructure and, consequently, in rising the number of places. In some cases, central governments provide financial support to ECEC mainstream services to promote the inclusion of children with a minority background or prioritise investment in remote or disadvantaged areas (Australia, Belgium). Many countries have also reformed their ECEC systems to make it more affordable for disadvantaged children at younger ages through financial subsidies, vouchers or free access for certain age cohorts. Most of these measures are means-tested.

Table 5.2. To increase access to ECEC, several OECD countries target disadvantaged families through financial subsidies

Measures to increase access to and uptake of ECEC, 2023

Countries with measures to increase ECEC provision	Countries with measures to increase access to and uptake among low-income families	Countries with specific measures to increase uptake among migrant families
Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland	Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, United States

Note: Emphasis is given to measures that may concern migrant children, but additional measures to expand access to ECEC might be in place. Countries with measures exclusively targeting Ukrainian children are not included in the third column (Czech Republic, France, Lithuania). Source: OECD Policy Questionnaire 2022.

Uneven parental engagement with different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds can result in greater inequity. In addition to accessibility, the provision of inclusive services is critical to engage with migrant families. Denmark for instance, supports language learning among children between the ages of 2 and 3 inside and outside of ECEC and provides additional training to staff on communication, language and trust-building skills. Similarly, Slovenia has invested in the strengthening of social and civic competences of ECEC professionals, improving the attitudes and competences of teachers according to evaluations of the programme. In Germany, one of the funding areas of the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) focuses on improving access to parental support among migrant parents with children of pre-school age. The FEAD also funds the work of counsellors/outreach workers to support the integration of disadvantaged, newly arrived citizens. Between 2017 and 2018 the Flemish Government in Belgium launched a programme, consisting of seven locally-adapted experiments, to increase parental involvement as a lever to increase ECEC enrolment among migrant families. The main impact of the programme was observed in the quality of relations between parents and school staff (European Commission, 2020^[80]).

Some countries have attempted to remove intercultural barriers through the translation of informational brochures or interpretation services (Austria, Norway), open pre-schools (Australia, France, Norway, Sweden), referral services (Australia, Ireland), the offer of bicultural services, intercultural training of staff, and hiring of staff from minority communities. Others engage in active recruitment policies (Belgium, Norway). Finally, some countries perform language assessments among children of young ages to ensure that, in the absence of ECEC attendance, they do not fall behind (Denmark, Korea, Norway) (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3. OECD countries rely on a variety of measures to increase access to and uptake of formal childcare among migrant families

Special measures or programmes to increase access to and uptake of ECEC among migrant families

Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tailored support to mainstream ECEC services to build their capacity and support children who do not speak English. - In-community support that prepares children for school, runs playgroups and connects families to local childhood activities, etc.
Austria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Free interpretation services for educational institutions in 61 languages via telephone or videocalls. - Nationwide standardised instrument to assess language skills among children with German as a second language from the age of 3. Individual results are used to support educational needs in elementary school.
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investment to fund eligible organisations that support children and families with particular needs, including newcomers, families in underserved communities, families working non standardised hours, children from language minorities.
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Financial investment (0.02% of GDP between 2017/20) to increase access to ECEC among Venezuelan migrants. - Programmes to increase permanence in the educational system of migrants and returnees, which include school meals, humanitarian school corridors, school levelling, teacher training, and flexible educational models.
Denmark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bilingual children who do not attend day care and who need language stimulation must be enrolled in language stimulation in the form of a day care service 30 hours a week. - Ukrainian children are not covered by these rules.
Ireland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Special referral programme led by the Department of Justice to facilitate access to asylum seekers and refugees.
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Programme aimed at enhancing service delivery that allows childcare centres to hire additional certified nursery teachers that can provide language support.
Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Targeted support to children of multicultural families (home visit services, language and academic support).
Luxembourg	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multilingual education programme for children aged 1-4 in childcare facilities, aiming at exposing children in their early stage and on a daily basis to French and Luxembourgish to stimulate and develop their overall potential through play.
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local Governments may receive funds from the central government to provide free education (children 2.5-4) to disadvantaged groups. The criterion of disadvantage is determined at the local level but may include the educational level of the mother, her origin or duration of residence in the Netherlands.
New Zealand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Funding from the Ministry of Education to services in lower socio-economic communities for children with special needs or from non-English speaking backgrounds, and to services that provide early childhood education in a language and culture other than English for more than half the time.
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Since 2018, earmarked grant for active information and recruitment of children with a minority language in municipalities with low ECEC participation. - Language assessment at the age of 2 or 4 by the child health's clinics. - Ad hoc measures to support Ukrainian children including temporary legislative measures, flexibility to implement contemporary kindergartens, and extra funding for the translation and development of school curricula. - Translation of materials about kindergartens by the Directorate of Education and Training. - Open kindergartens (with no or low fee) where a parent accompanies the child to pedagogical sessions one or several times per week. - Municipalities also receive earmarked grants to support language development among minority language children.
Slovenia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bilingual kindergartens and kindergartens with Italian language, financed by the state budget. - Since 2022, guidelines for the integration of children with temporary protection in educational institutions including: lower group sizes for children from regional or ethnic minorities; recruitment of staff with specific training or background, bilingual ECEC (Slovenian and Hungarian) or Italian-based ECEC; salary increase or specific allowances for staff who provide bilingual classes; additional budget/lump sum for ECEC settings in ethnically mixed areas.
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Open preschools for language and integration, which offer activities designed for foreign-born parents, including language courses, study and vocational guidance and recreational and cultural activities. The preschool pays special attention to the needs of foreign-born women, while also reaching out to fathers. The target group is newly arrived parents.
Switzerland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The State Secretariat for Migration supports the cantons in better informing migrant families about existing early childhood education services and facilitating their access (translated information, counselling sessions for newcomers). - The SEM supports professional development trainings that educate childcare staff on how to deal with cultural diversity and early language development.
Türkiye	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Activities aimed at raising awareness among public institutions (schools and municipalities) and migrants themselves about migrant children's right to formal education.
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training and mentorship programme targeting refugees (and women in particular) which helps them become licensed family childcare providers. The programme creates pathways for economic self-sufficiency among refugees, while increasing culturally and linguistically competent childcare options in the community. - Early Refugee School Impact Programme which facilitates childcare access, provides specialised training on cultural competencies for childcare providers, implements programmes that support the cognitive, social, and emotional readiness of young refugee children to enter school, facilitates parent integration and education programmes.

Source: OECD Policy Questionnaire 2022.

Specific policies to support employment among migrant mothers

For most women migrating to OECD countries, family formation is a parallel process which directly and disproportionately affects their socio-economic insertion compared to migrant men. Yet, few OECD countries explicitly consider women and those with children a priority in integration policy; even fewer provide tailored measures to address their needs (Table 5.4).

To improve the labour market integration of migrant women and help them reconcile paid work and family life, some OECD countries are increasingly turning to a diverse set of policies that emphasises three elements: removing obstacles to the participation in integration measures, designing mechanisms to build bridges and trust with migrant mothers, and actively promoting their labour market engagement through tailored programmes.

Table 5.4. Integration measures for migrant women and mothers available in OECD countries

Mainstream integration policies	Specific integration measures targeting women	Specific integration measures targeting women with children	Active Labour Market Policies with specific gender measures
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany Greece, Ireland, Italy Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands New Zealand, Norway Slovak Republic, Spain Sweden, Switzerland	Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany Greece, Lithuania, Norway, Slovak Republic Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, United States	Australia, Austria, Belgium Canada, Czech Republic Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden	Austria, Belgium, Canada Czech Republic, Germany, Norway, Sweden

Note: The second column means that the needs of migrant women are specifically considered and that there are tailor-made actions for them. In Belgium, the federal level co-ordinates integration policies, but there is no national integration policy at the federal level. In Switzerland, 4 out of 22 responding cantons were able to identify labour market measures aimed exclusively at women.

Source: OECD Policy Questionnaire 2022; Suri, M. et al. (2022^[97]), *Schlussbericht Geschlechtergleichstellung im Bereich arbeitsmarktliche Massnahmen*, https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/Publikationen/Dienstleistungen/Publikationen_und_Formulare/Arbeit/Arbeitsmarkt/Informationen_Arbeitsmarktforschung/schlussbericht_geschlechtergleichstellung_amm.html.

Removing obstacles to participate in integration programmes is essential for migrant women with family and care responsibilities

Care and family responsibilities among migrant women²⁴ can stand in the way of job seeking and employment and prevent them from taking part in introduction programmes and language training. In France where adult migrants coming from a country outside the EU must undergo language training if their test scores are insufficient, women account for the largest share of non-compliers. The main reasons for non-compliance include being pregnant and having to take care of children at home (Lochmann, Rapoport and Speciale, 2019^[98]). In Norway, women participating in the introduction programme (NIP) cited proximity and easy access to childcare as major determinants of their ability and motivation to participate in the programme (Bredal and Orupabo, 2014^[99]). A combination of measures may increase the participation of migrant mothers and fathers who are constrained by childcare responsibilities, including:

- **Flexible modalities:** To ensure that migrant parents have the possibility to engage in integration measures, it is important that these are flexible and compatible with family responsibilities. Flexible delivery modes for integration include first and foremost offers on a part-time basis and during evening hours. Countries may also consider self-study material and e-learning options online, and to advertise this more widely. Indeed, both e-learning and self-study are already available in most OECD countries (OECD, 2017^[56]).

- **Childcare arrangements:** Many countries have increasingly recognised the importance of removing these obstacles and now provide childcare services or facilities during integration courses, which are key enablers to participation (see Annex Table 5.A.1 in Annex 5.A). In Australia, 12% of the participants of the English integration programme reported using the childcare arrangements provided as part of the programme; nine in ten said these arrangements enabled their participation.
- **Parental leave provisions:** As seen in the previous chapter, many migrant women – and especially those who arrive through family reunification – exhibit elevated fertility immediately after arrival in destination. These dynamics might hamper their participation in introduction measures when there is a strict time period to complete them. In Norway, under the new Integration Act, participants in the Introduction Programme for new arrivals (NIP) are entitled to 10 months of parental leave during the child’s first year. Before 2021, parents participating in the NIP faced the challenge that the overall duration of the right to free language training and social studies was not automatically extended for those on parental leave. This led to cases where the obligation of the municipality to provide free training ended before participants could reach their class goal, disproportionately affecting women, who are more likely to go on parental leave. Under the new regulation, municipalities are obliged to offer Norwegian language training and social studies after four months of parental leave (OECD, 2022_[100]).
- **Longer timelines for completion:** some countries allow migrants to resume integration activities once childcare constraints are lower, even after eligibility has expired. In Canada, for example, the government has adopted public initiatives to facilitate language and vocational training beyond the first years after arrival. Similarly, Sweden allows parents to postpone measures beyond the two-year limit if they had to pause or reduce their participation in the integration programme for childcare reasons. Norway, with its “Job Opportunities” programme, targets migrant women who are no longer eligible to the integration programme for new arrivals.
- **Offers with low-threshold participation in informal settings:** Women with care responsibilities may not be able to immediately or intensively engage in integration programmes that require a high threshold of participation. Some countries are experimenting with informal settings, such as Austria, which offers integration support in the immediate environment through women’s cafés or tandem projects. In Switzerland, the association Femmes/Männer-Tische (Femmes/Men’s Tables) offers low-threshold discussion groups for migrants, which take up women-specific concerns.

Building bridges is particularly important for recently arrived migrant mothers, as they may find themselves in isolation

Migrant women tend to have insufficient information about existing integration programmes and public structures due to relatively small social networks. If they have children close to arrival, they also risk finding themselves in isolation during parental leave. To build bridges, some countries favour integration policies in pre-school settings, have set up networks to reach out to migrant mothers or mentorship programmes targeting women.

- **Integration measures in preschool settings:** Australia, France, Norway and Sweden offer a variation of “open preschools”, integration measures simultaneously targeting parents and children. In France, Opening Schools to Parents for Children’s Success (OEPRE), is a joint initiative of the Ministry of Education and Interior providing workshops that focus on learning French language and values, and the functioning of the school system. Workshops are free, last between 60 and 120 hours per year, consist of small groups and benefit mostly mothers (80% of participants). In Sweden, open preschools offer language courses, study and vocational guidance and recreational and cultural activities, with an emphasis on women’s needs. Norway’s open preschools not only target migrant families, but their objective is similar in that it facilitates low-threshold pedagogical sessions where children can be accompanied by their carer, promoting network building. Australia

runs a similar programme called Community Hubs, embedded in primary schools that help bridge the gap between migrant families and the wider community by connecting families with each other, with their school, and with local services and support.

- **Dedicated networks to reach out to mothers:** Denmark, Sweden and Norway have set up dedicated networks to specifically reach out to migrant women in their immediate environment. In Denmark, the Neighbourhood Mothers are primarily women with an ethnic minority background, who volunteer in their local area by conveying important information to isolated migrant women (offers from the municipality and other associations) and helping them build social networks. Sweden's Community Mothers, recruits migrant women and mothers to reach out to and provide guidance to newly arrived migrant women and mothers in the local community. In Norway, District Mother (introduced in 2016), has trained 150 immigrant mothers to reach out and provide information to support stay-at-home migrant mothers. The aim is to improve immigrant mothers' connection to Norway by providing information on available social services, the Norwegian labour market, and support concerning parenthood and health.
- **Mentorship programmes:** In Denmark, the Danish Centre for Gender, Equality and Ethnicity (KVINFO) is an NGO that, between 2003 and 2017, ran a mentorship programme for women from refugee families and other migrant groups to empower them on decision-making and leadership by matching them with women who were firmly established in the Danish workforce. Germany's "Migrant Women are becoming entrepreneurs" was a pilot project in Frankfurt that ran between 2015 and 2017 to promote entrepreneurship among migrant women through mentoring and skills training. At the end of the pilot, 16 out of 22 participants set up businesses (Desideri et al., 2020^[101]).

Some mothers may require active support in labour market initiatives

Migrant mothers from countries where women are underrepresented in the labour market might need particular support to engage in labour market initiatives and employment. Some examples of successful initiatives include:

- **Programmes that recognise the heterogeneity of migrant mothers:** Whenever migrant women – and especially mothers – are specifically targeted, they tend to be treated as homogenous group with few countries making distinctions between categories of migration or levels of skills. In Canada, the pilot of Career Pathways for Racialised Newcomer Women offers different models based on skills, language levels and different initial distances from the labour market. The majority of participants are highly educated and bring with them work experience outside of Canada. Thus far, the results of the programme have been positive with participants showing gains in career adaptability measures and employment outcomes.
- **Programmes that take the parental role as the starting point:** In Flanders, a specific civic integration programme was developed for low-literacy parents with young children. The programme is open to parents who have at least one child under the age of three or are expecting a child and whose literacy levels stand in the way of participating in the regular integration programmes. This programme was set up after a successful pilot project on a customised civic integration programme for low-literate women with young children in 2016, funded by AMIF (EMN Belgium, 2022^[102]). In France, the programme AGIR supports refugees' integration in the labour market by ensuring access to a wide array of services including childcare and family allowances, under the premise that the process must be adapted to their family situation.
- **Programmes that provide tailored support to migrant mothers:** In Germany, "Strong at work – Mothers with a migration background are entering the labour market" (2015-2022), provided career orientation and individual support to migrant mothers with the aim of accompanying the re-entry of the participants in the labour market throughout various phases: from vocational orientation to the

beginning of an internship, and up to the first employment. Up until July 2019, the programme counted approximately 10 000 participants, with one in four having a refugee background. After completion, 37% of participants had secured a job or had undergone vocational training and two-thirds had a better idea of what to focus on professionally (employment, qualifications, internships, recognition).

- Programmes that provide tailored support to female family migrants or refugees: the Netherlands, through six pilot programmes at the municipal level, targeted migrant women who arrived either to join a beneficiary of international protection or a partner/family member. The VOI-Pilot (2019/21) identified potential participants through multiple channels (municipal caseworkers, signatories of the integration trajectory, and through NGOs) and ensured accessibility and follow-up (through buddy sessions, personal follow-ups and provision of childcare). The programme, however, was more successful in activating women in volunteering, internships or educational/training opportunities, rather than work experiences (EMN Netherlands, 2022^[103]). Similarly, across five EU countries – Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Hungary – Momentum and Co-operation is an initiative focused on reducing barriers faced by migrant and refugee women aged 18-35 through tailored support spanning multiple stakeholders including employers, public authorities, civil society and employment centres among others.
- Programmes that recognise informal skills: recognising and making visible skills obtained in a variety of contexts is of particular importance for migrant mothers, since family formation after arrival may limit their ability to gain labour market experience in destination. The Flemish Government has developed a system of Earlier Obtained Competences towards this end, which makes the competences and skills obtained in a variety of contexts (free time, school, work context) more visible, independently of where the competences were obtained. Through recognition of these competences, women with lower education can enjoy easier access to the labour market. Similarly, Sweden’s “Equal Entry Programme” (2018-2021) targets refugee women who are far from the labour market, by mapping their formal *and* informal skills and doing the same with potential employers. Results show that 15 months after a random control trial, the employment rates of female participants were 10 percentage points higher than non-participants. A recent evaluation also found that 37% of the women in the programme were employed or studying after the programme, compared to 27% in other, less individually focused programmes
- Programmes aimed at formalising employment: To regularise the labour market situation of migrant mothers working informally in traditionally female-dominated sectors, some European countries have experimented with measures aiming at formalising paid domestic work. Sweden, for example, provides tax incentives to clients of these kinds of services, while Belgium and France have implemented voucher schemes towards this end.

Conclusion

Family remains the most important driver for migration in OECD countries – whether in the form of family reunification, family formation or accompanying family – and understanding the integration of migrant families is key to formulating relevant integration policies.

Migrant mothers are key drivers in the education of their children and play an important role in the transmission of values. What is more, the labour force participation of migrant mothers has significant implications for the outcomes of their children.

Yet, migrant mothers face important barriers to employment. On average, their employment rates are 20 percentage points lower than for migrant women with no children. Compared to native-born mothers, their employment is also more sensitive to the number and age of children, suggesting that they face higher childcare constraints. In parallel, they report higher levels of underemployment and involuntary part-time

employment. Their individual and cultural preferences are often cited as main obstacles to their labour market integration, but the evidence suggests that they are frequently trapped in involuntary inactivity. What is more, in the past, such preferences have often shaped stereotypes and misconceptions, including on the policy side, where action often disregarded the specific needs of migrant mothers.

As family formation and migration tend to be intertwined processes, it is essential to account for both simultaneously when thinking of integration. Pre-departure counselling as well as targeted support immediately after arrival are complementary measures towards facilitating employment. Many mainstream integration programmes remain relevant for migrant mothers as long as they facilitate a “second chance” if completion is not achieved within the first few years of arrival. To avoid that migrant mothers miss out on targeted support offers due to family responsibilities, some countries allow for parental leave schemes in integration programmes, have extended the time limit for eligibility or have invested in programmes targeting those who have remained inactive for a prolonged period. Migrant women with children are prone to disproportionately benefit from these measures.

Equally important are removing obstacles hampering equal access to employment-supportive measures such as childcare services and parental leave schemes. Migrant mothers are sensitive to policy incentives, just as their native-born peers. Various policy tools, including parental leave, childcare and out-of-school-hours-care, and flexible working schemes can help parents balance work and family life. These policies work best when provided in a coherent manner that avoids gaps in support, e.g. between the end of parental leave and entering formal childcare, and gives parents a continuum of support throughout childhood (OECD, 2016^[25]).

Families play a key role in migration and settlement decisions and in longer-term integration. Not only are migration and employment decisions usually taken as part of a household unit, but the presence of partners, children and parents can shape integration outcomes. Migrant women who emigrate for family reasons often do not benefit from structured integration programmes, such as those available for humanitarian migrants, nor from a job offer as do labour migrants. In addition, whenever they are taken care of by their sponsor and do not rely on benefits, they may not be the target of integration measures or might altogether be excluded from them (OECD, 2017^[56]). In this sense, investing in a whole-of-family approach to migrant integration might simultaneously contribute to the stability of families and their well-being, while enhancing their participation in and contributions to their receiving society.

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
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Annex 5.A. Supplementary tables and figures

Annex Figure 5.A.1. Differences in employment rates between native- and foreign-born women, by motherhood status and adjusted by age, education and number of children



Note: For each marker, the figure shows the difference in percentage points between employment rates of foreign-born and native-born women aged 25-54. Negative values mean that native-born women have a higher employment rate than foreign-born women. Round markers show the differences for mothers with at least one child aged 0-4. Diamond markers show the differences for mothers with at least one child aged 0-4, controlling for age, education and number of children. Triangle markers show the differences for women with no children, controlling for age and education.

Source: Eurostat (2019^[20]), *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>; US Census Bureau (2019^[23]), *Current Population Survey (CPS)*, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/fndp3l>

Annex Table 5.A.1. Availability of childcare services for migrants participating in introduction measures

	Childcare arrangements available
Australia	Yes
Austria	Yes (for language courses)
Belgium (Flanders)	No*
Canada	Yes
Chile	No
Colombia	Yes
Czech Republic	Yes
Denmark	Yes, in reception centres. In municipalities, migrants access ordinary Danish childcare
Estonia	Yes
Finland	Not systematically
France	Yes
Germany	Yes, though migrants in vocational language courses should apply for local services first
Greece	Yes, in reception centres. In municipalities, children attend ordinary nursery school
Iceland	Children of migrants access public kindergarten
Israel	Children of migrants access public school beginning at age 3
Italy	Yes, on local level
Japan	No
Korea	No
Latvia	Yes
Lithuania	Yes, in reception centres. In municipalities, children attend ordinary nursery school
Luxembourg	Migrants can access the same measures as all residents
Mexico	No*
Netherlands	Reimbursement of costs allowed
New Zealand	Yes (onsite during reception programme)
Norway	Yes, on local level
Poland	No
Portugal	Yes
Slovak Republic	No
Slovenia	Yes
Spain	No

Note: n/a= information is not applicable. A measure in Belgium (Flanders) to help pay for childcare and transportation ended on 01 January 2022. In Mexico, childcare spaces are available in the offices of COMAR for children accompanying applicants initiating international protection recognition procedures.

Source: OECD (2017^[56]), *Making Integration Work: Family Migrants*, Making Integration Work, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264279520-en>.

Notes

¹ According to a diagnostic by the European Migration Network and interviews with researchers in the Netherlands, the public and policy debate about the integration of migrant women focuses on the cultural aspects of integration. This is evidenced in statements by parliament members which reflect on the cultural challenges migrant women face and how these might differ from Dutch cultural norms (EMN Netherlands, 2022_[103]).

² In five countries – Luxembourg, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Norway – native born mothers outperform their childless peers. In three others, there is a positive difference of less than 1 percentage point for native-born mothers (Italy, Greece and the Netherlands).

³ The evidence on the fatherhood premium remains inconclusive. While many studies have identified a positive wage gap between fathers and non-fathers, the effect varies by occupation, marital status, and race, among others. The premium has been explained by selection effects (high-earning men are more likely to become fathers), couple-level specialisation, increased work effort, age at childbirth which tends to be higher for men than for women, and (positive) employer discrimination, among other things.

⁴ Taking the paid maternity and paid parental leave entitlements together, mothers in Hungary can take paid leave for a total of 160 weeks – almost three times longer than the OECD average (54 weeks).

⁵ There is also evidence that the birth of the first child produces a strong increase in labour informality among working mothers in Chile but the effects are milder for highly-educated women. According to 2017 census data, migrant women were, on average, more educated than their native-born peers. These dynamics also contribute to explaining the small gap between both groups.

⁶ While there was a nationwide homecare allowance between 2013 and 2015 for parents who did not use public childcare (children aged 0-2), in 2015 it was abolished. Several German states, however, continued to pay a form of homecare allowance since (Fendel and Jochimsen, 2017_[112]).

⁷ According to the 2021 EULFS, on average, 7% of female migrants to the EU24 countries aged 15 years and older were humanitarian migrants. In Germany, the share is 12%.

⁸ The negative outcomes for both native- and foreign-born mothers in Finland must be interpreted with caution, as the country provides the longest parental leave available among OECD countries and parents in homecare leaves are classified as inactive in labour force surveys. The opposite is true in Sweden where women on leave are counted as employed if they have a regular job to return to and regardless of the length of the absence. Given the structure of the leave, parents are allowed to combine paid and unpaid days and stretch leave days throughout the child's preschool years.

⁹ Except for Germany, all four countries offer mothers more than 60 weeks of leave when combining (paid) maternity leave, (paid) parental and home care leave. They are ranked in the top ten countries along with the Slovak Republic, Latvia and Norway. Germany offers 58 weeks and ranks slightly below the EU average.

¹⁰ It should be noted that the sample becomes increasingly selective and small at higher ages of the first child since women are excluded from the analyses two quarters before their second child is born and higher-order childbearing patterns are potentially selective.

¹¹ We estimated and assigned the employment probabilities of women who do not (yet) have children, but who have similar socio-demographic characteristics in terms of i) age, ii) highest educational level, iii) origin group and generation, iv) region of residence, v) LIPRO (Lifestyle PROjections model) household position, vi) the interaction between origin group and age, vii) the interaction between origin group and educational level, viii) the interaction between origin group and LIPRO position, ix) the interaction between educational level and age and x) the interaction between LIPRO position and age.

¹² Across EU countries, for instance, they display faster convergence rates to native-born women in the labour market than male migrants; in Canada married migrant women follow exhibit similar rising participation and wage progression compared to married native-born women with similar skills (Lee, Peri and Viarengo, 2022^[105]; Adsera and Ferrer, 2016^[104]). And in the United States, the family investment model does not hold for married migrants (Blau et al., 2003^[110]).

¹³ These are occupations that require low levels of skills and competences but that may demand some physical effort. Migrant women tend to use much more physical and demanding skills than their native-born peers. With time of residence, and across countries, migrant women experience increases in the analytical requirements of their jobs but do not fully converge with their native-born peers (Adsera, Ferrer and Hernanz, 2023^[107]).

¹⁴ In Belgium there is service voucher scheme that subsidises household services (cleaning, washing, ironing) in order to create formal, low-skilled jobs that improve the work-life balance of the users and provide a leverage to other jobs. The service mainly employs women, of which almost half are migrants. The service, however, has failed to offer transitions to other jobs (EMN Belgium, 2022^[102]).

¹⁵ Involuntary part-time employment consists of work of less than 30 usual hours per week due to the impossibility of finding a full-time job. It is difficult to assess whether a worker's decision is truly voluntary or involuntary as it might be an outcome forced upon a worker by his or her ability to find full-time work or due to an external constraint, such as lack of appropriate childcare. Further, both economic and cultural factors may guide or even force an individual's selection into a set of working hours (OECD, 2019^[49]).

¹⁶ The chart groups managers with other occupations but the difference between native- and foreign-born mothers averages only 1%.

¹⁷ In cases where the sponsor is a national or holds permanent residence in the host country, it is relatively clear from the outset that his or her family members are also likely to remain in the host country for good. But immediate access to the labour market should also apply in cases when the sponsor holds a permit of limited duration that is more or less indefinitely renewable and effectively puts them in a permanent track. Most OECD countries do not provide full and immediate labour market access to family members unless the sponsor qualifies as a high-skilled migrant. In other cases, labour market tests are required or access is subject to work permits in specific sectors (Luxembourg).

¹⁸ For men, employment rates were 85%, 68% and 50% among migrants with a skilled stream, family and humanitarian visa, respectively.

¹⁹ In Sweden, father's earnings have a positive effect on the use of leave, but the effect is smaller at higher levels of earnings (Sündstrom and Duvander, 2002^[106]). Similarly, in Finland, paternity leave is more often used by fathers with higher education and higher income (Saarikallio-Torp and Miettinen, 2021^[108]). In

Canada, reforms aimed at widening eligibility criteria disproportionately increased use among low-income families (Margolis et al., 2018_[109]).

²⁰ In Sweden, where there is a tiered system, migrant mothers use parental leave more intensively than their native-born peers, due to their lower disposable income (Mussino and Duvander, 2016_[68]).

²¹ Labour-market legislation in Sweden allows for job-protected leave for the child's first 18 months and during any parental leave taken within 12 years of the birth. This means that it is possible to stretch one's days of leave over a longer period by mixing paid and unpaid days during the first 18 months, and using paid leave when the child is somewhat older.

²² The theoretical capacity for children under three in France is 59%. However, approximately 24% of children have a place in public structures and 35% in private facilities or arrangements (ONAPE, 2020_[111]).

²³ In 2013, two childcare reforms came into effect simultaneously: a legal entitlement to a place in formal childcare for children aged one year or older; and the introduction of a new benefit for families who do not use public or publicly subsidised childcare. Both reforms were unconditional on the parents' income or employment status (Muller and Wrohlich, 2014_[91]).

²⁴ Across the EU countries, foreign-born women, on average, report more care responsibilities than their native-born peers (49% versus 37%, respectively). In addition, in situations in which strong family or social networks are lacking, constraints related to family responsibilities are likely to be much higher.

6 Country notes: Recent changes in migration movements and policies

Australia

Foreign-born population – 2021	29.2% of the population	Main countries of birth: United Kingdom (16%), China (9%), India (9%)
Size: 7.5 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2012: +21%	

In 2021, Australia received 169 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 2.4% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 2% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 21.3% labour migrants, 73.2% family members (including accompanying family) and 3.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 62 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 166 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, China and the United Kingdom were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Viet Nam registered the strongest increase (+2 700) and the United Kingdom the largest decrease (-900) in flows to Australia compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 36.4%, to reach around 19 000. The majority of applicants came from Iran (1 900), India (1 600) and Afghanistan (1 500). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Iran (1 100) and the largest decrease nationals of Malaysia (-1 100). Of the 23 000 decisions taken in 2022, 18% were positive.

Emigration of Australian citizens to OECD countries increased by 6% in 2021, to 17 000. Approximately 20% of this group migrated to the United States, 19% to New Zealand and 16% to the United Kingdom.

From July 2023, the Temporary Skilled Migration Income Threshold (TSMIT) increased from USD 53 900 to USD 70 000. New nomination applications from this date will need to meet the new TSMIT of USD 70 000 or the annual market salary rate, whichever is higher.

By the end of 2023, the Temporary Residence Transition (TRT) stream of the Employer Nomination Scheme (subclass 186) visa will be available for all Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa holders whose employers wish to sponsor them. These changes are in line with the government's commitment to expand pathways to permanent residence for temporary skilled sponsored workers. They will provide more certainty to TSS visa holders and their employers about the permanent residence pathways available. Employers will be able to alleviate skills shortages by ensuring a permanent employer sponsored pathway is available for a wider range of occupations.


In April 2023, the Australian Government announced a direct pathway to Australian citizenship for New Zealand citizens residing in Australia. Starting from July 2023, New Zealand citizens who have lived in Australia for at least four years are eligible to apply directly for Australian citizenship, eliminating the need for a separate permanent visa application. This change applied to New Zealand citizens holding a Special Category (subclass 444) visa (SCV) who arrived in Australia after 26 February 2001. To facilitate this process for long-term New Zealand residents in Australia, their period of permanent residence will be backdated to meet the 12-month requirement under the general residence rule outlined in the Australian Citizenship Act 2007. This provision allowed applicants to demonstrate lawful presence in Australia for four years, including 12 months as a permanent resident, immediately before the application date.

In October 2022, a new Ministerial Direction (No. 100) came into effect, for processing priorities for certain skilled visa applications. The direction formalises the Australian Government's prioritisation of healthcare and teaching occupations, as well as offshore permanent and provisional applications. The direction helped improve processing times, clear visa backlogs, and assist small businesses in recruiting overseas workers. This includes ending the Priority Migration Skilled Occupation List (PMSOL) and priority sectors. Removal of the PMSOL and priority sectors enables the Department to consider applications that were previously not prioritised while managing steady volumes of incoming visa applications.

In June 2023, the Australian Government announced a package of measures to tackle migrant worker exploitation targeting employers. New legislation will be introduced into Parliament to make it a criminal offence to coerce someone into breaching their visa conditions; introduce prohibition notices to stop employers from further hiring people on temporary visas where they have exploited migrants; increase penalties and new compliance tools to deter exploitation; and repeal section 235 of the Migration Act which actively discourages people from reporting exploitative behaviour. The reforms also include enhanced whistle-blower protections for temporary migrants to encourage individuals to report exploitative employers.

For further information: <https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/>

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Australia



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration



	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	41 370	- 37%
Seasonal workers	14 590	+ 219%
Intra-company transfers	1 560	+ 17%
Other temporary workers	106 880	+ 19%

Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	62 210	- 19%
Trainees	1 370	- 31%

Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	19 305	+ 36%




Components of population growth

	2022	2022/21
	Per 1 000 inhabitants	difference
Total	19.3	+13.8
Natural increase	4.3	-1.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	15.0	+15.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	1 298	+38.6	0.1
Outflows (2022)	6 350	+66.6	0.4



Austria

Foreign-born population – 2022	20.6% of the population	Main countries of birth: Germany (14%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (9%), Türkiye (9%)
Size: 1.8 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2012: +39%	

In 2021, Austria received 74 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 17% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 62.9% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 2.8% labour migrants, 17.1% family members (including accompanying family) and 16.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 4 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 18 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 221 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -5% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Germany, Romania and Syria were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Syria registered the strongest increase (+9 600) and Hungary the largest decrease (-500) in flows to Austria compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 180%, to reach around 106 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (24 000), India (19 000) and Syria (19 000). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of India (+18 000). Of the 39 000 decisions taken in 2022, 42% were positive.

Emigration of Austrian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -5% in 2021, to 16 000. Approximately 36% of this group migrated to Germany, 17% to Switzerland and 13% to Türkiye.

The reform of the Red-White-Red-Card on 1 October 2022, which entitles the holder to fixed-term settlement and employment by the employer specified in the application, aimed to simplify labour market access for qualified third-country nationals and address the shortage of skilled workers. Key changes included the introduction of a new category for regular workers, allowing the inclusion of seasonal workers who meet specific employment criteria. Minimum wage requirements were adjusted and abolished for university graduates. Required language diplomas were extended from one to five years in validity. The reform streamlined the application process through the expansion of the “Work in Austria” unit into a service centre for the R-W-R-Card and the EU Blue Card. Furthermore, the R-W-R-Card was aligned with the EU Blue Card, making it easier for applicants to meet the requirements. The reform introduced the possibility of simultaneous application for family members, relaxed points allocation criteria and less stringent requirements regarding documents and certificates. Amendments were made to facilitate work permits for artists and specialists on projects.

Since 21 October 2022, all third-country nationals legally residing in Austria can apply for their first R-W-R-Card. This expands the eligibility beyond highly qualified persons and includes skilled workers, university graduates, and other categories.

From 1 January 2022, a new Registered Seasonal Worker Regulation allows certain seasonal workers to obtain work permits without a labour market test and to be exempt from the quota system. Additionally, the list of shortage occupations expanded to 68 shortage occupations nationwide, 21 more than the previous year. A new R-W-R-Card category was created for tourism, agriculture, and forestry workers. Quotas in tourism and agriculture were increased by another 1 000 places in May 2023. The minimum capital requirement for start-up founders decreased from EUR 50 000 to EUR 30 000.

On 1 December 2022, a supplementary agreement to the Agreement between the Federal State and the Provinces on Basic Care came into force. It introduced for an increase of certain maximum cost rates for monthly allowances for housing and care in individual and organised accommodation (first increase since 2016), retroactively applied from 1 March 2022. In addition, the Federal State agreed to cover the costs for the initial care of displaced persons in the arrival centres of the Federal Provinces by granting a fixed contribution.

German language courses across Austria have been significantly expanded. Free courses are offered daily at different skill levels, including specialised courses for specific industries.


The EU Blue Card Directive was incorporated into national law on 1 October 2022. These changes simplified certain aspects, such as professional experience requirements or change of employer. Individuals granted asylum or subsidiary protection status, previously excluded, can now also apply for an EU Blue Card. Amendments were also made to the regulations governing the documents and certificates required for EU Blue Card applications.

For further information: www.migration.gv.at | www.bmaw.gv.at | www.bmi.gv.at

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Austria

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Austria



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	16 890	+ 20%
Intra-company transfers	70	- 13%
Other temporary workers	1 500	+ 170%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	4 020	+ 85%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	106 405	+ 181%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Austrian citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	13.9	+8.7
Natural increase	-1.2	-0.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	15.1	+9.3

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	2 888	-10.4	0.6
Outflows (2021)	7 016	+13.1	1.5

Labour market outcomes 2022



Belgium

Foreign-born population – 2022	18.4% of the population	Main countries of birth: Morocco (11%), France (9%), Netherlands (6%)
Size: 2.1 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2012: +27%	

In 2021, Belgium received 112 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 21% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 56.9% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 4.7% labour migrants, 29.3% family members (including accompanying family) and 9% humanitarian migrants. Around 9 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 1 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 174 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a 3% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Romania, France and the Netherlands were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Afghanistan registered the strongest increase (+3 100) in flows to Belgium compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 64%, to reach around 32 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (5 800), Syria (3 200) and Burundi (2 700). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Burundi (+2 200) and the largest decrease nationals of Somalia (-300). Of the 24 000 decisions taken in 2022, 45% were positive.

Emigration of Belgian citizens to OECD countries increased by 19% in 2021, to 30 000. Approximately 22% of this group migrated to France, 19% to Portugal and 16% to Spain.

Belgium has been experiencing a saturation of its reception network since the summer of 2021. In 2022, the reception and registration of applicants for international protection were split into two separate locations, in an attempt to reduce pressure on the arrival centre. The Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum-Seekers (Fedasil) undertook several measures in response to the reception crisis, such as the recruitment of extra staff and the opening of new centres. The Belgian Government also urged the Office of the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS), responsible for the processing of applications for international protection, to take measures to address its backlog.

In response to the influx of persons fleeing the war in Ukraine, a centre was opened specifically for individuals to register for temporary protection. Housing assistance was provided by the regions and by Fedasil and the Belgian Red Cross for persons in need of emergency accommodation. All Regions also undertook initiatives to facilitate access to the labour market, and some language-based Communities provided extra support for schools to accommodate children having fled the war in Ukraine.

The Immigration Office continued the deployment of Individual Case Management (ICAM) coaches throughout the country, to support irregularly-staying migrants towards a long-term solution, either a legal stay in Belgium or a return. An agreement was reached on the construction of four new detention (“closed”) centres, one of which replaces an existing centre.

The EU Directive on researchers, trainees and volunteers (Directive (EU) 2016/801) was partially transposed to facilitate participation to European volunteer projects, increase access to traineeships, and make third-country researchers legally eligible for a “search year”. To address labour shortages, the Walloon Region and the German-speaking Community added 33 and 6 professions (respectively) to their list of bottleneck professions.

In the field of migrant integration, the extension of the Flemish civic integration programme with a fourth pillar came into force in January 2023. In addition to the first three pillars (social orientation, Dutch L2, and strengthening of economic self-reliance), the new pillar offers newly-arrived migrants a 40-hours tailor-made programme to strengthen their social network and to enable participation in society. The civic integration programmes (French and Flemish) of the Brussels-Capital Region became mandatory as of 1 June 2022, and are now accessible to all third-country nationals (as opposed to only newcomers), regardless of their length of stay in Belgium. This change harmonises the integration conditions with the rest of the country. Furthermore, third-country nationals who have been residing in Belgium for more than five years can now resort to the successful completion of a civic integration programme in order to prove their social integration for the acquisition of Belgian citizenship.


Finally, in July 2022, the federal government approved its contribution the Interfederal Action Plan to Combat Racism (2021-24), adopting an intersectoral approach. In order to combat labour market discrimination, sectors will receive funding and guidance through three phases, starting with baseline measurement. The findings will be communicated by the end of 2023, with monitoring and further actions planned.

For further information: www.dofi.ibz.be | www.emploi.belgique.be | www.myria.be | www.statbel.fgov.be

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Belgium

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Belgium



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	30	-21%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	910	+2%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	8 980	+63%
Trainees	30	-18%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	32 140	+64%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Belgian citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	11.7	+6.3
Natural increase	-0.2	-0.7
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	11.9	+7.0

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	13 438	-2.0	2.3
Outflows (2022)	7 784	+9.5	1.3

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/xjp4ch>

Bulgaria

Foreign-born population – 2022	3.3% of the population	Main countries of birth: Russia (16%), Türkiye (9%), Germany (8%)
Size: 0.2 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2012: +162%	

In 2021, 6 500 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Bulgaria (excluding EU citizens), 8% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 19.7% labour migrants, 27.5% family members (including accompanying family), 9.9% who came for education reasons and 42.9% other migrants. Around 700 short-term permits were issued to international students and 1 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 6 500 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, an 8% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Germany registered the strongest increase (+1 200) and Russia the largest decrease (-1 000) in flows to Bulgaria compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 86%, to reach around 20 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (8 600), Afghanistan (7 100) and Morocco (1 700). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Syria (+4 800). Of the 4 820 decisions taken in 2022, 91% were positive.

Emigration of Bulgarian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -2% in 2021, to 82 000. Approximately 51% of this group migrated to Germany, 13% to the Netherlands and 6% to Poland.

Despite the temporary period of political instability, which included several general elections in 2022 and early 2023, the relevant legislative changes in the field of asylum and migration policy have been adopted in the reported period.

The Bulgarian Citizenship Act was amended in March 2022, revoking Article 14a which allowed the acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship in return for investment.

In February 2023, the government eased employment requirements for third-country nationals intending to work in a highly skilled occupation. They must now hold a “high professional qualification”, which can include either a higher education degree equivalent to three years of study, or at least five years of work experience related to the job offer. In addition, the minimum employment agreement term to qualify for an EU Blue Card was reduced to six months and the maximum validity of the Card extended to five years.

In 2022, asylum and migration policy changes were mostly dominated by the measures implemented to deal with the Ukrainian refugee crisis.

The amendments to the Labour Migration and Labour Mobility Act adopted on 3 June 2022 introduced simplified access to Bulgaria's labour market for Ukrainian citizens benefiting from temporary protection, and they do not require a permit for access to the labour market for the period of temporary protection.

In addition, the amendments to the Employment Promotion Act adopted on 3 June 2022 provide a simplified procedures for Ukrainians to register with the Employment Agency's Labour Offices and enjoy the rights of jobseekers in provision of employment services. Temporary protection status allows Ukrainians to work in Bulgaria.

With Decision No. 95 of the Council of Ministers of 1 February 2023, the validity period of temporary protection in the Republic of Bulgaria was extended until 4th of March 2024.

In September 2022, Bulgaria signed an Operational Plan with the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) to increase the capacity of the State Agency for Refugees (SAR) to implement the Temporary Protection Directive through improvements in digitalisation, reception, provision of information. The Plan was extended until June 2023 and a new Plan was signed in July 2023 to provide support in all phases of the procedure for international protection, including provision of interpretation services for rare languages. The Plan will be implemented until 31 December 2024.

Co-ordination mechanism for interaction between institutions and organisations in cases of unaccompanied children or foreign children separated from their families, located on the territory of Bulgaria, including children seeking and/or receiving international protection has been introduced. Through it, effective co-ordination between institutions and consistency in the fulfilment of obligations of all involved entities in the care and work with these children established in the territory of the country is ensured, in order to guarantee the observance of children's rights.


The Social Assistance Agency provided Ukrainian refugees with vouchers for food and essential goods, amounting to BGN 100 (EUR 50) each, which were valid for two months. At the end of 2022, more than 25 500 vouchers had been issued.

For further information: www.aref.government.bg | www.nsi.bg | www.mvr.bg

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Bulgaria

Grants of long-term residence permits
2021 (Source: Eurostat)

Bulgaria



Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	1 240	- 16%
Family reasons	2 400	+ 45%
Education reasons	690	+ 8%
Other reason	1 000	+ 96%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	20 260	+ 86%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Bulgarian citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	-5.4	+5.9
Natural increase	-9.6	+3.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.2	+2.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	2 033	+2.8	2.3
Outflows (2022)	188	+19.6	0.2

Labour market outcomes
2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/zwleju>

Canada

Foreign-born population – 2021	22% of the population	Main countries of birth: India (11%), Philippines (9%), China (9%)
Size: 8.4 million, 48% women	Evolution since 2012: +21%	

In 2021, Canada received 406 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 120% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 41.8% labour migrants, 40.5% family members (including accompanying family) and 14.8% humanitarian migrants. Around 215 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 125 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, China and the Philippines were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, India registered the strongest increase (+85 000) in flows to Canada compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 300%, to reach around 94 000. The majority of applicants came from Mexico (17 000), Haiti (11 000) and Türkiye (9 200). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Mexico (+14 000). Of the 58 000 decisions taken in 2022, 53% were positive.

Emigration of Canadian citizens to OECD countries increased by 10% in 2021, to 35 000. Approximately 44% of this group migrated to the United States, 7% to Korea and 7% to the United Kingdom.

Canada continues to welcome more newcomers (over 1% of Canada's population annually) and to support their settlement and integration. Under the 2023-25 Immigration Levels Plan, Canada aims to admit 465 000 permanent residents in 2023, 485 000 in 2024, and 500 000 in 2025. The 2023 target is 4% higher than in the 2022-24 Immigration Levels Plan released in 2022, in particular owing to significant increases to Canada's main regional immigration programmes, to more evenly distribute the benefits of immigration.

In June 2023, IRCC launched category-based selection, a new type of invitation round in Express Entry, to better target candidates for permanent residence that help meet identified economic goals. The categories chosen for 2023 focus on candidates with French-language proficiency and work experience in healthcare, STEM, trades, transport, or agriculture and agri-foods.

The now permanent Atlantic Immigration Program, launched in January 2022, helps provinces attract skilled newcomers and address demographic challenges in the region: the Levels Plan includes a 31% increase in target admissions for this programme. In September 2022, Canada extended the Rural and Northern Immigration Pilot until August 2024 and expanded the geographic boundaries of 7 of the 11 participating communities, spreading the benefits of immigration across Canada and into smaller communities.

Initially launched in 2018, Canada's Economic Mobility Pathways Pilot (EMPP) provides Canadian employers opportunities to access a talent pool of skilled refugees and other displaced people from around the world, allowing Canada to not only increase its economic immigration and fill in-demand jobs, but also to complement its existing humanitarian commitments. In June 2023, Canada implemented a new Federal pathway under the EMPP which helps more displaced people to become eligible and streamlines the application process. Canada funds and works closely with partner organisations to support the growth of this initiative.

As part of its efforts to modernise the Temporary Foreign Worker Program and improve client service, Canada has transitioned to online Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) applications. Since April 2023, employers and third-party representatives are required to submit LMIA applications using the LMIA Online Portal.

Canada funded a Racialised Newcomer Women Pilot from 2018 to March 2023. The Pilot supported targeted employment services for racialised newcomer women through the Settlement Program. Canada recognises that racialised newcomer women continue to show a demonstrable need for support and, as such, the government is providing funding to extend ten ongoing projects until 2025.


Canada took action to address global crises through migration and protection responses. As of June 2023, 33 405 Afghans have arrived in Canada since August 2021. IRCC pledged to resettle 40 000 Afghan refugees to Canada in 2021-23. To continue supporting those affected by Russia's war against Ukraine, Canada introduced the Canada-Ukraine authorisation for emergency travel, helping thousands of Ukrainian nationals and their family find safety in Canada. Between 17 March 2022 and 17 June 2023, 162 568 arrived in Canada. Temporary immigration measures were also introduced in response to conflict in Sudan.

For further information: <https://www.canada.ca/en/services/immigration-citizenship.html>

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Canada

Long-term immigration flows
2021 (Source: OECD)

Canada



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	14 170	- 11%
Seasonal workers	34 250	+ 10%
Intra-company transfers	11 350	+ 88%
Other temporary workers	65 610	+ 35%


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	215 180	+ 324%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	94 375	+ 304%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Canadian citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022	2022/21
	Per 1 000 inhabitants	difference
Total	18.4	+12.6
Natural increase	1.2	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	17.2	+12.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	860	+3.4	0.0
Outflows (2022)	8 312	+2.9	0.4

Labour market outcomes
2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/ig30d9>

Chile

Foreign-born population – 2022	7.5% of the population	Main countries of birth: Venezuela (30%), Peru (17%), Haiti (12%)
Size: 1.5 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2012: +282%	

Venezuela, Colombia and Peru were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Haiti registered the largest decrease (-22 000) in flows to Chile compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 100%, to reach around 5 100. The majority of applicants came from Venezuela (3 400), Colombia (800) and Cuba (200). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Venezuela (+1 400). Of the 1 740 decisions taken in 2022, 3% were positive.

Emigration of Chilean citizens to OECD countries increased by 28% in 2021, to 12 000. Approximately 34% of this group migrated to Spain, 13% to the United States and 8% to Colombia.

On 12 February 2022, a new immigration law came into effect. Under its provisions, foreigners must generally make their visa application from abroad prior to entering Chile and the possibility of changing from tourist to resident status has been abolished. Along with the changes, a new National Migration Service has been put in place, replacing the previous Immigration Office of the Ministry of the Interior. The new service has responsibility for decisions on residence visa applications. In contrast to the previous situation, the Consular Directorate (Dirección General Consular, DIGECONSU) under the Foreign Affairs Ministry is now only responsible for temporary residence (tourist) visa applications.

Possibilities for deportation have been enhanced as part of the changes. In May 2022, an Interministerial Committee for further development of the immigration legislation was established. From December 2022, the National Migration Service has been equipped with a civil society advisory board.

In December 2022, the results of the National Survey of Immigrants, the first of its kind in Chile, were released. It provides information on the integration trajectories and living conditions of the five main origin groups of migrants.

By April 2023, several hundred migrants from Venezuela were stranded at the border with Peru, after being denied entry to the country. A number of these were later repatriated to Venezuela.


In May 2023, the pilot of new integrated border system was inaugurated. It aims at both improving border observance at the posts from 2.5 km to up to 10 km. Also in May 2023, a new comprehensive statistical reporting system on migration permits was initiated.

For further information: www.extranjeria.gob.cl | www.serviciomigraciones.cl/en/home/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Chile

Long-term and temporary immigration flows
2018 (Source: OECD)


Chile




Asylum seekers
(Source: UNHCR)

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	5 055	+ 102%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Chilean citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2021 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2021/20 difference
Total	11.3	-7.1
Natural increase	2.0	-1.6
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	9.3	-5.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	69	+4.4	0.0
Outflows (2022)	676	+6.1	0.2

Labour market outcomes
2022 (first 11 months)



StatLink <https://stat.link/vo9gny>

China

Foreign-born population – 2020 (UNDESA)	0.1% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.9 million, 39% women	Evolution since 2015: +6%	Viet Nam (44%), Korea (21%), Brazil (8%)

China gradually started opening to restricted forms of movement from abroad in 2022. In 2022, 4.47 million foreigners (excluding residents of Hong Kong (China), Macau (China), and Chinese Taipei) crossed the border (exit and entry) in China, down from 97.68 million in 2019. Most entry was severely restricted in 2021 and into 2022. On 15 March 2023, China resumed issuing all categories of visa.

In 2022, 477 000 residence permits were issued to foreigners coming to China, of which 216 000 (45%) were for work, 115 000 for family reunion (24%), 76 000 for private affairs (16%), and 70 000 for study (15%).

In terms of temporary immigration, in 2022 there were 93 200 arrivals for employment, 76% more than in 2021, 38 900 for study, seven times more than in 2021, and 88 900 for “visiting relatives and friends”, almost triple the figure for 2021. For these categories, the main nationalities of foreigners were Japan (16%), Korea (15%), the United States (12%) and Canada (7%).

International student enrolment had been increasing prior to 2020 but was interrupted by pandemic-related closures and cancellation of visas. There were only 93 000 new enrolments for 2020/21 compared with 172 000 in 2019/20. Enrolment fell sharply from 333 000 to 256 000 and fell further in 2022. China reopened partially to degree-programme students in mid-2022 and more broadly in early 2023. Some effort is being made to attract back foreign students whose visas had been cancelled during the pandemic.

The increase in foreign residents which occurred during the 2010s have been reversed. While no figures are available on the stock of foreign residents, the pandemic closures led to an outflow of foreigners from China and made it difficult for multinational firms to attract foreigners to employment in China.

In the face of loss of attractiveness for international placement, China extended a preferential tax policy for foreigners – including treatment of housing rental and children’s education expenses – which had been scheduled to expire at the start of 2022. The benefits will now expire at the end of 2023.

Regulations for labour migration – separate work and residence permits – are designated at the city level and vary across China. Some regions have introduced facilitations for foreign talents of different categories. For example, in March 2023 Beijing allowed joint applications to be filed, rather than requiring work permits to be issued before residence permits could be requested. Shanghai also offers this through a one-stop shop which reopened in 2022. The regional systems means that work in a different city is not allowed without a new work and residence permit. However, some cities have taken steps to simplify movement: from April 2022, Guangzhou issues work permits to foreigners who hold a work permit in another mainland city in the Greater Bay Area.

Work permit eligibility depends on strict criteria. In April 2023, the Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security launched a pilot expansion of work permit eligibility. The two-year pilot is running in a number of large cities (including Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Shenzhen). Foreign experts included in the pilot are those with internationally recognised achievements, senior managers and technicians. Each pilot city also identifies shortage occupations for eligibility. No consolidated statistics are available on work permit issuance by different cities.


China sends workers abroad through international labour dispatch, mainly for construction projects. In 2022, it dispatched 259 000 workers, half the pre-pandemic level. The stock of Chinese workers dispatched abroad stood at 543 000 in December 2022, the lowest level in recent history.

For further information: www.nia.gov.cn

Key figures on immigration and emigration – China


Long-term immigration flows (Source: National Immigration Administration)

China



Note: Data for 2020 are not available.

Inflows of top 5 nationalities (national definition)



Temporary migration (Sources: UIS, UNHCR)


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	225 100	+ 12%

Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	288	- 18%

Emigration of Chinese citizens to OECD countries (national definition)



Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	0.0	-0.7
Natural increase
Net migration plus statistical adjustments

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	51 000	-3.8	0.3
Outflows (2022)	18 256	-20.5	0.1

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ybguw7>

Colombia

Foreign-born population – 2020 (UNDESA)	3.8% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 1.9 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2015: +1 095%	Venezuela (93%), the United States (1%), Ecuador (1%)

Venezuela, the United States and Peru were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, the United States registered the strongest increase (+2 700) and Venezuela the largest decrease (-39 000) in flows to Colombia compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -65%, to reach around 5 500. The majority of applicants came from Venezuela (5 200), Cuba (200) and Ukraine (28). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Cuba (+100) and the largest decrease nationals of Venezuela (-11 000). Of the 12 000 decisions taken in 2022, 1% were positive.

Emigration of Colombian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -18% in 2021, to 77 000. Approximately 52% of this group migrated to Spain, 20% to the United States and 7% to Mexico.

In July 2022, Colombia's Economic and Social Policy Council published CONPES 4 100, a ten-year strategy for the integration of Venezuelan migrants. The framework consists of seven action lines aiming to secure access to public services and the labour market, foster their social and cultural integration, and enhance the capacity of immigration policy institutions. The CONPES also sets data and evidence collection as a key to the success of migration policy.

The Temporary Protection Status (TPS) remains the main protection and regularisation instrument for Venezuelan migrants in Colombia. It grants them legal status to stay in the country and possibly apply for a permanent resident visa after ten years. The TPS was hailed by the international community and set a historic precedent in the region.

Since 2021, however, migrants have faced increasing challenges in obtaining a physical ID, called Permission for Temporary Protection (PPT). In 2023, the Colombian Government has issued new measures to extend protection to those in an irregular situation. In January 2023, the migration authority (Migración Colombia) developed a new temporary identification document/certificate for those applying for a PPT. The document allows migrants to gain immediate access to public services and temporarily enter and leave the country while awaiting the issue of a PPT. In April, the expiration date to acquire the new certificate was extended to the end of 2023.

Migración Colombia also launched the programme "You Are Still in Time" [Aún estás a tiempo] in March this year. The objective is to provide Venezuelan nationals who have been unable to secure the PPT with four alternatives, including: a) To Validate, the mechanism to confirm that the person is still interested in continuing the PPT process; b) To Download, the modality for those who have already started the application process for a PPT to download the temporary certificate; c) To Pick up, a strategy seeking to deliver more than 100 000 PPTs that Venezuelan nationals have not claimed; and d) To Register, an alternative aimed at Venezuelan migrants who hold the PEP or a Refugee Status declined and have not completed the PPT process (valid until 30 May 2023).


In April 2023, the Colombian Congress began discussing a bill to recognise climate-induced displacement, the first of its kind in Latin America. Adopting a broad definition of climate-displaced people, it seeks to prioritise access to housing, health services, and education and establish a national register. One month later, the bill received approval in the first of four rounds of discussion required to pass.

With the end of Title 42 in the United States, the Biden Administration announced that it would enable 100 regional migration hubs across the Western Hemisphere; currently, the Colombian authorities are in negotiations for the initiative and a proper operation.

Finally, Migración Colombia is implementing a strategy called "PPT in one day" The process allows for deliver the ID on the same day when the person enrolls.

For further information: www.migracioncolombia.gov.co

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Colombia



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration



	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	230	+ 14%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	130	- 4%
Other temporary workers	21 000	- 3%

Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	4 060	- 13%
Trainees

Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	5 530	- 65%




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	11.1	-3.7
Natural increase	10.6	+5.6
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.5	-9.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	9 440	+9.7	2.7
Outflows (2022)	419	+8.6	0.1



StatLink <https://stat.link/hdu6ko>

Costa Rica

Foreign-born population – 2020 (UNDESA)	10.3% of the population	Main countries of birth: Nicaragua (67%), Venezuela (5%), Colombia (5%)
Size: 0.5 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2015: +26%	

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 19%, to reach around 129 000. The majority of applicants came from Nicaragua (119 000), Venezuela (5 600) and Colombia (1 500). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Nicaragua (+17 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Haiti (-800). Of the 44 000 decisions taken in 2022, 9% were positive.

Emigration of Costa Rican citizens to OECD countries increased by 25% in 2021, to 3 400. Approximately 58% of this group migrated to the United States, 9% to Mexico and 8% to Germany.

Although Costa Rica is a longstanding destination for migrants in Latin America, it has been receiving an increasing number of asylum applications since the end of 2021, mostly from Nicaraguan nationals. By the end of 2022, Costa Rica was the fourth largest recipient of individual asylum claims globally. Amidst a strained capacity to meet demands, the government introduced several changes to its asylum system during the past year.

In February 2022, the government announced new visa requirements for Venezuelan nationals and a new transit visa for Cuban and Nicaraguan nationals. The General Immigration Directorate (DGME, Spanish acronym) explained that the new policy aimed to “order and regulate migration flows from their starting point.”

In November 2022, President Rodrigo Chaves, who took office in May that year, signed two decrees establishing stricter conditions for asylum seekers. The government justified these decrees as part of an effort to “free up the asylum system, which has been abused and is adversely affecting those applicants who are truly deserving of international protection and who must wait for months or even years for a decision on their refugee status.”

The first decree, in effect since November 2022, introduced the following changes: (i) It limits applicants’ ability to obtain a work permit while their asylum application is pending approval. Previously, applicants received a residence permit after two months of processing, which automatically granted them the right to work, (ii) It requires applicants to submit their refugee status application within one month from the date of entry to Costa Rica. In the past no such limitation existed, (iii) It requires applicants to claim asylum after having travelled directly from their origin country or to justify the reasons why they did not request protection in countries through which they transited and are deemed safe by the DGE, (iv) It requires applicants to remain in Costa Rica while their application is being processed and (v) It requires foreign nationals who obtain refugee status to enrol in Costa Rica’s Social Security system to obtain or renew a residence permit.


The second decree, in effect since March 2023, developed a temporary “special migration category” for Cuban, Nicaraguan and Venezuelan nationals. This enabled asylum-seekers from these countries with a pending or rejected application to obtain a two-year temporary work and residence permit. In return, they must waive their asylum application and renounce any claim to refugee status.

In January 2023, the DGME started the transition process towards a new digital immigration identity document for foreign nationals (DIMEX). The change is intended to facilitate the digital transformation of the cards and alleviate administrative hurdles resulting from the unprecedented demand for DIMEX cards. In February 2023, the DGME launched a pilot programme that allows telephone or online requests for first-time asylum applicants.

For further information: www.migracion.go.cr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Costa Rica

Emigration of Costa Rican citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)



% of total emigration of Costa Rican citizens to OECD countries

Temporary migration
(Sources: UIS, UNHCR)

Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	2 904	+ 9%

Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	129 480	+ 19%


Components of population growth


	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	9.8	-0.4
Natural increase	4.7	+0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.1	-0.6

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	621	+4.5	0.9
Outflows (2022)	566	+4.6	0.8

Labour market outcomes
2022



StatLink  <https://stat.link/b0yv89>

Czech Republic

Foreign-born population – 2022	4.3% of the population	Main countries of birth: Ukraine (34%), Slovak Republic (19%), Russia (8%)
Size: 0.5 million, 42% women	Evolution since 2012: +16%	

In 2021, the Czech Republic received 64 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 15% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 22.8% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 58.2% labour migrants, 17.8% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 5 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 3 700 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 54 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -10% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, the Slovak Republic and Russia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (+11 000) and the Slovak Republic the largest decrease (-200) in flows to the Czech Republic compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 26%, to reach around 1 300. The majority of applicants came from Türkiye (200), Ukraine (200, excluding temporary protection recipients) and Russia (100). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Türkiye (+200) and the largest decrease nationals of Georgia (-100). Of the 1 110 decisions taken in 2022, 29% were positive.

Emigration of Czech citizens to OECD countries decreased by -1% in 2021, to 13 000. Approximately 32% of this group migrated to Germany, 12% to Poland and 11% to Austria.

In May 2023, the Czech Parliament approved transposition of the recast EU Blue Card Directive. Key changes are: an increase in duration from two to three years; exemption for certain applicants from submitting educational qualifications; and possibility to receive a Blue Card with just a six-month contract. Other changes approved included requiring long-term visa and residence permit applicants abroad to have resided in the country for two rather than one year. Financially dependent adult children are no longer eligible for family reunification. The changes took effect on 1 July 2023.

From 1 July 2023, work permits and long-stay visas for seasonal work can be issued with a maximum validity period of nine months (instead of the previous six months). On 1 January 2023, a construction sector was newly added to the national list of economic sectors approved for admission of seasonal workers.

In April 2023, the restrictions on the visa application process for Ukrainian nationals at the Embassy in Kyiv and the consulate in Lviv were lifted for new categories of migrants. In May 2023, visa applications from within the Schengen area were centralised at the Dresden consulate; other embassies will no longer accept applications.

Temporary protection of refugees from Ukraine was extended by one year, until 31 March 2024. The procedure consisted of online registration and the issuing of new visa stickers. By 1 April 2023, there were 325 000 beneficiaries of temporary protection in the Czech Republic. Amended legislation applicable since 1 July 2023 brought changes to the rules for the provision of the accommodation to refugees. Free emergency accommodation will be provided only for up to 150 days (except for vulnerable categories of refugees). The humanitarian benefit for refugees will newly include the financial contribution to the housing costs, taking into account all incomes and savings of its recipients.

From September 2021, a level of A2 in the Czech language was required to obtain permanent residence (an increase from A1 level). The Amendment on the Act on Residence of Foreign Nationals created a distinction between close and distant family members of EU and the Czech Republic citizens.

For selected groups of immigrants from third countries with long-term residence, the obligation to complete within one year the adaptation and integration course started in January 2021.

In April 2023, the Ministry of Interior proposed a new draft immigration act that constitutes a legal basis for the digitalisation of admission procedure and a number of other processes. The proposal also introduces a general concept of a “guarantor” – a person or an entity that hosts migrants in the Czech Republic and that is responsible for ensuring that foreigners respect their admission conditions. The draft law is still undergoing revision prior to discussion by the government.


In September 2022, the OECD presented the results of Multicriterial Points-Based System for Managing Labour Migration to the Czech Republic project, implemented under the European Commission’s DG Structural Reform Support. In 2023, legislation for the introduction of a preferential labour migration system began to be prepared.

For further information: www.mvcr.cz | www.czso.cz | www.mpsv.cz | www.uradprace.cz | www.cizinci.cz | www.imigracniportal.cz/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Czech Republic

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Czech Republic



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	2 990	+ 83%
Intra-company transfers	190	+ 25%
Other temporary workers	530	- 10%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	5 010	- 17%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	1 335	+ 26%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Czech citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	29.1	+27.0
Natural increase	-1.8	+0.9
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	30.9	+26.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	4 153	-5.3	1.4
Outflows (2022)	3 946	-3.0	1.4

Labour market outcomes 2022



Denmark

Foreign-born population – 2022	11% of the population	Main countries of birth: Poland (7%), Syria (6%), Romania (5%)
Size: 0.6 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2012: +45%	

In 2021, Denmark received 55 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 32% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 58.1% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 22.5% labour migrants, 16.5% family members (including accompanying family) and 2% humanitarian migrants. Around 4 700 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 3 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 31 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -12% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Romania, Poland and Germany were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Romania registered the strongest increase (+1 000) in flows to Denmark compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 120%, to reach around 4 500. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (2 100, excluding temporary protection recipients), Afghanistan (400) and Syria (400). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Ukraine (+2 100) and the largest decrease nationals of Eritrea (-200). Of the 1 010 decisions taken in 2022, 51% were positive.

Emigration of Danish citizens to OECD countries increased by 14% in 2021, to 9 900. Approximately 17% of this group migrated to Sweden, 12% to Norway and 11% to Germany.

In response to labour shortage, a new Danish law was implemented in April 2023 to strengthen international recruitment of third-country nationals. The law implemented a new supplementary Pay Limit Scheme with a required minimum salary of DKK 375 000 per year. The worker can obtain a residence and work permit with a duration of up to five years with the possibility of further renewal if the criteria are met. The fast-track scheme has also been extended with a new track linked to the supplementary pay limit scheme (the supplementary pay limit track).

Certification under the fast-track scheme has also been extended to companies with at least 10 full-time employees, compared with 20 before.

The Positive List for People with a Higher Education has been expanded so that more professions can be included. Furthermore, the list will be more predictable for companies hiring from abroad as the professions on the list will stay on the positive list for at least two years.

Third-country nationals who have completed a Danish bachelor's, professional bachelor's, master's or PhD degree from a publicly accredited educational institution in Denmark are automatically given a job seeking permit for up to three years. This replaces the "establishment card", which previously – after filling an application – allowed third-country nationals with these degrees to work in any company or any position in Denmark for two years after graduating.

In July 2022, the Danish Government implemented a new law, following an agreement with the trade union federation, the employers' association and the Danish Agriculture & Food Council, with the aim of improving the duration and oversight of the scheme for third-country interns within the green sector. In areas within this sector where there is a significant shortage of internships under vocational education and training (VET) schemes, the residence and work permit for third-country interns is conditional on the employer having employed or tried to recruit an apprentice. Their length of stay was extended from 12 to 18 months.

On 11 November 2021, the Danish Parliament adopted a special act on temporary residence (valid two years) for the evacuated Afghan nationals who assisted Danish authorities etc. in Afghanistan. On 27 June 2023, the Danish Government decided to prolong the special act, enabling the residence permits to be prolonged until 30 November 2025 upon application.

On 16 March 2022, the Danish Parliament adopted a special act on temporary residence permit for displaced persons from Ukraine. Residence permits that are granted in accordance with the act are temporary and valid until 17 March 2024 with the possibility for the government to extend the scheme with one year.

A person granted residence permit under one of the special acts is offered similar rights in connection to accommodation, access to the labour market, welfare benefits, healthcare etc. as to those who are issued residence permits under the Aliens Act, including asylum.


The government is planning to introduce a new fee for repeat applications for citizenship in 2024.

For further information: www.uim.dk (in Danish) | <https://www.nyidanmark.dk> | www.integrationsbarometer.dk (in Danish) | www.dst.dk/en | www.workindenmark.dk

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Denmark

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Denmark



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	20	-98%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	980	+5%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	4 730	+6%
Trainees	2 050	+25%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	4 505	+124%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Danish citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	10.0	+4.3
Natural increase	-0.2	-1.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	10.2	+5.6

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	1 250	-8.7	0.3
Outflows (2022)	3 819	+4.2	1.0

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/a6qvbz>

Estonia

Foreign-born population – 2022	15.1% of the population	Main countries of birth: Russia (55%), Ukraine (14%), Belarus (5%)
Size: 0.2 million, 56% women	Evolution since 2012: -5%	

In 2021, Estonia received 37 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 41% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 11% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 81% labour migrants, 7.8% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.1% humanitarian migrants. Around 1 200 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 5 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 2 600 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -6% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Russia and Latvia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among main countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (+700) and Finland the largest decrease (-51) in flows to Estonia compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 3 820%, to reach around 2 900. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (2 600, excluding temporary protection recipients, excluding temporary protection recipients), Russia (200) and Belarus (30). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Ukraine (+2 600). Of the 2 200 decisions taken in 2022, 96% were positive.

Emigration of Estonian citizens to OECD countries increased by 28% in 2021, to 4 000. Approximately 48% of this group migrated to Finland, 8% to the Netherlands and 7% to Germany.

In May 2022, several amendments to the Aliens Act were made regarding labour and student migration. These amendments introduced incentives for hiring foreign labour to growth companies or scale-ups (from 1 January 2023). Building upon the existing start-up visa scheme, a growth company was defined in the law as a company registered in Estonia that is growing its activities and further developing a business model with high global growth potential, technology-based, innovative and repeatable, which significantly contributes to the development of Estonia's business environment and meets certain requirements related to company size, years in operation and tax obligations. At the same time, new measures to mitigate the risks of misusing different migration channels were also introduced, including establishing stricter requirements for the spouses of student visa holders, introducing accreditation requirements for educational institutions wishing to host international students, and permitting short-term employment for full-time work only.

The changes to the Aliens Act in May 2022 also created a new temporary residence permit for short-term employment. From 1 January 2023, third country nationals who have worked in Estonia in short-term employment for at least nine months immediately before applying for the residence permit, and whose employment continues with the employer who registered the employees' short-term employment, may apply for a residence permit that will be valid for up to two years. The new residence permit is exempt from the immigration quota but cannot be extended.

In response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the government issued a decree implementing the Temporary Protection Directive, which entered into force on 9 March 2022. The Aliens Act was amended accordingly, providing Ukrainian citizens a legal basis for entry and stay in Estonia, including those who resided in Estonia prior to the start of the aggression and whose legal basis to stay would have otherwise expired. The amendments also eased conditions and requirements for short-term employment.


Estonia suspended certain visa services for Russian nationals. In April 2022, restrictions were introduced on the short-term employment of Russian and Belarusian citizens in Estonia and on the issuance of temporary residence permits or visas for employment or engagement in business. Since August 2022, the visa ban for Russian nationals is universal and not restricted to employment or business purposes. From 19 September 2022, entry to Estonia is forbidden to all short-term Schengen visa holding Russian citizens for non-essential purposes regardless of their country of destination or visa issuing country. There are exceptions, including entry for humanitarian reasons, diplomatic missions, and for visiting close relatives. These restrictions were adopted in a concerted manner by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

For further information: www.politsei.ee | www.stat.ee | www.siseministerium.ee | www.emn.ee

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Estonia

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Estonia



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	4 690	+ 47%
Intra-company transfers	10	- 75%
Other temporary workers	410	+ 3%


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	1 230	+ 85%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	2 940	+3 820%

Inflows of top 5 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Estonian citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	25.3	+24.0
Natural increase	-4.2	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	29.5	+24.2

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	470	-19.0	1.2
Outflows (2022)	294	+14.1	0.8

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/2mzc9j>

Finland

Foreign-born population – 2022	8% of the population	Main countries of birth: Former USSR (14%), Estonia (11%), Sweden (8%)
Size: 0.4 million, 48% women	Evolution since 2012: +66%	

In 2021, Finland received 29 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 23% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 28% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 27.2% labour migrants, 33.4% family members (including accompanying family) and 10.3% humanitarian migrants. Around 5 800 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 3 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 14 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -42% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Russia, Estonia and Ukraine were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Estonia registered the strongest increase (+800) and Iraq the largest decrease (-200) in flows to Finland compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 250%, to reach around 4 800. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (1 700, excluding temporary protection recipients), Russia (1 100) and Afghanistan (200). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Ukraine (+1 700). Of the 2 610 decisions taken in 2022, 47% were positive.

Emigration of Finnish citizens to OECD countries increased by 6% in 2021, to 8 300. Approximately 20% of this group migrated to Sweden, 11% to the Netherlands and 10% to Spain.

Finland continues to adapt its immigration legislation to address skilled labour shortages. In April 2023, the two-week fast-track for specialists and start-ups including a long-term visa D was extended to students, researchers and employees with a certified employer and their family members. Moreover, the goal is to reach an average maximum processing time of one month for all study- and work-based residence permit applications. Bilateral agreement on working holiday arrangement with Japan was implemented in 2023.

Starting from February 2023, a new assessment of age for minors benefitting from international protection has been introduced into the family reunification process. It is now based on the applicant's age at the time of submitting the application, regardless of the application processing time. Moreover, the requirement for sufficient financial resources from the sponsors of minors has been eliminated to prioritise the child's best interest.

Finland increased its quota for resettled refugees from 1 050 to 1 500 in 2022 mainly due to the situation in Afghanistan. Since December 2022, temporary protection is issued for the entire period of the temporary protection and extension is not required for those who already hold residence permits. Starting in 2023, the central government can provide compensation to municipalities for their service provision once beneficiaries have been assigned a municipality.

Parliament approved the comprehensive reform of the Integration Act in March 2023. Its implementation will take place in the beginning of 2025, coinciding with the reform of employment services. In December 2022, legislative amendments to give undocumented migrants access to healthcare services were approved. In January 2023, legislative amendments improving the status of victims of human trafficking entered into force.

The new non-discrimination Act was partly implemented in June 2023, broadening the definition of harassment to include group cases targeting specific populations and enlarging the scope to discrimination in the labour market.


In June 2023, a new government took office. The new government Programme includes numerous entries related to tightening of immigration and new integration requirements for immigrants.

For further information: www.tem.fi/en/labour-migration-and-integration | www.migri.fi | www.stat.fi | www.intermin.fi

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Finland

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Finland



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	2 020	+ 20%
Intra-company transfers	20	+ 0%
Other temporary workers	990	+ 26%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	5 840	+ 81%
Trainees	90	+ 30%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	4 835	+ 254%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Finnish citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	2.8	+0.2
Natural increase	-3.3	-1.8
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	6.1	+2.0

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	594	-11.0	0.2
Outflows (2022)	994	+1.0	0.4

Labour market outcomes 2022



France

Foreign-born population – 2022	12.8% of the population	Main countries of birth: Portugal (7%), Italy (4%), Spain (3%)
Size: 8.7 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2012: +16%	

In 2021, France received 278 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 20% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 22.5% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 19.4% labour migrants, 34.9% family members (including accompanying family) and 13.4% humanitarian migrants. Around 85 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 23 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 308 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, similarly to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Morocco registered the strongest increase (+4 700) and Italy the largest decrease (-1900) in flows to France compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 33%, to reach around 138 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (23 000), Bangladesh (11 000) and Türkiye (10 000). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (+6 600) and the largest decrease nationals of Comoros (-1 100). Of the 130 000 decisions taken in 2022, 28% were positive.

Emigration of French citizens to OECD countries increased by 20% in 2021, to 100 000. Approximately 15% of this group migrated to Switzerland, 13% to Spain and 13% to Canada.

The French Ministry of the Interior updated the deployment schedule for the Digital Administration for Foreign Nationals in France (ANEF) on 14 February 2022. The online portal is now open to travel documents, beneficiaries of international protection, multi-annual “seasonal worker” residence permits, and residence permits for family reasons. The list of eligible residence permits has been further extended in March 2023.

Regarding international protection, France continued to implement the National Scheme for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and integration of Refugees (SNADAR) in response to difficulties with the availability of accommodation, through a regional orientation scheme.

In 2022, France recognised the effective integration of legally residing foreign nationals as a public policy priority and defined five priority areas of intervention: integration through employment, special attention to BIPs and foreign women, involvement of civil society, deepening the dynamics of “integration territories” with local authorities and co-ordination of public services and operators’ actions. On 13 July 2022, the Minister of Interior initiated the second phase of the deployment of the global and individualised support programme for beneficiaries of international protection, called AGIR. This programme aims to provide systematic support for employment, housing and access to public services. AGIR is being rolled out in three stages: in 2022, the programme was rolled out in 27 departments in metropolitan France; in 2023 a new wave of deployment started in 25 new departments; and by 2024 the aim is to roll out the programme nationwide.

Various components of the Republican Integration Contract (CIR) have been overhauled to improve the efficiency of the training provided (mainly language and civic training). From 4 May 2022, all foreign nationals who have signed a CIR and are applying for a multi-annual residence permit must sign an undertaking to respect the principles of the French Republic.

Before 2022, a language test determined whether the individual had achieved the A1 level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). Since 2022, the assessment has become more precise, ranging from infra-A1 to B1 levels. If the language level is below A1, compulsory language training is prescribed. For individuals at A1 or A2 levels, additional training is offered to progress towards higher CEFR levels.

Before 1 January 2022, only A1 level certifications issued by an internationally recognised organisation was offered to signatories of the CIR. Now, the OFII also funds A2 or B1 level certifications.


On 1 February 2023, the French Government presented a bill, titled “Controlling immigration while improving integration”. The 27-article bill aims, inter alia, to simplify immigration litigation, expedite the asylum process, provide regularisation options for undocumented workers, increase removal for those posing a serious threat to public order, require a minimum level of French proficiency for multi-year residence permits, allow mandatory fingerprinting, tighten residency renewal requirements, and prohibit administrative detention of minors under 16. The bill was presented to the Senate in February 2023. The plenary session for the examination of the bill, originally scheduled for 28 March 2023, has been postponed by the government.

For further information: www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr | www.ofii.fr | www.senat.fr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – France

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

France



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	2 460	+ 20%
Seasonal workers	11 010	+ 84%
Intra-company transfers	970	+ 52%
Other temporary workers	4 830	+ 47%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	85 330	+ 20%
Trainees	3 290	+ 31%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	137 605	+ 33%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of French citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	2.9	-0.3
Natural increase	0.8	-0.4
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.1	+0.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	30 044	-6.3	1.1
Outflows (2022)	14 440	-10.4	0.5

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/iz1y93>

Germany

Foreign-born population – 2022	16.8% of the population	Main countries of birth: Poland (11%), Türkiye (9%), Russia (7%)
Size: 14 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2012: +43%	

In 2021, Germany received 532 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 6.4% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 58.7% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 10.7% labour migrants, 16.2% family members (including accompanying family) and 13.1% humanitarian migrants. Around 19 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 12 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 430 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a 5% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short term contracts.

Romania, Poland and Bulgaria were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Syria registered the strongest increase (+28 000) and Poland the largest decrease (-7 400) in flows to Germany compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 47%, to reach around 218 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (71 000), Afghanistan (36 000) and Türkiye (24 000). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Türkiye (+17 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Iraq (-400). Of the 198 000 decisions taken in 2022, 65% were positive.

Emigration of German citizens to OECD countries increased by 18% in 2021, to 141 000. Approximately 17% of this group migrated to Poland, 15% to Switzerland and 14% to Austria.

In March 2023, the government adopted a bill to further enhance the immigration of skilled workers from third countries by amending – among others – the Residence Act. The process of parliamentary validation has been completed in July 2023. The reform further modernises Germany's immigration law, which will rest on three pillars: Skilled labour, job experience and potential. Skilled workers will be allowed to work in any unregulated profession. The reform also broadens the eligibility criteria for the EU Blue Card, e.g. by lowering the statutory salary requirements. Foreigners with qualifications that are not recognised in Germany but in their home country and who have at least two years work experience can immigrate and work in skilled occupations under certain conditions. Furthermore, the bill provides for the introduction of a new job-seekers permit, the so-called "opportunity card". This permit allows third-country nationals on the basis of a point system (based on qualifications, language skills, work experience, ties to Germany and age) to stay in Germany for up to one year and look for work.

Other measures to attract foreign talent include Germany's placement agreements with Jordan and Brazil for care workers in May and June 2022, respectively, and the extension of an earlier placement agreement with Mexico to include hotel and restaurant workers in March 2023. Workers recruited under these agreements can initiate the procedure for the recognition of their qualifications at the same time as they take up employment in Germany.

In October 2022, Germany launched an admission programme for Afghan nationals at risk. The programme allows authorised agencies to nominate Afghan nationals for admission to Germany who are at particular risk because of their commitment to a democratic Afghanistan, or who have experienced violence or persecution.

In December 2022, Germany implemented a new law that allows migrants with long-term tolerated status to obtain a residence permit for 18 months, subject to certain conditions (opportunity residence law). During this time, they can fulfil the legal requirements (e.g. acquiring language skills) for longer-term residence. In addition, the law changed the eligibility criteria for residence permits for young people with tolerated status and for those who can demonstrate "sustainable integration". Other important elements of the law include direct access to integration and vocational language courses for asylum seekers, facilitated family reunification for skilled workers and more consistent deportation of criminals.

A law on streamlining asylum procedures came into force in January 2023. It provides for the abolition of the regular review of asylum decisions in the context of revocation and withdrawal procedures in favour of an ad hoc review, as well as the introduction of asylum counselling independent of the authorities.


In July 2022, the German Parliament elected the first independent Anti-Discrimination Commissioner, who will head the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency for a period of five years. She has the right to participate in all projects related to her duties, as well as in legislative and policy proposals.

For further information: www.bmas.de | www.bmi.bund.de | www.bamf.de | www.arbeitsagentur.de

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Germany

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Germany



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	10	+ 0%
Intra-company transfers	6 430	- 4%
Other temporary workers


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	18 720	+ 52%
Trainees	5 350	+ 71%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	217 775	+ 47%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of German citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	13.4	+12.4
Natural increase	-3.9	-1.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	17.3	+13.6

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	19 288	-7.2	0.5
Outflows (2022)	25 599	+2.6	0.6

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/mobuv5>

Greece

Foreign-born population – 2022	11.2% of the population	Main countries of birth: Albania (48%), Georgia (7%), Russia (5%)
Size: 1.2 million, 54% women	Evolution since 2012: -9%	

In 2021, 23 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Greece (excluding EU citizens), 15.6% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 9.6% labour migrants, 51.4% family members (including accompanying family), 3% who came for education reasons and 36.1% other migrants. Around 340 short-term permits were issued to third-country students. In addition, 6 100 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -46% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 29%, to reach around 29 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (4 300), Afghanistan (4 100) and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (2 900). The largest increase since 2021 concerned applicants from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (+2 100) and the largest decrease nationals of Bangladesh (-1 200). Of the 39 000 decisions taken in 2022, 50% were positive.

Emigration of Greek citizens to OECD countries increased by 8% in 2021, to 28 000. Approximately 40% of this group migrated to Germany, 18% to the Netherlands and 6% to Switzerland.

In February 2022, Greece and Bangladesh signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Migration and Mobility, which has been ratified by both countries since then. It provides for the recruitment of 4 000 Bangladeshi workers per year, initially in the agricultural sector in Greece and includes a regularisation component which could benefit about 15 000 Bangladeshis residing in Greece on the date of signature. The MoU also aims at promoting efficient return and reducing irregular flows and migrants' smuggling and will be complemented by arrangements facilitating procedure for visa issuance. A bilateral agreement was also signed with Egypt in November 2022 and was ratified by parliament in January 2023. It regulates seasonal employment of Egyptian workers mainly in the agricultural sector.

In February 2022, the list of safe countries of origin was updated to include Egypt, Nepal and Benin, while in December 2022 Ukraine was removed from the list. As a result, 16 countries are designated as safe countries of origin: Ghana, Senegal, Togo, Gambia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Albania, Georgia, India, Armenia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Nepal and Benin.

In June 2022, the Law 4 939/2022 (Gov. Gazette: A' 111) "Ratification of the Code on reception, international protection of third-country nationals and stateless persons, and temporary protection in cases of mass influx of displaced persons" (Asylum Code) was adopted, mainly codifying amendments introduced after 2019 in one single piece of legislation.


In July 2022, the new Law 4 960/2022 (G.G. A' 145) on Guardianship and accommodation framework for UAMs, was adopted to regulate issues related to guardianship and establish a framework for the operation of hospitality centres and supervised apartments for semi-autonomous accommodation. It includes the necessary provisions for implementing the new guardianship scheme, providing flexibility to actors who fulfil specific criteria to provide guardianship services. There are also specific provisions for those who can offer the guardianship services, for the procedures to appoint a guardian, for the personnel and the institutional actors involved and for monitoring and supporting the implementation of the guardianship system.

In accordance with Law 5 007 (GG A'241), adopted in December 2022, the minimum investment for real estate investors applying for the «Golden Visa», was raised from EUR 250 000 to EUR 500 000 in parts of the country, including Athens, Thessaloniki, Santorini and Mykonos (effective as of 1st May 2023). Also, in these areas, investors will only be allowed to invest in one property.

In March 2023, the parliament approved the new Migration Code (Law 5 038/2022, G.G. A'81) to become effective on 1 January 2024. The Law codifies existing regulation on migration in a single text and modifies certain regulations on migrants' residence permits, aiming to correct malfunctions identified over the years. The new migration code also includes measures for those who wish to enter the country for work purposes, as well as for second generation children born and raised in Greece. A new measure with immediate effect eases regulations for unaccompanied minors who will only need to complete three years of secondary schooling by the age of 23 to receive a ten-year residence permit, against six in the previous legislative framework.

Further information: www.migration.gov.gr | www.astynomia.gr | www.statistics.gr



Key figures on immigration and emigration – Greece



Temporary migration (Source: Eurostat)

Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	29 135	+ 29%




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	-6.3	+14.4
Natural increase	-6.1	-0.6
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-0.2	+15.0

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	601	-12.8	0.3
Outflows (2022)	2 937	-0.0	1.3



StatLink <https://stat.link/oi4huc>

Hungary

Foreign-born population – 2022	6.3% of the population	Main countries of birth: Romania (34%), Ukraine (12%), Germany (7%)
Size: 0.6 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2012: +52%	

In 2021, 44 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Hungary (excluding EU citizens), -0.4% compared to 2020. This figure comprises 72.5% labour migrants, 6.6% family members (including accompanying family), 14.3% who came for education reasons and 6.5% other migrants. In addition, Hungary received 13 000 immigrants benefitting from free mobility. Around 3 300 short-term permits were issued to international students and 7 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 38 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a 30% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Germany and the Slovak Republic were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (+6 500) and the Slovak Republic the largest decrease (-3 500) in flows to Hungary compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 13%, to reach around 45. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (15), Iran (5) and Russia (5). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (+10) and the largest decrease nationals of Iran (-5). Of the 40 decisions taken in 2022, 75% were positive.

Emigration of Hungarian citizens to OECD countries stayed at a similar level as the previous year in 2021, counting 39 00. Approximately 37% of this group migrated to Germany, 25% to Austria and 9% to the Netherlands.

On 1 January 2022, Hungary introduced a digital nomad visa called the “White Card”, a new residence permit type that allows third-country nationals to enter and reside in Hungary without the requirement of local sponsorship. To be eligible, permit holders must be in a verified employment relationship with an employer in a country other than Hungary or have an ownership share in a company outside Hungary. In either case, the nature of the permit holder’s work must involve digital technology. The permit does not allow access to the Hungarian labour market. The permit is valid for a maximum of one year and may be extended once, for the same purpose and up to one additional year.

As Hungary’s official “state of danger” owing to the COVID-19 pandemic ended in June 2022, pandemic-related temporary measures in immigration also came to an end. In 2020, the validity period of issued residence documents, permanent residence and immigration permits (except for short-term visas and entry visas for receiving a residence permit) were automatically extended. In January 2022, the administration announced that residence documents expiring on or before 28 February 2022 would be valid until 30 June 2022, while permits expiring on or after 1 March 2022 would no longer be automatically extended.

From 1 January 2023, a large part of the immigration process was moved online. This includes a wide range of permit types concerning both EEA and non-EEA nationals, as well as extensions of residence permits and notifications of place of accommodation. Further, from 1 January 2023, Hungarian consulates will only accept invitation letters issued by a host company/person, while invitation letters issued by the immigration office will no longer be accepted.


On 10 November 2022, citing pressure on the asylum reception system and high migratory pressure at the EU’s external borders and security concerns, Austria issued regulation by which land traffic at the Austrian-Hungarian internal EU border would be required to use border crossing points until 11 May 2023. The temporary reintroduction of border controls on the Austrian-Hungarian land border has since been extended until 11 November 2023.

For further information: www.bmbah.hu

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Hungary

**Grants of long-term residence permits
2021 (Source: Eurostat)**

Hungary



**Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)**


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	7 160	+ 57%
Family reasons	1 450	+ 54%
Education reasons	3 300	+ 1%
Other reason	2 370	+ 15%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	45	+ 13%

**Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)**



**Emigration of Hungarian citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)**




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	-9.5	-5.2
Natural increase	-4.9	+1.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-4.6	-6.7

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	3 589	-5.5	2.1
Outflows (2022)	1 182	-8.7	0.7

**Labour market outcomes
2022**



StatLink <https://stat.link/jxw6mu>

Ireland

Foreign-born population – 2022	20.3% of the population	Main countries of birth: United Kingdom (34%), Poland (14%), Lithuania (4%)
Size: 1 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2012: +32%	

In 2021, Ireland received 38 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -10% compared to 2020. This figure comprises 54.8% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 33.8% labour migrants, 6.9% family members (including accompanying family) and 4.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 11 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students. In addition, 6 100 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -25% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 420%, to reach around 14 000. The majority of applicants came from Georgia (2 700), Algeria (1 800) and Somalia (1 600). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Georgia (+2 400). Of the 4 470 decisions taken in 2022, 80% were positive.

Emigration of Irish citizens to OECD countries increased by 37% in 2021, to 19 000. Approximately 17% of this group migrated to Spain, 14% to Canada and 12% to the Netherlands.

A White Paper, published in February 2021, proposed wide-ranging reform of the International Protection System, including Direct Provision accommodation. It envisaged a phased implementation of the new system between 2021 and 2024, but the process has been delayed by the influx of Ukrainians seeking temporary protection as well as a significant increase in international protection applications. This has resulted in unprecedented pressure on the Irish reception system. A review of the implementation timeline is underway. Progress made to date includes a new International Protection Integration Fund, which was established in 2022. This fund is aimed at enabling community-based organisations across Ireland to play a greater role in supporting the integration of applicants for international protection. Organisations may receive funding of between EUR 5 000 and EUR 20 000 to support integration initiatives. In 2023, EUR 1 200 000 will be made available through the fund.

In February 2022, the government lifted the visa requirement for Ukrainian nationals. Following an EU Council decision in March 2022, Ireland began providing Temporary Protection to those fleeing the war in Ukraine in conjunction with other Member States. The Irish Government implemented several additional measures to accommodate arrivals from Ukraine, including a temporary reception centre at Dublin airport, emergency accommodation in conference centres and serviced accommodation, as well as providing subsidies to households hosting refugees. A tax-free payment of EUR 400 per month to people hosting Ukrainian Beneficiaries of Temporary Protection was announced in May 2022, which was later increased to EUR 800 per month in December 2022. Arrivals from Ukraine are brought to Citywest Convention Centre where, if eligible, they are issued a Temporary Protection Certificate and their immigration permission in Ireland is simultaneously registered. They also obtain a Public Services Number from Department of Social Protection officials on-site, and can obtain information and assistance from healthcare professionals.

In December 2021, following the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, the Irish Government introduced the Afghan Admission Programme, which offered temporary Irish residence to people whose freedom or safety was at risk, who had fled from Afghanistan after 1 August 2021 and who had close family members in Ireland. The programme closed in March 2022 with 528 applications received.


With effect from 1 January 2023, several changes have been implemented to the Atypical Working Scheme (AWS). The scheme was developed to facilitate specialised, highly skilled, short-term employment (generally less than 90 days) of non-EEA nationals not currently supported by Employment Permit legislation. First, the minimum salary has been revised from the current National Minimum Wage to be aligned with the current salary requirement for a General Employment Permit. Second, the 90-day work permit can now be spread over a six-months period, and can support intermittent travel in and out of Ireland during that period. Previously, the 90 days of work had to be completed in one block. Thirdly, the waiting time to be offered a second permission under the AWS has been reduced to one month. Previously, only one AWS could be granted in any 12-month period.

For further information: www.inis.gov.ie | www.ria.gov.ie | www.enterprise.gov.ie

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Ireland

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Ireland



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	11 140	+ 26%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	13 645	+ 422%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (First permits - Non-EU countries, Source: Eurostat)



Emigration of Irish citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	26.2	+15.5
Natural increase	4.4	-0.8
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	21.8	+16.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	436	+142.3	0.1
Outflows (2022)	695	+27.7	0.1

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/yr5cx2>

Israel

Foreign-born population – 2022	19.1% of the population	Main countries of birth: Former USSR (49%), Morocco (7%), United States (6%)
Size: 1.8 million, 55% women	Evolution since 2012: -3%	

In 2021, Israel received 25 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 30% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 73% under the Law of Return and 27% family members (including accompanying family). Around 42 000 permits were issued to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Russia, France and the United States were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, the Former USSR registered the strongest increase (1 700) in flows to Israel compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 100%, to reach around 3 900. The majority of applicants came from Russia (1 000), Belarus (300) and India (300). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Russia (+1 000) and the largest decrease nationals of China (-200). Of the 6 030 decisions taken in 2022, 0.3% were positive.

Emigration of citizens of Israel to OECD countries increased by 14% in 2021, to 9 300. Approximately 36% of this group migrated to the United States, 12% to Canada and 11% to Germany.

2022 saw an increase in permanent migration under the Law of Return, driven primarily by arrivals from Russia and Ukraine. Procedures for migration from Russia and Ukraine were facilitated, so that formalities could be completed after arrival. Budgets were transferred from all ministries to fund the reception of the additional new immigrants from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The government also extended programmes to support the integration of permanent migrants of Ethiopian origin and their spouses, and to encourage foreigners eligible for permanent migration who have potential as high-tech employees to immigrate to Israel.

The quota for employment of Palestinian workers rose to 112.000 in 2022, from 100 000 in 2018-21. In addition, it has been estimated that about 30 000 Palestinians entered Israel illegally for work. Of the Palestinian workers employed in Israel on the basis of a legal work permit, it has been estimated that about one-third purchased their work permits from illegal brokers.

There were 105 000 other temporary foreign workers legally employed in Israel in June 2022. Quotas for the construction sector were stable at 22 000 while agricultural quotas increased in 2021 to 31 200. A new sector for employment of foreign workers quotas was opened for essential infrastructure projects.

Half of foreign care workers enter Israel under Bilateral Labour Agreements. Israel and India initiated agreements in May 2023 for admission of construction and care workers. Recruitment from Nepal resumed after a Government to Government agreement signed in 2020 and implemented in 2021. A BLA was signed with Uzbekistan in 2022.

2022 saw an influx of Ukrainians not eligible for permanent migration who applied for asylum in Israel. Work and tourist permits for Ukrainians are automatically renewed. Those with no valid status are temporarily protected from removal. The Ministry of Social Affairs provides some funding (about EUR 3 million) for their reception and support.

In 2022, the Population and Immigration Administration in the Ministry of Interior announced that foreign worker re-entry visas would be issued digitally, thus eliminating the former need to apply physically at PIBA office for such, or to transfer the workers' passports to the Administration for processing.

A procedure, published in June 2022 but suspended in the framework of an appeal pending in the HCJ, intends to limit the employment of migrants who entered Israel illegally as well as of asylum seekers in the central area of Israel or Eilat, to employment in the sectors in which Israel sets quotas for legal employment of foreign workers (e.g. construction, agriculture, institutional caregiving and hotels – as well as restaurants if the migrant had been employed at least three months prior to March 2023).


The minimum salary threshold for foreign experts increased by 12% in 2023, to NIS 23 460 (about EUR 5 900). B-1 Work permits began to be issued electronically in February 2023. The regulation to allow foreign students and recent graduates to be hired for the Hi-Tech Work Visa – at a lower salary threshold than other experts – was implemented in March 2022.

For more information: www.gov.il

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Israel

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Israel



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	41 600	+ 60%


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	3 915	+ 103%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Israeli citizens to OECD countries (national definition)



Components of population growth


	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	19.8	+3.3
Natural increase	13.9	+0.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.8	+3.2

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	6 143	-20.2	1.2
Outflows (2022)	7 283	+7.0	1.4

Labour market outcomes

2021 compared to 2022 OECD averages



StatLink <https://stat.link/3mx8rb>

Italy

Foreign-born population – 2022	10.4% of the population	Main countries of birth: Romania (15%), Albania (8%), Morocco (7%)
Size: 6.2 million, 53% women	Evolution since 2012: +8%	

In 2021, Italy received 241 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 91% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 18.7% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 20.2% labour migrants, 50% family members (including accompanying family) and 9% humanitarian migrants. Around 1 100 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 2 900 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 108 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a 19% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Romania, Albania and Morocco were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Bangladesh registered the strongest increase (+6 800) and Brazil the largest decrease (-500) in flows to Italy compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 71%, to reach around 77 000. The majority of applicants came from Bangladesh (15 000), Pakistan (11 000) and Egypt (8 800). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Bangladesh (+8 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-3 100). Of the 53 000 decisions taken in 2022, 48% were positive.

Emigration of Italian citizens to OECD countries increased by 8% in 2021, to 121 000. Approximately 24% of this group migrated to Spain, 16% to Germany and 13% to Switzerland.

Following a substantial increase in 2022, Italy's annual quota for third-country national workers rose again in 2023, indicating a continued worker shortage. The 2023 quota – announced in mid-2022 and published in January 2023 – was for 82 705 workers, up from 69 700 in 2022 (and 31 000 in the previous five years). The quota also assigned the number of seasonal (44 000) and non-seasonal workers and those admitted in different economic sectors (31 205) from countries which have signed or are negotiating migration management co-operation agreements with Italy. A further 7 500 places were set aside for status changes and self-employed individuals.

Following a new law, as of 2023 future quota numbers will be issued by the government every three years, instead of annually, the validity of residence permits issued for family reasons, indefinite contract work, self-employment changed from two to three years, extending the period between renewals extended.

Employers intending to hire a third-country national worker must first submit a request for personnel to the competent employment centre to verify the possible availability of suited workers already present in Italy. However, the hiring of seasonal workers, workers in the agricultural and tourist/hospitality sectors, and foreign workers trained abroad are exempt from this verification process.

During 2022, the deadline for third-country nationals holding residence permits to file for a change of status from a residence permit to a work permit was extended twice.

The introduction of a one-year Digital Nomad Visa was originally scheduled for the second half of 2022, but this is now on hold.

As of November 2022, Canada and Italy implemented a new Bilateral Youth Mobility Agreement allows young Canadian and Italian nationals (ages 18-35) to travel and work for up to 12 months in each other's country. Individuals can participate twice in the programme. The programme includes three categories of participation: Working Holiday, International Co-op (internship), and Young Professional.

In December 2022, a new Regulation on the protection of unaccompanied foreign minors was approved, reaffirming the responsibilities of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies in monitoring their presence and integration paths up to the age of 18. The Regulation also addresses the rules concerning residence permits for unaccompanied foreign minors and the conversion of permits upon reaching major age.


In 2022, earlier efforts to improve the protection and integration of unaccompanied foreign minors continued. Local authorities (the SAI network), the Ministry of Interior and humanitarian agencies collaborated on numerous projects to improve the reception and care of unaccompanied minors. In June 2021, an inter-institutional and inter-agency working group set out to prepare a handbook for actors and stakeholders receiving vulnerable migrants arriving to Italy, promoting a governance model for improved identification and care of vulnerable people during all phases of reception.

For further information: www.interno.gov.it | www.integrationemigranti.gov.it | www.istat.it

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Italy

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Italy



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	220	+ 1%
Seasonal workers	1 960	+ 9%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	680	+ 66%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	1 050	+ 51%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	77 200	+ 71%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Italian citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	-3.0	+0.5
Natural increase	-5.4	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.4	+0.8

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	10 530	+0.2	0.5
Outflows (2022)	11 586	-5.7	0.6

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/fkmhey>

Japan

Foreign population – 2022	2.2% of the population	Main countries of nationality: China (29%), Korea (16%), Viet Nam (15%)
Size: 2.8 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2012: +33%	

In 2021, Japan received 67 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -36% compared to 2020. This figure comprises 48.4% labour migrants, 44.6% family members (including accompanying family) and 1% humanitarian migrants. Around 12 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 30 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Viet Nam, China and the United States were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Viet Nam registered the largest decrease (-46 000) in flows to Japan compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 56%, to reach around 3 800. The majority of applicants came from Cambodia (600), Sri Lanka (500), and Türkiye (400). Of the 12 000 decisions taken in 2022, 16% were positive.

Emigration of Japanese citizens to OECD countries increased by 13% in 2021, to 19 000. Approximately 20% of this group migrated to the United States, 18% to Germany and 7% to Canada.

In February 2023, Japan announced two new immigration pathways to attract and retain talent. First, the “Japan System for Special Highly Skilled Professionals (J-Skip)” will allow foreigners who meet specific income and work experience or academic background requirements to skip the current points-based system and automatically be granted a Highly Skilled Professionals status. Under this, foreigners may change to a status of residence with indefinite duration of stay in Japan after only one year of residence.

Second, Japan introduced the “Japan System for Future Creation Individual Visa (J-Find)”, a job search visa for graduates of prestigious overseas universities. Under the J-Find visa, graduates may search for a job in Japan and prepare to start a business for up to two years and are allowed to sponsor accompanying spouses and children.

The Technical Intern Training Programme (TITP) and the Specified Skilled Worker System (SSWS) are currently under review. The interim report of the government’s advisory panel was published in May 2023 and called for the TITP to be replaced with a new programme that clearly aims, not only to develop, but also to secure human resources labour. To retain foreign workers, it suggests aligning the job categories of the new programme and the SSWS so that they can smoothly transfer from the new programme to the SSWS. The interim report also recommends that employer changes be allowed to a certain degree and that the criteria for certification of supervising organisations be tightened in the new programme. The final report of the panel is expected to be delivered by Autumn 2023.

In June 2023, an amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was passed. It is intended to be a well-balanced system that integrally resolves issues under the current act, such as evasion of deportation and long-term detention, through a package of various measures to achieve proper immigration and residence management while respecting the human rights of foreign nationals. This will serve as the foundation for accepting foreign nationals and realizing and maintaining a coexisting society.


Japan continued efforts to digitalise immigration processes, the Certificate of Eligibility (CoE) issued in Japan by the Immigration Services Agency is delivered in electric format starting March 2023. Foreign nationals who wish to enter Japan as a mid-to-long-term resident need this certificate as a first step before applying for a visa in the country of origin. The digitalisation of the CoE removes the step of mailing the CoE hardcopy to the immigrants in the country of origin, which streamlines and reduces the costs of the immigration process.

In July 2022, Japan concluded a Memorandum of Co-operation (MoC) with Lao PDR on the Japanese Specified Skilled Worker System. Lao PDR is the 15th country to sign a MoC since the launch of the programme in 2019.

In March 2022, Japan established an emergency pathway for Evacuees from Ukraine, who are allowed to stay in Japan temporarily under a “designated activities” status of residence. By April 2023, 2 402 individuals from Ukraine had arrived in Japan.

Further information: www.mhlw.go.jp/english | www.isa.go.jp/en | www.moj.go.jp

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Japan



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration



	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	240	- 93%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	500	- 84%
Other temporary workers	5 940	- 13%

Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	11 650	- 77%
Trainees	23 600	- 73%

Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	3 770	+ 56%




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	-4.4	+0.7
Natural increase	-5.8	-1.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	1.4	+1.7

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	5 384	+1.7	0.1
Outflows (2022)	4 522	-26.3	0.1



Korea

Foreign population – 2022	3.5% of the population	Main countries of nationality: China (43%), Viet Nam (10%), United States (4%)
Size: 1.8 million, 45% women	Evolution since 2012: +86%	

In 2021, Korea received 54 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -6.1% compared to 2020. This figure comprises 8.8% labour migrants, 28.9% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.2% humanitarian migrants. Around 39 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 59 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

China, Viet Nam and the United States were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Uzbekistan registered the strongest increase (+5 100) and Viet Nam the largest decrease (-10 000) in flows to Korea compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 400%, to reach around 12 000. The majority of applicants came from Kazakhstan (2 500), India (1 300) and Türkiye (1 200). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Kazakhstan (+2 400). Of the 11 000 decisions taken in 2022, 1% were positive.

Emigration of Korean citizens to OECD countries decreased by -11% in 2021, to 37 000. Approximately 33% of this group migrated to the United States, 22% to Canada and 8% to Germany.

Admission quotas for employment permit (E-9) workers in 2023 have been set about 110 000, with 89 970 allocated for new entries and 20 030 for re-entry. Most of these quotas, more than 75 000, are dedicated to the manufacturing sector. The remainder will be distributed among the construction (3 000), service (1 000), agriculture (14 000), and fishery (7 000) sectors.

In February 2023, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy announced the results of visa screenings for foreign workers in the shipbuilding sector. More than 2000 foreign workers with E-7 (professional) and E-9 status were selected to begin working. To address the labour shortage in the booming shipbuilding industry, several measures were implemented, including an improved expedited examination system, increased special examination support staff for shipbuilding visas, and an exemption from the practical skills test for international students graduating from domestic science and engineering majors related to shipbuilding when issuing E-7-3 visas.

In March 2023, the MoJ decided to waive fees for extending the stay for ethnic Korean nationals residing in Ukraine until the end of the Ukraine war. The ministry also simplified the visa issuance process for these ethnic Korean Ukrainian nationals, including waiving required documents and fees for overseas Koreans, their spouses and underage children when changing their status or applying for permission to work. This measure is expected to benefit approximately 1 200 Ukrainians of Korean descent.

From November 2022 to February 2023, the MoJ implemented the Special Voluntary Departure Program, waiving fines and suspending entry restrictions for undocumented residents who voluntarily departed Korea. Failure to depart voluntarily within the specified period or being caught in a crackdown would subject illegal residents to fines and tougher entry bans.

In January 2023, the MoJ launched a fast-track programme for permanent residence and naturalisation of outstanding foreign scientific and technological talents who have studied in Korea. This programme aims to expedite their process of obtaining permanent residence and nationality to facilitate successful settlement in Korean society after completing their degrees.

The government has been improving and implementing the foreign seasonal worker system to cater to the needs of farms and rural areas, with continuous collaboration and communication with farmers, fishermen, and local governments. In July 2022 and December 2022, a combined total of 35 166 foreign seasonal workers were assigned to local governments nationwide, to address labour shortages in the seasonal agricultural and fishing sectors.


In November 2022, the MoJ established the Immigration Policy Reform Division to update Korea's policies on border security and immigration services. The aim is to address current challenges such as population decline, eradication of illegal residence, and the establishment of stricter immigration regulations. To address concerns over human rights violations in the expansion of the nation's Seasonal Worker Program (SWP), the MoJ implemented several measures with the goal of strengthening human rights protection: the arrangement of communication assistance; intensified assessment of human rights violations using index indicators; abolition of the security deposit system; and customised education to prevent human rights violations.

For further information: www.eps.go.kr | www.immigration.go.kr | www.mrtc.re.kr/eng/main/main.php

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Korea

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Korea



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	320	- 64%
Seasonal workers	550	..
Intra-company transfers	380	- 6%
Other temporary workers	57 500	+ 34%


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	38 610	+ 36%
Trainees	380	+ 29%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	11 540	+ 395%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Korean citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	-0.9	+0.9
Natural increase	-2.4	-1.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	1.5	+2.2

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	7 825	+1.1	0.4
Outflows (2022)	8 301	-19.7	0.5

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink  <https://stat.link/asz8ud>

Latvia

Foreign-born population – 2022	12% of the population	Main countries of birth: Russia (47%), Belarus (17%), Ukraine (14%)
Size: 0.2 million, 60% women	Evolution since 2012: -23%	

In 2021, 5 300 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Latvia (excluding EU citizens), 55.2% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 50.6% labour migrants, 20.8% family members (including accompanying family), 19.7% who came for education reasons and 9% other migrants. In addition, Latvia received 700 immigrants benefitting from free mobility. Around 300 short-term permits were issued to international students and 1 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 2 200 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -16% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Russia and Belarus were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (+400) and Uzbekistan the largest decrease (-40) in flows to Latvia compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -6%, to reach around 500. The majority of applicants came from Russia (100), Afghanistan (100) and Belarus (65). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Russia (+90) and the largest decrease nationals of Iraq (-300). Of the 400 decisions taken in 2022, 58% were positive.

Emigration of Latvian citizens to OECD countries increased by 15% in 2021, to 11 000. Approximately 25% of this group migrated to Germany, 17% to the Netherlands and 10% to Norway.

In June 2022, the Immigration Law was amended to introduce remote work visas. Under this scheme, a long-stay visa for one year can be requested by third country nationals who are employed by an employer registered in any other Member State of the OECD or are registered as self-employed persons in these countries, and who can perform their duties remotely while staying in the Republic of Latvia. The visa may be renewed for a period of one additional year. Remote work visa recipients do not have the right to employment in Latvia.

In August 2021, the Cabinet of Ministers issued an order declaring a state of emergency in administrative territories along the Latvian-Belarusian border in response to the heightened risks of irregular border crossings and hybrid attacks, which was extended in 2022.

Several legislative changes were introduced in response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. On 5 March 2022, the Law on Assistance to Ukrainian Civilians came into force, activating temporary protection and outlining reception and integration support measures for persons fleeing Ukraine. The law also defines Ukrainian civilians as a group at risk of social exclusion. Multiple amendments to the law were passed throughout the year to adjust further and extend available support measures. In April 2022, the issuance of first temporary residence permits to citizens of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation was suspended, allowing for some exceptions, including family reunification. In September 2022, amendments to the Immigration Law entered into force, terminating in most cases the possibility of extending temporary residence permits granted through investments or the purchase of real estate for Russian and Belarusian citizens. In September, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decision to restrict the entry of Russian citizens holding Schengen short-stay visas for non-essential purposes, for instance, tourism and leisure. The decision was adopted in a concerted manner by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and took effect simultaneously in the three Baltic States on 19 September 2022.


In April 2022, the Citizenship Law was amended to allow for the revocation of Latvian citizenship from dual nationals in the case of committing actions that undermine or put at risk democratic countries' territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence.

For further information: www.pmlp.gov.lv | www.csp.gov.lv | www.emn.lv

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Latvia

Grants of long-term residence permits
2021 (Source: Eurostat)

Latvia



Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	990	+ 26%
Family reasons	1 040	+ 65%
Education reasons	330	- 38%
Other reason	450	+ 188%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	545	- 6%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Latvian citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	3.9	+13.2
Natural increase	-7.9	+1.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	11.7	+11.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	1 333	+1.2	3.3
Outflows (2022)	653	+64.1	1.6

Labour market outcomes
2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/ix7pf8>

Lithuania

Foreign-born population – 2022	6% of the population	Main countries of birth: Russia (36%), Belarus (25%), Ukraine (11%)
Size: 0.2 million, 44% women	Evolution since 2012: -18%	

In 2021, 20 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Lithuania (excluding EU citizens), -7.8% compared to 2020. This figure comprises 77.3% labour migrants, 8.6% family members (including accompanying family), 7.4% who came for education reasons and 6.8% other migrants. In addition, Lithuania received 940 immigrants benefitting from free mobility. Around 200 short-term permits were issued to international students and 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 4 400 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -5% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Belarus, Ukraine and Russia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Belarus registered the strongest increase (+1 000) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-3 000) in flows to Lithuania compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -77%, to reach around 900. The majority of applicants came from Belarus (400), Russia (100) and Iraq (100). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Belarus (+200) and the largest decrease nationals of Iraq (-2 300). Of the 740 decisions taken in 2022, 41% were positive.

Emigration of Lithuanian citizens to OECD countries increased by 14% in 2021, to 16 000. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Germany, 19% to Norway and 12% to the Netherlands.

On 1 August 2022, several significant amendments to the Law on Legal Status of Foreigners came into force, simplifying immigration rules for highly qualified workers, students and start-ups, while easing associated administrative burdens for third country nationals, companies looking to hire foreigners, and public officials. The changes included easing the requirements for highly skilled workers, the abolition of company whitelisting for simplified recruitment procedures, simplifying the rules to obtain an EU Blue Card, allowing for temporary and multi-employer contracts, removing the 20-hour working limit for international students, and extending the validity of residence permits for doctoral students and foreigners working in start-ups. The amendments also provide more opportunities for work and self-employment for the most vulnerable third country nationals, including Ukrainian citizens, asylum seekers and irregular migrants. From 1 January 2023, third country nationals can also apply for a temporary residence permit while abroad via intermediaries.

The quota for foreigners working in shortage occupations (163 professions in 2022), and eligible for obtaining visa and residence permits under simplified procedure, was raised to 35 600.

In November 2021, the government declared a state of emergency on borders with Belarus and Russia owing to the heightened risks of irregular border crossings and hybrid attacks, which expired in January 2022. In August 2021, the Seimas adopted a law for installing a physical barrier (550 km long, 4 m high) to the Lithuanian-Belarusian border and its construction was completed in August 2022.


In March 2022, following the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive by the EU, Lithuania began granting temporary protection for persons fleeing Ukraine. The conditions for temporary protection are outlined in the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners. In December 2022, the government decided to extend the provision of support to private hosts accommodating Ukrainian refugees until the end of 2023.

Following the start of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the state of emergency was reinstated on 24 February 2022. Under the state of emergency law, decisions on visa applications by the citizens of the Russian Federation and Belarus are suspended. The exception applies to cases where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an intermediary in issuing visas. Further restrictions were introduced to limit the entry of Russian citizens holding Schengen short-stay visas for non-essential purposes, in a concerted manner by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and took effect simultaneously in the three Baltic States on 19 September 2022.

For further information: www.migracija.lt | www.stat.gov.lt | www.emn.lt

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Lithuania

Grants of long-term residence permits
2021 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	240	+ 30%
Family reasons	150	+ 100%
Education reasons	230	+ 23%
Other reason	50	+ 19%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	905	- 77%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Lithuanian citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	18.1	+14.4
Natural increase	-7.4	+1.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	25.5	+13.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	736	-5.4	1.0
Outflows (2022)	568	+40.9	0.8

Labour market outcomes
2022



Luxembourg

Foreign-born population – 2022	49.8% of the population	Main countries of birth: Portugal (23%), France (14%), Belgium (7%)
Size: 0.3 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2012: +48%	

In 2021, Luxembourg received 25 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 19% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 67.3% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 8.8% labour migrants, 20% family members (including accompanying family) and 3.6% humanitarian migrants. Around 400 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 500 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 44 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -8% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Portugal, France and Italy were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Portugal registered the strongest increase (+600) in flows to Luxembourg compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 75%, to reach around 2 400. The majority of applicants came from Syria (1 000), Eritrea (400) and Afghanistan (200). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Syria (+600) and the largest decrease nationals of Iraq (-35). Of the 1 310 decisions taken in 2022, 79% were positive.

Emigration of Luxembourg citizens to OECD countries were stable in 2021, at 4 600. Approximately 44% of this group migrated to Germany, 27% to France and 9% to Belgium.

Amendments to the Immigration Law were introduced in 2021 which reduced the administrative burden for third-country nationals and amend certain provisions relating to intra-corporate transferees, trainees and family reunification. It introduced a minimum of three months of prior employment for an intra-company transferee. The norms regarding the stay of trainees and their hosts were simplified: trainees have to present a higher education diploma obtained within the two years preceding the application date or show that they followed studies leading to a higher education diploma.

At the end of 2022, temporary protection status holders from Ukraine who obtained an employment and have appropriate housing, are entitled to change their status to a salaried worker residence permit.

A new bill introduced in the case of a relationship between partners, an authorisation of stay if neither partner is in a marriage or registered partnership with another person. A residence permit for private reasons for exceptional circumstances has been introduced to illegally staying third-country nationals who have such ties with the country that removal from the territory would be disproportionately harmful to their personal and family situation.

The National Institute of Languages Luxembourg (INLL) was created in May 2022, available in three sites across the country: Mersch, Luxembourg and Belval. The aim is to regionalise the range of courses on offer to make it easier for people to take part. INLL aims to promote the Luxembourgish language and multilingualism, facilitate integration and social cohesion, encourage intercultural exchanges, and contribute to the employability of people.

On 20 June 2022, a bill was introduced in parliament, which purpose is to introduce into the Penal Code an aggravating circumstance for a crime or misdemeanour committed for a motive based on discrimination by reason of one of the characteristics referred to in Article 454 of the Penal Code.

To cope with the large influx of Ukrainians, the beneficiaries of temporary protection obtained directly health coverage through an amendment to the social security code and Luxembourg allowed the Ukrainian children to attend the international public schools, created a Ukrainian school and recruited additional teachers.


An amendment to the electoral law abolished the five-year residency requirement for foreign nationals wishing to register on the electoral rolls for communal elections, allowing them to strengthen their participation in the political life of the country. Furthermore, the deadline for registration in the electoral roll and allow the participation (both actively and passively) of EU citizens as well as of third-country nationals has been extended.

For further information: www.quichet.public.lu | www.ona.gouvernement.lu | www.integratioun.lu

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Luxembourg

Long-term immigration flows
2021 (Source: OECD)

Luxembourg



Temporary migration
(Sources: Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	160	+ 76%
Other temporary workers	300	+ 33%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	360	+ 60%
Trainees	40	+ 21%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	2 395	+ 75%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Luxembourg citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	23.6	+6.9
Natural increase	3.1	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	20.5	+7.3

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	2 208	-9.2	2.7
Outflows (2022)	15 506	-8.5	18.8

Labour market outcomes
2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/o054cx>

Mexico

Foreign-born population – 2020	1% of the population	Main countries of birth: United States (66%), Guatemala (5%), Spain (2%)
Size: 1.2 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2012: +24%	

In 2021, Mexico received 68 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 16% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 15.7% labour migrants, 40.9% family members (including accompanying family) and 30.1% humanitarian migrants. Around 4 600 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 23 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Honduras, Venezuela and the United States were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Honduras registered the strongest increase (+4 400) and Venezuela the largest decrease (-500) in flows to Mexico compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -9.7%, to reach around 119 000. The majority of applicants came from Honduras (31 100), Cuba (18 100) and Haiti (17 200). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Cuba (+9 800) and the largest decrease nationals of Haiti (-34 700). Of the 65 000 decisions taken in 2022, 35% were positive.

Emigration of Mexican citizens to OECD countries increased by 12% in 2021, to 128 000. Approximately 83% of this group migrated to the United States, 5% to Spain and 4% to Canada.

Throughout 2022, Mexico experienced an increase in irregular migration at the southern border. Additionally, as a result of the application of Title 42, Mexico continued taking back migrants expelled by US authorities. Due to the increase of irregular transit through Mexico, Mexico imposed visa requirements for Venezuelan nationals in January 2022 and for Brazilian nationals in August 2022. After the end of Title 42, in May 2023, Mexico announced that, on humanitarian grounds, it would continue to accept 30 000 individuals per month from Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba. Although in 2022 the issuance of humanitarian documents increased by more than 47% compared to 2021, this does not necessarily implied a decrease in the irregular migrations flows. In addition, to mitigate these irregular migratory flows, Mexico is seeking co-operation channels to facilitate regular labour migration.

Within the framework of the Migration Law, the National Institute of Migration (INM) increased scrutiny at the border, which were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, as they did not contain elements that would allow the individualisation of the procedure.

In 2022, close to 120 000 asylum claims were filed in the country which has put the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance under significant strain. While its processing capacity has improved over the years with support from the UNHCR, and its annual budget has increased in recent years, it has not been enough due to the increased number of claims.

In March 2023, a fire at a IMN accommodation facilities in the northern city of Ciudad Juárez killed 40 migrants. Immediately after, the INM announced it would work with the Mexican Human Rights Commission to evaluate conditions at migration centres.

In April 2023, Mexico's Supreme Court also ruled that the country's National Guard can support the INM by guaranteeing the safety of migrant and migrant centres. Human rights groups have opposed the decision.

Regarding integration, UNHCR continues to promote and support the integration of recognised refugees through their relocation in cities with increased prospects of formal employment. As part of its Local Integration Programme, the UNHCR in collaboration with Mexican authorities helps them secure access to employment, long-term accommodation, education, and health services. In 2022 alone, approximately 13 000 refugees received relocation and integration assistance – the highest annual number to date.

The Government of Mexico has had an approach with local governments to promote and foster actions for the integration of migrants. In addition, technical assistance has been provided in collaboration with international organisations, such as the IOM, UNHCR and GIZ.


In the northern border of Mexico can be found some Migrant Integration Centres where the migrant population is provided with job offers, as well as basic health, food and educational services while they are staying in Mexico. This strategy is in charge of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Welfare.

Further information: www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx | www.comar.gob.mx

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Mexico

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Mexico



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	3 740	+ 2%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	19 030	+ 84%


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	4 610	+ 58%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	118 735	- 10%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Mexican citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2021 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2021/20 difference
Total	5.6	-1.7
Natural increase	6.3	+1.9
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-0.7	-3.6

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	61 100	+12.9	4.3
Outflows (2022)	1 131	+7.0	0.1

Labour market outcomes 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/hnjv41>

Netherlands

Foreign-born population – 2022	14.5% of the population	Main countries of birth: Türkiye (8%), Suriname (7%), Poland (7%)
Size: 2.6 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2012: +34%	

In 2021, the Netherlands received 171 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 29% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 53.2% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 12.2% labour migrants, 20.2% family members (including accompanying family) and 14.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 20 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 2 300 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 153 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -61% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Poland, Romania and Syria were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Syria registered the strongest increase (+6 100) in flows to the Netherlands compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 44%, to reach around 36 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (13 000), Afghanistan (2 700) and Türkiye (2 700). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Syria (+4 300) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-300). Of the 17 000 decisions taken in 2022, 87% were positive.

Emigration of Dutch citizens to OECD countries increased by 23% in 2021, to 38 000. Approximately 20% of this group migrated to Belgium, 15% to Spain and 15% to Germany.

In January 2022 the Aliens Employment Act was amended. Work permits can be issued for up to three years instead of one, with a maximum of two years for permits subject to a full labour market test. Another important change requires employers to pay the wages specified in the work permit within one month through a designated bank account. Failure to do so may result in the revocation or non-renewal of the permit. The amended law also allows for the rejection of permit applications if the employer's business lacks the economic activity to ensure its ability to pay wages.

The new Civic Integration Act (*Wet Inburgering*), which came into force in January 2022, introduces significant changes to the integration process for newcomers. The law outlines three different learning pathways: one involving volunteer work while learning Dutch to reach a B1 level within one year; another directed at young migrants aiming for higher education or vocational training with a B1 language requirement; and a third for migrants facing challenges with the previous options, focusing on basic language skills at an A1 level. Municipalities are responsible for implementing and monitoring these pathways, carrying out assessments to determine the appropriate learning route and providing guidance on suitable educational institutions.

As of 22 July 2022, based on their permit approval letter visa-exempt highly skilled migrants are allowed to work immediately. The requirement to obtain a residence permit sticker before starting work has been removed to reduce waiting times. Instead, individuals have a four-month period to attend an in-person appointment with immigration authorities to obtain the necessary documents for a work permit. This policy does not apply to EU ICT or Blue Card holders. Originally intended to be a temporary scheme for six months, the policy has been extended beyond its original end date in January 2023.

On 26 September 2022, the Minister for Migration announced the extension of the maximum decision period for asylum applications. This gives the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) an additional nine months to process and assess asylum applications, effectively increasing the maximum statutory decision period to 15 months.


On 10 February 2023, the ban on family reunification for asylum seekers who have been granted residence in the country was lifted. This decision came just one month after the temporary suspension of these restrictions. The Dutch authorities made this change following a ruling by the Council of State, which found the ban on family reunification to be unlawful. The original restrictions on family reunification were introduced in August 2022 in response to the housing crisis and the influx of asylum seekers.

For further information: www.ind.nl

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Netherlands

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Netherlands



Temporary migration (Sources: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	3 750	+ 46%
Family reasons	3 450	+ 4%
Education reasons	4 200	+ 336%
Other reason	30	+ 11%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	35 530	+ 44%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Dutch citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	12.5	+5.9
Natural increase	-0.1	-0.6
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	12.6	+6.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	2 370	-0.8	0.2
Outflows (2022)	15 411	-2.4	1.6

Labour market outcomes 2022



New Zealand

Foreign-born population – 2018	27.4% of the population	Main countries of birth: United Kingdom (21%), China (10%), India (9%)
Size: 1.3 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2012: +32%	

In 2021, New Zealand received 35 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -0.9% compared to 2020. This figure comprises 9.2% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 19.4% labour migrants, 66.9% family members (including accompanying family) and 4.4% humanitarian migrants. Around 800 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 74 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, Australia and China were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Afghanistan registered the strongest increase (+900) and India the largest decrease (-5 600) in flows to New Zealand compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -19%, to reach around 300. The majority of applicants came from India (68), China (66) and Malaysia (34). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Malaysia (+23) and the largest decrease nationals of India (-72). Of the 590 decisions taken in 2022, 23% were positive.

The “Immigration Rebalance” has remained a feature of New Zealand’s post-COVID response.

Recent data shows a net migration inflow driven by non-New Zealand citizens. Stats NZ has provisionally estimated annual net migration for the year ended April 2023, to be an inflow of 72 300, a turnaround from a net migration loss of 19 300 in 2022.

“Green List” pathways to residence were introduced for highly skilled roles that have been identified as being in demand globally and in ongoing shortage. Alterations were made in May 2023, and further review is underway.

Individuals with post-study work visas for post-graduate/honours study and below can now stay for the same duration as their study in New Zealand. Master’s and doctoral students are eligible for 3-year visas. Non-degree students will only qualify where their qualification relates to an occupation on the Green List and can only work in a field linked to their study.

Immigration funding was reviewed, and new fee and levy rates were introduced for most visa applications from 31 July 2022. The Active Investor Plus Visa went live to attract investors with capital, skills and international connections to help build high-value New Zealand firms.

The Parent Resident Visa Category reopened in October 2022 with reduced requirements for sponsors and an increased number of places from 1 000 to 2 500 per year.

In early 2023, access to the Victims of Family Violence work visa was expanded to include people on partner-based visas that are linked to temporary migrants. A Migrant Community Reference Group was also established to advise the Minister of Immigration and engage with perspectives from New Zealand’s migrant communities.

An Immigration Amendment Bill was introduced to Parliament in March 2023, to better enable humane and rights-consistent detention of an irregular mass arrival. The government also released an interim response to a 2022 review on immigration by the Productivity Commission, focusing on achieving a longer-term balance between its immigration and broader policy objectives.

In mid-2023, the government announced that from late 2023, people on an Accredited Employer Work Visa (AEWV) who are not on a pathway to residence will be subject to a maximum continuous stay of five years. Sector agreements that provide limited exception to the AEWV median wage requirements remain in place for tourism and hospitality, the care workforce, seafood, construction and infrastructure, meat processing, and seasonal snow and adventure tourism, to allow a transition away from lower paid migrants. A Sector Agreement for the transport industry was added in early 2023.

The government also announced a simplification of the Skilled Migrant Category (from October 2023). To qualify, an applicant will need to hold either regulated NZ occupational registration requiring at least two years of training, a bachelor’s degree or higher, or earn at least 1.5 x median wage.


The 2022 Special Ukraine Visa now has wider eligibility criteria. Individuals with visas that expire soon can apply for another two-year visa, to provide certainty about their ability to shelter in New Zealand while the war continues.

For further information: <https://www.immigration.govt.nz>

Key figures on immigration and emigration – New Zealand

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

New Zealand



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	910	- 94%
Seasonal workers	19 440	+ 27%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	53 810	+ 39%


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	820	- 86%
Trainees	10	- 95%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	335	- 19%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of New Zealand citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	1.2	-3.0
Natural increase	4.6	-0.8
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-3.4	-2.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	677	+2.4	0.3
Outflows (2022)	890	-0.6	0.4

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/waje91>

Norway

Foreign-born population – 2022	16.6% of the population	Main countries of birth: Poland (12%), Sweden (5%), Lithuania (5%)
Size: 0.9 million, 48% women	Evolution since 2012: +46%	

In 2021, Norway received 39 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 16% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 50.5% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 10.7% labour migrants, 26.4% family members (including accompanying family) and 12.4% humanitarian migrants. Around 3 400 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 4 700 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Poland, Lithuania and Syria were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Poland registered the strongest increase (+4 400) in flows to Norway compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 190%, to reach around 4 700. The majority of applicants came from Syria (1 600), Ukraine (800, excluding temporary protection recipients) and Afghanistan (500). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Syria (+1 000). Of the 1 410 decisions taken in 2022, 78% were positive.

Emigration of Norwegian citizens to OECD countries increased by 20% in 2021, to 7 000. Approximately 18% of this group migrated to Spain, 18% to Denmark and 17% to Sweden.

Owing to the situation in Ukraine, some statutory requirements were reduced temporarily in 2022 and 2023, including provisions in the Integration Act that regulate the duration and obligation to participate in the Introduction Program and Norwegian Language Training.

Because of a shortage of high-skilled labour, the government increased the annual quota for skilled workers to 6 000 residence permits for the years 2022 and 2023, from a previous limit of 5 000. In 2021 and 2022, the Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Education (NOKUT) extended the system of automatic recognition to cover more countries.

From the fall semester of 2023, universities and colleges will charge at least cost-covering tuition fees from new degree students from outside the EEA and Switzerland.

Amendments to the Nationality Act, which took effect from January 2022, raise the general requirement for length of residence from seven of the last ten years to eight of the last eleven. Applicants with a specified minimum income level according to the most recent tax assessment are required to have resided in Norway for six out of the last ten years. From 1 October 2022, the Norwegian oral skills required for citizenship was raised from level A2 to B1.

The government presented its Action Plan to combat social dumping and work-related crime in October 2022. A new Action Plan against racism and ethnic discrimination will be launched in 2023.

As part of its national budget for 2022, Norway established a Special Initiative for Refugees, Displaced Populations and Host Communities and appointed a Special Envoy to oversee its further development.

Municipalities were asked to settle 38 000 refugees in 2023, an increase from 35 000 in 2022. Settling refugees is a voluntary matter for the municipalities which each municipality decides after receiving a request to settle a specific number of refugees from the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi).

In May 2023 allocations for integration and reception of asylum seekers in the national budget were increased by NOK 6 billion to account for arrivals from Ukraine. Of these, NOK 3 billion were allocated to increased integration costs and NOK 2.8 billion to the reception of asylum seekers.


Due to the general security situation in Sudan, in May 2023 the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board (UNE) and the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) temporarily suspended applicants' duty to return to Sudan after receiving a rejection of their application for a residence permit, until November 2023.

For further information: www.udi.no | www.imdi.no | www.regjeringen.no

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Norway

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Norway



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	160	- 9%
Seasonal workers	1 400	- 41%
Intra-company transfers	1 360	+ 58%
Other temporary workers	1 800	+ 32%


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	3 400	+ 69%
Trainees	1	- 98%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	4 650	+ 188%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Norwegian citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	11.7	+5.4
Natural increase	1.0	-1.6
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	10.6	+6.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	629	-6.4	0.1
Outflows (2022)	4 509	+13.0	0.8

Labour market outcomes 2022



Poland

Foreign-born population – 2022	2.5% of the population	Main countries of birth (2020, UNDESA): Ukraine (34%), Germany (12%), Belarus (12%)
Size: 1 million, 59% women	Evolution since 2012: +51%	

In 2021, 76 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Poland (excluding EU citizens), 10.9% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 56.2% labour migrants, 12.2% family members (including accompanying family) and 31.5% other migrants. In addition, Poland received 56 400 immigrants benefitting from free mobility. Around 46 000 short-term permits were issued to international students and 747 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 58 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -2% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (+44 000) and China the largest decrease (-200) in flows to Poland compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 23%, to reach around 7 700. The majority of applicants came from Belarus (2 900), Ukraine (1 500, excluding temporary protection recipients) and Russia (1 400). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Ukraine (+1 400) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-1 400). Of the 5 190 decisions taken in 2022, 75% were positive.

Emigration of Polish citizens to OECD countries increased by 4% in 2021, to 121 000. Approximately 42% of this group migrated to Germany, 21% to the Netherlands and 7% to Norway.

In January 2022, an amendment to the Act of foreigners came into force, aiming to simplify and speed up the procedures for employing foreigners. The requirement to provide documents confirming place of residence and a source of stable and regular income has been replaced by a minimum salary requirement corresponding to the legal minimum wage of PLN 3 490 gross per month (approx. EUR 775, increased to PLN 3 600, i.e. approx. EUR 800 from 1 July 2023). Under the law a new work permit is no longer required in the case of a change of employer or working conditions. In addition, a “priority route” has been introduced for those applying for work permits with entities of strategic importance to the Polish economy.

The period of employment of a foreigner, based on an employer’s declaration, is now possible for a period of 24 months (instead of 6 months within a 12-month period) for citizen of certain countries (currently Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). In October 2022, Russian citizens were excluded from the simplified employment procedures.

A proposal for a new law on the employment of foreigners was announced in 2022, aimed at accelerating the procedure of their employment by making it entirely electronic and eliminating the labour market test. The new system would instead introduce a maximum annual number of work permits and employer’s declaration on hiring a foreign worker issued, and reduce the period of residence and work permit from three years to one year.

In December 2022, the Office for Foreigners launched a new service online portal allowing foreigners to submit an application for a residence permit, fill in forms, correctly prepare documents and find out information on migration procedures. The website is available in seven languages.

The “Poland.Business Harbour” programme, launched in 2020 with the aim of supporting ICT sector entrepreneurs from selected countries, has been extended to include citizens of any country (as of 2022). The programme offers a simplified visa procedure.

From March 2023, citizens of Ukraine who stay in Poland in collective accommodation centres are obliged to contribute to the costs of accommodation and meals. Those staying for more than 120 days will cover 50% of the costs of assistance, with an upper limit of PLN 40 (about EUR 9) per person per day. People who live in collective accommodation centres for more than 180 days will cover 75% of the costs, but not more than PLN 60 (about EUR 13.5) per person per day. People who are unable to work or have childcare responsibilities are exempted from paying these costs.


In accordance with the provisions of the Act of 13 June 2003 on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of Poland (after the amendments of March and April 2022), non-Ukrainian nationals displaced from Ukraine can receive certificate which confirm using temporary protection. They can – at their request – be provided by the Office for Foreigners with medical care and assistance.

For further information: www.migrant.info.pl | www.emn.gov.pl | mos.cudzoziemcy.gov.pl/en

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Poland

Grants of long-term residence permits
2021 (Source: Eurostat)

Poland



Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	747 250	+ 62%
Family reasons	1 840	+ 2%
Education reasons	45 570	+ 68%
Other reason	96 510	+ 146%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	7 700	+ 23%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Polish citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	-3.7	+1.2
Natural increase	-3.9	+1.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.2	+0.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	6 399	-10.3	0.9
Outflows (2022)	10 835	+15.0	1.6

Labour market outcomes
2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/lmyzga>

Portugal

Foreign-born population – 2022	10.7% of the population	Main countries of birth: Brazil (25%), Angola (14%), France (9%)
Size: 1.1 million, 53% women	Evolution since 2012: +24%	

In 2021, Portugal received 94 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 11% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 28.3% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 41.2% labour migrants, 24.7% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.3% humanitarian migrants. Around 11 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level third-country students. In addition, 58 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a 99% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Brazil, India and Belgium were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Germany registered the strongest increase (+1 400) and Brazil the largest decrease (-2 800) in flows to Portugal compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 47%, to reach around 2000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (300), India (200) and Ukraine (200, excluding temporary protection recipients). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Ukraine (+200) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-300). Of the 870 decisions taken in 2022, 78% were positive.

Emigration of Portuguese citizens to OECD countries increased by 21% in 2021, to 47 000. Approximately 16% of this group migrated to France, 16% to Switzerland and 14% to Spain.

The Portuguese Government approved the creation of the Agency for Integration, Migration and Asylum (AIMA) early this April, having been later published the Decree-Law 41/2023, of 2 June, which establishes said creation of the Agency and its competencies. The Agency will succeed the High Commission for Migration (ACM), implementing public policies on migration and asylum, and the Immigration and Borders Service (SEF), whose police functions will be dispersed among other security forces and services.

In the summer of 2022, a law amending the Portuguese Immigration Law, known as the Foreigner's Law (Law No. 23/2007, of 4 July), was published. The new law introduces a job search visa and a digital nomad visa. Under the new job search visa, foreigners may stay in Portugal for six months to look for a job. If successful, they can change to a regular work permit without leaving the country. If not, they are barred from reapplying for another job search visa for one year. Under the new digital nomad visa, employed and self-employed individuals abroad may live in Portugal for up to one year. The eligibility criteria include a minimum income threshold equivalent to a monthly average of four minimum wages in the previous three months.

Another relevant change is the streamlining of visa issuances to citizens of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) under a Mobility Agreement among these countries. Under the new rules, consular posts may grant visas after checking the Schengen Information System for prior visa overstay and are no longer required to seek pre-approval from the Portuguese Immigration and Border Services (SEF).

Finally, some processes are simpler under the new law. International students automatically have the right to work. All visa approvals are automatically notified to the Employment Services, Social Security, Tax Authority and the Health Ministry, allowing social security, tax and national health numbers to be issued faster.

Portugal signed a bilateral labour agreement with Morocco in January 2022. Employers in Portugal will need to submit their hiring requests to the Portuguese Institute of Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP). The IEFP will then co-ordinate with Morocco's National Agency for Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC), who will recruit Moroccan nationals. Participants in the programme will be allowed to change employer after six months, or if their employment contract is terminated, and will be eligible for family reunification.


The Portuguese Government has automatically extended residence permits that expired or are set to expire in 2023 until the end of the year to address processing backlogs.

For further information: www.acm.gov.pt | www.om.acm.gov.pt | www.sef.pt

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Portugal

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Portugal



Temporary migration (Sources: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	10	- 85%
Family reasons
Education reasons
Other reason	640	+ 86%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	1 980	+ 47%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Portuguese citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	11.1	+13.0
Natural increase	-3.9	+0.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	15.0	+12.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	10 296	-3.3	4.1
Outflows (2021)	322	+25.8	0.1

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/ikqj3a>

Romania

Foreign-born population – 2021	3.6% of the population	Main countries of birth: Moldova (40%), Italy (11%), Spain (9%)
Size: 0.7 million, 46% women	Evolution since 2012: +309%	

In 2021, 23 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Romania (excluding EU citizens), 47.4% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 66.3% labour migrants, 15% family members (including accompanying family), 11.7% who came for education reasons and 7% other migrants. Around 1 400 short-term permits were issued to international students and 2 700 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 18 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a 3% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 33%, to reach around 12 000. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (4 400, excluding temporary protection recipients), India (1 500) and Bangladesh (1 400). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Ukraine (+4 400) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-3 500). Of the 4 070 decisions taken in 2022, 25% were positive.

Emigration of Romanian citizens to OECD countries increased by 2% in 2021, to 215 000. Approximately 43% of this group migrated to Germany, 13% to Italy and 8% to Austria.

Recent developments in migration policy in Romania have mainly concerned the transposition of several EU Directives or Regulations to simplify and improve migration and asylum management.

To attract and retain highly skilled workers, in 2022 Romania introduced a six-month digital nomad visa, allowing foreign nationals to live in Romania while working for companies outside the country. This allows eligible third country nationals to work more flexibly and with fewer constraints in Romania for a fixed period. Applicants need to prove significant financial means to be eligible for the visa.

One key priority for the government is to address labour market shortages. In that regard, Romanian authorities significantly raised the work permit quota in 2021. For 2023, as in 2022, Romanian authorities have set the quota at 100 000 for non-EU/EEA/Swiss nationals.

Migrant workers holding EU Blue Card and a Romanian single permit can no longer change employers within the first year of employment without the written consent of their current employer. This measure does not apply if the termination of the individual employment contract took place at the initiative of the previous employer or as a result of the agreement of the parties, or by the resignation of the foreigner if the employer does not fulfil the obligations assumed by the individual employment contract, under the conditions provided by Law no. 53/2003, republished, with subsequent amendments and additions. This measure does not apply to seasonal workers.

Legislative amendments in 2022 extended the period in which foreign workers can apply a long-stay visa for employment from 60 to 180 days after the employer obtains their work permit. In addition, visas are issued by the National Visa Centre within 20 days of application submission, compared with 10 days previously. These provisions aim at easing the administrative burden and facilitating the employment of foreigners in Romania. In addition, to ensure a better distribution of the workload from immigration offices, employers and foreign nationals may now have their legal representative submit work or posting permit applications at any offices of the General Inspectorate for Immigration.

Other changes in migration and asylum policy in Romania in 2022 mainly came in response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis. Romania adopted a National Plan to protect and integrate displaced individuals from Ukraine who have received temporary protection. This plan outlines various solutions to ensure their access to the labour market, health services, education, and housing. Romania also put together a decision-making structure to ensure efficient institutional co-ordination and co-operation to receive and integrate Ukrainian refugees, both in the short and medium term. The government signed on Operational Plan with the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) in support of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive. The EUAA supported Romania through the provision of information for Ukrainian refugees and training, capacity building and administrative support to Romanian authorities.


Finally, in December 2022, the European Union Council did not approve the requests of Romania and Bulgaria to join the Schengen zone despite positive recommendation from the European Commission.

For further information: www.alba.insse.ro | www.mai.gov.ro | www.igi.mai.gov.ro

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Romania

Grants of long-term residence permits
2021 (Source: Eurostat)

Romania



Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	2 740	+ 277%
Family reasons	690	+ 70%
Education reasons	1 370	+ 57%
Other reason	420	+ 92%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	12 065	+ 33%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Romanian citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	0.5	+8.8
Natural increase	-4.6	+2.8
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.1	+6.0

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	8 660	-5.0	2.9
Outflows (2022)	960	+49.5	0.3

Labour market outcomes
2021



Slovak Republic

Foreign-born population – 2022	4.2% of the population	Main countries of birth: Czech Republic (47%), United Kingdom (6%), Ukraine (6%)
Size: 0.2 million, 48% women	Evolution since 2012: +34%	

In 2021, 23 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in the Slovak Republic (excluding EU citizens), 52.2% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 75.2% labour migrants, 11.6% family members (including accompanying family), 10.5% who came for education reasons and 2.8% other migrants. In addition, the Slovak Republic received 1 600 immigrants benefitting from free mobility. Around 300 short-term permits were issued to international students and 4 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 14 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -20% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, the Czech Republic registered the largest decrease (-200) in flows to the Slovak Republic compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 53%, to reach around 500. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (200, excluding temporary protection recipients), Türkiye (75) and Morocco (70). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Ukraine (+200) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-75). Of the 150 decisions taken in 2022, 47% were positive.

Emigration of Slovak citizens to OECD countries decreased by -9% in 2021, to 27 000. Approximately 26% of this group migrated to the Czech Republic, 20% to Germany and 15% to Austria.

On 1 June 2022, an amendment to Act 480/2002 on Asylum came into force, introducing significant changes to the primary integration of asylum seekers and foreigners granted subsidiary protection. The main changes include a revised hierarchy of protection statuses, giving priority to subsidiary protection, followed by family reunification and humanitarian reasons. In addition, the benefits available to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have been expanded. The amendment also requires social and psychological counselling as well as cultural orientation courses. To promote integration and facilitate financial independence, the waiting period for access to the labour market has been reduced from nine to six months, while access to the labour market is without the obligation to obtain a work permit. Finally, the amendment introduces a provision for a period of absence from reception centres, the so-called “long-term pass”.

In addition, as of April 2022, highly skilled non-EU nationals can apply for a temporary work permit, known as the National Visa for the purpose of looking for a job for a period of three months or a job for one year. The main objective of the National Visa is to meet the demand for highly skilled professionals in the information technology sector, an industry that has experienced difficulties both nationally and globally from April 2022, national visas for selected groups of third country nationals – truck and bus drivers with quotas from selected countries are valid. This visa allows them to work in the country for up to one year, with the possibility of extension. Compared to other types of permits, the National Visa is less administratively complex, allowing both new and relocating employees to start working in the Slovak Republic sooner.

To address shortages in the healthcare sector, changes to the training of third-country healthcare professionals were introduced in October 2022. The reform focuses on improving employment opportunities by streamlining the recognition of qualifications and simplifying language requirements. Migrant health workers with recognised qualifications will now be able to undertake temporary work placements to gain experience and improve their chances of future employment.


New legislative changes came into force on 1 January 2023, affecting both EU and non-EU nationals. Key changes include the abolition of the labour market test for certain categories of workers, such as third-country nationals applying for the renewal of a single permit or blue card without changing job positions. Employers must submit information cards for EU nationals on assignment or secondment to the Labour Office within seven days, thus strengthening administrative compliance. Non-EU nationals can continue working under an expired permit during the renewal process if the renewal application is submitted at least 90 days before the permit expires. In addition, non-EU nationals with a residence permit for family reunification only need to apply for a work permit for the first nine months of their stay, allowing for greater access to the labour market thereafter.

For further information: www.minv.sk

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Slovak Republic

Grants of long-term residence permits
2021 (Source: Eurostat)

Slovak Republic



Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	4 230	+ 143%
Family reasons	990	+ 44%
Education reasons	260	- 21%
Other reason	140	+ 57%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	505	+ 53%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Slovak citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	-1.1	+3.5
Natural increase	-1.3	+1.8
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.2	+1.7

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	2 147	-11.6	1.9
Outflows (2022)	517	+17.3	0.5

Labour market outcomes
2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/i8dhm2>

Slovenia

Foreign-born population – 2022	14% of the population	Main countries of birth: Bosnia and Herzegovina (45%), Croatia (14%), Serbia (10%)
Size: 0.3 million, 42% women	Evolution since 2012: +28%	

In 2021, 19 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Slovenia (excluding EU citizens), 52.9% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 70.9% labour migrants, 28% family members (including accompanying family), 0.4% who came for education reasons and 0.7% other migrants. In addition, Slovenia received 2 700 immigrants benefitting from free mobility. Around 1 200 short-term permits were issued to international students and 4 700 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 13 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a 13% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Bulgaria registered the strongest increase (+28) and Bosnia and Herzegovina the largest decrease (-3 000) in flows to Slovenia compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 27%, to reach around 6 600. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (1 200), India (900) and Bangladesh (800). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of India (+800) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-1 400). Of the 350 decisions taken in 2022, 59% were positive.

Emigration of Slovenian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -4% in 2021, to 4 600. Approximately 33% of this group migrated to Austria, 21% to Germany and 13% to Switzerland.

In July 2022, the Ministry of the Interior together with other stakeholders established Consultative Body on Migration, with the aim of defining a new migration strategy, reinforce dialogue with the civil society, and adapt the legislation. In addition, the Working group for the preparation of the strategy of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia in the area of migration was established on 19 October 2022.

The amendments to the Foreigners Act entered into force on 27 April 2023, focusing primarily on faster and more effective procedures for obtaining residence permit/EU registration certificate. Single permit applications for professions in the fields of healthcare, social welfare, education and training will be given priority. Furthermore, the renewed legislation provisions the adoption of an integration strategy for third-country citizens. The amendments also refer to fingerprinting, periodical verification of means of subsistence provision abolished) and extended Slovenian language and society courses. The amendment, however, does not change the language proficiency requirement at the entry level for the extension of a temporary residence permit for the purpose of family reunification and at the basic level for the obtaining a permanent residence permit – these two conditions will enter into force on 1 November 2024. In addition to that, new amendment to the Foreigners Act is in the pipeline, focusing primarily on the implementation of the revised EU Blue Card Directive and the ETIAS Regulation.

Amendments to the law on the employment of foreigners were adopted in March 2023. The aim is to address labour shortages by speeding up the recruitment of immigrant workers from abroad or through status changes while ensuring adequate working conditions and fair remuneration. Employer or job changes will now be possible without any administrative procedure, solely with the consent of the public employment service and during the validity of the single permit. This law does not apply to foreigners who will be employed in a public sector by employers who carry out healthcare and social welfare activities. Thus, the employment service will not assess the labour market, employers or the foreigner nor the legal conditions regarding the foreigner's employment. The administrative unit will issue a single residence and work permit without the consent of the employment service for this category of foreigners. Furthermore, the asylum seekers will now be able to access the labour market three months after the application has been registered.


Concerning application of the EU Temporary Protection Directive, Slovenia implemented amendments of the Decree on the methods for ensuring rights of persons enjoying temporary protection in December 2022. The main change is the financial assistance provision for private accommodation, which will be granted either for six months or for the duration of the rental contract, in case it is shorter than six months.

In December 2022, Slovenia agreed to resettle 50 refugees from Afghanistan and Syria from Türkiye.

For further information: www.stat.si | <https://www.gov.si/en/news> | www.infotujci.si

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Slovenia

Grants of long-term residence permits
2021 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Employment reasons	4 670	+ 55%
Family reasons	2 220	+ 12%
Education reasons	1 510	- 14%
Other reason	10	+ 0%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	6 645	+ 27%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Slovenian citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	4.6	+5.5
Natural increase	-2.3	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	6.9	+5.7

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	688	-7.9	1.1
Outflows (2022)	341	-2.9	0.5

Labour market outcomes
2022



Spain

Foreign-born population – 2022	15.6% of the population	Main countries of birth: Morocco (12%), Colombia (8%), Romania (7%)
Size: 7.4 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2012: +17%	

In 2021, Spain received 370 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 14% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 30.6% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 10.6% labour migrants, 40.2% family members (including accompanying family) and 6.7% humanitarian migrants. Around 42 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 28 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 88 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a 7% increase compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Morocco, Colombia and Italy were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Morocco registered the strongest increase (+14 100) and Colombia the largest decrease (-11 600) in flows to Spain compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 87%, to reach around 116 000. The majority of applicants came from Venezuela (45 000), Colombia (36 000) and Peru (8 900). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Venezuela (+30 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Mali (-2 800). Of the 83 000 decisions taken in 2022, 42% were positive.

Emigration of Spanish citizens to OECD countries increased by 26% in 2021, to 73 000. Approximately 18% of this group migrated to Germany, 16% to France and 12% to the Netherlands.

In July 2022, the government reformed its General Immigration Law to address persistent labour shortages and promote regular migration. The new legislation expands work permits for foreign students, lowers income requirements for foreign nationals sponsoring minors, streamlines the process for certifying occupations affected by chronic labour shortages, and extends temporary work-related residence permits from two to four years with more flexible renewals. In addition, the reform provides new opportunities for irregular migrants to regularise their stay, including work and residence permits based on six months of formal employment or a 12-months training permit based on two years of stay. The eligibility requirements and geographical scope for self-employment have also been relaxed. The establishment of a new immigration agency, the Unit for the Processing of Aliens Record (UTEX), aims to ensure consistent and efficient application of immigration regulations across all territories.

In October 2022, Spain adopted new regulations to streamline procedures for recognising foreign university degrees. Spanish authorities will launch an online platform for their recognition to replace in-person submissions, provide online status tracking for applicants and reduce processing times.

In December 2022, the Law for the Promotion of the Startup Ecosystem extended the maximum initial validity of permits granted under the Entrepreneurs Act from two to three years and eased permit requirements, for example by broadening the definition of “highly qualified professionals” and “entrepreneurial activity”. The law also created a digital nomad visa, which allows third-country nationals working remotely for companies outside Spain to stay for one year (renewable for up to 5 years), subject to certain conditions.

Spain has taken steps to promote circular migration, including the launch of a new edition of the Collective Management of Recruitment in Origin (GECCO) programme in September 2022. The updated programme aims to bring more than 16 000 seasonal workers from Morocco to work in Spain’s agricultural sector. Spain is also collaborating with Canada and the United States to promote legal migration from Latin America. It signed a circular migration agreement with Guatemala in January 2023 that, together with previous agreements with other Latin American countries, is expected to bring around 2000 seasonal workers to Spain in 2023.

Spain has taken measures to ensure comprehensive and safe reception of humanitarian migrants, including approving EUR 392 million in grants to 20 entities involved in refugee reception in July 2022. In addition, Spanish authorities implemented, together with UNHCR, an action protocol on gender-based violence in the reception system and signed an agreement with the President of the Spanish Olympic Committee to promote sports integration in the reception system.


As of December 2022, Spain lifted all COVID-19-related restrictions at its external borders.

For further information: www.inclusion.gob.es | www.boe.es | www.exteriores.gob.es

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Spain

Long-term immigration flows
2021 (Source: OECD)

Spain



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	15 500	- 17%
Intra-company transfers	1 450	+ 157%
Other temporary workers	10 830	+ 32%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	41 550	+ 103%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	116 150	+ 87%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Spanish citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022	2022/21
	Per 1 000 inhabitants	difference
Total	11.8	+11.1
Natural increase	-2.8	-0.4
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	14.6	+11.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	9 254	-1.6	0.7
Outflows (2022)	405	+55.4	0.0

Labour market outcomes
2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/rsd8ij>

Sweden

Foreign-born population – 2022	20.1% of the population	Main countries of birth: Syria (9%), Iraq (7%), Finland (7%)
Size: 2.1 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2012: +46%	

In 2021, Sweden received 91 300 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 14% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 27.7% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 17.8% labour migrants, 42% family members (including accompanying family) and 12.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 8 500 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 7 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 58 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -6% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

India, Syria and Germany were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, India registered the strongest increase (+2000) and Afghanistan the largest decrease (-400) in flows to Sweden compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 38%, to reach around 14 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (1 800), Ukraine (1 800, excluding temporary protection recipients) and Afghanistan (800). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Ukraine (+1 400) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-400). Of the 10 000 decisions taken in 2022, 34% were positive.

Emigration of Swedish citizens to OECD countries increased by 21% in 2021, to 19 000. Approximately 16% of this group migrated to Spain, 11% to Norway and 10% to Türkiye.

The new government, which took office in October 2022, announced a paradigm shift in Swedish migration policy, with stricter migration and asylum legislation and an overall aim to reduce immigration to Sweden.

In November 2022, the Swedish Migration Agency was tasked by the new government to plan for a reduced number of quota refugees from 5 000 per year to 900 in 2023.

In May 2023, the government announced measures to introduce stricter conditions for low-skilled labour immigration and improved conditions for highly skilled labour. A proposal to increase the minimum salary threshold for work permits has been put forward. The new salary level is set to SEK 26 560, which corresponds to 80% of the median salary. This follows the decision in November 2022 to increase the minimum salary threshold as a mean to combat exploitation and reduce the number of unqualified labour migrants in the country. The new rules are due to come into force in October 2023.

In parallel, the Swedish Migration Agency has been given a mandate to promote highly qualified labour migration. This will include the introduction of a new model, introduced in late 2023, for handling work permit cases and establishing international recruitment units. The new model encourages employers to hire highly qualified workers from outside the EU by providing them with better service, including shortening the processing time for all labour market cases. The aim is to reduce the work permit application process time to a maximum of 30 days for highly qualified workers. The introduction of the new model is planned for the end of 2023.

The government aims to tighten the requirements to receive social benefits and become a Swedish citizen. A government inquiry will examine a new model for welfare qualification, whereby newly arrived immigrants will not immediately qualify for social benefits and allowances. Another inquiry will look at citizenship. Swedish language skills and knowledge of Swedish society will be required in order to qualify for Swedish citizenship, and other requirements will become stricter. The inquiry will investigate requirements for self-sufficiency, stricter requirements for an honest lifestyle, a longer period of residence and an obligatory declaration of loyalty. The inquiry will also present proposals that make it possible to revoke citizenship in certain cases.


The government has announced its aim to increase the number of returns and initiatives for repatriation by encouraging more collaboration between the Swedish Migration Agency, the Swedish Police and the Swedish Tax Agency. The capacity of detention centres will continue to increase and alternatives to detention will be investigated. Information campaigns aimed at increasing knowledge about available repatriation support will be launched. New legislation is also aimed at facilitating expulsion due to crime.

For further information: www.regeringen.se | www.migrationsverket.se | www.government.se/government-policy/swedens-new-migration-policy

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Sweden

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Sweden



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	400	- 75%
Seasonal workers	5 550	+ 59%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	1 170	..


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	8 530	+ 29%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	14 075	+ 38%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Swedish citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	6.6	-0.4
Natural increase	1.0	-1.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.6	+0.7

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	3 521	+5.5	0.6
Outflows (2022)	3 668	+2.7	0.6

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/rxpo56>

Switzerland

Foreign-born population – 2022	30.7% of the population	Main countries of birth: Germany (14%), Italy (10%), Portugal (8%)
Size: 2.7 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2012: +24%	

In 2021, Switzerland received 123 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 4.1% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 76.6% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 1.9% labour migrants, 11.8% family members (including accompanying family) and 6.6% humanitarian migrants. Around 6 100 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 48 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Germany, Italy and France were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Germany registered the strongest increase (+1 400) and the United Kingdom the largest decrease (-1 400) in flows to Switzerland compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 74%, to reach around 23 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (6 900), Türkiye (4 700) and Eritrea (1 600). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (+4 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Eritrea (-100). Of the 12 000 decisions taken in 2022, 86% were positive.

Emigration of Swiss citizens to OECD countries increased by 13% in 2021, to 9 800. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Germany, 17% to Spain and 8% to the Netherlands.

Switzerland has implemented in 2023 relaxed rules for highly skilled Third-country nationals, which include the lift of the labour market test for labour migrants working in industries with a skills shortage, and the eligibility for a residence permit even without an academic education. Foreign nationals who have been granted a B-permit with no restrictions or conditions, may apply for self-employment through a facilitated procedure.

In November 2022, Switzerland invoked the safeguard clause for Croatia. This clause temporarily reintroduced quotas on the number of permits issued to Croatian nationals as immigration from that country exceeds a certain threshold. Therefore, in 2023, restrictions will apply on the number of short-stay permits and work/residence permits issued to Croatian nationals.

Visa applications from earthquake victims in Türkiye and Syria, whose home has been destroyed and who can temporarily stay with close relatives in Switzerland, were given priority until 12 May 2023. If the person intends to stay for more than 90 days, they require a permit.

Following the changes introduced in the EU's modernised Professional Qualifications Directive, recognition of qualifications' procedures among EU mobile citizens are now carried out entirely online.

The protection status S for Ukrainians has been extended by one year and also extends the specific support measures. Federal funding focuses in particular to promote language learning so that Ukrainians can quickly take up employment and become socially integrated. As of 2023, status "S" holders aged above 15 can apply and complete an apprenticeship (i.e. participation in a formal company training programme with cantonal approval) in Switzerland, even if the "S" status for temporary protection has been lifted before completion. If "S" status is lifted, the State Secretariat for Migration will examine the applications on a case-by-case basis and approve those that meet the criteria.

Following a recent judgment from the Swiss Federal Court, as of October 2022, nationals of countries with which Switzerland has concluded a settlement agreement (Austria, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) must meet the same integration conditions as nationals of other countries and submit a certificate proving that they passed an A2 (spoken) and A1 level (written) language test (under the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages) after an uninterrupted stay of five years in Switzerland. Exceptions include tertiary-educated foreign nationals with the same native language as the one spoken in their place of residence or with recognised language proficiency.


Since 2018, the pre-apprenticeship integration programme PAI+ has prepared refugees and asylum seekers to integrate the labour market through apprenticeship. The programme has been extended to young adults outside of the asylum channel since 2021, and to Ukrainians with S status since 2022. From May 2022, the R programme supported Cantons to implement ad hoc measures for immigrants who have fled their country of origin. The programme aims to avoid social isolation, strengthen their resources and skills, and help them integrate into the labour market.

For further information: www.sem.admin.ch

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Switzerland

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

Switzerland



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, Eurostat)

Temporary labour migration

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	47 810	+ 7%


Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	6 080	+ 10%
Trainees	120	+ 33%


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	23 130	+ 74%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Swiss citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	8.4	+0.5
Natural increase	0.9	-1.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	7.5	+1.8

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	2 620	-4.3	0.3
Outflows (2022)	31 906	+1.0	4.0

Labour market outcomes 2022



StatLink <https://stat.link/5gsptk>

Türkiye

Foreign-born population – 2022	3.9% of the population	Main countries of birth: Bulgaria (11%), Germany (10%), Syria (9%)
Size: 3.2 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2014: +122%	

In 2021, Türkiye received 615 000 new immigrants, more than twice than in 2020. Iraq, Iran and Uzbekistan were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Iran registered the strongest increase (+54 000) and Germany the largest decrease (-5 500) in flows to Türkiye compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 14%, to reach around 33 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (19 000), Ukraine (7 100, excluding temporary protection recipients) and Iraq (4 100). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Iran (+100) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-2 500). Of the 70 000 decisions taken in 2022, 18% were positive.

Emigration of Turkish citizens to OECD countries increased by 34% in 2021, to 71 000. Approximately 41% of this group migrated to Germany, 10% to the Netherlands and 7% to France.

In September 2021, the provincial borders of Ankara were closed to temporary protection registration as part of efforts led by the Ankara Governor's Office, Migration Management, Gendarmerie and Police units. Additionally, Syrians with temporary protection status residing in Ankara, but registered in other provinces, were identified and sent back to their registered provinces. These decisions were made to enhance the regulation and management of foreigners' residence in the country.



In October 2021, the former "Directorate General of Migration Management" was renamed "Presidency of Migration Management (PMM)" with the issuance of Official Gazette No: 30479. The PMM is responsible for managing and implementing migration issues in the country, assessment of the residence permits applications, removal of foreigners and other migration-related issues.

In 2022, Türkiye continued its promotion of investment opportunities for foreigners by linking investment opportunities to residence permits and naturalisation. Law No. 6 458 on foreigners and international protection provides for issuance and the extension of short-term residence permits through the purchase of immovable property. Foreigners can also obtain Turkish citizenship by purchasing real estate with a value equal to USD 400 000 or by making an investment of minimum of USD 500 000 or its equivalent in foreign currency via defined financial instruments in Türkiye, provided that the investment is not withdrawn for at least three years, or by creating employment of at least 50 within Türkiye. The conditions for obtaining Turkish citizenship through an investment programme, first introduced in 2016, were made stricter in 2022 owing to the high demand for foreign citizenship.

The Turkish Presidency took significant steps to enhance the quality of higher education institutions and support international students in 2022 through the Turkish Scholarship programme. The monthly stipends for university students, including doctoral students, have been raised by between TRY 200-300. More opportunities for short-term students and students in STEM subjects were also made available.

For further information: www.goc.gov.tr | www.nvi.gov.tr/turk-vatandasliginin-kazanimasi | www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Türkiye



Components of population growth


	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	7.1	-5.6
Natural increase	6.2	+0.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.8	+0.0

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	694	-4.1	0.1
Outflows (2022)	731	+15.8	0.1

Labour market outcomes

2020 compared to 2022 OECD average



StatLink  <https://stat.link/8qnye3>

United Kingdom

Foreign-born population – 2021	14.3% of the population	Main countries of birth: India (9%), Poland (7%), Pakistan (5%)
Size: 9.6 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2012: +27%	

In 2021, the United Kingdom received 386 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 65% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 21.2% labour migrants, 51.5% family members (including accompanying family) and 11.3% humanitarian migrants. Around 368 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 72 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 38 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2021, a -39% decrease compared to 2020. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

India, China and Italy were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 58%, to reach around 89 000. The majority of applicants came from Albania (16 000), Afghanistan (11 000) and Iran (9 200). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Albania (+11 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Eritrea (-1 700). Of the 33 000 decisions taken in 2022, 60% were positive.

Emigration of citizens of the United Kingdom to OECD countries decreased by -29% in 2021, to 88 000. Approximately 29% of this group migrated to Spain, 12% to the United States and 11% to Australia.

In June 2022, the UK Government introduced significant policy changes to its border and legal migration system, with the aim of establishing a secure and efficient border system that prioritises national safety and prosperity. The government's main legislative efforts of 2022-23 have focused on stopping undocumented migration, in particular those arriving across the Channel in small boats.

There has been an increase in visa applications and grants compared to pre-pandemic levels.

In December 2022, the UK Government confirmed that 45 000 visas will be available for seasonal horticultural workers for 2023 with a further 2000 visas available for poultry to meet the increase in demand in the run-up to Christmas. A further 10 000 places will be released if there is sufficient evidence of need, and contingent with improvements in worker welfare. The UK Government has also added a mandatory hour's requirement to the Immigration Rules which ensures that all workers will receive a guaranteed 32 hours of paid employment per week and have raised the minimum hourly rate in line with the increases to the National Living Wage and compliance activity for the route was increased with the addition of a dedicated compliance visit team.

In 2023, the United Kingdom is starting the phased implementation of its Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) scheme for individuals who do not require a visa to enter the country. An ETA is an electronic permission linked to the passport and is required for visits, including tourism, seeing family or friends, business trips, short-term study, and transit even without going through border control. Applications can be made through the UK ETA app or online, with a decision usually provided within three working days. The ETA is valid for two years and can be used for multiple visits, but it does not guarantee entry to the United Kingdom.

Under the Innovator Founder route, entrepreneurs and individuals can establish innovative, viable, and scalable businesses in the United Kingdom. Notably, the minimum fund requirement of GBP 50 000 has been removed, and restrictions on Innovator Founders engaging in employment outside their business have been relaxed. These policy changes aim to attract talented entrepreneurs with ground-breaking business ideas, facilitating economic growth and fostering a vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem in the United Kingdom.


As of April 2023, the UK Government has introduced changes to the annual salary requirements for skilled worker visa applications. Applicants must be paid whichever is the highest of GBP 26 200 per year (up from GBP 25 600), GBP 10.75 per hour (up from GBP 10.10) or the going rate for the particular occupation. These updates reflect the latest available UK-wide salary data. As before, the requirements can be reduced through tradeable points. A new flexibility has also been introduced – usually when an applicant is sponsored to work over 48 hours per week, only the salary for the initial 48 hours is taken into consideration. The new exception allows for irregular working patterns. More than 48 hours in some weeks can be considered, provided the average over a regular cycle remains at or below 48 hours per week.

For further information: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office | www.gov.uk/government/collections/migration-statistics

Key figures on immigration and emigration – United Kingdom

Long-term immigration flows 2021 (Source: OECD)

United Kingdom



Temporary migration (Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	8 310	+ 4%
Seasonal workers	29 590	+ 310%
Intra-company transfers	12 890	+ 46%
Other temporary workers	20 930	+ 45%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2021	2021/20
International students	367 500	+ 66%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	89 395	+ 58%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of United Kingdom citizens to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2021 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2021/20 difference
Total	-0.8	-5.1
Natural increase	0.7	-0.9
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.6	-0.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	3 877	+12.1	0.1
Outflows (2022)	10 768	+4.8	0.4

Labour market outcomes 2022



United States

Foreign-born population – 2022	14% of the population	Main countries of birth: Mexico (25%), India (6%), China (4%)
Size: 47.3 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2012: +15%	

In 2021, the United States received 835 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 44% more than in 2020. This figure comprises 12.5% labour migrants, 76% family members (including accompanying family) and 5.8% humanitarian migrants. Around 399 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 653 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Mexico, India and China were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2021. Among the top 15 countries of origin, India registered the strongest increase (+46 800) and Viet Nam the largest decrease (-13 400) in flows to the United States compared to the previous year.

In 2022, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 290%, to reach around 730 000. The majority of applicants came from Cuba (157 000), Venezuela (139 000) and Honduras (43 000). The largest increase since 2021 concerned nationals of Cuba (+144 000) and the largest decrease nationals of China (4 600). Of the 226 000 decisions taken in 2022, 21% were positive.

Emigration of United States citizens to OECD countries increased by 36% in 2021, to 102 000. Approximately 12% of this group migrated to Canada, 9% to Spain and 9% to the United Kingdom.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is engaged in a number of initiatives intended to reduce barriers to legal immigration and promote citizenship and integration.

On 15 March 2022, the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 was enacted. The EB-5 Program allows eligible investors to apply for lawful permanent residence under certain conditions. The new legislation, among other things, authorises a new Regional Center Program through 30 September 2027. USCIS is in the process of updating policies and regulations to implement the new statutory requirements.

Several changes were made to the green card system. Since December 2022, green cards have been automatically extended for all lawful permanent residents who apply for naturalisation, in lieu of having to renew their documentation in case of its expiration. In January 2023, USCIS presented a redesign of green cards and employment authorisation documents, which include new fraud protection technology.

In September 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published a final rule to preserve and fortify Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). USCIS continues to accept DACA renewal applications but is enjoined by court order from reviewing initial DACA requests.

Also in September 2022, DHS published a final rule to provide clarity and consistency for noncitizens on how DHS applies the public charge ground of inadmissibility. Under the rule, a noncitizen is deemed to be inadmissible if they are likely at any time to become primarily dependent on the government for subsistence. Non-cash government benefits such as Medicaid and nutritional assistance are excluded from consideration.

During 2022-23, DHS announced designations or extensions of temporary protected status (TPS) for nationals of South Sudan, Ukraine, Sudan, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Syria, Venezuela, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Haiti, Yemen, Somalia, El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal and Nicaragua.


Following an increase in the backlog of visa applications during the pandemic and extended wait times for interview appointments, temporary changes were made to the visa application system for 2022. The Department of State temporarily waived in-person interview requirements for certain non-immigrant visa categories and for many renewals. In December 2022, the waiver was extended until end of 2023.

Border restrictions due to the Title 42 public health order, which allowed for the expulsion of asylum seekers, ended on 11 May 2023 with the termination of the public health emergency declared with respect to COVID-19. The emergency powers were enacted by the previous administration in March 2020 to prevent cross border spread of COVID-19. Around 2.8 million people were expelled while the order was in place.

Finally, the Presidential Determinations on Refugee Admissions in 2022 and 2023 were increased to a ceiling of 125 000, the highest target in several decades.

For further information: www.whitehouse.gov/priorities | www.dhs.gov | www.uscis.gov | www.state.gov

Key figures on immigration and emigration – United States



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration



	2021	2021/20
Working holidaymakers	39 650	+ 701%
Seasonal workers	421 750	+ 53%
Intra-company transfers	39 350	+ 111%
Other temporary workers	151 590	+ 94%

Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	399 020	+ 288%
Trainees	560	+ 83%

Humanitarian

	2022	2022/21
Asylum seekers	730 400	+ 287%




Components of population growth

	2022 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2022/21 difference
Total	3.8	+2.2
Natural increase	0.7	+0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.0	+1.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	7 079	+2.6	0.0
Outflows (2022)	79 153	+8.9	0.3



Notes and data sources

Foreign-born population

National sources and Secretariat estimates. Sources and notes are available in the statistical annex (see metadata for Tables A.4 and B.4).

Long-term immigration flows

The statistics are generally based on residence and work permit data and have been standardised, to the extent possible, except for Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, for which the source is Eurostat's database on first permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship (Table migr_resfirst).

Temporary migration

Residence or work permit data. Data on temporary workers do not generally cover workers who benefit from a free circulation agreement. Students exclude secondary education and vocational training. For Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the source is Eurostat's database on first permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship (migr_resfirst).

Inflows of asylum seekers. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (www.unhcr.org/statistics); Eurostat.

Inflows of top 10 nationalities

OECD countries: sources and notes are available in the statistical annex (metadata related to Tables A.1 and B.1).

Bulgaria: Number of new permanent and long-term residence permits granted (Source: Ministry of the Interior); Romania: Changes in permanent residence (Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook).

Emigration of nationals to OECD countries

Sum of the inflows of the country's citizens to OECD countries.

Components of population growth

European countries: Population change – Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Eurostat); other countries: national sources.

Annual remittances

World Bank calculation based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks.

Labour market outcomes

European countries and Türkiye: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat).

Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys.

Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN).

Japan: Population census 2020.

Korea: Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force and Economically Active Population Survey of Korean nationals (the rates refer to the long term resident foreign born population aged 15-59 who is foreign or was naturalised within the last five years).

Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE).

United States: Current Population Surveys.

Annex A. Statistical annex

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

A.1. Inflows of foreign population into OECD countries

B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality

A.2. Outflows of foreign population from selected OECD countries

Metadata relative to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2. Inflows and outflows of foreign population

Inflows of asylum seekers

A.3. Inflows of asylum seekers into OECD countries

B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.3 and B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

A.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries

B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth

Metadata relative to Tables A.4 and B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population

A.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality in OECD countries

B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.5 and B.5. Stocks of foreign population

Acquisitions of nationality

A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries

B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.6 and B.6. Acquisitions of nationality

Introduction

Most of the data published in this annex have been provided by national correspondents of the OECD Expert Group on Migration appointed by the OECD Secretariat with the approval of the authorities of member countries. Consequently, these data are not necessarily based on common definitions. Countries under review in this annex are OECD countries for which data are available. The OECD Expert Group on Migration has no authority to impose changes in data collection procedures. It is an observatory which, by its very nature, has to use existing statistics. However, it does play an active role in suggesting what it considers to be essential improvements in data collection and makes every effort to present consistent and well-documented statistics.

The purpose of this annex is to describe the “immigrant” population (generally the foreign-born population). The information gathered concerns the flows and stocks of the total immigrant population as well as the acquisition of nationality. These data have not been standardised and are therefore not fully comparable across countries. In particular, the criteria for registering persons in population registers and the conditions for granting residence permits, for example, vary across countries, which means that measurements may differ greatly even if the same type of source is being used.

In addition to the problem of the comparability of statistics, there is the difficulty of the very partial coverage of unauthorised migrants. Part of this population may be counted in censuses. Regularisation programmes, when they exist, make it possible to identify and enumerate a far from negligible fraction of unauthorised immigrants after the fact. In terms of measurement, this makes it possible to better measure the volume of the foreign-born population at a given time, even if it is not always possible to determine the year these immigrants entered the country.

Each series in the annex is preceded by an explanatory note concerning the data presented. A summary table then follows (series A, giving the total for each destination country), and finally the tables by nationality or country of birth, as the case may be (series B). At the end of each series, a table provides the sources and notes for the data presented in the tables for each country.

General comments

The tables provide annual series covering the period 2011-21 or 2012-22.

- The series A tables are presented in alphabetical order by the name of the country. In the other tables, nationalities or countries of birth are ranked by decreasing order of frequency for the last year available.
- In the tables by country of origin (series B), only the 15 main countries are shown. “Other countries” is a residual calculated as the difference between the total foreign or foreign-born population and the sum for all countries indicated in the table. For some countries, data are not available for all years and this is reflected in the residual entry of “Other countries”. This must be borne in mind when interpreting changes in this category.
- There is no table by nationality for the series on outflows of the foreign population (series A.2). These statistics, as well as data by gender, are available online (<http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/keystat.htm>).
- The rounding of data cells may cause totals to differ slightly from the sum of the component cells.
- The symbol “..” used in the tables means that the data are not available.
- Figures in *italic* are estimated by the Secretariat.

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

OECD countries seldom have tools specifically designed to measure the inflows and outflows of the foreign population, and national estimates are generally based either on population registers or residence permit data. This note describes more systematically what is measured by each of the sources used.

Flows derived from population registers

Population registers can usually produce inflow and outflow data for both nationals and foreigners. To register, foreigners may have to indicate possession of an appropriate residence and/or work permit valid for at least as long as the minimum registration period. Emigrants are usually identified by a stated intention to leave the country, although the period of (intended) absence is not always specified.

In population registers, departures tend to be less well recorded than arrivals. Indeed, the emigrant who plans to return to the host country in the future may be reluctant to inform about his departure to avoid losing rights related to the presence on the register. Registration criteria vary considerably across countries; in particular the minimum duration of stay for individuals to be registered ranges from three months to one year, which poses major problems of international comparisons. For example, in some countries, register data cover many temporary migrants, in some cases including asylum seekers when they live in private households (as opposed to reception centres or hostels for immigrants) and international students.

Flows derived from residence and/or work permits

Statistics on permits are generally based on the number of permits issued during a given period and depend on the types of permits used. The so-called “settlement countries” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) consider as immigrants persons who have been granted the right of permanent residence, and this right is often granted upon arrival. Statistics on temporary immigrants are also published in this annex for these countries. In the case of France, the permits covered are those valid for at least one year (excluding students).

Another characteristic of permit data is that flows of nationals are not recorded. Some flows of foreigners may also not be recorded, either because the type of permit they hold is not included in the statistics or because they are not required to have a permit (freedom of movement agreements). In addition, permit data do not necessarily reflect physical flows or actual lengths of stay since: i) permits may be issued overseas but individuals may decide not to use them, or delay their arrival; ii) permits may be issued to persons who have in fact been resident in the country for some time, the permit indicating a change of status.

Flows estimated from specific surveys

Ireland provides estimates based on the results of Quarterly National Household Surveys and other sources such as permit data and asylum applications. These estimates are revised periodically on the basis of census data. Australia and New Zealand conduct passenger surveys, which enable them to establish the length of stay on the basis of migrants’ stated intentions when they enter or exit the country.

Table A.1. Inflows of foreign population into selected OECD countries

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Australia	206.4	236.0	244.8	233.9	223.7	218.5	224.2	186.6	155.8	137.5	153.8
Austria	109.9	125.6	135.2	154.3	198.7	158.7	139.3	131.7	135.0	121.3	139.5
Belgium	133.6	116.1	105.5	106.3	128.8	106.1	109.2	119.7	129.5	101.6	122.4
Canada	248.7	257.8	259.0	260.3	271.8	296.7	286.4	321.0	341.2	184.6	405.8
Chile	50.7	65.2	84.4	83.5	101.9	135.5	207.2	339.4	254.1	154.6	96.7
Colombia	104.5	217.9	225.8	74.8	40.7
Costa Rica	15.7	6.6	8.6	9.2	7.8
Czech Republic	20.7	28.6	27.8	38.5	31.6	34.8	43.5	55.9	63.3	53.8	67.3
Denmark	34.6	35.5	41.3	49.0	58.7	54.6	49.0	45.3	42.3	37.8	47.3
Estonia	1.7	1.1	1.6	1.3	7.4	7.7	9.1	9.7	11.0	10.3	12.5
Finland	20.4	23.3	23.9	23.6	21.4	27.3	23.7	23.1	24.2	23.3	28.0
France	249.2	236.9	240.5	243.6	246.2	259.9	268.5	208.5	250.4
Germany	841.7	965.9	1108.1	1342.5	2016.2	1719.1	1384.0	1383.6	1345.9	994.8	1139.8
Greece	33.0	32.0	31.3	29.5	34.0	86.1	80.5	87.3	95.4	63.4	28.7
Hungary	22.5	20.3	21.3	26.0	25.8	23.8	36.5	49.3	55.3	43.8	49.1
Iceland	2.8	2.8	3.9	4.3	5.0	7.9	11.8	11.5	9.5	7.7	8.5
Ireland	33.7	37.2	41.0	43.7	49.3	53.9	57.2	61.9	61.7	56.5	35.0
Israel	16.9	16.6	16.9	24.1	27.9	26.0	26.4	28.1	33.2	19.7	25.5
Italy	354.3	321.3	279.0	248.4	250.0	262.9	301.1	285.5	264.6	191.8	243.6
Japan	266.9	303.9	306.7	336.5	391.2	427.6	475.0	519.7	592.0	220.6	80.0
Korea	307.2	300.2	360.5	407.1	372.9	402.2	452.7	495.1	438.2	233.1	220.6
Latvia	2.9	3.7	3.5	4.5	4.5	3.4	5.1	6.5	6.6	4.6	6.4
Lithuania	1.7	2.5	3.0	4.8	3.7	6.0	10.2	12.3	19.7	22.3	21.1
Luxembourg	19.1	19.4	19.8	21.0	22.6	21.6	23.2	23.4	25.2	21.0	23.8
Mexico	22.0	18.2	63.0	43.5	34.4	35.9	32.8	38.7	40.5	58.4	67.7
Netherlands	118.5	115.7	122.3	139.3	159.5	182.2	183.9	191.0	215.2	170.6	208.1
New Zealand	71.8	71.7	75.4	90.7	101.5	104.0	103.4	104.2	124.7	54.5	27.0
Norway	70.8	70.0	66.9	61.4	59.1	58.5	49.8	44.4	44.6	30.8	46.6
Poland	41.3	47.1	46.6	32.0	86.1	107.0	128.0	137.6	163.2	163.5	224.2
Portugal	45.4	38.5	33.2	35.3	37.9	46.9	61.4	93.2	129.2	118.1	111.3
Slovak Republic	3.8	2.9	2.5	2.4	3.8	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.5	2.8	2.0
Slovenia	10.8	12.3	11.6	11.3	12.7	13.8	15.5	24.1	27.6	24.8	19.7
Spain	335.9	272.5	248.4	264.5	290.0	352.2	454.0	560.0	666.0	415.2	456.6
Sweden	75.9	82.6	95.4	106.1	113.9	143.0	125.0	114.4	98.2	65.8	74.6
Switzerland	142.5	143.8	155.4	152.1	150.4	143.1	137.8	140.1	140.6	137.0	141.5
Türkiye	273.9	364.6	466.9	578.5	242.5	615.1
United Kingdom	279.6	236.4	297.6	357.7	390.2	374.9	353.5	357.2	377.9	233.7	385.8
United States	1062.0	1031.6	990.6	1016.5	1051.0	1183.5	1127.2	1096.6	1031.8	707.4	740.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Table A.2.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/bvoli3>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Australia (permanent)

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	21.9	27.8	38.1	39.6	34.7	38.6	40.0	33.1	32.6	24.5	26.4	49
China	29.5	26.2	29.2	28.5	29.4	30.9	31.1	27.7	27.2	20.1	21.0	56
United Kingdom	21.5	27.0	23.1	23.8	22.2	19.0	17.6	14.1	13.3	10.8	9.9	46
Philippines	10.7	12.8	11.0	10.3	11.9	12.0	12.1	10.9	9.2	8.5	9.8	64
Viet Nam	4.8	4.8	5.7	5.2	5.1	5.4	5.5	5.2	5.5	5.1	7.8	60
Nepal	2.1	2.5	4.0	4.4	4.2	5.1	4.4	3.0	3.8	4.7	6.8	51
Pakistan	1.8	3.9	3.6	5.7	8.0	7.0	6.8	6.3	4.7	3.8	4.7	43
New Zealand	34.6	44.3	41.2	27.3	22.4	19.7	12.6	15.2	14.2	4.7	4.3	46
South Africa	8.1	8.0	5.8	4.9	4.7	4.0	4.8	4.3	4.0	3.8	3.7	50
Iran	2.6	3.0	3.1	2.7	3.9	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.2	2.4	3.7	49
United States	3.0	3.3	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.6	2.7	3.6	3.2	3.5	54
Sri Lanka	4.5	5.7	5.3	4.5	3.9	3.8	3.2	2.7	2.7	2.4	3.2	49
Malaysia	4.9	5.4	5.6	4.5	4.0	4.1	4.2	3.4	2.5	2.1	2.9	60
Brazil	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.6	2.2	2.3	2.7	55
Thailand	2.5	2.7	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.0	2.4	80
Other countries	53.1	57.5	60.7	64.5	61.9	58.7	71.0	51.3	25.8	37.0	40.9	
Total	206.4	236.0	244.8	233.9	223.7	218.5	224.2	186.6	155.8	137.5	153.8	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Austria**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Germany	17.4	17.8	17.7	16.8	17.0	16.1	16.2	17.0	18.3	19.0	19.4	49
Romania	12.9	13.4	13.5	20.7	17.5	16.7	17.9	19.2	20.3	17.5	17.9	41
Syria	0.4	0.9	1.7	7.4	22.6	9.0	6.7	2.1	1.6	3.7	13.4	14
Hungary	9.3	13.1	14.9	14.5	14.4	13.3	13.1	12.6	12.1	10.1	9.6	45
Croatia	1.9	2.0	4.2	6.0	5.8	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.5	7.2	8.4	39
Serbia	6.1	6.7	7.1	7.4	7.6	7.3	7.2	6.8	6.5	5.3	5.4	44
Bulgaria	3.2	3.6	3.9	5.8	5.2	4.9	5.0	5.3	5.7	4.4	4.5	43
Poland	6.4	7.1	7.3	6.9	6.1	5.4	5.2	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.2	36
Slovak Republic	5.3	6.0	6.2	6.5	6.1	5.6	5.1	4.8	4.6	4.2	4.1	49
Italy	2.3	3.1	4.0	4.1	4.6	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.2	4.0	42
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.9	4.1	5.0	5.2	5.2	4.3	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.3	3.5	45
Türkiye	3.8	4.1	4.5	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.0	3.3	2.5	3.1	41
Afghanistan	2.9	3.8	2.3	3.2	19.5	11.7	2.1	1.3	1.4	1.5	2.3	42
Russia	2.6	3.4	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.1	2.2	1.8	2.1	59
Ukraine	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.5	2.0	61
Other countries	30.5	35.4	38.1	41.1	58.4	47.1	39.8	37.5	38.6	30.7	35.6	
Total	109.9	125.6	135.2	154.3	198.7	158.7	139.3	131.7	135.0	121.3	139.5	42

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Belgium

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Romania	9.9	10.0	8.7	11.3	10.6	10.9	11.9	13.4	14.3	11.3	13.0	36
France	12.8	12.4	12.6	12.0	12.0	11.3	11.3	11.7	12.0	11.3	11.9	52
Netherlands	8.5	8.1	7.9	8.1	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.8	6.9	7.6	49
Afghanistan	3.1	2.1	1.1	1.1	7.5	2.6	1.6	2.2	3.8	3.2	6.2	23
Spain	4.9	5.5	5.5	5.0	4.1	3.6	4.0	4.2	4.7	4.5	5.8	47
Morocco	8.6	5.8	4.5	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.5	5.0	5.8	4.7	5.3	55
Italy	4.3	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.1	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.5	4.7	4.9	45
Bulgaria	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.2	3.8	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.7	4.1	4.4	43
Portugal	2.8	3.9	3.8	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.9	3.2	2.9	3.5	38
Poland	8.2	7.7	6.6	5.8	5.3	4.6	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.3	3.4	46
Syria	0.6	0.5	1.0	2.8	10.4	4.7	5.5	3.6	2.8	1.7	3.3	41
Türkiye	3.2	2.2	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.4	2.8	2.2	2.8	42
India	2.1	1.9	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.4	3.0	3.3	3.3	2.0	2.8	47
Cameroon	1.7	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	2.8	51
Germany	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.5	52
Other countries	56.2	42.9	37.6	35.6	46.3	36.3	38.1	45.4	50.0	34.8	42.1	
Total	133.6	116.1	105.5	106.3	128.8	106.1	109.2	119.7	129.5	101.6	122.4	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Canada (permanent)**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	27.5	30.9	33.1	38.3	39.5	39.8	51.7	70.0	85.6	42.9	127.9	48
China	29.1	33.8	34.9	25.2	20.2	28.1	31.6	31.3	31.8	17.6	33.3	56
Philippines	36.8	34.3	29.5	40.0	50.8	41.8	40.9	35.1	27.8	11.0	18.0	55
Nigeria	3.1	3.4	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.4	5.5	10.9	12.6	6.4	15.6	49
France	4.1	6.3	5.6	4.7	5.8	6.4	6.6	6.2	5.0	4.6	12.7	47
United States	7.7	7.9	8.5	8.5	7.5	8.4	9.1	10.9	10.8	6.4	11.9	52
Brazil	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.8	4.0	5.3	3.7	11.4	52
Iran	7.5	7.5	11.3	16.8	11.7	6.5	4.7	5.5	6.1	3.8	11.3	52
Afghanistan	2.2	2.6	2.0	1.5	2.6	2.6	3.4	3.6	3.9	1.7	8.6	51
Pakistan	7.5	11.2	12.6	9.1	11.3	11.3	7.7	9.5	10.8	6.2	8.5	49
Korea	4.6	5.3	4.5	4.5	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.8	6.1	3.3	8.2	56
United Kingdom	6.1	6.2	5.8	5.8	5.5	5.8	5.3	5.7	5.6	3.4	6.6	42
Viet Nam	1.7	1.7	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.5	3.1	4.2	2.6	5.8	62
Syria	1.0	0.6	1.0	2.1	9.9	34.9	12.0	12.0	10.1	4.9	5.6	48
Eritrea	1.2	1.3	1.7	2.0	2.2	4.6	4.7	5.7	7.0	2.6	5.4	45
Other countries	107.2	103.0	100.5	93.3	92.3	93.9	94.1	103.0	108.5	63.6	115.1	
Total	248.7	257.8	259.0	260.3	271.8	296.7	286.4	321.0	341.2	184.6	405.8	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Chile

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Venezuela	0.8	0.8	1.0	2.3	7.4	21.9	65.9	122.8	135.8	69.0	48.4	..
Colombia	9.4	12.1	16.7	15.4	19.5	26.9	28.5	28.1	21.7	16.1	14.9	..
Peru	16.4	18.9	18.9	19.8	24.7	25.5	24.7	26.5	17.8	11.4	8.9	..
Haiti	0.7	1.1	1.2	2.2	6.4	23.0	42.1	108.7	32.2	28.6	6.3	..
Bolivia	6.2	10.8	23.6	21.6	19.8	14.8	20.1	27.1	19.6	11.7	5.7	..
Ecuador	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.8	4.3	5.8	6.1	4.6	3.1	2.3	..
Argentina	2.8	3.3	4.3	4.5	4.9	4.1	4.2	3.5	5.8	2.7	1.9	..
Brazil	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.3	1.5	0.9	..
Cuba	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.7	2.0	2.7	2.6	1.3	0.8	..
China	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.7	2.1	1.9	1.6	0.9	0.5	..
Spain	1.0	2.1	4.1	3.4	2.5	1.9	1.4	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.5	..
Dominican Republic	1.2	2.9	0.7	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.8	2.2	2.4	0.7	0.5	..
Mexico	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.3	..
United States	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.1	1.7	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.3	..
Paraguay	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.3	..
Other countries	4.6	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	..
Total	50.7	65.2	84.4	83.5	101.9	135.5	207.2	339.4	254.1	153.8	96.7	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Colombia**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Venezuela	88.9	201.7	206.6	63.7	24.8	..
United States	2.2	2.7	3.1	1.6	4.3	..
Peru	0.9	0.9	1.4	1.0	1.4	..
Ecuador	4.8	4.5	4.7	2.3	1.1	..
Chile	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.0	..
Spain	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.9	..
Mexico	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.8	..
Argentina	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.7	..
Dominican Republic	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.7	..
Brazil	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.5	0.5	..
France	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.4	..
Panama	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	..
Canada	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	..
Italy	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	..
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	..
Other countries	2.4	2.7	3.1	1.5	2.5	..
Total	104.5	217.9	225.8	74.8	40.7	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Czech Republic

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Ukraine	2.0	5.9	3.7	8.4	5.5	5.8	10.3	16.7	22.8	21.1	32.1	36
Slovak Republic	4.4	4.8	6.5	6.9	6.7	6.7	6.3	6.7	5.8	7.2	7.0	47
Russia	2.1	3.2	3.1	4.9	2.9	2.4	2.9	3.4	4.3	3.4	3.7	54
Viet Nam	0.7	1.6	1.2	1.7	1.3	1.8	2.2	2.3	1.9	1.4	1.6	54
Romania	0.4	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.1	1.6	1.4	35
Belarus	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.1	1.6	0.6	1.3	44
India	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.2	30
Hungary	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.1	41
Kazakhstan	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	47
Bulgaria	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.1	1.0	38
United States	1.3	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.7	1.0	30
Poland	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.8	1.0	0.9	48
Serbia	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.0	1.8	0.7	0.8	35
Germany	1.3	1.3	1.7	1.6	1.1	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.8	28
Moldova	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.8	41
Other countries	5.9	6.7	6.4	7.9	7.5	9.0	11.4	13.7	14.6	10.6	11.3	
Total	20.7	28.6	27.8	38.5	31.6	34.8	43.5	55.9	63.3	53.8	67.3	40

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Denmark**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Romania	2.7	3.2	3.6	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.6	5.6	34
Poland	3.2	3.3	3.6	4.0	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.4	3.0	2.8	4.2	37
Germany	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.5	3.2	52
Italy	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	2.5	40
Spain	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.8	43
India	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.1	1.3	1.8	42
Ukraine	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.9	2.0	1.3	1.7	45
Bulgaria	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.7	31
Sweden	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.5	51
Lithuania	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.4	1.2	1.4	37
Norway	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	58
Portugal	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.2	29
China	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.0	1.2	53
France	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.1	48
United States	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.0	53
Other countries	15.4	15.4	19.2	24.1	33.4	29.0	22.9	18.8	16.7	14.5	15.9	
Total	34.6	35.5	41.3	49.0	58.7	54.6	49.0	45.3	42.3	37.8	47.3	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Estonia

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Ukraine	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.5	1.8	2.4	3.0	33
Russia	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.9	49
Latvia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	35
Finland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	39
Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.6	45
Other countries	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	3.2	3.5	4.5	4.7	5.6	4.9	5.7	
Total	1.7	1.1	1.6	1.3	7.4	7.7	9.1	9.7	11.0	10.3	12.5	38

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Finland**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Russia	2.8	3.1	2.9	2.4	2.1	2.5	1.5	1.7	2.2	2.3	2.7	50
Estonia	4.7	6.0	5.9	4.7	3.4	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.6	1.6	2.4	31
Ukraine	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.5	36
India	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.0	1.4	43
China	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.1	51
Iraq	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.8	3.2	2.6	1.9	1.3	1.3	1.1	36
Afghanistan	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	1.9	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	31
Viet Nam	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.8	50
Philippines	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.7	70
Romania	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.7	37
Iran	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	45
Latvia	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.6	26
Sweden	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	42
Türkiye	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.6	41
Syria	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	1.7	2.0	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.5	52
Other countries	7.9	8.8	9.0	9.7	9.5	10.0	9.7	10.4	10.2	10.4	11.9	
Total	20.4	23.3	23.9	23.6	21.4	27.3	23.7	23.1	24.2	23.3	28.0	42

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – France

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Morocco	18.8	19.8	20.0	18.1	18.4	18.8	19.1	20.8	22.5	17.5	22.2	49
Algeria	21.2	23.7	23.6	22.0	22.4	21.8	21.8	22.6	21.8	17.9	18.4	51
Tunisia	10.3	11.3	11.6	10.8	10.5	11.3	11.9	14.2	15.0	11.5	13.2	46
Spain	13.7	12.9	12.4	10.7	10.9	12.7	10.5	8.2	11.4	52
Italy	12.2	12.7	13.2	13.9	13.6	14.4	14.6	11.5	9.7	48
Côte d'Ivoire	3.2	3.4	3.6	4.0	3.7	3.9	4.2	5.3	6.8	6.6	8.8	43
Afghanistan	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.6	1.7	5.0	5.3	5.5	5.4	8.6	13
Guinea	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.4	4.7	5.8	7.9	27
Portugal	18.8	14.7	11.6	12.4	8.3	8.0	7.6	6.0	7.7	48
Belgium	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.7	6.6	7.4	6.8	5.3	6.7	47
Comoros	2.5	3.1	4.8	5.5	7.3	3.9	4.2	5.0	6.6	4.4	6.5	61
Romania	6.1	8.1	10.1	8.5	8.1	8.4	8.6	6.8	6.1	47
Germany	7.7	6.4	7.1	6.2	5.7	6.1	5.7	4.5	5.8	55
Mali	4.6	3.6	3.9	3.9	3.5	3.8	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.3	5.7	18
United States	3.1	3.1	3.1	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.8	5.6	3.0	5.4	58
Other countries	76.3	81.2	110.4	104.1	106.5	113.0	116.1	117.6	122.1	89.6	106.5	
Total	142.1	151.6	249.2	236.9	240.5	243.6	246.2	259.9	268.5	208.5	250.4	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Germany**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Romania	97.5	120.5	139.5	198.7	221.4	222.3	230.6	252.0	245.0	198.4	202.7	34
Poland	164.7	177.8	190.4	192.2	190.8	160.7	149.7	143.6	128.6	101.9	94.4	34
Bulgaria	52.4	60.2	60.9	80.1	86.3	83.0	81.6	85.7	87.4	76.2	75.7	38
Syria	4.6	8.5	19.0	69.1	309.7	179.4	76.4	49.0	44.1	31.1	58.8	41
Türkiye	28.6	26.2	23.2	22.1	23.7	28.6	33.7	40.6	43.8	30.4	41.9	33
Afghanistan	9.3	8.6	9.1	12.9	84.9	75.8	12.5	12.5	13.0	14.1	40.1	40
Italy	28.1	36.9	47.5	56.7	57.2	52.6	51.5	53.3	50.4	36.6	34.8	41
India	15.4	18.1	19.5	22.4	26.1	27.7	29.5	33.7	39.1	20.5	34.1	41
Croatia	11.5	12.9	25.8	46.1	61.0	62.1	58.6	57.7	48.4	33.1	28.5	35
Hungary	41.1	54.5	60.0	58.8	58.1	51.6	48.1	43.9	36.7	28.4	27.7	66
Serbia	16.5	22.1	27.3	38.4	39.7	22.9	24.5	25.6	26.2	20.5	23.1	40
Iraq	7.5	6.7	5.2	7.1	64.8	68.0	27.6	21.7	16.9	12.2	21.4	33
Spain	16.2	23.3	29.0	27.1	23.6	21.9	18.5	18.6	18.7	16.3	20.6	45
Greece	23.0	32.7	32.1	28.8	28.3	27.1	26.1	25.6	23.5	18.3	17.9	38
Bosnia and Herzegovina	9.5	12.2	15.1	20.7	21.7	22.4	24.0	22.7	24.9	16.4	17.7	41
Other countries	315.8	344.8	404.5	461.5	718.9	613.1	491.2	497.2	499.3	340.4	400.3	
Total	841.7	965.9	1108.1	1342.5	2016.2	1719.1	1384.0	1383.6	1345.9	994.8	1139.8	40

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Greece

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
EU	15.0	16.0	16.5	16.6	17.2	16.7	13.8	7.5	3.3	52
Non-EU	16.3	13.5	17.5	69.5	63.3	70.6	81.6	55.9	25.4	36
Total	31.3	29.5	34.0	86.1	80.5	87.3	95.4	63.4	28.7	37

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Hungary**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Ukraine	1.3	0.9	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.2	6.3	16.7	21.2	8.9	15.4	36
Germany	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6	3.7	4.0	48
Slovak Republic	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.0	2.5	54
Romania	5.8	4.2	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.3	1.9	36
China	0.9	1.1	2.2	4.7	3.5	1.5	2.3	2.0	2.4	1.2	1.3	41
Korea	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.3	26
India	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.4	1.2	0.9	1.3	34
Serbia	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.7	2.9	2.5	0.7	1.2	20
Türkiye	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.9	1.1	31
Viet Nam	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.3	2.0	1.8	1.1	41
Austria	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.7	1.0	44
United States	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.4	0.7	0.9	50
Iran	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.8	46
Russia	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.7	58
Netherlands	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	43
Other countries	5.9	6.3	6.9	8.4	8.7	8.9	12.1	12.7	13.2	12.0	13.9	
Total	22.5	20.3	21.3	26.0	25.8	23.8	36.5	49.3	55.3	43.8	49.1	40

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Iceland

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Poland	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.4	1.6	2.9	4.5	3.9	2.8	2.0	2.0	38
Romania	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	22
Lithuania	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.6	25
Latvia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	17
United States	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	56
Spain	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	44
Germany	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	65
Italy	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	36
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	34
Czech Republic	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	45
France	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	51
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	28
Philippines	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	80
Venezuela	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	45
Denmark	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	52
Other countries	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.4	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.4	
Total	2.8	2.8	3.9	4.3	5.0	7.9	11.8	11.5	9.5	7.7	8.5	41

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Ireland**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
EU	23.8	26.8	29.4	28.9	28.5	32.3	30.3	18.8	17.2	36
Non-EU	18.3	20.3	22.5	27.2	22.7	32.8	30.1	23.9	29.7	52
Total	43.0	47.9	52.9	57.2	52.1	66.4	61.6	43.6	47.9	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Israel

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Russia	3.7	3.5	4.0	4.6	6.6	7.0	7.1	10.5	15.8	6.6	7.6	..
France	1.6	1.7	2.9	6.5	6.6	4.2	3.2	2.4	2.2	2.4	3.6	53
United States	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.3	3.5	52
Ukraine	2.1	2.0	1.9	5.7	6.9	5.8	7.0	6.4	6.2	2.9	3.1	..
Argentina	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8	53
United Kingdom	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	44
Brazil	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	57
South Africa	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	51
India	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.3	50
Mexico	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	50
Uzbekistan	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	..
Canada	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	50
Kazakhstan	0.1	0.2	..
Belgium	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	50
Germany	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	57
Other countries	5.3	5.4	4.2	3.0	3.0	3.8	4.2	3.6	3.8	2.7	3.6	
Total	16.9	16.6	16.9	24.1	27.9	26.0	26.4	28.1	33.2	19.7	25.5	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Italy**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Romania	90.1	81.7	58.2	50.7	46.4	45.2	43.5	40.1	39.2	28.7	28.4	58
Albania	16.6	14.1	12.2	11.4	11.5	13.0	15.4	18.0	22.2	17.2	22.1	51
Morocco	23.9	19.6	19.6	17.6	15.0	14.7	15.7	16.9	20.3	12.5	15.4	50
Bangladesh	10.3	10.1	10.5	12.7	12.4	10.7	14.6	13.4	11.8	7.8	14.6	28
Pakistan	7.5	8.8	7.8	9.6	11.4	14.7	15.0	13.2	9.9	9.7	14.3	15
India	13.3	11.2	10.8	11.1	11.2	10.0	7.7	11.1	12.0	7.3	11.3	42
Ukraine	17.9	11.5	12.8	9.7	9.3	8.7	7.9	7.7	6.6	5.2	8.7	81
Brazil	7.1	5.7	5.0	5.0	7.0	10.5	15.7	18.0	20.6	8.7	8.2	55
Egypt	9.6	8.6	9.8	8.7	7.4	6.6	7.7	7.4	9.0	5.7	7.9	38
Nigeria	4.5	6.7	6.3	5.3	8.9	14.7	23.3	17.9	5.7	7.2	7.6	44
China	20.1	20.5	17.6	15.8	14.9	12.4	11.3	10.0	10.8	4.9	6.2	54
Argentina	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.4	2.2	4.3	2.2	6.1	49
Senegal	6.6	5.5	6.5	6.3	7.5	8.5	10.9	8.8	5.8	4.6	5.8	26
Tunisia	5.9	5.4	4.3	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.7	4.9	3.3	5.0	39
Peru	8.7	5.6	4.3	2.8	1.9	1.7	2.2	2.4	3.2	2.7	4.8	62
Other countries	111.4	105.5	92.7	77.4	80.4	86.8	105.4	94.7	78.4	64.2	77.2	
Total	354.3	321.3	279.0	248.4	250.0	262.9	301.1	285.5	264.6	191.8	243.6	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.



StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Japan

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Viet Nam	13.9	19.5	31.7	43.0	65.9	77.5	98.6	123.3	148.2	71.1	24.2	..
China	101.0	107.8	93.9	99.7	101.9	104.9	112.1	117.1	133.9	46.3	15.3	..
United States	19.3	21.0	21.1	22.0	21.5	22.2	22.0	22.9	24.1	6.2	5.2	..
Philippines	13.6	15.4	16.4	19.9	24.0	26.2	29.6	31.3	34.7	12.7	4.9	..
Korea	23.4	25.7	24.2	21.1	22.6	25.6	28.0	32.4	33.9	8.3	2.9	..
Indonesia	8.4	9.3	9.6	11.8	14.3	16.8	19.6	23.2	28.8	13.7	2.3	..
Brazil	4.5	5.8	4.8	6.1	9.1	12.8	14.2	15.8	16.6	4.1	2.3	..
Thailand	13.6	15.4	15.4	14.3	14.5	15.4	16.4	17.1	17.9	6.4	1.6	..
Nepal	3.5	4.8	8.3	11.5	13.4	14.1	14.5	13.0	13.1	4.2	1.5	..
Myanmar	1.1	1.5	2.1	3.3	5.2	6.1	7.6	8.1	11.6	6.2	1.4	..
Chinese Taipei	5.6	6.6	6.6	7.7	10.8	12.2	13.7	14.9	16.3	4.2	1.3	..
India	4.7	5.6	5.6	6.9	6.9	7.0	7.9	9.6	11.0	3.7	1.3	..
United Kingdom	5.2	5.5	6.1	5.9	6.7	6.6	6.7	7.1	7.7	1.5	1.1	..
Canada	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.0	0.8	0.9	..
France	2.9	4.0	4.5	4.5	5.0	5.6	5.5	6.2	6.2	2.0	0.8	..
Other countries	44.2	53.8	54.2	56.5	67.2	71.6	75.9	74.9	85.0	29.1	13.1	..
Total	266.9	303.9	306.7	336.5	391.2	427.6	475.0	519.7	592.0	220.6	80.0	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Korea**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
China	149.6	127.8	179.3	193.8	177.8	166.5	157.8	170.2	139.4	97.0	95.5	50
Viet Nam	27.9	24.7	22.2	28.0	30.2	40.1	48.0	56.0	61.3	28.0	17.4	54
United States	28.1	28.9	26.6	24.5	22.7	21.8	19.8	21.2	20.8	21.3	17.0	60
Uzbekistan	8.2	11.4	12.3	12.9	14.2	16.2	18.5	18.8	26.0	8.0	13.1	40
Russia	2.6	2.7	2.8	3.2	6.8	15.0	18.6	18.7	18.0	6.7	7.3	57
Japan	5.5	5.8	5.9	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.5	5.2	5.1	4.5	6.1	79
Kazakhstan	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.4	3.5	7.7	13.4	15.7	12.5	3.5	6.1	53
Thailand	10.3	13.8	18.3	48.3	20.1	28.5	71.5	80.3	53.3	8.7	5.2	46
Cambodia	6.4	9.5	10.5	9.5	9.6	10.2	9.5	8.7	9.9	3.5	4.6	34
Mongolia	4.3	5.7	4.3	4.0	8.3	8.2	11.8	10.2	8.7	7.1	3.8	58
Canada	6.0	6.0	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.3	4.6	4.6	4.4	3.9	3.3	60
Indonesia	8.1	8.3	11.8	10.5	8.5	9.0	6.9	10.7	9.8	3.4	3.1	29
India	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.8	3.5	3.4	2.8	2.7	42
France	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.6	57
Germany	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.6	2.4	60
Other countries	44.9	49.3	53.7	54.0	55.0	62.6	60.7	67.5	61.6	30.8	30.3	..
Total	307.2	300.2	360.5	407.1	372.9	402.2	452.7	495.1	438.2	233.1	220.6	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Latvia

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Ukraine	0.5	0.9	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.5	16
Russia	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.6	1.0	41
Belarus	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.6	30
India	0.1	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.5	21
Uzbekistan	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.4	15
Lithuania	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	40
Italy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	31
Germany	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	35
Türkiye	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	19
Azerbaijan	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	18
Moldova	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	7
Sri Lanka	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	29
Cameroon	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	42
Tajikistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	2
Georgia	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	16
Other countries	2.9	3.7	3.5	1.6	4.5	3.4	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.6	
Total	2.9	3.7	3.5	4.5	4.5	3.4	5.1	6.5	6.6	4.6	6.4	27

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Lithuania**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Belarus	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	1.2	2.7	3.3	6.4	7.3	8.3	13
Ukraine	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.1	1.1	1.6	4.3	5.7	8.9	9.3	6.3	10
Russia	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.5	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.8	36
Uzbekistan	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.4	3
Kyrgyzstan	0.1	0.3	0.4	4
India	0.0	..	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	24
Kazakhstan	0.0	..	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	29
Moldova	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	10
Afghanistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	43
Georgia	0.0	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	22
Latvia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	45
United States	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	49
Nigeria	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	30
Türkiye	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	19
Azerbaijan	0.0	..	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	10
Other countries	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.8	2.2	2.2	
Total	1.7	2.5	3.0	4.8	3.7	6.0	10.2	12.3	19.7	22.3	21.1	17

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Luxembourg

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Portugal	5.0	5.2	4.6	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.3	3.9	42
France	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.0	4.1	3.6	3.6	43
Italy	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.9	40
Spain	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.2	42
Belgium	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.1	43
India	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.5	1.0	46
Germany	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	45
Romania	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	43
Brazil	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	60
United States	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.4	47
Greece	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.4	53
Poland	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	55
Syria	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	36
China	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4	59
Russia	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	62
Other countries	5.2	4.6	4.8	5.2	6.0	5.9	6.3	6.8	7.7	6.1	6.7	
Total	19.1	19.4	19.8	21.0	22.6	21.6	23.2	23.4	25.2	21.0	23.8	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Mexico**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Honduras	1.0	0.4	2.4	2.3	1.8	2.6	2.5	3.4	3.6	7.9	12.2	..
Venezuela	1.3	1.2	2.8	2.6	2.2	2.5	3.4	6.3	7.4	11.0	10.5	..
United States	4.3	4.0	14.4	9.4	7.1	6.8	5.4	5.2	5.0	5.3	6.8	..
Colombia	1.8	1.4	3.2	2.5	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.8	2.7	3.9	5.2	..
Cuba	1.7	1.8	3.2	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.7	5.1	5.0	..
Guatemala	1.3	0.5	3.1	2.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.3	1.9	2.5	4.2	..
El Salvador	0.7	0.4	1.6	1.2	1.1	1.8	2.3	2.8	2.5	3.6	4.0	..
Haiti	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.4	2.4	..
Canada	0.8	0.8	3.5	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.8	..
China	1.1	0.8	5.2	2.6	2.2	2.1	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.5	..
Argentina	1.0	0.9	3.2	2.1	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.5	..
Spain	0.8	1.0	2.6	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.3	..
Brazil	0.4	0.3	1.1	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.1	..
Nicaragua	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.8	..
Korea	0.4	0.4	1.3	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	..
Other countries	5.0	4.2	14.6	9.6	7.2	7.5	6.6	6.2	7.0	9.5	8.5	
Total	22.0	18.2	63.0	43.5	34.4	35.9	32.8	38.7	40.5	58.4	67.7	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Netherlands

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Poland	18.6	18.3	20.4	23.8	23.0	23.1	23.8	25.5	27.3	24.4	25.1	43
Romania	2.7	2.5	2.5	4.6	4.3	5.2	7.5	9.4	11.8	10.7	12.9	41
Syria	0.1	0.1	0.6	6.9	17.3	25.1	15.3	5.3	5.7	5.7	11.9	44
Germany	9.6	8.7	8.1	8.2	8.6	9.4	10.5	10.9	11.7	10.4	11.1	57
Bulgaria	5.4	5.0	4.5	5.2	4.8	5.0	6.0	6.9	9.2	9.2	10.4	42
India	3.8	4.0	4.5	5.1	6.1	7.2	8.6	10.6	12.3	5.9	9.8	46
Italy	3.1	3.6	4.2	5.1	5.7	6.5	7.6	8.5	9.4	7.7	9.1	48
Spain	3.7	4.6	5.3	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.9	6.5	7.6	6.3	8.9	49
Türkiye	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.8	3.2	4.4	5.5	6.6	5.2	7.3	45
China	5.5	5.2	4.7	4.8	5.4	5.7	6.5	6.8	7.5	4.4	6.0	56
France	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.5	5.9	5.0	5.9	54
Greece	2.7	3.3	2.9	2.6	2.8	3.1	3.6	4.0	4.7	4.0	5.2	42
Portugal	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.7	3.2	4.4	43
United States	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.8	4.7	4.7	5.6	5.8	6.0	4.0	4.4	55
Belgium	2.3	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.6	50
Other countries	48.9	45.3	49.9	52.8	59.9	68.5	67.3	73.2	82.3	61.0	72.0	
Total	118.5	115.7	122.3	139.3	159.5	182.2	183.9	191.0	215.2	170.6	208.1	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – New Zealand**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	8.4	8.6	9.1	16.2	19.5	14.7	14.0	14.3	15.1	9.2	3.6	56
Australia	4.8	4.7	5.6	6.1	6.6	6.9	6.8	6.6	7.5	3.3	3.2	49
China	10.1	10.6	11.2	13.7	15.8	17.3	16.3	15.7	16.1	4.6	3.1	53
United Kingdom	9.2	8.8	8.8	8.7	8.6	8.8	8.8	8.1	9.6	4.8	2.3	48
Philippines	3.7	4.2	4.5	6.5	8.4	8.2	9.1	9.1	10.6	3.1	2.1	52
Samoa	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.4	1.8	1.5	24
Vanuatu	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	1.0	1.5	3
United States	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.1	3.0	3.4	3.4	4.4	2.9	1.2	50
South Africa	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.5	3.4	5.8	5.8	7.0	12.2	3.9	1.0	51
Afghanistan	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	1.0	50
Fiji	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.9	2.5	2.4	2.9	1.2	0.4	47
Canada	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.7	0.8	0.4	61
Malaysia	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	0.9	0.4	53
Korea	2.7	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.6	3.1	2.9	2.7	3.0	1.4	0.3	55
Germany	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.1	0.3	60
Other countries	19.6	19.6	20.7	22.9	24.2	26.0	26.2	27.3	33.4	14.4	4.7	
Total	71.8	71.7	75.4	90.7	101.5	104.0	103.4	104.2	124.7	54.5	27.0	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Norway

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Poland	12.9	11.5	10.5	9.9	8.2	6.0	5.2	5.0	5.0	3.7	8.1	31
Lithuania	7.7	6.6	5.6	4.4	3.3	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.5	1.8	3.1	34
Syria	0.1	0.4	0.8	2.1	4.0	11.2	7.0	3.8	1.5	1.5	2.2	47
Sweden	8.2	5.7	5.3	4.6	3.6	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.8	2.1	44
Germany	2.3	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.7	53
Romania	1.4	2.0	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.6	37
Spain	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.7	1.4	45
India	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.4	1.0	1.3	47
Denmark	1.6	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.2	50
Latvia	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.1	35
Eritrea	2.0	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.3	2.7	2.1	1.1	0.7	0.7	1.1	58
United Kingdom	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.1	35
Afghanistan	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.8	1.4	2.2	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	1.1	56
United States	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.8	1.0	49
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.7	1.3	0.2	0.9	50
Other countries	26.7	29.5	27.9	24.6	24.7	22.6	20.8	19.0	21.2	13.7	17.6	
Total	70.8	70.0	66.9	61.4	59.1	58.5	49.8	44.4	44.6	30.8	46.6	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Poland**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Ukraine	10.1	11.8	11.9	7.8	45.2	63.8	79.0	88.7	108.4	111.0	154.8	46
Belarus	2.5	2.6	2.3	1.4	3.2	3.5	6.2	7.9	9.1	8.1	17.2	45
Georgia	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.9	4.1	4.3	5.9	18
India	1.1	1.2	1.2	0.8	1.9	2.8	4.1	4.5	4.9	4.9	5.3	29
Russia	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.1	2.5	2.6	2.7	3.0	3.4	3.4	4.5	51
Viet Nam	2.1	4.0	2.8	2.0	3.3	3.2	4.0	3.0	2.6	2.7	3.1	42
Moldova	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.8	2.0	2.9	34
China	2.8	2.9	3.0	1.6	3.8	3.9	4.2	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.1	44
Türkiye	1.2	1.3	1.4	0.9	1.7	1.7	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.7	2.0	24
Uzbekistan	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.6	1.1	1.4	10
Korea	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.3	34
Philippines	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.1	45
Azerbaijan	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.0	20
Germany	1.9	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.0	0.9	22
Armenia	1.2	1.6	1.1	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	39
Other countries	14.7	15.4	16.7	12.0	18.0	18.4	19.2	17.7	19.2	17.4	19.6	
Total	41.3	47.1	46.6	32.0	86.1	107.0	128.0	137.6	163.2	163.5	224.2	43

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Portugal

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Brazil	12.9	11.7	6.7	5.6	5.7	7.1	11.6	28.2	48.8	42.2	39.5	52
India	1.1	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.8	4.1	6.3	7.2	7.4	17
Belgium	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.9	3.5	4.1	4.8	5.2	5.7	44
Italy	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.6	3.1	5.3	7.0	7.9	4.5	5.3	46
France	0.7	0.5	0.7	1.9	2.5	3.5	4.7	5.3	4.4	4.1	4.8	49
Angola	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.9	4.5	4.8	4.6	54
Germany	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.9	2.5	2.8	2.6	3.9	46
Cape Verde	4.6	3.4	2.7	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.6	4.4	4.2	3.9	54
Guinea-Bissau	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.9	3.5	3.4	3.7	42
Spain	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	2.2	2.7	2.9	3.2	2.8	3.6	48
Nepal	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.7	4.2	5.0	3.9	2.8	34
United States	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.1	2.5	52
Bangladesh	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.7	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.1	18
Pakistan	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.3	1.0	1.3	2.0	28
Sao Tome and Principe	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.5	1.6	2.0	52
Other countries	15.4	11.9	11.7	13.6	14.0	17.9	20.4	22.4	27.6	27.1	17.6	
Total	45.4	38.5	33.2	35.3	37.9	46.9	61.4	93.2	129.2	118.1	111.3	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Slovak Republic**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Czech Republic	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	48
Hungary	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	34
Ukraine	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	58
Poland	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	42
Romania	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	26
Germany	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	40
Italy	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	25
Austria	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	21
Spain	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	44
Russia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	62
France	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	39
Albania	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	21
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	43
Norway	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	60
Other countries	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.3	
Total	3.8	2.9	2.5	2.4	3.8	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.5	2.8	2.0	41

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Slovenia

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.4	4.0	3.8	3.4	4.7	4.8	6.2	11.7	13.8	11.3	8.4	35
Serbia	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.6	2.0	3.2	3.8	3.0	2.1	33
North Macedonia	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.2	45
Croatia	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.1	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	0.9	46
Italy	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.5	37
Russia	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	55
Bulgaria	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.4	32
Ukraine	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	52
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	43
Montenegro	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	39
Austria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	51
Türkiye	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	21
United Kingdom	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	24
China	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	41
Hungary	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	41
Other countries	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.5	3.7	4.6	5.0	4.8	
Total	10.8	12.3	11.6	11.3	12.7	13.8	15.5	24.1	27.6	24.8	19.7	37

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Spain**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Morocco	28.0	22.4	20.5	20.0	23.8	29.7	39.8	60.9	72.9	44.9	59.1	40
Colombia	13.2	10.0	8.7	8.5	9.4	22.6	34.1	53.3	76.8	51.4	39.8	55
Italy	11.6	12.0	12.2	14.9	18.6	21.7	28.8	31.3	33.4	21.3	29.4	48
United Kingdom	15.7	16.4	14.1	14.2	15.0	18.5	21.2	24.0	29.4	29.5	25.2	44
Venezuela	6.8	4.6	4.7	7.2	10.5	18.5	31.6	47.1	58.1	29.7	23.8	56
Romania	50.8	27.3	22.8	29.7	28.8	28.6	31.0	29.1	27.0	15.7	16.7	47
Peru	7.7	5.6	4.8	4.7	5.3	8.0	13.9	19.3	28.6	18.1	16.1	56
Argentina	4.9	3.6	3.8	4.2	5.0	6.4	8.8	11.1	17.9	10.7	15.7	52
France	7.8	7.4	7.3	8.1	9.0	9.3	11.4	11.7	12.1	10.2	13.3	49
Germany	8.3	8.0	7.2	6.8	6.7	7.3	9.1	9.4	9.4	7.9	12.3	51
Honduras	6.3	5.3	4.3	5.7	7.6	10.9	18.3	23.4	29.1	18.7	10.3	59
Pakistan	11.5	8.3	6.5	5.3	4.8	6.4	6.6	8.7	11.7	7.4	9.8	41
Cuba	7.4	5.7	5.1	4.6	4.9	5.9	8.0	11.3	14.2	6.4	9.6	53
United States	5.0	4.9	5.5	5.3	5.6	5.9	7.5	8.2	9.1	5.5	8.9	57
Russia	7.6	7.6	8.4	8.2	7.0	6.2	7.0	8.1	9.0	4.7	8.1	57
Other countries	143.3	123.2	112.3	117.1	127.9	146.3	176.8	202.9	227.4	132.9	158.6	
Total	335.9	272.5	248.4	264.5	290.0	352.2	454.0	560.0	666.0	415.2	456.6	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Sweden

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	1.7	2.0	2.4	3.0	3.5	4.2	5.7	7.3	7.4	4.0	6.0	46
Syria	1.5	4.7	11.7	21.7	28.0	49.0	20.9	13.9	6.0	3.2	3.6	54
Germany	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.3	3.4	52
Pakistan	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.7	2.5	3.1	2.4	3.2	41
Poland	4.4	4.4	4.6	5.1	5.6	5.0	4.4	3.8	3.2	2.5	3.2	38
Afghanistan	3.4	4.7	4.2	3.8	3.4	4.1	11.3	9.6	7.9	2.6	2.2	50
Iran	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.3	1.7	2.3	2.5	2.3	1.5	2.0	50
China	2.6	2.5	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.9	2.8	1.7	1.9	52
Türkiye	2.0	1.8	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.5	2.2	2.2	1.6	1.8	45
Denmark	3.2	2.6	2.5	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.7	46
Romania	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.0	1.4	1.7	37
Finland	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.2	1.7	1.7	57
Iraq	4.5	3.6	2.3	2.4	2.8	3.4	6.0	3.9	2.8	1.6	1.5	51
Eritrea	2.1	2.2	3.3	5.9	7.6	7.6	4.8	3.8	3.9	1.7	1.4	49
United States	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	50
Other countries	39.7	43.4	50.3	48.0	46.4	52.4	52.5	51.4	47.0	34.5	37.9	
Total	75.9	82.6	95.4	106.1	113.9	143.0	125.0	114.4	98.2	65.8	74.6	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Switzerland**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Germany	30.5	27.1	26.6	23.8	22.1	20.9	19.7	20.2	19.9	19.2	20.6	44
Italy	10.8	13.6	17.5	17.8	18.2	18.1	15.5	16.5	15.9	16.5	15.5	40
France	11.5	11.4	13.5	13.8	14.8	13.8	14.1	13.8	14.0	15.7	14.9	43
Portugal	15.4	18.6	19.9	14.9	12.6	10.1	9.2	8.7	8.3	7.6	7.6	40
Spain	4.6	6.5	8.8	7.6	7.0	5.8	5.2	5.6	5.2	5.4	6.0	47
Romania	1.7	2.3	2.7	2.4	2.0	2.9	2.9	2.4	4.5	4.8	5.2	46
Poland	3.4	3.3	2.9	4.8	4.8	4.1	4.1	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.7	42
China	2.1	2.4	2.9	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.4	54
Türkiye	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.7	3.1	46
India	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.5	2.9	46
Hungary	2.1	2.5	2.5	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.3	3.2	3.1	2.8	2.8	43
United States	4.2	3.5	3.4	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.3	2.8	53
Austria	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.0	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.7	43
United Kingdom	5.4	4.4	4.6	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.8	3.8	4.0	4.0	2.7	43
Afghanistan	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.0	2.4	29
Other countries	43.6	40.6	42.7	44.8	46.7	46.4	45.6	46.5	46.1	42.0	44.3	
Total	142.5	143.8	155.4	152.1	150.4	143.1	137.8	140.1	140.6	137.0	141.5	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.



StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Türkiye

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Iraq	70.9	97.1	110.3	83.8	28.8	74.3	47
Iran	15.5	17.8	31.9	42.4	13.4	67.0	50
Uzbekistan	9.0	17.9	15.2	25.1	14.5	40.0	62
Syria	25.7	28.2	39.0	43.2	14.7	37.0	49
Afghanistan	27.9	37.7	45.0	47.2	22.9	34.1	38
Russia	6.4	7.3	13.8	17.3	15.3	31.5	58
Azerbaijan	15.3	20.9	23.2	26.6	9.0	27.1	47
Turkmenistan	8.4	20.3	34.9	80.0	17.9	24.5	44
Kazakhstan	3.6	4.3	7.4	10.0	9.0	20.2	58
Somalia	0.7	1.5	4.5	10.3	6.1	15.4	47
Egypt	4.1	8.6	13.5	12.5	4.3	13.4	44
Germany	8.6	8.4	8.9	9.4	7.6	13.2	47
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2.0	4.8	8.6	10.0	3.9	13.1	38
Libya	4.3	6.0	7.4	12.1	4.3	12.0	43
Pakistan	1.1	1.5	2.7	4.5	2.7	11.9	32
Other countries	70.3	82.3	100.6	144.2	68.2	180.5	
Total	273.9	364.6	466.9	578.5	242.5	615.1	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – United States (permanent)**

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Mexico	143.0	146.0	135.1	133.2	158.3	173.5	170.1	161.6	155.7	100.0	107.0	56
India	67.4	64.7	67.3	76.3	62.8	63.0	59.1	58.9	53.8	45.8	92.6	49
China	87.9	82.4	72.1	75.9	74.4	81.9	71.8	65.6	62.3	41.7	49.7	58
Philippines	56.6	56.9	54.3	49.2	56.0	52.2	48.7	46.9	45.6	25.2	27.5	68
Dominican Republic	45.7	41.2	41.2	43.7	50.0	59.9	58.1	57.0	49.4	29.7	24.1	53
Cuba	36.1	32.4	31.8	45.9	53.6	65.6	64.5	75.5	39.4	15.1	21.6	49
El Salvador	18.5	16.1	18.2	19.2	19.4	23.1	24.9	28.1	27.5	17.8	18.6	54
Brazil	11.5	11.2	10.8	10.2	11.2	13.5	14.7	15.1	19.4	16.3	18.0	58
Viet Nam	33.5	27.6	26.5	29.4	30.4	40.1	37.9	33.4	39.2	29.5	16.1	64
Canada	20.2	20.6	21.0	18.5	20.1	20.3	18.8	16.1	17.8	14.5	15.3	53
Colombia	22.2	20.4	20.7	17.7	16.8	18.0	17.4	17.1	19.3	11.7	15.0	64
Venezuela	9.2	9.4	9.5	8.2	9.0	10.6	11.6	11.5	15.2	11.5	13.7	60
Jamaica	19.3	20.4	19.1	18.7	17.4	22.9	21.7	20.2	21.5	12.7	13.2	54
Nigeria	11.6	13.2	13.5	12.6	11.3	14.1	13.4	13.8	15.7	12.2	12.9	48
Korea	22.6	20.7	23.0	20.2	17.0	21.7	19.0	17.5	18.3	16.1	12.2	58
Other countries	456.8	448.5	426.5	437.7	443.3	503.2	475.5	458.3	431.8	307.5	282.5	
Total	1062.0	1031.6	990.6	1016.5	1051.0	1183.5	1127.2	1096.6	1031.8	707.4	740.0	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/r6bi0g>

Table A.2. Outflows of foreign population from selected OECD countries

Thousands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Austria	72.8	74.4	74.5	76.5	80.1	89.0	89.6	91.7	90.0	79.4	84.6
Belgium	52.7	60.4	69.7	64.9	59.8	61.8	58.6	56.8	46.5	52.0	59.1
Czech Republic	2.5	16.7	27.2	16.1	15.0	13.4	14.4	16.2	17.5	26.8	18.2
Denmark	26.6	29.1	29.7	30.4	30.6	37.4	41.5	45.4	52.4	41.7	31.5
Estonia	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	3.3	3.4	4.3	3.9	6.2	5.5	5.5
Finland	3.3	4.2	4.2	5.5	6.7	7.5	6.8	7.6	7.2	6.6	5.2
Germany	538.8	578.8	657.6	765.6	859.3	1083.8	885.5	923.6	961.3	746.2	746.5
Greece	39.2	59.4	55.0	51.2	53.4	51.8	49.7	53.1	49.5	44.3	45.3
Hungary	2.7	9.9	13.1	10.8	10.4	10.5	12.9	24.4	27.9	48.0	46.3
Iceland	2.8	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.2	3.6	3.9	4.9	4.4	5.8	4.5
Ireland	38.6	33.3	33.0	30.0	27.5	29.1	34.0	28.0	25.9	28.2	31.2
Italy	32.4	38.2	43.6	47.5	44.7	42.6	40.6	40.2	57.5	38.9	64.1
Japan	230.9	219.4	213.4	212.9	223.5	233.5	259.2	292.1	333.6	173.0	140.0
Korea	217.7	290.0	268.1	270.5	301.0	325.0	348.7	365.1	425.6	361.6	263.3
Latvia	6.7	4.7	3.4	1.4	2.6	3.0	2.3	2.9	4.1	3.8	3.7
Lithuania	2.4	2.6	3.3	3.5	7.6	4.3	2.6	3.2	4.8	7.8	6.4
Luxembourg	7.5	8.6	8.9	9.5	10.4	11.3	11.6	11.6	13.0	12.0	12.9
Netherlands	70.2	80.8	83.1	83.4	85.2	89.9	96.4	102.8	109.9	113.2	100.6
New Zealand	45.2	41.5	37.3	35.7	37.0	38.9	45.3	47.0	55.1	39.2	41.8
Norway	22.9	21.3	25.0	23.3	27.4	30.7	26.6	24.5	17.6	19.9	26.0
Poland	51.0	68.9	49.5	68.6	89.5	40.1	45.8	43.0	43.9	57.5	72.9
Portugal	2.6	2.5	3.0	1.9	0.5	1.1	0.6	2.3	0.7	2.0	1.3
Slovak Republic	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Slovenia	7.3	6.2	5.6	6.2	6.3	6.8	7.7	6.9	8.5	11.9	15.3
Spain	353.6	389.3	459.0	320.0	249.2	237.5	282.0	230.3	220.2	183.1	304.6
Sweden	23.7	26.6	24.6	26.4	31.3	23.5	23.4	24.1	25.3	26.7	22.8
Switzerland	64.0	65.9	70.0	69.2	73.4	77.6	79.1	80.7	80.0	70.3	74.4
Türkiye	178.0	253.6	323.9	245.4	342.7	184.0
United Kingdom	190.0	165.0	170.0	171.0	164.0	195.0	222.0	203.0	202.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata in the following table.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ofdsue>

Metadata related to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2. Inflows and outflows of foreign population

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Australia	<p><i>Inflows:</i> Includes persons who are entitled to stay permanently in Australia at arrival (Settler Arrivals) as well as those who changed status from temporary to permanent residence. Settler arrivals include holders of a permanent visa, holders of a temporary (provisional) visa where there is a clear intention to settle, citizens of New Zealand indicating an intention to settle and persons otherwise eligible to settle.</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> People leaving Australia for 12 months or more in a 16-month period. Net Overseas Migration (NOM).</p>	Data refer to the fiscal year (July to June of the year indicated). From 2014, figures inferior to 5 individuals are not shown.	Department of Home Affairs.
Austria	<p><i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and who have actually stayed for at least 3 months.</p>	Outflows include administrative corrections.	Population Registers, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	<p><i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for a period that is of at least 3 months (up to 2009) or of at least 12 months (from 2010).</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Up to 2009: Departures and automatic write-offs. From 2010: Changes of usual residence for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.</p>	Both series include breaks in 2010 and in 2011, and data for the year 2019 are provisional.	Population Register, Eurostat.
Canada	Total number of people who have been granted permanent resident status in Canada.	Country of origin refers to country of last permanent residence. Due to privacy considerations, the figures have been subjected to random rounding (either up or down to multiples of 5).	Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
Chile	Total number of people who obtained a temporary visa for the first time.	Estimations for the years 2017 and 2018.	Register of residence permits, Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
Colombia	Inflows of all foreign nationals who entered Colombia in the given year and subsequently stayed for at least 90 days.		Migration Colombia, Ministry of External Relations.
Czech Republic	<p><i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a permanent or a long-term residence permit (visa over 90 days) or who were granted asylum in the given year. Excludes nationals of EU countries if they intend to stay for less than 30 days in the country.</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Departures of foreigners who were staying in the country on a permanent or temporary basis.</p>	Country of origin refers to country of last permanent or temporary residence. Inflows and outflows of nationals of EU countries are likely to be underestimated.	Register of Foreigners, Czech Statistical Office.
Denmark	<p><i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners who live legally in Denmark, are registered in the Central population register, and have been living in the country for at least one year.</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Include administrative corrections.</p>	Excludes asylum seekers and all those with temporary residence permits.	Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	<p><i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreigners expecting to stay in the country (out of the country in the case outflows) for at least 12 months.</p>	The number of nationals from other EU countries who are staying temporarily in the country for at least 12 months may be underestimated.	Statistics Estonia.
Finland	<p><i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreign nationals with a residence permit valid for more than one year and nationals of EU countries who intend to stay in the country for more than 12 months. Nordic citizens who are moving for less than 6 months are not included.</p>	Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. Excludes asylum seekers and persons with temporary residence permits. Inflows and outflows of nationals of EU countries can be underestimated.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
France	<i>Inflows:</i> Inflows of non-EU nationals are first issuances of permanent-type permits. They include status changes from a temporary-type permit to a permanent-type permit. Inflows of EU nationals included from 2013 onwards are extracted from the permanent census. <i>Outflows:</i> Departures of usual residents for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.		<i>Inflows:</i> Ministry of the Interior and INSEE. <i>Outflows:</i> Eurostat.
Germany	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners who had previously no registered address in Germany and intending to stay at least one week in the country. <i>Outflows:</i> Deregistrations from population registers of persons who move out of their address without taking a new address in the country and administrative deregistrations.	Includes asylum seekers living in private households. Excludes inflows of ethnic Germans (<i>Aussiedler</i>).	Central Population Register, Federal Statistical Office.
Greece	<i>Inflows:</i> Permits valid for more than 12 months delivered to third country nationals. <i>Outflows:</i> Departures of usual residents for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.		Hellenic Statistical Authority (HAS) until 2020, Eurostat for 2021 <i>Outflows:</i> Eurostat.
Hungary	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners expecting to stay in the country for at least 90 days. <i>Outflows:</i> Foreign citizens having a residence or a settlement document and who left Hungary in the given year with no intention to return, or whose permission's validity has expired and did not apply for a new one or whose permission was invalidated by authority due to withdrawal. From 2012 on, includes estimations.		Population Register, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreigners expecting to stay in the country (out of the country in the case outflows) for at least 12 months.		Register of Migration Data, Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	<i>Inflows:</i> The estimates derive from the quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and relate to those persons resident in the country at the time of the survey and who were living abroad one year earlier. <i>Outflows:</i> The estimates derive from the quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and relate to the persons who were resident in the country at a point in the previous twelve-month period who are now living abroad.	Figures for Tables A.1. and A.2. are based on May to April of the year indicated.	Central Statistics Office.
Israel	Data refer to permanent immigrants by last country of residence.	The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.	Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Changes of residence.	Excludes seasonal workers. Administrative corrections are made following censuses (the last census took place in 2011).	Administrative Population Register (Anagrafe) analysed by ISTAT.
Japan	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners who entered the country, excluding temporary visitors and re-entries. <i>Outflows:</i> Foreigners who left Japan without re-entry permission. Excludes temporary visitors.		Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Korea	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Data refer to long-term inflows/outflows (more than 90 days).		Ministry of Justice.
Latvia	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Long-term migration (permanent change of residence or for a period of at least one year).		Population Register, Central Statistical Office.
Lithuania	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreign citizens who have been residing in the country for at least 6 months.		Lithuanian Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 12 months. <i>Outflows:</i> Foreigners who left the country with the intention to live abroad for at least 12 months.		Central Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico	Until 2012, number of foreigners who are issued an immigrant permit for the first time (" <i>inmigrante</i> " FM2). 2011 and 2012 also include new and former refugees who obtained immigrant status (" <i>inmigrado</i> "). From 2013 on, number of foreigners who are issued a permanent residence card, as the 2011 Migration Act came into effect.	The sharp increase in the numbers of 2013 is explained by administrative changes with the implementation of the 2011 Migration Act. Most of these "new residents" are foreigners already in the country on a temporary status.	National Migration Institute, Unit for Migration Policy, Ministry of Interior.
Netherlands	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least four of the next six months. <i>Outflows:</i> Outflows include the "net administrative corrections", i.e. unreported emigration of foreigners.	Inflows exclude asylum seekers who are staying in reception centres.	Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
New Zealand	<i>Inflows:</i> Permanent and long-term arrivals to live in the country for 12 months or more. <i>Outflows:</i> Permanent and long-term departures: Foreign-born returning to live overseas after a stay of 12 months or more in New Zealand.	This data is based on Stats NZ migration flows data calculated using the 12/16 month rule. This data is provisional until 16 months after the fact; for this reason we will continue to provide updated figures for both the reporting year and the previous year. For more information see https://www.stats.govt.nz/methods/defining-migrants-using-travel-histories-and-the-1216-month-rule	Statistics New Zealand.
Norway	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 6 months. Include EU/EFTA foreigners. <i>Outflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and who stayed in the country for at least 6 months.	Asylum seekers are registered as immigrants only after having settled in a Norwegian municipality following a positive outcome of their application. An asylum seeker whose application has been rejected will not be registered as an 'immigrant', even if the application process has taken a long time and return to the home country is delayed for a significant period.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland	<i>Inflows:</i> Number of permanent and "fixed-term" residence permits issued. Since 26 August 2006, nationals of European Union Member States and their family members are no longer issued residence permits. However, they still need to register their stay in Poland, provided that they are planning to stay in Poland for more than 3 months. <i>Outflows:</i> Departures of usual residents for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.		<i>Inflows:</i> Office for Foreigner. <i>Outflows:</i> Eurostat.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Portugal	<p><i>Inflows:</i> Data based on residence permits. Following the new legislation, the data include the new residence permits delivered to every foreigner with a citizenship from an EU or non-EU country. Includes continuous regularisation.</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Departures of usual residents for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.</p>		<p><i>Inflows:</i> Immigration and Border Control Office (SEF); National Statistical Institute (INE); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (before 2008).</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Eurostat.</p>
Slovak Republic	<p><i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Includes permanent, temporary, and tolerated residents.</p>		Register of Foreigners, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
Slovenia	<p><i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Persons who immigrated/emigrated to Slovenia from abroad and have usual residence in Slovenia (intend to stay for a year or more).</p>		Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS). Eurostat.
Spain	<p><i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Changes in regular residence for at least 12 months declared by foreigners.</p>	From 2008 on, data correspond to Migration Statistics estimates that are based on the number of registrations and cancellations in the Municipal Registers by all foreigners, irrespective of their legal status.	Municipal Population Registers (<i>Padron municipal de habitantes</i>), National Statistical Institute (INE).
Sweden	<p><i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least one year (including nationals of EU countries).</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Departures of foreigners who have the intention to live abroad for at least one year.</p>	Excludes asylum seekers and temporary workers.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	<p><i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit. Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months.</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Departures of foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit and of holders of an L-permit who stayed in the country for at least one year. The data include administrative corrections, so that, for example, foreigners whose permit expired are considered to have left the country.</p>		Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
Türkiye	<p><i>Inflows:</i> Residence permits issued for the first time to foreigners intending to stay 12 months or more in the country (long-term residents).</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Departures of long-term residents.</p>		Turkish Statistical Institute.
United Kingdom	<p><i>Inflows:</i> OECD Secretariat calculation based on entry clearance data.</p> <p><i>Outflows:</i> Non-British citizens leaving the United Kingdom. x</p>		Home Office.
United States	Permanent migrants: Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) ("green card" recipients).	Includes persons already present in the United States who changed status. Certain LPRs are admitted conditionally and are required to remove their conditional status after two years; they are counted as LPRs when they first enter. Data cover the fiscal year (October to September of the year indicated).	Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security; Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

Inflows of asylum seekers

Statistics on asylum seekers published in this annex are based on data provided by Eurostat and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Since 1950, the UNHCR, which has a mission of conducting and co-ordinating international initiatives on behalf of refugees, has regularly produced complete statistics on refugees and asylum seekers in OECD countries and other countries of the world (<https://www.unhcr.org/data.html>).

These statistics are most often derived from administrative sources, but there are differences depending on the nature of the data provided. In some countries, asylum seekers are enumerated when the application is accepted. Consequently, they are shown in the statistics at that time rather than at the date when they arrived in the country. Acceptance of the application means that the administrative authorities will review the applicants' claims and grant them certain rights during this review procedure. In other countries, the data do not include the applicants' family members, who are admitted under different provisions (France), while other countries count the entire family (Switzerland).

The figures presented in the summary table (Table A.3) generally concern initial applications (primary processing stage) and sometimes differ significantly from the totals presented in Tables B.3, which give data by country of origin. This is because the data received by the UNHCR by country of origin combine both initial applications and appeals, and it is sometimes difficult to separate these two categories retrospectively. The reference for total asylum applications remains the figures shown in summary Table A.3.

Table A.3. New asylum requests in OECD countries

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Australia	15 745	11 740	8 965	12 305	27 685	36 295	28 840	27 405	19 220	14 155	19 305
Austria	17 410	17 500	25 700	85 520	39 905	22 470	11 610	11 010	13 415	37 830	106 405
Belgium	18 450	12 080	14 130	39 065	14 290	14 055	18 160	23 140	12 930	19 605	32 140
Canada	20 230	10 330	13 655	16 560	23 620	47 845	55 375	58 340	19 045	23 365	94 375
Chile	170	245	280	615	2 280	5 635	5 775	770	1 675	2 500	5 055
Colombia	105	225	710	405	405	610	2 675	10 620	11 920	15 940	5 530
Costa Rica	1 155	1 120	1 365	2 190	4 485	6 320	27 970	59 180	21 125	108 425	129 480
Czech Republic	515	500	915	1 240	1 205	1 140	1 360	1 575	795	1 060	1 335
Denmark	6 075	7 230	14 565	20 855	6 070	3 140	3 495	2 645	1 435	2 015	4 505
Estonia	75	95	145	225	150	180	90	100	45	75	2 940
Finland	2 920	2 995	3 495	32 150	5 295	4 350	2 955	2 455	1 455	1 365	4 835
France	54 280	60 475	58 845	70 570	76 790	91 965	126 580	138 290	81 735	103 810	137 605
Germany	64 540	109 580	173 070	441 900	722 365	198 310	161 930	142 510	102 580	148 235	217 775
Greece	9 575	7 860	7 590	11 370	49 875	56 950	64 985	74 915	37 860	22 660	29 135
Hungary	2 160	18 570	41 215	174 435	28 215	3 120	635	470	90	40	45
Iceland	110	170	160	360	1 100	1 065	730	805	625	865	4 530
Ireland	940	940	1 440	3 270	2 235	2 910	3 655	4 740	1 535	2 615	13 645
Israel	1 985	2 600	225	7 535	15 045	15 345	16 260	9 445	1 885	1 925	3 915
Italy	17 185	25 720	63 655	82 790	121 185	126 560	53 440	35 005	21 340	45 200	77 200
Japan	2 530	3 260	4 995	7 575	10 900	19 650	10 495	10 375	3 935	2 415	3 770
Korea	1 140	1 570	2 880	5 690	7 520	9 925	16 125	15 430	6 665	2 330	11 540
Latvia	190	185	365	330	345	355	175	180	145	580	545
Lithuania	560	250	385	275	415	520	385	625	260	3 905	905
Luxembourg	2 000	990	1 030	2 360	2 065	2 325	2 225	2 200	1 295	1 370	2 395
Mexico	805	1 275	1 510	3 410	8 760	14 585	29 610	70 365	41 205	131 420	118 735
Netherlands	9 660	9 815	21 780	43 035	19 285	16 090	20 465	22 540	13 720	24 755	35 530
New Zealand	300	275	270	335	380	430	425	540	435	415	335
Norway	9 310	11 475	10 970	30 505	3 275	3 385	2 550	2 205	1 340	1 615	4 650
Poland	9 175	13 975	5 610	10 255	9 785	3 005	2 405	2 765	1 510	6 240	7 700
Portugal	290	505	445	870	710	1 015	1 240	1 735	900	1 350	1 980
Slovak Republic	550	290	230	270	100	155	155	215	265	330	505
Slovenia	260	240	355	260	1 265	1 440	2 800	3 615	3 465	5 220	6 645
Spain	2 355	4 290	5 460	14 610	15 570	33 040	52 745	115 190	86 385	62 065	116 150
Sweden	43 930	49 355	75 090	156 195	22 385	22 225	18 110	23 150	13 630	10 180	14 075
Switzerland	25 965	19 440	22 130	38 120	25 875	16 670	13 535	12 600	9 765	13 295	23 130
Türkiye	26 455	44 795	87 800	133 305	78 595	126 050	83 795	56 415	31 335	29 255	33 245
United Kingdom	27 980	29 875	32 345	39 970	39 355	34 435	38 485	44 315	36 025	56 465	89 395
United States	78 410	84 400	121 160	172 740	261 970	331 700	254 300	301 070	250 940	188 860	730 400
OECD	475 490	566 235	824 935	1 663 470	1 650 755	1 275 265	1 136 545	1 288 950	853 930	1 093 750	2 091 385

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.3.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/rhle15>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Australia

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Iran	1 839	967	260	816	2 971	5 075	744	1 069	1 289	846	1 916
India	943	1 163	958	644	1 117	1 299	1 813	2 495	1 762	833	1 562
Afghanistan	3 079	370	125	542	2 563	1 478	453	697	346	1 138	1 542
China	1 160	1 568	1 560	1 513	1 960	6 638	6 586	5 058	2 484	2 104	1 625
Sri Lanka	2 345	806	172	778	2 662	2 184	451	836	534	432	1 149
Malaysia	171	209	681	2 771	7 258	7 983	9 791	7 065	4 010	2 149	1 030
Pakistan	1 512	1 104	826	627	1 334	1 404	657	801	495	392	881
Viet Nam	75	128	262	217	772	1 263	812	959	1 165	764	721
Indonesia	127	190	151	213	318	510	618	752	605	384	705
Stateless	544	361	59	197	721	1 917	141	355	406	233	671
Vanuatu	5	6	71	..	642
Tonga	69	88	69	35	55	66	70	222	400	..	621
Myanmar	89	58	32	26	60	208	27	74	156	499	549
Fiji	236	413	284	248	390	260	638	1 093	649	..	498
Thailand	24	22	38	112	204	301	1 481	919	636	515	474
Other countries	3 534	4 291	3 487	3 568	5 294	5 701	4 557	5 012	4 213	3 864	4 717
Total	15 747	11 738	8 964	12 307	27 684	36 293	28 839	27 407	19 221	14 153	19 303

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Austria

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	4 003	2 589	4 915	24 840	11 520	3 525	1 765	2 585	2 825	8 050	23 655
India	401	339	265	370	415	310	195	295	140	870	19 320
Syria	922	1 991	7 660	24 720	8 640	7 255	3 300	2 675	5 080	16 130	19 005
Tunisia	198	225	135	150	125	70	35	55	145	500	12 605
Morocco	353	516	220	670	935	205	90	110	705	1 850	8 405
Pakistan	1 827	1 037	330	2 890	2 415	1 445	160	255	145	1 315	7 565
Türkiye	273	302	165	190	310	260	175	245	280	875	5 080
Somalia	483	433	1 150	2 040	1 505	655	475	600	615	1 575	1 620
Egypt	124	184	95	175	200	130	85	45	165	955	1 450
Bangladesh	212	278	100	700	290	125	95	205	215	980	1 070
Iraq	491	468	1 050	13 225	2 725	1 345	650	605	625	955	865
Russia	3 098	2 841	1 485	1 340	1 235	1 035	690	550	360	365	680
Iran	761	595	725	3 380	2 400	950	1 050	660	310	405	575
Algeria	573	949	440	840	850	220	80	120	325	425	560
Ukraine	79	64	420	485	340	435	190	185	65	80	540
Other countries	3 615	4 692	6 545	9 505	6 000	4 505	2 575	1 820	1 415	2 500	3 410
Total	17 413	17 503	25 700	85 520	39 905	22 470	11 610	11 010	13 415	37 830	106 405

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Belgium

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	2 525	910	805	7 730	2 225	995	1 045	2 245	2 310	5 155	5 760
Syria	815	965	2 635	10 295	2 235	2 625	2 770	2 730	1 320	1 765	3 215
Burundi	130	130	65	255	270	235	400	620	320	480	2 720
West Bank and Gaza Strip	5	..	10	10	140	815	2 420	2 320	455	1 200	2 500
Eritrea	65	55	790	335	330	665	725	1 155	805	1 505	1 880
Türkiye	335	195	135	185	650	465	785	1 000	585	560	1 620
Moldova	20	10	15	15	5	5	5	5	170	435	910
Georgia	390	210	280	195	185	415	640	500	210	485	840
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	1 325	1 090	610	630	500	550	405	520	385	275	815
Guinea	1 430	1 010	665	635	720	750	1 000	830	455	535	725
Cameroon	460	360	350	280	255	350	355	390	270	400	695
Ukraine	70	35	490	370	125	110	90	115	70	85	685
Somalia	290	155	280	2 010	725	295	380	765	600	935	640
Iran	350	205	180	450	255	200	485	710	210	225	555
Russia	1 200	780	535	535	410	390	355	405	220	170	500
Other countries	9 040	5 970	6 285	15 135	5 260	5 190	6 300	8 830	4 545	5 395	8 080
Total	18 450	12 080	14 130	39 065	14 290	14 055	18 160	23 140	12 930	19 605	32 140

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Canada

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Mexico	382	110	65	99	256	1 446	3 156	5 061	1 776	2 292	16 620
Haiti	417	334	348	306	634	7 329	1 403	1 374	1 056	755	11 194
Türkiye	363	183	182	262	1 106	2 163	1 820	1 548	312	842	9 196
Colombia	692	585	540	683	821	1 347	2 571	3 040	974	1 441	7 833
Iran	277	216	167	156	302	694	2 483	3 663	689	1 396	4 768
India	684	223	298	374	580	1 487	4 524	5 150	1 564	1 705	4 273
Pakistan	853	643	790	912	1 165	1 640	2 031	2 059	684	521	2 649
Venezuela	99	31	164	255	566	1 176	1 254	1 199	289	485	1 929
Nigeria	707	455	597	820	1 565	5 459	9 599	3 976	646	326	1 892
Chile	11	..	6	25	50	78	102	152	138	170	1 703
DRC	337	279	301	274	417	559	1 167	1 312	274	235	1 371
Afghanistan	348	368	422	463	624	738	634	437	190	337	1 340
Brazil	54	11	14	41	28	363	99	287	131	84	1 281
Sri Lanka	428	228	196	232	210	390	524	664	267	228	1 181
United States	212	70	140	147	128	2 097	1 311	1 076	345	214	1 133
Other countries	14 365	6 593	9 424	11 511	15 167	20 878	22 698	27 341	9 710	12 334	26 011
Total	20 229	10 329	13 654	16 560	23 619	47 844	55 376	58 339	19 045	23 365	94 374

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Chile

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Venezuela	14	246	1 345	1 666	226	394	2 065	3 430
Colombia	138	224	238	490	1 803	2 516	1 157	252	670	98	821
Cuba	5	17	56	1 603	2 764	272	531	158	183
Afghanistan	..	5	12	74	146
Haiti	23	8	6	29	115
Ukraine	5	96
Russia	..	5	5	..	5	67
Other countries	26	10	31	96	149	149	183	20	80	74	199
Total	169	244	279	617	2 282	5 633	5 776	770	1 675	2 498	5 057

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Colombia

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Venezuela	10	21	47	119	316	575	2 592	10 479	11 832	15 811	5 184
Cuba	73	64	430	227	54	24	41	24	57	111	233
Ukraine	28
Russia	27
Ecuador	5	6	5	5	7	23
Peru	10	10
Nigeria	..	5	7
Haiti	5	5	7
Dominican Republic	5
Other countries	5	127	233	55	29	13	43	118	26	5	6
Total	103	223	710	406	404	612	2 676	10 621	11 920	15 939	5 530

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Costa Rica

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Nicaragua	6	..	15	38	66	78	23 138	31 624	9 416	101 962	119 425
Venezuela	13	31	130	280	1 423	3 175	2 884	2 626	742	2 928	5 634
Colombia	495	624	524	583	669	778	533	1 137	377	789	1 492
Cuba	376	162	167	129	89	172	42	1 856	1 644	344	1 095
El Salvador	148	163	303	801	1 471	1 644	1 059	1 149	152	335	367
Honduras	34	73	80	82	149	225	188	436	129	325	353
Russia	5	24	344
Dominican Republic	6	67	21	41	88
Ecuador	5	..	5	5	5	5	..	44	80
Haiti	9	7	68	62	..	92	73	902	77
China	5	12	153	60	113	66
Panama	5	..	6	5	9	5	57	52
Peru	5	..	7	47	49
Mexico	9	5	6	8	13	15	5	22	47
Argentina	5	9	9	..	31	44
Other countries	80	69	118	259	545	154	79	20 002	8 496	463	269
Total	1 157	1 122	1 366	2 189	4 486	6 322	27 972	59 180	21 127	108 427	129 482

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Czech Republic

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Türkiye	10	10	..	5	25	25	35	20	25	35	220
Ukraine	100	70	420	565	355	295	280	215	240	265	205
Russia	30	40	25	30	50	40	70	80	30	15	135
Viet Nam	35	35	50	55	55	60	75	120	40	50	105
Uzbekistan	10	5	5	5	15	10	90	65	35	25	75
Georgia	5	10	10	15	45	110	140	190	85	185	70
Moldova	5	10	5	15	5	15	10	40	45	55	70
Afghanistan	10	10	15	25	35	15	20	20	5	175	60
Syria	60	70	105	130	65	70	30	35	20	30	45
Belarus	35	15	20	15	10	15	10	10	60	35	40
India	10	15	5	5	35
Bangladesh	5	..	30
Tunisia	5	5	10	5	5	10	25
Nigeria	5	10	15	15	20	10	10	15	5	5	20
Myanmar	30	5	5	..	5	5	5	5	20
Other countries	180	210	240	365	515	465	565	745	190	165	180
Total	515	500	915	1 240	1 205	1 140	1 360	1 575	795	1 060	1 335

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Denmark

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Ukraine	15	40	135	95	95	40	45	35	20	10	2 065
Afghanistan	565	410	305	2 215	1 110	170	115	90	70	555	375
Syria	875	1 685	7 200	8 580	1 255	765	600	490	340	320	370
Eritrea	55	85	2 275	1 705	250	295	675	480	165	380	195
Iran	550	360	275	2 745	315	145	195	135	80	65	120
Russia	510	965	495	170	70	45	80	60	30	15	105
Morocco	100	145	205	175	325	300	175	155	100	65	100
Iraq	125	95	145	1 470	435	130	120	115	55	65	100
Georgia	75	65	105	100	70	70	405	65	35	45	95
Belarus	155	55	60	65	40	50	30	30	15	20	90
Türkiye	55	15	15	25	15	35	25	25	35	35	60
Nigeria	110	135	95	115	110	65	25	20	15	20	50
Uzbekistan	15	5	10	5	5	..	5	45
Tunisia	65	70	55	45	50	20	40	15	15	20	40
Somalia	910	920	695	255	250	85	105	160	40	40	40
Other countries	1 895	2 180	2 495	3 090	1 675	925	855	770	420	360	655
Total	6 075	7 230	14 565	20 855	6 070	3 140	3 495	2 645	1 435	2 015	4 505

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Estonia

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Ukraine	55	95	5	10	15	5	..	5	2 610
Russia	10	15	15	15	10	15	10	30	15	10	215
Belarus	5	5	5	5	5	30
Nigeria	5	5	15
Afghanistan	5	10	5	5	..	5	..	15	15
Uzbekistan	10
Georgia	35	10	5	10	5	10	..	5	10
Türkiye	5	5	20	5	10	10
Moldova	5
Armenia	5	10	5	5	5

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Finland

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Ukraine	15	5	300	65	55	40	40	20	20	10	1 710
Russia	200	215	125	165	175	395	455	285	95	70	1 095
Afghanistan	190	170	195	5 190	685	305	135	125	190	225	215
Somalia	175	195	405	1 975	425	100	155	140	180	140	190
Iraq	785	760	800	20 400	1 080	1 000	565	270	475	150	185
Türkiye	55	55	40	55	100	110	285	360	80	125	175
Syria	180	150	145	875	600	740	105	95	55	85	135
Iran	120	145	90	615	140	90	230	95	25	30	95
Nigeria	95	200	155	155	160	95	90	105	35	55	90
Georgia	30	15	35	15	20	120	70	60	5	50	65
Sri Lanka	30	15	20	25	25	15	15	25	5	..	65
Rwanda	5	5	5	10	5	15	5	20	..	20	55
Nicaragua	25	30	5	35	55
Cameroon	20	35	45	40	85	45	55	60	25	25	45
Ethiopia	15	25	30	80	35	20	20	10	10	15	45
Other countries	1 005	1 005	1 105	2 485	1 705	1 260	705	755	250	330	615
Total	2 920	2 995	3 495	32 150	5 295	4 350	2 955	2 455	1 455	1 365	4 835

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – France

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	515	525	575	2 410	6 015	6 600	11 885	11 685	10 000	16 005	22 585
Bangladesh	1 045	3 070	2 655	3 345	2 440	2 620	4 045	6 705	4 615	6 200	10 555
Türkiye	2 030	1 685	1 400	1 015	1 010	1 290	2 110	4 110	3 095	4 965	10 005
Georgia	2 540	2 455	1 370	1 085	870	1 895	7 405	7 985	1 805	4 580	8 905
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	5 175	5 265	5 195	3 800	3 385	3 805	4 225	4 545	3 120	2 750	6 760
Guinea	1 815	2 450	2 190	2 040	2 645	4 130	7 985	7 045	4 690	5 250	6 200
Côte d'Ivoire	955	970	950	1 270	1 675	3 620	6 465	6 725	4 635	6 210	5 915
Albania	2 645	5 015	2 845	3 220	6 945	11 425	8 555	8 510	2 010	4 885	5 690
Pakistan	1 940	1 735	2 135	1 805	1 835	1 500	3 070	4 610	3 555	3 730	3 765
Nigeria	950	1 305	1 385	1 580	1 750	2 030	4 540	5 720	3 100	3 160	2 790
Russia	5 275	4 685	3 620	2 865	1 775	2 215	3 285	3 340	1 600	970	2 600
Sudan	745	840	1 950	5 315	6 085	4 680	2 980	2 120	1 355	2 210	2 520
Armenia	2 170	1 720	1 540	1 390	1 270	2 165	2 220	1 870	595	1 205	2 510
Syria	625	1 305	2 830	4 625	4 765	4 695	3 540	3 010	1 730	1 815	2 150
Comoros	640	525	650	370	250	355	345	1 585	1 830	3 155	2 010
Other countries	25 215	26 925	27 555	34 435	34 075	38 940	53 925	58 725	34 000	36 720	42 645
Total	54 280	60 475	58 845	70 570	76 790	91 965	126 580	138 290	81 735	103 810	137 605

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Germany

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Syria	6 200	11 850	39 330	158 655	266 250	48 970	44 165	39 270	36 435	54 905	70 975
Afghanistan	7 500	7 735	9 115	31 380	127 010	16 425	9 945	9 520	9 900	23 275	36 360
Türkiye	1 455	1 520	1 565	1 500	5 385	8 025	10 160	10 785	5 780	7 065	23 940
Iraq	5 350	3 960	5 345	29 785	96 115	21 930	16 330	13 740	9 845	15 605	15 175
Georgia	1 300	2 335	2 875	2 780	3 450	3 080	3 765	3 330	2 050	3 685	7 965
Iran	4 350	4 425	3 195	5 395	26 425	8 610	10 855	8 405	3 120	2 695	6 320
Somalia	1 245	3 785	5 530	5 125	9 850	6 835	5 075	3 570	2 605	3 650	3 940
Eritrea	650	3 615	13 200	10 875	18 855	10 225	5 570	3 520	2 560	3 170	3 925
Russia	3 200	14 885	4 410	5 255	10 985	4 885	3 940	3 145	1 700	1 440	2 850
North Macedonia	4 545	6 210	5 615	9 085	4 835	2 465	1 245	1 115	410	2 330	2 755
Moldova	30	70	255	1 560	3 345	890	1 780	1 770	1 285	2 390	2 590
Nigeria	890	1 925	3 925	5 205	12 710	7 810	10 170	9 070	3 305	2 510	2 365
Venezuela	5	10	5	20	90	205	405	725	555	390	1 820
Lebanon	465	495	695	1 285	5 200	1 160	645	705	535	680	1 755
Albania	230	1 245	7 865	53 805	14 855	3 775	1 875	1 695	815	1 210	1 745
Other countries	27 125	45 515	70 145	120 190	117 005	53 020	36 005	32 145	21 680	23 235	33 295
Total	64 540	109 580	173 070	441 900	722 365	198 310	161 930	142 510	102 580	148 235	217 775

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Greece

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Syria	275	470	730	3 325	26 630	16 305	13 145	10 750	7 415	2 945	4 280
Afghanistan	585	1 185	1 550	1 545	4 295	7 480	11 820	23 665	11 100	3 195	4 085
West Bank and Gaza Strip	30	40	65	55	850	1 305	1 515	2 140	1 260	760	2 895
Pakistan	2 340	1 325	1 125	1 505	4 420	8 345	7 185	6 420	3 515	3 415	2 555
Iraq	315	130	130	575	4 770	7 870	9 640	5 590	1 465	990	2 030
Somalia	60	120	105	95	125	230	715	2 270	1 530	1 485	1 985
Türkiye	30	25	30	40	180	1 820	4 820	3 795	1 590	1 910	1 395
Egypt	250	285	230	230	260	810	915	1 695	710	775	1 335
Bangladesh	1 005	715	370	535	1 055	1 255	1 435	2 375	1 625	2 480	1 280
Albania	385	580	555	915	1 300	2 345	3 125	2 795	1 025	1 125	885
Sierra Leone	85	30	20	25	40	45	85	120	75	90	880
Eritrea	140	155	245	135	415	320	330	305	200	140	630
Yemen	10	35	95	195	310	275	130	60	560
India	165	75	35	45	65	170	210	370	255	220	490
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	20	145	80	110	225	1 085	1 450	3 570	1 850	565	465
Other countries	3 890	2 580	2 310	2 200	5 150	7 370	8 285	8 780	4 115	2 505	3 385
Total	9 575	7 860	7 590	11 370	49 875	56 950	64 985	74 915	37 860	22 660	29 135

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Hungary

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	880	2 280	8 560	45 560	10 775	1 365	270	185	15	5	15
Iran	45	60	255	1 785	1 250	95	30	20	5	10	5
Russia	4	10	10	15	5	5	..	5
Other countries	1 228	16 220	32 390	127 075	16 185	1 660	335	265	65	25	20
Total	2 157	18 570	41 215	174 435	28 215	3 120	635	470	90	40	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Iceland

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Ukraine	15	10	10	10	30	10	5	..	2 350
Venezuela	15	180	105	355	1 220
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2	5	15	15	25	20	120	90	230
Somalia	1	1	..	5	20	30	50	35	40	40	100
Syria	3	5	5	40	35	30	40	20	60	65	90
Iraq	3	6	5	30	70	110	110	135	110	60	70
Nigeria	17	2	..	5	20	10	35	50	35	50	65
Afghanistan	9	4	..	20	25	15	45	45	30	90	65
Colombia	1	..	5	5	10	5	15	40
Iran	12	1	..	15	20	25	30	35	15	20	35
Russia	3	5	10	..	10	5	10	15	5	..	30
Honduras	..	3	5	5	..	20
Libya	2	2	5	5	..	10	..	20
Georgia	8	3	5	..	40	290	30	20	5	..	20
Yemen	5	5	10	5	..	15
Other countries	52	140	127	230	835	515	295	215	70	80	160
Total	113	172	172	360	1 100	1 065	730	805	625	865	4 530

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Ireland

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Georgia	20	15	20	40	75	300	450	635	35	330	2 705
Algeria	30	50	75	80	65	80	95	95	70	135	1 765
Somalia	5	10	15	15	30	20	55	135	165	335	1 570
Nigeria	160	130	140	185	175	185	250	385	210	450	1 105
Zimbabwe	50	70	85	95	190	260	280	445	80	145	975
Afghanistan	30	30	25	125	120	75	95	105	70	200	850
South Africa	35	30	50	55	95	105	200	315	80	115	445
Ukraine	15	10	50	45	20	15	5	10	..	5	420
Botswana	5	5	..	15	10	25	5	70	370
Egypt	15	15	5	15	15	35	35	40	20	25	340
Pakistan	105	90	290	1 350	235	195	240	205	85	55	240
Albania	45	50	100	215	220	280	460	970	40	65	220
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	60	70	75	60	65	95	100	75	35	25	185
Morocco	5	5	5	..	10	15	15	25	30	30	180
El Salvador	5	20	20	40	175
Other countries	365	365	500	985	920	1 235	1 360	1 255	590	590	2 100
Total	940	940	1 440	3 270	2 235	2 910	3 655	4 740	1 535	2 615	13 645

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Israel

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Russia	..	5	395	635	2 772	4 477	325	53	1 012
Belarus	103	376	667	165	8	319
India	322	671	636	189	268	279
Moldova	302	332	436	242	75	193	218
China	6	5	52	40	248	88	405	185
Türkiye	5	41	169	322	89	128	159
Sri Lanka	160	..	430	540	446	134	174	151
Colombia	22	5	21	127	212	85	16	143
Philippines	15	20	..	62	122
Myanmar	7	..	76	114
Uzbekistan	72	356	190	38	18	111
Sudan	36	952	30	1 373	661	936	766	41	13	25	110
Ukraine	..	5	..	703	6 880	7 711	1 765	633	217	117	95
Serbia and Kosovo	38	..	94
Uganda	24	75	55	30	43	85
Other countries	1 921	1 630	196	5 298	6 801	4 665	8 152	1 250	400	341	719
Total	1 985	2 602	226	7 534	15 044	15 344	16 260	9 446	1 886	1 927	3 916

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Italy

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Bangladesh	560	460	4 525	6 010	6 570	12 125	4 165	1 340	2 275	6 635	14 590
Pakistan	2 575	3 175	7 095	10 275	13 470	9 470	7 445	7 305	4 960	6 880	11 370
Egypt	440	905	680	560	775	810	740	805	360	2 680	8 835
Tunisia	890	500	465	295	330	445	1 005	705	1 000	6 360	5 365
Georgia	65	105	90	130	195	540	1 155	970	495	1 335	3 240
Peru	20	15	20	35	40	120	750	2 445	735	570	3 000
Ukraine	35	35	2 075	4 665	2 555	2 720	3 015	1 775	380	535	2 995
Morocco	280	305	310	575	1 545	1 860	1 875	1 510	475	1 575	2 785
Afghanistan	1 465	2 050	3 105	3 975	2 830	1 010	495	590	640	5 235	2 100
Nigeria	1 610	3 170	9 690	17 755	26 550	24 950	5 510	1 255	855	1 300	1 805
Colombia	45	50	70	40	90	210	580	875	540	380	1 765
Côte d'Ivoire	620	235	1 480	3 080	7 435	8 380	1 685	405	500	1 015	1 580
Venezuela	10	15	25	45	140	520	1 260	1 545	830	455	1 350
Albania	65	115	175	425	365	465	1 290	1 545	450	760	1 280
El Salvador	35	45	105	205	1 055	1 365	2 270	2 520	1 060	605	1 220
Other countries	8 470	14 540	33 745	34 720	57 240	61 570	20 200	9 415	5 785	8 880	13 920
Total	17 185	25 720	63 655	82 790	121 185	126 560	53 440	35 005	21 340	45 200	77 200

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Japan

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Cambodia	62	67	..	772	961	1 321	578
Sri Lanka	461	345	485	469	938	2 226	1 551	1 530	502
Türkiye	718	658	845	926	1 143	1 198	563	1 331	445
Myanmar	640	380	434	808	650	962	656	788	298
Pakistan	495	241	212	295	289	469	720	971	238
Bangladesh	300	190	284	244	242	438	542	662	230
Uzbekistan	6	210
Afghanistan	5	..	26	14	24	182
India	202	165	225	229	470	603	549	730	172
Nepal	577	544	1 293	1 768	1 451	1 451	1 713	1 256	130
Cameroon	58	99	70	67	..	98	203	234	84
Iran	83	..	68	68	..	120	56	38	79
Senegal	23	..	75	49	223	74
Uganda	24	..	31	42	..	68	62	193	61
Nigeria	161	68	86	154	..	77	98	120	56
Other countries	524	570	935	2 403	5 718	11 093	2 770	954	433
Total	4 316	3 260	4 994	7 577	10 901	19 650	10 493	10 375	3 936	2 413	3 772

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Korea

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Kazakhstan	45	539	1 223	2 496	2 236	603	36	2 456
India	7	..	40	295	218	691	1 120	959	420	148	1 278
Türkiye	..	5	5	..	11	42	158	320	171	16	1 188
Russia	7	27	324	692	1 916	2 829	1 064	45	1 038
China	5	46	360	401	1 062	1 413	1 199	2 000	311	301	772
Myanmar	32	11	18	44	52	48	27	59	37	73	390
Pakistan	244	275	396	1 143	809	667	1 120	790	303	131	349
Bangladesh	32	45	62	388	335	383	608	491	435	233	304
Egypt	6	97	568	812	1 002	741	870	114	718	117	288
Morocco	..	5	54	89	127	152	305	365	173	36	271
Uzbekistan	5	..	9	82	145	43	146	235	168	64	265
Nigeria	102	206	201	264	324	486	390	270	147	164	252
Kyrgyzstan	27	92	71	112	86	41	49	206
Nepal	43	90	84	236	217	149	175	291	260	108	178
Haiti	5	5	15	8	..	160
Other countries	656	773	1 076	1 839	2 263	3 118	5 478	4 369	1 807	807	2 143
Total	1 132	1 553	2 880	5 692	7 520	9 924	16 125	15 429	6 666	2 328	11 538

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Latvia

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Russia	10	5	10	10	25	25	50	25	10	30	120
Afghanistan	5	..	15	35	35	15	5	5	10	70	110
Belarus	5	5	..	5	45	55	65
Iran	5	5	5	5	60
Iraq	20	85	5	5	20	5	5	350	50
Azerbaijan	5	5	5	15	35	10	15	25
Ukraine	75	45	5	5	5	10	..	5	20
Sri Lanka	5	..	5	..	5	5	20
Syria	20	15	35	5	150	140	5	5	10	..	15
Uzbekistan	..	5	5	..	5	5	5	10
India	20	5	5	15	5	5	10
Georgia	105	145	165	30	5	10	10	10	5	..	5
Pakistan	5	20	..	5	5	5	5	5
Morocco	5
Bangladesh	5	5	5	5	5	..	5
Other countries	45	15	40	110	60	130	45	45	25	30	20
Total	190	185	365	330	345	355	175	180	145	580	545

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Lithuania

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Belarus	15	5	10	15	10	35	15	15	80	245	400
Russia	55	30	35	35	50	80	50	275	65	115	140
Iraq	5	..	5	25	40	..	35	10	15	2 370	95
Syria	..	5	5	5	165	170	15	15	5	110	60
Tajikistan	5	5	20	50	120	205	40	35	45
Afghanistan	80	45	70	30	30	15	20	10	10	115	40
Nigeria	5	10	5	..	35	10
Egypt	5	..	5	10
Ukraine	5	5	65	60	30	35	15	15	10
Cameroon	120	10
Iran	15	5	..	75	10
Sri Lanka	5	5	20	15	..	5	65	10
Azerbaijan	5	5	20	15	5	5	25	10	..	5	5
Yemen	10	5
India	..	10	5	10	5	..	65	5
Other countries	390	145	160	75	60	110	50	50	40	535	50
Total	560	250	385	275	415	520	385	625	260	3 905	905

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Luxembourg

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Syria	10	25	95	635	330	405	280	375	360	445	1 045
Eritrea	10	5	40	45	115	230	410	565	255	320	445
Afghanistan	10	15	5	220	60	40	180	170	100	115	185
Türkiye	10	5	10	20	15	10	45	60	45	25	90
Venezuela	10	65	45	35	85
Iran	30	25	10	60	50	20	50	55	55	25	45
Guinea	10	5	5	5	20	35	50	40	25	15	30
Tunisia	45	50	40	20	40	100	90	30	20	15	30
Algeria	35	40	40	25	75	160	75	75	35	20	30
Albania	300	70	90	130	220	130	40	55	20	10	25
Ethiopia	5	5	5	10	15	25	30	25	10	35	25
Iraq	25	25	15	545	180	140	185	130	65	55	20
Somalia	15	5	10	15	25	20	30	45	20	15	20
Cameroon	5	5	10	10	20	15	15	25	20	25	20
Colombia	5	10	10	10	20
Other countries	1 490	710	655	620	900	995	730	475	210	205	280
Total	2 000	990	1 030	2 360	2 065	2 325	2 225	2 200	1 295	1 370	2 395

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Mexico

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Honduras	272	529	768	1 560	4 119	4 272	13 631	30 093	15 469	36 361	31 092
Cuba	77	101	81	37	43	796	212	8 683	5 758	8 319	18 095
Haiti	25	14	24	16	47	436	82	5 536	5 964	51 827	17 153
Venezuela	41	57	361	4 042	6 344	7 665	3 292	6 223	14 915
Nicaragua	11	20	24	28	70	62	1 246	2 232	802	2 919	8 984
El Salvador	200	308	418	1 475	3 488	3 708	6 186	8 999	4 053	6 037	7 806
Guatemala	54	46	52	102	437	676	1 383	3 778	3 005	4 149	5 269
Brazil	5	5	5	552	372	3 836	2 594
Colombia	41	40	11	26	44	96	204	558	501	1 275	2 490
Dominican Republic	5	5	5	..	5	5	10	34	32	200	1 423
Ecuador	5	5	..	5	20	23	22	78	85	245	1 241
Senegal	5	..	13	334	1 095
Angola	184	58	184	1 069
Chile	5	418	808	6 970	885
Afghanistan	8	6	541
Other countries	105	207	87	102	123	462	274	1 553	992	2 533	4 083
Total	803	1 275	1 511	3 408	8 762	14 583	29 609	70 363	41 204	131 418	118 735

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Netherlands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Syria	455	2 230	8 750	18 640	2 865	2 965	2 960	3 675	4 070	8 385	12 645
Afghanistan	1 020	455	450	2 550	1 025	320	325	435	390	3 010	2 730
Türkiye	90	45	45	55	235	480	1 300	1 250	990	2 460	2 685
Yemen	25	35	30	50	45	170	530	645	410	1 190	2 430
Somalia	875	965	350	260	155	125	135	220	200	905	1 455
Eritrea	425	850	3 835	7 390	1 865	1 590	1 410	500	370	770	1 365
Algeria	30	30	15	45	980	890	1 270	1 210	995	1 105	1 205
Ukraine	25	35	250	725	315	140	305	130	40	70	1 060
Pakistan	150	105	185	155	160	180	310	395	265	445	875
Morocco	25	60	55	80	1 270	980	1 065	1 060	775	905	720
Iran	835	595	505	1 885	885	720	1 870	1 535	370	265	700
Iraq	1 390	535	615	3 010	960	845	745	620	335	745	670
Russia	745	230	165	125	125	315	295	400	180	205	590
Colombia	5	10	10	5	35	35	45	160	105	185	520
Nigeria	105	130	225	215	195	245	560	2 105	635	415	520
Other countries	3 460	3 505	6 295	7 845	8 170	6 090	7 340	8 200	3 590	3 695	5 360
Total	9 660	9 815	21 780	43 035	19 285	16 090	20 465	22 540	13 720	24 755	35 530

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – New Zealand

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
India	9	..	18	21	31	43	49	66	43	140	68
China	33	21	23	23	64	76	103	91	60	68	66
Malaysia	5	..	5	7	11	10	18	36	38	11	34
Sri Lanka	25	41	29	23	13	30	42	50	25	29	21
Ukraine	7	5	5	18
Fiji	21	37	29	28	12	8	..	12	18	5	18
Pakistan	24	18	24	24	14	18	28	12	..	5	14
Afghanistan	10	7	9	9	6	27	7	32	13	5	13
Uganda	5	6	5	12
Myanmar	5	5	5	10	17	12
Russia	5	5	22	7	11	11	15	10
Bahrain	..	6	5	6
Tonga	6	5	..	5	5
South Africa	..	9	..	22	13	5	6	14	8	10	5
Indonesia	..	8	5	5	111	26	5
Other countries	170	123	123	163	199	180	149	205	108	75	30
Total	302	275	272	337	378	429	424	539	435	416	337

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Norway

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Syria	310	850	1 980	10 535	540	1 000	415	535	540	585	1 575
Ukraine	30	25	130	90	25	30	35	25	10	5	750
Afghanistan	960	680	550	6 910	365	135	90	95	55	250	500
Eritrea	1 155	3 210	2 805	2 785	545	840	220	180	150	185	310
Russia	285	325	175	110	60	45	50	80	25	10	250
Türkiye	40	60	45	80	80	160	770	360	85	100	210
Colombia	..	5	10	15	10	35	25	45	150
Venezuela	5	..	10	10	20	20	15	30	90
Iran	425	250	95	1 310	115	85	110	70	45	30	70
Ethiopia	185	280	365	655	155	85	40	40	20	35	55
Georgia	105	65	35	30	10	35	30	25	10	5	40
Iraq	195	165	165	2 935	205	140	95	50	35	30	35
Albania	165	180	200	430	125	85	65	60	15	15	30
Yemen	30	35	35	70	15	10	10	30	10	10	30
Somalia	2 110	1 630	760	495	140	45	45	30	20	15	30
Other countries	3 315	3 715	3 625	4 070	875	665	545	570	280	265	525
Total	9 310	11 475	10 970	30 505	3 275	3 385	2 550	2 205	1 340	1 615	4 650

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Poland

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Belarus	60	25	20	20	35	30	25	30	385	2 130	2 880
Ukraine	60	35	2 150	1 575	595	300	225	215	95	115	1 505
Russia	4 935	11 935	2 065	6 985	7 435	2 120	1 600	1 770	495	340	1 350
Iraq	25	30	25	55	40	40	65	30	40	1 280	350
Afghanistan	90	45	30	15	20	25	40	55	120	1 595	245
Egypt	100	35	10	10	10	15	20	15	10	15	165
Armenia	380	150	100	160	320	65	35	30	5	10	100
Tajikistan	10	5	105	525	830	85	35	80	45	95	95
San Marino	40	90
Iran	15	10	15	5	15	10	30	35	10	60	85
Syria	105	255	105	285	40	40	25	25	35	125	85
Georgia	2 960	1 050	560	230	55	20	20	50	20	45	60
Pakistan	35	25	40	20	20	20	25	15	10	15	60
Yemen	10	10	5	10	30	45
India	5	5	5	5	5	10	15	20	5	15	45
Other countries	395	370	380	355	365	225	235	390	225	330	540
Total	9 175	13 975	5 610	10 255	9 785	3 005	2 405	2 765	1 510	6 240	7 700

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Portugal

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	5	5	20	30	5	20	10	595	250
India	5	5	..	80	230
Ukraine	5	..	155	365	140	125	135	80	10	10	165
Gambia	..	5	..	5	25	20	20	175	150	65	165
Morocco	5	15	25	20	5	10	30	35	85	115	110
Pakistan	5	25	25	65	25	20	50	10	5	15	90
Dominican Republic	90
Senegal	5	35	5	10	25	25	20	70	80	45	90
Colombia	10	5	5	..	5	..	20	15	5	10	85
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	15	10	10	25	40	160	130	85	25	10	60
Angola	5	..	15	20	30	120	225	305	115	45	55
Russia	5	5	5	10	15	30	10	15	55
Guinea-Bissau	20	20	5	..	5	10	50	155	90	50	50
Algeria	5	10	20	5	15	5	15	45
Guinea	65	80	10	35	50	45	70	120	80	50	35
Other countries	145	305	185	300	315	400	470	630	240	245	405
Total	290	505	445	870	710	1 015	1 240	1 735	900	1 350	1 980

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Slovak Republic

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Ukraine	5	5	20	15	15	5	..	5	150
Türkiye	10	5	5	5	5	20	10	75
Morocco	5	5	..	5	40	105	70
Bangladesh	5	..	5	5	..	5	..	15	15	5	55
Russia	10	5	..	5	..	5	5	5	35
Nepal	5	15
Pakistan	5	10	5	5	15	10	10	5	5	10	15
Tunisia	5	10	5	15
Afghanistan	60	85	75	25	10	25	30	85	50	90	15
Syria	5	15	35	5	10	10	10	5	35	10	10
Georgia	40	15	5	5	5
Nigeria	..	5	5
Sudan	..	10	5	5	5
Belarus	5
Algeria	15	5	5	..	5	20	20	5
Other countries	385	135	80	210	45	80	90	75	70	70	25
Total	550	290	230	270	100	155	155	215	265	330	505

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Slovenia

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	50	15	70	45	410	575	455	415	740	2 590	1 205
India	5	5	35	25	20	35	850
Bangladesh	..	5	5	5	60	175	150	265	825
Cuba	5	5	5	..	5	10	..	30	..	40	605
Pakistan	10	20	20	25	105	140	775	520	490	490	555
Morocco	5	10	5	5	40	40	170	720	1 215	160	370
Burundi	230
Türkiye	25	10	10	5	60	100	65	65	55	275	200
Ukraine	5	..	15	10	5	..	195
Iraq	10	45	115	20	95	85	85	255	180
Iran	..	5	20	30	75	50	160	120	50	325	135
Nepal	5	25	..	10	55	130
Ghana	5	5	25	115
Gambia	5	5	..	45	105
Russia	5	15	5	5	5	5	30	10	5	10	100
Other countries	155	155	185	90	445	485	920	1 445	640	650	845
Total	260	240	355	260	1 265	1 440	2 800	3 615	3 465	5 220	6 645

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Spain

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Venezuela	30	35	115	585	3 960	11 390	19 070	40 305	28 065	15 655	45 225
Colombia	60	50	90	120	610	3 150	8 465	28 880	27 180	11 100	35 515
Peru	5	5	5	10	30	255	525	3 965	5 145	2 235	8 850
Morocco	40	40	85	395	335	520	1 280	2 470	945	6 440	3 765
Honduras	40	40	50	150	385	1 155	2 400	6 730	5 465	2 195	2 970
Nicaragua	5	5	5	10	20	80	1 360	5 840	3 680	1 195	2 040
Mali	95	1 450	585	215	210	300	650	1 190	1 440	4 470	1 625
El Salvador	30	25	60	135	415	1 225	2 240	4 715	2 475	815	1 455
Cuba	60	50	15	40	80	140	355	1 295	1 485	1 065	1 335
Afghanistan	40	60	95	40	65	90	70	115	30	1 580	1 310
Senegal	25	45	30	30	45	235	435	720	665	3 145	1 255
Argentina	5	10	20	55	270	410	275	700
Paraguay	5	5	10	20	60	350	365	235	700
Syria	220	710	1 495	5 720	2 920	4 120	2 725	2 315	330	1 060	690
Russia	35	50	60	85	170	345	630	760	445	365	660
Other countries	1 660	1 725	2 770	7 070	6 305	9 995	12 425	15 270	8 260	10 235	8 055
Total	2 355	4 290	5 460	14 610	15 570	33 040	52 745	115 190	86 385	62 065	116 150

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Sweden

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Syria	7 920	15 905	30 315	50 890	4 710	5 250	2 615	5 015	1 760	2 165	1 800
Ukraine	130	155	1 280	1 335	545	460	500	835	515	445	1 800
Afghanistan	4 760	2 705	2 880	41 190	2 145	1 245	615	745	850	990	820
Eritrea	2 405	4 565	11 055	6 515	740	1 540	750	1 155	1 205	665	725
Russia	940	875	710	495	260	315	300	305	110	165	670
Uzbekistan	395	280	280	285	220	280	665	965	720	160	615
Colombia	20	15	25	20	120	190	325	490	150	115	545
Türkiye	150	140	155	220	690	825	440	635	395	495	460
Iraq	1 340	815	1 745	20 190	2 045	1 475	1 065	940	765	515	440
Iran	1 535	1 015	800	4 270	935	905	1 095	985	580	310	415
Somalia	5 695	3 130	3 785	4 730	1 280	550	430	730	615	490	360
Peru	5	5	15	5	15	90	120	200	100	35	295
Ethiopia	315	365	465	1 560	375	295	280	265	345	260	295
Nigeria	500	575	440	405	300	320	320	300	205	135	245
Nicaragua	20	15	25	20	30	70	275	360	120	35	240
Other countries	17 800	18 795	21 115	24 065	7 975	8 415	8 315	9 225	5 195	3 200	4 350
Total	43 930	49 355	75 090	156 195	22 385	22 225	18 110	23 150	13 630	10 180	14 075

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Switzerland

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	1 350	865	730	7 800	3 185	1 180	1 125	1 350	1 630	2 960	6 940
Türkiye	515	370	265	385	475	770	925	1 225	1 130	2 245	4 680
Eritrea	4 300	2 490	6 825	9 860	5 040	3 155	2 495	2 500	1 635	1 725	1 595
Algeria	680	715	335	285	520	515	710	780	935	960	1 305
Burundi	5	5	..	15	20	35	30	30	35	10	1 190
Syria	1 145	1 850	3 770	4 650	2 040	1 810	1 195	945	755	905	1 165
Georgia	615	565	400	365	395	615	805	530	205	335	660
Morocco	860	975	665	370	795	420	440	320	370	510	490
Iran	315	180	115	570	530	280	455	490	255	260	465
Iraq	380	350	280	2 285	1 250	545	520	490	270	495	455
Somalia	760	550	770	1 215	1 530	795	510	360	260	395	450
Tunisia	1 995	1 565	665	285	215	180	245	125	135	170	380
Sri Lanka	445	455	905	1 775	1 315	730	500	475	340	270	285
Russia	300	370	150	175	150	120	135	115	55	65	240
Ethiopia	295	220	310	565	1 010	305	190	145	100	175	195
Other countries	12 005	7 915	5 945	7 520	7 405	5 215	3 255	2 720	1 655	1 815	2 635
Total	25 965	19 440	22 130	38 120	25 875	16 670	13 535	12 600	9 765	13 295	23 130

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Türkiye

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	14 146	8 726	15 652	63 443	34 775	67 352	53 029	35 042	22 606	21 926	19 400
Ukraine	7 131
Iraq	6 942	25 280	50 510	55 574	28 763	44 500	19 959	15 532	5 875	4 961	4 083
Iran	3 589	5 897	8 202	11 383	12 115	9 186	6 387	3 558	1 425	1 032	1 140
Other countries	1 780	4 892	13 437	2 906	2 940	5 014	4 422	2 285	1 428	1 337	1 492
Total	26 457	44 795	87 801	133 306	78 593	126 052	83 797	56 417	31 334	29 256	33 246

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – United Kingdom

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Albania	1 017	1 641	1 869	1 809	1 768	1 696	2 384	3 970	3 071	4 754	15 925
Afghanistan	1 242	1 456	1 715	2 807	3 094	1 927	2 087	2 135	1 546	3 088	10 872
Iran	3 162	2 967	2 457	3 694	4 792	3 057	3 962	5 464	4 199	10 446	9 183
Iraq	423	450	869	2 609	3 651	3 268	3 598	3 901	3 281	7 721	6 295
Syria	1 289	2 020	2 406	2 846	1 588	793	919	1 374	1 746	3 895	4 534
Bangladesh	1 169	1 246	906	1 281	2 234	1 982	1 440	1 364	876	887	3 468
Eritrea	768	1 431	3 275	3 756	1 263	1 128	2 196	1 927	2 604	5 019	3 275
India	1 195	1 111	896	1 288	2 025	1 777	1 632	1 910	1 046	1 125	3 248
Sudan	740	834	1 601	3 014	1 436	1 832	1 774	1 784	2 153	2 385	3 191
Pakistan	4 867	4 576	3 893	3 254	3 717	3 130	2 582	2 566	1 525	1 159	2 582
Türkiye	200	267	283	249	424	507	784	1 266	794	748	2 008
Egypt	260	312	297	340	473	437	376	356	344	595	1 522
Georgia	28	50	47	47	61	74	78	264	195	540	1 457
El Salvador	8	20	21	22	89	76	203	1 186	1 043	1 310	1 289
Nigeria	1 498	1 450	1 444	1 509	1 849	1 589	1 361	1 430	1 015	1 027	1 168
Other countries	10 089	10 044	9 430	10 330	10 038	10 226	12 067	13 568	10 589	11 767	19 376
Total	27 955	29 875	31 409	38 855	38 502	33 499	37 443	44 465	36 027	56 466	89 393

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – United States

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Cuba	195	185	155	112	147	730	1 512	9 155	9 497	12 879	157 226
Venezuela	716	882	3 113	7 354	18 312	29 926	27 483	25 664	23 530	27 020	138 597
Honduras	2 115	3 165	6 798	14 255	19 470	28 806	24 435	39 466	30 815	19 596	43 190
Haiti	1 612	1 879	2 196	2 220	3 969	8 643	4 112	3 945	7 116	10 038	41 864
Guatemala	4 152	4 865	9 098	16 419	25 723	35 318	33 073	51 502	36 490	23 008	39 522
Nicaragua	280	259	349	387	518	857	1 527	5 474	3 736	4 724	33 080
Colombia	574	631	817	1 058	1 767	3 204	2 678	3 334	3 852	11 263	32 189
El Salvador	4 587	5 692	10 093	18 883	33 620	49 459	33 391	33 619	23 352	14 913	27 147
Brazil	444	311	492	983	1 454	2 625	2 282	2 798	4 593	4 915	25 334
Afghanistan	204	186	273	315	311	112	0	105	111	507	25 057
India	1 998	1 633	3 395	3 650	6 162	7 435	9 440	10 607	5 599	4 886	21 415
Ecuador	1 394	1 848	3 545	3 732	4 423	3 884	2 386	2 748	3 378	5 625	21 220
Mexico	11 067	10 077	13 987	19 294	27 879	26 065	20 026	22 525	15 402	12 135	18 850
Russia	881	950	1 103	1 699	2 158	2 936	1 900	2 595	2 775	3 831	18 197
China	15 884	12 295	13 716	15 083	19 868	17 374	9 426	10 267	10 144	4 549	9 103
Other countries	19 998	23 385	52 030	67 296	96 189	114 326	80 629	77 261	70 550	28 971	78 408
Total	66 101	68 243	121 160	172 740	261 970	331 700	254 300	301 065	250 940	188 860	730 399

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7w5od9>

Metadata related to Tables A.3 and B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers

Totals in Table A.3 might differ from the tables by nationality (Tables B.3) because the former totals get revised retroactively while the origin breakdown does not. Data for Table A.3 generally refer to first instance/new applications only and exclude repeat/review/appeal applications while data by origin (Tables B.3) may include some repeat/review/appeal applications. Data by country of origin since 2014 may be slightly underestimated as they are the sum of monthly data where only cells with 5 people and above were filled.

Comments on countries of asylum:

France: Data include unaccompanied minors.

Germany: Germany has a pre-registration system (EASY system). Asylum requests officially registered and presented in this section may be lower than the pre-registrations in the EASY system (1.1 million in 2015).

EU countries and United Kingdom: Figures are rounded to the nearest multiple of 5.

United States: In Table B.3, data are a combination of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS – number of cases) affirmative asylum applications, and of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR – number of persons) defensive asylum applications, if the person is under threat of removal. Factors have been applied to totals since 2010 in both Table A.3 and Table B.3 to reflect the estimated number of cases.

Comments on countries of origin:

Serbia (and Kosovo): Data may include asylum seekers from Serbia, Montenegro and/or Former Yugoslavia.

Source for all countries: European countries: Eurostat; other countries: governments, compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Data Unit (<https://popstats.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/>).

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

Who is an immigrant?

There are major differences in how immigrants are defined across OECD countries. Some countries have traditionally focused on producing data on foreign residents (European countries, Japan and Korea), whilst others refer to the foreign-born (settlement countries, i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). This difference in focus relates in part to the nature and history of immigration systems and legislation on citizenship and naturalisation.

The foreign-born population can be viewed as representing first-generation migrants, and may consist of both foreign and national citizens. The size and composition of the foreign-born population is influenced by the history of migration flows and mortality amongst the foreign-born. For example, where inflows have been declining over time, the stock of the foreign-born will tend to age and represent an increasingly established community.

The concept of foreign population may include persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generations born in the host country. The characteristics of the population of foreign nationals depend on a number of factors: the history of migration flows, natural increase in the foreign population and naturalisations. Both the nature of legislation on citizenship and the incentives to naturalise play a role in determining the extent to which native-born persons may or may not be foreign nationals.

Sources for and problems in measuring the immigrant population

Four types of sources are used: population registers, residence permits, labour force surveys and censuses. In countries which have a population register and in those which use residence permit data, stocks and flows of immigrants are most often calculated using the same source. There are exceptions, however, with some countries using census or labour force survey data to estimate the stock of the immigrant population. In studying stocks and flows, the same problems are encountered whether population register or permit data are used (in particular, the risk of underestimation when minors are registered on the permit of one of the parents or if the migrants are not required to have permits because of a free movement agreement). To this must be added the difficulty of purging the files regularly to remove the records of persons who have left the country.

Census data enable comprehensive, albeit infrequent analysis of the stock of immigrants (censuses are generally conducted every five to ten years). In addition, many labour force surveys now include questions about nationality and place of birth, thus providing a source of annual stock data. The OECD produces estimates of stocks for some countries.

Some care has to be taken with detailed breakdowns of the immigrant population from survey data since sample sizes can be small. Both census and survey data may underestimate the number of immigrants because they can be missed in the census or because they do not live in private households (labour force surveys may not cover those living in collective dwelling such as reception centres and hostels for immigrants). Both these sources may cover a portion of the unauthorised population, which is by definition excluded from population registers and residence permit systems.

Table A.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries

Thousands and percentages

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Australia	6 214	6 409	6 570	6 730	6 912	7 139	7 333	7 533	7 653	7 502	..
% of total population	27.8	28.2	28.4	28.7	29.0	29.5	29.8	30.2	30.2	29.2	..
Austria	1 323	1 365	1 415	1 485	1 595	1 656	1 697	1 729	1 765	1 798	1 842
% of total population	15.8	16.2	16.7	17.4	18.5	19.0	19.3	19.6	19.9	20.2	20.6
Belgium	1 680	1 724	1 751	1 786	1 849	1 881	1 920	1 973	2 056	2 080	2 126
% of total population	15.3	15.6	15.7	16.0	16.5	16.7	16.9	17.3	17.9	18.1	18.4
Canada	6 914	7 029	7 156	7 287	7 541	7 714	7 896	8 362	..
% of total population	20.1	20.2	20.4	20.6	21.1	21.4	21.6	22.0	..
Chile	388	416	442	465	..	746	..	1 299	1 448	1 460	1 482
% of total population	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.6	..	4.1	..	6.9	7.6	7.5	7.5
Colombia	.	.	.	159.4	1905.4	.	.
% of total population	0.3	3.8
Costa Rica	.	.	.	411.7	520.7	.	.
% of total population	8.6	10.3
Czech Republic	391	387	396	416	433	465	468	507	534	570	453
% of total population	3.7	3.7	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.8	5.0	5.3	4.3
Denmark	442	456	476	501	541	571	592	608	614	618	641
% of total population	7.9	8.2	8.5	8.9	9.5	10.0	10.3	10.5	10.6	10.6	11.0
Estonia	211	199	197	195	194	193	196	198	199	198	201
% of total population	15.9	15.0	14.9	14.8	14.7	14.6	14.9	15.0	15.0	14.9	15.1
Finland	266	285	304	322	337	358	373	387	404	421	442
% of total population	4.9	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.2	6.5	6.8	7.0	7.3	7.6	8.0
France	7 475	7 591	7 715	7 847	8 028	8 099	8 200	8 429	8 522	..	8 651
% of total population	11.5	11.6	11.7	11.8	12.1	12.1	12.3	12.6	12.7	..	12.8
Germany	9 752	10 047	10 401	10 792	11 392	12 609	13 043	13 457	13 682	13 592	13 964
% of total population	12.1	12.5	12.9	13.3	13.9	15.3	15.8	16.2	16.5	16.3	16.8
Greece	1 313	1 280	1 265	1 243	1 220	1 251	1 278	1 307	1 348	1 362	1 198
% of total population	11.8	11.6	11.5	11.4	11.3	11.6	11.9	12.2	12.6	12.7	11.2
Hungary	403	424	448	476	504	514	537	565	594	598	613
% of total population	4.0	4.3	4.5	4.8	5.1	5.2	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.1	6.3
Iceland	35	35	37	39	42	47	55	61	67	69	72
% of total population	10.9	11.0	11.5	12.0	12.7	13.9	15.9	17.4	18.5	18.8	19.3
Ireland	771	779	790	805	810	845	879	914	948	983	1 017
% of total population	16.9	17.0	17.1	17.3	17.3	17.8	18.3	18.8	19.3	19.7	20.3
Israel	1 850	1 835	1 821	1 817	1 818	1 812	1 811	1 809	1 812	1 797	1 793
% of total population	23.8	23.2	22.6	22.1	21.7	21.2	20.8	20.4	20.0	19.5	19.1
Italy	5 715	5 696	5 737	5 805	5 907	6 054	6 175	6 069	6 161	6 262	6 161
% of total population	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.6	9.8	10.1	10.3	10.1	10.3	10.5	10.4
Latvia	289	279	271	265	259	251	246	242	237	230	224
% of total population	14.0	13.7	13.5	13.3	13.1	12.8	12.7	12.5	12.4	12.1	11.9
Lithuania	207	..	137	136	130	127	131	138	153	165	169
% of total population	6.8	..	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.6	4.9	5.5	5.9	6.0
Luxembourg	215	226	238	249	261	271	281	291	302	310	319
% of total population	41.5	42.6	43.7	44.7	45.7	46.4	47.1	47.9	48.7	49.1	49.8
Mexico	974	991	940	1 007	1 075	..	1 212	..	.
% of total population	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	..	1.0
Netherlands	1 906	1 928	1 953	1 996	2 057	2 137	2 216	2 299	2 400	2 451	2 551
% of total population	11.4	11.5	11.6	11.8	12.1	12.5	12.9	13.3	13.8	14.1	14.5

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
New Zealand	965	1 002	1 050	1 108	1 169	1 231	1 272
% of total population	22.0	22.7	23.6	24.5	25.4	26.2	27.4
Norway	616	664	705	742	772	800	822	842	868	878	898
% of total population	12.4	13.2	13.9	14.4	14.9	15.3	15.6	15.8	16.2	16.3	16.6
Poland	631	625	620	612	626	652	696	761	849	902	951
% of total population	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.5
Portugal	894	915	937	959	980	1 002	1 024	1 046	1 067	1 089	1 105
% of total population	8.5	8.7	9.0	9.2	9.5	9.7	9.9	10.2	10.4	10.6	10.7
Slovak Republic	170	173	175	178	182	186	190	194	198	202	227
% of total population	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	4.2
Slovenia	230	233	235	238	241	245	250	265	282	293	295
% of total population	11.2	11.3	11.4	11.5	11.7	11.9	12.1	12.8	13.5	13.9	14.0
Spain	6 295	6 175	5 958	5 891	5 918	6 025	6 199	6 539	6 997	7 215	7 365
% of total population	13.5	13.2	12.8	12.7	12.8	13.0	13.3	14.0	14.9	15.2	15.6
Sweden	1 427	1 473	1 533	1 604	1 676	1 784	1 877	1 956	2 020	2 047	2 091
% of total population	15.1	15.5	16.0	16.5	17.1	18.0	18.7	19.2	19.6	19.8	20.1
Switzerland	2 158	2 218	2 290	2 355	2 416	2 480	2 519	2 553	2 590	2 630	2 672
% of total population	27.3	27.7	28.3	28.8	29.2	29.6	29.8	30.0	30.2	30.5	30.7
Türkiye	1 460	1 592	1 777	1 924	2 278	2 669	2 610	3 141	3 243
% of total population	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.2	3.8	3.9
United Kingdom	7 588	7 860	8 064	8 482	8 988	9 369	9 388	9 482	9 539	9 614	..
% of total population	12.0	12.3	12.6	13.1	13.8	14.3	14.2	14.3	14.3	14.3	..
United States	40 738	41 344	42 391	43 290	43 739	44 525	44 729	44 933	44 258	45 273	47 331
% of total population	13.0	13.1	13.3	13.5	13.5	13.7	13.7	13.7	13.4	13.5	14.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.4. The percentage of total population is based on the UN and Eurostat estimates of the total population and may differ from national estimates.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/un8yrh>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Australia

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
United Kingdom	1 211.5	1 220.2	1 216.3	1 209.1	1 202.1	1 196.0	1 188.1	1 179.0	1 173.2	1 155.9	..	49
India	355.4	378.5	411.2	449.0	489.4	538.1	592.8	664.7	723.3	710.4	..	46
China	496.3	524.9	561.7	606.7	658.2	708.7	752.7	772.9	755.4	703.5	..	55
New Zealand	569.6	585.4	583.7	575.4	568.2	567.3	567.7	568.2	564.9	560.0	..	49
Philippines	206.1	218.9	230.2	241.1	252.7	265.8	277.6	295.4	310.2	310.6	..	61
Viet Nam	212.1	219.9	228.5	235.6	243.2	250.6	257.0	264.0	270.5	268.2	..	56
South Africa	167.6	172.2	174.9	177.4	180.5	185.5	189.3	194.5	200.2	201.9	..	50
Malaysia	136.6	138.4	139.4	143.4	152.9	164.7	173.6	176.3	177.3	172.3	..	54
Italy	200.4	200.7	200.4	198.5	195.8	191.5	187.0	182.1	178.0	171.5	..	49
Sri Lanka	105.0	110.7	115.1	119.7	124.5	129.5	134.4	140.9	147.3	145.8	..	48
Nepal	30.7	34.8	42.9	50.2	59.0	73.8	94.8	118.8	132.1	129.9	..	46
United States	96.7	100.8	102.7	104.7	105.8	108.1	108.4	108.6	110.0	109.5	..	53
Germany	124.7	123.1	120.8	119.1	116.7	115.9	114.3	112.1	111.1	107.9	..	54
Korea	91.6	97.9	101.9	106.6	111.6	114.8	116.4	116.0	111.5	106.6	..	55
Greece	120.5	119.8	118.3	115.8	113.4	111.5	109.1	106.3	103.8	100.7	..	53
Other countries	2 089.3	2 162.8	2 222.4	2 277.4	2 338.3	2 417.0	2 469.5	2 533.1	2 584.9	2 547.9
Total	6 214.0	6 408.7	6 570.2	6 729.7	6 912.1	7 138.6	7 332.6	7 533.0	7 653.6	7 502.5	..	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Austria**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Germany	201.4	205.9	210.7	215.0	219.9	224.0	227.8	232.2	237.8	244.9	251.6	52
Bosnia and Herzegovina	150.5	151.7	155.1	158.9	162.0	164.3	166.8	168.5	170.5	172.4	174.3	51
Türkiye	158.7	159.2	160.0	160.0	160.2	160.4	160.3	159.7	159.6	159.1	159.1	48
Serbia	130.2	130.9	132.6	134.7	137.1	139.1	141.9	143.2	144.4	144.4	143.9	52
Romania	69.1	73.9	79.3	91.3	98.7	105.6	113.3	121.1	128.8	134.2	138.3	52
Hungary	42.6	48.1	55.0	61.5	67.7	72.4	75.8	79.0	81.9	83.9	85.3	54
Poland	60.5	63.2	66.8	69.9	72.2	73.8	75.1	75.6	76.1	76.6	76.5	51
Syria	3.4	4.2	5.2	12.3	33.6	41.6	47.0	48.5	49.7	52.3	63.0	36
Croatia	39.1	39.0	39.8	41.7	43.3	44.5	45.2	46.7	48.1	50.6	53.5	51
Slovak Republic	27.7	30.0	32.6	35.5	38.0	40.0	41.5	42.7	43.8	44.9	45.8	62
Afghanistan	11.0	13.6	18.2	20.3	36.6	44.7	44.4	43.1	42.2	42.2	43.0	35
Russia	27.5	29.4	30.2	31.7	33.0	33.9	34.4	34.7	35.2	35.8	36.6	61
Italy	25.3	26.2	27.7	29.3	31.2	32.3	33.3	34.1	35.1	35.9	36.4	45
Czech Republic	42.5	41.6	40.8	40.3	39.6	38.7	37.8	37.0	36.3	35.5	34.6	63
Bulgaria	15.7	17.0	18.5	21.6	23.8	25.7	27.4	29.2	31.1	32.2	33.0	54
Other countries	317.8	330.8	342.1	360.6	397.7	415.4	425.3	433.2	444.5	452.6	467.5	..
Total	1 323.1	1 364.8	1 414.6	1 484.6	1 594.7	1 656.3	1 697.1	1 728.6	1 765.3	1 797.6	1 842.4	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Belgium

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Morocco	197.1	201.9	204.8	208.1	211.2	214.1	217.4	221.0	226.5	229.7	233.6	50
France	176.9	179.2	180.8	182.2	183.7	184.5	184.9	186.1	189.2	191.0	191.9	54
Netherlands	126.9	127.4	127.9	128.5	129.4	129.8	130.0	130.7	131.6	131.8	132.8	50
Italy	119.7	119.5	119.7	120.0	120.1	119.7	119.1	119.1	119.5	118.3	117.1	49
Romania	45.0	52.7	57.9	65.2	71.7	77.3	83.5	90.9	99.9	104.7	108.0	45
Türkiye	98.0	98.5	98.4	98.3	98.3	98.5	99.1	100.1	102.0	102.6	104.1	48
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	82.0	83.1	83.5	83.6	84.1	84.4	84.9	85.4	86.4	86.7	87.1	54
Germany	83.9	83.2	82.4	81.5	81.1	80.6	80.2	80.2	80.2	79.8	79.6	54
Poland	63.0	67.8	70.9	73.4	75.5	76.3	76.9	77.4	78.2	77.5	76.6	57
Former USSR	51.0	51.5	51.1	51.8	51.2	51.7	53.1	54.6	58.5	58.2	59.5	60
Spain	40.5	42.8	44.7	46.0	47.0	47.2	47.9	48.9	50.5	51.7	53.5	53
Former Yugoslavia	45.7	44.2	43.1	43.1	42.9	42.9	43.1	43.8	46.9	44.9	45.1	50
Bulgaria	21.1	23.9	26.1	28.7	31.3	32.9	34.8	36.9	40.4	42.6	44.5	50
Syria	6.2	7.2	8.1	10.9	21.3	25.1	30.0	33.1	35.7	36.4	38.7	43
Portugal	29.4	31.5	33.3	34.3	35.2	36.1	36.4	36.8	37.7	38.0	38.4	48
Other countries	493.6	509.9	518.1	530.4	565.2	579.7	599.2	628.2	673.3	685.9	715.1	
Total	1 679.8	1 724.4	1 750.8	1 786.1	1 849.3	1 880.8	1 920.5	1 973.0	2 056.4	2 079.8	2 125.7	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Canada**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
China	858.2	929.7	..	45
India	668.6	898.1	..	50
Philippines	588.3	719.6	..	42
United Kingdom	499.1	464.1	..	49
United States	253.7	256.1	..	45
Pakistan	202.3	234.1	..	51
Italy	236.6	204.1	..	50
Iran	154.4	182.9	..	50
Viet Nam	169.3	182.1	..	45
Jamaica	138.3	145.4	..	44
Korea	123.3	138.4	..	46
Sri Lanka	132.0	136.2	..	49
Poland	146.5	135.0	..	45
Portugal	139.5	128.8	..	49
Germany	145.8	126.5	..	48
Other countries	3 085.0	3 480.5	..	
Total	7 540.8	8 361.5	..	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Chile

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Venezuela	83.0	..	287.9	455.5	447.8	444.4	..
Peru	146.6	157.7	187.8	..	223.9	235.2	238.5	246.5	..
Haiti	62.7	..	178.8	185.9	182.3	180.3	..
Colombia	16.1	19.1	105.4	..	147.4	161.2	166.2	173.8	..
Bolivia	26.7	30.5	73.8	..	107.5	120.1	123.7	132.1	..
Argentina	63.2	64.9	66.5	..	74.4	79.5	76.4	77.0	..
Ecuador	20.9	21.9	27.7	..	36.8	41.4	40.0	42.0	..
Dominican Republic	11.9	..	20.5	20.1	19.9	19.5	..
Spain	11.6	12.1	16.7	..	20.6	22.5	19.0	18.9	..
Brazil	10.5	11.2	14.2	..	18.1	20.0	18.5	18.8	..
Cuba	6.7	..	15.8	16.3	17.2	17.4	..
United States	10.4	10.9	12.3	..	16.2	18.5	14.1	14.2	..
China	5.9	6.6	10.1	..	13.6	15.7	13.5	13.5	..
Mexico	5.8	..	8.8	10.4	7.5	7.5	..
France	5.4	..	8.7	10.5	6.6	6.5	..
Other countries	56.3	..	120.5	35.8	68.7	70.0	..
Total	388.2	415.5	441.5	465.3	..	746.4	..	1 299.4	1 448.4	1 460.0	1 482.4	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Colombia**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Venezuela	55.9	1 780.5	50
United States	19.0	20.8	45
Ecuador	16.4	19.2	49
Spain	11.9	17.1	43
Argentina	4.5	5.7	40
Peru	5.1	5.7	39
Mexico	4.3	5.6	45
Chile	3.4	4.7	42
Brazil	3.5	4.7	52
Italy	2.9	3.2	34
France	2.6	3.2	39
Panama	2.6	3.1	49
Cuba	2.1	2.5	37
Germany	2.1	2.2	39
Costa Rica	1.4	1.8	50
Other countries	21.7	25.3
Total	159.4	1 905.4	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Costa Rica

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Nicaragua	292.2	350.9	50
Venezuela	1.4	28.2	49
Colombia	21.3	25.5	48
El Salvador	13.9	16.7	53
United States	12.7	15.2	41
Panama	11.4	13.7	47
Cuba	5.8	6.9	45
Honduras	3.9	4.7	54
Peru	3.8	4.5	46
China	3.6	4.3	44
Mexico	3.1	3.7	51
Guatemala	2.7	3.2	47
Spain	2.2	2.6	42
Italy	2.1	2.6	36
Germany	1.9	2.2	40
Other countries	29.9	35.8	
Total	411.7	520.7	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Czech Republic**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Ukraine	109.7	99.8	94.2	100.7	104.1	110.3	107.5	122.9	136.8	129.5	154.2	42
Slovak Republic	76.2	80.3	84.7	89.3	94.0	98.9	102.4	106.6	110.1	82.0	86.0	49
Russia	29.0	29.2	30.6	32.7	33.7	36.2	33.4	35.1	35.3	32.4	34.4	56
Viet Nam	48.4	46.2	45.9	45.5	45.6	46.6	46.1	47.2	47.7	32.3	32.5	47
Poland	18.2	18.4	18.6	18.8	19.0	19.4	19.7	20.3	20.7	12.7	13.2	58
Bulgaria	7.0	7.7	8.5	9.3	10.1	11.2	12.6	14.2	15.6	9.0	9.7	38
Moldova	7.4	6.3	6.2	6.8	7.3	8.3	8.3	9.5	10.5	8.1	9.2	42
Kazakhstan	5.2	5.7	6.1	6.6	7.0	7.8	7.1	7.5	7.5	6.6	7.3	55
Romania	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.4	6.1	7.1	8.0	9.1	9.9	5.8	6.3	32
Belarus	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.5	4.6	5.5	6.3	5.5	6.2	50
Mongolia	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.6	5.1	5.8	6.4	7.3	8.0	5.1	5.4	53
United States	3.5	3.8	5.5	5.2	5.4	7.7	7.6	7.6	5.6	4.3	5.0	40
India	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.9	3.3	4.0	4.5	4.2	5.0	30
China	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.7	6.2	6.4	4.9	5.0	49
Germany	12.6	13.6	14.7	15.6	16.2	16.8	16.8	16.9	17.1	4.5	4.9	29
Other countries	55.2	57.4	61.8	65.3	68.7	76.2	78.3	87.0	91.6	62.2	69.1	
Total	390.8	387.3	396.2	416.5	433.3	465.1	467.6	507.1	533.6	409.2	453.4	44

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Denmark

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	28.0	29.9	32.0	34.5	37.1	39.1	40.6	41.5	41.5	41.9	44.2	47
Syria	3.1	4.0	5.8	11.6	24.1	33.6	35.4	35.9	35.5	35.7	35.3	44
Romania	10.1	12.9	15.7	18.7	21.9	24.3	26.3	28.5	29.4	30.3	34.1	43
Türkiye	32.4	32.2	32.4	32.4	32.5	32.6	32.9	33.1	33.1	33.2	33.5	48
Germany	28.6	28.7	28.7	28.7	29.1	29.6	29.8	30.3	30.6	30.9	32.4	52
Iraq	21.2	21.2	21.1	21.2	21.2	21.4	21.6	21.9	21.8	21.9	22.0	46
Iran	12.9	13.3	14.1	14.9	15.6	16.0	16.8	17.1	17.2	17.6	18.0	43
Bosnia and Herzegovina	17.6	17.4	17.3	17.3	17.2	17.1	17.1	17.0	16.8	16.6	16.5	51
United Kingdom	12.2	12.5	12.8	13.0	13.4	14.1	14.8	15.3	15.5	15.8	16.0	35
Norway	14.9	14.9	14.9	15.1	15.6	15.8	15.8	15.7	15.7	15.6	15.6	65
Sweden	13.1	13.1	13.2	13.4	13.6	13.8	14.2	14.3	14.4	14.6	14.8	61
Pakistan	12.1	12.3	12.9	13.5	13.8	14.0	14.2	14.4	14.5	14.5	14.6	48
Afghanistan	11.1	11.6	12.1	12.6	12.8	13.0	13.5	13.8	13.9	13.9	14.0	45
Lithuania	7.3	8.3	9.0	9.7	10.6	11.3	12.4	13.2	13.2	13.2	13.8	48
India	6.1	6.3	6.7	7.4	8.5	9.8	10.7	11.8	12.8	12.7	13.7	44
Other countries	210.9	217.9	227.3	237.2	253.5	265.1	275.7	284.1	288.4	289.5	302.3	
Total	441.5	456.4	476.1	501.1	540.5	570.6	591.7	607.6	614.4	617.8	640.9	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Estonia**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Russia	83.8	138.5	136.4	129.2	126.2	122.9	120.6	118.1	115.9	113.1	110.2	63
Ukraine	15.7	21.7	21.5	21.8	22.4	22.7	23.2	24.0	25.0	26.4	28.6	46
Belarus	9.1	11.6	11.5	11.1	10.9	10.7	10.6	10.4	10.4	10.3	10.3	60
Latvia	2.7	4.1	4.2	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.5	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.4	49
Finland	4.1	2.4	2.3	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.4	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.1	40
Kazakhstan	2.6	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	57
Germany	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.0	2.5	45
Lithuania	1.5	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	55
Azerbaijan	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	41
Georgia	0.8	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	47
Other countries	87.9	10.6	10.9	13.4	14.5	15.7	19.5	21.9	24.0	24.9	27.7	
Total	210.8	199.0	196.9	194.7	193.9	192.6	196.3	198.1	199.0	198.2	201.3	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Finland

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Former USSR	50.5	52.3	53.7	54.7	55.6	56.5	56.7	57.1	58.1	59.0	60.6	61
Estonia	29.5	35.0	39.5	42.7	44.5	45.7	46.0	46.2	46.0	46.2	46.9	49
Sweden	31.4	31.6	31.8	31.9	32.0	32.1	32.4	32.7	32.9	33.4	33.7	48
Iraq	7.9	8.4	9.3	10.0	10.7	13.8	16.3	17.9	19.0	20.1	20.9	36
Russia	9.0	10.0	11.1	12.0	12.8	13.7	14.2	14.9	15.7	16.6	17.8	54
China	7.7	8.3	8.9	9.4	10.0	10.4	10.9	11.4	11.9	12.6	13.5	57
Somalia	8.8	9.1	9.6	10.1	10.6	11.1	11.4	11.8	12.1	12.4	12.7	49
Thailand	7.4	8.1	8.7	9.2	9.7	10.2	10.5	10.9	11.3	11.7	12.0	79
Viet Nam	4.8	5.2	5.5	6.0	6.6	7.5	8.0	8.5	9.0	9.4	10.1	54
India	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.4	5.7	5.8	6.2	6.8	7.9	8.4	9.4	42
Türkiye	5.4	5.7	6.1	6.3	6.5	6.8	7.1	7.5	8.2	8.8	9.2	35
Iran	4.4	4.9	5.3	5.8	6.1	6.8	7.2	7.4	7.9	8.3	8.9	44
Former Yugoslavia	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.9	7.1	7.3	7.5	7.6	8.0	8.3	8.7	42
Afghanistan	2.9	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.3	5.7	6.4	6.9	7.3	7.8	8.5	38
Syria	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.4	2.0	3.6	5.4	6.1	6.8	7.1	7.6	45
Other countries	85.3	92.0	98.6	106.1	113.1	120.5	126.6	133.7	142.1	150.7	161.8	
Total	266.1	285.5	304.3	322.0	337.2	357.5	372.8	387.2	404.2	420.8	442.3	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – France**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Algeria	1 359.8	1 363.9	1 368.4	1 375.3	1 383.7	1 386.4	1 390.3	1 386.2	1 397.4	51
Morocco	907.8	924.0	935.4	953.5	967.2	981.2	992.1	1 009.6	1 019.5	51
Portugal	625.2	633.2	642.1	648.1	648.1	644.2	624.2	614.2	614.2	..	596.3	50
Tunisia	381.2	387.6	393.9	397.8	403.7	410.7	415.6	427.8	427.0	46
Italy	331.7	327.6	325.0	323.9	322.7	322.0	314.9	315.4	315.4	..	308.7	51
Spain	282.5	283.4	284.6	286.2	285.2	284.1	275.8	274.1	274.1	..	275.6	55
Türkiye	259.5	260.2	261.2	260.5	258.2	257.7	256.7	264.0	257.6	47
Germany	213.8	211.6	209.9	208.3	206.4	204.3	198.3	190.3	190.3	..	200.9	57
Belgium	148.5	149.7	151.2	152.7	154.1	155.6	154.3	163.6	163.6	..	153.7	54
United Kingdom	170.1	168.0	167.0	166.5	165.6	165.0	162.3	163.6	163.6	51
Senegal	119.6	124.1	127.7	132.7	137.3	143.6	148.4	156.3	158.9	47
Comoros	39.3	40.3	42.5	45.0	108.4	131.4	137.6	143.3	149.7	55
Madagascar	120.1	122.3	124.7	127.1	134.8	137.9	140.3	141.3	149.8	60
Côte d'Ivoire	96.0	99.9	104.4	109.0	114.6	120.5	127.5	133.7	143.5	52
Romania	87.3	96.7	108.8	117.3	124.6	131.9	135.7	141.2	141.2	..	144.9	52
Other countries	2 332.2	2 398.6	2 468.5	2 543.5	2 613.7	2 622.5	2 725.6	2 904.1	2 955.9	
Total	7 474.7	7 590.9	7 715.1	7 847.5	8 028.2	8 098.9	8 199.7	8 428.7	8 521.8	..	8 651.1	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Germany

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	1 076	1 147	1 203	1 253	1 328	1 460	1 553	1 668	1 638	1 452	1 542	54
Türkiye	1 298	1 292	1 313	1 343	1 362	1 321	1 194	1 319	1 339	1 279	1 284	49
Russia	961	950	959	936	954	955	1 057	1 076	1 076	953	1 001	57
Kazakhstan	735	728	728	725	735	735	909	946	926	829	912	53
Syria	35	42	53	70	141	453	620	711	721	873	878	40
Romania	377	422	460	484	545	653	670	779	813	742	798	51
Italy	372	371	417	425	439	506	467	508	522	514	521	40
Bosnia and Herzegovina	134	148	148	157	164	171	263	289	304	333	338	49
Croatia	199	205	208	219	254	305	242	278	297	280	303	50
Greece	198	211	221	233	256	281	264	298	294	291	273	46
Iraq	74	75	88	97	104	151	193	233	245	252	273	44
Afghanistan	88	83	90	101	111	176	179	209	233	250	267	40
Bulgaria	66	91	96	119	146	214	226	264	269	227	262	50
Ukraine	205	205	210	214	211	222	255	269	264	259	252	62
Serbia	158	174	180	185	183	187	205	207	223	228	223	53
Other countries	3 776	3 903	4 027	4 231	4 459	4 819	4 746	4 403	4 518	4 830	4 837	
Total	9 752	10 047	10 401	10 792	11 392	12 609	13 043	13 457	13 682	13 592	13 964	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Greece**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Albania	357.1	..	337.7	..	312.7
Georgia	54.2	..	45.1	..	43.3
Russia	37.8	..	43	..	35.3
Bulgaria	35	..	40.9	..	31
Germany	21.2	..	25.7	..	26.7
Romania	32.7	..	27.2	..	22.1
Ukraine	11.5	..	10.7	..	16.6
Pakistan	24	..	18	..	16.5
Armenia	9.6	..	7.7	..	11.4
Poland	9.4	..	16.6	..	10.8
Cyprus	10.3	..	10.9	..	9.8
Türkiye	9.4	..	12.5	..	9.4
United States	7.4	..	5.3	..	8.7
Egypt	11.4	..	9.8	..	7.7
Moldova	1.8	..	4.9	..	6.3
Other countries	97.1	..	111.5	..	80.2
Total	729.9	..	727.5	..	648.5

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Hungary

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Romania	183.1	190.9	198.4	203.4	208.4	206.3	207.4	207.1	210.4	208.0	207.4	51
Ukraine	25.5	28.8	33.3	42.0	50.2	55.8	61.6	68.5	72.2	71.5	74.5	49
Germany	25.7	27.3	29.2	30.2	31.7	32.4	33.6	34.4	37.9	39.0	42.6	49
Serbia	24.1	27.1	30.0	32.4	34.0	34.7	39.4	42.2	43.0	41.0	41.5	44
Former USSR	13.1	14.1	13.5	13.2	13.3	12.7	14.6	23.4	27.6	27.1	28.5	47
Slovak Republic	21.1	21.3	21.3	21.1	21.1	21.1	20.9	20.3	20.5	21.3	21.2	60
United Kingdom	4.9	5.6	6.8	7.9	9.4	11.2	12.9	14.6	16.7	18.0	19.3	46
China	9.0	9.9	11.1	14.8	18.2	17.5	18.2	17.0	17.8	16.8	16.0	49
Austria	7.6	8.1	8.8	9.3	9.9	10.3	10.6	10.8	11.5	13.0	14.0	46
Former Czechoslovakia	5.6	5.8	6.0	6.2	6.2	5.8	5.5	5.5	5.8	8.6	9.5	58
United States	7.0	7.2	7.4	7.8	8.2	8.4	8.7	9.0	9.4	9.1	9.5	47
Viet Nam	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.6	4.1	5.1	6.3	7.4	7.1	47
Italy	3.4	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.4	6.1	6.2	38
Netherlands	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.6	4.7	5.0	44
France	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.9	4.8	5.0	46
Other countries	64.0	64.6	67.3	72.3	77.0	80.5	84.5	92.5	99.4	101.5	105.3	
Total	402.7	424.2	447.7	476.1	504.3	514.1	536.6	565.1	594.3	597.6	612.7	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Iceland**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	9.3	9.4	10.2	11.0	12.0	13.8	17.0	19.2	20.5	20.6	20.9	43
Denmark	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8	50
Lithuania	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.4	38
United States	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.9	49
Romania	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.5	2.0	2.1	2.5	31
Philippines	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	66
Germany	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.4	63
Sweden	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.4	51
Latvia	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.3	33
United Kingdom	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	40
Thailand	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	74
Norway	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	52
Spain	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	42
Portugal	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	35
France	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	48
Other countries	8.8	9.2	9.5	10.0	10.7	12.2	14.6	16.7	18.7	19.9	20.5	
Total	34.7	35.4	37.2	39.2	42.0	46.5	54.6	61.4	66.8	68.9	71.8	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Ireland

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2016 (%)
United Kingdom	277.2
Poland	115.2
Lithuania	33.3
Romania	28.7
United States	28.7
India	21.0
Latvia	19.0
Nigeria	16.6
Brazil	15.8
Philippines	14.7
Germany	13.0
Pakistan	12.9
France	11.9
Spain	11.8
China	11.3
Other countries	179.3
Total	810.4

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Israel**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Former USSR	867.0	862.4	858.7	859.4	863.1	867.1	873.3	882.2	895.6	891.0	886.7	56
Morocco	149.6	147.2	145.4	143.1	140.9	138.8	136.1	133.2	130.3	126.9	123.8	54
United States	84.8	86.2	88.0	90.5	92.6	94.6	96.9	98.8	101.4	103.5	103.4	54
Ethiopia	81.9	84.6	85.9	85.6	85.7	85.5	87.0	86.9	87.5	88.6	90.6	51
France	43.5	44.2	46.3	51.1	57.0	60.1	62.6	64.0	65.3	66.5	68.8	54
Romania	90.0	87.0	84.0	80.8	77.8	74.8	71.8	68.8	66.0	63.2	60.6	56
Iraq	60.0	58.5	56.8	54.9	53.0	51.1	49.3	47.4	45.4	43.4	41.3	54
Iran	48.1	47.4	46.7	46.0	45.2	44.4	43.5	42.7	41.8	40.9	40.0	52
Argentina	37.6	36.8	36.3	36.0	35.6	35.4	35.1	34.8	34.9	35.1	35.5	53
United Kingdom	23.0	23.0	23.2	23.5	24.0	24.4	24.6	24.8	25.2	25.3	26.1	52
Poland	48.0	45.0	42.2	39.7	37.2	34.8	32.6	30.5	28.6	26.8	25.1	58
Tunisia	29.2	28.8	28.4	28.6	28.3	27.7	27.1	26.4	25.6	24.9	24.4	55
Türkiye	24.9	24.1	23.4	22.8	22.1	21.6	21.2	20.6	20.0	19.2	18.5	53
India	17.5	17.4	17.5	18.0	18.0	17.8	17.9	18.1	17.9	17.8	18.1	53
Yemen	26.9	24.1	25.4	22.5	21.6	22.7	21.7	20.9	19.9	18.9	16.4	58
Other countries	218.0	218.3	213.0	214.6	215.5	211.7	210.6	208.9	207.0	205.5	213.7	..
Total	1 850.0	1 835.0	1 821.0	1 817.0	1 817.5	1 812.4	1 811.2	1 808.9	1 812.2	1 797.3	1 792.9	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Italy

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Romania	1 003.7	1 000.1	1 004.6	1 016.0	1 024.1	1 036.0	1 033.0	984.5	979.1	913.2	901.0	60
Albania	434.3	432.7	440.1	446.6	449.7	458.2	467.9	463.0	478.3	505.3	507.8	49
Morocco	411.1	409.6	418.1	424.1	428.9	434.5	437.8	432.4	442.4	457.0	456.0	45
Former USSR	448.2	462.8	454.9	81
China	192.0	191.3	197.1	200.4	212.2	220.1	223.7	218.3	222.4	259.1	228.6	50
Germany	219.9	220.0	216.3	214.3	211.6	210.4	209.0	205.5	204.7	198.3	198.3	56
Switzerland	192.1	191.5	194.9	194.0	192.8	192.1	191.7	190.4	190.1	187.3	187.7	54
Former Yugoslavia	185.7	188.9	181.0	50
India	127.3	126.8	134.1	139.1	149.5	155.6	157.8	154.4	160.6	172.0	170.2	41
Bangladesh	87.9	87.5	95.4	105.5	111.3	119.5	128.5	125.9	129.5	146.7	148.4	25
Philippines	135.9	135.4	141.1	143.2	145.5	147.8	148.5	140.8	141.6	149.0	144.3	60
Egypt	105.8	105.5	106.7	108.9	112.8	117.7	121.8	120.9	127.5	137.3	138.8	32
Pakistan	77.3	77.1	83.4	89.5	97.8	108.9	116.7	117.9	121.5	135.0	134.8	26
Brazil	109.2	108.9	102.5	100.0	104.8	111.8	121.8	129.4	140.7	128.9	121.0	64
France	136.5	136.7	132.2	127.9	128.4	128.1	127.4	124.8	124.3	122.8	119.4	60
Other countries	2 482.0	2 472.8	2 470.8	2 495.8	2 538.1	2 613.2	2 689.8	2 660.8	2 064.9	2 098.6	2 068.7	
Total	5 715.1	5 695.9	5 737.2	5 805.3	5 907.5	6 054.0	6 175.3	6 069.0	6 161.4	6 262.2	6 161.0	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Latvia**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Russia	152.3	146.3	140.7	136.4	131.8	126.9	122.4	117.8	113.8	109.5	104.8	64
Belarus	53.2	51.5	50.0	48.6	47.2	45.5	43.9	42.6	41.3	39.8	38.5	67
Ukraine	36.8	35.7	34.7	34.1	34.0	33.0	32.5	32.6	32.4	31.7	31.4	52
Lithuania	18.6	17.9	17.2	16.7	16.1	15.4	14.9	14.3	13.9	13.4	12.8	62
Kazakhstan	6.4	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.4	56
United Kingdom	1.0	1.2	1.7	2.2	2.6	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.1	4.3	4.5	42
Uzbekistan	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.9	2.8	39
Estonia	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	54
Germany	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	51
Azerbaijan	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	41
Moldova	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	47
India	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.3	18
Georgia	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	43
Ireland	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	43
Kyrgyzstan	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	57
Other countries	6.6	6.5	6.9	7.4	7.4	7.7	8.3	9.3	9.8	10.0	10.5	
Total	289.0	279.2	271.1	265.4	258.9	251.5	246.0	241.8	237.0	230.1	223.6	59

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Lithuania

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Russia	86.3	..	60.1	58.5	54.9	52.3	50.5	49.1	48.3	47.2	60.9	59
Belarus	47.8	..	35.4	33.6	31.1	30.0	30.8	32.2	36.0	39.6	41.5	55
Ukraine	17.4	..	12.4	12.3	11.3	12.4	15.4	19.6	25.7	30.6	17.9	40
United Kingdom	10.3	..	3.3	4.3	5.2	5.0	5.4	6.3	8.0	9.1	11.2	49
Latvia	9.2	..	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.5	6.9	57
Kazakhstan	7.7	..	4.6	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.5	6.1	54
Ireland	3.9	..	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.8	50
Norway	1.0	1.4	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.6	3.1	3.4	2.7	49
Germany	3.3	..	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.6	1.9	48
Uzbekistan	1.6	..	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.5	40
Poland	3.2	..	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.4	64
Azerbaijan	1.3	..	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.1	35
Estonia	1.3	..	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	56
United States	1.7	..	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.9	46
Spain	1.2	..	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	47
Other countries	10.4	..	6.1	6.6	6.5	7.2	8.4	9.9	11.9	14.2	10.0	
Total	206.6	..	137.4	136.0	129.7	127.4	131.0	138.2	152.6	165.2	168.8	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Luxembourg**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Portugal	72.5	72.8	73.2	73.3	73.1	72.9	48
France	39.0	40.6	41.9	43.2	44.0	44.8	46
Belgium	20.5	20.8	21.0	21.3	21.4	21.3	46
Italy	17.0	17.7	18.4	19.0	19.3	19.8	42
Germany	16.5	16.5	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.8	52
Cape Verde	6.4	6.6	6.9	7.4	7.7	8.2	52
Spain	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.6	48
Romania	4.2	4.6	5.1	5.5	5.8	6.1	58
United Kingdom	5.1	5.3	5.5	5.5	5.8	5.7	44
Poland	4.5	4.6	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.3	58
Brazil	2.9	3.2	3.6	4.2	4.6	5.2	59
China	3.5	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.9	56
India	1.8	2.2	2.7	3.3	3.6	4.3	46
Netherlands	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.8	46
Greece	2.5	2.8	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.7	50
Other countries	65.6	69.8	74.5	79.9	84.3	89.6	
Total	215.3	226.1	237.7	248.9	260.6	270.7	280.8	291.2	301.7	309.6	319.0	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Mexico

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
United States	739.2	799.1	..	797.3
Guatemala	42.9	32.4	..	56.8
Spain	22.6	19.7	..	20.8
Colombia	18.7	27.9
Venezuela	15.7	24.4
Argentina	14.7	10.5
Honduras	14.5	18.4
Cuba	12.8	18.2
El Salvador	10.6	13.6
Canada	9.8	14.8
China	8.9
France	8.6	14.2	..	9.1
Italy	6.4
Germany	6.4
Brazil	5.8
Other countries	69.4	81.5	..	328.3
Total	973.7	991.2	939.9	1 007.1	1 074.8	..	1 212.3

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Netherlands**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Türkiye	197.4	196.5	195.1	192.7	191.0	190.8	192.0	194.3	198.0	200.0	205.0	49
Suriname	185.5	184.1	182.6	181.0	179.5	178.6	178.2	178.3	178.8	178.4	177.9	56
Poland	78.2	86.5	96.2	108.5	117.9	126.6	135.6	145.2	155.2	164.2	173.5	52
Morocco	168.3	168.2	168.5	168.6	168.5	168.7	169.2	170.5	172.2	172.7	173.4	50
Germany	122.8	121.8	120.5	119.1	118.6	118.8	119.5	120.6	122.0	122.5	124.0	58
Syria	7.3	7.7	9.5	17.9	38.5	65.9	81.8	86.7	91.9	97.4	108.4	43
Indonesia	135.1	132.0	129.2	126.4	123.5	120.8	117.9	115.1	112.5	108.8	106.1	57
Former USSR	49.2	51.8	53.7	56.4	59.1	62.2	66.6	72.1	78.9	82.5	89.0	61
China	57.6	59.8	61.3	62.5	64.4	66.0	68.3	71.0	74.1	73.5	75.6	56
Belgium	50.9	51.9	52.8	54.0	55.3	56.9	58.6	60.2	61.8	63.5	64.9	54
United Kingdom	47.5	47.8	48.4	49.1	50.2	51.7	53.4	55.8	59.0	61.1	60.9	44
Former Yugoslavia	52.7	52.5	52.5	52.6	52.7	53.1	53.5	54.3	55.6	56.0	57.3	53
India	19.5	20.7	22.2	24.3	27.0	30.6	35.3	41.2	48.2	49.2	55.1	45
Iraq	40.8	40.6	40.5	40.7	40.9	43.1	43.9	44.8	45.4	45.9	46.4	44
Bulgaria	17.5	18.2	18.3	20.1	21.9	23.7	26.4	29.9	34.7	38.8	43.5	49
Iran	675.9	687.6	702.0	722.4	747.5	779.6	815.5	858.7	911.5	936.6	989.7	..
Total	1 906.3	1 927.7	1 953.4	1 996.3	2 056.5	2 137.2	2 215.9	2 298.7	2 399.8	2 451.2	2 550.8	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – New Zealand

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2018 (%)
United Kingdom	..	255.0	265.5	49
China	..	96.4	144.2	55
India	..	67.2	117.3	42
Australia	..	62.7	75.8	53
South Africa	..	54.3	71.4	51
Philippines	..	37.3	67.6	52
Fiji	..	52.8	62.3	51
Samoa	..	50.7	55.5	51
Korea	..	26.6	31.0	54
United States	..	22.1	27.7	54
Tonga	..	22.4	26.9	48
Malaysia	..	16.4	19.9	54
Netherlands	..	19.9	19.3	50
Germany	..	12.9	16.6	57
Sri Lanka	..	9.6	14.3	47
Other countries	..	195.5	256.4	
Total	..	1 001.8	1 271.8	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Norway**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	67.6	76.9	84.2	91.2	96.1	97.6	98.6	99.1	101.5	102.5	105.9	37
Sweden	47.0	47.8	48.6	49.2	49.1	48.3	47.9	47.7	47.7	47.8	48.2	49
Lithuania	22.7	28.6	33.0	35.9	37.4	37.7	38.4	39.4	40.7	41.4	42.1	42
Syria	1.6	2.0	3.1	5.5	9.7	20.8	27.4	30.8	32.0	32.8	34.4	41
Germany	27.3	27.8	27.9	28.2	28.2	28.0	27.8	28.0	28.4	28.7	29.4	49
Somalia	20.7	23.7	25.9	27.0	28.3	28.7	28.8	28.7	28.6	28.4	28.1	47
Philippines	16.3	17.8	19.5	20.6	21.4	22.2	23.1	24.1	25.1	25.0	24.8	76
Eritrea	8.2	10.1	12.4	14.8	17.7	20.1	21.9	22.7	23.2	23.6	24.5	43
Denmark	23.3	23.8	24.4	25.3	25.1	24.8	24.6	24.5	24.4	24.3	24.3	48
Thailand	15.2	16.4	17.3	18.0	18.9	20.1	21.1	22.0	22.8	23.3	23.6	81
Iraq	22.0	22.1	22.1	22.2	22.2	22.5	23.1	23.3	23.3	23.3	23.3	44
Pakistan	18.0	18.6	19.0	19.4	19.7	20.1	20.6	20.9	21.3	21.6	22.2	48
United Kingdom	18.1	18.6	19.0	19.3	19.5	19.4	19.4	19.7	20.3	20.8	21.4	38
United States	16.6	17.0	17.3	17.5	17.6	17.7	17.9	18.4	18.9	19.1	19.6	51
Iran	14.4	15.1	15.9	16.2	16.5	17.2	17.8	18.1	18.6	18.8	19.4	47
Other countries	277.5	297.4	314.8	331.5	345.0	354.6	364.0	374.4	390.9	396.7	407.1	
Total	616.3	663.9	704.5	741.8	772.5	799.8	822.4	841.6	867.8	878.2	898.2	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Poland

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Ukraine	204.1	272.6	57
Germany	75.4	100.7	49
Belarus	75.0	100.2	56
Lithuania	49.8	66.6	57
Russia	37.7	50.3	59
United Kingdom	34.1	45.6	42
France	25.8	34.5	51
United States	13.5	18.0	45
Italy	9.8	13.1	41
Ireland	7.5	10.0	44
Belgium	5.2	6.9	43
Spain	4.8	6.4	43
Kazakhstan	4.5	6.1	49
Czechia	4.5	6.0	48
Austria	3.7	5.0	45
Other countries	49.3	65.9	
Total	604.7	807.7	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Portugal**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Brazil	139.7	271.2	..	56
Angola	162.6	157.0	..	56
France	94.5	103.3	..	54
Mozambique	73.1	65.3	..	55
Cape Verde	62.0	55.3	..	56
Venezuela	25.2	41.0	..	56
Ukraine	33.6	..	54
United Kingdom	19.1	32.0	..	48
Germany	28.0	28.2	..	52
Guinea-Bissau	29.6	26.1	..	49
Switzerland	16.5	20.9	..	49
Sao Tome and Principe	18.6	20.4	..	58
Spain	16.5	18.2	..	55
India	8.1	17.4	..	28
Romania	23.7	14.6	..	52
Other countries	154.7	184.6	..	
Total	871.8	1 089.0	..	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Slovak Republic

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Czech Republic	88.7	88.6	88.2	88.0	87.8	88.0	88.0	88.1	88.2	88.2	106.4	54
United Kingdom	3.7	4.2	4.8	5.5	6.3	7.2	8.1	9.1	10.2	11.0	14.4	47
Ukraine	9.8	9.8	9.9	10.1	10.5	10.7	11.1	11.4	11.8	12.1	13.2	57
Hungary	17.6	17.7	17.3	17.1	16.8	16.6	16.3	16.1	15.8	15.7	13.1	53
Austria	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.3	4.7	5.0	5.3	5.9	47
Romania	7.6	7.8	8.1	8.3	8.7	9.1	9.3	9.6	9.7	9.8	5.7	42
Germany	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.4	5.8	6.1	6.5	6.9	5.5	45
Poland	6.5	6.5	6.7	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.4	7.5	5.0	57
Serbia	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	4.1	37
Italy	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.2	3.4	34
United States	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.3	47
Viet Nam	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	3.0	40
Russia	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	61
France	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.1	48
Ireland	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.1	49
Other countries	15.0	16.1	17.1	18.1	19.5	21.0	22.2	23.3	24.4	25.5	37.0	
Total	169.8	172.6	174.9	177.6	181.6	186.2	190.3	194.4	198.4	201.9	227.3	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Slovenia**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	97.2	98.5	100.0	100.9	102.8	104.7	107.7	116.4	126.4	132.6	133.8	38
Croatia	48.8	48.3	47.7	47.0	46.1	45.6	45.0	44.4	43.9	43.3	42.0	52
Serbia	26.4	26.7	26.9	27.1	24.3	24.6	25.4	27.4	29.5	30.2	29.7	40
North Macedonia	14.2	14.7	15.1	15.6	15.9	16.5	17.1	18.2	19.3	19.8	19.9	42
Germany	8.4	8.0	7.7	7.6	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.6	7.7	48
Italy	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.6	4.7	40
Russia	1.2	1.4	1.7	2.1	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.2	57
Montenegro	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	46
Ukraine	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.0	65
Austria	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	50
China	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	45
France	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	49
Bulgaria	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.1	46
Switzerland	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	46
United States	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	47
Other countries	18.4	19.3	20.3	21.4	25.7	26.4	27.1	29.5	32.7	36.1	38.0	
Total	230.1	232.7	235.3	237.6	241.2	245.4	250.2	265.1	281.6	292.8	294.5	42

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Spain

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Morocco	762.4	740.1	712.5	699.9	696.8	699.5	713.8	752.2	803.8	828.0	852.5	45
Colombia	373.6	366.0	353.2	347.5	347.2	361.5	386.1	431.1	499.2	541.6	564.9	58
Romania	750.4	715.0	670.1	646.2	627.8	611.9	595.7	587.1	579.3	568.9	542.4	52
Venezuela	155.8	156.3	154.3	160.5	174.0	199.4	245.0	311.8	383.5	415.3	438.6	54
Ecuador	471.3	452.4	429.4	416.4	409.4	408.2	408.7	411.9	418.9	420.8	423.2	54
Argentina	270.9	264.0	255.3	251.8	252.1	255.5	261.0	272.8	296.0	309.5	333.3	50
United Kingdom	318.7	321.1	314.4	306.0	300.3	296.8	288.4	290.2	304.0	316.9	319.7	50
Peru	198.0	193.6	186.9	184.8	185.8	190.5	200.5	216.8	241.5	255.5	265.4	57
France	209.2	208.4	205.4	203.7	204.4	205.7	207.9	211.9	216.1	219.2	223.7	51
Germany	210.2	209.6	204.5	200.6	197.2	195.7	193.1	192.1	192.3	192.4	194.5	51
Dominican Rep.	148.0	152.9	154.1	156.9	159.7	164.3	170.5	176.9	183.7	186.6	189.8	60
Cuba	118.6	124.0	127.5	131.1	134.8	139.0	145.0	155.4	169.8	174.2	184.2	54
China	163.7	160.5	155.7	155.7	158.7	161.9	165.9	171.5	176.7	176.1	171.1	55
Italy	94.8	99.3	102.1	106.3	114.2	123.7	135.3	147.0	157.6	161.8	167.0	42
Bolivia	188.7	174.3	157.5	150.7	148.3	148.6	150.2	153.1	156.6	157.7	158.5	60
Other countries	1 860.5	1 837.1	1 775.3	1 773.1	1 807.6	1 862.4	1 931.7	2 057.0	2 217.9	2 290.2	2 336.5	
Total	6 295.0	6 174.7	5 958.3	5 891.2	5 918.3	6 024.5	6 198.8	6 539.0	6 996.8	7 214.9	7 365.3	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Sweden**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Syria	22.4	27.5	41.7	67.7	98.2	149.4	172.3	186.0	191.5	193.6	196.1	44
Iraq	125.5	127.9	128.9	130.2	131.9	135.1	140.8	144.0	146.0	146.4	146.8	46
Finland	166.7	163.9	161.1	158.5	156.0	153.6	150.9	147.9	144.6	140.3	136.6	61
Poland	72.9	75.3	78.2	81.7	85.5	88.7	91.2	92.8	93.7	93.8	95.1	52
Iran	63.8	65.6	67.2	68.4	69.1	70.6	74.1	77.4	80.1	81.3	83.1	47
Somalia	40.2	44.0	54.2	57.9	60.6	63.9	66.4	68.7	70.2	70.2	70.1	50
Afghanistan	17.5	21.5	25.1	28.4	31.3	34.8	44.0	52.0	58.8	60.9	62.8	35
Bosnia and Herzegovina	56.3	56.6	56.8	57.3	57.7	58.2	58.9	59.4	60.0	60.2	60.2	50
Türkiye	43.9	45.1	45.7	46.1	46.4	47.1	48.3	49.9	51.7	52.6	54.0	45
Germany	48.4	48.7	49.0	49.4	49.6	50.2	50.9	51.1	51.4	51.4	53.0	53
Eritrea	12.0	13.7	16.6	21.8	28.6	35.1	39.1	42.3	45.7	47.2	48.3	45
India	18.6	19.4	20.6	21.9	23.2	25.7	29.7	35.2	40.6	42.8	47.4	46
Thailand	33.6	35.6	37.0	38.1	38.8	39.9	41.2	42.4	43.6	44.3	45.1	78
Norway	43.1	42.9	42.5	42.3	42.1	42.1	42.0	41.7	41.6	41.1	40.6	55
Denmark	45.0	44.2	43.2	42.4	41.9	41.2	40.6	40.0	39.5	38.9	38.5	47
Other countries	617.5	641.4	665.6	691.4	715.4	748.9	786.8	824.7	860.7	881.8	912.9	
Total	1 427.3	1 473.3	1 533.5	1 603.6	1 676.3	1 784.5	1 877.1	1 955.6	2 019.7	2 046.7	2 090.5	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Switzerland

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Germany	330.0	337.4	343.6	348.1	350.5	352.2	353.4	355.3	357.4	360.5	364.5	50
Italy	241.0	244.7	251.3	258.3	263.3	267.3	267.9	268.8	268.9	270.0	271.1	44
Portugal	187.4	199.2	211.5	218.7	222.3	223.1	220.9	217.7	214.1	210.7	207.3	46
France	138.4	141.4	146.8	153.1	158.6	162.5	166.3	169.4	172.8	178.5	183.3	50
Türkiye	76.9	77.4	77.9	78.2	78.7	79.2	79.8	80.4	81.6	82.8	84.5	47
North Macedonia	53.5	55.1	57.0	59.2	61.4	64.3	66.9	69.3	72.3	74.8	77.4	48
Spain	57.2	59.8	64.1	67.1	68.9	69.4	68.9	68.6	68.3	69.0	69.9	49
Serbia	59.2	60.1	62.9	63.4	64.6	65.3	65.7	65.9	66.8	67.2	67.4	52
Austria	59.2	59.7	59.9	60.0	60.1	59.8	59.6	59.2	58.8	58.5	58.2	58
Bosnia and Herzegovina	52.4	53.2	54.1	55.4	56.4	56.9	57.1	57.4	57.7	57.8	57.7	53
United Kingdom	43.7	44.2	44.8	45.2	45.2	45.0	45.3	45.7	46.3	47.4	47.6	46
Poland	24.0	26.2	28.1	31.6	34.7	36.7	38.7	40.8	42.9	44.8	46.9	53
Brazil	33.4	34.4	35.5	36.6	37.8	39.1	40.9	42.5	44.0	45.4	46.8	69
United States	34.9	35.4	35.9	36.3	36.6	37.0	37.6	38.6	39.0	40.0	40.9	52
Sri Lanka	29.6	30.0	30.6	31.3	32.6	34.2	35.1	35.6	35.8	35.9	36.2	48
Other countries	737.4	760.3	785.6	812.5	844.6	888.0	914.9	938.2	963.2	987.1	1 012.9	
Total	2 158.4	2 218.4	2 289.6	2 354.8	2 416.4	2 480.0	2 519.1	2 553.4	2 590.0	2 630.4	2 672.4	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Türkiye**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Bulgaria	382.1	378.7	374.0	366.2	362.7	361.9	365.1	358.5	351.7	55
Germany	259.1	263.3	272.7	277.9	281.9	292.4	316.6	330.3	337.2	53
Syria	66.1	76.4	98.1	109.4	163.8	217.9	225.4	276.9	304.1	49
Iraq	52.2	97.5	146.1	199.7	283.8	313.8	285.7	327.9	284.9	49
Afghanistan	33.8	38.7	59.3	78.7	115.2	142.4	153.9	180.5	186.3	41
Russia	30.3	34.5	37.8	37.4	47.2	57.0	64.3	86.8	161.5	54
Iran	30.2	36.2	47.5	53.8	80.2	108.5	89.4	155.0	151.3	51
Turkmenistan	19.9	24.9	30.3	45.2	71.2	136.9	97.3	130.3	123.6	50
Azerbaijan	46.1	52.8	64.2	71.2	85.3	97.8	85.0	107.1	110.2	59
Uzbekistan	29.6	36.1	43.7	52.1	63.2	78.0	72.7	109.9	106.0	64
Kazakhstan	19.3	21.5	23.1	21.6	29.5	36.2	41.1	58.8	67.9	59
Ukraine	16.2	20.5	23.4	23.9	26.0	29.8	29.0	35.9	63.8	73
Saudi Arabia	12.6	14.6	17.3	25.6	41.3	53.2	49.8	55.7	58.9	47
France	28.1	28.5	33.3	35.3	33.9	37.5	39.5	46.0	46.4	51
Netherlands	32.0	32.3	34.1	34.1	34.6	35.7	38.6	41.5	42.2	53
Other countries	402.2	435.7	472.6	491.9	558.8	669.5	656.6	840.5	846.6	
Total	1 459.8	1 592.4	1 777.3	1 923.9	2 278.5	2 668.6	2 610.0	3 141.4	3 242.7	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – United Kingdom

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	750	746	733	784	807	809	862	837	847	896	..	49
Poland	658	650	764	783	883	907	889	827	746	682	..	56
Pakistan	432	476	419	510	525	523	529	533	519	456	..	46
Ireland	429	400	346	372	391	398	380	358	364	412	..	55
Germany	303	343	279	252	299	299	309	305	310	347	..	56
Romania	118	151	162	220	264	340	410	434	370	329	..	48
Nigeria	162	202	170	206	212	190	205	207	219	312	..	53
South Africa	208	224	201	178	200	245	235	255	229	298	..	52
Italy	135	142	159	168	188	220	237	246	240	280	..	47
China	99	116	118	114	209	226	210	198	211	245	..	56
Bangladesh	191	184	187	198	220	247	259	259	251	223	..	45
United States	203	216	186	158	179	163	159	174	168	196	..	57
Portugal	84	114	111	141	141	142	132	149	175	170	..	51
France	146	128	127	174	146	164	178	183	169	169	..	54
Australia	106	117	123	131	131	135	142	145	155	165	..	50
Other countries	3 564	3 651	3 979	4 093	4 193	4 361	4 047	4 372	4 566	4 434
Total	7 588	7 860	8 064	8 482	8 988	9 369	9 183	9 482	9 539	9 614

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – United States**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Mexico	11 489.4	11 556.5	11 714.5	11 643.3	11 573.7	11 269.9	11 171.9	10 931.9	11 295.3	11 780.9	11 969.8	48
India	1 974.3	2 036.3	2 205.9	2 389.6	2 434.5	2 610.5	2 652.9	2 688.1	3 075.1	3 020.6	2 982.1	49
China	1 719.8	1 786.1	1 929.5	2 065.4	2 130.4	2 216.8	2 221.9	2 250.2	1 943.0	1 952.8	2 190.0	55
Philippines	1 862.0	1 863.5	1 926.3	1 982.4	1 941.7	2 008.1	2 013.8	2 045.2	1 704.0	1 747.2	1 822.4	61
Cuba	1 114.9	1 138.2	1 172.9	1 210.7	1 271.6	1 311.8	1 344.0	1 360.0	1 430.0	1 465.9	1 584.0	50
Dominican Republic	960.2	1 010.7	997.7	1 063.2	1 085.3	1 162.6	1 177.9	1 169.4	1 244.8	1 248.0	1 347.7	55
El Salvador	1 254.5	1 247.5	1 315.5	1 352.4	1 387.0	1 401.8	1 419.3	1 412.1	1 484.3	1 424.9	1 347.5	49
Viet Nam	1 264.2	1 308.2	1 291.8	1 300.5	1 352.8	1 342.6	1 345.8	1 383.8	1 295.4	56
Guatemala	880.9	900.5	915.6	927.6	935.7	958.8	1 007.0	1 111.5	1 082.1	1 136.7	1 178.4	45
Honduras	535.7	539.2	588.3	599.0	651.1	655.4	646.3	745.8	831.1	900.7	1 114.8	47
Colombia	705.0	679.6	706.8	699.4	704.6	783.0	789.6	808.1	920.2	56
Jamaica	668.8	705.3	705.8	711.1	736.3	744.7	733.4	772.2	680.2	721.9	769.9	54
Canada	799.1	841.1	806.4	830.6	783.2	809.3	813.7	797.2	609.2	671.1	728.4	53
Haiti	616.0	599.6	628.0	675.5	668.2	679.8	687.2	701.7	735.8	732.0	726.5	51
Brazil	325.5	337.1	335.6	361.4	409.6	451.1	472.6	502.1	489.1	526.0	715.4	56
Other countries	14 567.9	14 794.9	15 150.1	15 477.5	15 673.3	16 119.3	16 231.3	16 253.5	17 654.3	17 944.2	16 639.0	..
Total	40 738.2	41 344.4	42 390.7	43 289.6	43 738.9	44 525.5	44 728.5	44 932.8	44 258.3	45 272.9	47 331.5	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ezlt9s>

Metadata related to Tables A.4 and B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population

Country	Comments	Source
Australia	Ⓔ Estimated residential population. Reference date: 30 June.	Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).
Austria	Ⓔ Stock of foreign-born residents recorded in the population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	Ⓔ From 2011 on, includes persons who have lived in Belgium for a continuous period of at least 12 months and persons who arrived in Belgium less than 12 months before the reference time with the intention of staying there for at least one year; also includes asylum seekers. Up to 2010, includes persons whose main place of residence is in Belgium and who are registered in a municipality (aliens' register or register of aliens with a privileged status or register of European Union officials) so excludes asylum seekers, persons who have been residing in the Belgian territory for less than three months or are in an irregular situation. The series include breaks in 2011 and in 2012, and data for the year 2019 are provisional.	Population Register, Eurostat.
Canada	Ⓔ 2011: National Household Survey. The foreign-born population covers all persons who are or have ever been a landed immigrant/permanent resident in Canada. The foreign-born population does not include non-permanent residents, on employment or student authorizations, or who are refugee claimants. Ⓔ 2016: Census, 25% sample data. ε PM for other years.	Statistics Canada.
Chile	Ⓔ Up to 2017: register of residence permits. ε From 2018 on: estimates for the total and for selected countries.	Servicio Nacional de Migraciones (SERMIG), Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
Colombia	UN Migrant stock 2015 and 2020	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2020). International Migrant Stock 2020.
Costa Rica	UN Migrant stock 2015 and 2020	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2020). International Migrant Stock 2020.
Czech Republic	Ⓔ 2011 Census. ε CM for other years. In table B4, data broken down by country of birth from 2012 to 2022 are from Eurostat. Break in series from 2021.	Czech Statistical Office, Eurostat
Denmark	Ⓔ Immigrants according to the national definition, e.g. persons born abroad to parents both foreigner or born abroad. When no information is available on the parents' nationality/country of birth, foreign-born persons are classified as immigrants.	Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Ⓔ National population register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Finland	Ⓔ Population register. Includes foreign-born persons of Finnish origin.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France	From 2006 on, annual censuses. From 2015 on, estimated totals based on Eurostat data. From 2014 on, includes the département of Mayotte. Data by country of birth are available only for EU countries. Includes persons who were born French abroad.	National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Eurostat.
Germany	Ⓔ 2011 Census. ε Other years, estimation based on the 2011 census or the 1987 census (up to 2010). Up to 2016, data refers to country of citizenship or former citizenship; from 2017 on, it refers to country of birth. Includes ethnic Germans (Aussiedler). Excludes people in shared/community accommodation. For details please refer to the methodological notes: https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Population/Households-Families/Methods/mz2020-redesigned-changed.html?nn=23832	Federal Statistical Office.
Greece	Totals in Table A.4 (Eurostat dataset) are not comparable to data presented in Table B.4 by country of birth (Labour Force Survey data, foreign-born population aged 15 and above; 4th quarter prior to 2014; 2nd quarter from 2014 on).	Eurostat and Hellenic Statistical authority.

Country	Comments	Source
Hungary	Ⓢ From 2010 on, includes third-country nationals holding a temporary residence permit (for a year or more). From 2012 on, includes refugees and persons under subsidiary protection. Data for 2011 were adjusted to match the October census results. Reference date: 1 January.	Office of Immigration and Nationality; Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register); Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Ⓢ National population register. Numbers from the register are likely to be overestimated. Reference date: 1 January.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Ⓢ 2011, 2016 and 2022 Censuses. Interpolation for 2017-2021. Persons usually resident and present in their usual residence on census night. ε PM for other years.	Central Statistics Office.
Israel	Estimates are based on the results of the Population Censuses and on the changes that occurred in the population after the Censuses, as recorded in the Population Register. They include Jews and foreign-born members of other religions (usually family members of Jewish immigrants). The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.	Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy	Ⓢ Population register. From 2019 on, the data on foreign resident population takes into account the results of the permanent population census. Reference date: 1 January.	National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
Latvia	Ⓢ Population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Statistical Office.
Lithuania	Reference date: 1 January.	Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	Ⓢ 2011: Census. ε CM for other years.	Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Stateg).
Mexico	Ⓢ 2010 census; 2015 Intercensal Survey. ε Other years, estimation from the National Survey on Occupation and Employment (ENOE).	National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
Netherlands	Ⓢ Reference date: 1 January.	Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand	Ⓢ 2013 and 2018 Censuses. ε PM for other years.	Statistics New Zealand.
Norway	Ⓢ Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland	UN Migrant stock 2015 and 2020	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2020). International Migrant Stock 2020.
Portugal	Ⓢ 2011 and 2021 censuses. Interpolation for 2012-2020. 2022 total estimated using percent change of the series on Eurostat website.	National Statistical Institute (INE).
Slovak Republic	Ⓢ Population Register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia		Eurostat.
Spain	Ⓢ Population register. Foreign-born recorded in the Municipal Registers irrespective of their legal status. Reference date: 1 January.	Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden	Ⓢ Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	Ⓢ Population Register of the Confederation. ε CM for other years.	Federal Statistical Office.
Türkiye		Turkish Statistical Institute.
United Kingdom	Ⓢ Until 2019: Foreign-born residents in the Labour Force Survey. 2020: Estimates from the Annual Population Survey.	Office for National Statistics.
United States	Ⓢ Includes persons who are naturalised and persons who are in an unauthorised status. Excludes children born abroad to US citizen parents. Break in series in 2020: for 2020, 2021, 2022, CPS instead of ACS.	American Community Survey and Current Population Survey, Census Bureau.

Notes: Ⓢ Observed figures. ε Estimates (in italic) made by means of the complement method (CM) or the parametric method (PM). No estimate is made by country of birth (Tables B.4). Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

Table A.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality in OECD countries

Thousands and percentages

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Austria	951	1 004	1 066	1 146	1 268	1 342	1 396	1 439	1 486	1 531	1 587
% of total population	11.3	11.9	12.5	13.4	14.6	15.3	15.8	16.2	16.7	17.2	17.8
Belgium	1 207	1 231	1 241	1 277	1 333	1 354	1 376	1 414	1 479	1 489	1 515
% of total population	11.0	11.1	11.1	11.4	11.8	11.9	12.1	12.3	12.8	12.9	13.0
Canada	2 405	3 185	..
% of total population	6.7	8.4	..
Chile	953	..	1 251	1 493
% of total population	5.2	..	6.6	7.8
Czech Republic	434	436	439	449	465	493	524	564	593	633	659
% of total population	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.7	5.0	5.4	5.6	6.0	6.3
Denmark	359	375	397	423	463	485	506	526	537	539	562
% of total population	6.4	6.7	7.0	7.5	8.1	8.5	8.8	9.1	9.2	9.2	9.6
Estonia	211	211	212	211	212	212	214	216	216	201	203
% of total population	15.9	16.0	16.1	16.1	16.1	16.1	16.2	16.3	16.2	15.1	15.3
Finland	183	196	208	220	230	244	249	258	268	279	296
% of total population	3.4	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.8	5.0	5.4
France	3 981	4 084	4 289	4 428	4 542	4 704	4 850	5 000	5 142	5 220	5 320
% of total population	6.3	6.5	6.8	6.9	7.1	7.3	7.6	7.8	8.0	8.1	8.2
Germany	6 931	7 214	7 634	8 153	9 108	10 039	10 624	10 915	11 228	11 432	11 818
% of total population	8.5	8.8	9.3	9.9	11.1	12.2	12.8	13.1	13.5	13.7	14.2
Greece	921	887	855	822	798	810	816	832	906	922	748
% of total population	8.4	8.1	7.9	7.6	7.4	7.6	7.7	7.8	8.6	8.8	7.2
Hungary	143	141	141	146	157	151	162	181	200	194	203
% of total population	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.1
Iceland	21	21	23	24	26	30	38	44	49	51	55
% of total population	6.6	6.7	7.0	7.4	8.0	8.9	10.8	12.4	13.6	13.9	14.8
Ireland	600	602	604	606	607	567	594	623	644	646	801
% of total population	13.2	13.2	13.1	13.0	13.0	11.9	12.4	12.8	13.1	13.0	16.0
Italy	4 052	4 388	4 921	5 014	5 027	5 047	5 144	4 996	5 040	5 172	5 031
% of total population	6.7	7.3	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.6	8.4	8.5	8.7	8.5
Japan	2 079	2 034	2 066	2 122	2 232	2 383	2 562	2 731	2 933	2 887	2 761
% of total population	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.2
Korea	1 200	1 202	1 304	1 489	1 595	1 663	1 750	1 951	2 025	1 889	1 830
% of total population	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.8	3.9	3.6	3.5
Latvia	324	315	305	298	289	279	273	267	260	252	245
% of total population	15.7	15.4	15.1	14.9	14.6	14.2	14.0	13.8	13.7	13.4	13.2
Lithuania	23	22	22	22	19	20	27	47	66	80	100
% of total population	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.6	2.3	2.8	3.6
Luxembourg	230	239	249	259	269	281	288	291	296	299	304
% of total population	43.8	44.5	45.3	46.0	46.7	47.7	47.9	47.5	47.4	47.2	47.2
Mexico	296	..	326	355	382	424	462	480
% of total population	0.3	..	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Netherlands	786	796	816	847	901	972	1 041	1 111	1 192	1 203	1 256
% of total population	4.7	4.7	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.7	6.0	6.4	6.9	6.9	7.2
Norway	407	449	483	512	538	559	568	584	605	602	586
% of total population	8.2	8.9	9.5	9.9	10.3	10.6	10.7	11.0	11.3	11.2	10.8
Poland	86	93	101	108	150	210	239	290	358	457	453
of total population	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.2

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Portugal	437	417	401	395	389	398	422	480	590	662	699
% of total population	4.1	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.7	5.7	6.4	6.8
Slovak Republic	53	57	59	62	66	70	73	76	79	82	63
% of total population	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.2
Slovenia	86	91	97	102	108	114	122	138	156	169	172
% of total population	4.1	4.4	4.7	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.8	6.6	7.4	8.0	8.1
Spain	5 236	5 073	4 677	4 454	4 418	4 419	4 563	4 840	5 227	5 368	5 407
% of total population	11.2	10.9	10.1	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.8	10.3	11.0	11.3	11.4
Sweden	655	667	695	739	783	852	897	932	941	905	881
% of total population	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.5	7.9	8.5	8.9	9.1	9.1	8.7	8.4
Switzerland	1 772	1 825	1 887	1 947	1 994	2 030	2 054	2 081	2 111	2 152	2 242
% of total population	22.3	22.7	23.2	23.6	23.9	24.1	24.2	24.4	24.5	24.8	25.7
Türkiye	242	279	457	518	650	816	919	1 211	1 531	1 792	1 824
% of total population	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.1
United Kingdom	4 788	4 941	5 154	5 592	5 951	6 137	5 991	6 227	..	6 013	..
% of total population	7.5	7.7	8.0	8.6	9.1	9.3	9.0	9.3	..	9.0	..
United States	21 359	21 128	21 325	22 236	22 824	22 759	22 942	22 519	21 434	22 165	23 825
% of total population	6.8	6.6	6.6	6.9	7.0	6.9	6.9	6.8	6.4	6.6	7.1

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.5.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/l5gx4t>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Austria

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Germany	150.9	157.8	164.8	170.5	176.5	181.6	186.8	192.4	200.0	208.7	216.7	50
Romania	47.3	53.3	59.7	73.4	82.9	92.1	102.3	112.7	123.5	131.8	138.4	50
Serbia	110.4	111.3	112.5	114.3	116.6	118.5	120.2	121.3	122.1	122.0	121.6	49
Türkiye	112.9	113.7	114.7	115.4	116.0	116.8	117.3	117.2	117.6	117.6	117.6	49
Bosnia and Herzegovina	89.6	89.9	91.0	92.5	94.0	94.6	95.2	95.8	96.6	97.0	97.3	47
Croatia	58.3	58.6	62.0	66.5	70.2	73.3	76.7	80.0	83.6	89.0	95.3	46
Hungary	29.8	37.0	46.3	54.9	63.6	70.6	77.1	82.7	87.5	91.4	94.4	52
Syria	1.9	2.7	4.3	11.3	33.3	41.7	48.1	49.8	51.5	55.4	68.4	36
Poland	42.1	46.0	50.3	54.3	57.6	60.1	62.2	63.4	64.4	65.6	66.1	47
Slovak Republic	22.5	25.3	28.6	32.1	35.3	38.1	40.2	42.0	43.6	45.4	46.7	59
Afghanistan	9.4	12.4	14.0	16.8	35.6	45.3	45.7	44.4	43.7	44.0	45.1	36
Bulgaria	12.5	14.1	15.9	19.6	22.4	24.9	27.4	29.9	32.5	34.2	35.9	51
Italy	16.2	17.8	20.2	22.5	25.3	27.3	29.2	30.9	32.5	34.3	35.7	43
Russia	25.5	27.3	28.8	30.0	31.2	32.0	32.4	32.6	32.9	33.3	33.9	58
North Macedonia	18.9	19.4	20.1	20.9	21.7	22.4	23.1	23.4	24.1	24.6	25.1	50
Other countries	203.3	217.7	233.0	251.3	285.3	302.7	312.0	320.3	330.2	336.8	348.4	
Total	951.4	1 004.3	1 066.1	1 146.1	1 267.7	1 341.9	1 395.9	1 438.9	1 486.2	1 531.1	1 586.7	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Belgium**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
France	149.8	153.3	155.9	158.8	161.8	163.7	164.9	166.9	170.9	173.8	175.6	52
Netherlands	141.1	143.8	146.0	148.9	151.7	153.2	154.7	157.1	159.5	160.9	163.1	48
Italy	159.6	157.4	156.4	156.6	156.8	156.3	155.6	155.5	155.7	154.7	153.4	46
Romania	42.4	50.9	56.7	65.3	73.2	79.8	86.6	94.9	105.5	111.3	116.0	44
Morocco	86.2	83.4	80.9	82.3	83.0	82.6	81.3	80.3	80.9	80.9	81.7	54
Spain	50.8	54.3	57.3	59.9	61.7	62.6	63.6	65.1	67.9	70.0	73.1	48
Poland	55.9	61.4	64.9	68.1	70.4	71.1	71.2	71.0	71.0	70.1	68.8	53
Portugal	36.0	38.7	41.1	42.6	44.2	45.6	46.4	47.5	49.1	50.2	51.5	46
Bulgaria	20.4	23.4	25.6	28.6	31.3	32.9	34.8	37.0	40.6	43.1	45.2	48
Germany	39.9	39.7	39.4	39.1	39.3	39.3	39.2	39.5	39.7	40.0	40.2	52
Türkiye	40.1	38.7	37.4	37.2	37.1	37.0	37.0	37.5	38.8	39.0	40.0	48
Syria	3.1	3.8	4.6	7.4	18.0	22.1	27.5	30.8	33.1	32.8	32.3	45
Afghanistan	7.2	8.8	8.5	9.6	17.5	19.0	19.2	19.7	22.7	23.3	27.8	29
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	22.6	22.5	22.0	22.1	22.3	22.3	22.5	22.5	22.8	22.7	22.8	51
Greece	15.0	15.5	15.9	16.2	16.7	17.0	17.4	17.8	18.3	18.5	18.6	50
Other countries	336.5	335.6	328.5	334.3	348.5	349.3	354.6	370.7	402.4	397.9	404.7	
Total	1 206.5	1 231.3	1 241.2	1 276.9	1 333.2	1 353.8	1 376.4	1 413.8	1 478.8	1 489.2	1 514.9	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Canada

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	274.2	644.3	..	46
China	340.6	387.0	..	54
Philippines	259.2	289.4	..	55
United States	149.7	133.4	..	55
United Kingdom	113.9	95.4	..	46
France	65.2	87.8	..	46
Korea	60.5	72.0	..	58
Nigeria	27.2	71.6	..	49
Syria	35.9	65.8	..	48
Iran	52.2	65.2	..	50
Pakistan	59.2	59.3	..	50
Mexico	35.6	58.3	..	47
Brazil	19.7	48.6	..	51
Viet Nam	23.5	37.9	..	60
Germany	46.6	37.4	..	52
Other countries	841.6	1 031.9	..	
Total	2 404.8	3 185.3	..	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Czech Republic**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Ukraine	118.9	112.5	105.1	104.2	105.6	109.9	117.1	131.3	145.2	165.4	196.6	43
Slovak Republic	81.3	85.8	90.9	96.2	101.6	107.3	111.8	116.8	121.3	124.5	114.6	49
Viet Nam	58.2	57.3	57.3	56.6	56.9	58.0	59.8	61.1	61.9	62.8	64.8	46
Russia	32.4	33.0	33.1	34.4	34.7	35.8	36.6	38.0	38.0	41.7	45.2	56
Romania	4.8	5.7	6.8	7.7	9.1	10.8	12.6	14.7	16.8	18.4	18.8	34
Poland	19.1	19.2	19.5	19.6	19.8	20.3	20.7	21.3	21.8	20.7	17.9	55
Bulgaria	7.4	8.2	9.1	10.1	11.0	12.3	13.8	15.6	17.2	17.9	17.3	38
Germany	15.8	17.1	18.5	19.7	20.5	21.2	21.3	21.3	21.5	20.9	14.8	23
Mongolia	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.5	6.0	6.8	7.9	9.1	9.8	10.1	11.0	53
Hungary	0.8	1.0	1.5	2.3	3.1	4.1	5.4	6.6	7.7	8.9	9.7	37
United States	7.3	7.0	7.1	6.5	6.5	8.8	9.6	9.5	7.2	7.5	8.7	41
Belarus	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.7	5.2	6.2	6.9	7.0	8.0	51
Kazakhstan	4.5	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.5	5.7	6.0	5.9	6.9	8.0	54
China	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.7	6.2	6.9	7.6	7.7	8.0	7.9	47
United Kingdom	4.9	5.2	5.4	5.6	6.0	6.3	6.7	7.1	8.3	9.1	7.9	24
Other countries	63.5	63.9	64.8	66.0	68.5	75.7	83.2	92.2	96.1	102.7	107.3	
Total	434.2	435.9	439.2	449.4	464.7	493.4	524.1	564.3	593.4	632.6	658.6	43

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Denmark

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	24.5	26.8	29.3	32.3	35.3	37.6	39.3	40.5	40.8	41.2	43.6	45
Romania	9.5	12.4	15.4	18.8	22.4	25.3	27.8	30.7	32.4	33.8	38.3	42
Syria	1.9	2.7	4.4	9.8	21.6	31.0	33.6	34.7	34.9	35.6	35.8	45
Türkiye	29.0	28.8	28.9	28.8	28.8	28.1	28.2	28.3	28.4	28.4	28.5	49
Germany	22.1	22.4	22.7	23.0	23.7	24.4	24.8	25.5	26.1	26.5	28.2	50
United Kingdom	15.0	15.4	15.8	16.1	16.7	17.6	18.3	18.8	19.0	18.7	18.2	36
Sweden	13.1	13.4	13.9	14.4	14.9	15.1	15.7	16.1	16.5	17.0	17.6	56
Norway	15.3	15.3	15.5	15.8	16.4	16.7	16.8	16.8	17.0	17.0	17.1	61
Lithuania	7.7	8.7	9.7	10.4	11.5	12.4	13.5	14.5	14.7	14.7	15.4	48
Ukraine	6.3	6.6	7.0	7.9	8.6	9.2	10.2	11.7	12.7	12.8	13.7	50
Italy	5.1	5.7	6.4	7.2	8.1	9.0	9.6	10.2	10.9	11.7	13.5	40
India	4.9	5.1	5.6	6.3	7.5	8.7	9.6	10.9	12.0	11.9	12.8	45
Bulgaria	4.0	5.0	6.1	7.2	8.2	9.0	9.7	10.4	10.8	11.2	12.4	41
China	7.5	7.8	8.4	8.9	9.6	10.1	10.5	10.9	11.3	10.9	11.2	58
Thailand	8.6	8.8	9.2	9.5	9.8	10.0	10.2	10.4	10.5	10.5	10.6	85
Other countries	184.7	189.9	199.1	206.0	220.0	220.7	228.2	235.4	239.2	237.7	245.2	
Total	358.9	374.7	397.3	422.6	463.1	485.0	506.0	525.9	537.1	539.5	562.2	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Estonia**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Russia	96.5	95.1	93.6	92.6	91.4	90.3	89.0	88.1	86.0	82.9	81.7	53
Stateless	89.8	88.4	87.1	84.3	81.4	78.9	76.8	74.6	70.4	69.1	66.6	47
Ukraine	5.4	5.5	5.7	6.3	7.2	7.8	8.3	9.3	10.4	13.4	15.9	38
Latvia	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.6	3.9	4.2	5.0	5.6	6.3	4.8	5.0	43
Finland	4.3	5.0	5.7	6.3	6.9	7.6	8.2	8.8	9.2	4.7	4.7	36
Belarus	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.7	47
Lithuania	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	1.9	1.9	44
Germany	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.6	3.0	3.3	3.6	3.9	1.7	1.8	40
Italy	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.2
France	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	2.0
United Kingdom	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6
Sweden	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.5
Spain	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4
Poland	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1
Romania	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0
Other countries	4.3	4.8	5.6	6.7	7.7	8.8	10.4	12.2	14.1	20.4	23.1	
Total	211.1	210.9	211.7	211.4	211.5	212.2	213.7	216.4	215.6	201.3	203.4	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Finland

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Estonia	34.0	39.8	44.8	48.4	50.4	51.5	51.5	51.5	50.9	50.9	51.8	48
Russia	29.6	30.2	30.8	30.6	30.8	31.0	29.2	28.7	28.5	28.9	30.0	53
Iraq	5.7	5.9	6.4	6.8	7.1	9.8	11.7	13.1	13.9	14.7	15.1	36
China	6.2	6.6	7.1	7.6	8.0	8.5	8.7	9.2	9.8	10.5	11.4	53
India	3.8	4.0	4.4	4.7	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.7	6.8	7.2	8.2	41
Thailand	5.5	6.0	6.5	6.9	7.2	7.5	7.5	7.6	7.8	7.9	7.9	85
Sweden	8.5	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.2	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	7.9	40
Afghanistan	2.8	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.7	5.3	5.8	6.2	6.7	7.1	7.7	36
Viet Nam	3.1	3.3	3.6	4.0	4.6	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.4	6.6	7.2	52
Syria	0.2	0.3	0.5	1.0	1.6	3.4	5.3	6.0	6.6	6.9	7.2	47
Ukraine	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.4	3.8	4.0	4.6	5.1	5.8	7.2	45
Somalia	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.3	7.0	6.7	6.4	6.4	6.5	6.6	49
Türkiye	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.8	5.2	5.7	6.1	38
Serbia and Montenegro	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.3	4.7	5.4	38
Philippines	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.4	2.7	3.0	3.3	3.5	4.2	4.7	5.4	65
Other countries	65.3	68.9	72.3	77.2	81.7	86.4	88.4	92.2	97.1	102.9	111.3	
Total	183.1	195.5	207.5	219.7	229.8	243.6	249.5	257.6	267.6	278.9	296.5	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – France**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Algeria	496.1	505.9	518.4	530.9	537.6	559.8	567.2	..	49
Portugal	532.2	541.9	546.4	548.9	548.9	537.2	537.2	546.3	535.1	47
Morocco	458.6	465.2	472.8	480.6	489.3	504.3	510.9	..	51
Italy	181.9	188.0	194.7	202.7	202.7	228.0	228.0	232.0	234.6	46
Tunisia	173.1	178.9	187.1	195.4	206.8	216.2	219.0	..	44
Türkiye	215.6	212.6	211.9	210.4	214.2	207.7	210.4	..	47
Spain	145.1	152.3	157.5	163.7	163.7	177.4	177.4	180.6	192.8	50
Comoros	116.1	121.8	147.3	155.1	162.1	171.0	175.3	..	54
Romania	87.1	96.9	106.2	116.8	116.8	137.4	137.4	139.7	140.8	50
United Kingdom	152.7	150.5	148.4	146.2	146.2	136.0	136.0	138.0	..	49
Belgium	97.8	99.3	100.5	101.8	101.8	107.6	107.6	109.6	106.0	52
China	100.7	100.5	102.2	103.1	108.1	100.4	101.8	..	59
Côte d'Ivoire	59.6	63.4	68.3	74.5	79.1	90.9	92.0	..	52
Mali	73.4	75.5	78.1	79.1	85.5	88.7	89.9	..	35
Haiti	72.5	74.6	77.5	82.6	80.3	87.2	88.2	..	56
Other countries	1 437.0	1 492.6	1 462.0	1 759.0	1 708.7	1 787.5	1 814.4	..	
Total	3 944.7	4 092.1	4 227.2	4 431.4	4 544.8	4 605.7	4 950.7	4 995.4	5 137.4	5 215.2	5 315.3	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Germany

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Türkiye	1 607.2	1 575.7	1 549.8	1 527.1	1 506.1	1 492.6	1 483.5	1 476.4	1 472.4	1 461.9	1 458.4	48
Poland	468.5	532.4	609.9	674.2	741.0	783.1	866.9	860.1	862.5	866.7	871.0	47
Syria	32.9	40.4	56.9	118.2	366.6	637.8	699.0	745.6	789.5	818.5	867.6	42
Romania	159.2	205.0	267.4	355.3	452.7	533.7	622.8	696.3	748.2	799.2	844.5	43
Italy	520.2	529.4	552.9	574.5	596.1	611.5	643.1	643.5	646.5	648.4	646.8	42
Croatia	223.0	225.0	240.5	263.3	297.9	332.6	367.9	395.7	414.9	426.8	434.6	47
Bulgaria	93.9	118.8	146.8	183.3	226.9	263.3	310.4	337.0	360.2	388.7	410.9	46
Greece	283.7	298.3	316.3	328.6	339.9	348.5	362.2	363.2	363.7	364.3	362.6	46
Afghanistan	56.6	61.8	67.0	75.4	131.5	253.5	251.6	257.1	263.4	271.8	309.8	37
Iraq	82.4	84.1	85.5	88.7	136.4	227.2	237.4	247.8	255.1	259.5	276.9	42
Russia	195.3	202.1	216.3	221.4	231.0	245.4	249.2	254.3	260.4	263.3	268.6	63
Serbia	198.0	202.5	205.0	220.9	230.4	223.1	225.5	231.2	237.8	242.6	252.3	49
Bosnia and Herzegovina	153.5	155.3	157.5	163.5	168.0	172.6	181.0	190.5	203.3	211.3	222.1	48
Hungary	82.8	107.4	135.6	156.8	178.2	192.3	207.0	212.4	211.7	211.5	212.7	44
Spain	110.2	120.2	135.5	146.8	155.9	163.6	178.0	176.0	177.8	181.6	187.9	48
Other countries	2 663.7	2 755.4	2 890.6	3 054.8	3 349.3	3 558.4	3 738.5	3 828.2	3 961.1	4 016.4	4 191.0	
Total	6 930.9	7 213.7	7 633.6	8 153.0	9 107.9	10 039.1	10 623.9	10 915.5	11 228.3	11 432.5	11 817.8	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Greece**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
EU	202.1	196.1	192.6	198.7	206.7	205.2	211.2	213.2	191.1	168.6	115.2	64
Non-EU	719.4	690.3	662.4	623.2	584.7	604.8	604.9	618.5	715.2	752.9	632.7	47
Total	921.4	886.5	855	822	798.4	810	816.1	831.7	906.3	921.5	747.9	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Hungary

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Ukraine	11.9	10.8	8.3	6.9	6.7	5.8	10.5	24.2	30.3	27.4	30.7	38
Germany	15.8	17.4	18.7	18.8	19.4	18.6	17.9	16.5	18.3	17.5	19.7	48
China	10.1	11.5	12.7	16.5	19.8	19.1	19.9	18.9	19.7	18.6	17.7	49
Romania	41.6	34.8	30.9	28.6	29.7	24.0	22.7	21.0	22.2	18.2	16.6	35
Slovak Republic	6.7	7.6	8.3	8.7	9.4	9.5	9.7	9.6	10.6	14.7	16.0	55
Viet Nam	2.6	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.7	4.7	5.7	6.7	6.4	47
Russia	2.9	3.4	3.7	4.3	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.0	5.0	61
Austria	3.3	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.1	3.3	4.1	4.6	39
India	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.5	2.0	2.9	3.2	3.3	3.8	32
Italy	1.6	2.0	2.3	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.6	4.0	3.7	3.7	30
Korea	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.8	2.4	3.2	3.6	32
Serbia	8.3	4.9	3.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	3.4	5.3	5.0	3.5	3.5	28
Türkiye	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.5	29
United Kingdom	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.3	32
Netherlands	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.8	3.2	3.1	3.3	41
Other countries	30.9	34.0	36.9	40.6	43.9	45.6	50.2	55.3	60.0	59.0	61.1	
Total	143.4	141.4	140.5	146.0	156.6	151.1	161.8	180.8	200.0	194.5	202.5	43

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Iceland**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	9.0	9.4	10.2	11.1	12.1	13.8	17.0	19.3	20.6	20.8	21.2	41
Lithuania	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.3	3.4	4.1	4.6	4.6	4.8	35
Romania	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.5	2.1	2.2	2.8	28
Latvia	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.4	31
Germany	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.7	67
Spain	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.4	42
Portugal	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.4	35
United Kingdom	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.2	33
Philippines	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	62
United States	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	52
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.0	28
Denmark	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	54
France	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	47
Italy	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	39
Czech Republic	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	44
Other countries	4.7	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.3	6.0	7.1	8.0	9.2	10.4	11.6	
Total	21.0	21.4	22.7	24.3	26.5	30.3	37.8	44.3	49.4	51.3	55.0	42

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Ireland

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	122.5	93.7	50
United Kingdom	113.0	113.4	114.9	115.5	103.1	107.7	110.8	114.5	116.9	118.2	83.3	46
India	11.5	45.4	46
Romania	29.2	43.3	46
Lithuania	36.6	31.2	54
Brazil	13.6	27.3	53
Italy	11.7	18.3	47
Latvia	19.9	18.3	56
Spain	12.1	18.0	57
France	11.7	13.9	51
Croatia	5.3	13.6	45
United States	10.5	13.4	61
China	1.0	13.1	53
Germany	11.5	12.4	57
Ukraine	1.8	11.8	61
Other countries	205.4	344.3	
Total	600.0	601.8	603.7	605.6	607.4	566.6	593.5	622.7	644.4	645.6	801.4	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Italy**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Romania	834.5	933.4	1 081.4	1 131.8	1 151.4	1 168.6	1 190.1	1 143.9	1 145.7	1 076.4	1 083.8	57
Morocco	408.7	426.8	454.8	449.1	437.5	420.7	416.5	406.1	414.2	428.9	420.2	46
Albania	450.9	465.0	495.7	490.5	467.7	448.4	440.5	423.2	421.6	433.2	420.0	49
China	197.1	223.4	256.8	265.8	271.3	282.0	290.7	283.4	288.9	330.5	300.2	49
Ukraine	180.1	191.7	219.1	226.1	230.7	234.4	237.0	227.9	228.6	236.0	225.3	78
India	118.4	128.9	142.5	147.8	150.5	151.4	151.8	147.2	153.2	165.5	162.5	42
Bangladesh	81.7	92.7	111.2	115.3	118.8	122.4	132.0	131.0	138.9	158.0	159.0	29
Philippines	129.2	139.8	162.7	168.2	165.9	166.5	167.9	158.0	157.7	165.4	159.0	57
Egypt	66.9	76.7	96.0	103.7	109.9	112.8	119.5	119.9	128.1	139.6	140.3	34
Pakistan	71.0	80.7	90.6	96.2	101.8	108.2	114.2	116.6	121.6	135.5	134.2	28
Nigeria	48.2	56.5	66.8	71.2	77.3	88.5	106.1	114.1	113.0	119.1	119.4	42
Moldova	132.2	139.7	149.4	147.4	142.3	135.7	131.8	122.8	118.5	122.7	114.9	66
Senegal	73.7	80.3	90.9	94.0	98.2	101.2	105.9	105.3	106.2	111.1	110.8	27
Sri Lanka	71.6	79.5	95.0	100.6	102.3	104.9	108.0	104.8	107.6	112.0	108.1	47
Tunisia	83.0	88.3	97.3	96.0	95.6	94.1	93.8	90.6	93.4	97.4	99.0	37
Other countries	1 104.9	1 184.4	1 311.1	1 310.8	1 305.8	1 307.4	1 338.7	1 301.4	1 302.4	1 340.6	1 274.1	
Total	4 052.1	4 387.7	4 921.3	5 014.4	5 026.9	5 047.0	5 144.4	4 996.2	5 039.6	5 171.9	5 030.7	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Japan

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
China	674.9	652.6	649.1	654.8	665.8	695.5	730.9	764.7	813.7	778.1	716.6	55
Viet Nam	44.7	52.4	72.3	99.9	147.0	200.0	262.4	330.8	412.0	448.1	432.9	44
Korea	545.4	530.0	519.7	501.2	457.8	453.1	450.7	449.6	446.4	426.9	409.9	54
Philippines	209.4	203.0	209.2	217.6	229.6	243.7	260.6	271.3	282.8	279.7	276.6	71
Brazil	210.0	190.6	181.3	175.4	173.4	180.9	191.4	201.9	211.7	208.5	204.9	46
Nepal	20.4	24.1	31.5	42.3	54.8	67.5	80.0	89.0	96.8	96.0	97.1	43
Indonesia	24.7	25.5	27.2	30.2	35.9	42.9	50.0	56.3	66.9	66.8	59.8	35
United States	49.8	48.4	50.0	51.3	52.3	53.7	55.7	57.5	59.2	55.8	54.2	32
Chinese Taipei	..	22.8	33.3	40.2	48.7	52.8	56.7	60.7	64.8	55.9	51.2	67
Thailand	42.8	40.1	41.2	43.1	45.4	47.6	50.2	52.3	54.8	53.4	50.3	74
Peru	52.8	49.2	48.6	48.0	47.7	47.7	48.0	48.4	48.7	48.3	48.3	48
Myanmar	8.7	8.0	8.6	10.3	13.7	17.8	22.5	26.5	32.0	35.0	37.2	53
India	21.5	21.7	22.5	24.5	26.2	28.7	31.7	35.4	40.2	38.6	36.1	32
Sri Lanka	9.3	8.4	9.2	10.7	13.2	17.3	23.3	25.4	27.4	29.3	29.0	28
Dem. People's Rep. of Korea	33.9	32.5	30.9	29.6	28.1	27.2	26.3	45
Other countries	164.2	156.9	162.7	172.4	186.7	201.2	217.0	231.7	247.8	239.7	230.2	
Total	2 078.5	2 033.7	2 066.4	2 121.8	2 232.2	2 382.8	2 561.8	2 731.1	2 933.1	2 887.1	2 760.6	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Korea**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
China	611.3	592.5	651.3	756.4	810.6	826.1	838.9	888.1	889.2	818.8	780.9	50
Viet Nam	110.6	114.2	113.8	122.6	128.0	137.8	151.4	170.7	187.3	181.4	178.9	52
United States	67.0	67.8	69.0	71.1	70.6	69.7	69.1	69.3	71.3	69.5	71.5	53
Uzbekistan	25.8	30.9	34.5	39.3	42.5	49.3	56.7	63.1	68.1	61.1	62.5	36
Cambodia	16.8	23.4	30.7	37.3	42.0	44.5	45.7	45.3	45.0	40.2	40.3	33
Russia	7.2	8.0	9.0	9.8	13.2	21.5	28.7	35.3	40.5	38.9	39.6	52
Philippines	38.4	33.2	38.8	43.2	45.3	46.1	45.2	45.3	45.4	40.7	38.0	48
Nepal	12.6	17.8	20.7	25.5	29.2	33.1	35.4	38.9	40.9	38.5	35.4	12
Thailand	26.0	21.4	26.2	26.8	27.9	29.3	30.2	31.4	32.6	30.8	31.4	37
Indonesia	29.7	29.9	33.3	38.9	40.2	39.3	37.1	37.6	37.3	33.5	30.7	11
Japan	21.8	23.4	23.9	24.0	23.8	24.1	24.1	24.7	25.1	23.5	25.1	79
Myanmar	5.6	8.3	11.5	14.7	18.1	21.3	23.5	26.7	27.5	25.0	24.3	7
Mongolia	21.3	19.8	18.4	17.3	18.5	20.1	22.6	24.2	24.8	24.5	23.7	54
Kazakhstan	1.7	2.1	2.5	3.0	3.9	7.6	12.7	18.5	22.7	19.9	22.0	48
Canada	17.9	19.2	19.5	20.3	20.7	21.0	20.6	20.2	20.2	19.9	20.7	54
Other countries	186.5	190.4	200.8	238.8	260.2	272.0	307.6	411.8	446.4	423.1	404.7	
Total	1 200.1	1 202.3	1 303.8	1 488.9	1 594.8	1 662.8	1 749.6	1 951.1	2 024.6	1 889.5	1 829.8	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Latvia

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Russia	37.0	36.1	38.8	51.6	56.0	55.4	54.7	53.9	53.1	52.3	51.5	..
Ukraine	2.4	2.3	2.4	4.1	5.9	6.4	7.0	8.2	9.2	9.4	9.7	..
Lithuania	3.0	2.9	2.9	4.3	4.6	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.1	..
Belarus	1.6	1.6	1.7	2.6	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.9	3.9	4.3	..
Germany	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.8	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.6	..
Uzbekistan	1.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	2.3	2.4	2.5	..
India	0.6	0.9	1.3	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.2	..
United Kingdom	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	..
Estonia	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	..
Italy	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	..
France	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	..
Sweden	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	..
China	0.9	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	..
Kazakhstan	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	..
Poland	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	..
United States	279.0	271.1	257.5	228.3	208.7	198.0	190.1	182.3	174.0	166.5	159.4	..
Total	324.3	315.4	304.8	298.4	288.9	279.4	272.5	266.6	260.4	252.4	245.0	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Lithuania**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Ukraine	2.1	1.9	1.7	2.1	1.5	2.5	6.2	13.9	21.4	26.9	31.8	..
Belarus	3.4	3.0	2.3	1.9	0.8	0.9	3.2	8.9	15.6	20.8	31.0	..
Russia	10.8	10.5	10.3	10.7	8.9	8.3	8.1	10.9	12.3	12.6	13.4	..
Stateless	2.5	2.3	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.8	2.5	..
Latvia	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	..
India	0.0	..	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.1	..
Germany	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.1	..
Uzbekistan	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	1.0	..
Poland	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.9	..
Moldova	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.9	..
Kazakhstan	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.8	..
United Kingdom	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.7	..
Kyrgyzstan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.7	..
Georgia	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	..
United States	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	..	0.0	0.1	..	0.6	0.7	0.7	..
Other countries	1.8	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.8	3.5	4.4	6.9	8.1	9.5	11.4	..
Total	22.9	22.2	21.6	22.5	18.7	20.1	27.3	47.2	65.8	79.9	100.1	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Luxembourg

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Portugal	85.3	88.2	90.8	92.1	93.1	96.8	96.5	95.5	95.1	94.3	93.7	47
France	33.1	35.2	37.2	39.4	41.7	44.3	45.8	46.9	47.8	48.5	49.2	46
Italy	18.1	18.3	18.8	19.5	20.3	21.3	22.0	22.5	23.0	23.5	24.1	44
Belgium	17.2	17.6	18.2	18.8	19.4	20.0	20.2	20.0	19.8	19.6	19.4	45
Germany	12.3	12.4	12.7	12.8	12.8	13.1	13.1	13.0	12.8	12.8	12.8	49
Spain	4.0	4.3	4.7	5.1	5.5	6.1	6.5	6.8	7.2	7.7	8.4	47
Romania	1.9	2.2	2.5	3.2	3.8	4.1	4.7	5.2	5.7	6.1	6.4	56
Poland	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.8	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.0	56
China	1.7	1.8	2.2	2.5	2.8	3.2	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.2	55
United Kingdom	5.6	5.7	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.1	5.9	5.8	5.3	4.6	4.1	43
Netherlands	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.1	46
Greece	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.4	3.7	3.8	4.0	50
India	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.9	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.8	45
Montenegro	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	4.4	4.2	3.6	3.2	2.9	2.9	48
Brazil	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.9	66
Other countries	36.3	38.0	40.3	42.7	46.2	47.3	49.8	51.6	54.7	56.7	59.3	
Total	229.9	238.8	248.9	258.7	269.2	281.5	288.2	291.5	296.5	299.4	304.2	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Mexico**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
United States	63.4	..	65.3	67.5	68.9	74.6	79.6	82.5	44
Venezuela	12.9	..	15.3	18.6	22.3	28.2	35.1	39.3	55
Colombia	16.7	..	18.3	20.6	23.0	26.3	30.0	32.0	55
Spain	20.7	..	24.7	26.7	27.7	28.5	28.9	26.9	40
Cuba	14.5	..	17.0	18.4	20.5	24.3	26.5	27.9	50
China	15.6	..	18.4	20.6	21.5	22.7	23.6	24.5	42
Argentina	15.3	..	16.8	18.0	19.0	19.8	20.7	20.8	47
Honduras	6.9	..	7.8	9.3	12.0	15.6	19.5	22.5	55
Guatemala	9.7	..	10.3	11.6	13.2	15.8	18.5	19.9	55
Canada	12.9	..	13.2	14.1	14.6	16.0	17.2	18.3	46
El Salvador	5.7	..	6.2	7.2	9.0	12.2	15.3	17.3	51
France	9.0	..	9.8	10.5	10.9	11.7	12.1	11.8	45
Germany	8.8	..	9.5	10.5	10.9	11.2	11.4	11.0	42
Brazil	6.5	..	7.2	8.2	9.3	10.5	11.4	11.6	52
Japan	5.6	..	8.0	9.0	9.9	10.8	11.2	11.0	40
Other countries	72.1	..	78.2	84.5	89.2	95.8	101.1	103.0	
Total	296.4	..	326.0	355.2	381.8	423.9	462.0	480.3	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Netherlands

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	65.1	74.6	85.8	99.6	110.9	121.4	132.4	144.0	155.9	164.9	176.1	50
Germany	72.8	72.6	72.2	71.8	72.3	73.3	75.0	77.1	79.5	80.6	82.9	57
Türkiye	84.8	81.9	80.1	77.5	75.4	74.1	73.8	74.8	77.0	77.3	80.2	48
Syria	0.6	0.8	1.4	8.2	25.4	51.4	67.5	74.1	79.5	71.2	57.0	46
Italy	22.6	23.6	25.0	27.1	29.5	32.3	35.5	39.1	43.3	45.1	49.1	43
Bulgaria	16.8	17.6	17.8	19.8	21.9	24.1	27.3	31.2	36.8	41.8	47.7	47
United Kingdom	41.4	41.7	42.3	43.0	44.2	45.3	46.0	47.3	47.9	48.8	47.1	41
India	10.8	11.7	13.1	14.7	17.1	20.4	24.9	30.6	37.4	37.1	42.1	44
Spain	20.3	21.9	23.9	25.3	26.8	28.3	30.3	32.7	35.6	37.4	42.1	50
China	23.9	25.9	27.2	28.2	29.7	31.4	33.9	36.5	39.4	38.9	40.9	53
Romania	9.1	9.5	10.0	11.9	13.7	16.1	20.0	24.9	30.7	34.6	40.6	47
Belgium	27.6	28.2	28.8	29.6	30.6	31.9	33.2	34.4	35.9	37.0	38.2	53
Morocco	56.6	51.0	48.1	44.9	42.3	39.9	38.0	36.5	35.8	33.8	33.2	49
France	18.1	18.3	18.7	19.7	20.9	22.6	24.2	25.8	27.8	29.0	31.5	52
Portugal	16.4	17.3	18.1	18.7	19.4	20.2	21.1	22.4	24.2	25.4	28.0	45
Other countries	299.1	299.5	303.5	307.1	320.4	339.6	357.7	379.5	405.7	400.0	419.7	
Total	786.1	796.2	816.0	847.3	900.5	972.3	1 040.8	1 110.9	1 192.3	1 203.0	1 256.2	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Norway**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	66.6	77.1	85.6	93.6	99.6	102.0	103.8	105.2	108.6	110.3	112.7	36
Lithuania	24.1	30.7	35.8	39.5	41.7	42.5	43.7	45.1	46.9	47.9	48.8	42
Sweden	42.0	43.1	44.2	45.1	45.1	44.4	44.0	44.0	44.2	43.6	39.6	47
Syria	0.4	0.7	1.5	3.6	7.6	18.9	26.0	30.2	32.0	32.8	34.0	43
Germany	23.7	24.4	24.6	25.0	25.2	24.9	24.7	24.8	25.3	25.6	26.2	48
Denmark	21.4	21.9	22.6	23.5	23.3	23.0	22.8	22.8	22.9	22.3	20.8	45
Romania	5.7	7.5	10.0	12.0	13.8	14.5	15.0	15.6	16.6	17.2	17.4	42
United Kingdom	14.7	15.5	15.8	16.3	16.3	16.3	16.2	16.5	17.2	17.5	16.4	34
Eritrea	7.6	10.0	12.7	15.2	17.7	19.0	18.6	19.1	18.9	17.1	14.8	45
Latvia	6.9	8.5	9.4	10.3	10.8	11.0	11.1	11.5	12.1	12.5	12.9	42
Thailand	10.0	10.8	11.4	11.5	11.6	12.1	11.3	11.9	12.0	11.9	10.6	85
Spain	3.4	4.6	5.8	6.9	7.6	8.1	8.5	8.8	9.5	9.8	10.4	44
Philippines	8.9	10.1	11.4	11.7	11.8	12.1	11.7	12.3	12.8	12.1	10.0	76
India	4.3	5.2	5.9	6.8	7.0	6.8	7.1	8.3	9.7	9.5	9.1	45
Netherlands	7.5	7.8	8.0	8.3	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.7	8.9	9.0	9.1	44
Other countries	160.1	170.9	178.5	183.0	190.7	195.1	194.9	199.5	207.0	202.5	193.1	
Total	407.3	448.8	483.2	512.2	538.2	559.2	567.8	584.2	604.5	601.6	586.0	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Poland

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Ukraine	13.4
Germany	5.2
Russia	4.2
Belarus	3.8
Viet Nam	2.6
Armenia	1.8
Other countries	54.8
Total	85.8	93.3	101.2	108.3	149.6	210.3	239.2	289.8	358.2	457.0	453.1	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Portugal**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Brazil	111.4	105.6	92.1	87.5	82.6	81.3	85.4	105.4	151.3	184.0	204.7	55
United Kingdom	17.7	16.7	16.5	16.6	17.2	19.4	22.4	26.4	34.4	46.2	41.9	44
Cape Verde	43.9	42.9	42.4	40.9	38.7	36.6	35.0	34.7	37.4	36.6	34.1	52
Italy	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.3	6.1	8.5	12.9	18.9	25.4	28.2	30.8	43
India	5.4	5.7	6.0	6.4	6.9	7.2	8.0	11.4	17.6	24.6	30.3	20
Romania	39.3	35.2	34.2	31.5	30.5	30.4	30.8	30.9	31.1	30.1	28.9	47
Ukraine	48.0	44.1	41.1	37.9	35.8	34.5	32.5	29.2	29.7	28.6	27.2	54
France	5.3	5.2	5.3	6.5	8.4	11.3	15.3	19.8	23.1	24.9	26.7	47
Angola	21.6	20.4	20.2	19.7	18.2	17.0	16.9	18.4	22.7	24.4	25.8	57
China	16.8	17.5	18.7	21.5	21.4	22.6	23.2	25.4	27.9	26.1	22.8	50
Nepal	1.1	1.7	2.6	3.5	4.8	5.8	7.4	11.5	16.8	21.0	21.5	37
Guinea-Bissau	18.5	17.8	17.8	18.0	17.1	15.7	15.2	16.2	18.9	19.7	20.4	47
Spain	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.7	10.0	11.1	12.5	14.1	15.8	17.0	18.5	49
Germany	9.1	8.6	8.6	8.8	9.0	10.0	11.2	12.8	14.7	16.0	18.3	47
Sao Tome and Principe	10.5	10.4	10.3	10.2	9.6	9.0	8.6	9.2	10.2	10.7	11.2	55
Other countries	73.6	70.9	70.9	71.3	72.3	77.4	84.4	96.1	113.2	124.0	135.7	
Total	436.8	417.0	401.3	395.2	388.7	397.7	421.7	480.3	590.3	662.1	698.9	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Slovak Republic

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Czech Republic	10.6	11.0	11.4	11.9	12.5	13.0	13.5	14.0	14.4	15.1	10.3	49
Hungary	7.1	7.8	8.1	8.6	9.2	9.8	10.2	10.7	11.1	11.6	6.8	34
Ukraine	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.1	4.4	6.5	53
Poland	4.8	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.4	5.6	5.8	5.9	6.1	6.3	4.4	55
Romania	4.4	4.7	4.9	5.3	5.8	6.3	6.5	6.9	7.1	7.3	4.4	31
Russia	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.4	60
Italy	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.1	17
Viet Nam	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.0	43
Germany	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	1.9	27
China	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.7	48
United Kingdom	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.5	1.6	21
Bulgaria	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.3	31
Serbia	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	29
Austria	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.2	28
Croatia	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	29
Other countries	10.4	11.0	11.6	12.1	13.0	13.8	14.5	15.1	15.6	16.2	14.2	
Total	53.4	56.5	59.2	61.8	65.8	69.7	72.9	76.1	78.9	82.1	63.1	40

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Slovenia**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	39.3	41.3	43.3	44.9	47.7	50.4	54.0	62.9	73.2	79.6	81.7	31
Serbia	7.3	7.8	9.8	9.7	9.8	10.6	11.8	14.0	16.2	17.3	16.9	29
North Macedonia	9.1	9.6	9.8	10.1	10.4	10.8	11.3	12.3	13.3	14.0	14.1	45
Croatia	8.0	8.3	8.7	8.8	8.9	9.2	9.5	9.8	10.1	10.2	9.9	41
Russia	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.6	3.0	3.3	3.5	3.7	55
Bulgaria	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.3	3.1	31
Italy	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.8	2.9	35
Ukraine	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4	61
China	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3	45
Germany	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	48
Montenegro	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	44
United Kingdom	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	35
Hungary	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	48
Austria	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	45
Slovak Republic	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	63
Other countries	13.7	15.2	14.9	16.6	18.3	19.6	20.4	23.0	26.5	29.9	31.9	
Total	85.6	91.4	96.6	101.5	107.8	114.4	121.9	138.2	156.4	168.7	172.4	36

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Spain

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Morocco	771.6	759.3	718.0	688.7	680.5	665.6	682.0	713.8	760.7	775.3	775.2	47
Romania	799.0	769.6	728.3	708.4	695.0	683.8	673.6	670.2	665.9	658.0	631.6	51
United Kingdom	313.0	316.4	310.1	301.8	296.4	293.5	285.0	286.8	300.6	314.0	315.8	49
Colombia	245.8	223.1	173.2	145.5	135.9	138.4	159.6	199.2	261.2	297.7	315.4	56
Italy	178.2	181.0	180.8	182.7	191.6	203.8	221.4	243.7	267.7	279.7	298.2	45
Venezuela	53.8	52.0	44.4	44.2	50.0	63.3	91.1	134.0	187.2	209.0	220.3	56
China	170.8	169.6	166.0	167.5	172.2	177.5	183.5	190.6	197.2	197.6	193.0	51
Germany	153.6	153.4	148.5	145.0	142.1	141.1	138.8	138.3	139.0	139.6	142.6	51
France	101.1	101.5	99.5	98.7	100.7	103.2	106.2	111.5	117.1	121.7	127.7	50
Honduras	32.2	35.0	34.3	35.9	40.8	48.1	64.1	84.8	109.5	123.1	125.2	68
Ecuador	309.8	269.4	214.0	174.4	159.0	145.2	139.4	134.9	132.6	126.9	120.8	47
Peru	122.0	109.6	84.2	66.4	61.3	59.5	66.7	79.9	101.0	112.0	117.9	57
Bulgaria	151.5	147.3	139.9	134.4	130.5	127.4	125.0	123.3	122.8	120.8	116.8	51
Portugal	121.3	116.4	109.0	103.8	101.8	100.9	100.1	102.8	106.1	106.9	107.2	43
Ukraine	84.4	84.1	81.8	84.1	90.8	94.5	99.0	103.6	107.6	107.2	105.7	58
Other countries	1 628.0	1 584.8	1 445.1	1 372.6	1 369.0	1 373.7	1 427.5	1 522.9	1 650.7	1 678.5	1 694.1	
Total	5 236.0	5 072.7	4 677.1	4 454.4	4 417.5	4 419.5	4 563.0	4 840.2	5 226.9	5 368.3	5 407.5	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Sweden**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Syria	5.0	9.1	20.5	42.2	70.0	116.4	132.1	137.1	116.4	95.1	68.5	46
Poland	42.7	44.6	46.1	48.2	50.8	52.5	54.0	54.9	55.5	53.8	54.0	43
Afghanistan	12.7	16.7	20.3	23.6	26.0	28.0	37.4	45.4	49.6	48.5	46.7	34
Finland	67.9	65.3	62.8	59.7	57.6	55.8	53.8	51.0	48.7	46.1	43.1	58
Eritrea	8.4	10.0	12.8	18.0	25.1	32.1	36.4	39.7	43.0	43.5	42.4	43
India	7.7	8.4	9.2	10.4	11.4	13.5	17.1	22.2	27.0	28.3	31.7	42
Norway	34.8	34.8	34.6	34.5	34.4	34.6	34.7	34.5	34.5	32.6	30.7	51
Germany	27.8	28.0	28.1	28.2	28.2	28.7	29.0	29.2	29.5	29.0	29.9	50
Denmark	40.5	40.2	39.3	38.4	37.1	35.2	33.4	31.5	30.2	29.1	27.4	42
Somalia	33.0	36.1	45.0	47.1	46.2	41.3	36.4	32.4	30.9	28.9	24.8	50
China	15.5	16.3	17.1	17.5	16.6	17.3	18.6	20.2	21.9	22.3	23.2	54
Iraq	55.8	43.2	31.2	25.9	23.2	22.7	25.3	26.4	25.9	23.4	22.2	41
Romania	10.2	11.2	12.0	13.0	14.4	15.5	16.9	18.2	19.3	18.9	19.6	43
Iran	14.3	14.5	14.8	14.9	14.1	14.2	14.6	15.2	15.9	15.6	16.3	45
Lithuania	7.7	8.7	9.5	10.4	11.3	12.2	13.6	14.6	15.5	15.6	16.0	44
Other countries	271.1	280.2	291.4	307.5	316.4	332.0	344.0	360.0	376.7	374.9	384.4	
Total	655.1	667.2	694.7	739.4	782.8	851.9	897.3	932.3	940.6	905.3	880.8	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Switzerland

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Italy	290.5	294.4	301.3	308.6	313.7	318.7	319.4	322.1	323.7	328.3	335.8	42
Germany	276.8	285.4	293.2	298.6	301.5	304.7	305.8	307.9	309.4	311.5	317.5	45
Portugal	224.2	238.4	253.8	263.0	268.1	269.5	268.0	265.5	262.9	260.9	257.8	45
France	99.5	103.9	110.2	116.8	123.1	127.3	131.5	135.3	139.6	146.4	157.8	45
Spain	66.0	69.8	75.4	79.5	82.4	83.5	83.7	84.3	85.2	87.2	92.4	46
Türkiye	70.2	69.6	69.2	69.1	68.6	68.0	67.3	66.7	66.3	67.1	69.2	47
North Macedonia	60.8	61.6	62.5	63.3	64.2	65.2	65.8	66.5	67.0	67.6	69.0	51
Serbia	103.0	94.9	79.3	69.7	65.3	64.3	63.2	61.9	60.7	59.7	57.6	51
Austria	38.2	39.0	39.6	40.4	41.3	42.1	42.7	43.2	43.9	44.5	46.1	47
Poland	13.9	16.2	17.9	21.4	24.7	26.9	29.2	31.6	33.9	36.2	42.2	48
United Kingdom	38.6	39.4	40.4	41.1	41.3	41.0	41.0	41.0	41.4	42.4	40.0	43
Eritrea	8.4	9.8	11.7	14.0	16.6	19.8	23.2	26.2	29.0	30.9	33.9	45
Croatia	32.8	31.8	30.7	30.2	29.6	29.0	28.5	28.5	28.3	28.3	30.7	49
Romania	7.0	8.6	10.2	11.3	12.1	13.8	15.6	16.7	19.9	23.1	30.6	54
Hungary	7.9	9.8	11.6	14.9	17.6	19.7	21.4	22.7	24.0	25.3	27.9	49
Other countries	434.5	452.6	479.6	505.1	524.0	536.1	547.4	561.1	576.2	592.6	633.4	
Total	1 772.3	1 825.1	1 886.6	1 947.0	1 993.9	2 029.5	2 053.6	2 081.2	2 111.4	2 151.9	2 241.9	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Türkiye**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Iraq	11.8	19.1	31.1	47.2	93.7	149.7	201.1	283.9	313.8	322.0	275.3	49
Afghanistan	10.7	19.5	27.9	33.6	38.5	59.9	79.6	120.4	152.2	183.6	186.2	41
Russia	14.4	15.6	20.7	21.6	25.3	27.7	24.3	33.4	40.2	66.8	151.0	50
Iran	7.9	12.2	16.8	21.9	27.8	37.9	44.9	68.8	92.7	128.9	117.0	51
Turkmenistan	5.8	11.7	13.4	18.4	23.4	28.3	42.8	68.1	133.7	124.0	116.4	49
Germany	43.6	25.6	59.0	63.2	69.9	75.1	77.2	82.0	88.5	102.6	110.5	51
Syria	5.1	10.1	57.9	50.9	56.6	75.2	64.6	88.0	114.3	104.6	99.4	48
Azerbaijan	14.8	18.9	26.2	30.2	36.5	47.0	51.6	61.8	68.5	68.6	68.9	54
Uzbekistan	3.4	6.5	7.9	11.0	16.1	21.7	31.6	34.1	44.9	71.1	61.8	70
Ukraine	4.7	7.0	9.7	12.9	17.1	19.9	18.7	18.5	20.2	23.4	50.4	72
Kazakhstan	6.9	8.4	11.1	11.9	13.7	14.9	12.6	16.8	21.2	39.5	45.5	59
Egypt	0.4	0.6	1.2	2.7	4.4	7.6	14.5	26.2	31.1	34.2	33.0	44
West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.8	1.3	1.9	2.5	3.3	4.8	8.3	15.7	21.5	28.0	26.3	41
Kyrgyzstan	4.8	6.1	8.4	10.6	14.0	17.1	18.6	19.6	23.5	26.5	24.5	71
Jordan	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.5	2.2	3.5	5.3	12.0	19.6	23.7	22.7	43
Other countries	106.5	115.4	162.3	178.2	207.7	226.0	223.4	261.6	345.3	444.8	435.0	
Total	242.1	278.7	456.5	518.3	650.3	816.4	919.1	1 211.0	1 531.2	1 792.0	1 823.8	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – United Kingdom

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Poland	713	679	826	855	1 006	994	829	696	..	55
India	360	336	354	379	347	317	370	370	..	50
Ireland	356	345	309	329	330	343	350	370	..	54
Romania	117	148	165	219	324	382	478	342	..	48
Italy	125	138	182	212	262	296	311	342	..	48
Portugal	106	138	140	235	247	269	195	268	..	50
Spain	82	75	130	167	162	191	156	206	..	51
Pakistan	163	194	197	184	175	167	186	181	..	47
Nigeria	102	114	84	104	95	106	100	178	..	53
United States	146	149	145	132	127	130	149	166	..	57
Lithuania	126	153	158	192	204	196	181	153	..	60
France	132	132	135	189	181	186	179	149	..	56
Germany	137	153	110	119	166	131	120	135	..	62
China	87	93	106	122	113	132	148	124	..	56
Hungary	48	57	83	103	101	91	66	118	..	57
Other countries	1 989	2 037	2 030	2 051	2 111	2 206	2 173	2 215
Total	4 788	4 941	5 154	5 592	5 951	6 137	5 991	6 227	..	6 013

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – United States**

Thousands

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Mexico	8 327.2	8 263.7	8 179.5	8 524.7	8 340.2	8 165.7	8 021.2	7 644.3	7 186.5	7 700.9	8 006.3	46
India	1 103.3	1 117.2	1 158.8	1 203.8	1 443.8	1 606.6	1 679.1	1 765.4	1 686.7	1 657.0	1 706.5	48
China	752.4	744.1	859.4	920.6	1 061.7	1 082.8	1 115.5	1 059.3	1 007.6	943.5	1 066.6	53
Honduras	339.7	409.4	448.8	482.1	531.0	471.6	513.2	543.3	651.4	734.2	948.4	46
Guatemala	557.7	630.8	600.8	686.3	732.5	672.2	664.3	686.1	780.5	865.7	923.8	43
El Salvador	919.7	847.8	971.5	913.5	908.1	997.6	930.6	927.0	909.7	901.9	895.5	45
Dominican Rep.	434.9	433.6	449.8	498.6	569.7	509.7	580.9	560.6	540.8	590.7	684.6	53
Cuba	556.9	510.3	499.1	532.8	619.7	648.7	673.6	635.2	524.6	521.0	581.6	46
Venezuela	75.7	81.2	109.0	123.7	176.9	220.8	256.2	314.2	366.7	424.3	496.0	53
Brazil	202.7	228.1	218.0	251.2	279.2	310.4	403.2	416.4	319.6	319.9	494.1	53
Philippines	551.0	492.9	498.6	565.7	599.5	510.8	516.1	505.6	456.0	414.4	410.6	60
Colombia	300.5	231.2	250.8	274.7	300.8	278.9	245.9	331.9	265.7	353.4	407.1	50
Canada	372.0	372.7	358.9	349.0	331.3	331.0	308.2	282.8	284.0	339.5	377.3	57
Viet Nam	366.6	315.0	268.9	286.3	301.3	350.3	394.9	351.2	287.4	281.8	281.3	56
Jamaica	224.5	221.0	223.4	243.5	244.1	222.6	237.3	227.4	190.8	220.6	248.9	51
Other countries	6 274.4	6 228.6	6 230.0	6 379.7	6 384.4	6 379.0	6 401.8	6 268.1	5 975.7	5 895.8	6 296.7	..
Total	21 359.1	21 127.6	21 325.1	22 236.2	22 824.2	22 758.7	22 941.9	22 518.8	21 433.7	22 164.7	23 825.2	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/57h8jf>

Metadata related to Tables A.5 and B.5. Stocks of foreign population

Country	Comments	Source
Austria	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	From 2011 on, includes foreigners who have lived in Belgium for a continuous period of at least 12 months and persons who arrived in Belgium less than 12 months before the reference time with the intention of staying there for at least one year; also includes asylum seekers. Up to 2010, includes foreigners whose main place of residence is in Belgium and who are registered in a municipality (aliens' register or register of aliens with a privileged status or register of European Union officials) so excludes asylum seekers, persons who have been residing in the Belgian territory for less than three months or are in an irregular situation. The series include breaks in 2011 and in 2012, and data for the year 2019 are provisional. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Eurostat.
Canada	2016 and 2021 Censuses.	Statistics Canada.
Chile	2017 Census. Estimates for the total and for selected countries for other years.	Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
Czech Republic	Numbers of foreigners residing in the country on the basis of permanent or temporary residence permits (i.e. long-term visa, long-term residence permit or temporary residence permit of EU nationals). Reference date: 1 January.	Ministry of the Interior, Directorate of Alien Police.
Denmark	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Excludes asylum seekers and all persons with temporary residence permits. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Ministry of the Interior.
Finland	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France	Foreigners with permanent residence in France. Includes trainees, students and illegal migrants who accept to be interviewed. Excludes seasonal and cross-border workers. Totals in A5 up to 2019 are from INSEE, for 2020 to 2022, they are estimated using Eurostat data. In B5 table, from 2011 onwards: Eurostat. Includes the département of Mayotte from 2014.	Censuses, National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
Germany	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes all foreigners regardless of their housing situation (private or non-private dwelling). Excludes ethnic Germans (<i>Aussiedler</i>). Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece	Estimated population by group of citizenship. Reference date: 1 January.	Hellenic Statistical authority.
Hungary	Foreigners having a residence or a settlement document. From 2010 on, includes third-country nationals holding a temporary residence permit (for a year or more). From 2012 on, includes refugees and persons under subsidiary protection. Data for 2011 were adjusted to match the October census results. Reference date: 1 January.	Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Data are from the National Register of Persons. It is to be expected that figures are overestimates. Reference date: 1 January.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Census data for 2016 and 2022. Other years: Annual population estimates - Estimated population.	Central Statistics Office (CSO).
Italy	Data refer to resident foreigners (registered in municipal registry offices). Excludes children under 18 who are registered on their parents' permit. Includes foreigners who were regularised following the 2009 programme. From 2019 on, the data takes into account the results of the permanent population census. Reference date: 1 January.	National Statistical Institute (ISTAT).
Japan	Foreigners staying in Japan for the mid- to long-term with a resident status under the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. Reference date: 1 January.	Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.

Country	Comments	Source
Korea	Registered foreigners, Ethnic Koreans (F-4) visa holders and foreigners who stayed for more than 90 days with a short-term visa	Ministry of Justice and Korean Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
Latvia	Population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.
Lithuania	<i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in population register. Excludes visitors (staying for less than 3 months) and cross-border workers. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico	Number of foreigners who hold a valid permit for permanent or temporary residence. Data until 2013 are estimates under the terms of the 1974 Act; they include immigrants FM2 "inmigrante" and "inmigrado" (both categories refer to permanent residence) and non-immigrants FM3 with specific categories (temporary residence). Data from 2015 are estimates under the terms of the 2011 Migration Act.	National Migration Institute, Unit for Migration Policy, Ministry of Interior.
Netherlands	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Figures include administrative corrections and asylum seekers (except those staying in reception centres). Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
Norway	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. It excludes visitors (staying for less than six months) and cross-border workers. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland		Central Population Register, Central Statistical Office.
Portugal	Figures include holders of a valid residence permit and holders of a renewed long-term visa.	Immigration and Border Control Office (SEF); National Statistical Institute (INE).
Slovak Republic	Holders of a permanent or long-term residence permit.	Register of Foreigners, Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia	Number of valid residence permits, regardless of the administrative status of the foreign national. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Ministry of the Interior.
Spain	All foreign citizens in the Municipal Registers irrespective of their legal status. Reference date: 1 January.	Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	Stock of all those with residence or settlement permits (permits B and C, respectively). Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months. Does not include seasonal or cross-border workers. Reference date: 1 January.	Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
Türkiye	Reference date: 1 January.	Turkish Statistical Institute.
United Kingdom	Foreign residents. Those with unknown nationality from the New Commonwealth are not included (around 10 000 to 15 000 persons). Reference date: 1 January.	Labour Force Survey, Home Office.
United States	Foreigners born abroad.	Current Population Survey, Census Bureau.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

Acquisitions of nationality

Nationality law can have a significant impact on the measurement of the national and foreign populations. In France and Belgium, for example, where foreigners can fairly easily acquire the nationality of the country, increases in the foreign population through immigration and births can eventually contribute to a significant rise in the population of nationals. On the other hand, in countries where naturalisation is more difficult, increases in immigration and births among foreigners manifest themselves almost exclusively as growth in the foreign population. In addition, changes in rules regarding naturalisation can have significant impact. For example, during the 1980s, a number of OECD countries made naturalisation easier and this resulted in noticeable falls in the foreign population (and rises in the population of nationals).

However, host-country legislation is not the only factor affecting naturalisation. For example, where naturalisation involves forfeiting citizenship of the country of origin, there may be incentives to remain a foreign citizen. Where the difference between remaining a foreign citizen and becoming a national is marginal, naturalisation may largely be influenced by the time and effort required to make the application, and the symbolic and political value individuals attach to being citizens of one country or another.

Data on naturalisations are usually readily available from administrative sources. The statistics generally cover all means of acquiring the nationality of a country. These include standard naturalisation procedures subject to criteria such as age or residency, etc., as well as situations where nationality is acquired through a declaration or by option (following marriage, adoption or other situations related to residency or descent), recovery of former nationality and other special means of acquiring the nationality of the country.

Table A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries

Numbers and percentages

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Australia	95 235	83 698	123 438	162 002	135 596	133 126	137 750	80 562	127 674	204 817	140 748
% of foreign population
Austria	6 690	7 043	7 354	7 570	8 144	8 530	9 271	9 450	10 606	8 996	16 171
% of foreign population	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	1.1
Belgium	29 786	38 612	34 801	18 726	27 071	31 935	37 399	36 200	40 594	33 915	39 233
% of foreign population	2.8	3.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.4	2.7
Canada	179 451	111 923	127 470	259 274	251 144	147 267	105 813	176 487	250 498	110 835	135 241
% of foreign population	..	5.7	4.4	6.9	9.2	3.9	4.5
Chile	1 030	1 226	678	1 048	691	792	2 991	1 801	354	504	2 985
% of foreign population	0.2	0.2
Costa Rica	3 415	4 400	3 050	2 018	3 791	5 562	5 875	5 831	5 808	4 070	3 572
% of foreign population
Czech Republic	1 936	2 036	2 514	5 114	4 925	5 536	6 440	5 260	4 456	4 214	6 205
% of foreign population	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.7	1.0
Denmark	3 911	3 489	1 750	4 747	11 745	15 028	7 272	2 836	1 781	7 076	6 483
% of foreign population	1.2	1.0	0.5	1.3	3.0	3.6	1.6	0.6	0.4	1.3	1.2
Estonia	1 518	1 340	1 330	1 614	897	1 775	882	766	779	770	1 034
% of foreign population	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5
Finland	4 558	9 087	8 930	8 260	7 921	9 375	12 219	9 211	9 649	7 816	6 643
% of foreign population	2.9	5.4	4.9	4.2	3.8	4.3	5.3	3.8	3.9	3.0	2.5
France	114 569	96 050	97 276	105 613	113 608	119 152	114 274	110 014	109 821	84 864	130 385
% of foreign population	3.0	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.3	1.7	2.5
Germany	106 897	112 348	112 353	108 422	107 317	110 383	112 211	112 340	128 905	109 880	131 595
% of foreign population	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.2
Greece	17 533	20 302	29 462	21 829	12 837	32 819	34 305	27 857	16 328	13 272	10 120
% of foreign population	1.9	2.2	3.2	2.5	1.5	4.0	4.3	3.4	2.0	1.6	1.1
Hungary	20 554	18 379	9 178	8 745	4 048	4 315	2 787	3 508	3 255	2 139	2 511
% of foreign population	10.4	8.9	6.4	6.2	2.9	3.0	1.8	2.3	2.0	1.2	1.3
Iceland	370	413	597	595	801	703	637	569	437	395	905
% of foreign population	1.7	2.0	2.8	2.8	3.5	2.9	2.4	1.9	1.2	0.9	1.8
Ireland	10 749	25 039	24 263	21 090	13 565	10 044	8 195	8 223	5 791	5 475	9 778
% of foreign population	1.9	4.2	4.0	3.5	2.2	1.7	1.3	1.5	1.0	0.9	1.5
Italy	56 153	65 383	100 712	129 887	178 035	201 591	146 605	112 523	127 001	131 803	121 457
% of foreign population	1.5	1.7	2.5	3.0	3.6	4.0	2.9	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.4
Japan	10 359	10 622	8 646	9 277	9 469	9 554	10 315	9 074	8 453	9 079	8 167
% of foreign population	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3
Korea	19 570	12 527	13 956	14 200	13 934	12 854	13 293	14 758	12 875	16 065	14 057
% of foreign population	1.7	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.7
Latvia	2 467	3 784	3 083	2 141	1 897	1 957	962	930	808	725	419
% of foreign population	0.7	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Lithuania	311	183	173	179	177	173	166	196	123	176	236
% of foreign population	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.4
Luxembourg	3 405	4 680	4 411	4 991	5 306	7 140	9 030	11 864	11 450	9 387	6 801
% of foreign population	1.6	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.8	3.4	4.2	4.0	3.2	2.3
Mexico	2 633	3 590	3 581	2 341	2 736	2 940	3 067	3 872	3 070
% of foreign population	0.9	1.2	1.2	..	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.7
Netherlands	28 598	30 955	25 882	32 578	27 877	28 534	27 663	27 851	34 191	55 943	62 959
% of foreign population	3.9	4.1	3.3	4.1	3.4	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.3	5.0	5.3
New Zealand	19 232	27 155	27 828	27 894	27 583	31 956	36 447	35 735	31 029	22 756	18 159

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
% of foreign population
Norway	14 286	12 384	13 223	15 336	12 432	13 712	21 648	10 361	13 201	19 698	41 092
% of foreign population	4.4	3.4	3.2	3.4	2.6	2.7	4.0	1.9	2.3	3.4	6.8
Poland	2 325	3 792	3 462	4 518	4 048	4 086	4 259	4 593	12 917	7 159	7 537
% of foreign population	3.1	4.8	4.0	4.8	4.0	3.8	2.8	2.2	5.4	2.5	2.1
Portugal	23 238	21 819	24 476	21 124	20 396	25 104	18 022	21 333	21 099	32 147	24 516
% of foreign population	5.1	4.9	5.6	5.1	5.1	6.4	4.6	5.4	5.0	6.7	4.2
Slovak Republic	272	255	207	234	309	484	645	721	586	548	592
% of foreign population	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7
Slovenia	1 775	1 490	1 470	1 057	1 255	1 297	1 563	1 978	1 911	1 725	1 782
% of foreign population	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.1
Spain	114 599	115 557	225 793	205 880	114 351	150 944	66 498	90 774	98 954	126 266	144 012
% of foreign population	2.1	2.2	4.3	4.1	2.4	3.4	1.5	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.8
Sweden	36 328	49 746	49 632	42 918	48 249	60 343	68 898	63 818	64 206	80 175	89 354
% of foreign population	6.0	7.9	7.6	6.4	6.9	8.2	8.8	7.5	7.2	8.6	9.5
Switzerland	36 757	34 121	34 332	33 325	40 888	41 587	44 515	42 630	40 277	34 062	37 129
% of foreign population	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.6	1.8
Türkiye	9 216
% of foreign population	5.5
United Kingdom	177 866	194 288	208 021	125 715	118 054	149 378	123 207	157 011	159 356	130 568	159 954
% of foreign population	3.9	4.1	4.3	2.5	2.3	2.7	2.1	2.6	2.7	2.1	2.6
United States	694 193	757 434	779 929	653 416	730 259	753 060	707 265	761 901	843 593	628 254	813 861
% of foreign population	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.0	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.8	2.9	4.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.6.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/gbsh6m>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Australia

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	12 948	10 076	19 217	27 827	24 236	21 989	24 181	17 716	28 470	38 209	24 205	49
United Kingdom	19 101	16 401	20 478	25 884	20 583	20 949	21 069	13 875	13 366	25 018	17 374	52
Philippines	4 051	5 592	9 090	11 628	8 996	8 333	9 112	4 921	9 267	12 838	8 788	39
China	8 898	6 876	8 979	10 613	8 610	7 999	7 580	1 990	8 966	17 008	7 383	44
New Zealand	4 304	3 458	3 794	5 361	4 091	4 390	3 593	1 840	3 027	5 367	5 643	53
Pakistan	1 057	990	2 100	2 739	2 341	3 077	4 480	919	3 360	8 821	5 615	53
Viet Nam	1 688	1 929	2 568	3 514	3 835	4 173	3 859	1 216	3 501	6 804	4 942	38
South Africa	4 389	4 206	7 900	9 286	6 211	5 629	4 906	3 370	2 680	5 438	3 854	50
Iraq	875	1 103	2 739	3 150	2 054	1 417	1 930	788	3 087	3 883	3 808	49
Afghanistan	941	889	1 253	2 620	2 103	991	1 102	387	620	5 102	3 674	52
Sri Lanka	2 520	1 671	2 746	3 957	3 179	3 752	4 487	3 262	4 861	6 195	2 888	49
Iran	779	1 024	1 657	2 155	2 198	2 416	3 182	1 108	2 770	4 634	2 580	51
Syria	138	140	171	207	196	185	281	78	290	1 351	2 524	49
Ireland	1 302	1 145	1 796	2 843	3 092	3 943	4 286	2 670	2 991	4 301	2 513	54
Nepal	520	589	1 384	1 810	2 401	2 959	2 402	1 665	3 294	3 676	2 232	49
Other countries	31 724	27 609	37 566	48 408	41 470	40 924	41 300	24 757	37 124	56 172	42 725	
Total	95 235	83 698	123 438	162 002	135 596	133 126	137 750	80 562	127 674	204 817	140 748	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Austria

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Israel	6	14	14	24	25	3	20	13	26	67	2 635	45
United States	15	20	21	34	24	18	22	19	18	50	1 659	46
United Kingdom	3	3	4	3	8	9	21	40	91	125	1 190	45
Türkiye	1 178	1 198	1 108	885	997	818	778	828	911	847	1 101	49
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 174	1 131	1 039	1 120	1 216	1 261	1 288	1 032	1 183	967	921	57
Serbia	1 090	709	823	671	633	751	557	625	1 008	943	785	61
Afghanistan	157	179	28	232	187	332	424	328	372	298	545	40
Syria	61	53	83	95	79	134	98	103	164	211	543	35
Russia	296	316	427	431	298	337	323	373	463	355	472	61
Iran	138	168	18	159	182	226	217	306	325	355	389	50
Romania	223	275	224	244	221	257	291	456	376	301	315	69
North Macedonia	182	163	182	210	224	297	296	453	313	250	278	58
Germany	117	110	127	187	148	182	234	265	239	227	273	52
Ukraine	106	99	134	136	298	225	181	220	360	184	262	71
Hungary	66	71	83	111	119	154	227	258	236	221	259	62
Other countries	1 878	2 534	3 039	3 028	3 485	3 526	4 294	4 131	4 521	3 595	4 544	
Total	6 690	7 043	7 354	7 570	8 144	8 530	9 271	9 450	10 606	8 996	16 171	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Belgium

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Morocco	7 035	7 879	5 926	2 408	3 170	3 996	5 084	4 856	4 975	3 756	3 698	51
Syria	186	246	205	92	185	253	243	474	979	1 431	3 385	36
Romania	356	777	1 155	824	1 192	1 535	2 031	2 219	2 409	2 079	1 968	52
Iraq	184	397	612	377	546	655	930	672	759	888	1 891	33
Afghanistan	174	260	283	194	326	534	875	1 067	1 418	1 464	1 460	30
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	1 158	1 936	1 526	713	1 061	1 016	1 201	1 191	1 359	1 178	1 240	57
Italy	3 697	3 203	1 856	1 199	1 067	1 048	1 174	1 352	1 589	1 217	1 229	49
Cameroon	600	924	915	546	738	845	872	955	1 046	945	1 196	57
Poland	394	729	888	742	1 136	1 243	1 498	1 528	1 710	1 096	1 064	61
Netherlands	495	961	1 272	705	993	1 390	1 368	1 064	1 296	939	1 040	48
France	638	903	973	586	647	673	795	869	952	862	1 038	48
United Kingdom	114	99	141	110	127	506	1 381	1 045	1 630	868	1 010	47
Türkiye	2 359	2 517	1 857	691	843	989	1 061	985	1 073	882	911	43
Russia	1 032	1 439	1 525	641	950	1 029	973	896	1 059	835	798	62
Guinea	228	757	941	416	635	681	972	855	832	711	790	56
Other countries	11 136	15 585	14 726	8 482	13 455	15 542	16 941	16 172	17 508	14 764	16 515	
Total	29 786	38 612	34 801	18 726	27 071	31 935	37 399	36 200	40 594	33 915	39 233	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Canada

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	22 043	13 319	15 246	26 320	28 048	16 601	9 978	19 486	31 337	15 418	20 752	..
Philippines	15 902	10 392	14 583	27 416	31 729	23 875	14 050	19 647	33 922	15 991	18 131	..
Syria	763	481	412	1 084	1 252	657	587	1 597	6 434	7 179	9 639	..
China	16 562	11 146	10 729	22 914	21 303	11 338	6 284	10 484	14 559	5 120	5 730	..
Pakistan	9 812	5 526	5 197	8 988	8 628	5 779	5 089	9 406	11 187	4 740	5 520	..
Iran	4 923	3 506	3 337	9 357	8 959	3 927	3 523	10 037	14 041	4 887	4 834	..
United States	5 010	3 797	4 424	7 249	6 627	4 405	3 283	4 229	5 623	2 479	3 423	..
Nigeria	2 184	1 238	1 318	2 978	4 210	2 158	1 883	4 398	5 021	2 285	3 260	..
United Kingdom	5 971	4 298	4 721	7 293	6 255	4 158	3 005	3 515	4 844	2 020	3 021	..
France	2 702	1 441	2 089	5 755	4 590	2 252	2 112	3 836	5 502	2 316	2 720	..
Iraq	1 581	1 298	2 359	4 556	5 175	2 983	2 238	3 951	5 056	2 003	2 185	..
Ukraine	2 186	1 326	1 588	3 200	3 088	1 754	1 209	2 356	3 056	1 366	1 906	..
Egypt	1 458	990	1 135	3 471	4 729	2 392	2 284	4 115	4 109	1 505	1 860	..
Jamaica	2 321	1 537	1 755	2 582	1 905	1 574	1 082	1 721	2 736	1 420	1 751	..
Mexico	2 392	1 423	1 599	3 558	3 477	2 079	1 505	2 433	3 770	1 536	1 711	..
Other countries	83 641	50 205	56 978	122 553	111 169	61 335	47 701	75 276	99 301	40 722	50 676	
Total	179 451	111 923	127 470	259 274	251 144	147 267	105 813	176 487	250 498	110 987	137 119	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Chile

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Colombia	98	149	105	168	121	121	597	155	68	108	..	59
Peru	241	307	153	236	142	167	944	223	74	87	..	71
Ecuador	116	174	95	127	83	95	272	268	53	64	..	55
Venezuela	26	21	8	23	24	42	93	143	25	56	..	59
Bolivia	135	119	58	92	54	63	224	241	29	31	..	61
Dominican Republic	4	17	2	14	10	15	103	42	20	30	..	57
Cuba	158	159	88	115	85	69	183	178	12	18	..	61
Argentina	26	33	21	31	27	28	67	69	14	15	..	47
Haiti	2	1	1	6	4	14	43	86	3	11	..	27
Spain	5	14	8	17	8	6	34	24	6	8	..	25
Russia	8	14	4	6	7	4	28	30	3	7	..	86
Brazil	7	9	5	6	6	8	25	20	3	6	..	33
India	23	15	8	23	12	18	48	25	7	5	..	20
Mexico	6	4	3	7	1	5	11	19	1	4	..	75
Türkiye	2	4	1	6	2	3	7	11	2	3	..	33
Other countries	173	186	118	171	105	134	312	267	34	51	..	
Total	1 030	1 226	678	1 048	691	792	2 991	1 801	354	504	2 985	58

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Costa Rica

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Nicaragua	1 351	1 945	1 455	1 043	1 971	3 010	3 576	3 617	3 690	2 811	2 447	..
Colombia	795	936	610	394	667	757	658	594	457	242	259	..
Venezuela	40	53	53	25	54	136	191	286	448	263	231	..
El Salvador	99	144	93	73	160	196	274	246	234	148	105	..
Honduras	29	58	38	27	57	107	94	111	101	61	56	..
United States	135	158	119	70	146	182	153	142	108	74	49	..
Dominican Republic	139	149	89	46	65	182	113	125	94	43	44	..
Panama	53	95	61	39	61	118	86	87	70	39	34	..
Cuba	179	204	108	52	80	113	104	107	78	64	34	..
Guatemala	19	42	38	17	43	43	32	59	57	28	34	..
Peru	123	133	111	46	77	134	87	69	64	59	26	..
Chile	14	18	7	3	8	13	22	22	32	10	23	..
Spain	11	14	18	5	15	40	43	42	39	27	23	..
Mexico	33	58	32	22	25	44	28	45	59	20	20	..
Ecuador	27	29	16	16	26	26	35	38	31	11	17	..
Other countries	368	364	202	140	336	461	379	241	246	170	170	
Total	3 415	4 400	3 050	2 018	3 791	5 562	5 875	5 831	5 808	4 070	3 572	56

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Czech Republic

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Ukraine	501	518	948	2 075	1 044	1 429	1 891	1 319	1 002	940	1 484	..
Russia	68	173	162	463	305	563	752	633	574	516	921	..
Slovak Republic	378	331	270	574	111	372	630	501	421	365	587	..
Viet Nam	86	80	166	298	271	405	223	231	129	89	174	..
Belarus	38	49	53	137	94	135	215	139	107	115	139	..
Moldova	32	25	41	175	55	93	138	118	92	58	88	..
Kazakhstan	48	30	65	122	48	50	64	53	41	60	87	..
Poland	198	180	176	105	34	96	110	60	58	54	78	..
Bulgaria	28	19	27	52	51	65	87	53	30	31	46	..
Romania	76	70	30	311	111	115	108	82	69	33	44	..
Serbia	57	65	66	90	57	38	47	42	..
Syria	8	19	23	28	18	29	10	10	8	8	33	..
North Macedonia	9	6	14	20	23	28	47	31	22	15	32	..
Armenia	47	74	46	144	49	35	41	19	30	33	31	..
Croatia	8	12	5	20	38	20	30	22	25	11	28	..
Other countries	411	450	488	533	2 608	2 035	2 004	1 932	1 810	1 839	2 391	..
Total	1 936	2 036	2 514	5 114	4 925	5 536	6 440	5 260	4 456	4 214	6 205	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Denmark

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
United Kingdom	26	21	17	21	20	85	164	143	118	692	546	42
Pakistan	73	89	77	38	191	641	199	82	43	630	470	36
Ukraine	35	44	32	10	72	228	329	73	79	362	380	54
Germany	55	80	41	27	38	110	248	168	129	375	290	58
India	27	27	9	34	31	211	85	48	45	241	269	40
Poland	33	41	39	29	45	174	372	122	78	384	232	62
Türkiye	227	300	166	150	193	977	353	113	71	192	214	52
Romania	18	34	23	8	43	101	164	49	38	197	202	67
United States	12	11	15	6	23	110	248	114	54	254	191	48
Afghanistan	576	463	151	917	408	1 621	297	67	62	164	176	40
Russia	55	85	62	31	76	232	330	110	62	209	170	74
Stateless	205	109	46	161	130	415	274	92	14	353	166	49
Iraq	838	730	356	1 588	1 131	2 917	357	96	82	195	158	49
Thailand	57	52	29	54	14	142	273	72	38	126	149	73
Bosnia and Herzegovina	110	82	39	59	96	493	374	94	53	164	141	50
Other countries	1 564	1 321	648	1 614	9 234	6 571	3 205	1 393	815	2 538	2 729	..
Total	3 911	3 489	1 750	4 747	11 745	15 028	7 272	2 836	1 781	7 076	6 483	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24ji7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Estonia

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Stateless	1 341	1 123	1 129	1 360	737	1 452	590	497	483	501	640	55
Russia	156	174	169	204	132	244	225	199	230	198	298	54
Ukraine	10	24	18	30	19	29	30	26	33	19	34	74
Latvia	1	1	1	3	1	8	2	7	1	5	10	90
Belarus	1	5	2	3	..	5	6	6	4	5	7	43
Armenia	..	1	1	12	4	6	1	8	5	80
Bangladesh	1	..	2	4	25
India	..	5	1	2	..	3	2	2	1	3	4	0
Lithuania	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	6	4	75
Georgia	1	2	1	1	..	3	3	1	5	1	3	33
Türkiye	1	1	2	1	2	5	3	3	0
Venezuela	3	33
Iraq	1	..	1	2	50
Uzbekistan	..	1	1	2	50
Italy	1	..	1	..	2	50
Other countries	6	3	8	9	5	14	15	19	14	20	13	
Total	1 518	1 340	1 330	1 614	897	1 775	882	766	779	770	1 034	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Finland

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Russia	1 652	2 477	2 103	2 317	1 728	2 028	2 758	1 766	1 946	1 546	1 161	64
Iraq	106	457	521	405	560	534	742	621	589	602	744	31
Somalia	96	609	814	834	955	1 066	957	856	583	541	436	49
Estonia	302	521	436	382	420	459	705	541	658	516	370	54
Syria	23	20	22	16	28	47	118	118	299	205	360	43
Sweden	196	190	146	186	165	206	212	210	248	196	282	43
Afghanistan	100	510	479	251	242	376	469	339	309	264	227	41
Thailand	50	75	104	125	150	193	261	249	281	304	209	89
Ukraine	95	148	157	141	145	163	281	202	255	220	171	54
Iran	145	451	341	219	140	222	309	244	205	156	155	48
Viet Nam	82	150	150	114	146	225	249	197	221	148	140	71
Türkiye	166	278	271	257	229	264	313	210	260	172	125	35
Nepal	33	45	53	48	74	123	178	125	132	119	106	64
India	76	117	99	152	137	193	245	154	174	181	105	54
Philippines	35	48	77	67	79	106	141	182	225	124	97	66
Other countries	1 401	2 991	3 157	2 746	2 723	3 170	4 281	3 197	3 264	2 522	1 955	
Total	4 558	9 087	8 930	8 260	7 921	9 375	12 219	9 211	9 649	7 816	6 643	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – France

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Morocco	22 612	18 325	16 662	18 051	19 110	17 769	16 687	15 390	15 776	12 759	18 905	49
Algeria	15 527	12 991	13 408	15 142	17 377	17 662	16 283	14 867	14 785	11 072	15 228	49
Tunisia	6 828	5 546	5 569	6 274	7 018	7 663	7 045	6 687	6 640	5 346	8 710	47
Türkiye	8 277	6 920	5 873	5 835	5 595	5 757	5 332	5 101	5 198	3 982	5 543	50
Congo	2 018	1 326	1 808	1 797	2 089	2 181	2 967	2 935	2 994	2 248	4 282	55
Mali	2 616	2 201	2 645	3 345	3 621	4 111	4 057	3 662	3 638	2 666	4 029	46
Côte d'Ivoire	2 257	1 766	2 513	3 055	3 188	3 652	3 363	3 012	2 863	2 399	3 887	54
Cameroon	2 425	1 926	2 579	3 010	3 125	3 377	3 137	2 502	2 463	2 108	3 841	59
Senegal	3 168	2 755	2 823	3 048	3 382	3 369	3 249	2 949	2 940	2 224	3 569	48
Haiti	2 204	1 799	2 121	2 181	2 228	2 922	2 574	2 496	2 603	2 059	2 870	54
Russia	3 390	2 203	2 517	3 040	2 654	4 094	3 550	2 011	2 414	1 775	2 775	68
Guinea	1 270	974	1 208	1 457	1 678	1 820	1 995	1 828	1 878	1 545	2 760	44
Romania	1 233	1 268	1 409	1 486	1 557	1 695	1 882	1 956	1 896	1 522	2 598	58
Comoros	1 828	1 778	2 307	2 175	1 881	2 869	2 917	3 903	2 613	1 834	2 510	49
Madagascar	1 643	1 748	1 470	1 621	1 734	1 728	1 624	1 697	1 639	1 199	1 756	65
Other countries	37 273	32 524	32 364	34 096	37 371	38 483	37 612	39 018	39 481	30 126	47 122	
Total	114 569	96 050	97 276	105 613	113 608	119 152	114 274	110 014	109 821	84 864	130 385	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Germany

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Syria	1 454	1 321	1 508	1 820	2 027	2 263	2 479	2 880	3 860	6 700	19 095	34
Türkiye	28 103	33 246	27 970	22 463	19 695	16 290	14 984	16 700	16 235	11 630	12 245	49
Romania	2 399	2 343	2 504	2 566	3 001	3 828	4 238	4 325	5 830	5 930	6 920	58
Poland	4 281	4 496	5 462	5 932	5 957	6 632	6 613	6 220	6 020	5 000	5 490	68
Italy	1 707	2 202	2 754	3 245	3 406	3 597	4 256	4 050	4 475	4 075	5 045	48
United Kingdom	284	325	460	515	622	2 865	7 493	6 640	14 600	4 930	4 570	43
Iraq	4 790	3 510	3 150	3 172	3 450	3 553	3 480	4 080	4 645	4 770	4 420	44
Iran	2 728	2 463	2 560	2 546	2 533	2 661	2 689	3 080	3 805	3 965	4 020	49
Greece	2 290	4 167	3 498	2 800	3 058	3 444	3 424	3 235	3 130	2 650	3 220	48
Afghanistan	2 711	2 717	3 054	3 000	2 572	2 482	2 400	2 545	2 675	2 880	3 175	40
India	865	946	1 190	1 295	1 343	1 549	1 619	1 760	2 130	2 235	2 515	43
United States	869	756	994	919	816	1 086	979	745	1 205	935	2 505	50
Israel	1 971	1 438	1 904	1 432	1 481	1 428	1 080	680	1 000	1 025	2 485	45
Bulgaria	1 540	1 691	1 790	1 718	1 619	1 676	1 739	1 830	1 990	2 040	2 260	60
Serbia	2 878	2 611	2 586	2 223	1 941	2 596	1 950	2 475	3 115	2 765	2 225	53
Other countries	48 027	48 116	50 969	52 776	53 796	54 433	52 788	51 095	54 190	48 350	51 405	
Total	106 897	112 348	112 353	108 422	107 317	110 383	112 211	112 340	128 905	109 880	131 595	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Greece

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Albania	15 452	17 396	25 830	18 409	10 665	28 251	29 769	24 203	14 050	10 795	7 736	48
United Kingdom	15	29	41	43	43	31	58	52	30	118	264	65
Romania	56	76	129	156	136	234	306	291	205	273	219	68
Russia	..	1	2	309	289	386	345	353	184	186	195	72
Ukraine	130	235	246	231	188	504	449	388	171	223	183	75
Bulgaria	101	75	192	200	142	287	329	220	136	230	181	71
India	35	122	16	18	18	255	278	245	190	171	131	40
Georgia	252	152	359	226	189	331	323	300	207	148	129	60
Armenia	150	210	189	150	109	296	287	240	154	82	107	59
Moldova	91	131	159	124	114	365	378	241	137	115	104	75
Poland	25	27	52	33	46	66	89	78	51	48	81	79
Türkiye	49	70	167	151	139	141	107	106	63	84	73	45
Cyprus	46	41	118	93	73	95	76	38	46	61	60	65
Egypt	65	332	58	57	45	358	283	144	114	78	56	36
United States	83	84	126	65	62	52	48	51	20	46	51	35
Other countries	983	1 321	1 778	1 564	579	1 167	1 180	907	570	614	550	
Total	17 533	20 302	29 462	21 829	12 837	32 819	34 305	27 857	16 328	13 272	10 120	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Hungary

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Romania	15 658	14 392	6 999	6 200	2 605	2 874	1 757	2 123	1 822	1 058	1 319	43
Slovak Republic	414	307	202	310	208	282	136	223	260	234	298	63
Egypt	2	6	9	81	93	101	119	191	103	124	105	39
Venezuela	1	1	2	3	1	0	2	46	129	97	93	53
Ukraine	2 189	1 765	894	858	386	365	186	192	142	82	75	69
Russia	168	151	97	170	131	119	75	89	93	74	61	79
Germany	55	67	35	59	29	15	38	50	59	45	60	55
Serbia	1 678	1 330	647	410	158	144	93	105	88	52	59	47
United Kingdom	6	8	7	4	3	11	14	22	52	35	53	28
Viet Nam	38	29	15	67	39	36	46	87	100	62	36	64
Bulgaria	9	7	6	5	3	3	8	29	3	6	24	71
Türkiye	12	8	20	58	19	20	23	20	26	18	23	22
Poland	27	18	11	45	15	18	22	19	21	11	21	86
United States	17	13	9	25	13	17	10	17	25	25	18	39
Syria	7	11	10	57	21	11	21	15	13	5	16	31
Other countries	273	266	215	393	324	299	237	280	319	211	250	
Total	20 554	18 379	9 178	8 745	4 048	4 315	2 787	3 508	3 255	2 139	2 511	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Iceland

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Poland	35	30	89	149	265	224	223	149	131	134	190	53
Viet Nam	14	8	39	33	33	26	22	27	30	18	87	60
Philippines	35	49	89	52	74	55	41	20	27	13	46	63
Thailand	27	26	26	43	42	48	34	37	19	19	45	73
United States	11	12	13	14	18	11	17	28	12	9	34	68
Ukraine	10	21	18	12	17	12	11	7	11	8	31	65
Lithuania	8	6	7	16	10	16	15	13	4	15	30	40
Latvia	1	4	18	4	21	22	24	19	16	11	30	70
United Kingdom	7	3	2	1	3	2	5	6	8	9	26	42
Syria	0	1	0	1	3	8	3	57	4	1	23	39
Denmark	6	1	0	5	11	35	22	9	9	6	22	64
Sweden	6	11	3	6	11	17	10	15	5	12	18	83
Romania	2	12	7	10	24	5	4	3	11	2	16	50
Algeria	0	0	2	2	3	1	1	1	0	1	15	53
Russia	12	21	18	13	25	14	20	10	11	7	14	71
Other countries	196	208	266	234	241	207	185	168	139	130	278	
Total	370	413	597	595	801	703	637	569	437	395	905	56

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24ji7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Ireland

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
United Kingdom	68	84	55	51	54	98	529	687	665	945	1 186	48
Poland	25	359	508	939	1 161	1 326	1 357	1 464	925	758	819	51
India	944	2 617	3 009	2 939	1 611	1 028	665	629	515	465	746	37
Nigeria	1 204	5 689	5 792	3 293	1 360	776	509	478	305	227	743	43
Romania	135	457	564	1 029	901	756	763	819	552	538	720	46
Pakistan	428	1 288	1 807	1 244	732	419	341	364	125	136	611	37
Brazil	86	203	245	459	393	304	264	220	188	180	334	57
China	403	798	656	576	494	304	225	234	162	129	293	47
Latvia	19	98	150	226	327	379	392	308	221	146	240	56
Philippines	1 755	3 830	2 486	2 184	1 167	729	362	320	191	157	217	56
United States	148	263	217	304	246	233	177	195	154	132	199	59
South Africa	418	708	489	563	0	213	140	143	97	85	176	49
Syria	10	34	53	55	26	31	24	28	21	35	152	43
Ukraine	432	815	695	536	323	200	130	99	87	62	148	52
Bangladesh	700	566	404	222	141	111	79	81	58	41	146	31
Other countries	3 974	7 230	7 133	6 470	4 629	3 137	2 238	2 154	1 525	1 439	3 048	
Total	10 749	25 039	24 263	21 090	13 565	10 044	8 195	8 223	5 791	5 475	9 778	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Italy

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Albania	8 101	9 493	13 671	21 148	35 134	36 920	27 112	21 841	26 033	28 107	22 493	49
Morocco	10 732	14 728	25 421	29 025	32 448	35 212	22 645	15 496	15 812	18 024	16 588	49
Romania	3 921	3 272	4 386	6 442	14 403	12 967	8 042	6 542	10 201	11 449	9 435	59
Brazil	1 960	1 442	1 786	1 579	1 458	5 799	9 936	10 660	10 762	7 149	5 460	53
Bangladesh	972	1 460	3 511	5 323	5 953	8 442	4 411	1 873	1 541	5 661	5 116	38
India	1 051	2 366	4 863	5 015	6 176	9 527	8 200	5 425	4 683	5 602	4 489	44
Pakistan	601	1 522	3 532	4 216	5 617	7 678	6 170	1 974	2 722	5 629	4 410	39
Argentina	569	332	362	331	404	753	956	1 348	2 304	1 717	3 669	48
Moldova	846	1 222	1 430	1 475	2 464	5 605	3 827	3 068	3 788	4 340	3 633	63
Egypt	2 352	1 342	2 130	3 138	4 422	3 438	1 477	1 122	1 245	2 791	3 531	39
Ecuador	599	677	854	1 182	2 660	4 604	3 426	2 306	3 041	2 579	3 362	58
Tunisia	2 067	2 555	3 521	4 411	5 585	4 882	3 187	2 484	2 471	2 718	3 036	46
Senegal	797	1 070	2 263	4 037	4 144	5 091	4 489	2 918	2 869	4 005	2 881	36
Peru	1 726	1 589	2 055	3 136	5 503	5 783	3 689	2 421	2 685	2 553	2 748	62
North Macedonia	1 141	1 219	2 089	2 847	5 455	6 771	3 845	3 487	4 966	3 230	2 718	46
Other countries	18 718	21 094	28 838	36 582	46 209	48 119	35 193	29 558	31 878	26 249	27 888	
Total	56 153	65 383	100 712	129 887	178 035	201 591	146 605	112 523	127 001	131 803	121 457	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Japan

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Korea	5 656	5 581	4 331	4 744	5 247	5 434	5 631	4 357	4 360	4 113	3 564	..
China	3 259	3 598	2 845	3 060	2 813	2 626	3 088	3 025	2 374	2 881	2 526	..
Brazil	383	409	444	..
Viet Nam	264	301	269	..
Philippines	235	301	237	..
Peru	168	172	175	..
Bangladesh	81	125	129	..
Nepal	100	108	..
Sri Lanka	46	55	77	..
India	66	66	..
Other countries	1 588	1 444	1 443	1 470	1 473	1 409	1 494	1 596	1 692	542	556	
Total	13 072	10 359	10 622	8 646	9 277	9 469	9 554	10 315	9 074	8 453	9 079	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Korea

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
China	11 726	6 282	5 805	7 056	6 755	5 331	5 097	5 092	4 620	8 122	5 398	..
Viet Nam	3 318	3 011	4 034	3 044	2 834	3 429	3 894	4 988	4 008	4 194	4 335	..
United States	1 690	1 414	1 587	1 764	1 681	1 498	1 667	1 694	1 490	1 075	1 734	..
Chinese Taipei	310	224	274	286	479	303	249	279	388	418	466	..
Philippines	590	339	532	400	412	476	496	750	612	500	363	..
Canada	110	158	226	250	305	289	359	339	280	228	357	..
Cambodia	525	362	509	404	427	503	418	464	365	327	278	..
Thailand	96	72	91	84	81	75	94	99	115	116	128	..
Mongolia	183	110	123	133	119	125	121	125	117	159	122	..
Uzbekistan	107	75	110	96	120	87	82	86	93	151	115	..
Japan	89	57	84	82	95	68	68	71	59	72	110	..
Russia	333	99	125	93	134	138	100	77	119	104	97	..
Australia	35	53	87	95	96	102	112	116	122	64	65	..
New Zealand	15	6	22	22	17	31	35	37	35	14	46	..
Pakistan	37	17	33	40	25	34	51	44	48	26	35	..
Other countries	406	248	314	351	354	365	450	497	404	495	408	..
Total	19 570	12 527	13 956	14 200	13 934	12 854	13 293	14 758	12 875	16 065	14 057	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Latvia

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Russia	49	82	71	109	70	127	53	50	59	92	40	..
Iraq	..	0	0	0	0	..	0	0	0	0	4	..
Belarus	12	14	12	15	12	14	5	13	12	11	4	..
Armenia	4	6	3	4	5	5	3	3	1	5	3	..
United States	..	4	23	25	10	20	2	0	3	4	3	..
Uzbekistan	..	0	0	1	4	1	1	5	1	0	3	..
Lithuania	3	7	5	5	9	13	9	3	3	1	2	..
India	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	2	2	..
Cyprus	..	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	..
Albania	..	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	..
Ukraine	13	8	51	54	32	39	9	8	22	10	1	..
Australia	..	0	3	7	0	8	0	1	0	0	1	..
Morocco	..	0	0	0	0	..	0	0	0	0	1	..
Colombia	..	0	0	1	0	..	0	0	0	0	1	..
Sri Lanka	..	0	0	0	0	..	2	0	0	0	1	..
Other countries	2385	3663	2915	1920	1754	1725	878	845	705	600	351	..
Total	2467	3784	3083	2141	1897	1957	962	930	808	725	419	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Lithuania

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Stateless	125	86	57	61	50	33	31	50	38	45	88	..
Russia	97	39	53	49	38	49	43	39	34	47	45	..
Belarus	17	14	14	12	14	16	22	29	9	20	33	..
Ukraine	44	19	19	26	28	36	29	26	16	20	31	..
Armenia	6	7	8	6	9	5	8	7	5	5	7	..
Kazakhstan	5	4	2	7	5	7	2	1	2	6	6	..
Türkiye	1	1	4	2	..	2	6	8	0	4	3	..
Viet Nam	1	2	4	1	2	4	..	2	3	..
Uzbekistan	3	1	..	2	1	2	3	..
Egypt	..	1	1	1	2	3	1	7	3	2	2	..
Kyrgyzstan	1	..	2	0	2	..
Georgia	..	1	3	1	2	5	1	3	..	2	1	..
Iran	..	1	1	1	1	..	2	1	..
Syria	1	2	..	2	1	2	..	1	1	..
Tajikistan	1	0	1	..
Other countries	16	10	9	10	21	12	17	17	15	18	9	..
Total	311	183	173	179	177	173	166	196	123	176	236	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Luxembourg

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
France	314	462	639	860	1 205	2 262	2 468	2 784	2 466	2 264	1 704	52
Portugal	1 085	1 155	982	1 211	1 168	1 089	1 328	1 594	1 067	981	1 141	53
Belgium	450	1 581	1 577	1 346	1 264	1 836	1 624	1 598	1 335	1 013	844	47
Germany	208	201	195	209	279	246	288	364	360	360	289	55
Italy	425	411	314	418	313	304	379	461	339	256	283	47
United Kingdom	44	56	37	66	75	128	384	440	431	291	201	48
Montenegro	148	126	99	118	127	134	264	490	372	260	198	47
Syria	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	8	10	30	142	37
United States	32	42	48	80	100	233	412	665	730	438	139	51
Brazil	7	12	18	15	30	100	280	931	2 116	1 799	137	52
Cape Verde	60	41	44	27	47	33	142	220	167	129	128	51
Russia	30	17	22	30	40	31	60	77	95	88	126	65
Spain	35	38	30	48	42	44	85	124	90	79	98	52
Serbia	80	68	49	79	55	55	97	225	201	149	83	59
Romania	12	10	6	15	16	22	34	54	56	65	79	65
Other countries	475	460	350	468	545	623	1 185	1 829	1 615	1 185	1 209	..
Total	3 405	4 680	4 411	4 991	5 306	7 140	9 030	11 864	11 450	9 387	6 801	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Mexico

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Venezuela	162	279	334	259	484	580	725	1 245	1 096	57
Cuba	408	579	531	287	305	341	403	467	376	48
Colombia	486	634	601	397	378	358	346	364	265	53
United States	79	108	119	120	136	119	127	189	139	46
Spain	152	180	163	119	169	166	165	173	116	34
Argentina	178	271	304	130	126	172	141	147	93	49
El Salvador	82	99	109	66	66	75	73	100	79	53
Honduras	92	143	129	60	74	89	66	94	78	56
Guatemala	117	196	141	62	57	98	84	75	62	52
Peru	138	182	159	100	93	79	79	72	58	50
Nigeria	7	8	3	5	39	63	56	59	56	27
Dominican Republic	22	75	59	53	63	81	72	69	52	37
Ecuador	46	63	59	40	62	56	63	78	49	55
Russia	36	42	36	44	29	28	38	41	45	73
Italy	45	53	66	31	38	59	60	61	43	28
Other countries	583	678	768	568	617	576	569	638	463	
Total	2 633	3 590	3 581	2 341	2 736	2 940	3 067	3 872	3 070	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Netherlands

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Syria	82	126	236	235	210	86	94	214	1 587	15 177	26 678	40
Eritrea	45	46	30	52	70	51	63	70	237	3 659	7 305	41
Türkiye	5 029	4 292	2 872	3 119	2 824	2 764	2 947	2 675	2 828	3 025	2 855	51
Morocco	6 824	6 238	3 886	4 251	3 272	3 364	2 944	3 005	2 582	2 961	2 180	54
India	292	406	415	794	638	574	616	661	756	2 029	1 736	45
Iraq	289	525	929	1 331	909	922	738	761	849	1 223	1 242	45
Iran	281	361	848	690	464	449	492	443	463	1 007	930	49
Afghanistan	371	567	1 341	1 027	510	477	453	392	390	789	791	50
Russia	295	427	291	446	355	403	376	399	409	799	757	67
Suriname	934	875	659	828	594	601	536	560	593	717	675	61
Ukraine	223	276	228	337	277	256	277	304	343	697	616	63
United Kingdom	207	198	165	162	166	636	1 241	1 250	2 588	1 360	580	46
Philippines	330	381	263	457	319	331	349	334	327	620	495	79
Poland	296	360	237	421	313	329	401	357	378	490	479	67
Pakistan	279	388	248	384	322	242	226	231	303	531	417	51
Other countries	12 821	15 489	13 234	18 044	16 634	17 049	15 910	16 195	19 558	20 859	15 223	
Total	28 598	30 955	25 882	32 578	27 877	28 534	27 663	27 851	34 191	55 943	62 959	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – New Zealand

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
United Kingdom	4 412	5 596	4 822	4 413	3 997	4 925	5 955	5 471	4 413	3 746	3 054	50
India	1 643	2 265	2 205	2 214	2 395	3 339	4 665	4 845	4 680	3 309	2 727	39
Philippines	662	2 215	2 781	2 714	2 988	3 016	3 565	3 079	2 555	2 016	1 522	55
Samoa	2 029	2 948	2 930	2 590	2 721	3 030	2 952	3 184	2 813	1 598	1 289	49
South Africa	2 098	2 780	3 264	3 691	3 532	3 637	2 894	2 691	2 462	1 741	1 245	50
Fiji	1 211	2 078	2 090	2 235	2 365	2 695	3 242	2 542	2 013	1 299	966	52
Australia	110	179	214	285	317	507	679	768	599	495	670	57
China	925	1 227	1 255	1 322	1 004	1 220	1 314	1 174	1 105	738	574	50
United States	435	570	560	562	516	627	775	814	665	525	522	55
Pakistan	46	115	143	156	155	194	199	363	538	471	347	46
Tonga	333	458	521	500	506	764	684	848	701	385	312	54
Sri Lanka	157	201	263	330	439	519	679	637	545	325	286	42
New Zealand	18	87	142	203	225	320	373	437	406	292	240	45
Ireland	82	112	143	128	139	143	237	208	243	185	220	54
Brazil	53	93	135	152	205	242	377	289	334	205	214	50
Other countries	5 018	6 231	6 360	6 399	6 079	6 778	7 857	8 385	6 957	5 426	3 971	
Total	19 232	27 155	27 828	27 894	27 583	31 956	36 447	35 735	31 029	22 756	18 159	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Norway

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Sweden	233	213	229	253	300	233	257	235	133	1 172	4 590	52
Eritrea	248	199	323	563	1 114	1 879	2 971	1 091	1 406	2 790	3 559	35
Russia	630	629	418	401	444	457	464	353	186	638	3 216	71
Philippines	410	341	479	851	704	567	1 389	410	682	718	1 955	75
Somalia	2 092	1 571	1 667	1 138	451	1 200	1 746	1 881	2 986	3 051	1 831	51
Poland	80	138	166	324	241	276	442	122	152	258	1 727	60
United Kingdom	40	37	52	62	54	27	71	66	23	230	1 578	44
Denmark	127	126	207	161	120	39	77	63	26	487	1 576	50
Thailand	363	265	346	547	683	677	1 666	300	583	586	1 560	87
Afghanistan	1 280	1 013	1 005	1 371	1 088	999	1 264	451	655	360	1 361	39
Syria	61	54	57	65	84	107	289	144	253	817	1 361	38
United States	39	31	54	64	134	123	282	100	85	243	1 210	57
Serbia	52	75	88	173	177	124	154	86	56	360	1 161	53
Iceland	31	52	26	35	38	30	40	21	13	216	931	51
India	209	130	132	313	382	391	636	168	373	425	888	47
Other countries	8 391	7 510	7 974	9 015	6 418	6 583	9 900	4 870	5 589	7 347	12 588	
Total	14 286	12 384	13 223	15 336	12 432	13 712	21 648	10 361	13 201	19 698	41 092	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Poland

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Ukraine	800	1 196	908	1 911	2 010	1 432	900	2 608	7 072	3 985	4 007	..
Belarus	320	456	390	741	527	512	229	833	2 145	2 010	2 211	..
Russia	200	244	171	370	251	112	63	219	367	311	329	..
Viet Nam	104	150	105	289	222	68	120	136	246	93	143	..
Armenia	103	163	111	367	285	160	113	119	120	90	67	..
Türkiye	12	72	17	33	36	34	22	33	57	43	56	..
Germany	106	171	389	38	17	31	34	39	31	15	31	..
United States	53	75	86	26	22	23	11	19	32	15	31	..
Lithuania	19	26	28	13	21	9	19	19	17	20	30	..
United Kingdom	7	9	16	7	8	6	7	29	47	40	27	..
Syria	22	43	20	33	16	12	7	23	31	7	27	..
India	12	55	12	14	36	6	10	23	33	20	26	..
Egypt	4	76	11	5	15	9	2	30	36	27	23	..
Kazakhstan	42	44	41	36	36	17	13	40	32	27	23	..
Tunisia	3	61	8	16	19	7	6	27	50	13	22	..
Other countries	518	951	1 149	619	527	1 648	2 703	396	2 601	443	484	..
Total	2 325	3 792	3 462	4 518	4 048	4 086	4 259	4 593	12 917	7 159	7 537	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24ji7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Portugal

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Brazil	5 352	4 596	5 102	4 656	6 394	7 804	6 084	6 928	6 468	10 109	7 736	59
Cape Verde	3 502	3 230	3 821	3 200	2 854	3 607	2 591	3 640	3 462	4 701	2 913	57
Ukraine	2 336	3 322	4 007	3 310	2 895	3 240	1 909	1 752	1 620	2 111	1 603	57
Angola	1 870	1 857	2 131	1 630	1 316	1 507	1 225	1 438	1 387	2 118	1 587	54
Nepal	51	36	33	53	102	293	319	426	1 103	1 249	1 406	30
Guinea-Bissau	1 815	1 753	2 082	1 915	1 676	1 884	1 226	1 542	1 451	2 257	1 304	49
India	860	628	539	490	454	1 002	693	855	747	1 326	1 113	34
Bangladesh	193	110	93	71	98	230	189	284	629	678	788	24
Sao Tome and Principe	1 156	869	1 027	938	809	1 061	753	1 006	951	1 271	732	56
Pakistan	476	443	346	333	189	407	239	285	291	688	507	24
Venezuela	87	68	45	80	51	127	90	188	283	449	406	62
Romania	469	492	796	687	515	621	412	434	484	582	400	58
Moldova	2 324	2 043	1 816	1 363	964	815	453	400	356	422	298	55
Russia	590	506	515	395	327	359	194	272	196	368	228	70
Mozambique	204	193	199	148	148	206	158	175	161	283	202	64
Other countries	1 953	1 673	1 924	1 855	1 604	1 941	1 487	1 708	1 510	3 535	3 293	..
Total	23 238	21 819	24 476	21 124	20 396	25 104	18 022	21 333	21 099	32 147	24 516	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24ji7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Slovak Republic

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Serbia	53	55	9	5	8	94	124	42	26	55	242	38
Ukraine	61	60	63	62	73	77	129	127	76	90	74	61
Czech Republic	45	36	24	37	70	105	91	119	88	98	59	58
Russia	8	3	20	5	5	7	6	27	21	8	21	62
United States	6	6	2	5	31	19	16	39	35	35	21	48
United Kingdom	2	15	33	60	70	30	18	61
Australia	4	12	10	20	16	16	50
Germany	3	2	1	1	11	38	35	41	33	23	16	56
Switzerland	4	3	9	9	24	3	13	46
Romania	18	25	9	7	5	26	24	25	17	17	9	33
Viet Nam	5	11	15	49	20	26	53	54	46	40	9	67
Hungary	9	8	5	1	4	6	13	15	8	8	9	44
Poland	4	4	4	2	4	4	6	9	7	9	6	50
Iraq	7	2	1	1	1	5	0
North Macedonia	1	5	3	2	10	3	6	7	5	40
Other countries	60	45	54	48	67	57	84	141	108	108	69	
Total	272	255	207	234	309	484	645	721	586	548	592	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Slovenia

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	635	587	545	570	741	724	918	1 321	1 215	1 144	988	44
North Macedonia	165	155	122	117	145	166	208	222	192	158	242	46
Serbia	169	139	184	155	127	159	153	179	262	186	236	52
Croatia	164	134	93	34	30	30	22	40	48	33	50	42
Ukraine	31	30	35	17	21	29	23	24	33	21	31	84
Russia	19	13	12	26	8	11	17	7	13	17	26	54
Bulgaria	2	5	1	1	4	1	5	3	12	19	15	33
Italy	204	156	186	11	23	18	27	13	7	7	14	57
Montenegro	22	22	32	9	20	25	24	22	16	5	12	42
Egypt	3	3	2	1	2	0	0	1	2	3	6	0
Slovak Republic	1	1	1	2	3	4	0	2	5	1	5	100
Romania	3	1	3	2	2	3	2	3	1	6	4	100
United Kingdom	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	5	4	4	50
Pakistan	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0
Türkiye	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	3	0	2	3	33
Other countries	357	243	253	111	128	127	157	137	100	119	143	
Total	1 775	1 490	1 470	1 057	1 255	1 297	1 563	1 978	1 911	1 725	1 782	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Spain

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Morocco	14 427	16 163	31 674	34 806	24 286	37 010	17 082	25 315	24 527	28 240	42 000	44
Colombia	19 803	19 396	39 332	25 114	11 881	14 299	5 647	6 826	7 515	9 021	8 328	58
Ecuador	32 026	23 763	39 226	32 756	13 950	15 255	7 301	7 988	8 157	8 336	8 325	52
Bolivia	5 333	7 424	19 278	20 895	11 164	15 802	6 124	8 157	7 417	7 794	8 311	61
Dominican Rep.	4 985	6 028	14 611	14 110	8 171	9 176	4 107	4 940	5 366	6 897	6 791	59
Venezuela	2 596	2 823	6 217	4 302	2 332	3 127	1 068	2 034	2 554	5 817	6 536	59
Pakistan	491	596	1 949	3 326	2 798	3 148	1 708	2 054	3 057	4 458	5 921	32
Cuba	3 088	2 921	7 026	5 618	3 072	4 353	1 429	2 688	3 105	5 405	4 975	57
Honduras	440	578	1 702	2 142	1 632	2 525	1 267	1 783	2 739	3 868	4 235	75
Peru	9 255	12 008	19 225	16 601	6 954	6 933	3 224	3 273	3 798	4 219	4 082	59
Paraguay	864	1 297	2 958	3 003	1 935	3 358	1 265	2 500	2 726	3 647	3 219	78
Brazil	1 854	2 540	4 698	4 017	2 273	3 427	1 294	2 153	2 737	3 382	3 209	67
Argentina	5 482	5 217	8 843	7 059	3 054	3 716	1 445	2 043	2 493	3 581	3 120	54
Romania	416	528	1 174	1 608	966	1 469	696	991	1 696	2 771	3 006	61
Nigeria	670	711	1 766	1 697	1 512	2 187	743	1 272	1 172	1 965	2 383	47
Other countries	12 869	13 564	26 114	28 826	18 371	25 159	12 098	16 757	19 895	26 865	29 571	
Total	114 599	115 557	225 793	205 880	114 351	150 944	66 498	90 774	98 954	126 266	144 012	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24ji7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Sweden

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Syria	675	666	540	495	1 370	4 479	8 635	10 626	20 066	24 472	31 113	46
Somalia	1 087	1 547	2 482	2 925	4 776	9 069	8 140	6 746	2 952	2 120	4 522	53
Afghanistan	636	851	776	785	1 198	2 330	2 316	1 912	2 793	2 820	4 269	39
Eritrea	396	743	836	997	1 113	1 451	1 677	1 836	1 865	2 307	3 717	49
Stateless	1 517	1 450	2 005	1 711	3 264	4 395	7 072	5 629	3 197	3 227	2 758	53
Iraq	6 164	16 582	14 317	7 271	4 955	3 694	3 272	2 579	2 260	3 610	2 371	47
Finland	2 227	2 245	2 255	3 023	2 133	2 182	1 974	2 522	1 730	1 582	2 248	64
Poland	1 787	1 645	2 473	2 417	2 333	2 702	2 083	1 783	1 209	2 722	2 071	53
Denmark	391	475	564	603	1 510	1 942	1 720	2 052	1 356	1 393	2 044	44
Norway	342	317	302	370	331	355	384	431	346	1 725	1 857	55
Thailand	1 537	1 903	2 038	2 070	2 928	2 675	2 517	1 620	1 391	1 921	1 640	84
India	174	234	325	306	457	470	724	816	909	1 283	1 635	43
Germany	770	654	837	920	918	858	854	893	694	1 419	1 349	50
Iran	1 021	1 392	1 305	1 128	1 331	1 420	1 788	1 736	1 399	1 584	1 312	53
Serbia	771	1 089	886	919	1 169	1 234	1 808	1 273	1 037	1 269	1 169	53
Other countries	16 833	17 953	17 691	16 978	18 463	21 087	23 934	21 364	21 002	26 721	25 279	
Total	36 328	49 746	49 632	42 918	48 249	60 343	68 898	63 818	64 206	80 175	89 354	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24ji7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Switzerland

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Germany	3 544	3 401	3 835	4 120	5 255	4 658	6 021	6 212	6 640	6 924	7 983	51
Italy	4 109	4 045	4 401	4 495	5 496	5 134	5 863	5 233	4 839	3 946	4 216	48
France	1 325	1 229	1 580	1 750	2 598	3 134	2 964	2 699	2 747	2 756	3 159	49
Portugal	2 298	2 110	2 201	2 458	3 626	3 941	3 920	3 352	2 801	2 055	2 092	54
Türkiye	1 886	1 662	1 628	1 399	1 808	1 729	1 796	1 678	1 802	1 363	1 484	49
North Macedonia	1 337	1 223	1 272	1 288	1 306	1 554	1 721	1 626	1 706	1 270	1 325	51
Serbia	4 359	3 463	2 562	1 865	1 677	1 568	1 543	1 493	1 364	1 069	1 219	51
Spain	1 091	1 055	1 054	1 071	1 501	1 564	1 585	1 491	1 280	994	1 082	53
United Kingdom	351	396	328	449	617	665	883	1 006	844	727	866	51
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 628	1 163	1 173	966	1 103	965	972	995	847	566	551	50
Sri Lanka	781	768	761	825	793	657	531	545	55
Russia	397	397	562	614	589	514	536	485	525	73
Poland	169	172	202	218	258	248	292	283	313	279	379	66
Croatia	1 273	1 201	1 126	838	904	737	730	649	560	454	372	59
Brazil	455	596	538	618	595	480	350	362	70
Other countries	13 387	13 001	12 573	10 775	12 813	13 777	14 193	14 011	12 861	10 293	10 969	
Total	36 757	34 121	34 332	33 325	40 888	41 587	44 515	42 630	40 277	34 062	37 129	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z24jj7>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – United Kingdom

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	26 278	28 343	36 349	22 425	18 391	24 615	16 687	15 104	14 680	11 444	11 598	51
Pakistan	17 639	18 437	21 647	12 995	13 083	16 737	10 379	11 802	12 914	11 459	11 139	48
Italy	297	555	808	479	846	1 282	3 515	5 255	5 774	6 049	8 614	49
Romania	565	678	2 487	1 501	1 673	1 979	3 022	5 527	5 604	5 483	7 739	54
Poland	1 862	3 041	6 063	3 161	3 777	4 435	7 113	9 626	8 802	5 430	7 662	60
Nigeria	7 932	8 878	9 268	8 074	8 049	9 810	6 941	8 696	8 839	8 065	6 734	48
Zimbabwe	4 877	5 646	4 413	3 102	3 385	4 411	2 849	3 127	3 078	2 238	5 245	57
Iran	5 539	4 135	2 389	1 542	1 518	2 097	1 797	2 854	2 960	2 342	4 800	44
France	490	630	744	411	728	1 163	2 824	4 103	4 472	3 465	4 474	54
South Africa	6 351	6 925	6 447	5 294	4 771	5 059	3 103	3 582	4 797	3 008	4 255	52
Sri Lanka	5 886	6 158	3 851	2 335	2 287	3 431	2 465	2 907	2 986	1 541	4 002	51
Bangladesh	5 147	5 701	8 900	3 891	3 611	4 648	3 080	3 572	3 780	3 424	3 909	48
Spain	158	260	328	260	402	614	1 624	2 401	2 604	2 529	3 708	52
Germany	400	479	569	311	584	992	2 635	4 759	4 331	3 244	3 670	60
United States	2 589	3 345	3 117	3 761	2 961	4 024	3 182	3 270	3 496	2 749	3 360	59
Other countries	91 856	101 077	100 641	56 173	51 988	64 081	51 991	70 426	70 239	58 098	69 045	
Total	177 866	194 288	208 021	125 715	118 054	149 378	123 207	157 011	159 356	130 568	159 954	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – United States

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Mexico	94 721	102 121	99 330	94 843	105 910	103 487	118 469	131 950	121 983	83 436	112 910	57
India	45 087	41 916	48 945	36 931	41 178	45 183	49 815	51 325	63 579	47 233	56 085	50
Philippines	42 122	44 508	43 076	34 277	40 438	40 973	36 573	38 519	43 263	33 079	47 989	66
Cuba	20 903	31 071	30 299	23 975	25 674	31 939	25 836	31 940	35 974	31 013	47 427	53
China	35 936	34 694	38 201	32 743	33 644	38 063	39 529	41 647	39 718	26 453	29 599	60
Dominican Rep.	20 402	33 225	39 448	23 694	26 582	31 216	29 598	22 891	22 977	18 494	27 853	59
Viet Nam	20 416	23 106	23 798	18 451	21 624	24 406	18 989	20 660	25 193	22 302	23 884	64
Jamaica	14 385	15 314	16 278	13 387	16 370	16 541	14 889	16 998	17 722	13 202	20 383	61
Canada	14 723	14 443	14 931	13 878	14 969	15 170	13 649	15 796	18 498	13 588	18 368	54
El Salvador	13 830	16 679	18 363	15 568	16 886	17 189	16 893	17 260	18 206	12 514	18 220	57
Colombia	22 478	23 733	21 942	16 283	17 024	18 374	16 012	17 402	16 914	12 562	17 253	63
Korea	12 623	13 732	15 697	13 513	14 119	14 251	14 470	15 922	16 149	11 223	14 827	58
Haiti	14 170	19 097	23 444	13 635	14 037	15 223	12 723	14 343	14 228	10 726	14 744	53
United Kingdom	10 945	10 814	11 066	10 333	11 638	11 052	10 485	12 165	13 910	10 126	13 174	45
Brazil	10 216	9 846	9 501	8 574	10 476	10 234	9 634	10 455	10 341	8 214	12 281	61
Other countries	301 236	323 135	325 610	283 331	319 690	319 759	279 701	302 628	364 938	274 089	338 864	
Total	694 193	757 434	779 929	653 416	730 259	753 060	707 265	761 901	843 593	628 254	813 861	56

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Metadata related to Tables A.6 and B.6. Acquisitions of nationality

Country	Comments	Source
Australia	From 2014, figures inferior to 5 individuals are not shown.	Department of Home Affairs.
Austria	Data refer to persons living in Austria at the time of acquisition.	Statistics Austria and BMI (Ministry of the Interior).
Belgium	Data refer to all acquisitions of Belgian nationality, irrespective of the type of procedure. Data only take into account those residing in Belgium at the time of the acquisition.	Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSEI) and Ministry of Justice.
Canada	Data refer to country of birth, not to country of previous nationality. Persons who acquire Canadian citizenship may also hold other citizenships at the same time if allowed by the country of previous nationality.	Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
Chile	Register of residence permits.	Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
Czech Republic	Acquisitions of nationality by declaration or by naturalisation.	Ministry of the Interior.
Denmark	The decrease in 2013 can be explained by the change in the naturalisation conditions that year.	Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Acquisitions of citizenship by naturalisation.	Police and Border Guard Board.
Finland	Includes naturalisations of persons of Finnish origin.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France		Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice.
Germany	Figures do not include ethnic Germans (<i>Aussiedler</i>). From 2018 on, figures are rounded to the nearest multiple of five.	Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece	Data refer to all possible types of citizenship acquisition: naturalisation, declaration (for Greek descents), adoption by a Greek, etc.	Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction.
Hungary	Person naturalised in Hungary: naturalisation (the person was born foreign) or renaturalisation (his/her former Hungarian citizenship was abolished). The rules of naturalisation in Hungary were modified by the Act XLIV of 2010. The act introduced the simplified naturalisation procedure from 1 January 2011, and made it possible to obtain citizenship without residence in Hungary for the foreign citizens who have Hungarian ancestors. This data refer only to those new Hungarian citizens who have an address in Hungary.	Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register), Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Includes children who receive Icelandic citizenship with their parents.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Figures include naturalisations and post nuptial citizenship figures.	Department of Justice and Equality.
Italy		Ministry of the Interior.
Japan		Ministry of Justice, Civil Affairs Bureau.
Korea		Ministry of Justice.
Latvia	Acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation including children who receive Latvian citizenship with their parents.	Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.
Lithuania		Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	Includes non-residents. Excludes children acquiring nationality as a consequence of the naturalisation of their parents.	Ministry of Justice.
Mexico		Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).
Netherlands		Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand	Before 2016, the country of origin refers to the country of birth if birth documentation is available (if not, the country of origin is the country of citizenship as shown on the person's passport).	Department of Internal Affairs.
Norway	The statistics are based on population register data.	Statistics Norway.
Poland	Data include naturalisations by marriage and acknowledgment of persons of Polish descent, in addition to naturalisation by ordinary procedure.	Office for Repatriation and Aliens.
Portugal	Acquisition of nationality by foreigners living in Portugal.	Institute of registers and notarial regulations, Directorate General for Justice Policy (DGPJ).
Slovak Republic	Data refer to persons living in Slovak Republic at the time of acquisition.	Ministry of the Interior.

Country	Comments	Source
Slovenia	Include all grounds on which the citizenship was obtained.	Internal Administrative Affairs, Migration and Naturalisation Directorate, Ministry of the Interior.
Spain	Includes only naturalisations on the ground of residence in Spain. Excludes individuals recovering their former (Spanish) nationality. The large increase in the number of naturalisations in 2013 is due to the Intensive File Processing Nationality Plan (<i>Plan Intensivo de tramitación de expedientes de Nacionalidad</i>) carried out by the Ministry of Justice.	Ministry of Employment and Social Security, based on naturalisations registered by the Ministry of Justice.
Sweden		Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland		Federal Office of Migration.
Türkiye		General Directorate for population and citizenship, Ministry of the Interior.
United Kingdom		Home Office.
United States	Data by country of birth refer to fiscal years (October to September of the year indicated).	Department of Homeland Security.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

List of the members of the OECD Expert Group on Migration

Australia	John NAPIER, Australian Home Affairs, Canberra
Austria	Gudrun BIFFL and Isabella SKRIVANEK, Danube University, Krems
Belgium	Sarah DECLERCQ and Koen DEWULF, Federal Migration Center, Brussels
Bulgaria	Daniela BOBEVA, Academy of Sciences, Sofia
Canada	Christopher HAMILTON, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Ottawa
Czech Republic	Jarmila MAREŠOVÁ, Czech Statistical Office, Prague
Denmark	Henrik Torp ANDERSEN, Ministry of immigration and integration, Copenhagen
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France	Guillaume MORDANT, Ministry of the Interior and the Overseas, Paris
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International Migration Outlook 2023

The 2023 edition of *International Migration Outlook* analyses recent developments in migration movements and the labour market inclusion of immigrants in OECD countries. It also monitors recent policy changes in migration governance and integration in OECD countries. This edition includes two special chapters on the labour market integration of migrant mothers and on fertility patterns among migrant populations in OECD countries. The Outlook also includes country notes and a detailed statistical annex.



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