



BRAZIL'S ELECTORAL JUSTICE PERMANENT PROGRAM ON COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

STRATEGIC PLAN ELECTIONS 2022

Brasília
TSE
2022



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PRESENTATION

The Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation, established by Ordinance-TSE nº 510, of August 4, 2021, represents the continuity and improvement of the efforts of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) to reduce the harmful effects of disinformation regarding Electoral Court and its members, the electronic voting system, the electoral process in its different phases and the participants involved. Thus, disinformation content aimed at pre-candidates, candidates, political parties, coalitions and federations is excluded from its scope, except when the information conveyed has the ability to negatively affect the integrity, credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process.

The creation of the Program is aligned with the constitutional mission of the TSE to ensure that the electoral process takes place legitimately and democratically, falling within the Court's administrative competence, without any sanctioning bias. The approach adopted is consistent with the main norms, research and recommendations on disinformation at the national and international level, is systemic, multidisciplinary and multisectoral. Concerning these parameters, a "network" model of organization and operation was chosen, based on the involvement of the Electoral Justice bodies and the formation of strategic partnerships with multiple participants. In this scenario, the TSE acts as a hub for dialog, cooperation and engagement of the whole society.

To ensure the integration and coordination between the strategic units of the TSE, the Program is structured internally with a Management Group, a Strategic Committee to Confront Disinformation and an Analysis and Monitoring Group, which will orbit, from the mandate of Justice Luiz Edson Fachin on, around the Special Advisory for Confronting Disinformation (AEED), in charge of carrying out the actions provided for in this Program. A national strategy was also planned that integrates the other Regional Electoral Courts (TREs) in efforts to acting against disinformation. Finally, the Program organizes relationships with partner entities, such as: (i) media vehicles; checking organizations and other associations representing sectors of the press; (ii) providers of internet, including social networks, private messaging services and search engines; (iii) political parties; (iv) public entities or bodies; (v) technology companies; (vi) associations, foundations, institutes, research institutions, movements or groups, including those from public and private universities, with expertise in issues of disinformation, freedom of expression, technology, democracy, elections, electoral law and human rights, and notable public recognition in its area of expertise.

The permanent character of the Program guarantees not only its own structure with exclusive dedication, but also: the continuous training of the team; the construction of knowledge and innovation management processes; uninterrupted dialog with partners; the strengthening of network operations and the development and execution of medium and long-term strategies against disinformation. The actions to be developed are distributed in three axes: (i) *Inform*, aimed at the dissemination of official, reliable and quality information; (ii) *Empower*, aimed at media literacy and training the whole of society to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the functioning of the electoral process; and (iii) *Respond*, related to the identification of cases of disinformation and the adoption of strategies, both preventive and repressive, to contain its negative effects.

For the 2022 electoral cycle, the first axis has five projects with their own purposes and goals. They are: (i) mass dissemination network of truthful and official information about elections and the Electoral Justice; (ii) *chatbot* – electoral queries on WhatsApp; (iii) access, dissemination and enhancement of the scope of fact checking on the electoral process; (iv) deepening electoral transparency; (v) development and improvement of other technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information. In this strategic point, the Court's action is guided by the preferential position of freedom of expression, in the legal system, by encouraging plurality of information. Likewise, information actions meet the recommendations for “prophylactic” *prebunking* actions (that is, strategies to reduce citizens' susceptibility to disinformation by exposing examples of how disinformation operates).

The second axis, in turn, includes seven initiatives: (i) training for internal and external audiences on disinformation, on the integrity of Brazilian elections and on the fundamentality of the Electoral Justice as an institution that guarantees democracy; (ii) prevention of the mental health of members, agents and collaborators of the Electoral Justice who deal directly with actions to contain disinformation; (iii) training the internal and external public on the electoral process, including the functions performed by it in the context of the democratic rule of Law; (iv) awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public; (v) cooperation and actions to enhance reaching partners' media and information literacy initiatives; (vi) dialog with political parties and party federations to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of fighting against disinformation; (vii) support to other public institutions to implement actions to confronting disinformation.

Finally, the response axis encompasses eight projects: (i) permanent coalition for verification; (ii) engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in confronting structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior; (iii) reporting channel for mass shooting of content in partnership with WhatsApp; (iv) creating a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process; (v) containment of disinformation on Telegram; (vi) partnership and dialog with the Federal Police and the Electoral Prosecutor Office; (vii) Strategic Cyberintelligence Committee and (viii) review and elaboration of norms that acts against the practice of disinformation in the Electoral Justice, as a way of preventing the phenomenon in question. Concerning to this point, the planning met the parameters of timely response, appreciation of fact checking, importance of engagement and transparency of platforms, as well as the expansion and improvement of channels for complaints.

This strategic plan defines regulatory frameworks, theoretical references, scope, axes, institutional organization, and multisectoral actions and strategies to be developed for the 2022 electoral cycle.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEDD – Special Advice on Confronting Disinformation

Aesi – Special Security and Intelligence Advisory

Agel – Election Management Advisory

AIN – International Affairs Unit

Coalizão – Coalition for Checking

Covid-19 – Disease caused by the SARS-Cov-2 virus

Program – Brazil's Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation

Program for Confronting Disinformation in the Electoral Justice – Brazil's Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation

Secom – Secretary of Communication and Multimedia

SGP – People Management Department

SMG – Secretariat for Modernization, Strategic and Socio-environmental Management

STI – Information Technology Secretariat of the Superior Electoral Court

TRE – Regional Electoral Court

Court – Superior Electoral Court

TSE – Superior Electoral Court

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I. The Program

The Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation was established by the TSE on August 4, 2021, through Ordinance-TSE No. 510/2021. It seeks to make continuous and expand the actions developed in the Program on Countering Disinformation Focused on the 2020 Elections, considering the need for growing and uninterrupted efforts to deal with the complex, multifactorial and potentially perennial phenomenon of disinformation.

The Program aims to confront disinformation related to the Electoral Justice and its members, the electronic voting system and the electoral process in its different phases, from a *systemic, multidisciplinary and multisectorial* approach.

In order to respond to the challenges that disinformation imposes on the integrity of elections and on democracy itself, the Program adopts a “network” model of organization and functioning, based on the mobilization of Electoral Justice bodies and the formation of strategic partnerships with multiple participants, including the most diverse government agencies, press and fact-checking organizations, Internet providers, civil society entities, academia and political parties. We seek to allow the cooperation of the whole society (whole of society), through the engagement of private participants, communities and individuals, in addition to other public bodies, in the coordinated execution of short, medium and long-term actions, aimed at mitigating the pernicious effects of disinformation on the electoral process.

The actions that compose the Program on Countering Disinformation in the Electoral Justice are organized into three axes: (i) *Inform*, aimed at the dissemination of official, reliable and quality information; (ii) *Empower*, aimed at media literacy and the training of society as a whole to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the functioning of the electoral process; and (iii) *Respond*, related to the identification of cases of disinformation and the adoption of strategies, both preventive and repressive, to contain its negative effects.

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II. Context, History and Justification

The democratic regime presupposes the holding of free and fair elections, in which the broad, free and informed participation of citizens is guaranteed, equal opportunities between the different candidates, parties and political currents in the dispute, and a legitimate electoral process, endowed with fairness, health and public credibility. In recent years, however, there has been a growing perception that the misuse of the Internet and social networks, especially through the production and dissemination of false, misleading, hateful and extremist content, can pose a serious threat to democracy and legitimacy of the elections.

In fact, disinformation and hate campaigns are capable of affecting the ability of citizens to make decisions consciously in elections, unbalance the dispute and erode social trust in the integrity of the electoral process, threatening the stability of democracy itself. The massive dissemination of disinformation through the internet has been used in electoral contexts to generate several negative effects: reducing political participation; to generate in the population a feeling of distrust in relation to the bodies responsible for conducting the elections and the legitimacy of the electoral process; enhance social polarization; unfairly harm the reputations of political participants and public officials; marginalizing minority groups; manipulate voters; and encourage extremism and violence.

These pernicious effects have become even more evident with the more recent trend of targeting disinformation campaigns not only against political participants, candidates and parties, but against the very integrity of elections. In several countries, there have been increasing attacks on electoral bodies and officials and on the electoral process itself, through unfounded allegations of fraud and other attempts to delegitimize elections, their procedures and their results. This phenomenon can be identified, by way of illustration, in the US presidential elections of 2016 and 2020, in the elections in Brazil in 2018 and 2020, in the elections in Colombia in 2018 and in the presidential elections in Peru and the legislative elections in Mexico in 2021. Likewise, a report by the European Commission, dated April 26, 2018, points out that, until that year, at least 18 electoral processes were contaminated by disinformation manipulation on that continent.

In Brazil, in 2018, disinformation assumed an unprecedented role in electoral history. In that election, the electoral process, the Electoral Court and its members became the preferred target of false and misleading narratives, which aimed to undermine confidence in the electronic voting system and in electoral institutions. Since then, the strategy of using disinformation to delegitimize the electoral process has been constantly employed, inside and outside of campaign periods.

In this scenario, in which the systemic fight against disinformation becomes essential to guarantee the legitimacy of elections and the survival of democracy, the institution, by the TSE, of the Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation is justified.

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HISTORY

The Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation represents the consolidation and expansion of actions and strategies to understand and face the phenomenon of disinformation, which have been outlined by the TSE since the end of 2017.

PRELIMINARY ACTIONS

Since 2017, the Electoral Justice has promoted studies and actions aimed at understanding the phenomenon of disinformation and addressing its effects on the electoral process. In December of that year, the TSE instituted, through Ordinance-TSE nº 949, of December 7, 2017, the Advisory Council on Internet and Elections, with the objective of developing research on the subject and proposing actions and goals aimed at improving of the norms. The Council's activities made it possible to bring the Court closer to specialists, the media, information checking agencies and digital platforms.

In 2018, the TSE entered into collaboration agreements with political parties, which, through its intermediary, committed to maintaining an environment of information integrity, in order to “*reprove any practice or expedient regarding the use of false content*” in the election and act as “*collaborators against the proliferation of fake news*”. Partnerships were also signed with political-electoral marketing professionals, entities representing the communication sector (Brazilian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters – Abert, National Association of Newspapers – ANJ and National Association of Magazine Editors – Aner) and digital platforms (Google and Facebook), with the aim of obtaining support for the prevention of disinformation, initiatives to promote digital education and the identification and confrontation of false content.

During the 2018 election, from the (then unprecedented) targeting of fake news and attacks against the Electoral Justice itself and the electoral process, the Court took additional measures to face the challenges posed by the dissemination of disinformation. A strategic office was created, working together with the Presidency, composed of Justices of the House and representatives of the Prosecutor Office, the Executive Power and the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association, aimed at monitoring and formulating responses to the issues that could interfere with the conduct of that claim. From the formation of this strategic cabinet, the TSE worked together with the Federal Police and technical bodies of the Executive Branch in the search for solutions that would guarantee the security and credibility of the electoral process. A multidisciplinary group was also created, formed by Electoral Justice officials, with the aim of mapping the spread of false news against the electoral process on digital platforms, as well as providing clarification to society. For this purpose, the *Explanation on False Information Broadcasted in the 2018 Elections* page was created, in which the responses prepared by the multidisciplinary group and the links to the materials produced by fact-checking institutions on the topics were published.

PROGRAM ON COUNTERING DISINFORMATION IN THE 2020 ELECTIONS

Considering the experiences of the Electoral Justice during the 2018 electoral process, in particular the risks of damage caused by disinformation to the institutional image and credibility, to the execution of activities entrusted to the Electoral Justice and the participants involved in them (political parties,

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candidates, voters, magistrates, civil servants), the TSE instituted, on August 30, 2019, the Program on Countering Disinformation Focusing on the 2020 Elections.

The Program was structured in six axes: (i) internal organization; (ii) media and information literacy; (iii) containment of disinformation; (iv) identification and checking of disinformation; (v) improvement of the legal system; and (vi) improvement of technological resources. Its actions were centered on non-regulatory and multisectoral strategies, based on three pillars: (i) confronting disinformation with information; (ii) confronting disinformation with empowering; and (iii) confronting disinformation focusing on behavior control and, exceptionally, content control.

In August 2020, the TSE launched a strategic plan for the Program, with foundations, normative frameworks and theoretical references, information on the management and execution of the Program, selection criteria for partner institutions, in addition to a detailed work plan, which established actions and measures to be implemented during the 2020 Elections.

In order to carry out the actions detailed in this plan, the TSE promoted a close contact with more than 60 entities and organizations, which were willing to act in a concrete way to minimize the impacts of disinformation in the electoral process, according to their institutional area of action. Among these partnerships, those carried out with checking institutions, social media platforms, telephone companies, research institutions, civil society organizations, public bodies and media associations.

The initiatives developed for the 2020 Elections are summarized in the *Actions and Results Report* of the Program on Countering Disinformation Focusing on the 2020 Elections, published in October 2021. In summary, the main innovative actions were:

1. Creation of the Coalition for Checking – Elections 2020: network created by 9 check institutions to verify fake news related to the electoral process, which produced 274 articles;
2. Creation of the *Fact or Rumor* page, on the Electoral Justice website, to centralize the verification of false information published during the elections, allowing all citizens to access the page's contents without charging data traffic (*zero rating*) by mobile telephone operators. The page had more than 13 million views;
3. Development of a chatbot on WhatsApp, which allowed voters to access checked news and ask questions about the electoral process, which had almost 20 million messages exchanged;
4. Creation of a notification center in the Electoral Justice Apps *e-Título* (voters registration), *Mesários* (election officials) and *Pardal* ([*PARDAL – Sistema de Denúncias Eleitorais para os membros da Justiça Eleitoral* – <https://pardal.tse.jus.br/pardal-admin>] *PARDAL – Electoral Complaints System for members of the Electoral Justice*), allowing direct communication between the Electoral Justice and the more than 18 million users of these Apps;
5. Formalization of partnerships with some of the main Internet providers, through the signing of agreements that provided specific measures for confronting disinformation and ensure a healthier information environment during elections;

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6. Creation of a quality content network broadcasters about the electoral process on social networks, launching the campaign *#EuVotoSemFake* (*#IVoteWithoutFake*), which was joined by more than 100 media associations, public and private entities and citizens who wished to participate; and the campaigns *#NãoTransmitaFakeNews* (*#Don'tBroadcastFakeNews*) *#PartiuVotar* (*#Let'sVote*), supported by the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF) and several national football clubs, which reached more than 30 million people;
7. Launch of the media campaign *Se For Fake News, Não Transmita* (If It's Fake News, Don't Broadcast), to train voters on the phenomenon of disinformation and the dangers of spreading fake news, broadcast on TV, radio and social networks, reaching around 130 million Brazilians;
8. Creation of an extrajudicial channel for denouncement about mass shooting of messages, in partnership with WhatsApp, which allowed the analysis of user behavior by the platform and the banning of 1,042 accounts that sent massive messages in the elections;
9. Creation of a network to monitor disinformation practices harmful to the electoral process, which used monitoring tools from social networks and strategic partners, managing to identify cases and practices of disinformation against the electoral process and acting with social networks to confronting network structures for disseminating disinformation and inhibiting inauthentic behavior and disinformation content;
10. Creation of the cyber-intelligence committee to facilitate rapid action and communication in the event of cybersecurity incidents in elections.

THE NEED FOR A PERMANENT PROGRAM

After the close of the 2020 municipal elections, it became evident that the effort for confronting disinformation – concentrated in electoral periods – would not be enough to deal with this global phenomenon, for which there is no single, simple or short-term solution.

First, it was checked that disinformation campaigns against the electoral process are not limited to campaign periods. Although they gain greater prominence in the years when elections are held, disinformative narratives that seek to affect the population's confidence in elections are produced and disseminated also in non-electoral years. Thus, continuous action is necessary to respond to the meta-narratives of electoral fraud, in order to mitigate the negative effects that they may have on social trust in the fairness of elections and in electoral institutions.

In addition, new challenges were identified in this period, directly related to the phenomenon of disinformation against the electoral process, which increased the complexity of its confrontation and began to demand the expansion of the scope of the TSE's action. In particular, disinformation campaigns also began to use cyber threats, hate speech, incitement to political violence and extremism to attack electoral integrity. In addition, the multiplication of social network and private messaging Apps with reduced or non-existent control was observed, accompanied by a significant increase in their user bases.

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Consequently, as soon as the 2020 electoral cycle was concluded, the molds of a permanent program for confronting disinformation within the Electoral Justice began to be outlined, capable of acting in a continuous and systemic way, based on the following requirements:

Own structure, with adequate human resources: allocation of its own structure and adequate team to perform the multiple functions and planned activities, with permeability in several TSE units and expansion of cooperation with the TREs;

Continuous training: definition of an expanded schedule of educational and training activities related to the systemic confrontation of disinformation for the Program team and the employees of the Court and other Electoral Justice bodies, as well as for the Program's strategic partners;

Knowledge management and innovation: construction of knowledge management processes to allow the constant improvement of projects, the adaptation of strategies to new scenarios and the adoption of innovative solutions for the fighting against disinformation;

Uninterrupted dialog with partners: creation of opportunities and spaces for frequent exchanges with the Program's partners, which allow the definition and implementation of actions and strategies for facing disinformation that are not limited to the critical period of the elections;

Strengthening of "networking" (whole-of-society approach): encouraging cooperation and mutual support between the Program's various partners and society in general, in order to expand and strengthen the ecosystem for fighting against disinformation;

Medium and long-term strategies for "immunization" against disinformation: development of communication, training and transparency projects and actions that go beyond limited electoral cycles, in order to allow citizens to be "immunized" against disinformation.

Then, on August 4, 2021, the new Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation was established, formalized by Ordinance-TSE No. 510/2021. The Program's structure and work plan are defined in this strategic plan, including its normative frameworks, theoretical references, scope, axes, institutional organization, and the multisectoral actions and strategies to be developed for the 2022 electoral cycle.

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III. Normative Frameworks

The performance of the Electoral Justice within the Program on Countering Disinformation is guided by the following rules, which constitute the normative framework of the Program:

1. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988;
2. American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José de Costa Rica), of November 22, 1969, promulgated by Decree No. 678, of November 6, 1992;
3. Electoral Code, instituted by Law No. 4,737, of July 15, 1965;
4. Complementary Law No. 64, of May 18, 1990 (Ineligibility Law);
5. Law No. 9,096, of September 19, 1995 (Political Parties Law);
6. Law No. 9,504, of September 30, 1997 (Law on Elections);
7. Civil Rights Framework for the Internet, established by Law No. 12,965, of April 23, 2014;
8. Law No. 13,188, of November 11, 2015, on the victim's right of reply or rectification in subjects divulged, published or transmitted by the media;
9. General Personal Data Protection Law (LGPD), established by Law No. 13,709, of August 14, 2018;
10. Decree no. 10,222, of February 5, 2020, which approves the National Cyber Security Strategy;
11. Law on Crimes against the Democratic State of Law, instituted by Law No. 14,197, of September 1, 2021;
12. TSE Resolution No. 23,650, of September 9, 2021, which establishes the General Policy on Privacy and Protection of Personal Data within the Electoral Justice
13. TSE-Resolution No. 23,610, of December 18, 2019, updated by TSE-Resolution No. 23,671, of December 14, 2021, on electoral propaganda, use and generation of free time and illicit conduct in electoral campaigns.

IV. Theoretical References

The Program adopts as parameters of action and interpretative guides, always in a critical way and adapted to the Brazilian context and to the particularities of the local electoral legislation, a series of declarations, guides, reports and other documents, produced by international organizations and international and national entities dedicated to studying and fighting against disinformation.

The main theoretical references used by the Program, including some of the most relevant recent developments on the subject, are indicated below.

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

Joint Declarations UN, OSCE and OAS

1. UN, OSCE, OAS and CADHP / ACHPR ([*CADHP - Comissão Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos*] / ACHPR - African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights]), *Joint Declaration on Freedom of Speech and "Fake News", Disinformation and Propaganda* (2017)¹;
2. UN, OSCE and OAS, *Joint Declaration on Freedom of Speech and Elections in the Digital Age* (2020)²;
3. UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR, *2021 Joint Declaration on Politicians and Public Officials and Freedom of Speech* (2021)³.

Documents within the Inter-American Human Rights System

4. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Speech of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), *Guide to Ensuring Freedom of Speech against Deliberate Disinformation in Electoral Contexts* (2019)⁴.

¹ Declaración Conjunta Sobre Libertad De Expresión Y "Noticias Falsas" ("Fake News"), Desinformación Y Propaganda, Relator Especial de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) para la Libertad de Opinión y de Expresión, la Representante para la Libertad de los Medios de Comunicación de la Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), el Relator Especial de la OEA para la Libertad de Expresión y la Relatora Especial sobre Libertad de Expresión y Acceso a la Información de la Comisión Africana de Derechos Humanos y de los Pueblos (CADHP), 2017. Available at: <https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/showarticle.asp?artID=1056&IID=2>.

² Declaración Conjunta Sobre Libertad De Expresión y elecciones en la era digital, Relator Especial de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) para la Libertad de Opinión y de Expresión, el Representante para la Libertad de los Medios de Comunicación de la Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE) y el Relator Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), 2020. Available at: <https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/showarticle.asp?artID=1174&IID=2>.

³ Joint Declaration on Politicians and Public Officials and Freedom of Speech, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur for the Protection and Promotion of Freedom of Opinion and Speech, the Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Freedom of the Media, the Special Rapporteur of the Organization of American States (OAS) for Freedom of Speech and the Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) for Freedom of Speech and Access to Information, 2021 available at: <https://www.oas.org/pt/cidh/expressao/showarticle.asp?artID=1214&IID=4>.

⁴ Guía para garantizar la libertad de expresión frente a la desinformación deliberada en contextos electorales. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Speech of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) with contributions from the Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation and the Department of International Law of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS), October 2019, available at: https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/publicaciones/Guia_Desinformacion_VF.pdf.

Documents within the European Union

5. European Commission, *Multidimensional Approach to Disinformation: Report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation* (2018)⁵;
6. European Commission, *Communication, Fighting Against Online Disinformation: a European Strategy* (2018)⁶;
7. European Parliament, *The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World* (2018)⁷;
8. *European Union Code of Conduct on Disinformation* (2018)⁸;
9. European Commission, *Communication, Action Plan against Disinformation* (2018)⁹;
10. European Commission, *Communication on the Action Plan for European Democracy* (2020)¹⁰;
11. European Commission, *Communication, European Commission Guidelines on Strengthening the Code of Conduct on Disinformation* (2021)¹¹;
12. *European Union Code of Conduct on Confronting Illegal Hate Speech Online* (2016)¹².

⁵ Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (European Commission), *A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation: Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation*, 30 abr. 2018, available at: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6ef4df8b-4cea-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>.

⁶ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Confronting in line disinformation: a European strategy*, Brussels, 26.4.2018 COM(2018) 236 final. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0236>.

⁷ European Parliament, 2018. Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU\(2021\)653635_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf).

⁸ *European Union Code of Conduct on Disinformation*. Available at: <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation>.

⁹ European Commission, *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan against Disinformation*, Brussels, 5.12.2018 JOIN(2018) 36 final. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/eu-communication-disinformation-euco-05122018_en.pdf.

¹⁰ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On the European Democracy Action Plan*, Brussels, 3.12.2020, COM(2020) 790 final. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A790%3AFIN&qid=1607079662423>.

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¹⁷ Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz and Rasto Kužel, IFES Working Paper, Social Media, Disinformation and Electoral Integrity, Ago. 14/2019. Available at: https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/ifes_working_paper_social_media_disinformation_and_electoral_integrity_august_2019.pdf.

¹⁸ Michael Golebiewski, Danah Boyd, Data & society. Data voids: Where Missing Data Can Easily Be Exploited. Oct. 29/2019. Available at: <https://datasociety.net/library/data-voids/>.

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²⁵ Dangerous Speech Project, *Dangerous Speech: a Practical Guide*. Apr. 19/2021. Available at: <https://dangerousspeech.org/guide/>.

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²⁸ Matt Masterson, Jennifer DePew, Katie Jonsson, Shelby Perkins, Alex Zaheer, *Zero Trust: How to Secure American Elections When the Losers Won't Accept They Lost*, Stanford Internet Observatory, Out. 14/2021. Available at: <https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/publication/zero-trust>.

²⁹ Aspen Commission, *Commission on Information Disorder Final Report*, Nov. 2021. Available at: https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Aspen-Institute_Commission-on-Information-Disorder_Final-Report.pdf.

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³¹ Unesco, 2021. Available at: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000378233>.

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³⁵ Harvard Kennedy School, Handbook, mar. 2020. Available at: <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/IO%20Playbook%20%20Part%201.pdf>.

³⁶ Center for Tech and Civic Life, July 2020. Available in: <https://www.techandciviclelife.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Combating-Election-Misinformation-participant-guide.pdf>.

³⁷ USAID, feb. 2021. Available at: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XFKF.pdf.

³⁸ IT&E, *Recomendações sistêmicas para combater a desinformação nas eleições do Brasil* (Systemic recommendations to fight against disinformation in Brazil's elections), Márcio Vasconcelos Pinto, Ariel Kogan, Thiago Rondon, Ellen Larissa de Carvalho Aquino, Carlos A. de Moraes Junior. Sao Paulo, 2018 Available at: <https://tecnologiaequidade.org.br/projetos-do-ite/>.

³⁹ Marco Konopacki (ITS) e Rodrigo Ferreira (Graphika), *Relatório, Política de Oposição: influência e informação nas eleições de 2018* (Report, Opposition Politics: influence and information in the 2018 elections), Available at: <https://itsrio.org/pt/publicacoes/politica-de-oposicao-influencia-e-informacao-nas-eleicoes-de-2018/>.

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From this theoretical framework, it is possible to extract several recommendations and guidelines for the design of the Program, among which can be highlighted:

- i. the need to preserve freedom of speech, through a predominantly non-regulatory approach, and the encouragement of information plurality;
- ii. need to adopt multisectoral strategies to face disinformation, with the involvement of the whole society (*whole of society*);
- iii. need to promote instances of dialog and cooperation between the multiple actors interested in fighting against disinformation;
- iv. need to preserve the personal data and privacy of users;
- v. importance of media and information education, including through training on the electoral process, and initiatives to strengthen citizens' capacity to dismantle disinformation campaigns (such as *prebunking* strategies for "immunization");
- vi. importance of promoting independent fact-checking institutions;
- vii. importance of avoiding information voids (*data voids*), through the provision of reliable information in a timely and repeated manner;
- viii. importance of adopting clear and proportionate rules to fighting against disinformation;

⁴¹ RUEDIGER, M. A.; GRASSI, A. (Coord.). O ecossistema digital nas eleições municipais de 2020 no Brasil: o buzz da desconfiança no sistema eleitoral no Facebook, YouTube e Twitter (The digital ecosystem in the 2020 municipal elections in Brazil: the buzz of distrust in the electoral system on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter). Policy paper. Rio de Janeiro: FGV DAPP, 2020. Available at: <https://democraciadigital.dapp.fgv.br/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/PT-Estudo-2-Ficha-e-ISBN.pdf>.

⁴² RUEDIGER, M. A.; GRASSI, A. (Coord.). Discurso de ódio em ambientes digitais: definições, especificidades e contexto da discriminação on-line no Brasil a partir do Twitter e do Facebook (Hate speech in digital environments: definitions, specificities and context of online discrimination in Brazil from Twitter and Facebook.) Policy paper. Rio de Janeiro: FGV DAPP, 2021. Available in: https://democraciadigital.dapp.fgv.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Estudo-3_Discurso_de_Odio_PT-Ficha-e-ISBN.pdf.

⁴³ Manoel Júnior, Philipe Melo, Ana Paula Couto da Silva, Fabrício Benevenuto, Jussara Almeida. 2021. Towards Understanding the Use of Telegram by Political Groups in Brazil. In Brazilian Symposium on Multimedia and the Web (WebMedia '21), November 5–12, 2021, Belo Horizonte / Minas Gerais, Brazil. ACM, New York, NY, USA. Available at: <https://homepages.dcc.ufmg.br/~fabricio/download/manoel-webmedia2021.pdf>.

⁴⁴ ITS-Rio, 2020. Available at: <https://itsrio.org/en/publicacoes/lidando-com-a-desinformacao-estrategias-para-o-empoderamento-digital-cidadao/>.

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- ix. importance of transparency in the performance of internet App providers and the adoption of clear moderation rules and policies related to elections by platforms;
- x. importance of platforms creating technological resources to highlight reliable information, reduce economic incentives for the propagation of disinformation and contain the viralisation of disinformation content;
- xi. need for coordinated action on different platforms, given the cross-platform nature of the dissemination of disinformation narratives;
- xii. need for initiatives to increase the transparency of the platforms and favor research;
- xiii. need for action regarding the spread of false narratives by digital influencers, political figures and other verified account holders;
- xiv. need to expand and improve channels for reporting and monitoring illicit practices, including disinformation and hate speech; and
- xv. need to adopt adequate measures to repress and mitigate the negative impacts of disinformation campaigns.

Based on these guidelines, the Program's structure was designed to ensure its multisectoral nature, ensure privileged protection of freedom of speech and encourage plurality of information. The structuring of the axes and respective actions are also derived from the theoretical framework adopted, to be detailed below.

V. Scope

Next, we present the clarifications on the scope of the work developed by the Brazil's Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation, including: (i) the administrative and non-sanctionary nature of the Program; (ii) the concept of disinformation used for the purpose of directing its different actions and strategies; and (iii) the delimitation of the Program's object, referring to disinformation that seeks to affect the integrity, credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process and electoral institutions.

THE NATURE OF THE PROGRAM

The creation of the Electoral Justice Program on Countering Disinformation is aligned with the constitutional mission of the TSE to ensure that the electoral process takes place in a legitimate and democratic manner. The Program thus falls within the scope of the Court's administrative competence, being carried out independently of any administrative or jurisdictional process, even if related to the fighting against disinformation. In addition, the Program does not have a sanctioning bias, so it does not interfere with the powers of investigation and criminal prosecution bodies, such as the Federal Police and the Electoral Prosecutor Office, and of judges and Electoral Courts, to investigate and/or punish any illicit committed for the dissemination of disinformation.

DISINFORMATION CONCEPT FOR THE PROGRAM PURPOSES

Although the concepts of disinformation and related categories (e.g., *misinformation*, *malinformation*, *fake news*) are subject to multiple definitions and categorizations in the specialized literature, within the scope of the program, the term “disinformation” is adopted as an umbrella concept, which synthesizes the different contents related to the contexts of informational disorder⁴⁵ and informational manipulation⁴⁶.

For this reason, it will be considered “potential disinformation” for the purposes of the Program, any information or content - regardless of the format, means of presentation or channel of delivery, whether in text, audio, video, news or publication on a social network - identified as false, mistaken, misleading, inaccurate, manipulated, produced, fraudulent, unlawful or hateful. Thus, the characterization of content as uninformative is independent of the agent's intentionality (encompassing both the notion of *disinformation*⁴⁷ as that of *misinformation*⁴⁸). It is also covered by the concept of disinformation, information out of context, manipulated, edited maliciously, with falsifying the source or presented

⁴⁵ Wardle, Claire; Derakhshan, Hossein, *Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making*, Council of Europe Report DGI(2017)09 (2017), Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research/168076277c>.

⁴⁶ Arnaudo, Daniel; Bradshaw, Samantha; Ooi Hui Hui; Schwalbe Kaleigh; Studdart Amy; Zakem, Vera; Zink, Amanda. *Combating Information Manipulation: A Playbook for Elections and Beyond*. The International Republican Institute, The National Democratic Institute, The Stanford Internet Observatory. Available at: <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/InfoManip%20Playbook%20updated%20FINAL.pdf>.

⁴⁷ According to Wardle, et al., cited above, disinformation corresponds to “information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country” [–Information that is false and deliberately created with harmful intent].

⁴⁸ – On the other hand, according to the same authors, misinformation can be conceptualized as “information that is false, but not created with the intention of causing harm”, that is, false information not created or shared with the intention of deceiving.

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in a sensationalist way, or even instrumentalized for illegitimate purposes (comprising the notion of *malinformation*, illustrated by the case of malicious dissemination of cyber incidents against online systems of electoral bodies).

PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAM

The Program seeks to confronting a particularly pernicious form of disinformation: the one that aims to affect the integrity, credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process. Thus, all disinformation related to the Electoral Justice and its members, the electronic voting system, the electoral process in its different phases and the participants involved in it (defined as “disinformation against the electoral process”) will be included in the object of the Program.

More specifically, for purposes of framing the object of the Program, the concept of disinformation against the electoral process covers, in a non-exhaustive way, the following hypotheses:

Disinformation related to the Electoral Justice and its members: disinformation against the TSE, the TREs and other bodies of the Electoral Justice, as well as against magistrates, civil servants, collaborators, election officials and other people involved in electoral work and in monitoring, guarding and transporting the electronic voting machines.

This topic includes content that represents threats or incites physical or symbolic violence against members of the Electoral Justice, people involved in electoral work or the headquarters and other physical facilities of Electoral Courts and voting places.

Examples of fact checks already carried out on the topic:

- “Plea bargain of a former governor of RJ did not reveal a scheme to change votes in the TSE”;
- “PF inquiry does not investigate TSE server who helped create electronic voting machine”;
- “Video deceives by stating that TSE and STF want to bar Christians from politics”;
- “Posts distort TSE president’s speech about elections in Roraima”;
- “TSE did not sell São Paulo election to leftist candidate”.

Disinformation related to the electronic voting system: disinformation related to the design, production and operation of the electronic voting machine and its components, the security of the electronic voting machines and other electoral systems, the mechanisms for auditing electoral systems, the procedures for counting and totaling votes, and defining the results of the elections.

This topic includes content that seeks to produce distrust: (i) in electronic voting machines and in the electoral process, when unaccompanied by evidence or based on inaccurate elements or false and misleading claims; (ii) on the results of the elections (e.g. unfounded allegations of fraud, deviations or defects in voting, counting and counting of votes; and false, opportunistic or malicious disclosure of cyber incidents).

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Examples of fact checks already carried out on the topic:

- “It is not true that the electronic voting machine cannot be audited”;
- “Smartmatic, which supplied voting machine to Venezuela, never sold devices to Brazil”;
- “Election officials cannot transfer votes by opening an electronic voting machine system”;
- “The election result is not secretly determined by the TSE”;
- “TSE’s supercomputer is not a third-party cloud service”.

Disinformation related to the electoral process in its different phases and to the participants involved: disinformation related to the phases of party conventions, registration of candidacies, campaign and electoral propaganda, campaign financing, accountability, electoral research, voting, counting and totaling of votes, proclamation of results, diplomacy of those elected, as well as the rules and procedures applicable to each of these phases and the participants involved in them. This category also includes other acts or facts, including those of an extraordinary nature, with an impact on the organization and conduct of the electoral process, such as the health security of elections in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.

This topic includes content that could promote: confusion about voting procedures (e.g., disinformation about the time, place or duration of voting and about documents needed to vote); interference or disincentives to voter participation (e.g., attempts to suppress votes and intimidate voters).

Examples of fact checks already carried out on the topic:

- “TSE does not send e-mails summoning voters to test their votes over the Internet”;
- “It is true that doing electoral propaganda on election day is a crime”;
- “It is false that the Electoral Code allows people to commit crimes without punishment”;
- “Voting is not optional for people over 60”;
- It is not true that anyone who has Covid-19 will not be able to vote.

Finally, disinformation content that targets pre-candidates, candidates, parties and coalitions will be excluded from the object of the Program, since that the information conveyed does not have the potential to compromise the integrity, credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process. However, it should be clarified that, by delimiting the scope of the Program, it is not intended to remove the relevance of disinformation related to these specific participants in the electoral process. This type of disinformation may receive adequate treatment within the scope of the exercise of jurisdictional and administrative powers by the Electoral Justice, either in specific judicial procedures or in the exercise of police power over electoral propaganda by electoral judges. Furthermore, the media literacy and training actions carried out within the scope of the Program contribute to confronting this form of disinformation, both by preparing voters to deal with the phenomenon of disinformation, as well as by training judges and civil servants to act in relation to to illicit practices in the virtual environment.

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VI. Axes

According with the main recommendations on freedom of speech and the fight against disinformation, the Permanent Program to Confronting Disinformation within the Electoral Justice is structured in three axes: *Inform*, *Empower* and *Respond*.

This organization stems from the restructuring of the six thematic axes of the former Program to Confronting Disinformation Focusing on Elections 2020 (internal organization; media and information literacy; containment of disinformation; identification and checking of disinformation; improvement of the legal system; and improvement of technological resources), in order to consolidate initiatives that were previously dispersed in several axes, as well as to facilitate the understanding of the actions performed.

AXIS 1 – INFORM: DISSEMINATION OF QUALITY INFORMATION

The first axis of the Program – Inform – aims at the creation and dissemination of true, reliable and official information about the electoral process and about the disinformation that affects the perception of integrity of the elections, so that Brazilians can exercise their political rights to informed and conscious way.

The axis encompasses the creation of a broad communication strategy aimed at: (i) increase the population's knowledge of the electoral process, in order to generate greater confidence in the legitimacy of the election and in the credibility of the bodies responsible for conducting it; and (ii) increase citizens' understanding of the phenomenon of disinformation, the various forms of information manipulation in elections, how disinformation campaigns are effectively structured and operate, and their risks and negative effects.

The communication strategy foresees, firstly, actions to disseminate information from the Electoral Justice (including TSE and TREs) through the most diverse media and channels – radio and television, official websites, social networks, private messaging Apps, proper Apps, etc. –, with the production of campaigns, articles, messages, notifications, events and press conferences. In addition, it seeks to promote the creation of networks of trust for the distribution of quality content, based on the participation of partners, institutions and relevant entities, opinion makers (including digital influencers) and other citizens.

In this point, the Program prioritizes the adoption of preventive strategies that guarantee the “immunization” of people against electoral disinformation. One of the techniques employed seeks to carry out the so-called *prebunking*, that is, the production and dissemination of information capable of reducing citizens' susceptibility to disinformation and giving them the appropriate tools to create resistance to its negative influence.

AXIS 2 – ENABLE: MEDIA LITERACY AND TRAINING

The second axis of the Program – Empower – aims at media and information literacy and the promotion of educational actions and training Programs aimed both at the Electoral Justice internal public and at the external public, including partners and citizens in general, with the objective of stimulating

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the development of skills to engage in the digital world, understand the functioning and impact of the phenomenon of disinformation and expand their knowledge of the Brazilian electoral process.

The axis comprises the definition of a set of training initiatives adapted to different audiences and their needs. Actions aimed at the internal public seek to serve the entire staff, including magistrates, civil servants, employees and election officials, and must be segmented to reach defined groups - for example, civil servants who work in communication and media advisory services, through specific initiatives, and teams that act directly in the fight against disinformation in the TSE and in the TREs. The actions directed at the external public are aimed at serving the Program's various partners, interested groups and citizens, such as political parties, journalists and press associations, fact-checking institutions, civil society associations, candidates and voters. The initiatives will be developed directly by the Program or by partners, in cooperation with the Program and the TSE, and should take different formats, depending on the target audience and the degree of depth required, covering institutional campaigns, instructional videos, courses, debates, lectures, workshops, handouts and other written materials.

More specifically, the knowledge and skills to be developed can be organized into three groups. The first group relates to broader Media and Information Literacy Programs (AMI), which include, among others, learning that allows the use of digital platforms and tools in an effective, critical and responsible manner. The second group is intended for specific training on the phenomenon of disinformation, covering its motivations, main operating mechanisms, cognitive effects, identifying signs, risks, means to recognize disinformation content, ways of confrontation, mechanisms for reporting, etc. Finally, the third group refers to educational actions on aspects of the electoral process, notably on the electronic voting machine and the functioning of the entire electronic voting process, counting and totaling of votes, as well as on macro-themes related to electoral integrity, fundamentality of Electoral Justice and the protection of democracy.

AXIS 3 – RESPOND: IDENTIFICATION AND CONTAINMENT OF DISINFORMATION

The third axis of the Program – Respond – aims at the adoption of concrete measures to identify, contain and discourage disinformation practices and other types of manipulation of the informational environment.

The axis encompasses action on three levels. First, the monitoring of social networks to identify inauthentic behavior, including the mass shooting of messages and the use of computer propaganda, as well as disinformation content, manipulation campaigns and other types of information disorder capable of affecting the electoral process. Therefore, the Program provides for the definition of mechanisms, processes, tools and strategic partnerships to allow the monitoring of the informational environment.

Second, the adoption of quick and effective responses to mitigate the negative impact of cases of disinformation identified from the monitoring. Regarding to this action, workflows and criteria will be established to define the appropriate referrals for each situation. Such referrals will be articulated based on cooperation, dialog and coordination with several partners, including platforms, verification institutions, the Electoral Prosecutor Office and the Federal Police. The Program will prioritize action in situations of inauthentic behavior and content that reveal coordinated actions to spread disinformation,

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without ceasing to act on disinformation content against the electoral process, observing parameters for the preservation of freedom of speech.

Finally, at the third level of action, we seek to discourage disinformation practices based on structural and systemic answers defined from trends and experiences extracted from activities to identify and contain disinformation. This includes initiatives to improve the legal system, through both cooperation with the National Congress in discussions on the subject and the elaboration and revision of norms within the scope of the TSE's normative competence. The strategy also involves dialog with social networks and private messaging Apps to: improve the rules and policies applicable to the electoral context; seek greater consistency, effectiveness and speed in its application; and also encourage greater transparency regarding the application of such rules and policies.

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VII. Institutional Organization

The Program's systemic, multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach is based on a "network" model of organization and operation, which seeks to achieve a comprehensive cooperation of society (whole of society). Thus, its organization is based both on the mobilization of Electoral Justice bodies and on the formation of strategic partnerships with multiple participants.

The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) has a structure of groups and committees integrated by key-units of its internal structure, capable of managing the Program and executing its strategic plan. Its permanent conformation also guarantees integration, training and perennial dialog with the Regional Electoral Courts (TREs) and their own structures to fighting against disinformation. Finally, the Program acts as a focal point of the ecosystem to acting against disinformation in Brazil, through its partnerships with various government agencies, press and fact-checking organizations, Internet Apps providers, civil society entities, academia and political parties.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

To ensure integration and coordination between strategic TSE units, the Program is structured internally based on the composition of three main groups and committees: (i) Management Group; (ii) Strategic Committee; and (iii) Analysis and Monitoring Group. As of February 22, 2022, the general management of the Program will be the responsibility of the Special Advisory Office for Combating Disinformation (AEED), its own unit, with an expanded composition, which will centralize and coordinate such groups and committees.

Program Management Group

The Management Group is responsible for the strategic planning and management of the Program, which includes, among others, the following actions: (i) definition of guidelines, projects and work plan; (ii) coordination and dialog with the Strategic Committee, Monitoring and Analysis Group and other units of the Court; (iii) primary approach and dialog with partner institutions; (iv) elaboration of the main documents of the Program; (v) monitoring of the Program's actions and projects.

The Group is currently integrated by representatives of the Presidency, Vice-Presidency and the Court's Communication and Multimedia Secretariat (Secom) and has a Digital Coordinator for Confronting Disinformation, responsible for structuring digital actions and strategies to fighting against disinformation.

Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation

The Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation works as an advisory body to the Management Group, in addition to acting instantly and integrated in the process of identifying and responding to crisis situations arising from disinformation practices against the electoral process, taking immediate measures to mitigate its effects. In this aspect, the Committee occupies the position of supervisory body of the Monitoring and Analysis Group, to which it must report critical or recurring situations.

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In addition to the members of the Management Group, the Strategic Committee includes representatives from the following areas of the Court: (i) Information Technology Secretariat (STI); (ii) Special Security and Intelligence Advisory Board (Aesi); (iii) Electoral Management Advisory (Agel); (iv) Secretariat for Modernization, Strategic and Social and Environmental Management (SMG).

Analysis and Monitoring Group

The Group is responsible for receiving, recording, analyzing and giving the proper referral to potentially misleading content (“notes”) about the electoral process, by filling in tickets organized in its own demands management system. It will be made up of Court servants appointed by the Strategic Committee, preferably among representatives of the following areas: (i) Office of the Presidency; (ii) Agel; (iii) Secom; and (iv) STI.

The Group should: (i) monitoring the circulation of disinformation practices against the electoral process, based on criteria strictly related to the scope of the Program, that is, “key words” that refer to content related to the electoral process and its phases, aspects of the electronic voting system, Electoral Justice and any other acts related to the holding of elections; (ii) receiving, analyzing and recording, on an internal ticket platform, any and all content that contains potential disinformation about the electoral process; (iii) adopting the appropriate measures to mitigate the effects of the detected disinformation, in light of the pre-established indicators for each measure, such as: a) forwarding to Secom for the preparation of a clarification note, if it does not yet exist; b) referral to the Coalition for Checks; c) notification to platforms; d) science to the security and investigation bodies. Critical or recurring situations must be reported to the Committee so that it can formulate action guidelines.

The Analysis and Monitoring Group has the 10-20-60 Plan as a guideline: Register-Analyze-Mitigate, which provides the deadlines for: 10 minutes for the registration of all information about the potentially uninformative content received by the team, in the fields of the proper tool (“note”); 20 minutes to analyze, understand the narrative, identify its classification (that is, if the case is disinformation, phishing, electoral or cyber crime, among others) and outline the best reaction strategy; and 60 minutes to execute the mitigation strategy, activating directly related partners, in addition to a direct communication network capable of taking counter-information to the greatest number of people. The establishment of deadlines for the Group’s activities seeks to minimize the risks caused by the “delay in response”.

NATIONAL STRATEGY OF ELECTORAL JUSTICE

The Permanent Program integrates the efforts of the TSE with those of the TREs in a systemic and coordinated manner. In the 2020 Elections, the Regionals not only presented focal points to work with the TSE Strategic Committee and the Fact Check Coalition, but also started to institute their own structures to fighting against disinformation. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that most of the TREs have already installed or are in the process of instituting groups dedicated to the theme.

In addition to the ability to better understand and dialog with local perspectives, the Regionals rely on the capillarity of their Electoral Zones and the consequent daily experience of assisting voters. These assets are essential in all aspects of the Program, ensuring the possibility of the Electoral Justice

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reaching the target audience in a particular way in information and awareness actions, as well as acting in episodes of localized disinformation. On the other hand, and respecting the autonomy of each TRE, the coordination of the TSE guarantees the optimization in the performance of the Regionals, taking into account the respective structural differences.

The national integration of the Electoral Justice will take place in three phases:

- a. institution: the TSE will encourage those Regionals that still do not have their own structures to fighting against disinformation to establishing them, observing their particularities and limitations. In any case, the recommendation prevails that the Strategic Committee within each TRE be composed, at least, of magistrates or civil servants who are members of the Presidency, Secom and STI. Regardless of the institution with its own structure, focal points with the TSE Committee must be appointed to the Court, who may participate in the following actions;
- b. training: the Court will initially hold a workshop on the Permanent Program, based on the experiences of 2020 and the planning for 2022. It will also promote caravans to encourage the active confrontation of disinformation at the local level, with the presentation of a comprehensive playbook of alternatives for the work of Electoral Offices. In addition, TSE and partners will continuously promote training in the areas of communication, technology and behavior for the committees and technical units of the Regionals;
- c. perennial dialog and monitoring: an instant communication channel will be opened focusing the TREs to ensure fast and clear communication between the Electoral Justice bodies. In addition, periodic meetings will be held with representatives and Committees of the Courts, to monitor and discuss the actions. Finally, it will formally integrate the Strategic Committee of the TSE: the Judge President of the College of Presidents of the TREs; the Judge President of the College of Electoral Inspectors; and the President of the College of Directors of Electoral Judicial Schools (EJEs).

PARTNER INSTITUTIONS

Since the creation of the Program, the Court has entered into partnerships with institutions that are committed to collaborating with the fight against disinformation by signing a Term of Adhesion. Currently, the Program already has 72 partner institutions (Appendix I). Public and private entities that fall into the following categories are admitted as partners:

- a. media outlets, checking organizations and other associations representing sectors of the press;
- b. Internet App providers, including social networks, private messaging services and searching tools;
- c. political parties;
- d. public entities or bodies that can contribute to the planning of actions, to the prevention or repression of disinformation;

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- e. technology companies that can contribute with actions in the area of cyberintelligence; and
- f. associations, foundations, institutes, research institutions, movements or groups, including those from public and private universities, with expertise related to disinformation, freedom of speech, technology, democracy, elections, electoral law and human rights, and notable public recognition in its field of activity.

Partners will be chosen based on technical and scientific criteria and must be effectively capable of collaborating for the planned actions and for the fulfillment of the Program's objectives.

The TSE should actively seek to expand the list of partners, provided that such partnerships prove to be useful and necessary for achieving the Program's objectives and actions.

In addition to signing the terms of adhesion to the Program, the TSE must make efforts to conclude cooperation agreements, memoranda of understanding or other partnership instruments that define the concrete measures that will be developed by the partners to face disinformation within the scope of the Program in their respective areas of activity.

Coordination with social networks, messaging Apps and other Internet App providers

The Program team keeps constant dialog with the main social media and messaging Apps with representation in Brazil, seeking to identify forms of cooperation capable of mitigating the harmful effects of disinformation against the electoral process and related topics. This dialog is guided by the three axes of the Program and seeks to make commitments beyond the electoral period.

In the first axis, Inform, we highlight the mapping of actions that use the specific functionalities and features of each platform to expand the reach of official content on the electoral process. In addition, the TSE has sought the commitment of providers to train the Electoral Justice, notably the TREs and Program partners, on the functioning of the platforms, as well as their policies and good practices. It also seeks to train communication teams at the Regional Offices to make better use of their potential. Finally, to respond to disinformation, the Court promotes "structured self-regulation" on disinformation against the electoral process. Regarding this, the dialog is centered on ensuring transparency in platform policy, as well as consistency and speed in monitoring and *enforcing* these policies. To ensure accountability and the production of knowledge, the TSE highlights the importance of producing feedback reports on the measures taken to protect the electoral process.

Coordination with civil society

The Program has extensive interaction with civil society. Actions aimed at sharing knowledge about the phenomenon of disinformation stand out in this field. Likewise, some remarks can be made: a) the holding of *feedback* and debate meetings; b) the organization and participation in academic, scientific or journalistic events; and c) partnerships signed with monitoring and research entities. These initiatives not only guarantee access to public data and information, helping to monitor disinformation episodes, but also to research and analysis of attacks carried out against the electoral process, with the production of

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scientific knowledge about the phenomenon. Therefore, this interaction supports the Program's strategic performance and allows for its constant improvement.

In addition, the increasingly present correlation between disinformation, hate speech and “dangerous speech”⁴⁹ has made dialog with institutions representing vulnerable groups more present in the Program, which – without denaturing the scope of the Program – bring relevant issues to the fight against disinformation and guarantee the legitimacy of the electoral process, notably the political violence.

Finally, civil society also plays an important role in forming a wide network for the massive dissemination of true and official information about elections and the electoral process. Similarly, the Program provides for the formation of partnerships with various associations, public figures and influencers, who start to act as disseminators of Electoral Justice contents.

Coordination with the press and checking institutions

Lined with the preferential position of freedom of speech in the Brazilian legal system, the Program is guided by the promotion of information plurality. For this reason, it is essential that the Electoral Court maintains constant dialog with press and fact-checking institutions. In this context, the checking institutions act permanently to confronting disinformation against the electoral process, observing their autonomy and editorial independence, and the press institutions ensure that true official information reaches the electorate.

It is noteworthy that the entry of new checking institutions into the Coalition must take into account their commitment and effort to fighting against disinformation, in addition to aspects such as transparency, non-partisanship, journalistic ethics, consistency in the verification work over the last two years, in addition to the application of a clear and publicly communicated correction policy.

Coordination with public bodies

Coordination with public bodies is carried out in multiple spheres. The main one concerns the investigation and suppression of disinformation, which also covers security measures. Thus, the Court will establish a close, agile and effective communication network with representatives of the Federal Police (PF) and the Electoral Prosecutor Office (MPE), capable of responding, with agility and efficiency, to hypotheses of illicit actions against the election process, among which: art. 9-A of TSE Resolution No. 23,610/2019; arts. 296 and 297 of the Electoral Code (EC); threat, violence, damage to the voting machines, among others.

Another area of coordination with public and private bodies is cybersecurity, aimed at responding quickly to cyber incidents and events linked to the TSE's digital infrastructure, such as: (i) security of the official systems and channels of the Electoral Justice; (ii) data leakage; and (iii) *phishing*.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ *Dangerous speech*, conceptualized by Professor Susan Benesch and others as “any form of expression (i.e., speech, text, or images) that may increase the risk that its audience will accept or commit (direct physical) violence against members of another group”. (Dangerous Speech Project, *Dangerous Speech: a Practical Guide*. Apr. 19/2021. Available at: [https://dangerousspeech.org/guide/.](https://dangerousspeech.org/guide/))

⁵⁰ Phishing is a cyber crime that occurs through messages that try to trick the user into illegally obtaining personal information.

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Coordination with political parties

Political parties are constitutional institutions that play a key role in Brazilian democracy. Therefore, it is essential that these are integrated into efforts in order to fighting against disinformation, promoting awareness and training of their affiliates about the phenomenon and its harmful effects on democracy. Also valuable are internal actions that seek to prevent affiliates and candidates from engaging in the production of dissemination of disinformation. Regarding to this, the Court will promote institutional dialogs with representatives of parties that have or have not adhered to the Program, also promoting the dialog of associations with partners able to promote training on disinformation and related topics.

Institutional support to other courts and bodies

The electoral process is, even today, one of the major targets of disinformation in Brazil. However, there is no doubt that the ubiquity of the phenomenon has reached other state institutions essential to Brazilian democracy, such as the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and the National Health Surveillance Agency (Anvisa). In that direction, the Management Group will coordinate the dialog with other courts and bodies, promoting workshops, holding meetings and making itself available for permanent dialog with those who have been affected by attacks of production and dissemination of disinformation.

EXCHANGES OF EXPERIENCE WITH ELECTORAL BODIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The Program team has already held meetings with Latin American electoral bodies in order to exchange experiences in the fight against disinformation, a practice that will be maintained for the constant improvement of the Program, as well as for the dissemination of good practices. In addition, the TSE will seek to approach international institutions active in research and fighting against disinformation through meetings and participation in events and seminars, in order to allow the exchange of information and experiences.

FINANCIAL-BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT

The financial-budgetary management of the Program will be carried out by the General Directorate of the TSE, based on a request from the Presidency. The project will be funded, predominantly, from the budget actions planned for Secom and STI, without loss to other specific budget actions. With the creation of the AEED, the Program will have its own budget.

Among the costs foreseen for the Program, within the mentioned budget actions, it is highlighted: (i) contracting monitoring tools; (ii) hiring specialists; and (iii) organization of seminars and events on the subject.

The participation of partner entities in the execution of the actions that compose the Program to Confronting Disinformation Focused on Elections 2020 will be free of charge for the TSE and within the limit of the resources that the interested institution makes available for this purpose, under the terms of § 2 of the art. 4 of Ordinance-TSE No. 510/2021.

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VIII. Work Plan

Based on the Permanent Program axes – *inform*; *enable*; and *respond* –, the Work Plan for the 2022 elections was developed. In addition to the specific goals of each axis, the plan includes the actions outlined for the development and strengthening of the institutional organization as a means of executing the Program.

INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION

The main structures for the management and execution of the Program, which will be centralized in the AEED, are three: (i) Management Group; (ii) Strategic Committee; and (iii) Analysis and Monitoring Group. The scope of the actions presupposes, however, the engagement of all units of the Court, with emphasis on: Presidency, Secom, STI, Aesi, Agel; SMG, International Affairs Unit (AIN) and People Management Secretariat (SGP).

Management Group	
Target Audience	Superior Electoral Court
Participants involved	AEED
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: Presidency	
GOAL 1 formalizing the creation of the AEED and define the composition of the Management Group of the Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation.	
GOAL 2 maintaining instant institutional communication systems among the members of the Management Group, as well as hold periodic meetings of the Strategic Committee.	
GOAL 3 establishing and maintain a project planning, management and monitoring system, including digital actions to fighting against disinformation.	
GOAL 4 maintaining dialog, through periodic meetings, with: (i) TSE's Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation; (ii) regional representatives; and (iii) partner institutions.	
GOAL 5 seeking partnerships with new institutions aligned with the purpose of the Program, through terms of adhesion to the Program, as well as the celebration of memoranda of understanding and terms of cooperation.	
GOAL 6 producing and disseminate a post-election document, summarizing the results of the Program, a balance of the actions developed, lessons learned and proposals to strengthen the fight against disinformation.	

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2) Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation within the TSE

Target audience	TSE, TREs, electoral voting zones
Participants involved	Magistrates and civil servants in the following areas: Presidency, Vice-Presidency, Secom, STI, Aesi, Agel, SGM, SGP
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED	
<p>GOAL 1 updating the indication of the TSE representatives (focal points) who will integrate the Strategic Committee to Fighting Against Disinformation. In addition to the members of the Management Group, representatives from the following areas of the Court will integrate the Strategic Committee: (i) STI; (ii) Aesi; (iii) Agel; (iv) SMG. The Committee will also formally be composed of: the Judge President of the College of Presidents of the TREs and the Judge President of the College of Electoral Inspectors.</p> <p>GOAL 2 sending a letter to the TREs, requesting an update of the appointment of representative(s) (focal points) to work with the TSE's Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation.</p> <p>GOAL 3 establishing and structure the Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation of the TSE, by defining the work flow, attributions of the representatives, scope of action and deadlines for investigating the situation and disclosing any counter-information, considering the seriousness and urgency of the different situations.</p> <p>GOAL 4 holding a workshop with information and strategic guidelines for the TREs so that they can implement and operationalize the functioning of strategic committees in their internal spheres, with the collaboration of the TSE, as well as periodic meetings with them.</p> <p>GOAL 5 creating virtual communication groups that allow quick dialog between the TSE's Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation with the TREs' focusing the fighting against disinformation, as well as with verification agencies and other strategic partners of the Program.</p> <p>GOAL 6 establishing cycles of monthly meetings as controlling point and exchange of information between the members of the Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation of the TSE.</p> <p>GOAL 7 establishing workflow with the Analysis and Monitoring Group.</p>	

3) Analysis and Monitoring Group

Target audience	Voters and civil society
Participants involved	AEED, STI
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: Digital Coordinator to Confronting Disinformation and AEED	
<p>GOAL 1 creating an Analysis and Monitoring Group that will be integrated by Court servants appointed by the Strategic Committee, preferably among representatives of the following areas: (i) Office of the Presidency; (ii) Agel; (iii) Secom; and (iv) STI.</p> <p>GOAL 2 training members to use open data monitoring tools, as well as to operate the demand management system (tickets).</p> <p>GOAL 3 establishing a workflow, focusing on agility and efficiency in the registration, analysis and measures of each case, with a view to minimizing the risks of delay in response (Plan 10-20-60: Register-Analyze-Mitigate).</p>	

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AXIS 1 – INFORM: DISSEMINATION OF QUALITY INFORMATION

The first axis of the program – Inform – aims at the creation and dissemination of true, reliable and official information about the electoral process and about the disinformation that affects the integrity of the elections, so that Brazilians can exercise their political rights in an informed and aware way. Its objective is to counteract the environment of informational disorder with a “rain” of official, truthful and quality information, with the aim of building and expanding trust in the electronic voting process. The approach, which also involves the dissemination of information about the phenomenon of disinformation itself, the deepening of the transparency of the process and the search for initiatives to improve communication with the internal and external public, seeks to prevent cognitive biases from operating in favor of fraudulent narratives. The axis also observes the guidelines of information plurality and the importance of avoiding information vacuums on important topics.

Three projects are planned, with their own goals: (i) mass dissemination network of true and official information about the elections and the electoral process, which includes several initiatives; (ii) deepening electoral transparency; (iii) development and improvement of technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information.

PROJECT 1: Massive dissemination network of truthful and official information about elections and the electoral process

Purpose: Create a large network for the dissemination of reliable content related to the electoral process, in order to reduce the impact of “influence operations” (influence operations) and avoid the formation of information vacuums (*data voids*), which favor the dissemination of fraudulent and fake news.

Main actions: To achieve these objectives, the TSE must: (i) celebrating partnerships with Internet App providers to allow access to reliable electoral content on their own platforms; (ii) disseminating useful information about the elections through notifications sent by the Electoral Justice Apps (notification center); (iii) creating a network for sharing true and accurate information to confronting disinformation about the electoral process within the scope of public campaigns, with partnerships with civil society associations, opinion makers, personalities and digital influencers; (iv) developing partnerships with communication and media associations to expand the network of disseminators of reliable information on the electoral process, including those resulting from fact checks; and (v) expanding its presence on the networks through official profiles on today’s main digital platforms.

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Massive dissemination network of truthful and official information about elections and the electoral process

Target audience	Voters and civil society
Participants involved	AEED, Presidency/TSE, STI, Secom, SGP, media and press vehicles and Internet App providers

Institutional organization

Internal responsible: AEED and Secom

Partnerships with Internet App providers

GOAL 1 entering into partnerships with Internet App providers, through agreements that provide for specific measures, so that they enable and implement the use of their platforms and their different resources (features) to disseminate reliable electoral content, not only during the election period.

Notification center

GOAL 2 developing and operate a digital communication infrastructure (notification center) with the ability to send short messages, in order to disseminate quality content on Electoral Justice Apps. The notifications sent will contain useful information about the elections, including explanation on fake news.

GOAL 3 improving the notification center for Electoral Justice Apps, including through indicators regarding the reading of notifications, sending notifications in audio format and encouraging the sharing of messages by installing forwarding functionalities in the Apps.

Network for sharing truthful information about the electoral process

GOAL 4 creating an immense network constituted of citizens and public and private institutions, which will be able to receive and share true and accurate information to confronting disinformation about the electoral process within the scope of public campaigns.

GOAL 5 improving the digital communication infrastructure with the ability to send short, accessible and clear messages, in order to disseminate quality content in the Electoral Justice Apps and in other digital communication platforms.

GOAL 6 creating and disseminate short messages with clear, accessible and objective language, to inform citizens about the electoral process and to explain rumors and disinformation about the electoral process.

GOAL 7 establishing a plural and collaborative network, based on partnerships with civil society entities, opinion makers, personalities and digital influencers, ensuring that the choice of influencers avoids possible cognitive blocks.

GOAL 8 operationalizing the network of disseminators of true information about the electoral process, from the sharing of selected content with partners.

Partnership with communication and media associations

GOAL 9 developing partnerships with communication and media associations to form a network of disseminators of reliable information on the electoral process, including that resulting from fact-checking.

GOAL 10 expanding the network of information disseminators by producing and offering a complete communication kit on the voting process, which is frequently updated. Thus, program partners and other institutions will have enough informational support to build their own messages about the integrity and security of the electronic process.

TSE channels and social networks

GOAL 11 expanding its presence on the networks through official TSE profiles on today's main digital platforms.

GOAL 12 producing quality content with accessible and democratic language, available on multiple channels and in different formats.

GOAL 13 producing and disseminating materials and publications on social media about the phenomenon of disinformation in the electoral process and the importance of checking.

Contacts with digital influencers

GOAL 14 establishing contact and promote workshops for digital influencers with national or regional reach, so that, knowing the Brazilian electoral process, they can start producing content about it, in their own way, to reach their followers.

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PROJECT 2: Chatbot – Electoral question-answer on WhatsApp

Purpose: Reactivating and improving chatbot for the reactive and proactive use of the WhatsApp Business API tool, in collaboration with WhatsApp, in order to facilitate citizen access to useful information about the Electoral Justice and elections, as well as verifying the inclusion of new functionalities.

Chatbot – Electoral question-answer on WhatsApp	
Target audience	Voters and civil society
Participants involved	AEED, STI, Secom, Presidency/TSE, WhatsApp Inc. and developer company
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: digital coordinator to confronting disinformation and AEED	
GOAL 1 reactivating and improving a chatbot for the reactive and proactive use of the WhatsApp Business API tool, in collaboration with WhatsApp, in order to facilitate citizen access to useful information about the Electoral Justice and elections.	
GOAL 2 keeping the chatbot active during non-election periods. The volume of messages exchanged with voters in the Electoral Answer on WhatsApp during the 2020 Elections highlighted the usefulness and practicality of the tool in expanding the Court's communication with the citizen.	
GOAL 3 defining structure and content for the TSE chatbot on WhatsApp. In 2020, the chatbot initially worked through a decision tree, that is, the voter chose pre-defined navigation options in the menus. Improving and facilitating communication through natural language processing integration, which will allow the bot to capture voter intent more broadly.	
GOAL 4 producing content for proactive use of the WhatsApp Business API tool in sporadic and exceptional situations, such as in the event of the circulation of serious disinformation that affects the electoral process.	
GOAL 5 implementing new functionalities that, in addition to information and services, cover the training and media literacy of voters, including gamified dynamics related to production, consumption and the filtering of disinformation against the electoral process.	
GOAL 6 expanding the dissemination of the chatbot and establish opt-in strategies, in order to maintain and increase the bot's user base, notably for proactive communication.	

PROJECT 3: Access, dissemination and enhancement of the reach of fact checks on the electoral process

Purpose: Contributing to the disclosure and dissemination of checks carried out within the scope of the Coalition for Checks, in order to ensure that voters have real conditions to easily access and locate truthful information about the electoral process and explanations of rumors that circulate during the elections. The action is especially important considering the fact that fraudulent narratives against the electoral process are repeated every year, so that the constructed database lends itself not only to *debunking*, that is, to the reaction of unmasking narratives, as also to *prebunking*, preventive informational action. It should be

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noted that the Coalition for Checking is a fact-checking and information-supplying network on the electoral process formed by collaboration and partnership with checking institutions (see Axis 3).

Main actions: To achieve these objectives, the TSE must improve the specific page hosted on the Electoral Justice website, called *Fact or Rumor*, to: (i) publishing and disseminating fact checks on the electoral process produced by the institutions that compose the Coalition for Checks; (ii) give wide dissemination to the content published on this page through its Apps, its social networks and other pages; (iii) facilitating citizens' access and search of the numerous articles produced, from the improvement of the page to make it a repository that allows the user to browse different types of navigation.

Furthermore, considering that voters who have access to the Internet only through cell phones are often unable to verify the veracity of the information they receive in private messaging Apps, due to plans with limited data access, the TSE must renew a partnership with the mobile telephony companies, to allow their users to access the fact checks produced and other informative content published on the Electoral Justice website without charging for data traffic (*zero rating*). Considering the continuous circulation of disinformation content about the electoral process beyond the critical period or even beyond the election year, it is considered important to extend the *zero rating* to the *Fact or Rumor* page during non-electoral periods.

Access, dissemination and enhancement of the reach of fact checks on the electoral process	
Target audience	Civil society
Participants involved	AEED, Secom, STI, checking institutions, media and press vehicles and Internet App providers
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED, Secom and digital coordinator to confronting disinformation	
GOAL 1 improving the Fact or Rumor page – a hub for official information and fact checks about the electoral process – to host content in a variety of formats and varied sources, as well as to facilitate navigation and people's access to checks and materials. The changes may include integration with the WhatsApp chatbot; the use of tags to organize content and facilitate search; links to facilitate sharing on social networks; and validation of the use of a tool to collect access statistics.	
GOAL 2 importing to the Fact or Rumor page the contents of the Explanations page, referring to the 2018 Elections, in order to centralize all the checks and official information produced, creating a single repository.	
GOAL 3 entering into a partnership with mobile telephony companies to allow their users to access fact checks and other informative content published on the Electoral Justice website without charging for data traffic (<i>zero rating</i>), also seeking to keep the partnership active in an perennial way, outside the electoral period.	
GOAL 4 expanding the dissemination of checks carried out by the institutions that are part of the Checking Coalition, including them, through referencing, in the official explanations of the TSE.	
GOAL 5 validating with the checking institutions the operation of integration protocols, such as the claim review, having in mind the importance of giving more prominence to the checks carried out by the agencies, prioritizing truthful content.	
GOAL 6 promoting the strengthening of the checking ecosystem through initiatives to support institutions, notably by encouraging dialog with other partners and increasing the visibility of content.	

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PROJECT 4: Deepening electoral transparency

Purpose: Ensure greater reach and emphasis on transparency actions through the dissemination of information on initiatives to expand access to inspection and audit procedures of the electronic voting process.

Electoral transparency	
Target audience	Voters and civil society
Participants involved	STI, Secom, Presidency/TSE, civil society, public and private organizations and institutions
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: Presidency/TSE, STI and AEED	
GOAL 1 publicize, in the networks, in the press and through the program partners, the actions to deepen transparency, such as the beginning of the electoral transparency cycle, one year before the elections, with the opening of the source code, as well as with the creation and performance of the Elections Transparency Commission and the Elections Transparency Observatory.	
GOAL 2 ensuring that all authorship and inspection procedures are duly widely publicized, notably the electronic voting machine integrity test.	
GOAL 3 expanding actions aimed at ensuring greater transparency of the stages of the electoral process, increasing public knowledge about the Brazilian electronic voting system. As an example, that can be pointed out actions to familiarize citizens with the new models of electronic vote machine.	
GOAL 4 promoting greater participation in inspection and auditing procedures, of public and private organizations and institutions with notable performance in the areas of technology, human rights, democracy and political science.	
GOAL 5 publicizing and encourage society's cooperation with the constant and uninterrupted improvement of the Brazilian electoral process through the availability of data and the opening of electoral system codes by the Court.	

PROJECT 5: Development and improvement of technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information

Purpose: Developing and improving technological tools that allow the TSE to act more quickly in the dissemination of true and quality information, including: (i) development and constant updating of the status and performance page of the Court and Electoral Justice online services; (ii) improvement of the analysis tools (*analytics*) of the *Fact or Rumor* website; (iii) updating the content and improving the structure of the Electoral Justice portals; and (iv) elaboration and periodic publication of a newsletter for the Electoral Justice internal public with information related to the phenomenon of disinformation.

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Development and improvement of other technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information

Target audience Voters and civil society

Participants involved STI, Secom and AEED

Institutional organization

Internal responsible: AEED, Secom and digital coordinator to confronting disinformation

GOAL 1 to constantly develop and update the status and performance page of the Court and Electoral Justice online services. The page allows TRE voters, the press and citizens in general to be aware, in real time, of possible instabilities and unavailability, as well as scheduled suspensions of digital services of the Electoral Justice, giving greater transparency and agility to access to information.

In addition to identifying cases of services with scheduled suspension, with instabilities or outages, the status page should also provide information about the channels available for the public to report any problems.

GOAL 2 improving the use of analysis tools (analytics) on the Fact or Rumor page to obtain more quantitative and qualitative information about searches performed and checks accessed.

GOAL 3 monitoring, with Secom, the constant improvement of the Electoral Justice portals (<https://www.tse.jus.br/> and <https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/>) with attention to accessibility parameters, user and dynamism.

GOAL 4 publishing, on the Electoral Justice portals, the action criteria and protocols for forwarding the notes received by the Notes Analysis Group, including examples of disinformation about the electoral process, explanations about mass shooting and other useful information, such as integrity policies and the reporting channels of Internet App providers.

GOAL 5 preparing and periodically publish a newsletter with information and updates related to the phenomenon of disinformation.

GOAL 6 building, in partnership with Aesi and the TREs, a practical guide to deal with episodes of disinformation in face-to-face consultations or on election day.

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AXIS 2 – ENABLE: MEDIA LITERACY AND TRAINING

The second axis of the program – Empower – aims at media and information literacy and the promotion of educational actions and training programs aimed both at the Electoral Justice internal public and at the external public, including Courts and other bodies, partners and citizens in general, with the objective of stimulating the development of skills so that they can engage in the digital world, understand the functioning and impact of the phenomenon of disinformation and expand their knowledge of the Brazilian electoral process. The axis aims to integrate and train the different participants to fulfill their role in the multisectoral strategy to confronting disinformation, with the involvement of the whole of society (*whole of society*), also promoting instances of dialog and cooperation between them. The team's experience in 2020 also indicated the need to foresee specific actions to promote greater integration of political parties in confronting the phenomenon, as well as to guarantee the mental health of those involved in confronting disinformation.

In this axis, therefore, the program foresees the following main initiatives:

- i. training for internal and external audiences on disinformation;
- ii. training for internal and external audiences on the electoral process;
- iii. awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public;
- iv. dialog with political parties to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of fighting against disinformation;
- v. support to other public institutions to implement programs to confronting disinformation.

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PROJECT 1: Training for the internal public on disinformation

Purpose: Training magistrates, civil servants and collaborators of the Electoral Justice, in addition to the public in general, to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the best approaches to face it, including from notions about the functioning of App providers.

Training for the internal public on disinformation	
Target audience	Civil servants, magistrates and employees of the Electoral Justice
Participants involved	AEED, civil society organizations, Internet App providers, Presidency/TSE, Secom, TREs and SGP
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED and Secom	
<p>GOAL 1 promoting, together with the program's partner digital platforms, events for civil servants and magistrates of the TREs, so that they understand the functioning of each one of them and can better identify disinformation in their scope and promote actions to prevent its dissemination, as well as report violations of its terms of use.</p> <p>GOAL 2 promoting courses to improve the knowledge of civil servants regarding the circulation of information on the networks, as well as communication strategies, emphasizing the following topics: (i) behavioral science and disinformation; (ii) inauthentic behaviors; (iii) and containment of radicalism and polarization.</p> <p>GOAL 3 distributing booklets and other educational materials on the main Internet App providers to the TREs, with information on their civic integrity policy and best practices in the use of their resources and functionalities.</p> <p>GOAL 4 holding a workshop for the TREs on the Committee to Confronting Disinformation, so that they can internally structure their own regional committees. Relevant topics for training are considered: (i) coordinated networks and inauthentic behavior; and (ii) Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques to investigate disinformation networks.</p> <p>GOAL 5 improving and update the Inside the Electoral Process – Confronting Disinformation course, considering recent and complementary materials.</p> <p>GOAL 6 Holding periodic meetings between the Management Group and Secom to share knowledge about false or fraudulent narratives and meta-narratives used against the electoral process.</p> <p>GOAL 7 circulating quarterly reports between the TREs and the Electoral Prosecutor Office with recent data and surveys on disinformation against the electoral process.</p> <p>GOAL 8 establishing dialog with international organizations to exchange experiences and information about the context of disinformation in other countries, main conspiracy theories, metanarratives, their modus operandi and the strategies that are being used to confronting them.</p> <p>GOAL 9 Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) - open and widely accessible course offering on disinformation, targeting citizens at large.</p>	

This project includes a specific measure for the promotion and preservation of the mental health of those involved in the fighting against disinformation:

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PROJECT 2: Prevention of mental illness and promotion of mental health of members, civil servants and employees of the Electoral Justice who deal directly with actions to contain disinformation

Purpose: Promoting, in association with the Health Care Coordination (Cats/TSE) of the People Management Secretariat (SGP/TSE), actions to prevent mental illnesses and promote the mental health of employees directly involved with initiatives to confronting disinformation, given the negative effects that fake news and hate speech can cause.

Prevention of mental illness and promotion of mental health of members, civil servants and employees of the Electoral Justice who deal directly with actions to contain disinformation	
Target audience	Members, civil servants and collaborators of the TSE and TREs
Participants involved	Members, civil servants and collaborators of the TSE (SGP and Cats) and the TREs
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: SGP/TSE and Cats/TSE	
GOAL 1 holding a meeting with the SGP/TSE and the Cats/TSE to discuss preventive measures for mental disorders and the promotion and preservation of the mental health of members, civil servants and collaborators of the TSE and the TREs.	
GOAL 2 implementing mental health actions periodically, in addition to publicizing the service channel.	

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PROJECT 3: Training for internal and external audiences on the electoral process

Purpose: Training Electoral Justice magistrates, civil servants and collaborators, as well as program partners, journalists, opinion makers and digital influencers and a broader external public on the electoral process, so that they can (i) act as disseminators of truthful information about the electoral process in general and on the security of the electronic voting process in particular; and (ii) exercise their political rights and citizenship in a conscious and informed manner.

Training for internal and external audiences on the electoral process	
Target audience	Electoral Justice civil servants and collaborators, program partners, journalists, with possible subsequent expansion to the wider external public
Participants involved	AEED, STI/TSE, Presidency/TSE, SGP/TSE, SGP/TREs, partner entities of the program
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED, STI/TSE and Secom/TSE	
GOAL 1 promoting training of spokespersons for the Electoral Justice (presidents, vice-presidents, Justices, judges, directors-general, managers and heads of notary) in order to strengthen the institutional discourse in defense of the electoral process.	
GOAL 2 training the focal points of the fight against disinformation within the scope of the TREs to form networks for the dissemination of official information.	
GOAL 3 promoting workshops for verification institutions and civil society partners on the electronic voting process and disinformation related to electronic voting machine security.	
GOAL 4 training journalists and civil servants on the electoral process, including recent legislative changes, general aspects of the organization and functioning of the Electoral Justice, accountability and disinformation in the electoral context.	
GOAL 5 expanding the dissemination of courses and training offered on the channels of the Electoral Judiciary School (EJE) and on the Mesários App.	
GOAL 6 expanding and deepening the election officials with a specific module in the App aimed exclusively at addressing disinformation against the electoral process.	
GOAL 7 developing training based on the main false news against the electoral process, as a measure to prevent (<i>prebunking</i>) the spread of false narratives that are repeated (“recycled”) each year.	
GOAL 8 developing actions, with the help of program partners, that aim to teach voters how disinformation about the electoral process can be created in simple and “friendly” interfaces, including the creation of gamified dynamics.	
GOAL 9 opening of the course Inside the Electoral Process – Confronting Disinformation to other bodies and the external public in general, in order to disseminate basic knowledge about the electoral process, electronic voting process and disinformation.	

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PROJECT 4: Awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public

Purpose: Instructing and raise awareness of the electorate and citizens in general about the phenomenon of disinformation, about the importance of fact checking, as well as about the electoral process, in order to (i) contribute so that voters can exercise their right to vote consciously and informed; (ii) strengthen the capacity of citizens to identify and face disinformation, especially in the electoral context; and (iii) prevent conflicts and scenarios of political violence, based on false narratives about the integrity of national claims.

Awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public	
Target audience	Specifically voters and citizens, in general
Participants involved	AEED, Secom/TSE, partner entities of the Program and civil society
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED and Secom/TSE	
GOAL 1 holding events on the phenomenon of disinformation on the networks, with the participation of TSE Justices and Electoral Justice officials, and lectures with specialists on the subject.	
GOAL 2 holding hybrid or online events on media education, democracy and disinformation, focusing on youth, with the participation of TSE Justices, Electoral Justice officials, and lectures with experts on the subject.	
GOAL 3 producing media campaigns with videos on the subject of disinformation and fact checking, with the possible participation of prominent people in the digital environment, for dissemination on social networks, radio and television. The diversity of campaign protagonists must be ensured, taking into account the context of polarization in social networks that creates cognitive blocks capable of preventing institutional campaigns from successfully reaching the target audience.	
GOAL 4 training communicators and influencers to produce content about the electoral process and the electronic voting system, in a language capable of dialoging and engaging society.	
GOAL 5 expanding actions to confronting disinformation in radio and TV vehicles, such as the “Check Minute”.	
GOAL 6 launching a massive campaign against the spread of fake news, seeking support from party leaders, members of civil society and program partners (Brazil without Fake – for a Country Free of Fake News).	

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PROJECT 5: Cooperation and actions to enhance the reach of partners' media and information literacy initiatives

Purpose: Promoting dialog and cooperation between partners in the area of media and information literacy to enhance the reach of existing initiatives.

Cooperation and actions to enhance the reach of partners' media and information literacy initiatives	
Target audience	Civil society organizations that are partners in the program
Participants involved	AEED, Secom/TSE, Presidency/TSE, program partners
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED and Secom/TSE	
GOAL 1 discussing with partner institutions working in the area of media and information literacy strategies to enhance the reach of media and information literacy initiatives, especially during the electoral period.	
GOAL 2 Implementing, in cooperation with partner institutions, strategies to expand the reach of media and information literacy initiatives.	

PROJECT 6: Interlocution with political parties to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of confronting disinformation

Purpose: Promoting dialog with political parties to make them aware of their responsibility towards a healthy information environment in which the creation and use of disinformation networks and inauthentic behavior in electoral campaigns is discouraged.

Interlocution with political parties to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of confronting disinformation	
Target audience	Political parties and party federations
Participants involved	AEED, Presidency/TSE, political parties and party federations
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED and Presidency/TSE	
GOAL 1 holding a meeting with representatives of all national bodies of parties and party federations, with a brief presentation on the impacts and risks of the phenomenon of disinformation.	
GOAL 2 promoting events for political parties, together with the program's partner digital platforms, so that they understand the functioning of each of them and can better identify disinformation in their scope, promoting actions to prevent its dissemination, as well as denounce violations of its terms of use.	
GOAL 3 proposing a term of commitment for representatives of national bodies of political parties and party federations to commit to (i) carrying out activities aimed at raising awareness among affiliates about the phenomenon of disinformation; and with (ii) the adoption of measures to discourage the creation and use of disinformation networks and inauthentic behavior in electoral campaigns.	

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PROJECT 7: Support to other electoral bodies and public institutions to implement actions to confronting disinformation

Purpose: Enable the implementation of actions to confronting disinformation in other public institutions and in various electoral bodies.

Support for electoral bodies and public institutions to implement similar programs to confronting disinformation	
Target audience	Public institutions
Participants involved	AEED and Presidency of the TSE
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED and International Advisory	
GOAL 1 coordinating the dialog with other Courts and national bodies through workshops, meetings and ongoing dialog, proactively or on demand.	
GOAL 2 coordinating dialog and cooperation with electoral bodies in other countries to confronting disinformation.	

AXIS 3 – RESPOND: IDENTIFICATION AND CONTAINMENT OF DISINFORMATION

The third axis of the Program – Respond – aims to adopt concrete measures to identify, contain and discourage disinformation practices and other types of manipulation of the information environment, at three levels: (i) monitoring of social networks to identify inauthentic behavior, as well as disinformation content, manipulation campaigns and other types of information disorder; (ii) adoption of quick and effective responses to mitigate the negative impact of cases of disinformation identified from the monitoring; (iii) discouraging disinformation practices from structural and systemic responses defined on the basis of trends and experiences extracted from activities to identify and contain disinformation.

In this axis, therefore, the program foresees the following main initiatives:

- i. Permanent Coalition for Checking;
- ii. engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in confronting structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior;
- iii. creation of a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process; and
- iv. revision and elaboration of norms that fight against the practice of disinformation in the scope of the Electoral Justice, as a way of preventing the phenomenon.

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PROJECT 1: Permanent Coalition for Checking

Purpose: Coordinate and foster the permanent fact-checking network and the provision of information on the electoral process, through collaboration and partnership with fact-checking agencies and institutions. The Standing Coalition for Checking will be formed: (i) in the verification axis, by institutions and verification agencies that are partners of the Program; (ii) in terms of providing information on the electoral process, by representatives of the TSE and two representatives of each of the TREs.

Permanent Coalition for Checking	
Target audience	Civil society
Participants Involved	Fact-checking institutions, media and press outlets, Internet App providers, TSEs and TREs
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: Secom/TSE and AEED	
GOAL 1 holding meetings with verification institutions to discuss the challenges faced and the construction of a permanent cooperation agreement.	
GOAL 2 preparing and proposing a cooperation agreement with fact-checking institutions to the creation of a permanent network for fact-checking and providing information on the electoral process, in which, at least, the scope of checking (electoral process) and the work plan to be developed are defined.	
GOAL 3 defining workflow within the Coalition, applicable to the institutions involved.	
GOAL 4 organizing, within the scope of the TSE, a team responsible for quickly collecting and providing information to enable the checks.	
GOAL 5 requesting the update of the nomination of representatives of each TRE to compose the Coalition. The request will be made through the forwarding of official letters to the TREs.	
GOAL 6 updating the composition of the WhatsApp group and managing an editable spreadsheet for recording the flow of information and checking, for the purposes of operationalizing the Coalition.	
GOAL 7 ensuring periodic access to reports and analytics from the Fact or Rumor website as soon as these functionalities are operating	
GOAL 8 promoting the dialog between the checking institutions and the Internet App providers that are partners of the program.	

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PROJECT 2: Engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in fighting against structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior

Purpose: Developing cooperation agreements with Internet App providers that favor the mobilization of these digital platforms and their technological resources in favor of disseminating true information about the electoral process and confronting inauthentic behavior.

Engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in fighting against structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior

Target audience	Civil society
Participants involved	Internet App providers, TSE Presidency, Secom/TSE and AEED

Institutional organization

Internal responsible: AEED

GOAL 1 holding regular meetings with Internet App providers that are partners of the program to learn about their new initiatives in the fighting against disinformation and discuss possibilities for innovation in the partnership on behalf of the integrity of the process.

GOAL 2 promoting dialog with Internet App providers that do not yet participate in the program, seeking their adhesion and the celebration of a partnership in the fighting against disinformation.

GOAL 3 celebrating memoranda of understanding with the program's partner Internet App providers to establish specific initiatives and concrete measures to be implemented throughout the election year, monitoring the implementation of initiatives through periodic meetings.

GOAL 4 proposing the improvement of the civic integrity policies of Internet App providers, based on clear rules of content moderation for the Brazilian electoral context, including detailing the protocol of action in cases of identification of coordinated inauthentic behavior and publication of information misleading about the electoral process, as well as correlated hypotheses of political violence, hate speech and other issues that negatively impact the elections.

GOAL 5 establishing reporting and/or communication channels with Internet App providers in order to allow citizens and Electoral Justice bodies to report suspected mass shootings and dissemination of false information on the Internet. Seeking prompt and diligent action in the analysis of complaints made by the TSE.

GOAL 6 proposing the adoption of an exceptional action protocol that provides for imperative and promptly actions in cases of dissemination of serious disinformation capable of compromising the integrity of the election (such as unfounded allegations of fraud in the election results, serious threats and false announcement about the cancellation of the elections) Also carrying out simulations of the protocol operation before the critical period of the elections, in order to test the speed and adequacy of the adopted measures.

GOAL 7 encouraging the elaboration and periodic dissemination of data on the general application of the platforms' policies in cases of disinformation (transparency center), especially during the electoral period, both for the public in general and for national researchers. Also requesting training on the use of this data and APIs for Brazilian researchers and journalists.

GOAL 8 requesting access to data and periodic reports with statistics on cases of disinformation received against the electoral process and the respective measures adopted.

GOAL 9 requesting and encouraging the development of initiatives that strengthen the work of national researchers.

GOAL 10 soliciting and encouraging the development of initiatives that strengthen the fact-checker ecosystem.

GOAL 11 promoting dialog between civil society organizations that represent vulnerable groups that are targets of hate speech and platforms, encouraging the development of initiatives to protect these groups.

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PROJECT 3: Whistleblowing channel for mass shooting of content in partnership with WhatsApp

Purpose: Creation of an electronic form that allows citizens in general to send mass shooting complaints.

Whistleblowing channel for mass shooting of content in partnership with WhatsApp	
Target audience	Civil society
Participants involved	Internet App providers, TSE Presidency, STI/TSE, Secom/TSE and AEED
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED and STI/TSE	
GOAL 1 building an electronic form that allows voters and citizens in general to submit mass shooting complaints.	
GOAL 2 improving the operation of the whistleblower channel with the ticket system, increasing the speed in extracting and forwarding data to WhatsApp.	
GOAL 3 publicizing, in advance and widely, the mass shooting complaint channel.	

Project 4: Creation of a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process

Purpose: Creating a network to monitor disinformation practices operated through the Internet that could be considered harmful to the electoral process. The monitoring and intelligence network, based on open sources, must be able to (i) identify, expose and disseminate disinformation practices against the electoral process; and (ii) communicate the identified disinformation practices to the TSE, proposing, if applicable, the corresponding counter-information measures and Information Technology resources suitable for that purpose. The activities of this network are concentrated within the scope of the TSE, in the Analysis and Monitoring Group, without prejudice to the integration of external partners.

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Creation of a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process

Target audience	Electoral Justice
Participants involved	AEED, TSE, TREs and electoral place stations, Institutional Security Office of the Presidency of the Republic (GSI and Abin), Ministry of Justice (Integrated Center of Command and Control – Judicial Police, Electoral Justice, Prosecutor Office, Armed Forces), Directorate of Intelligence of the Federal Police (DIP), forensic laboratories, research institutions, civil society organizations, Internet App providers

Institutional organization

Internal responsible: AEED and digital coordinator to combat disinformation

GOAL 1 establishing collaboration agreements with forensic laboratories and other research institutions and specialized civil society organizations, with the objective of monitoring coordinated networks for the dissemination of disinformation, with information sharing, establishment of a communication channel for forwarding notes and reports, as well as training.

GOAL 2 establishing collaboration agreements with technology companies to exchange knowledge and carry out joint actions in the area of cybersecurity.

GOAL 3 hiring a company specialized in monitoring networks, with Information Technology and Communications resources capable of identifying disinformation practices that involve the electoral process. The monitoring tool must operate based on open sources and detect disinformation content in at least four social networks, based on criteria and indicators previously established within the scope of the Notes Analysis Group.

GOAL 4 seeking more external partners that have the capacity to identify inauthentic behavior and build cooperation terms with them for sharing reports based on public data.

GOAL 5 developing an internal ticketing platform, organized into its own ticket management system demands, for the registration of receipts of disinformation content about the electoral process (“notes”) and for the automated submission of complaints to the platforms.

GOAL 6 improving the flow of receiving complaints through the Court’s Ombudsman.

GOAL 7 designating and training the team of civil servants that will integrate the Analysis and Monitoring Group, with the coordination made by the AEED team. The person appointed to represent Secom will be trained to operate the contracted monitoring tool and any tools made available by partners with expertise in the area.

GOAL 8 hiring a data analysis and disinformation specialist to join the TSE monitoring team.

GOAL 9 narrowing contact with the TREs, through the exchange of information focusing the points designated to work in the Strategic Committee and in the Coalition for Checks, in order to expanding and spreading the network for monitoring and identifying disinformation about the electoral process.

GOAL 10 hiring a URL perpetual tool or celebrating a partnership with a company that provides the aforementioned service, so that a database of the occurrences received can be maintained, before the eventual deletion of the URL.

GOAL 11 establishing reporting and/or communication channels with Internet App providers in order to allow citizens and Electoral Justice bodies to report suspected mass shootings and dissemination of false information on the Internet.

GOAL 12 implementing the Integrated Center for National Command and Control (CICCN), using the existing one under the coordination of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), to identifying disinformation practices via the Internet, in order to verifying the possibility of counter-information measures, answering to the Electoral Justice, and to speed up judicial police measures in the event of verified crimes.

GOAL 13 integrating the CICCN and the bodies that comprise it in training actions.

GOAL 14 informing the CICCN about the data related to occurrences connected to disinformation against the electoral process, to update the indicator in the monitoring panel released on election days.

GOAL 15 collecting and analyzing data to support future preventive or “prophylactic” campaigns, such as a video about the “top 10 recycled fakes”.

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Project 5: Partnership and dialog with the Federal Police (PF) and the Electoral Prosecutor Office (MPE)

Purpose: Establish a close, agile and effective communication network between the TSE and the representative(s) of the PF and MPE, so that cases of disinformation that constitute illicit acts, such as those provided for in arts. 296 and 297 of the Electoral Code, which are: “promote disorder that harms electoral work” and “prevent or hinder the exercise of suffrage”, or even situations that fall under threat, violence, damage to the electronic voting machines, political violence, among others. It may also be reported hypotheses that can be classified in art. 9-A of TSE Resolution No. 23,610/2019.

Partnership and dialog with the PF and MPE	
Target audience	Voters and civil society
Participants involved	Presidency/TSE, AEED, PF, MPE, Aesi
Institutional organization	Internal responsible: AEED
GOAL 1	requesting the appointment of representative(s) of the PF and MPE who will act focusing these institutions in the Program to Confronting Disinformation, via official letter.
GOAL 2	creating virtual communication groups that allow quick dialog between representatives of the PF and MPE, the Program Management Group, and representative(s) of Aesi, in order to facilitate and expedite the forwarding of cases received in the Electoral Court in which there are indications of committing crimes, given the urgency of situations of this nature.
GOAL 3	developing training with the intelligence and investigation departments of the PF and the Prosecutor Office (MP) on monitoring social networks and strategies to confronting disinformation.
GOAL 4	deepening the integration and improving the workflow with representatives of the MPE and PF.

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Project 6: Cyber-Intelligence Strategic Committee

Purpose: Create a committee capable of responding, quickly and efficiently, to cyber incidents and events linked to the TSE's digital infrastructure, such as: (i) security of the official systems and channels of the Electoral Justice; (ii) data leakage; and (iii) phishing. The adoption of concrete measures capable of reacting to cyber incidents is essential to prevent rumors arising from trivial technology problems from being transformed into narratives that aim at a mere attack on the credibility of the electoral process.

Cyber-Intelligence Strategic Committee	
Target audience	TSE, voters and civil society
Participant involved	Presidency/TSE, AEED, digital coordinator to confronting disinformation, STI, technology and infrastructure service providers
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED and digital coordinator to confronting disinformation	
GOAL 1 establishing more robust channels with main technology and infrastructure providers, able to contribute to cyber-intelligence strategies throughout the election period.	
GOAL 2 creating virtual communication groups with members of the Management Group, STI and technology and infrastructure service providers.	
GOAL 3 elaborating operational flows with prediction of action in cases of cyber-attacks.	
GOAL 4 performing internal simulations, exercises with attack and defense teams and monitoring.	
GOAL 5 developing training on systems security, data leakage, phishing and other topics involving cyberintelligence.	
GOAL 6 constantly improving the protocols for forwarding notes to platforms, MP, PF and the Center for the Prevention, Treatment and Response to Government Cyber Incidents (CTIR-Gov) in the event of cyber crimes.	

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Project 7: Review and elaboration of norms to confronting the practice of disinformation within the Electoral Justice as a way of preventing the phenomenon

Purpose: Observing the Court's institutional limits, collaborating for the discussion of law projects dealing with the issue of disinformation, as well as contributing to the TSE's resolutions on the subject.

Review and elaboration of norms to confronting the practice of disinformation within the Electoral Justice	
Target audience	Legislative Power, TSE and civil society
Participants involved	AEED, civil society entities and organizations
Institutional organization	
Internal responsible: AEED	
GOAL 1 monitoring the progress of projects dealing with the issue of disinformation, in particular Law Project (PL) No. 2,630 (PL of Fake News), as well as contribute, as far as possible, to the improvement of propositions.	
GOAL 2 participating in debates, seminars and conferences that discuss the improvement of the legal system to confronting disinformation, through the members of the Management Group, especially those organized by Program partners and civil society entities and organizations active in the subject.	
GOAL 3 monitoring the jurisprudence of the TSE and the TREs on disinformation, preparing a compilation of the most important judgments on the subject.	
GOAL 4 ensuring the participation of members of the Program Management Group in the working groups dedicated to the elaboration of proposed resolutions related to the theme in order to evaluate the inclusion and/or alteration of norms aimed at confronting disinformation practices.	

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IX. Schedule

Schedule																											
Axes	Initiatives	2021												2022													
		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		
1	Massive information dissemination network	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	Chatbot – Electoral question-answer on WhatsApp								x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	Access, dissemination and empowerment of the scope of checks								x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	Deepening electoral transparency								x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	Development and improvement of other technological tools and digital channels								x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
2	Training for the internal audience										x				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Mental health prevention														x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Training for internal and external audiences														x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Awareness campaigns and media and information education actions								x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Cooperation and actions to enhance the reach of partner media and information literacy initiatives								x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Dialog with political parties						x									x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Support to other public institutions															x	x	x	x	x							
3	Permanent Coalition for Checking	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Engagement of digital platforms	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Mass shooting reporting channel														x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Creation of monitoring network														x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Partnership and dialog with the PF and MPE														x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Cyber-Intelligence Strategic Committee														x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Review and development of standards to confronting the practice of disinformation								x	x	x	x	x									x	x	x	x		

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X. Assessment Plan

The evaluation of the Program is structured based on its functioning, following the systemic, multidisciplinary and multisectoral model. Thus, the measurement of the impacts of the actions developed will occur, firstly, from the perspective of the Electoral Justice members themselves, as well as the Program's partners.

Regarding this, a research form will be developed, in partnership with partner academic institutions: (i) to magistrates and civil servants of the Electoral Justice and; (ii) to election officials staff, through its own App. In the same way, a questionnaire will be structured internally, with the collaboration of SMG and with possible suggestions from the academy, to be submitted to the partners according to their working group. The survey report will be delivered in December 2022, providing an insight into the challenges faced, the impact of the Program and possibilities for improvement.

In addition to the opinion survey, the Program will have a post-election midterm evaluation with independent election observers.

Finally, a final report will be prepared by the Management Group with the results of the actions developed and the balance of the initiatives carried out under the Program, as well as the lessons learned and the proposals to strengthen the fighting against disinformation. The document will be released by August 2023.

Type of assessment	Date	Contributors	Instrument
Survey Research	December 2022	Members and collaborators of the Electoral Justice and partner institutions	Research report and expert analysis
Post-election midterm evaluation	March 2023	Independent election observers	Meeting and report
Actions and results report	August 2023	Program Management Group (AEED)	Report

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ANNEX I

PARTNERS OF THE ELECTORAL JUSTICE PERMANENT PROGRAM ON COUNTERING DISINFORMATION – BY JANUARY 2022

Seq.	Organization/Institution	Date of Accession
1	Associação Brasileira de Emissoras de Rádio e Televisão (Abert)	30/8/2019
2	Associação Brasileira de Imprensa (ABI)	30/8/2019
3	Associação Brasileira de Internet (Abranet)	30/8/2019
4	Associação Brasileira de Rádio e Televisão (Abratel)	30/8/2019
5	Associação Brasileira de Provedores de Internet e Telecomunicações (Abrint)	30/8/2019
6	Associação Nacional de Jornais (ANJ)	30/8/2019
7	Agência aos Fatos	30/8/2019
8	Associação Acredito	30/8/2019
9	Associação Brasileira das Agências de Comunicação (Abracom)	30/8/2019
10	Associação InternetLab de Pesquisa em Direito e Tecnologia	30/8/2019
11	Boatos.org	30/8/2019
12	Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil (CGI.br)	30/8/2019
13	Instituto Palavra Aberta	30/8/2019
14	Instituto Update	30/8/2019
15	Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública	30/8/2019
16	Ministério Público Federal	30/8/2019
17	Conselho Federal da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB)	30/8/2019
18	Partido Avante	30/8/2019
19	Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB)	30/8/2019
20	Partido DC – Democracia Cristã	30/8/2019
21	Partido Democratas	30/8/2019
22	Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro (PRTB)	30/8/2019
23	Partido Solidariedade	30/8/2019
24	Partido Progressistas (PP)	30/8/2019
25	Partido Republicanos	30/8/2019
26	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)	30/8/2019
27	Politize!	30/8/2019
28	Safernet Brasil	30/8/2019
29	Sociedade Brasileira de Computação (SBC)	30/8/2019

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Seq.	Organization/Institution	Date of Accession
30	Secretaria Executiva do Comitê Nacional do Movimento de Combate à Corrupção Eleitoral (MCCE)	30/8/2019
31	Agência Lupa	30/8/2019
32	Partido Social Cristão (PSC)	30/8/2019
33	Partido Podemos (Pode)	30/8/2019
34	Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT)	30/8/2019
35	Gabinete de Segurança Institucional da Presidência da República (GSI)	4/9/2019
36	Instituto Não Aceito Corrupção (Inac)	8/10/2019
37	Twitter Brasil Rede de Informação Ltda.	17/10/2019
38	WhatsApp Inc.	21/10/2019
39	Facebook Serviços Online do Brasil Ltda.	22/10/2019
40	Google Brasil Internet Ltda.	22/10/2019
41	Associação Nacional de Editores de Revistas (Aner)	5/11/2019
42	Um a Mais Serviços de Tecnologia e Consultoria Ltda.	1º/10/2019
43	Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU)	26/11/2019
44	Academia Brasileira de Direito Eleitoral e Político (Abradep)	27/11/2019
45	Instituto Liberdade Digital (ILD)	27/11/2019
46	Freitas e Bittencourt Sociedade de Advogados	3/12/2019
47	Conselho Nacional dos Procuradores-Gerais do Ministério Público dos Estados e da União (CNPGE)	28/11/2019
48	Grupo Nacional de Coordenadores Eleitorais (GNACE)	28/11/2019
49	Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia em Democracia Digital (INCT.DD)	18/2/2020
50	Redes Cordiais	11/5/2020
51	Senado Federal	27/6/2020
52	Instituto Tecnologia e Equidade (IT&E)	10/9/2020
53	Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)	22/9/2020
54	Globo Comunicação e Participação S.A.	26/9/2020
55	Editora Globo S.A.	
56	Rádio Excelsior S.A.	
57	Sindicato Nacional das Empresas de Telefonia e de Serviço Móvel Celular e Pessoal (Sinditelebrasil)	29/9/2020
58	Byte Dance Brasil Tecnologia Ltda. (TikTok)	30/9/2020
59	Brasil Serviços de Valor Adicionado Ltda. (Infobip)	1º/10/2020
60	Clube Associativo dos Profissionais de Marketing Político (Camp)	7/10/2020
61	Instituto Tecnologia e Sociedade (ITS Rio)	9/10/2020

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Seq.	Organization/Institution	Date of Accession
62	Fundação João Mangabeira (FJM)	16/10/2020
63	The Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab)	21/10/2020
64	Bluetrix Tecnologia Ltda.	23/10/2020
65	Avaaz	27/10/2020
66	Instituto Igarapé	23/11/2020
67	Instituto de Ciências Exatas da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (ICEX -UFMG)	24/08/2021
68	Instituto Vero de Pesquisa e Educação em Comunicação Digital	23/09/2021
69	Fundação Tide de Azevedo Setubal	24/09/2021
70	Microsoft do Brasil Importação e Comércio de Software e Vídeo Games LTDA	5/10/2021
71	Joyo Tecnologia Brasil LTDA (Kwai)	18/11/2021
72	Laboratório de Estudos de Internet e Redes Sociais da Escola de Comunicação UFRJ (Netlab)	23/11/2021

