

b. National Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region

Against the backdrop of the existence of various political systems, the concentration of nation states that possess large-scale military force, including nuclear weapons, and the insufficiently legislated regional cooperation frameworks on national security, so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, are likely to arise, and this risks further aggravation of the situation.

North Korea has enhanced the capability of its WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as well as repeatedly carried out provocative military actions, increasing tension in the region.

While there is an expectation for China to share and

comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues, it has been rapidly strengthening and expanding its military capabilities without sufficient transparency, taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the current status quo in the seas including the East China Sea and South China Sea, and rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan. In addition, there is a mutual existence of stability and potential instability in the relationship between the sides of the Taiwan Strait.

(3) Japan's Strategic Approach to National Security

Japan should take a strategic approach centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy as shown in the reference.

See Fig. II-2-1-3 (Outline of Japan's Strategic Approach to National Security)

Section 2 Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines

1 Basic Approach – Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

The NDPG calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan's peace and security.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the number and the duration of situations, including so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, which require the SDF's commitment are both increasing. Therefore, it is essential to regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and swiftly build a response posture in accordance with the development of the situation to prevent further escalation of a situation. In dealing with such situations, it is also essential to minimize the damage by dealing with situations by effective response through achieving necessary maritime supremacy¹ and air superiority². Among these situations, the quality and quantity of the defense force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily sufficient.

The NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, calls for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability by pursuing further joint operations, improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing defense capabilities

adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities. To this end, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to the SDF's total functions and capabilities, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be comprehensively prioritized. The NDPG carries great significance as it has made it possible to adapt to an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, and realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability build-up, based on the results of these capability assessments.

Additionally, it requires the build-up of the most effective operational posture, by further strengthening a wide-ranging logistical support foundation. Specifically, the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of various fields as the basic foundations for the SDF such as training and exercise, operational infrastructure, personnel and education, medical, defense production and technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancement of the intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense.

See Appendix 2 Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability

¹ See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Effective Deterrence and Response)

² See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Effective Deterrence and Response)

2 A New Security Environment

1 The Global Security Environment

As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately expand among the entire international community. Moreover, there are shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the U.S., along with an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies, and cases of undue infringement upon freedom of the high seas. In addition, securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace is becoming a significant challenge.

2 The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

While countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships, gray-zone situations tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations.

North Korea has deployed a massive military force and continues to maintain and strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities. Furthermore, North Korea has also repeatedly taken actions that heightened tension in the region. In particular, with regard to nuclear and missile development, North Korea is planning to make technological improvements to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its ballistic missiles. The possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. As such, this issue poses a serious and imminent threat to Japan's security, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan.

As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner, its military trends have caused security concerns for the Asia-Pacific region and the international community. The trends include continuous increases in its defense expenditures at a high

level, efforts to deny access and deployment as well as prevention of military activities to its surrounding areas by foreign militaries, insufficient transparency concerning its military, rapid expansion and intensification of activities in the maritime and aerial domains, and attempts to change the status quo by force in maritime areas.

As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active.

The U.S. has clearly manifested its decision on the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fiscal and various other constraints while enhancing its relationships with its allies, among other efforts.

3 Japan's Geographical Characteristics

As Japan is a maritime state, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity. Japan also faces security vulnerabilities such as frequent natural disasters, concentration of population, and a large number of nuclear power plants in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, its impact may spread to the international community. It is increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake.

4 Issues to be Tackled by Japan

As various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and it is difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Therefore, it is increasingly necessary that countries which share interests in responding to shared security and other challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability.

3 Japan's Basic Defense Policy

1 Basic policy

In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture, and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, thereby seeking to establish an infrastructure necessary for fully exercising its defense capabilities.

Under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-

oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. is indispensable. Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S., and take appropriate responses through its own efforts. In addition, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

2 Japan's Own Efforts

Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. In the event of various situations, Japan will appropriately and promptly make decisions and seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others.

Furthermore, Japan will continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people, and will enhance the capability to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals in foreign countries in an emergency situation.

In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training, and exercises.

Furthermore, Japan will make efforts to build up a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as mentioned above, in addition to the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture.

3 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan's own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan's national security. Also, the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. From this perspective, Japan will place emphasis on the following efforts:

(1) Strengthening Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan will continue revising the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation³. In addition, Japan will promote joint training and exercises, joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas. Japan will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination.

(2) Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Broad Range of Fields

The Japan-U.S. Alliance will strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping and counter terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. In addition, Japan will constantly

strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence, and defense equipment and technology.

(3) Steady Implementation of Measures Relating to the Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan

Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa and other local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by the U.S. Forces.

4 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region

Japan will promote a variety of cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, with regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia and India, Japan will make efforts to improve cooperation and interoperability. Japan will also endeavor to promote dialogue and exchanges with China and Russia.

Additionally, with regard to capacity building assistance, Japan will promote and carry it out in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Official Development Assistance (ODA), and Japan will expand the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope.

Furthermore, in multilateral security cooperation and dialogue, Japan, in cooperation with the U.S. and Australia, will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region, and Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises.

(2) Cooperation with the International Community

It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, such forces play an important role in building peace and promoting confidence-building. Therefore, Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and capacity building assistance on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community. Specifically Japan will strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), along with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries. Furthermore, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular, will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF's capabilities.

³ On April 27, 2015, new Guidelines were approved between Japan and the U.S.

4 Future Defense Forces

1 Role of the Defense Forces

(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations

Japan will achieve intelligence superiority⁴ through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate any change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations from an early stage, including gray zone situations, and establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

In particular, the following points will be emphasized:

(1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters.

(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environment

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the region. Moreover, by working in partnership with its allies and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance.

In order to respond appropriately to global security issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance. Japan will attach importance to the following in particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting defense cooperation and exchange; (3) promoting capacity building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security; (5) implementing international peace cooperation activities; and (6) cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

2 Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the SDF

(1) Basic Approach

Based on the results of the capability assessments conducted based on the standpoint of joint operations in relation to

various potential contingencies, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.

At the same time, in terms of preparation for an invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

(2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized

The SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces.

○ ISR capabilities

Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, and adopt a flexible approach for boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.

○ Intelligence capabilities

Japan will strengthen its system for collecting intelligence, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations and take other actions. In doing so, the SDF will seek to enhance its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to establish a framework for the securing and nurturing of personnel in information gathering and analysis.

○ Transport capability

In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with the civilian transport sector on a regular basis.

○ Command and control, and information and communication capabilities

In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), among other measures. The SDF will also strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions

⁴ Intelligence superiority refers to having an advantage over the other party in terms of quick and correct identification, collecting, processing and conveying of intelligence.

among the three services, along with other capabilities.

- Response to an attack on remote islands
The SDF will strengthen its engagement capability for the ensuring of maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for an effective response. The SDF will strengthen the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan's remote islands, and newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands. Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region. In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.
- Response to ballistic missile attacks
To counter North Korea's improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against ballistic missiles. With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory. Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan's own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take necessary means.
- Response in outer space and cyberspace
While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will enhance the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness.
As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment.
- Responses to major disasters, etc.
The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately sized units.
- Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities
The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units. The SDF will also work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and on strengthening logistics and medical service structure.

Furthermore, the SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems.

3 Architecture of Each Service of the Self-Defense Forces

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

In order to respond swiftly to an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units capable of effectively performing amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain half of these rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment.

The GSDF will implement rationalization and streamlining with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets, and review the organization and equipment of units.

The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of FY2013, in order to ensure sufficient personnel availability to respond to major disasters or other situations.

(2) Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)

The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers to 54 (14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer improved response capabilities for various missions and have more compact designs, and will maintain ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime traffic. Furthermore, two Aegis-equipped destroyers⁵ will be added, bringing the fleet to eight.

Furthermore, in order to effectively carry out regular information gathering and warning and surveillance activities, as well as patrolling of surrounding waters⁶ and defense operations, the MSDF will maintain an augmented submarine fleet and patrol aircraft units.

(3) Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF)

The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons as well as establish one new squadron in the air warning unit⁷.

As for Fighter Aircraft Units, the 13th squadron will be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to the

⁵ Destroyers equipped with the Aegis Weapon System that uses high performance computers to automatically process series of operations such as target search, detection, identification and attack.

⁶ The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.

⁷ The Airborne Early Warning Group was reorganized on April 20, 2014 and the 603rd Squadron with E-2C early warning aircraft was newly established at Naha Air Base.

Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a two-squadron architecture.

Furthermore, the ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF.

See Fig. II-2-2-1 (NDPG Comparison Tables)
 Fig. II-2-2-2 (Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes))
 Fig. II-2-2-3 (Structure of the Major Units of the ASDF in the 2013 NDPG (Changes))

Fig. II-2-2-1 NDPG Comparison Tables

Category		1976 NDPG	1995 NDPG	2004 NDPG	2010 NDPG	2013 NDPG	
GSDF	Authorized Number of personnel	180,000	160,000	155,000	154,000	159,000	
	Active-Duty Personnel		145,000	148,000	147,000	151,000	
	Reserve-Ready Personnel		15,000	7,000	7,000	8,000	
	Major units	Regionally deployed units in peacetime ⁴	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	5 divisions 2 brigades
		Rapid Deployment Units	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training group 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness	Central Readiness 1 armored division	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile units					5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments
		Major Equipment	Tanks ³ Artillery (Main artillery) ³	(approx. 1,200) (approx. 1,000/vehicle)	approx. 900 (approx. 900/vehicle)	approx. 600 (approx. 600/vehicle)	approx. 400 (approx. 400/vehicle)
	MSDF	Major units	Destroyer units			4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 divisions	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions
			for mobile operations regional deployment	4 flotillas (Regional units) 10 units	4 flotillas (Regional units) 7 units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions	
Submarine units			6 divisions	6 divisions	4 divisions	6 divisions	6 divisions
Minesweeper Units			2 flotillas	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	1 flotilla
Patrol aircraft units		(Land-based) 16 squadrons	(Land-based) 13 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	
Major Equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft	approx. 60 16 approx. 220	approx. 50 16 approx. 170	47 16 approx. 150	48 22 approx. 150	54 22 approx. 170	
ASDF	Major units	Air Warning & Control Units	28 warning groups 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	28 warning squadron 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units			12 squadrons	12 squadrons	13 squadrons
		Fighter-interceptor units	10 squadrons	9 squadrons			
		Support fighter units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons			
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	
	Aerial refueling/transport units			1 squadron	1 squadron	2 squadrons	
Major Equipment	Combat aircraft (Fighters)	approx. 430 (approx. 350) ³	approx. 400 approx. 300	approx. 350 approx. 260	approx. 340 approx. 260	approx. 360 approx. 280	
Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions ¹	Aegis-equipped destroyers			4 ships	6 ships ²	8 ships	
	Air Warning & Control Units			7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons	11 warning groups/units		
	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units			3 groups	6 groups		

Notes: 1. "Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions" are included in the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF in the 2004 NDPG and the 2010 NDPG, but their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of destroyers (Aegis-equipped destroyers), air warning & control units, and surface-to-air guided missile units in the 2013 NDPG.
 2. Additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.
 3. Although not stated in the Attached Tables of 1976 NDPG and the 2013 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG Attached Table from 1995 to 2010.
 4. Units referred to as Regional Deployment Units in the 2013 NDPG.

Fig. II-2-2-2 Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes)


Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes)

New Structure

○ In order to defend the seas surrounding Japan and ensure the security of maritime traffic through effectively conducting various operations such as persistent ISR and anti-submarine operations etc., the MSDF promotes various programs, and steadily obtains and secures maritime supremacy.

Location of Headquarters, etc., of Destroyer/Submarine/Aircraft Units, etc.


Units planned to be established are shown in red.



Structure of Destroyer Units

Destroyers *47 destroyers as of the end of 2013 (48 destroyers (12 divisions) in the 2010 NDPG) → 54 destroyers (14 divisions) in the 2013 NDPG.

- Increased number of destroyers by introduction of the new destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull.
- Destroyers with detachable equipment for minesweeping and anti-submarine operations.
- Establishment of an 8-destroyer structure with 2 additional Aegis-equipped destroyers.
- Continued procurement of destroyers (DD).



Structure of Patrol Aircraft Units

Patrol Aircraft

- Maintenance of current structure (65 aircraft) of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1/3C) through continued procurement of P-1.
- Increased number of patrol helicopters (SH-60K/J) (72 helicopters in the 2010 NDPG) → 80 helicopters in the 2013 NDPG.




Structure of Submarine Units

Submarines *16 submarines as of the end of 2013. (22 submarines in the 2010 NDPG) → 22 submarines in the 2013 NDPG.

- Continued increase in the number of submarines through construction and life extension.



Capabilities of New Destroyer




Others

Other main programs

- Refit tank landing ships (operation of amphibious vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft).
- Consider what the role should be of a multipurpose vessel with capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations.
- Provide new destroyers with capabilities for anti-mine operations.
- Extend the life of existing vessels (destroyers) and aircraft (P-3C, SH-60J).



Fig. II-2-2-3 Structure of the Major Units of the ASDF in the 2013 NDPG (Changes)



5 Basic Foundation for SDF

To ensure that the defense force can function as effectively as possible, it is also imperative to strengthen the following foundations underpinning the defense force.

1 Training and Exercises

The SDF will enhance and strengthen training and exercises by making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, and working in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector. In the southwest region, the SDF will promote the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community.

2 Operations Infrastructure

The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively. Moreover, the SDF will promote the maintenance of facilities of each service as well as quarters, thereby enhancing its readiness.

The SDF will undertake deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, in order to ensure that such

facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away.

In addition, the SDF will secure and stockpile the necessary ammunition, and maintain and upgrade SDF equipment.

3 Personnel Education

The SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF.

The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the integrated operations structure, the SDF will, through enhanced education and training, retain personnel who can respond flexibly and rapidly to various situations.

The SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures, and promote support for re-employment by

strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations. Furthermore, in order to support sustainable operation of units, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, and take measures to improve the sufficiency of reserve personnel.

4 Medical

The SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training such medical staff as medical officers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. The SDF will improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation.

5 Defense Production and Technological Bases

The MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technological bases as a whole, and will promote adapting defense equipment to civilian use⁸.

Furthermore, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment⁹.

See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

6 Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

In order to achieve efficient and effective acquisition of equipment, the MOD will introduce a project manager system, and strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle, including technological aspects. The MOD will consider the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts.

The MOD will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the contract system.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Initiatives for Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters)

7 Research and Development

The MOD will ensure consistency with the priorities for research and development and upgrading defense capability, given the operational needs of the SDF in view of the severe fiscal situation.

The MOD will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan's technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas.

The MOD will strive to make active use of dual-use technologies, by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes.

8 Collaboration with Local Communities

As well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, the MOD and the SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities targeting local governments and communities.

The MOD and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units. Furthermore, in operating the military camps, etc., the MOD will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy.

9 Boosting Communication Capabilities

The MOD and the SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication, and utilize a diverse range of media.

10 Enhancing the Intellectual Base

The MOD will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions. Moreover, in addition to strengthening research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the MOD will promote various partnerships with other research institutions.

11 Promoting reform of the Ministry of Defense

The MOD will further promote reforms in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening the SDF's integrated operation functions, and enhancing policy-making and communication functions.

⁸ In June 2014, the Ministry of Defense decided on "Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases – For strengthening the bases to support defense forces and 'Proactive Contribution to Peace'."

⁹ Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology were approved by the Cabinet on April 1, 2014.

6 Additional Points

The NDPG sets out the form of Japan's defense capabilities over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review

and verification process, necessary examination considering the security environment at that time will be implemented and these guidelines will be revised adequately. In light of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup while ensuring harmony with other national initiatives.

Section 3 Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program

1 Program Guidelines

Following the NDPG, Japan is working to achieve an appropriate defense buildup through the MTDP under the following six basic program guidelines.

- Emphasis will be placed on the following functions and capabilities in particular: (1) ISR capabilities; (2) intelligence capabilities; (3) transport capabilities; (4) C3I capabilities; (5) response to an attack on remote islands; (6) response to ballistic missile attacks; (7) response to outer space and cyber space threats; (8) response to large-scale disasters; and (9) international peace cooperation efforts.
- Prioritize development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, development of rapid

deployment capabilities, and achievement of greater efficiency and rationalization of preparations for invasions such as landing invasions.

- Efficiently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity.
- Promote measures to reform the personnel management system
- Strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
- Achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup of the defense forces

2 Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

1 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

For the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nationwide operations of basic GSDF units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. As part of such efforts the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command.

In order to respond swiftly to an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades. In addition, by establishing a coast observation unit and area security units, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In order to enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade will be established.

From the perspective of thoroughly facilitating efficiencies and rationalization of preparations for full-scale invasions, and swift and flexible operations, the GSDF will deploy mobile combat vehicles and remove tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than

Hokkaido will be concentrated into field artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies.

See Fig. II-2-3-1 (Command Relationship of Ground Central Command, etc.)

2 Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the MSDF will retain four escort flotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH) and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and five escort divisions consisting of other destroyers. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued.

3 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base. To prevent the relative decline of Japan's air defense capabilities and