3 Making of the Moscow Spectacle

In April 1957, Komsomol chief Aleksander Shelepin reminded the members of the Soviet preparatory committee that the sixth World Youth Festival was going to take place in one of the leading powers in the world and therefore that preparations for the festival had "to be done well, with a great artistic taste."[1] Hosting thousands of foreigners from around the world represented a new form of Soviet cultural diplomacy. Earlier the USSR had welcomed and sent abroad selected cultural, political and sports delegations, but now the whole world was invited to meet Soviet people face to face on the streets of Moscow. Welcoming the world for a visit fit Khrushchev's foreign policy aims beautifully, epitomizing the desire to demonstrate that the talks about peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world was "not only words, but also the deeds of the Soviet government".[2] The Komsomol and the Party spent months preparing Soviet people for contact with foreigners and potential exposure to information and habits that were not in agreement with the party line. Notwithstanding this political education, Soviet authorities took a conscious risk, balancing between a level of openness intended for foreign visitors and the need to control the potential consequences that the temporal openness might cause to Soviet society.

Shelepin's Team

The Moscow celebration was by far the most important of the World Youth Festivals for the Soviet government. Never before and never since was a World Youth Festival planned so vigorously so as to attain the goals of the Kremlin's leaders. But as much as the Moscow festival favored Khrushchev's political agenda, the project provided a unique chance for Aleksander Shelepin to demonstrate his skills in managing such a huge international undertaking. Shelepin had been involved with the organization of the festivals since Bucharest and certainly knew how to run a world youth gathering. Khrushchev trusted his expertise and let Shelepin with his team lead the orchestra, despite the grown interest of the Soviet leadership in the festival. Vladimir Semichastnyi, Shepin's

1 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 12, l. 130. Stenograficheskii otchet 9.4.1957; Hazan, Baruch, *Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games. Moscow 1980* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982), 84–122.

2 Aksiutin, Iurii, *Khrushchevskaia "ottepel'" i obshchestvennye nastroeniia v SSSR v 1953–1964 gg* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004), 257.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110761160-004

successor as the head of the Komsomol and the KGB, reminisced in his memoirs that "no governmental commission for organizing the festival was formed – everything was decided by the Komsomol Central Committee. There was only the organizing committee headed by A. N. Shelepin, and all of the ministries we needed were at our disposal."[3] In addition to Shelepin, the "leading troika" of the festival organization included Sergei Romanovskii, head of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations (KMO), and Nikolai Bobrovnikov, head of the Moscow city administration (Mossovet).

Giving a free hand to Shelepin and his crew did not mean, however, that the CPSU was completely detached from the organization of the festival. As Shelepin pointed out in his letter to the Party Central Committee in 1955, there were a lot of practical matters on which the Komsomol was not able to decide alone.[4] Some of these issues were discussed in a meeting between the Party Central Committee, the KGB and the Komsomol in May 1957.[5] The meeting focused on the public image of the festival, control over foreign guests and security issues. The list of topics included, e.g., invitations to governmental leaders and the heads of foreign communist parties; a letter to fraternal communist parties about the festival, the overall amount of foreign visitors, a meeting of young Christians, and censorship of foreign journalists during the festival.[6] As long as the Soviet Union was presented in the right way, and when it was known who and how many foreigners would be coming over, the Komsomol was free to organize a celebration according to its own taste.

The practical work was in the hands of two preparatory bodies: the Soviet Preparatory Committee and the International Preparatory Committee. These two committees' work was in theory divided so that the Soviet Preparatory Committee took care of practical matters in Moscow and the International Committee focused upon international matters and the festival program.[7] In practice, the division was not so clear, and nothing was decided against the wishes of the Komsomol and the

3 Semichastnyi, Vladimir, *Bespokoinoe serdtse* (Moscow: Varius, 2002), 67–69. See also Mlechin, Leonid, *Shelepin* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2009), 120.

4 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 2, ll. 26–27. A. Shelepin v TsK KPSS, (no date).

5 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 93. Spisok tovarishchei, priglashaemykh k sekretariu TsK KPSS tovarishchu Shepilovu po voprosam festivalia. In addition to Shelepin, Romanovskii and Bobrovnikov, the participants included CPSU Central Committee secretary I. V. Shikin, and K. F. Lunev from the KGB.

6 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 92. Voprosy dlia rassmotreniia u sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha Shepilova.

7 See e.g. *VI Vsemirnyi festival' molodezhi i studentov. Sbornik materialov* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1958), 17–19.

Party Central Committees. The Soviet Preparatory Committee (*sovetskii podgotovitel'nyi komitet*), which started its work in October 1955, consisted of workers from the Komsomol Central Committee, the Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol, KMO, the Ministry of Culture, the Committee of Physical Culture, Mossovet, the Ministry of Transportation, the KGB, and correspondents from *Pravda* and *Komsomol'skaia pravda*.[8] Ministries, institutions and other state and party bodies took care of their respective practical matters; for example the Ministry of Transportation organized the trains, boats and airplanes that transported festival guests from the Soviet border to Moscow and public transportation for guests inside the USSR, and the Ministry of Trade made sure that city centre shops had enough consumer goods to sell. The KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) dealt with visa issues and controlled who could enter the country. The Moscow City Committee of the Party (*gorkom KPSS*) and the Komsomol took care of the ideological education of Soviet youth and citizens.

The International Preparatory Committee (IPC) started its work in August 1956. The IPC decided on the date, the name and the program of the festival, on the rules of the cultural and sporting competitions, the means of publicity and information, the finances and transportation.[9] The core group consisted of Shelepin and Romanovskii as well as the leadership from the WFDY and the IUS: WFDY president Bruno Bernini (1919–2013), general secretary Jacques Denis and IUS president Jiří Pelikán (1923–99). The rest of the 155 members represented communist or democratic youth and student organizations, journalists, leftist politicians, writers and internationally respected cultural figures, such as Soviet ballerina Galina Ulanova, Soviet violinist David Oistrakh, Argentinean composer Ariel Ramirez and a British jazz musician Bruce Turner.[10] For international media, the IPC was displayed as *the* festival organizing body, but according to one of the members – the

8 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 20, ll. 21–22. O podgotovitel'nykh organakh VI Vsemirnogo festivalia molodezhi i studentov, 9.5.1956; RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 5, ll. 14–16. O zavoze i razvedenii v Moskve golubei k VI Vsemirnoi festivale, N. Bobrovnikov, Z. Mironova.

9 *Council of the World Federation of Democratic Youth: XI meeting*, Sofia, 20–23 August 1956, 12–13, 14. The International preparatory committee consisted of a presidium (made up of the WFDY and IUS presidents, representatives of the sporting competitions, representatives of the AKSM and the Komsomol Central Committee), departments of contacts (26 workers), the department for work with foreign delegations (66 workers), the department of press and information (88 workers), editorial staff of the Festival magazine (46 workers), the department of the festival programme (136 workers), the general department (177), the organizational committee of the international friendship games (25–30 workers). RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 20, ll. 1–7. Predlozheniia (no date); RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 90, ll. 32–38. Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo podgotovitel'nogo komiteta festivalia. Moskva 14.8.1956 i 15.8.1956.

10 *Le VIe Festival Mondial de la Jeunesse et des Etudiants* (Moscow: WFDY, 1957), 204–209.

head of the Finnish festival delegation to Moscow, Ele Alenius – the IPC did not possess any real power.[11]

Dressing Moscow in a Festival Outfit

Organizing an international event like the World Youth Festival was a grandiose enterprise, which demanded gigantic state commitment, resources and money. Around 34,000 festival delegates and an estimated 120,000 Soviet tourists and foreign journalists needed to be catered to during the two-week celebration. The festival's cultural program required fourteen theatres, five concert halls, forty clubs and seventeen open air theatres. Furthermore, museums and other tourist attractions were renovated, central streets repaired, new hotels built, and old ones reconstructed. Foreign participants were accommodated in seven hotels near the Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy (VDNKh) in the Ostankino district in the Northern part of the city.[12] The largest individual building project, the Lenin stadium in the Luzhniki district, began in October 1954. After the festival the stadium functioned as a venue for numerous sports events, including the Olympic Games in 1980 and a home arena for the Spartak football team.[13]

Besides the facilities for the festival, vast sums were spent on the lavish program and hosting the guests. The Soviet organizers paid for practically everything once foreign guests had crossed the border: accommodation, food, transportation, visits to nearby towns and a top-quality program of ballet, fine arts and classical music – registration fees only covered a marginal share of these costs.[14] Foreign

11 Interview with Ele Alenius, 21 November 2007.

12 RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, d. 454, ll. 76–78. N. Bobrovnikov v TsK KPSS, 1.9.1956. *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 2 July 1957, 1, "Zhdem vas dorogie gosti". For a comparison with the preparations for the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980, see Hazan, *Olympic Sports*, 106–108; Young, Simon, *Playing to Win. A Political history of the Moscow Olympic Games, 1975–1980* (Ph.D. diss., University of Winchester, 2015) and Orlov, I. B. and Popov, A. D., *Olimpiiskii perepolokh. Zabytaia sovetskaia modernizatsiia* (Moscow: Izdatel'skii dom "Vysshei shkoly ekonomiki", 2020), 215–259.

13 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 404, ll. 3, 26. Stenogramma sobranie molodezhi stolitsy, posviashchennogo stroitelstvu bol'shogo Moskovskogo stadiona v Luzhnikakh ot 20.5.1955 g; *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 26 July 1957, 3, S. Soloveichik, "Kak Genka stroil stadion". On the construction of the Luzhniki district, see Köhring, Alexandra, "'Sporting Moscow': Stadia Buildings and the Challenging of Public Space in the Post-war Soviet Union", *Urban History*, 37, No. 2, 2010, 253–271.

14 RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, d. 454, ll. 76–78. N. Bobrovnikov v TsK KPSS, 1.9.1956; RGANI, f. 5, 28, d. 454, ll. 79–92. Postanovlenie SSSR Sovet Ministrov o podgotovku k Vsemirnoi festivaliu

guests could use special food, healthcare and cleaning services provided by the hosts. These included 180 special restaurants, forty-two repair shops for clothes and shoes and fifteen for cameras and wrist watches, ninety-one places for laundry and sixty-seven medical points.[15] The festival preparations also included extensive printing of various information sheets, materials on the country and Moscow, as well as souvenirs and gifts to be handed to the foreign guests.[16] Practically the whole infrastructure of Moscow was available for the festival. The importance of state support in terms of infrastructure was seen at the festivals in Vienna (1959) and Helsinki (1962), where local officials refused cooperation with the festival organizers, which made for severe difficulties in finding accommodation and venues for festival events. In Vienna, hotels, concert halls and even schools were suddenly booked for the period of the festival and the majority of the participants spent their nights in tents under the open sky. In Helsinki, the organizers managed to book some schools and a few hotel rooms for honored guests, however, some 1,300 socialist delegates stayed in the ships that had transported them to Helsinki.[17]

Muscovites could hardly avoid the event, which was seen, heard and experienced all-around the city. Even those who did not live in or visit Moscow during the festival period encountered the preparations in media and the Festival of Youth of the USSR (*Vsesoiuznyi festival' molodezhi*), a Soviet replica festival held in different parts of the country during May 1957. According to the organizers' reports, the Moscow festival employed around one million people. Around 30,000 people worked in city centre restaurants, cafes and shops, and 1,500 workers and 3,300 interpreters were employed for the hotels.[18] The Komsomol also provided special cadres (*obshchestvennye kadry*) from the ranks of the youth league and the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU to work with foreigners in hotels, restaurants and other public places, as well as 504 activists who worked as guides and interpreters for the national delegations.[19] The largest group involved in the arrangements was a voluntary crop of over one million people, mostly Komsomol

molodezhi i studentov; RGALI, f. 2329, op. 3, d. 592, ll. 2–12. Ministerstvo kultury SSSR v sviazi s podgotovkoi k festivaliu, N. Pavlovskii, 13.2.1957.

15 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 179. N. Bobrovnikov, A. Shelepin, S. Romanovskii v TsK KPSS, 30.8.1957.

16 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 84, ll. 110–118. L. Sav'ialova, (no date).

17 Krekola, Joni, *Maailma kylässä 1962. Helsingin nuorisofestivaali* (Helsinki: Like, 2012), 181–182; Hautmann, Hans, "Die Weltjugendfestspiele 1959 in Wien", *Mitteilungen der Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft*, Jahrgang 1999, [http:www.klahrgesellschaft.at/Mitteilungen/Hautmann_3_99.html] (Accessed 19 February 2008).

18 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, ll. 178, 180. N. Bobrovnikov, A. Shelepin, S. Romanovskii v TsK KPSS, 30.8.1957.

19 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 84, ll. 110–118.

members, who decorated the city.[20] According to the general plan, all residential buildings in the city centre were to be decorated with posters, flowers and other festival emblems. A selection of 61 different posters was printed in an excess of 990,000 copies. Added to this were 250,000 bouquets of flowers and 2.3 million other decorative details. The grand designer of the decorations was the Soviet painter Mikhail Ladur, an experienced choreographer of mass festivals.[21]

As had been the case with the earlier festivals in the people's democracies, the organizers used the decorating process as a way to mobilize locals in the preparatory work. In the centre of Moscow, citizens were expected to embellish the facades and balconies of their apartments. The organizers provided "Mosknigotorg" shops with the decorations and expected that people would voluntarily buy them. Some did, but apparently many Muscovites were not interested in the decoration project.[22] Discontent at the request to decorate residential buildings were not reported to authorities; what was reported, however, were rumors claiming that because of the festival services for ordinary Muscovites would deteriorate, epidemics would be unavoidable, and that most students would be forced to leave Moscow for the period of the festival.[23] Similar fears had been reported on the eve of the Warsaw festival. The Poles, too, had been scared that the Warsaw festival would decrease their standard of living. Moscow was indeed not the first socialist country to undergo such a huge build-up for a World Youth Festival. Virtually every festival host prior to Moscow had built something new or, during the late 1940s, reconstructed what the war had destroyed. As with Berlin in 1951, the whole state and society were involved in the process. For the Soviet Union the task was, however, somewhat easier than it had been for Hungary or East Germany, which in 1948 and 1951 had to dress up their capital so soon after they had been ruined in the war.[24] Moscow was allowed a longer time to recover and, unlike the other socialist countries, the Soviet organizers could choose a suitable time for holding the festival.

20 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 177. N. Bobrovnikov, A. Shelepin, S. Romanovskii v TsK KPSS, 30.8.1957.

21 GARF, f. 5446, op. 91, d. 299, ll. 18–20. Lozungi dlia oformleniia g. Moskvy (no date). On the decoration project see also *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 1 February 1957, 4, S. Startseva, "Paskaz o nedalekom budushchem".

22 TsAOPIM, f. 4, op. 113, d. 23, ll. 107–109. O massovom oformlenii dlia okon i balkonov.

23 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 88. O nekotorykh voprosakh VI Vsemirnogo festivala molodezhi i studentov, 31.5.1957.

24 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 546, l. 13. Tov. Grigor'ian v TsK VKP(b), 12.4.1951; Rossow, Ina, "'. . . alles nett, schön und gefühlsbetont, mit viel Absicht'. Die III. Weltfestspiele der Jugend und Studenten 1951 im Kalten Krieg", in *Fortschritt, Norm und Eigensinn. Erkundungen im Altag der DDR* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1999), 22.

Moscow at the time of the festival looked flamboyant indeed; but whom did the Soviet authorities wish to impress? A central goal in making Moscow an attractive venue for an international gathering was to demonstrate to Western and Global South visitors that the socialist system was capable of generating as good a life as capitalism, and thus could offer a competitive alternative to the capitalist lifestyle.[25] The festival gave the authorities a chance to prove that some impressions that foreigners seemed to have about the country were wrong. For example, at the Warsaw 1955 youth festival, an American youngster had asked where Soviet youth bought their clothes, because according to his local newspaper, Russians "are only able to make bear skin boots and vodka".[26] To react and amend stereotypical images of this kind, the Soviet organizers craved to show that the Soviet Union was neither the backward Tsarist Russia nor the self-isolated and hostile dictatorship of Stalin, but a modern, technically advanced and culturally appealing country – a socialist option for a modern citizen.

In making Moscow an appealing city by foreign standards, Soviet organizers paid special attention to "cultured service" (*kul'turnoe obsluzhivanie gostei*). Culturedness in services and trade was not a new phenomenon. As Julie Hessler has shown, culturedness was linked with the idea of socialist modernity and was discussed among trade managers already in the 1930s and again after post-war reconstruction.[27] Cultured service was not precisely defined in the context of the Moscow festival, but it clearly meant more than just being helpful and friendly toward customers. One speaker in a meeting of the Moscow City Committees of the Komsomol, the Party and the trade unions maintained that customer service at the time of the festival had to be at the same level as anywhere else in the world. He gave an example that a hairstylist had to be prepared to make a haircut like his or her foreign colleagues. Another important element in preparing cultured service was learning foreign languages, although, as one speaker commented, it was already too late to try to study a new language in such a short

25 On Soviet and East European consumer culture, see Crowley, David and Reid, Susan E., "Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism?", in *Pleasures in Socialism. Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc*, edited by David Crowley and Susan E. Reid (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 3–51; Stitziel, Judd, *Fashioning Socialism. Clothing, Politics, and Consumer Culture in East Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 22–25, 66–67; Bren, Paulina and Neuberger, Mary (eds), *Communism Unwrapped. Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

26 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 265, l. 87. V pomoshch propagandistu, lektoru, dokladchiku i agitatoru VI Vsemirnogo festivalia molodezhi i studentov za mir i druzhbu.

27 Hessler, Julie, "Postwar Normalisation and its Limits in the USSR: The Case of Trade", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53, No. 3, 2001, 457–463.

time.[28] Furthermore, an idea was expressed that people working in cafeterias should learn how to make good coffee and that meat, fresh fruits and vegetables should be on display during the festival.[29] Moreover, *Komsomol'skaia pravda* told that book stores offered phrasebooks in various languages as well as classics of Russian literature in English translation.[30] The efforts seemed to be worthwhile. On the first day of the festival, *The New York Times* paid attention to the selection of foreign papers, noting that *The New York Times*, *The Times* and *The Daily Herald* were on display at the festival headquarters in the hotel Moskva.[31] The Soviet festival organizers wished to show Moscow as being just as well provided for as other major European cities. Even though they knew the Soviet Union and even Moscow lagged behind the West in terms of consumer goods and service culture, they attempted to offer their foreign guests services that were comparable to those provided by the capitalist metropolises.

The project of polishing the socialist capital for the festival also entailed a cleansing of "undesirable social elements" from the streets since they broke with the idealized picture of socialist society. Months before the festival started, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) cleared Moscow and its surrounding regions of hooligans, gypsies, prostitutes, waifs and thieves.[32] These people, branded "anti-social, parasitical elements", stood in stark contrast to the idea of the loyal and hard-working new Soviet person and gave a distorted picture of a socialist society, where such problems as criminality, unemployment and prostitution were not supposed to exist anymore.[33]

As a result of the campaign against undesirable social elements in the spring of 1957, crime diminished by 8.4 percent compared to the same period in 1956, and hooliganism too went down. Between 15 March and 1 June, altogether 16,104 people were deported from Moscow and 6,300 people were deported

28 TsAOPIM, f. 4, op. 104, d. 7, ll. 111–113. Stenogramma soveshchaniia partiinogo, khoziastvennogo, profsoiuznogo i komsomol'skogo aktiva goroda Moskvy, 20.6.1957.

29 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 13, ll. 112, 122–123. Stenogramma sovetskogo podgotovitel'nogo komiteta, 18.6.1957.

30 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 19 July 1957, 3, "Khoroshii podarok".

31 *The New York Times*, 28 July 1957, 3, "The Times in Moscow. Edition First Put on Sale at Youth Festival Office".

32 GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 491, ll. 150–155. Dudorov, MVD, v otdel administrativnykh organov TsK KPSS, tov. Zootukhinu 8.7.1957.

33 On parasitical elements in Soviet society, see Fitzpatrick, Sheila, "Social Parasites. How Tramps, idle youth, and busy entrepreneurs impeded the soviet march to communism", *Cahiers du monde russe*, 47, No. 1, 2006, 377–408; and on hooligans see LaPierre, Brian, *Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia, Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance during the Thaw* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012).

from Moscow oblast. Furthermore, almost 70,000 people were apprehended by the police. Most of them were detained in prisons and children's homes, or else listed for follow-up talks.[34] For example, prostitutes were exiled from Moscow and, like many other undesired people, they were not allowed to come closer than 100 km to the capital. Many ended up in communities 101 km from Moscow, but some also moved farther from the capital. This was not the whole picture, though. According to Mark Popovskii, at the same time that the Party asked the militia to clean the city of potential prostitutes, the KGB established a brothel in a quiet suburb to provide services for foreign business visitors. Anatolii Rubinov also links the festival to the emergence of prostitution, which, according to him, did not officially exist in the USSR in 1957, but which everyone knew about after the festival.[35] Soviet Ukrainian writer Vasili Grossman described the cleansing before the festival in his short story "Eternal rest". In the story, the Vagankovo cemetery, which was going to be visited by some foreign Christians was cleared of people whom, in the authorities' view, would have harmed the picture of Moscow.

> The people who suffered most were the beggars: the hunch-backed, those who sang, those who whispered, those who shook, disabled veterans from the Great Patriotic War, the blind, the retarded. They were taken straight from the cemetery and packed off in lorries. Anyone who came into the cemetery office during this period was told, "Come back again once the festival's over".[36]

In order to keep the streets safe and clean during the festival, MVD put thousands of officers to work. Altogether approximately 60,000 people took care of public order and social control.[37] These included 11,275 militiamen, 8,589 officers from the MVD, 32,000 members of voluntary "police-assistance brigades" (BSM), 6,000 caretakers (*dvornikov*), 4,000 students from militia schools in other cities, and around 16,500 Komsomol volunteers. Militiamen received special training for their jobs, as well as – and this was apparently part of the campaign for "cultured service" – upgrading the outward appearance of their officers.[38]

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34 GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 491, ll. 150–155. Dudorov, MVD, v otdel administrativnykh organov TsK KPSS, tov. Zootukhinu V. V., 8.7.1957.

35 Popovskii, Mark, *Tretii lishnii* (London: Overseas Publications, 1985), 309–311, 332. Rubinov, Anatolii, *Intimnaia zhizn Moskvy* (Moscow: "Ekonomika", 1991), 224–225.

36 Grossman, Vasili, *The Road* (London: MacLehose Press, 2011).

37 GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 491, ll. 427, 429. Dudorov, 17.8.1957.

38 GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 491, ll. 153–154. Dudorov, MVD, v otdel administrativnykh organov TsK KPSS, tov. Zootukhinu V. V., 8.7.1957; GARF, f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 491, ll. 427, 429. Dudorov, 17.8.1957.

Cleansing public spaces of undesired elements was not an uncommon practice in the Soviet Union. Already in the 1930s, socially alien groups were removed from city centres during times of public celebration.[39] Similar methods were employed in the preparations for the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980, when Soviet officials removed thousands of drunks and troublemakers to the suburbs. Contrary to 1957, when the dissident movement had not yet emerged, in 1980 the most famous non-conformists, physicist Andrei Sakharov among them, were also exiled for the duration of the games.[40]

In Western non-communist accounts on the Moscow festival, and among the memoirs of contemporary observers, there was a tendency to underline the face-lifting that took place for the World Youth Festivals. An American diplomat, Raymond Garthoff, who was able to follow the repair work before the festival, stated that the beautification was undoubtedly "required by the normally incredibly sad state of perpetual disrepair that cloaked a picturesque city in ragged drabness." In his words, "goods were withheld from the stores for a number of weeks and then released immediately prior to the festival, so that the shelves would be stocked and people would freely spend the money that they hadn't been able to spend whilst there were few goods available."[41]

Did these preparations amount to some sort of Potemkin village, an oft-employed metaphor for Soviet methods of impressing visitors by selecting, hiding and staging propitious scenes for visitors? Was the Moscow festival a Khrushchevian Potemkin village made to fool foreign youngsters about the "true face" of the country? In the 1920s, Soviet propagandists developed very particular ways to receive visitors and to showcase the great socialist experiment, including pre-arranged schedules, selected places to visit and careful guidance for the visitors.[42] The festival preparations bear some resemblance to these methods, but as we shall see later, Soviet organizers allowed visitors and locals much freer access and possibilities to take a glimpse behind the scenes

39 Rolf, Malte, "Working Towards the Centre: Leader Cults and Spatial Politics in Pre-war Stalinism", in *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc*, edited by Balazs Apor; Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones and E. A. Rees (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 147.

40 Caraccioli, Jerry and Caraccioli, Tom, *Boycott: Stolen Dreams of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games* (Washington D.C.: New Chapter Press, 2008), 172; Hazan, *Olympic Sports*, 200.

41 Garthoff, Raymond, *Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment & Coexistence* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 34.

42 For a discussion on the Potemkin village in relation to Western visitors to the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s, see David-Fox, Michael, *Showcasing the Great Experiment. Cultural Diplomacy & Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–1941* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 7–8, 102–103, 126–127, 141, 183.

than had been allowed before. Therefore, even if some parts of the arrangements might have come close to the methods used for the visits of Western fellow travellers to the country in the 1920s and 1930s, Khrushchevian staging was to some extent different from Stalinist performances.

Financing the Festival

The Moscow festival was an extremely expensive enterprise. According to the financial reports, organizing the festival events and providing for the stay of foreign delegates came to almost 200 million roubles.[43] The cost was much more than the Soviet Union had paid for the earlier youth festivals (Prague 2.1 million roubles, Budapest 3.8, Berlin 5.9, Bucharest 2.6 and Warsaw 2.6), four times as much as Moscow's 800-year anniversary celebration in 1947 (49 million roubles), and more than twice as much as the Spartakiad of the Peoples (91.6 million roubles).[44] If the costs for the festival's cultural program, which came from the budget of the Ministry of Culture (38 million roubles) and the investment in buildings and renovations (around 400 million roubles) are taken into account, the final sum comes to at least 638 million roubles.[45] Contemporary Western estimates were quite right in declaring that the festival was enormously expensive, but calculating the costs at between $100 and $200 million, they shot much too low.[46]

43 Festival costs included the maintenance of the delegates (travel in the Soviet Union, food, accommodation), transportation in Moscow, events of the festival, decoration of the city, printed materials, sports games, preparations of cadres, the Soviet contribution toward the international solidary fund, and the costs of the Soviet preparatory committee. RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 241, l. 142. Svodka raskhodov, 6.1.1958.

44 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 241, ll. 12–24. Predsedateliu gosekonomkomissii SSSR tov. Pervuhinu, M. G. 14.2.1957, Postanovlenie Soveta ministrov SSSR 17.11.1956, no 1487, S. Romanovskii.

45 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 241, ll. 12–24. Predsedateliu gosekonomkomissii SSSR tov. Pervuhinu, M. G. 14.2.1957, Postanovlenie Soveta ministrov SSSR 17.11.1956, no 1487, S. Romanovskii; RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 241, ll. 131–49. Svodka raskhodov, 6.1.1958; RGALI, f. 2329, op. 3, d. 592, l. 6. Ministerstvu kul'tury SSSR N. Mikhailovu. Dokladnaia zapiska o khode vypolneniia prikazov Ministerstva kul'tury no. 520, 642, 677 po voprosam podgotovki k festivaliu, 12.2.1957, I. Pavlovskii. The overall cost of the festival is difficult to calculate because the money used for reconstruction, renovation and repairs of the city cannot easily be tabulated. Different documents gave sums which were allocated or used but it is difficult to know if the numbers given in different documents overlap with each other and whether they were, in the end, the final sums for putting on the festival. The total introduced here is therefore only suggestive.

46 Barghoorn, Frederick C., *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 261; Clews, John C., *Communist Propaganda Techniques* (London: Methuen & Co, 1964), 142; Apeland, Nils M., *Communist Front Youth Organizations* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot),

While funds for renovation and buildings came from state resources, the expenses for carrying out the festival (around 200 million roubles) were covered by a national lottery organized by the Komsomol. In the lottery, one could win a trip to the Moscow festival, a camera, an alarm clock, a bicycle, clothes or even a television.[47] One of the festival organizers, V. F. Stukalin, recalled in a round-table discussion, organized as a part of the 50th anniversary celebration of the 1957 festival, that the lottery had enjoyed "vast popularity among Soviet citizens."[48] A Soviet Karelian Finn shared quite a different recollection in an interview. With a hint of irony in his voice, he commented that "this event was paid for by Soviet people, as with many other events before and after".[49] Another grass-roots perspective from a Soviet citizen shared much the same position, commenting that "the government was bankrupt, that's all there is to it. They couldn't even afford the festival – the people had to pay."[50] The idea of the Moscow festival being a government sponsored show made a reporter of *The New York Times* refuse to believe in the national lottery as a fundraising method. "The subterfuge that funds were raised by means of a lottery among Soviet young people, as is claimed officially, will not fool anyone."[51] A financial report on the festival's direct costs – excluding the resources employed for the infrastructure and other external expenses – shows that the expense was indeed covered by the national lottery. In fact, the lottery did so well that a significant sum was still left over to be used by the Komsomol.

Part of the festival costs, $480,500, were covered by the International Solidarity Fund. The main idea of the fund, which was a joint body of the WFDY member organizations, was to help participants from colonies and post-colonial countries

1959, 52–53. According to a 1959 American study, the exchange rate was four rubles to the dollar. *Courtship of Young Minds. A Case Study of the Moscow Youth Festival* (New York: East European Student and Youth Service, 1959), 12–14; see also Kotek, Jöel, *Students and the Cold War* (London: Macmillan, 1996), 212.

47 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 241, ll. 12–24, 131–49. For an overview of what one could win in the lottery, see the list of winning tickets on one of the lottery rounds, *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 2 July 1957, 4, "Prover', vygral li ty. Denezhno-veshchevaia loteriia, 'Vsesoiuznyi festival' molodezhi'". *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 25 June 1957, 3, V. Kitain, V. Peskov, "Kogda zavertelos' tirazhnoe koleso".

48 "V Federatsii mira i soglasiia proshel Mezhdunarodnyi 'kruglyi stol', posviashchennyi 50-letiiu VI Vsemirnogo festivalia molodezhi i studentov 1957 goda v Moskve", [http://www.moskvaimir.mos.ru/ru/c/events/index.php?id_4=2590&god=2007&mes=07] (Accessed 11 January 2012).

49 Interview with a Soviet Karelian Finnish man, 24 July 2007.

50 Belfrage, Sally, *A Room in Moscow* (London: Pan Books ltd, 1959), 44.

51 *The New York Times*, 30 July 1957, 22, "Moscow's Youth Festival".

to travel to the festival. From the Soviet perspective, the solidarity fund showed that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries were not the only financial backers of the festivals. Information given in public about this fund was, however, misleading. Table 4, on payments to the solidarity fund with regard to the Warsaw and Moscow youth festivals, indicates that the socialist countries, after all, paid most of the costs for this joint effort. While the socialist countries (Eastern Europe, China and Mongolia) paid $430,500, the share of the capitalist countries was a humble $50,000.[52] Another document, dated 30 August 1957, claimed that the total sum of the International Solidarity Fund will have been $435,000 and the capitalist countries paid $100,000 toward the fund. The total sum is smaller than in the earlier document, yet the contribution of the capitalist countries is doubled. Given that the figures tended to increase as information reached the upper echelons of the party apparatus, it seems that this modification was made in order to give the Central Committee a picture that capitalist countries had contributed a greater proportion of the money than they really did.[53] Socialist countries were in a very different position than the capitalist and Global South countries, since they received the money for the festival trips and arrangements from the state, whilst other countries depended on their youth organization members' willingness and ability to collect money. Yet, the fact that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries provided the great majority of the festival finances was clearly a big failure for the Komsomol, whose goal had been to widen the influence of the WFDY, the IUS and the festival around the world. Against this backdrop, it is easy understand the frustration felt within the Komsomol and the Party as to the unequal financial situation in the WFDY (and the IUS).[54]

Despite the huge financial commitment by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, participation in the Moscow festival was not completely free. The sums were, however, marginal, and again, the socialist countries were the biggest payers. While the representatives of the people's democracies had to cough up $4 per day, and thus $60 for 15 days, young people from the capitalist countries paid only half of that ($2 per person per day, or $30 for 15 days). The costs of the youth from the Global South were covered by the solidarity fund and the Soviet state, and thus they were free from any payment.[55] For the money ($4, $2 or $0 per day), every delegate got full board service and was

52 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 36, l. 65. Finansovye voprosy festivalia.

53 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 157. N. Bobrovnikov, A. Shelepin, S. Romanovskii v TsK KPSS, 30.8.1957.

54 RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, d. 363, l. 10. O deiatel'nosti VFDM. A. Shelepin v TsK KPSS, 18.1.1955.

55 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 36, ll. 63–65. Finansovye voprosy festivalia.

Tab. 4: Payments to the International Solidarity Fund.

Country	Warsaw Festival 1955	Moscow Festival 1957
Socialist countries	**Payments ($)**	**Payments ($)**
Bulgaria	5,000	20,000
Hungary	7,500	20,000
GDR	10,000	30,000
China	85,000	120,000
Mongolia	10,000	10,000
Poland	62,700	50,000
Romania	15,000	30,000
USSR	90,000	120,000
Czechoslovakia	10,000	30,000
Albania	–	5,000
Total	285,200	430,500
Capitalist countries		
Australia	1,000	4,500
Great Britain	2,000	6,000
Belgium	500	1,500
Netherlands	500	1,500
Denmark	1,500	3,000
Iceland	500	1,000
Italy	3,500	5,000
Canada	1,000	2,000
Luxemburg	100	500
Norway	1,000	3,000
USA	1,000	4,500
Finland	1,500	4,000
France	4,000	6,500
Switzerland	500	1,000
Sweden	1,000	3,500
Total	20,000	50,000
Overall Total	305,200	480,500

Source: RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 36, l. 65. Finansovye voprosy festivalia.

allowed to use public transportation for free during the festival. This price also included free entrance to museums, parks and exhibitions.[56] Australian delegate Charles Bresland recalled in his travel account that "the Participant's Card entitled the owner to free transport anywhere in Moscow. The books of tickets covered three meals per day [. . .] And a buffet ticket which entitled the owner

56 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 7, l. 156. Reshenie ob ustanovlenii besplatnogo vkhoda v parki, muzei i na vystavki dliia uchastnikov VI Vsemirnogo festivalia molodezhi i studentov, 12.7.1957.

to two packages of 'Prima' cigarettes a day, or the equivalent at the buffet in sweets or a bottle of beer."[57] The Soviet state provided foreign visitors with luxury service in comparison to the next two festivals in capitalist countries. Participants in the Vienna and Helsinki festivals got austere facilities and less services for costlier fees. This was simply because the Austrian and Finnish governments refused to have anything to do with the event.[58]

The Promulgation of Openness

The key concept of the Moscow youth festival was a new kind of openness, which was repeated in the Soviet media, international festival publications and local leftist and communist newspapers around the world. Since 1947, the WFDY had proclaimed that participation in the World Youth Festivals was open to all, irrespective of political, ideological, religious or ethnic roots. The reality during the earlier festivals had been quite different, however, and by declaring at the council meeting in August 1956 that *now in Moscow* the World Youth Festival would be truly open, the WFDY indirectly admitted that events in the past had not been such.[59]

The rationale behind the openness policy was the wish to show the Soviet Union in a new light in accordance with Khrushchev's thinking on peaceful coexistence, especially after the secret speech earlier the same year. In contrast to the Stalinist image of an isolated and xenophobic country, the Komsomol and the Party now strove to depict a peace-loving and tolerant Soviet Union, which was no longer hostile to others and allowed basic freedoms for its citizens. Criticism of Soviet hegemony and its undemocratic way of managing the WFDY and the IUS voiced inside these organizations also pushed the Komsomol to demonstrate in practice that times had changed.

The new openness was manifested by granting access to everyone who wanted to take part in the festival planning. In August 1956, the WFDY council sent the message that times had changed and that now everyone was welcome to be part of the International Preparatory Committee to influence the way the Moscow gathering was organized. The message highlighted that many crucial issues had still not been decided, although it admitted that they had already sketched a draft programme for the festival and decided about the rules for

57 Bresland, Charles, *Moscow Turned it on! Story of Australians at 6th World Youth Festival* (Sydney: Coronation Press, 1957), 5.
58 Krekola, *Maailma kylässä*, 62–66.
59 *Council of the World Federation of Democratic Youth*, 1956, 30.

cultural competitions.[60] The WFDY actively tried to encourage new organizations to join in, extending invitations to the festival for the first time to organizations such as the International Federation of Catholic Youth, Young Christian Workers and the World Federation of Liberal and Radical Youth, the International Students' Movement of the United Nations, the Junior Red Cross and the Service Civil International.[61] In a meeting of the Soviet preparatory committee, Shelepin accentuated that the best strategy to get maximum attention for the Moscow festival would be to ignore direct criticism and to strive for influencing wide masses of young people, particularly in the colonies and ex-colonies. Managing to appeal to a traditionally difficult target group, social democrats, would be a great advantage, as would be influencing the Catholic youth, especially now that the Vatican was openly opposing the festival.[62] In the long run, attempting to reach a wider audience aimed at spreading Soviet peace work into new areas and finding new potential affiliates for the WFDY and the IUS, since by the early 1950s they consisted mainly of communist and socialist organizations.[63]

The most important non-communist rivals, World Assembly of Youth, International Student Congress and the International Union of Socialist Youth did not believe the WFDY's new policy and continued to boycott the festival. They had argued of the previous festivals that the arrangements and all meaningful decisions had been made by a small group and they remained doubtful as to whether any real change had taken place in this respect. And they were right: the most important decisions were still made within the Komsomol and the Party, and the International Preparatory Committee had very limited room for action.[64] Sending Soviet tanks to Budapest worsened the situation ever more. In May 1957, *The New York Times* reported that two leading US youth organizations, the National Student Association and the Young Adult Council of the National Social Welfare Assembly, had refused invitations to the festival because of ethical concerns about participating in a Soviet-sponsored festival in the aftermath of what had happened in Hungary.[65]

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60 *Council of the World Federation of Democratic Youth*, 1956, 12–13.

61 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 12, l. 131. Stenogramma zasedaniia komiteta podgotovlenii i provedenii VI VFMS, 9.4.1957.

62 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 12, l. 131. Stenogramma zasedaniia komiteta podgotovlenii i provedenii VI VFMS, 9.4.1957.

63 Cornell, Richard, *Youth and Communism. An Historical Analysis of International Communist Youth Movements* (New York: Walker and Company, 1965), 86–95.

64 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 9, l. 3. Zadachi festivalia, TsK VLKSM.

65 *The New York Times*, 25 May 1957, 10, "U.S. Youth Groups Spurn Soviet Bid".

In addition to widening the membership base of the WFDY and the IUS, new non-communist youth and student organizations were needed for demonstrating that the World Youth Festival was not only a communist gathering. One of the ways to decrease communist participation was an agreement made between the fraternal communist parties to the effect that the Moscow festival should, in comparison with earlier festivals, feature fewer communists and should welcome as many "decent and honest non-conformists (*inakomyshliashchii*)" as possible in national delegations.[66] The document, mentioning this agreement, does not elaborate upon the word non-conformist, but in view of the still prevailing fear and skepticism about foreigners, the word probably referred to non-communist, leftist youths sympathetic to the Soviet Union and its ideology. This strategy, however, involved risks that the authorities were aware of. In the eyes of the Soviet authorities, the line between a non-conformist and an anti-Soviet or anti-communist was very thin. This was indicated by the way that Soviet reports evaluated comments by some foreign visitors and branded people anti-Soviet for certain political views or simply for making negative comments about the USSR. By accepting non-conformists within national delegations, communist youth leaders might open the door to anti-communist elements.

The strategy of openness also included allowing the international media to report from the festival. In a letter to Dmitri Shepilov on 13 June 1957, Minister of defense Georgi Zhukov explained that censorship should not be imposed because this was an international event and because that had not been applied at the previous festivals. Zhukov reminded that censorship had been similarly suspended for the meeting of the council of foreign ministers and during the visits of various international delegations, implying that the Soviet authorities were capable of handling an international event with the increased risks that unfettered communication with the outside world might bring. The letter also suggested that foreign television companies, radio stations and print media should be allowed to send their correspondents to the festival.[67] American correspondent Max Frankel commented on this situation on the eve of the youth gathering, stating that for the first time since World War II foreign newspapers were allowed to report from the USSR without censorship.[68] Another US correspondent, Daniel Schorr, representing the Columbia Broadcasting System, also noted the improved media environment. Schorr and his crew were provided with a new radio studio and were allowed to film at the festival without censorship. The other side of the coin was

66 TsAOPIM, f. 478, op. 1, d. 685, l. 47. Protokol zasedaniia plenuma partiinogo komiteta MGU ot 17 aprela 1957 goda.

67 RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 31, ll. 45–46. Tov. Shepilovu D. T., G. Zhukov, 13.6.1957.

68 *The New York Times*, 28 July 1957, 7, Max Frankel, "Youngsters Fill Moscow for Fete".

that Schorr was watched the whole time, and later the Soviet authorities accused him of trying to slander the festival because he interviewed American participants who had plans to tour China in defiance of the ban from the US home office.[69]

The openness was also spatial and visual. During the festivities, visitors were given access to numerous places that until quite recently had allowed limited access to foreigners. The symbolic places of Soviet power, the Kremlin and the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum on Red Square, opened their doors to foreigners, as did churches and synagogues, as if to prove that religious practice was free in Soviet society.[70] "Kremlin excursions! Stalin must be whirling clockwise in his tomb", an American reporter Harrison Salisbury commented at the time.[71] Showing the Kremlin to foreigners was not such a big deal, but allowing people to visit churches and organizing meetings between local and foreign religious youth groups made party officials nervous. Some CPSU Central Committee members strongly opposed religious meetings and even those who supported these kinds of activities stressed that it had to be made sure that such "meetings would not grow into mass events".[72]

Carnivalesque colors, flags, slogans, festival emblems and peace doves replaced the omnipresent portraits of Stalin and local political leaders which had dominated the visual imagery at previous festivals. The emblem of the Moscow festival, a five-petal daisy with a miniature globe at its core, was designed by Soviet artist Konstantin Kuzginov, who won a special competition to design a new logo. In an article published in *Vecherniaia Moskva*, Kuzginov told that he had chosen a flower as the basis because it symbolized the spring – the youth. Kuzginov had wanted to design a simple and easily understandable logo, which would symbolize the unity of young people of the world.[73] Slogans, too, were designed in a way that all guests might find them acceptable.[74] "For peace and Friendship" – "Mir i

69 Schorr, Daniel, *Staying Tuned. A Life in Journalism* (New York: Pocket Books, 2001), 104–105.

70 Ardamatskii, V., *Piat' lepestok: reportazh o VI Vsemirnom festivale molodezhi i studentov v Moskve* (Moscow: Detiz, 1958), 66–67; Bresslein, Erwin, *Drushba! Freundschaft? Von der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale zu den Weltjugendfestspielen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fisher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1973), 104.

71 Salisbury, Harrison E., *And Beyond. A Reporter's Narrative* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 11, 28.

72 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 86. O nekotorykh voprosakh VI Vsemirnogo festivalia molodezhi i studentov, 31.5.1957.

73 *Vecherniaia Moskva*, 6 July 1957, 3, "Emblema vsemirnogo", G. Senichakova.

74 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 12, l. 131. Stenogramma zasedaniia komiteta po organizatsii i provod. VI VFMS 9.4.1957.

Druzhba" – was certainly a motto anyone could associate with. This was more neutral than earlier and later slogans with their overtly political meanings (see Table 5). In Warsaw 1955, the slogan proclaimed "for peaceful coexistence and for international friendship, against the preparation of nuclear war", and in Vienna 1959, young people celebrated "peace, friendship and peaceful coexistence".[75] Besides the official slogan, city centre houses and the venues of the festival programme were decorated with phrases like "Peace to the World" (*Miru-mir!*), "Youth is against the war!" (*Molodezh' protiv voiny!*) and "All nations have the right to national independence!" (*Vse narody imeiut pravo na national'noi nezavisimost'!)*.[76] Soviet officials considered slogans very important, and based

Tab. 5: World Youth Festival Slogans 1947–1989.

I Prague 1947	Youth unite, for a lasting peace
II Budapest 1949	Youth unite forward for a lasting peace, democracy, national independence and a better future for the peoples
III Berlin 1951	For peace and friendship – against nuclear weapons
IV Bucharest 1953	For peace and friendship
V Warsaw 1955	For peace and friendship – against the aggressive imperialist military pacts
VI Moscow 1957	For peace and friendship
VII Vienna 1959	For peace and friendship and peaceful coexistence
VIII Helsinki 1962	For peace and friendship
IX Sofia 1968	For solidarity, peace and friendship
X East Berlin 1973	For anti-imperialist solidarity, peace and friendship
XI Havana 1978	For anti-imperialist solidarity, peace and friendship
XII Moscow 1985	For anti-imperialist solidarity, peace and friendship
XIII Pyongyang 1989	For anti-imperialist solidarity, peace and friendship

Source: [www.wfdy.org] (Accessed 5 October 2010).

75 *VIIth World Festival of Youth and Students, Vienna 1959*, Prague: IUS, 1959; The WFDY website, Festivals [www.wfdy.org] (Accessed 29 November 2011).

76 GARF, f. 5446, op. 91, d. 299, ll. 18–20. Lozungi dlia oformleniia g. Moskvy (no date).

on oral history accounts they were certainly right that slogans were an efficacious method of leaving a positive memory of the Soviet peace agenda. Almost every memoirist and interviewee recalled the magical words "peace and friendship" that had enabled communication even between those who did not have a common language.[77] "Tiresome and banal though they may be, the slogans are effective in getting across to a vast audience the really significant elements of their [Soviets] propaganda line", noticed a CIA report on the eve of the festival, which went on to remind that the slogans should be taken seriously. "They are not, as some observers in the free world are wont to believe, mere catchwords or ballyhoo phrases. They are carefully thought-out, semantically worked-over statements of International Communist policy".[78]

An Event of Great Political Significance

Allowing Soviet youth to mingle with foreign guests was part of the openness strategy, though it entailed the risk that unpleasant topics and disconcerting versions of recent history might be spread to Soviet people. It was one thing to show foreigners the new Soviet Union, which accepted non-communists and allowed visitors to walk freely in the city centre. It was another thing to ensure that Soviet people would take the right stance on a number of issues that foreign festival participants and visitors might bring to Moscow. Prior experiences of such encounters abroad, most recently with the Warsaw youth festival, had exemplified what increased openness might bring in, and therefore much effort was put into preparing Soviet youth, and the Soviet people more generally, for the contact with the outside world.

For the Komsomol, the forthcoming youth festival was a serious business. As Aleksandr Shelepin stressed at the plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee in February 1957: "It is wrong to view the festival as an entertaining event, as many comrades have understood it"; on the contrary, "the festival is an event of great political significance."[79] The political importance of the festival was equally emphasized by Sergei Romanovskii, who explained for members of the Soviet

77 Bresland, *Moscow Turned it*, 12; Chernin, Kim, *In My Mother's House. A Daughter's Story* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), 270, 277; Interview with Finnish participants, 16 March 2006.
78 CIA archives, Central CIA records, Job no. 80–01445R, Box no. 1, folder no. 5, International Communism and Youth: the Challenge of the 1957 Moscow Festival, 6 June 1957, 17.
79 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 53. Ob uluchenii ideino-vospitatel'noi raboty komsomol'skikh organizatsii sredi molodezhi, 25.2.1957. A speech to be presented at the Plenum of the TsK VLKSM.

preparatory committee that "30,000 foreigners will come here and they will talk with Muscovites about everything. [. . .] We need to conduct a huge job and clarify what the festival is all about and explain how our people should represent our country and themselves among these 30,000 people."[80] First and foremost, Soviet youth needed to show that they stood by the Soviet system. Therefore, the Komsomol expected every exemplary young person to show pride in his or her homeland by talking about the successes of the socialist system, the 40 years of building socialism, the high morals and political unity of Soviet youth, friendship toward fraternal countries and the superiority of socialist culture over capitalist culture.[81] Being able to project the correct image of the country and, if necessary, to amend the erroneous perceptions of their visitors was crucial also because Soviet authorities held that truthful news about the country only rarely circulated in foreign media. "Therefore", *Komsomol'skaia pravda* advised, "do not be surprised about the questions you will be asked; you need to be ready to answer them."[82]

Although the most important thing was to be able to promote the homeland, it was almost as important to know about and be able to respond to information that foreign guests might share with Soviet citizens. Coping with a broad range of foreign visitors demanded a level of cultural knowledge, such as knowing about the relationship between Algeria and France – at this time Algeria was a French colony, and the organizers struggled over whether to use the Algerian flag at the festival – or knowing about cultural traditions, such as Scottish men and their traditional kilts.[83] Besides the less controversial topics, part of the Soviet youth needed to be informed about a number of politically and culturally sensitive issues. As a speaker at a meeting of Party, Komsomol and trade union city committees reminded those present, among foreign guests there would also be enemies who would try to lure Soviet youth into decadent Western music, such as rock and roll, or teach them bourgeois democracy.[84] In order to respond to these possible provocations, Soviet youth had to know about such issues as "the personality cult, 'the cold war', the counterrevolutionary rising in Hungary,

80 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 35, ll. 2–5. Stenogramma i zasedaniia sovetskogo podgotovitel'nogo komiteta ot 24.12.1956.

81 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 1, ll. 35, 38. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS 16.4.1957; RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 12, l. 131. Stenogramma Sovetskoi podgotovitel'nogo komiteta 9.4.1957.

82 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 3 February 1957, 1, "Shestoi vsemirnyi".

83 TsAOPIM, f. 4, op. 104, d. 7, ll. 82, 105, 111–13, 126–7. Stenogramma soveshchaniia partiinogo, khoziastvennogo, profsoiuznogo i komsomolskogo aktiva goroda Moskvy, 20.6.1957.

84 TsAOPIM, f. 4, op. 104, d. 7, ll. 108, 126. Stenogramma, 20.6.1957.

imperialist aggression in Egypt and the ideological struggle between imperialist reactionaries and the countries of the socialist camp".[85] Some Komsomol activists were even provided with lists of political questions for their meetings with certain delegations. In a diary entry, Veljko Mićunović (1916–82), Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR in 1956–58, marked some of the questions Soviet youth had posed to Yugoslav delegates, like: "Why do you permit a flood of American films in Yugoslavia? Why does Yugoslavia not join the socialist camp? Why do you permit the cult of Tito in Yugoslavia?"[86]

Being able to respond to the attacks of those who were viewed as enemies did not, however, equal aggression toward those people. During the meetings of the bodies organizing the festival, an idea was constantly repeated that instead of attacking them, discordant views should be tolerated. A guidebook for propagandists, lecturers and agitators underlined this idea by pointing out that "our duty is neither to disappoint our friends nor to give weapons to our enemies."[87] In effect, it was preferable to treat enemies like potential friends so that they would not get the impression that they were unwelcome in the Soviet Union. "The main goal [. . .] is that all guests should leave the country as friends."[88] Tolerating enemies was a new and a radical idea, as the times when people were put in jail for contact with foreigners were not very far past. This soft approach to enemies and different opinions can be seen as part of the discursive change that took place after the death of Stalin. Ted Hopf called the new public way of speaking a "discourse of difference", which allowed both leaders and common people more ways to express their identities and errors, even though the idea of the Soviet Union "as atop a hierarchy of modernity" remained a constitutive part of discourse and Soviet official identity.[89] In a similar fashion, it was now acceptable to contact and converse with foreign citizens, including those who held opposing political views.

Given that the Moscow festival was framed as a significant political event, delicate political issues and young people's political views were elaborated and

85 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, l. 10. Stenogramma sobraniia aktiva MGK, ob itogakh raboty VII plenuma TsK VLKSM, 6.3.1957; TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 525, l. 26. Protokol nro 5 plenuma MGK VLKSM 26.3.1957; RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, ll. 101–105. Perechen' nekotorykh voprosov, zadannykh tov. Mikhailovu N. A. 11 iiulia 1957 g. na seminare predstavitelei sovetskogo podgotovitel'nogo komiteta.

86 Mićunović, Veljko, *Moscow Diary* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1980), 293–294.

87 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 265, ll. 86, 88. V pomoshch propagandistu, lektoru, dokladchiku i agitatoru VI VFMS za mir i druzhbu.

88 TsAOPIM, f. 4, op. 104, d. 7, ll. 108, 126. Stenogramma, 20.6.1957.

89 Hopf, Ted, *Reconstructing the Cold War. The Early Years, 1945–1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 146–147.

discussed within the Komsomol and other preparatory organizations surprisingly little. Instead, much more time and space seem to have been devoted to contemplating the potential harmful influence of Western "decadent" culture on Soviet youth. Evaluating by the mere share of each topic addressed in archival documents would allow an interpretation that Soviet authorities were more concerned about the cultural than the political views of Soviet young people. It is more likely, however, that the majority of political issues were so delicate that they simply could not be discussed very broadly within the Komsomol bodies and preparatory committees. While political taboos remained largely untouched, cultural tastes and appropriate genres of popular music were widely treated within the Komsomol as well as within cultural and artistic institutions.

Debating Jazz and Cultural Tastes

The Komsomol leadership began to pay attention to harmful Western cultural influences in the latter half of 1956. Fighting the decadent and harmful Western cultural impact had been one of central elements of Soviet cultural policy from the 1920s, and especially since establishing socialist realism as the official style in arts. Exactly what was regarded as decadent and harmful in Western culture varied from time to time, but there was a continuous tendency to regard Soviet (Russian) culture as superior to Western bourgeois culture and to fight against "banality" (*poshlost'*), meaning everything between vulgarity, lack of spirituality, triviality and bad taste.[90] The conception of the superiority of Soviet culture and aversion to "bad taste" were the key words also in discussions of the cultural risks stemming from the Moscow youth festival.[91]

One of the catalysts for tightening control over youth behavior was the picture of Soviet youth being spread abroad. A case in point was an article published in *the Observer* in September 1956. Titled "Spivs and Hooligans", the piece spoke about a minority of disoriented Soviet youth: "Broadway boys" who imitated Western lifestyles, "Business boys" engaged in obtaining Western goods from foreign

90 Boym, Svetlana, *Common Places. Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 41.

91 Fürst, Juliane, *Stalin's Last Generation. Soviet Post-war Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), passim; Tsipursky, Gleb, *Socialist Fun: Youth, Consumption, & State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1945–1970* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), 136.

visitors, and hooligans.[92] A similar case of bad publicity took place in May 1957, when the French *Le Monde*, Australian *Forum* and Radio Free Europe discussed student riots at Moscow State University.[93] Articles about activities that questioned the "official" image of Soviet youth and students as loyal citizens certainly fed Western readers' curiosity and were exceedingly embarrassing for the Soviet leadership, which put vast funds and effort into managing the image of the Soviet system. With the forthcoming Moscow festival in mind, the Ministry of Internal Affairs advised the Komsomol to deal with these kinds of problems in order to prevent such articles in the future.[94]

Interest in "everything Western" was not a new problem. Already since the late 1940s a small core of Soviet youth had been enthusiastic about Western music, fashion and lifestyles. Nicknamed *stiliagi* by an article published in *Krokodil* in 1949, these young people (mostly young, middle-class men) led a hedonistic lifestyle, sharing an obsession with Western fashion and music as well as a reluctance toward political activism. Their individualistic way of living represented the antithesis of a model Soviet youth, the loyal builder of socialist society devoted to the collective good instead of individual pleasure.[95] *Stiliagi*, as well as other youth subcultures that developed towards the end of the 1950s, such as *bitniki* (beatniks, enthusiasts of beat music and poetry) and *shtatniki* (admirers of American culture) presented alternatives to the official culture of the Komsomol.[96]

The fight against Western influences intensified especially after the Komsomol Central Committee plenum in February 1957. The plenum reacted to growing and

92 *The Observer*, 30 September 1956, 7, William C. Jest, "The Young People of Russia 2, Spivs and Hooligans". The piece was part of a series of four articles on young people in Russia, published in September and October of 1956, written under a pseudonym by a Russian-speaking British student who had recently studied in the Soviet Union.

93 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, 233, l. 75. Tovarishchu Shepilovu, I. Tugarinov, zamestitel' predsedatelia komiteta informatsii pri MID SSSR, 15 May 1957.

94 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 179, l. 87. Tov. Pospelovu P. N., S. Rumiantsev, chlen komiteta informatsii pri MID SSSR, 7.12.1956.

95 For *stiliaga* culture, see Starr, S. Frederick, *Red and Hot. The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917–1980* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 240–243; Edele, Mark, "Strange Young Men in Stalin's Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945–1953", *Jahrbücher für Geschicte Osteuropas*, 50, No. 1, 2002, 37–61; Fürst, Juliane, "The Arrival of Spring? Changes and Continuities in Soviet Youth culture and policy between Stalin and Khrushchev", in *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization. Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, edited by Polly Jones (London: Routledge, 2006), 138; Troitskii, Artemi, *Back in the USSR* (Sankt-Peterburg: Amfora, 2007), 15–24.

96 Fürst, Juliane, "The Importance of Being Stylish. Youth, Culture and Identity in the Late Stalinism", in *Late Stalinist Russia. Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention*, edited by J. Fürst (London: Routledge, 2006), 210.

excessive interest in Western cultural trends stemming from the cultural liberalism of the Thaw, the forthcoming youth festival and Western Cold War propaganda, by launching "an aesthetic upbringing campaign".[97] Proclaiming that "we need to act forcefully against attempts to bring to the festival all kinds of trash (*khaltura*) and vulgarity", Shelepin signaled that allowing contact with the West did not automatically mean embracing all aspects of it.[98] Indeed, Shelepin stated that "under the influence of the West, many young men, and women in particular, have started to invent the devil knows what kind of hairdos (*chort znaet kakie pricheski*)". He clarified that Soviet youth should follow the fashion but "with moderation and good taste".[99] The plenum speech emphasized that Komsomol organizations should take new measures in the artistic and cultural education of young people and children, including discussions on good taste and programs for teaching Soviet citizens to value the products of fine art, sculpture, literature and music of their motherland.[100]

The relationship with Western popular culture was not only a matter for youth; it touched upon a larger question about the development of Soviet culture and the mobilization of youth for the benefit of the Soviet project. Questions about what constituted the right attitude toward Western popular culture, such as jazz, divided Soviet institutions and authorities into conservatives and reformists. With regard to the youth festival, a telling example was a clash between the Komsomol and the Composers Union and the CPSU Central Committee on jazz.

In April 1957, the Union of Soviet Composers, with its head Tikhon Khrennikov, attacked Komsomol leadership by accusing them of having been too supportive of Western popular culture, namely jazz. The problem was that the number of jazz orchestras had substantially increased during the preparatory period for the festival and that workers in the Komsomol Central Committee had been involved in these orchestras. "What astonishes here", Khrennikov said, "is that our youth, even the most developed and cultured part of it, expresses unforgivable ignorance and fairly poor taste in the field of music."[101]

97 Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun*, 134–139.

98 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 53. Ob uluchenii ideino-vospitatel'noi raboty komsomol'skikh organizatsii sredi molodezhi, 25 February 1957, to be presented at the Plenum of the TsK VLKSM, see also Shelepin, Aleksandr, *Ob uluchenii ideino-vospitatel'noi raboty komsomol'skikh organizatsii sredi molodezhi* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1957), 7–9, 45–48.

99 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 56. Ob uluchenii.

100 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 57. Ob uluchenii. See also TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 49–50. Stenogramma sobraniia aktiva MGK komsomola, 6.3.1957.

101 RGANI, f. 5, op. 36, d. 46, l. 51. A. Shelepin v TsK KPSS, 12.4.1957. For a discussion on the transformation of attitudes towards jazz within the Soviet cultural elite, see also Starr, *Red and Hot*, 245, 248–249.

Shelepin answered Khrennikov's criticism by noting that the Komsomol Central Committee had clearly announced its attitude toward the dangers of light music. He admitted that a portion of the Soviet youth preferred light music and had poor taste, but insisted that the great majority "knows, loves and honors good music and deeply respects its creators". Shelepin felt sufficiently annoyed to ask the CPSU Central Committee permission to write a reply to Khrennikov's accusations in *Pravda*, *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, *Trud* and *Sovetskaia kul'tura*.[102]

The question was then handled within the cultural department of the CPSU Central Committee, where, in fact, the criticism initially originated. In reply to Shelepin, the literary critic Boris S. Riurikov and musicologist Boris M. Iarustovskii, both workers in the CPSU cultural department, agreed with Khrennikov's statement about the harmfulness of jazz music and its increased popularity. According to Riurikov and Iarustovskii, the bureau of the Komsomol Central Committee had approved the rules and categories for the festival of the youth of the USSR in January 1956 – one of the categories being jazz orchestras (*estradnye orkestry*). This had stimulated the widespread cultivation of bourgeois jazz, such that by late May 1957, in Moscow alone there existed over 100 jazz bands. As the organizing body of the domestic festival, Riurikov and Iarustovskii held the Komsomol guilty for the massive increase in the number of jazz orchestras. To resolve the problem, they suggested that central newspapers publish articles on good quality music and against the "wrong tendencies".[103] The main concern was not actually jazz as a genre but rather the way it was performed. Riurikov and Iarustovksii were principally aggrieved that the majority of new jazz bands seemed to be interested in the Americanized form of Western jazz and that many songs were performed in English, Spanish or other foreign languages. Riurikov and Iarustovskii found the repertoires of these kinds of bands harmful to the artistic development of young people's musical tastes and thought that the emergence of jazz bands had negatively affected the development of folk ensembles, choirs, and brass and folk bands.[104]

While *stiliagi* had been a marginal phenomenon during the 1940s and early 1950s, the Komsomol and cultural institutions like the Union of Composers feared that at the festival, with the presence of thousands of foreign youths, enthusiasm for the things that Western young people admired might become a mass phenomenon. Another fundamental fear was that embracing an excessive amount of foreign cultural elements might overrun one's own national cultural traditions. This fear was clearly seen in documents dealing with the festival

102 RGANI, f. 5, op. 36, d. 46, l. 52. A. Shelepin v TsK KPSS, 12.4.1957.
103 RGANI, f. 5, op. 36, d. 46, ll. 54–56. B. Riurikov i B. Iarustovskii v TsK KPSS, 22.5.1957.
104 RGANI, f. 5, op. 36, d. 46, ll. 54–56. B. Riurikov i B. Iarustovskii v TsK KPSS, 22.5.1957.

preparations as well as in media coverage of the festival. New styles, genres or fashionable clothes were not questioned in principle, but the point was that the cultural choices of Soviet youth should go hand in hand with socialist values and aesthetical norms.[105]

The problem of cultural tastes was related to a larger question about Soviet society and the cultural Cold War. Socialist culture was an essential part of the Soviet project and, eventually, after socialism had beaten capitalism, it was to constitute the future world. Young people's cultural tastes and priorities were particularly important because they were seen as the hope for the future, the builders of the socialist system, those who would finally see the envisioned communist society completed. If young people were not interested in the project of constructing a new society, if they were keener on enjoying the products of the capitalist system than fighting capitalism, then who would complete the project?

Notwithstanding the criticisms about jazz and other Western cultural influences, it was surprising that Komsomol records mentioned only one attempt to cancel performances of Western groups. According to a report written on the eve of the festival, the leader of the British delegation, Malcolm Nixon, was asked to cancel the concerts of British rock and roll groups scheduled to play at the festival. Nixon, a Scottish musician and a promoter of skiffle and blues bands, had told the Soviet authorities that "we cannot dictate to our youth what to perform." Nixon was, in fact, the wrong person to ask to cancel performances of British rock groups. Even though he was a member of the communist youth league, he did not take politics too seriously and, after the Moscow festival, he set up the Malcolm Nixon Agency and started performing together with Ewan MacColl in their Ballads and Blues ensemble.[106] Whether by coincidence or on purpose, *Molodoi Kommunist*, a paper for Komsomol activists, published an article on the British delegation, which included a paragraph on the jazz groups of Jeff Ellison and Bruce Turner, who were scheduled to perform in Moscow.[107]

Preparing Soviet youth for the festival and managing the image of young people as loyal builders of socialism was a serious matter for the Komsomol and

105 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 49–50. Stenogramma sobraniia aktiva MG komsomola, 6.3.1957. On socialist values and aesthetical norms, see Hoffmann, David L., *Stalinist Values. The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

106 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 197, l. 85. Informatsiia 2, 21.7.1957; Harker, Ben, *Class Act. The Cultural and Political Life of Ewan MacColl* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 121, 126. Soviet authorities also carried out measures to prevent some of the concerts of the Israeli delegation, however, this was for political, not cultural reasons. Kostyrchenko, G. V., *Tainaia politika Khrushcheva. Vlast', intelligentsia, evreiskii vopros* (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia", 2012), 275–276.

107 *Molodoi Kommunist*, 7/1957, 34–35, Jennifer Mary Warren, "Molodye anglichane i festival' v Moskve".

the Party. This can be seen in a response to *The New York Times* correspondent Max Frankel's article discussing Soviet preparations for the festival. Frankel's text, published in late May 1957, focused on the guidance given to Soviet youth. Referring to an article published in *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Frankel maintained, with a hint of sarcasm, that young people were encouraged to restrain from sighing for such Western items as cigarette lighters, women's jewelry, cufflinks or colorful clothes. The Soviet response in *Moskovskii komsomolets* came on 23 July. It lashed out at Frankel for missing the main point of the article – educating young people to be proud of their home country as well as the idea of bringing people closer by means of a peace festival – and underlined some minor factual mistakes and typos made by Frankel. The article ended by asking, whether or not "everyone, including, we hope, Mr. Frankel, too, usually tries to put his house in order when he expects guests". The Soviet reaction demonstrated how seriously the organizers took the Moscow festival, and moreover, how important it was for the Soviet Union to be respected, not mocked, even by its superpower rival. This was also mentioned in internal correspondence between *The New York Times* staff. It was stated that the Soviet response to the NYT article amounted to a "wounded reaction", behind which was "extreme sensitivity about the festival and their self-consciousness about the elaborate preparations".[108]

These two articles aptly illustrated what the cultural Cold War was all about: trying to undermine the cultural successes of the other side when they seemed to threaten one's own plans. In the end, it was not devastating if a few individuals were interested in jazz and jeans, but if the general impression of Soviet youth as a collective entity was based on a picture of young people obsessed with all things Western, the credibility of the whole Soviet project was brought into question. Soviet culture and arts constituted an essential part of the Soviet cultural diplomacy that was actively promoted to other countries. Therefore, the view that Soviet youth, who were apparently the most progressive and avant-garde, preferred to enjoy the culture of the enemy severely harmed the image of the Soviet project.

108 A letter from William J. Jorde to Emanuel Freedman on 24 July 1957 (which included a translation of the article published in *Moskovskii komsomolets*), New York Times Company records, Foreign desk records, Manuscripts and Archives Division, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations, box 34, folder 8. I am indebted to Dina Fainberg for sharing this source with me. *The New York Times*, 28 May 1957, 9, Max Frankel, "Moscow Readies Youths as Hosts"; *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 27 May 1957 and 23 July 1957.

Popularizing the Festival in Soviet Media

On 5 January 1957, an article titled "Towards the Festival" in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* started a massive campaign of popularizing the forthcoming festival among the Soviet population. Hundreds of articles in *Molodaia Gvardiia*, *Molodoi Kommunist*, *Smena*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Ogonek*, *Novyi mir*, *Sovetskii sport*, and *Krokodil* familiarized Soviet readers with the ideas of the World Youth Festival, told how individuals in different parts of the world prepared for the event, and repeatedly recalled the role that Soviet youth was going to play at the peace and friendship gathering.[109] Foreign youth were targeted through a special publication, named *Festival*, which was released in several languages and with special issues of the WFDY's *World Youth* and the IUS's *World Student News*.[110] Weekly radio broadcasts were delivered in Moscow, Beijing, Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Bucharest, Budapest and Warsaw in 33 languages between January and July 1957.[111] The publishing houses *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, *IZOGIZ*, *Sovetskii Kompozitor*, *Iskusstvo* and *MUZGIZ* printed 50 million copies of 947 different titles, including festival guidebooks, photo albums, songbooks and Moscow city guides, in Russian, French, English, German, Spanish, Arabian, Hindi, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, Norwegian, Finnish and Flemish.[112] Typical of the Soviet propaganda system, the festival campaign was more focused on volume than content. This was illuminated in reports dealing with festival propaganda that more often than not suggested increasing the volume of propaganda to better put across the message of peace and friendship through the international media. What Vladimir Pechatnov pointed out about Soviet propaganda during the early Cold War was also applicable to festival propaganda in 1957: it suffered from a fixation on quantity and a lack of target-specific orientation.[113]

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109 On plans for publicising the festival see RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 84, l. 106. L. Sav'ialova.

110 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 52, ll. 173–174. Predlozhenie po gazete "Festival", tov. Vdovin; RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 270–279. Russian, English, Spanish, German and French versions of *The Festival*.

111 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 52, ll. 1–8. VLKSM, AKSM. Nekotorye predlosheniia po orgnizatsii podgotovki i provedeniiu VI Vsemirnogo Festivalia, 26.9.1955, peredal Nikitin, prinial Kuz'menko; RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 84, ll. 99, 102. L. Sav'ialova.

112 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, l. 152. N. Mihailov v TsK KPSS, 16.8.1957; RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 38, ll. 92–94. A. Romanov, K. Bogoliubov (otdel agitpropa) v TsK KPSS, 16.5.1957.

113 RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 31, ll. 18–22. A. Shelepin v TsK KPSS, 13.3.1957; see also Pechatnov, V., "Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945–1947", *Cold War History*, 1, No. 2, 2001, 1–27. See also Kenez, Peter, *The Birth of the Propaganda State. Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 13.

The massive media campaign was an excellent forum to shape the understanding of the outside world. With their illustrated stories from different corners of the world, magazines like *Ogonek*, *Smena* and *Krokodil* provided their readers a miniature encyclopedia of the world. One could read about distant countries such as Uganda and Sierra-Leone, wonder at Indonesian celebration practices on Bali, read a reportage of Czechoslovakian runner Emil Zátopek, who was to compete in the friendly games of the festival, or ponder the thoughts of foreign members of the International Preparatory Committee, who visited Moscow before the start of the festival.[114] Through these numerous stories the Soviet print media showed what potential festival guests looked like and what they thought about the Soviet Union. Reporting on how prospective attendees prepared for the festival elsewhere, the Soviet media attempted to familiarize people with the variety of cultures and multi-ethnic crowds that the festival was going to introduce.[115]

Although the tone was milder in 1957 than earlier, the festival narrative was still very much framed by the Cold War. The Soviet Union was shown as the source of a good life for all peoples and as the leader of the "progressive camp", which fought against the development of nuclear weapons and international pacts like NATO.[116] The Western governments were depicted as "enemies of the festival", who attempted to harm young people's festival trips in capitalist countries. *Molodoi Kommunist* offered an explanation, according to which the enemies saw the youth festival as a threat. "The imperialist masters are afraid that having travelled to Moscow, world youth can see our country with their own eyes and will start to believe how false and dirty imperialist propaganda is".[117] A similar agenda was embedded in a short story published in a special festival issue of the satirical magazine *Krokodil*, which emphasized the uniqueness of state support for such a festival and hinted that providing the infrastructure for the use of such a youth celebration was only possible within a socialist system. In a fictitious conversation, an American youngster asked permission to use the streets, squares, restaurants, hotels, theatres, stadia and clubs of New York for a similar youth festival. "Are you out of your mind?", replies the mayor, "we cannot offer you anything.

114 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 11 June 1957, 3, "Otkuda priedut na festival'"; *Ogonek*, 30/1957; *Ogonek*, 31/1957; *Smena*, 13/1957, 22–23, "Anketa Smeny".

115 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 15, d. 84, ll. 99, 102, 106. L. Sav'ialova.

116 *Molodoi Kommunist*, 8/1957, 65–78, "Molodezh' mira – protiv ugrozy atomnoi boiny", V. Vdovin; *Molodoi Kommunist*, 10/1957, 114–118, "Sovetskoi strane prinadlezhit budushchee", N. Nikolaev. For the history of peace in Soviet foreign policy, see Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda*, 80–121; Johnston, Timothy, *Being Soviet. Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life under Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5–11, 142–65.

117 *Molodoi Kommunist*, 5/1957, 103–108 (quote on page 104). "Gotov li ty k festivaliu?".

Hotels and restaurants, theatres and stadia – all belong to private owners, to capitalists. They ask such money that you will not be having fun but weeping". "And who are you inviting? Soviet youth, Chinese? The State department hardly lets them in?", the mayor continues. So the youth understood how silly his question was. "No, it is impossible, such a picture is absurd! And everybody knows it. The whole world sees it. Try to convince even one honest person that the USA is a democracy, and that in the USSR there is an iron curtain."[118]

One of the most compelling individual stories of repressive measures in the capitalist world was Barbara Perry's case. Inspired by President Eisenhower's speech on the importance of person-to-person contacts, Barbara Perry, a 23-year-old former dancer from the University of Chicago, had decided to put together the first US preparatory committee for a World Youth Festival. To her disappointment, Perry found that the US government did not encourage, but rather forbade US citizens from travelling to the festival.[119] Despite the difficulties that she faced, Perry, with her parents and some 140 fellow Americans, eventually travelled to Moscow.[120] *Komsomolskaia pravda* closely followed Perry's attempts to get to Moscow. Its readers sent her good luck wishes and were fascinated by her courageous fight against the US authorities.[121] Perry's case proved extremely propitious for Soviet propaganda efforts to reinforce the picture of the USA's attitude towards the festival and the communist world more widely. Soviet readers were offered a story of an American youth that had to fight the capitalist bureaucrats to be able to take part in a peace festival. Perry, the heroine of the story, was easily linked with images of class struggle, as a socially conscious young communist who fought against the bourgeois government and showed an example of youth elsewhere struggling with similar problems. The question arose: what kind of a country bans its youth from participating in a peace festival? In the Cold War world, usefulness was evanescent, as Perry would come to realize. Two years later,

118 *Krokodil*, 21/1957, 2, "Molodym vezde u nas doroga".

119 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, March 1957; *The New Republic*, July 1957; *The New York Times*, 19 July 1957, A6, "Pro-Reds Recruit U.S. Youths to Attend 'Festival' in Moscow". According to *the New York Times*, her real name was Perlman.

120 The figure for US participation varies depending on the source. According to the organizers' statistics, the US delegation had 141 members; Max Frankel writes about 160 US citizens who attended the festival, but these probably included tourists and observers. *Le VIe Festival Mondial de la Jeunesse et des Etudiants*, 1957; *The New York Times*, 11 August 1957, 169, Max Frankel, "Voices of America in Moscow".

121 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 13 March 1957, 4, "Moskovskii festival i volneniia v belom dome"; *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 16 March 1957, 3, "My verim, chto vstremitsia na festival"; *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 17 March 1957, 3, "Molodye amerikantsy khotiat priekhat' na vsemirnyi festival".

the American peace fighter had apparently ceased to be useful for Soviet aims, as she refused to acknowledge the Komsomol supported New York preparatory committee for the Vienna festival as the leading national committee.[122]

In accordance with Khrushchev's ideas on opening up the Soviet Union and coexisting with the capitalist system in a peaceful manner, the festival reportage proclaimed a new kind of relationship with the outside world – a new type of internationalism, which went beyond official delegations, party meetings and diplomatic relations. The media promoted an idea of international culture, where the Soviet Union was viewed as an integrated part of the world in which communication with other countries was encouraged, not punished as it had been during the Stalin period. In *Ogonek*, Ivan Melekhov, a turner in a car factory, boasted of his language skills, "I already know fifty English words. It is, of course, little, but one can use gesture language, mimics, the language of the heart, and I am sure I will find new friends".[123] Interest in learning about others was also noted by foreign observers, like *World Student News* editor Ricardo Ramirez, who visited Moscow during the preparatory period. "There seems to be a mass movement to learn languages, to study the history, social life and culture of the participating countries", remarked Ramirez.[124] Another way of reshaping the relationship with the outside world was conducted through the discussion of Soviet culture. Besides introducing readers to the most prominent part of the Soviet cultural canon, including the acceptable parts of Tsarist Russian culture, texts and illustrations linked Soviet culture to "classic works of world culture", as viewed by the Soviet cultural establishment. While *Krokodil* welcomed old friends to Moscow, including the good soldier Svejk, Jonathan Swift's Gulliver, Rabelais's Gargantua, Mark Twain's Tom Sawyer, Cervantes's Don Quixote and Rudolph Raspe's baron Münchausen, a cartoon published in *Smena* pictured how some of these "heroes of world literature", including Svejk and Don Quixote, alongside a domestic hero in the form of Khletaskov from Gogol's *Government Inspector* (*Revisor*), might have celebrated in *festival'naia Moskva*.[125]

On 27 July – a day before the start of the Moscow festival – *Komsomol'skaia pravda* published an article, "Our Soviet culture" (*Nasha sovetskaia kul'tura*). The article, which was written by the Minister of Culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, was part of a series of educational texts that offered concrete facts and arguments on Soviet culture for use in potentially provocative conversations with

122 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 4c, d. 416, l. 2. Informatsiia o khode podgotovki k VII Vsemirnomu festvaliu molodezhi i studentov v Vene.

123 *Ogonek*, 30/1957, E. Riabchikov, "Idet festival".

124 *World Student News*, 5/1957, 6–10. Ricardo Ramirez, "Moscow Festival".

125 *Smena*, 14/1957, 8, "Geroi mirovoi literature na festivale"; *Krokodil*, 21/1957, 8–9.

foreign guests. One of the key themes of the article was to defend socialist realism as an art genre. Mikhailov wrote that socialist realism was born as a method to demonstrate the new revolutionary relationship with reality, stating that it was a product of the change that had occurred in living conditions. Mikhailov pointed out that, contrary to the usual conceptions in the West, socialist realism was in no way prescribed. Moreover, he criticized the view that Soviet artists were not interested in contemporary art and culture. Lastly, Mikhailov summarized the official Soviet conception of culture as a combination of different cultural traditions: "we want to take the best parts of foreign cultures and to develop our Soviet socialist culture".[126]

Another Western argument on Soviet culture that Mikhailov criticized was the supposed existence of a "cultural iron curtain". With figures on the amount of translated and exported book titles, as well as Soviet mobility abroad (according to the article 4,280 different titles were translated in 1955, while in the USA the number was only 800), Mikhailov ridiculed the idea of cultural isolation. "How can we talk of an iron curtain, when the Soviet Union is the world leader in importing literature from other countries", he asked.[127] Most importantly, Mikhailov praised Soviet culture and the educational system that was free for everybody. He encouraged young people to "propagandize the love and respect for the first country of workers and peasants" and reminded them that the World Youth Festival was going to be "a celebration of socialist culture".[128] The implicit aim of this discussion was to show that Soviet culture was not isolated from the cultural trends of the outside world, but it was a part of what the Soviet cultural elite called "world culture". Culture, cultured education and tastes were also discussed in numerous readers' letters in *Komsomol'skaia pravda* during the run-up to the festival. There was, for example, discussion on what a cultured person should know about various forms of art, how to dress and dance aesthetically and whether ball room dancing belonged in a museum or an archive, rather than in the leisure activities of a modern young person.[129]

Thousands of pages and hours of broadcasts covering the youth festival not only popularized the event to Soviet youths, but also enabled young people to

126 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 27 July 1957, 2, N. Mikhailov, "Nasha sovetskaia kul'tura".

127 For translations of foreign literature in the 1930s, see Clark, Katerina, *Moscow, the Fourth Rome. Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931–1941* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 16–20.

128 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 27 July 1957, 2, N. Mikhailov, "Nasha sovetskaia kul'tura".

129 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 27 June 1957, 2, "Razgovor nachistatu prodalzhaetsia". Answers from readers to an article written by V. Ivanov and published by *Komsomol'skaia pravda* on 31 May 1957.

sense the multi-cultured atmosphere of the festival and, more importantly, mobilized them for service to the motherland. While the World Youth Festival could accommodate only a handful of Soviet young people, anyone could take part in the preparatory events, in local and regional festivals, volunteer work and creative production – all traditional forms of Soviet mass mobilization. According to stories published in the press, young people from Leningrad to Vladivostok took part in the preparations by producing gifts for foreign delegates or organizing local get-togethers, balls, evenings and even small festivals in honor of the World Youth Festival.[130] The international tone was embedded in an article that recounted the correspondence between the young workers of the Likhachev car factory in Moscow and those of the Csepel car factory in Budapest. According to the article, the young Hungarians were working extra hours to finish a milling machine for use in the festival. At the end, the hardest working of them would win tickets granting them access to the Moscow festival.[131] Stories like that of the Likhachev factory workers created the feeling that although only a small minority of Soviet youth could be in Moscow in July-August, by engaging in the preparations, correspondence with foreign youths, or miniature youth festivals one could be part of something bigger and could contribute to the cause of peace. Besides mobilizing young people for the purposes of the festival, the implicit aim of the media coverage was to activate young people to work more efficiently for the socialist motherland.[132]

Besides print media and radio, one could follow the youth festival through a fresh medium: television. With more than 200 hours of live coverage, the youth festival represented the first time in the history of Soviet television that ordinary people were seen on screen dancing and celebrating. Broadcasting the festival demonstrated the potential of television and gave a boost to its further development in the Soviet Union.[133] Like the print press and radio, television engaged Soviet people throughout the country by showing programs whose primary function was to educate citizens on the themes of the festival and to teach them foreign languages. Live broadcasts not only told of what was happening in Moscow but sought to engage people in other parts of the country with the

130 *Smena*, 13/1957, 15, K. Musiev, "Trud, mir, druzhba".

131 *Ogonek*, 28/1957, 24, "Chepel' – festivaliu".

132 *Molodoi Kommunist*, 2/1957, 102, "Navstrechu festival'iu"; *Molodoi Kommunist*, 5/1957, 105, "Gotov li ty k festivaliu?"; *Council of the World Federation of Democratic Youth*, 1956, 13.

133 Roth-Ey, Kristin, *Moscow Prime Time. How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 238–239, 246.

festival in a way that print media and radio were unable to – as eyewitnesses.[134] In *Krokodil's* terms, spectators were "remote participants" in the festival, who, without being on the spot in Moscow, could see what was happening there and be a part of an international celebration.[135] As the American journalist Irvine Levine put it: "if by the time the festival actually got under way the populace of Moscow was *not* fully festival-minded, it was not the fault of television", or of any other medium for that matter.[136]

Western Reactions

Western governments, intelligence, and media had followed the World Youth Festival more or less since its beginning. They had taken advantage of various counter measures against the festival, most notably in a divided Berlin in 1951, but had shown declined interest in the Bucharest and Warsaw festivals. If they had not yet understood the potential danger of the Soviet-sponsored youth gathering, this became evident when Moscow was announced the host of the next celebration. Khrushchev's secret speech and the uprising in Hungary that shook the socialist bloc from within further increased Western interest in influencing young people in Eastern Europe. The West was certainly late in realizing the importance of this cultural exchange; however, Western authorities and political leaders were not so ignorant and passive as has been argued before.[137]

A perspicacious report by CIA officers of 6 June 1957 paid attention to the advertised openness and inclusion of previously ignored international associations and assessed that organizing the festival as scheduled in the aftermath of Hungary "must have been regarded by the Kremlin as a calculated risk". The CIA estimated that the purpose of the festival was to stabilize international communism after de-Stalinization had started; intensify Soviet influence on the Global South; and take

134 Roth-Ey, *Moscow Prime Time*, 238–239, 246; Roth-Ey, Kristin, "'Loose Girls' on the Loose?: Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 Youth Festival", in *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, edited by Melanie Ilic, Susan E. Reid, and Lynne Attwood (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 92–93.

135 *Krokodil*, 21/1957, 6, "FEK (Festival'naia entsiklopediia Krokodila)", M. Vaiasbord, Ia. Dymskoi. On the experience of watching television, see e.g. Raleigh, Donald. J. *Soviet Baby Boomers. An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 59.

136 Levine, Irvine, *Main Street U.S.S.R* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959), 161.

137 Barghoorn, Frederick, C., *The Soviet Cultural Offensive. The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 25–26; Hixson, Walter L., *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997), 159–160, 223; see also Kotek, *Students and the Cold War*, 113.

tighter control over youth in socialist countries. The report considered the festival a major challenge to the US, "both a danger to be averted and an opportunity to be exploited". Aware of the limited chances of conducting open propaganda inside the USSR, the intelligence officers thought they should try to exploit the budding disagreement within the communist countries and to influence educated Soviet youth who were starting to be curious about the world outside the Soviet borders. Based on the assessment of previous festivals, the report supposed there would be only limited opportunity for voicing dissent in Moscow; however, it believed a few Western participants would look for possibilities to express non-communist views on recent events.[138] In order to utilize these chances, the CIA covertly resourced the National Student Association, whose student activists flew to the USSR to spread alternative information among local people and to listen out for signs of the public mood via person-to-person contacts.[139]

The possibilities for using the Moscow festival were discussed also within NATO member countries. The opportunity to conduct propaganda in Moscow was tempting, but the environment was not easy, as the materials from the NATO online archive demonstrate. There was a high risk that any official delegation from the West could be interpreted as a support for the festival's idea and more broadly for the USSR and the socialist system. In August 1956, the Canadian delegation shared their authorities' evaluation, according to which a single Western "official" delegation could not operate effectively at the festival but would need support from others. They maintained that a possible delegation should be strictly non-political, well-briefed, led by people who would communicate with their respective governments and embassies and who would absolutely not get involved in any discussions on organizational relationships with the WFDY and the IUS. Western cooperation apparently did not find support from the other countries, as the UK delegation related in a meeting in March 1957 that their government had decided not to send its own people but to rely on non-communist youth who were anyway going to Moscow and who had no illusions about the nature of festival. If briefed and organized, these young people could "voice Western views effectively", the British thought.[140]

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138 CIA Archive, Central CIA records, Job no. 80–01445R, Box no. 1, folder no. 5, International Communism and Youth: The Challenge of the 1957 Moscow Festival, 6 June 1957, vi, 1–77.

139 Stern, Sydney Ladensohn, *Gloria Steinem. Her Passions, Politics, and Mystique* (Secaucus: Carol Publishing Group, 1997), 111–112; for CIA-funded student activities see also Wilford, Hugh, *The Mighty Wurlitzer. How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 123–148.

140 NATO Archive, NATO confidential document AC/52-D/232, Committee on information and cultural relations, Sixth World Youth Festival, Note by the United Kingdom delegation, 26 March 1957; NATO Archive, AC/52-D/181, Committee on information and cultural relations, World Youth Festival – Moscow 1957, Note by the Canadian delegation, 14 August 1956.

Besides exploiting the Moscow festival for advancing Western agendas, the idea of organizing a NATO youth festival in the summer of 1957 was on the table in 1956. A document sketching this Western alternative to the Moscow gathering reveals that it would have been fully funded by NATO and was planned only for the young people of member countries. In terms of the programme, it would have been quite close to the World Youth Festivals, including cultural, artistic and sporting activities as well as performances and exhibitions by national delegations.[141]

While the discussion did not explicitly mention the World Youth Festival as the reason for planning a NATO youth festival, it underlined the fact that interest in cultural exchanges had increased enormously over the past few years and that therefore NATO should also answer that call.[142] The documents from the NATO online archive do not reveal the origins or designer of the idea of a NATO festival or the reasons why it did not materialize. News of the plans, however, reached Moscow and, according to Soviet records, it would have been the Danish foreign minister who suggested organizing an alternative youth event.[143] When it was clear that the NATO festival would not be held, WFDY president Jacques Denis mocked the plan in *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, explaining that the whole thing had faded way "because youth did not support" such a "military festival".[144] Based on Soviet monitoring reports, the Catholic Church and Pope Pius XII, one of the most fervent anti-Communist Cold Warriors, were also planning a competing event. According to Sergei Romanovskii, Pius XII advised Catholic youth to attend an event organized by the Vatican that ran simultaneously with the Moscow youth festival, proclaiming that "those who are with Christ travel to Rome, but those who are with the Anti-Christ travel to the festival in Moscow".[145]

141 NATO Archive, AC/52(CE)D9, NATO confidential document, Ad hoc meeting of senior officers of NATO countries concerned with government-sponsored cultural activities, 4 July 1956.

142 NATO Archive, AC/52(CE)D9, NATO confidential document, Ad hoc meeting of senior officers of NATO countries concerned with government-sponsored cultural activities, 4 July 1956.

143 RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, d. 454, l. 7. A. Shelepin V TsK KPSS, 13.2.1956; RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, d. 454, l. 7. Sessiia ispolkoma VFDM, 1.–4.2.1956, A. Shelepin. The possibility of a counter-festival for the NATO countries' youth was still a topical issue in March 1957. RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 31, ll. 18–22. A. Shelepin v TsK KPSS, 13.3.1957. The discussion on the idea of "a rally of Western European youth" was mentioned in a memorandum of the United States Foreign Office. FRUS, Telegram from the United States delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting to the Department of State, 17 December 1955, 43.

144 *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 28 July 1957, 3, Jacques Denis, "Vernyi kurs".

145 TsAOPIM, f. 4, op. 113, d. 23, ll. 30–31. Sergei Romanovskii. The meeting for youth held in Rome by the Vatican was also mentioned by Carlos Fonseca Amador, a Nicaraguan revolutionary

In the end, the United States chose a path of boycotting the Moscow festival. The US State Department openly discouraged Americans and young people from other NATO countries from attending the Moscow gathering and the largest youth organizations, the US National Union of Students and the Young Men's Christian Association, turned against the festival.[146] The fear was that American participants would be used as tools of Soviet propaganda. "Their pictures would be taken smiling with Russians, and then spread all over the world to show that we approve of what Russia did in Hungary", a State Department official pointed out.[147] Similarly cynical views were echoed in *The New York Times*, which described the festival as "one of Moscow's most expensive propaganda efforts in many years". The article supported exchange of ideas and free spontaneous communication in principle, but it emphasized that the festival was connected to communist propaganda: "it is clear that this huge and expensive spectacle would never have proved possible if the Soviet Government had not felt there were great propaganda dividends to be had". The article, nevertheless, foresaw that besides these gains, the Soviet government might brook propaganda pushback, since "the young people who have gone to Moscow are not blind". Therefore, the question arose: who was going to influence whom more in Moscow?[148]

The US government's festival boycott has been viewed as a result of its failure to understand the potential of cultural exchange in the first decades of the Cold War.[149] While this holds true with regard to the concept of the World Youth Festival – the United States and its Western allies never put together anything like it themselves – in terms of separate festivals, this was not quite the case. CIA and NATO documents show that ways to use the festival for Western interests were pondered but the conclusion was that sending an official delegation with government sanction or an openly anti-Soviet group to Moscow would have been audacious. Although it seems – especially with hindsight – that the festival would have offered fruitful prospects for successful counter-propaganda, the

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and delegate to the Moscow festival. Fonseca Amador, Carlos, *Un Nicaragüense en Moscu* (Managua: Silvio Mayorga [1958] 1981), 60.

146 Rosenberg, Victor, *Soviet-American Relations, 1953–1960. Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange during the Eisenhower Presidency* (London: McFarland & Co., 2005), 168.

147 *The New Republic*, 15 July 1957, 12–14, H. Wofford, "Moscow's Festival for Youth. Is the State Department Justified in Discouraging American Participation? I. The More Contacts the Better"; *The New Republic*, 15 July 1957, 14–15, H. Lunn, "II. The Department is Right". See also *The New York Times*, 19 July 1957, A6, "Pro-Reds Recruit U.S. Youths To Attend 'Festival' in Moscow".

148 *The New York Times*, 30 July 1957, 22, "Moscow's Youth Festival".

149 Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive*, 25–26; Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 159–160, 223; see also Kotek, *Students and the Cold War*, 113.

possibility that the organizers would have used the presence of a large delegation from the United States as proof of the festival's world-wide recognition was equally plausible. Also, the anti-communist aftermath of McCarthyism very likely contributed to the decision to keep away from Soviet-organized activities.[150]

Through the spring and summer of 1957, Shelepin and his team closely followed information on boycotts and other counter-measures. They received information on various campaigns against the festival in Western Europe and in Scandinavia. They heard of withdrawals of support for the festival and of refusal to issue travel documents in several countries. In Argentina, the Catholic youth organization threatened those who were planning to take part in the festival with expulsion.[151] The same threat was used in non-communist youth organizations in Western Germany, where police conducted house searches of the members of the West German festival committee.[152] Two weeks before the start of the festival, the Party Central Committee made a last-minute move to make sure everything was under control. It sent out a circular to Soviet ambassadors, saying that the enemies were taking measures to disturb the festival. The circular called ambassadors to keep their eyes open and to prevent "reactionary forces" from placing their agents in foreign delegations. It also urged that they check the foreign delegations' performances so that Moscow would not be inundated with demoralized bourgeois culture. Finally, the circular emphasized the significant role the Moscow gathering played in propagandizing the achievements of the socialist camp.[153] From rank-and-file youths to ambassadors abroad the Soviet state and society were now ready to encounter the world and take a controlled risk.

150 On McCarthy's influence on US Cold War politics, see Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 52–55, 121–124.

151 RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 31, ll. 18–22. A. Shelepin v TsK KPSS, 13.3.1957; RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 38, ll. 107–108. N. Bobrovnikov, A. Shelepin, S. Romanovskii v TsK KPSS, 12.7.1957; *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 21 July 1957, 1, 3, "Oni boiatsia? Da, boiatsia. Festivalia Moskvy, pravdy"; *The New York Times*, 26 July 1957, 3, "Thai Red Law Upheld. But Curbs Are Reported Eased for Soviet Fete", Bagdasarian et al., 2007, 105–106.

152 *The New York Times*, 19 July 1957, 7, "W. German Police Search Homes".

153 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, ll. 95–98. Sovposlam i poslannikam, 15.7.1957.