The EU’s Connectivity Strategy 2.0: Global Gateway in the Indo-Pacific

Abstract

The EU’s Global Gateway—launched in 2021—goes back to the Connectivity strategy launched in 2018, and addresses the challenge of a rising China, especially its bid to increase its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Global Gateway provides target states with a safer bet than the BRI and meets the infrastructure needs in the Indo-Pacific region. Based on three core principles—sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based—the EU is able to combine economic growth with strengthened liberal values, thus maintaining and improving its global economic competitiveness and strategic advantages especially in the Indo-Pacific. The regulatory aspects of the Global Gateway are also important, as these regulations, especially in the digital domain, will have democratic values integrated within them which directly challenge the digital authoritarianism of China. Whether the EU can be successful in implementing this agenda will depend on its ability to work with the United States, Japan, and like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Introduction

This chapter was written in October 2021, before the formal launch of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy in December 2021 and the war against Ukraine that started in February 2023. For publications by the author that consider these events in more detail, although not directly in relation to the Liberal International Order (LIO), see Okano-Heijmans (2023), Okano-Heijmans and Shah (2022) and Dekker et al. (2022).

Policymakers in Europe are increasingly concerned with the mounting strain on the existing liberal international order (LIO) and the shifting geopolitical center of gravity to the Indo-Pacific. As the status quo of the post-Cold War era is quickly fading away, it is clear that a new, more challenging era of international politics is taking form. Leaders of the European Union (EU) and its member states are acutely aware that maintaining the previously set course will cause Europe to fall behind and hinder its competitiveness in the contemporary era. Therefore, new and increasingly ambitious policy programs are being devised and implemented to further European interests.

The EU Connectivity strategy—relabeled “Global Gateway” in September 2021—is potentially a central pillar in the EU’s changing global posture.¹ Originally launched in September 2018, the connectivity agenda revolves around three core principles of being: sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based. This strong normative element is also apparent in the EU–Japan agreement on “sustainable connectivity and high-quality infrastructure” of 2019—which makes a thinly veiled reference to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) modalities as problematic.² Given the lagging of real progress with implementation, a second attempt to push the connectivity agenda forward came from Brussels in 2021. The agenda was then taken to the global level, and paralleled by a stronger EU commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, where the EU commits to defend and uphold the same liberal principles.

The new connectivity strategy called Global Gateway seeks to cement liberal and democratic norms and values within the international order and enhance cooperation with like-minded states. As such, it is fundamentally also an indirect response to the challenges facing the LIO. European states benefit from maintaining the current status quo. Economic liberalism, open trade policies, maintaining the principles of international law and safeguarding democracy are all crucially important to keeping Europe secure, competitive and prosperous. Therefore, the EU has a vested interest in working to relieve the strain on the LIO and help to guide it through this era of global turbulence.

Closely related to—or, arguably, part of—the connectivity agenda are the Indo-Pacific Guidelines, which are underpinned by very similar goals but targeted specifically at the Indo-Pacific region. This region is now being prioritized by European policymakers since many of the challenges to the LIO are most pressing and acutely felt in this region. The EU seeks to build on the good relations it already has in this region, pressing onwards with a more values-based approach that offers transparency and good governance to its partners, and invests in quality infrastructure, connecting goods, people and services around the world. But it is only with real political willpower and putting resources into these programs, that the EU can play an active role in preserving and reinforcing the LIO throughout this new, challenging era.

This chapter discusses the EU connectivity agenda, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific, and discusses the key challenges to achieving the EU’s objectives in relation to the LIO. It is organized as follows. Section one will introduce European connectivity in the Indo-Pacific in general terms, and presents four key dilemma’s that emerge in discussion of the topic in relation to the liberal international order as an overall conceptual framework. Subsequently, section two discusses recent developments in Europe—that is, the EU and its member states—regarding connectivity and the Indo-Pacific. Next, the third section reflects on partners and partnerships that the EU is turning to as it seeks to take its connectivity agenda in the Indo-Pacific to a higher level. Building on these insights, the fourth section discusses the four dilemmas introduced in section one. Finally, the conclusion offers suggestions that may guide policymakers in Europe and Japan in their efforts to implement their connectivity partnership in such a way that it contributes to defending and upholding the core elements of the LIO in the Indo-Pacific, while working with partners that share its interests, and preparing for the challenges from China and the U.S.–China confrontation.

Connectivity and the Liberal International Order

The LIO has served the EU well. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has greatly expanded by integrating the former Soviet bloc countries, enjoyed modest economic growth and international stability. However, with the return of great power conflict, economic instability, rising security challenges in Europe’s neighbourhood and abroad, as well as a myriad of other issues, it is clear that the EU must step up and play a more active role in preserving the LIO. The potential erosion of the LIO is unacceptable to European policymakers, thus, the EU has constructed a policy program which will address international challenges in a wholistic manner. As argued in this section, the EU connectivity agenda is simultaneously an indirect China policy, an indirect LIO policy, a response to America’s retreat from global responsibility and a core aspect of the EU’s intention to become more active in the Indo-Pacific.

Although approaches and conceptualizations of the LIO seem to vary from country to country, what unifies the approaches of not only EU member states, but most liberal democracies generally, is the perception that the LIO is under considerable strain, if not in an outright crisis. In this historical movement, changing global dynamics and worrisome trends are fueling anxiety. The most direct challenge to the LIO is the rising power and influence of China. China, as a rising state capitalist, authoritarian power, is significantly challenging the rules, norms and assumptions of the LIO. Simultaneously, the United States’ place in the international order is under increased scrutiny, both domestically and abroad. Faith in America’s commitment to the security of its allies and its willingness to uphold the international political and economic orders is questioned and U.S. allies are grappling with the consequences of the intensifying U.S.–China conflict. Beyond geopolitics, governments around the world are under increasing pressure to address climate change, both through mitigation and adaptation. In the face of these global challenges, European law makers have attempted to construct a firm, cohesive response.

Indirect China Policy

The EU connectivity agenda and the increased attention being given to the Indo-Pacific region can be seen as an indirect China policy. It sets out to address the unwarranted consequences of the BRI and the growing role and influence of the rise of China, including within Europe; while the Indo-Pacific focus acknowledges that the challenge needs to be tackled where it originates: in China’s own backyard. In the words of European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, the EU wants “to create links and not dependencies.”³

The EU’s current China policy, published in 2019, labeled China a “systemic rival” although it also highlighted the possibilities for deepened economic relations.⁴ Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, relations between the EU and its member states and China have soured. China’s initial mishandling of the pandemic, the ham-fisted mask diplomacy which put Europe’s reliance on China for critical goods on public display, and the inflammatory remarks made by China’s “wolf-warrior diplomats” all contributed to this. The relationship saw a moment of optimism with the conclusion of the EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in late December of 2020. However, tensions over the absence of language binding China to end the use of forced labour, especially by Uighurs in the Xinjiang region, made the deal unlikely to pass through the European Parliament for approval. The ratification came to a complete halt after China put sanctions on 10 individuals and four entities in the EU, including EU parliament members, as retribution for earlier sanctions placed on Chinese officials involved in the oppression of the Uighurs.⁵

The rise of an authoritarian competitor to the United States has put considerable pressure on democratic norms also in Europe, as China pursues its geopolitical interests with little regard for human rights and other Western values. Furthermore, China’s rapid growth has rebalanced and reshaped the global economic system. The Chinese economy, which has grown at a spectacular rate over the relatively short period since it opened its economy to the world, is now at the center of the international economy. This has led to some questioning the liberal economic policies which seemed set in stone not long ago. Chinese dominance over manufacturing has given rise to discussion that European economies are overly reliant on China, which is worrying when it concerns critical goods, as the scramble for medical masks in the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic showed. More recently, as China has become an innovative economy,⁶ Chinese technology companies are also growing in influence. These companies, in close collaboration with the Chinese government, secure growing market shares and work to export China’s digital authoritarianism. This enables increased state surveillance and the ability to repress dissent, empowering authoritarian leaders globally. These trends are most noticeable in the Indo-Pacific, which is increasingly the center of international competition.

With the rise of a global power as directly opposed to Western values and interests as China, which is at the same time a crucial player in addressing global challenges such as climate change, Europeans believe that restraining rather than constraining its influence is essential to maintaining the strength of the LIO. Therefore, the EU has formulated the connectivity agenda in such a way as to address China’s rise indirectly, by focusing on improving relations with partner states, engaging in capacity building and infrastructure construction and reinforcing the norms which underline the LIO. This indirect approach, which can be contrasted with the United States’ direct, “extreme competition” approach,⁷ plays off the EU’s strengths, which are primarily economic, diplomatic and political.

Indirect Liberal International Order Strategy

The Connectivity strategy and Indo-Pacific guidelines are evidence of a shift in the foreign policy and geopolitical thinking of the EU. The EU has started to chart its own course, after years during which the growing power of China—especially as a norms and standards-setter in international politics—became more evident. Simultaneously, the great power competition between the United States and China continues to intensify. China’s growing influence, and the resurgence of great power conflict has the potential to challenge the norms of the LIO. This is a threat which European states are increasingly conscious of. The EU and its member states are seeking to position themselves as a balancing power in order to protect their interests, strengthen their strategic position and reinforce the norms of the LIO.

For as long as possible, the EU seeks to avoid being forced to choose between two great powers and fall into opposing camps. Avoiding this scenario is important to many partner nations as well, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining the EU and its partners’ ability to act autonomously from the two major powers is equally important. The EU is essentially attempting to put forward an alternative to China and the U.S. and give other states the opportunity to avoid being squeezed between the two. Distinctions between the EU and the other competing powers, especially China, are becoming increasingly stark, especially on issues such as human rights, digital policies and economic approaches.

As Europe is pushing for a third way, it is challenged to ensure that it remains clear that there is no equidistance from the U.S. and China. After all, the shared beliefs and strong political, economic and cultural links to the U.S. run closer and deeper. The new EU–U.S. agenda for global change of December 2020⁸ acknowledges this: “As open democratic societies and market economies, the EU and the U.S. agree on the strategic challenge presented by China's growing international assertiveness, even if we do not always agree on the best way to address this.”⁹

In addition to geopolitical stresses, challenges like climate change are also eroding the LIO. Many studies have shown the potentially devastating impacts that climate change may have in the future. Increasingly extreme weather may lead to a dramatic increase in natural disasters, food and clean water scarcity, and drive an increase in global conflict, especially in the global south. The Indo-Pacific may be a focal point which showcases the destruction climate change can bring, as many countries in the region are ill-equipped to deal with challenges like flooding and rising sea levels. This threat is reflected in the EU’s connectivity agenda, which includes a focus on sustainable connectivity—including (but not limited to) environmentally sustainable connectivity.¹⁰ The EU is working to ensure that connectivity projects live up to high environmental standards and address the need for climate change adaptation when necessary. The question of sustainability does not stop there however, as the EU also uses it in an economic manner. While Chinese projects are often described as debt-traps, due to the tenuous economic footing they leave partner countries in, European funded projects are planned so that they leave partners with manageable debt loads and useful infrastructure afterwards.

The Role of United States

The presidency of Donald Trump was a serious disruption in many ways. Unlike other recent American Presidents, Trump did not pay the same lip service to the importance of the LIO. Furthermore, the few statements he, or state department officials working under him, did make in support of the LIO were not taken seriously. Throughout the West there were doubts that Trump actively believed in the central tenets of the world order that the United States itself had been central in developing. Free trade agreements, multilateral frameworks like NATO and other core aspects of the international order were suddenly under fire from the White House. Simultaneously, Trump seemed to favor or at least accept authoritarian leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who challenged the LIO, even pointing out that the United States was not innocent of breaching international rules and norms itself.¹¹ This coupled with the rapid intensification of the great power rivalry with China, added strain to the LIO.

On the other hand, the Biden Administration has attempted to make a clear break from President Trump’s foreign policy record and position itself as a defender of the LIO. That said, it is slowly brought home to Europeans that alignment with the U.S. under Biden will (still) have to be on its terms. This was shown by two major developments in American foreign policy. First was the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan—which was not coordinated with European allies who also have great stakes in the country. Second was the surprise-announcement of the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS), which embarrassed not just France but also the EU, as it came on the exact day of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy launch.

Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has, by many accounts, seemed to have doubled down on the international order. During the conference between American and Chinese officials in Anchorage, Alaska, Blinken opened the meeting by reiterating that the Biden Administration was committed “to leading with diplomacy to advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order.”¹² Blinken characterizes the preservation of the LIO as a global common good. However, the prior mention of advancing the interests of the United States may be just as critical to understanding the Biden Administration’s approach to the LIO as the later signal in favor of it. The Biden Administration is being pressed to address what many see as America’s faltering world power in the face of a rising China. Worries of overextension may drive the U.S. to focus more on preserving its own strength and strategic position, possibly to the detriment of the LIO. While of course the LIO still serves the American interest for the most part, Europe is coming to terms with the fact that the U.S. will not put liberal norms and values or even its most important alliances above its own interests. In addition, Europe must recognize that a close relationship with the U.S. will not necessarily bring Western countries together easily, as interests often diverge within the Western bloc itself.

America’s foreign policy is critical to take into consideration as Europe has been trapped into reacting to American policy, rather than forging its own. The EU–Japan relationship is unfortunately no exception. During the Trump Administration, when America’s commitment to the LIO was in serious question, there was an opening for renewed cooperation with Japan. Although this was often overstated in Europe, as anxieties over Trump’s rhetoric were much more pronounced in Europe than in Japan where policymakers welcomed Trump’s hard stance on China. This period was beneficial to the EU as it illustrated clearly the extent to which the EU’s relationship with Japan is shaped by the United States’ positioning.

Ultimately, the EU has developed the connectivity agenda as a reaction to geopolitical stress, but also as a means of becoming more autonomous from the U.S. America’s recent posture has pushed the EU in this direction, in the same way as the rise of China and its growing influence in Europe has.

EU Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific and the LIO: Four Dilemmas

Adopting the concept of the liberal international order as an analytical lens, this chapter’s discussion of the EU’s connectivity agenda focuses on four key dilemmas that academics and policymakers face in pushing this agenda forward. These are: (1) to clarify what (element of the) liberal international order specific policies seek to defend, update or promote; (2) to reshape our own industrial policies—the domestic policies that broadly inform the international connectivity agenda—without undermining the liberal and open elements of the LIO; (3) to establish interlinkages between various policy domains that have traditionally been considered separately in the LIO; and (4) to address differences between the key rhetorical devices and diverging conceptualizations governments use in relation to LIO. Each of these challenges will be analyzed in greater detail in the fourth section, after a detailed discussion of the EU connectivity strategy and its turn to the Indo-Pacific, and partners in these agendas.

Greater analytical clarity about each of these four challenges related to the promotion of the LIO is needed to bring academic discussions to a higher level and to assist policymakers as they consider potential opportunities and challenges in defending, upholding and readjusting the LIO. This certainly includes key stakeholders in the EU and its member states, as they seek to implement the EU’s Connectivity and Indo-Pacific strategies with partners in the Indo-Pacific, specifically Japan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).

Reflecting on these dilemmas will contribute to a better understanding of the challenges and changes which the EU connectivity agenda is attempting to address. As pressure from multiple sources mounts on the LIO and the international status quo continues to evolve in various ways, it is critical to have a wholistic perspective on the context in which the connectivity agenda was devised and is being implemented.

Europe’s Connectivity Efforts in the Indo-Pacific

Connectivity policy was originally conceived in Brussels, as the primary vehicle of the EU and its member states for meeting its sustainability and geopolitical goals, namely supporting democratic ideals and maintaining the liberal international order (LIO) in the face of growing authoritarian influence. It is also increasingly being seen as a central mechanism for pursuing the EU’s long-term goals: to ensure that European or Western values and norms continue to underpin the economic, political and security orders in every domain, including the crucial digital domain. As such, connectivity may be conceived as the foreign policy extension of domestic (and in the EU’s case, EU-internal) industrial policies. Both are informed by the understanding that governments have to intervene more actively to protect and uphold core interests and values—that is, move beyond merely securing framework conditions favorable to industrial competitiveness, toward more mission-oriented (innovation and standardization) policies that add public value through a multi-stakeholder approach. It is thus no surprise that attempts to boost the EU’s industrial policy and connectivity policy have moved in parallel in recent years, even if more concrete outcomes have been achieved on the industrial policy front.

As China policies in the West harden and become more cynical or realistic, there has been a growing recognition in Europe that the broader region, China’s backyard, cannot be ignored as a region where China’s role and influence is rising, while many of these countries share EU concerns and interests. It is in this geopolitical climate that first the member states and then the EU have been revaluating their position in the Indo-Pacific and the policies it has at its disposal have become more active in the region.

Towards Connectivity 2.0

In September 2018 the EU published its Europe–Asia Connectivity Strategy, calling attention to the importance of investments in sustainable transport, energy, digital and human connectivity.¹³ As schematically illustrated in Fig. 4.1, the EU strategy was outspokenly normative, in seeking to contribute to “sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity” that will “contribute to the enhanced prosperity, safety and resilience of people and societies in Europe and Asia.”¹⁴ That means investments in commercially viable projects that are respectful of labor rights and environmental standards, agreed through transparent processes that guarantee a level-playing field for businesses and do not create financial dependencies on the part of recipient countries. Much like Japan’s focus on “high-quality investment” and the “partnerships for quality infrastructure” that Tokyo had promoted since 2015,¹⁵ the EU initiative may be considered a counter-proposition to BRI modalities, which—like Japan—it perceives as problematic.

Fig. 4.1

Source Okano-Heijmans and Sundar (2018)

Focus areas and values underpinning the EU’s sustainable connectivity.

Just one day after the publication of its connectivity strategy, the EU hosted the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in Brussels, where “sustainable connectivity” featured high on the agenda. The EU played a crucial role in pushing this agenda, including the launch of an ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal—a data-set that should measure quantity and quality of connections—and a “Connectivity Inventory”—an overview of lessons learned in the field from the ASEM’s activities, matched with ideas for how to improve and deepen policies and action.

A major challenge to the implementation of the EU connectivity agenda has been the fact that it came without an accompanying budget. A dedicated team of four officials, including an Ambassador for Connectivity, was installed at the European External Action Service, but this team had difficulty getting other EU institutions dedicated to key elements of the strategy, including trade, energy, digital issues and development cooperation, on board with the agenda.

An instrumental push to bring the connectivity strategy to a next level came in 2021. In January, the European Parliament (EP) adopted the resolution on connectivity and EU–Asia relations¹⁶ following a report prepared by one of its members, Reinhard Bütikofer. The resolution called on the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to bring the EU Connectivity Strategy to a global level; to strengthen partnerships with democracies around the world that share Europe’s fundamental values; to prioritize the Western Balkans as a region and digital connectivity as a thematic focus, among other things. In response, the European Commission and EEAS in July 2021 updated the EU Connectivity strategy, referred to now as “a Globally Connected Europe.”¹⁷

A more crucial step came in September 2021, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced “Global Gateway” in her State of the Union speech—effectively rebranding and revamping the connectivity agenda.¹⁸ This support from the highest-level of EU politicians means that the EU institutions are now more incentivized to act.

The revamp is to be formalized with the forthcoming Joint Communication on Global Gateway (November 2021), whereby the EU seeks to improve its ability to pursue its economic, foreign, and development policy goals while safeguarding its security interests and promoting European ideals abroad. Still, substantial funds need to be allocated to infrastructure projects, digital development cooperation projects (to build capacity in partner countries), and regulatory dialogues.

The new Global Gateway initiative sets out to increase the number of large-scale, and highly visible physical infrastructure projects which European actors can participate in, while ensuring that sustainable financing and environmental impacts do not fall to the wayside. These projects will be built in cooperation with multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the European Investment Bank, partners in the private sector and with public financing tools. However, in addition to physical infrastructure the new connectivity strategy also calls for efforts to improve and invest in regulatory frameworks which will maintain a level playing field, incentivize investment and safeguard the international norms. These regulatory frameworks are intended to back up democratic values and the continuation of the rules-based economic order.

While the EU connectivity agenda in its early years focused much on (land) transport, the digital and energy agendas became more prominent recently—paralleling the EU’s efforts towards an industrial policy that “would support the twin transitions to a green and digital economy, make EU industry more competitive globally, and enhance Europe’s open strategic autonomy.”¹⁹

Digital connectivity is the more normative of the two domains, as it ties into the deepening technology and data conflict, setting standards that will govern the digital societies of the future. Unsurprisingly, the EU’s directorate-general for communications networks, content and technology (DG Connect) has come to play a bigger role in the connectivity agenda. And high-ranking EU officials throw their weight behind this. For example, European Council President Charles Michel participated in the Tallinn Digital Summit of September 2021 that pushed trusted connectivity as the European value proposition.²⁰ The concept of trusted connectivity is to highlight “the nexus between cross-border infrastructure, geopolitics, and digital technologies,” with transparency and accountability as two “non-negotiable pillars.” A clear distinction was made between like-minded partners with democratic systems—whose democratic communication architecture is diverse and enables freedom—and autocratic regimes. This proposition and concept clearly draws on Japan’s push for data free flows with trust (DFFT) across borders that was set out in the G20 Osaka Leaders Declaration under the G20 Japanese Presidency in 2019.

Restraining but Not Containing China

The EU wants to address the rising influence and power of China globally, and policymakers see the connectivity agenda as a means to do so indirectly. The intention is for the Connectivity strategy to deliver tangible benefits for partner states in the region, which includes sustainable financing for much needed infrastructure projects and aid in strengthening relations and democratic ideals in the Indo-Pacific. A key consideration of the connectivity agenda is the need to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which China launched in 2013. While assisting in the development of third countries, the BRI is primarily promoting China’s foreign policy goals and bilateral partnerships, tying those countries closer to China by furthering interoperability and compatibility of their economic and regulatory systems as well as political links—if not dependencies. The contrast between the BRI and the connectivity agenda should be clear here. While Chinese investments more often come with unsustainable debt loads and possible authoritarian influence, the EU hopes to offer an alternative to states in the region, which delivers similar benefits without the risks attached. Simultaneously, the connectivity agenda seeks to improve the EU’s position in the Indo-Pacific and safeguard liberal values.

The BRI and the connectivity agenda compete in various areas, including non-traditional infrastructure. The Health Silk Road is intended to boost the healthcare infrastructures and plays on China’s strength in manufacturing healthcare products.²¹ More concerning is the Digital Silk Road (DSR) which focuses on digital connectivity.²² The DSR has many focuses ranging from investing in and constructing telecommunications networks or enabling Chinese e-commerce and mobile payment systems to proliferate in other countries. Although the success of the projects has been hotly debated and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has not yet come into focus, the BRI has nonetheless caused anxiety among western policymakers.

For several years, the EU stood by as the BRI facilitated partnerships—and with that, the growing and influential relationship of the Chinese government with other countries. Many states in the Indo-Pacific and within the EU itself—mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, but also Italy—have signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with China agreeing to cooperate on the BRI. The chagrin of many in Brussels about individual EU member states signing BRI MoUs lies in the MoUs’ potential to align these countries’ priorities with those of China.²³ This potentially undermines EU unity and cooperation, for instance when the EU negotiates with China directly or when it wants to speak out about Chinese actions in the South China Sea or in Hong Kong. More recently, the challenge to EU internal unity diminished as Chinese promises often remained unfulfilled. Poland, for example, is highly disappointed with the slow and ineffective progress of bilateral cooperation.

In recent years, the Digital Silk Road has perhaps become the element of the BRI that is the most direct challenge to the EU’s global goals. And with these digital economy products, advanced surveillance technology and smart city technology is also being sold, giving authoritarian-leaning leaders new tools for cracking down on dissent. Rather than authoritarian norms and standards, the EU wants to actively push for democratic ideals to be integrated into digital technology, all of which shows the need for a comprehensive response to the BRI. China’s current foreign policy engagement is directly challenging norms of the LIO, going directly against the interest of the EU, Japan and other democratic nations.

The success of the BRI and the rise of China’s influence and power generally has caused the EU and other western actors to reconsider development and infrastructure investment. In response to the BRI and the recognition for the need to invest large sums into global economic stimulus following the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of new international investment programs have been established. The Blue Dot Network was the first project but it has largely been replaced by the Build Back Better World program which was launched by the G7 in June of 2021.²⁴ The newly updated EU connectivity agenda seeks to contribute to this.

In order to secure democratic norms and the rules-based international system, it is essential that democratic states are also active in traditional and non-traditional infrastructure projects, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Assisting in this capability building has a myriad of benefits both for Europe and the states in the Indo-Pacific. Following through on the connectivity agenda will give states a third option other than working with either China or the United States, helping them to avoid the pressures of getting caught in the middle of geopolitical struggles. Having dropped out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the U.S. has, in effect, opened space for the EU as a partner for Indo-Pacific countries.

More European activity in the Indo-Pacific can also be positioned as a bulwark to block further authoritarian influence. This is especially pronounced in the field of digital connectivity and digital development cooperation. As China continues to spread its digital authoritarianism, in direct opposition to the norms of the LIO, the EU is investing increasingly more in partnerships with like-minded partners—especially in the Indo-Pacific—and becoming more active in putting forth democratic alternatives.

Connectivity Partnerships

The EU considers strategic connectivity partnerships, as well as multi-country projects with key partners, essential to achieve its goal of sustainable and secure connections. Hence, from the outset the EU has strived to build partnerships with key countries in the region, specifically Japan and India, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In September 2019 the EU and Japan concluded a Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure—the EU’s first partnership of this kind with a non-EU country.²⁵ The partnership followed logically from the value propositions that both sides had presented earlier, in contrast to China’s BRI. This document notably contained various normative elements, tied to the shared values which are embedded in the EU and Japan’s approach and acceptance of the LIO. Next to its strong normative element, the agreement was notable for its mention of the Indo-Pacific—the first time for the EU to do so in an official document. Two years on, the challenge of moving from rhetoric to practice is evident: the EU–Japan partnership has failed to deliver substantial results; a (forthcoming) study that is to identify possible joint/coordinated projects in Central Asia is perhaps its most tangible output.

After Japan, a Connectivity Partnership was forged with India at the May 2021 EU–India summit.²⁶ In addition, agreements with the ASEAN—building on the EU–ASEAN joint ministerial statement on connectivity of December 2020—and the Mekong River Delta, as well as partnerships with the United States are being discussed, while South Korea is said to be also of potential interest.

The connectivity partnerships serve as a framework for further practical cooperation by the EU and its partners, focusing on issues like infrastructure, energy, the digital domain and transportation. The partnerships also look to adopt, promote and advance mutually shared rules governing core matters like trade, investment and sustainability, and to leverage existing bilateral and multilateral channels like the G7, G20, Organisation for Economic Cooperation (OECD), European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) to advance this fundamental objective.

Summing up, it can be asserted that the connectivity agenda primarily aims to defend, promote and update the economic liberal order, as well as the political liberal order. The EU is effectively seeking to use its economic leverage to become a more active reinforcing agent for the LIO. This approach plays on the EU’s strength and seeks to transform it into a more effective political power with the capacity to safeguard the LIO.

The EU’s Turn to the Indo-Pacific

In 2020 the EU set out to devise its own Indo-Pacific strategy, following policy papers put out by France, Germany and the Netherlands, respectively. Different from the connectivity agenda, this refocusing on the Indo-Pacific has been largely driven by a bottom-up, member states-led push to engage more comprehensively and cohesively with the crucially important region. Each policy document called on the EU to improve its posture towards the Indo-Pacific and focuses on crucial policy areas such as security, ensuring deepening economic relations with the rapidly emerging economies and effectively pursuing common goods like tackling climate change and poverty reduction. Turning points for European engagement with the Indo-Pacific came in 2019 and 2020, when the concept was mentioned for the first time in an official EU document: the EU–Japan Connectivity Partnership. The need to act on the Indo-Pacific became evident as the United States engaged more with the concept, and the adoption by ASEAN of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific showed the possibility of doing so without a politicized or confrontational approach.

What is significant today is that the EU and its member states are willing to accept the Indo-Pacific as a political construct. They were hesitant to do so earlier, when only France—with its particular set of assets, interests and capabilities in the region—started to engage with the concept, and when the Japan-initiated Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision became more confrontational towards China as the U.S. under President Donald Trump got on board with the concept.

The EU connectivity agenda is one of seven priority areas in the EU’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific of September 2021.²⁷ This may be a logical outcome from negotiations informed by the Indo-Pacific policy documents released by member states, each of which has given attention to furthering the connectivity agenda. Many activities, like improving infrastructure or trade relationships are mutually beneficial to the goals outlined in the connectivity agenda and the council conclusions on the EU Indo-Pacific strategy.

International trade is obviously crucially important for the connectivity agenda and individual European countries, many of which pride themselves on being strong trading nations. However, China’s disregard for international law, especially in the South China sea, could very well be a threat to Europe’s continued growth and stability in the coming years. Therefore, it is increasingly clear, from the Indo-Pacific strategies and the actions of several EU member states, that European countries are increasingly willing to be actively involved in maritime security beyond European waters. This willingness extends to a range of security issues, from freedom of navigation to the preservation of crucially important undersea cables.

A significant manifestation of this willingness is the increasing willingness of European governments to engage in “naval signaling” in conjunction with other allies in the region. In 2021, the region will have seen “two frigates, one helicopter carrier and a nuclear-powered submarine” deployed by the French, German and Dutch navies, “in addition to the 12 ships based in French overseas territories.”²⁸ The deployment of these European frigates is a clear sign that Western countries and their partners in the Indo-Pacific are now ready to act to uphold freedom of navigation in international waters and protect “open societies,” in support of regional partners that share European values. Clearly, challenges to free navigation in the critically important shipping lanes running through the contested waters harm trade and transport connectivity.

Such moves remain controversial among significant parts of the European establishment for being potentially provocative and unnecessarily antagonistic towards China. This explains why the Germans sought to have their frigate make port in Shanghai—a move that China eventually blocked.²⁹ European military naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region may continue to be rare, and efforts “to guarantee safe passage and maritime security” will likely focus on other types of action. However, the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly states that the EU and its member states will attempt to make more joint exercises and port calls in the future and engage in capacity building for experts in the area of the international law of the sea. Specifically, the EU has outlined building maritime capacity against drug trafficking, human trafficking, wildlife crime and illicit financial flows as priority areas.

Enhancing Digital Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific

Within the Indo-Pacific, there is another field where the EU and its member states may be most willing and able to effectively act. This is the critically important and increasingly contested high-tech and digital domain. Here, European actors can contribute to an open, safe and inclusive digital connectivity and engage with the thriving digital economies in the Indo-Pacific. For one, the Netherlands—as per its Indo-Pacific Guidelines—intends to encourage further cooperation on digital technologies, enable the increased integration of digital economies and address the rising threat of cyber-attacks.³⁰

Acting in this increasingly contested domain is not only in the EU’s political and economic interest, but it will work to counter China’s authoritarian influence in these domains. For this reason, the focus in this discussion of EU engagement with the Indo-Pacific will be on EU efforts in digital connectivity, while transport, energy and human connectivity will be less discussed.

The Indo-Pacific is home to the fastest growing digital economies in the world. Therefore, the potential economic benefits of improving digital connectivity between the EU and the Indo-Pacific are immense. At home, the EU can already begin to make this a reality by actively pursuing policies which support European start-ups and supporting projects like Gaia-X, which seeks to develop common requirements for an open, transparent and secure European data infrastructure and encourage the growth of European champions. In third countries, the EU seeks to be active in further developing and promoting a third way, between the American and Chinese digital models. While the American model prioritizes economic growth above all and the Chinese model supports increased state control and surveillance, Europe has adopted a human-centered model which prioritizes privacy and fairness. The “Brussels effect” has already been applied successfully to push for democratic standards in digital technology, specifically in data protection and privacy. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has effectively become a global standard as many countries around the world have based their own data regulations on it. Europe can build on this success and exert further democratic influence in this domain.

The digital domain is crucial because it gives the EU avenues to reinforce the political and economic liberal order simultaneously. Promoting a human-centered approach, enforced through good regulatory practice, will safeguard the political liberal order from authoritarian influence. Meanwhile, improving digital connectivity with the Indo-Pacific has the potential to produce significant economic growth for both regions, while remaining within the bounds of the liberal economic order.

EU Connectivity Partners in the Indo-Pacific

The EU connectivity agenda is especially important in the Indo-Pacific. As previously mentioned, this connectivity is one of seven priority areas within the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy. Therefore, it is important to take the region into consideration when looking at the connectivity agenda wholistically. An increasingly active posture of the EU and its member states is being welcomed by many states and policymakers in the Indo-Pacific region. A key question, however, is which countries and multilateral fora are the EU’s main partners to cooperate, coordinate and synergize with to ensure that the Indo-Pacific region remains free and open, despite the global political turbulence, in the coming years and, what do these partners expect of the EU?

The EU and its partners are beginning from a similar place, characterized by mutual commitment to the U.S.-based alliance system, desire for open trade, and anxiety concerning the current health and viability of the LIO. However, these similarities do not erase the differences in approaches.

Indian experts have been particularly outspoken, expressing the wish that European engagement in the Indo-Pacific be strategically autonomous and informed by a genuine will to engage in the region, rather than about alignment and management of relations with the U.S. Meanwhile, ASEAN elites watch with caution the EU’s engagement with the “Quad” dialogue, as any formal linkage with the grouping will be considered too contentious.

A critical challenge the EU faces in implementing its connectivity agenda and Indo-Pacific strategy with partners that share an interest in upholding the LIO, is to align policies despite differences in approaches and prioritization of various domains and regions. Figure 4.2 illustrates this schematically with reference to changing views on China.

Fig. 4.2

Source Dekker and Okano-Heijmans (2020)

Assessment of China’s behaviour and the preferred response of various governments.

Until just a few years ago, France, Germany and the EU generally took a very collaborative approach towards China, with few limits to engagement. The economic opportunities outweighed possible national security threats, which were scarcely considered at the time. This dismissal of potential downsides was amplified by the geographical distance and strong internal focus of the EU. Compared to European countries, countries in the Indo-Pacific (most notably Japan, India and Australia) started from a less open position. These states maintained a position of conditional engagement and have assessed China’s behavior as assertive or even aggressive for much longer than Europe. Today, there seems to be a strong consensus on conditional engagement with China, both within and beyond the Indo-Pacific, wherein cooperation is not ruled out, but care is taken not to align one’s own priorities with those of the Chinese government or the Communist Party. The EU and its member states now also consider China’s behavior as (somewhat) aggressive and are wary of indirectly aiding China in growing its global stature.

However, as both the starting points and intensity of change differ, current stances obviously still vary. The U.S. stands in lonely distance from the other countries, (publicly) assessing China’s behavior as predatory and taking an outright conflictual approach. Clearly, these differences complicate cooperation, coordination and synergies between partners.

Go-To Partners in the Region

Japan is one of the EU’s most important strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region. The two actors have a shared interest in reinforcing the LIO and ensuring that the pillars of the LIO are upheld in the Indo-Pacific and globally. Both the EU and Japan are also key allies in the American-centred alliance system, and as such the United States plays a significant role in shaping the EU–Japanese relationship, as previously mentioned.

Beyond Japan, the most important partners that the EU and EU member states seek to cooperate with are India and ASEAN—the two that the EU has established connectivity partnerships with and receive most mention in the EU Indo-Pacific strategies. ASEAN is mentioned 31 times and India is mentioned 32 times and Japan is mentioned 22 times in the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy (compared to China, which is mentioned eighteen times). Other notable countries include South Korea (mentioned 14 times), Australia (mentioned 12 times), and New Zealand (mentioned eight times), which are also explicitly mentioned as like-minded partners, as are Indonesia (mentioned 13 times), Singapore (mentioned eight times), Taiwan (mentioned five times) Malaysia (mentioned six times), and Vietnam (mentioned seven times). The EU Indo-Pacific Strategy states that the bloc will prioritize engagement with countries that have Indo-Pacific strategies. Not only did this serve as a discrete means of prioritizing certain partners, like Japan and Australia, but it also served as a means of excluding China.

Cooperating with the United States

Since President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” the United States has been attempting to reprioritize the Indo-Pacific as a focal point of its foreign policy. This will increasingly impact Europe’s approach to the region as well. Many states, Japan included, currently, and will continue, to prefer cooperation with the United States as they remain by far the most important ally, especially when the rising power of China is concerned. As America withdraws from Afghanistan, and the Middle East generally, it is likely that the Indo-Pacific will increase in prominence in America’s foreign policy.

Already, numerous Biden Administration members have made trips to the Indo-Pacific, including Vice-President Kamala Harris who visited in August 2021. In a major policy speech in Singapore,³¹ Harris laid out America’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, which is much more directly focused on countering China than the Indo-Pacific strategies put out by the EU or its member states. Vice-President Harris emphasized the importance of upholding the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and directly called out China for its misdeeds in the South China sea, while highlighting the fact that the United States is attempting to become more involved in security concerns in this theatre. Previously the EU–Japan relationship benefited from both being closely aligned on UNCLOS, more so than the U.S. and Japan. However, as America adjusts its position, it may have taken the EU’s momentum on this file. The United States is also deepening relations with key states. To illustrate, Harris visited Vietnam after Singapore.³² In the decades since America’s intervention in Vietnam, relations have dramatically improved, and the two former rivals have signed a strategic partnership. Assistance in global health matters in the Indo-Pacific is also being highlighted, by the announcement of a new Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Southeast Asia regional office. In addition, the United States will engage increasingly in “vaccine diplomacy” by helping Southeast Asian countries with their vaccine rollouts.

Notably, the United States seems willing to step into security matters in the Indo-Pacific and take on new security commitments, even if it means stepping on European toes. In September 2021, Washington announced a new “AUKUS” technology-sharing working group with the U.K. and Australia, primarily aimed at sharing nuclear submarine technology. The deal came after Australia grew tired of delays and other troubles with a previous deal for submarine technology made with France. In response, France strongly criticized both Australia and the United States harshly, cancelled diplomatic events and recalled their ambassadors from Washington and Canberra. French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian went so far as to say, “This unilateral, brutal, unpredictable decision is a lot like what Mr. Trump did.”

Although tensions between the United States and France seemed to simmer down after a phone call between Presidents Macron and Biden and the two sides agreed to launch EU–US consultations on the Indo-Pacific³³ in October 2021, with the aim to step up transatlantic cooperation and joint engagement in the region, questions remain for the future of European–American cooperation in the region. Firstly, tensions between France and Australia and the U.K. seem to be more difficult to overcome, despite Australia being especially important for Europe in the Indo-Pacific. Secondly, it is notable that this dispute began between the United States and the European state most focused on security issues (versus Germany’s more economical approach). It may be the case that the United States would prefer that European states focus more on security cooperation in Europe and on issues within the European neighborhood while leaving security matters in the Indo-Pacific to the United States. Also considering limitations to EU military capabilities and contestation over those being taken to the Indo-Pacific, a focus of EU action on connectivity—with a focus on the contested digital domain—in the Indo-Pacific, seems in place.

Engaging with Networks: Quad, NATO

While foreign countries, especially in Asia, took a significant interest in the turn of EU member states and the EU to the Indo-Pacific, the Dutch Indo-Pacific Guidelines did not spark much debate in the Netherlands and the launch of the EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific in September was clearly overshadowed by the surprise announcement of the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS). Policymakers in Europe are still confronted with a situation wherein Quad meetings garner greater attention than their own actions. This was evident from the fact that while the Indo-Pacific Guidelines received no attention in the Dutch Parliament, the first Summit Meeting of the Quad on 12 March 2021 sparked a question about possible alignment or cooperation with this body. In response, the Dutch government stated that it is open to explore cooperation “with the Quad and individual Quad members at EU-level.”

This suggests that the tactics of European governments in implementing their Indo-Pacific strategies should be in relation to the Quad, and therefore the United States. While this may have its advantages, it may also have its drawbacks. ASEAN countries and India generally wish for the EU’s Indo-Pacific actions to be independent, and some EU member states, especially France, will still desire autonomy from the American approach. France is unlikely to want to follow America’s lead in the Quad or other arrangements, especially after the fallout from the AUKUS announcement. Although France will cooperate with the United States and likely prioritize that cooperation, France will still want to continue acting independently and autonomously from the United States. There are already signs of this as France has moved forward on improving strategic partnerships with Australia, India and Japan.

Against this context, the EU would do well to align with but not to get on board with the Quad. Also, cooperation is more likely at the EU level—rather than at the level of EU member states—as the EU Indo-Pacific strategy states that it is interested in engaging with the Quad on issues of common interest, such as climate change, technology or vaccines. However, beyond these areas there are no further hints at cooperation within the document. On the other hand, the leaders of the Quad countries did publicly welcome the EU strategy³⁴ during the first ever, in-person Quad summit held in September, 2021. Despite some willingness on both sides, it may be too early to tell what EU-Quad cooperation will look like in the near future. Non-security issues, especially climate change and vaccines, are likely to be the prioritizations since they are largely uncontroversial and non-political.

Despite NATO being increasingly concerned with China as an opponent, a NATO presence in the Indo-Pacific is not under consideration in European circles. Nor is it desirable to Indo-Pacific countries, as this would seriously antagonise China. However, with a view to implementing the connectivity agenda, there are benefits to the EU linking to NATO partnerships in the region. In recent years, NATO has strengthened relationships with New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and Australia in particular. These newly reinforced relationships could be beneficial to the EU. Again, the digital realm should be especially considered. The NATO Cyber Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is developing closer relations with these four countries.³⁵ Existing efforts of individual EU member states, such as that of the Netherlands Defence Cyber Command, complement this. Within NATO itself there is currently some debate on whether more out-of-area (OOA) missions should be undertaken. Before cooperation with the EU in the Indo-Pacific can be undertaken, NATO must first make up its own mind on how it will contribute to security in the region.

Ultimately the EU has options in the Indo-Pacific and can adjust depending on what avenues its member states deem most appropriate. On one hand, the EU has the lead in putting forward a coordinated approach—bringing key stakeholders together in what is increasingly more often called a “Team Europe” approach. On the other, individual member states engage with the region and focus on niche areas where each of them can be most effective and successful, while remaining committed to the general guidelines within the EU Connectivity and EU Indo-Pacific Strategies. A coalition of the willing EU member states may also be the best, as some states are more interested in Indo-Pacific engagement than others and may not be willing to expend resources on a region which does not benefit their interests.

Divergences and Convergences on the LIO in Europe and “The West”

Although most Western countries have given some credence to the need to strengthen the LIO or rules-based international order, the individual conceptualizations and policy approaches to the world order vary. This section discusses the four main challenges that academics and policymakers face when adopting the concept of the liberal international order as an analytical lens in discussions on Europe’s newfound connectivity activism in the Indo-Pacific.

What (Element of the) LIO Is Addressed?

First, although rarely discussed in such terms, the EU connectivity agenda and key elements in the EU’s recent turn to the Indo-Pacific seek to defend, update and promote different versions of the liberal international order (LIO) as identified by Hans Kundnani.³⁶ The connectivity agenda seeks primarily to promote European interests in the liberal economic order as well as the political liberal order. Moving beyond the globalization and openness that characterized the liberal economic order earlier, the EU connectivity agenda now seeks to promote openness, conditional globalization—based on sustainability and high-quality—next to targeted defensive policies that are tied to the EU’s rethink on industrial policy including more diversified supply chains and investment screening. Separately, and more specifically, the EU’s push in the digital/cyber domain in the Indo-Pacific is primarily about defending updating key elements of the economic liberal order and promoting core principles of the political liberal order, in which the concepts of democracy, human-centered and rules-based systems take more prominence, next to openness. Lastly, the EU’s activism in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain primarily relates the liberal order as an IR-concept (concept of international relations), wherein state sovereignty is central. Compared to the other two elements, the EU’s approach has changed less as the aim is still for a rules-based LIO.

A key point to note is that the EU and its member states and Japan share more between them than each of them shares with the U.S., which is less willing to accept the rules-based IR-LIO in the maritime domain (as may be derived from the fact that it is not a member of UNCLOS) and less willing to join a political rules-based LIO 2.0 in the digital domain (and instead, more willing to go-it-alone while pressuring partners to join its bandwagon). That said, neither the EU nor Japan is able—or really willing—to hold the U.S. more accountable in a LIO 2.0, as both still rely on the U.S. security guarantees. Yet, the EU and Japan are challenged in their position to the extent to which they—and other countries—consider U.S. actions to be a positive contribution to global public goods (e.g., international security and stability, freedom of navigation, free trade, financial stability) while their opposition to (elements of) its ideological underpinnings grows.

Industrial Policies Undermining the LIO?

Second, we are witnessing a profound change in approach to economic policies. This is evident from the international connectivity agenda, as from the turn to new domestic (or: EU-internal) industrial policies. The typical neo-liberal approach which has categorized liberal democracies since the 1980s is giving way to a new economic status quo. The often times blind devotion to allowing the free market to drive the economic route a country takes, is being replaced by a new willingness of governments to intervene in the economy. While this shift is not necessarily a threat to the LIO, it is a significant global trend which must be accounted for.

There are various causes for this shift in economic policies. A leading cause is the “clash of capitalisms” that is increasingly evident, as neo-liberal market economies are having to compete with a state capitalist country. This has exposed the weaknesses of the West’s market-driven approach, as private companies struggle to compete with (state and private companies) that receive financial and more indirect support from the state. Closely intertwined in this growing apprehension is the “free riding” issue: the idea that there are countries, especially China, that make use of the benefits of open, transparent economics, but do not adhere to these ideals themselves. Worries that the West cannot keep up with China’s economic growth are also encouraging policymakers to intervene economically, especially in strategic and high-tech sectors of the economy where they do not want to be overly dependent on non-market players.

Complementing this challenge at the global level, domestically, Western economies are now grappling with the impact of de-industrialization, the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs and other negative trends which governments are increasingly aiming to halt or reverse. The economic challenges have led to societal issues such as the rise of populism, political polarization and general discontent among the greater public. Finally, COVID-19 had a significant role in completing the shift towards more industrial policies, with the rapid normalization of historically large stimulus funds being utilized to address the economic fallout of the pandemic.

For these and other reasons, cracks in neo-liberalism are beginning to show. In the United States, one of the firmest supporters of the free market, the shift towards economic intervention became particularly evident under former President Trump. U.S. policies were openly protectionist, and even turned against allies in Europe and in Asia. But also under President Biden, national security concerns are, in the views of Europeans at least, used as a guise for protectionist economic policies. Illustrative of the break³⁷ from America’s previous economic status quo, the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act—a piece of legislation intended to directly address the America’s waning competitiveness with China—was passed in June of 2021 with rare bipartisan support.³⁸

The policies of European governments and businesses in the trade, high-tech, and digital domains especially are undergoing profound changes. Countries across the world are now increasingly willing to see the return of industrial policies, protectionism, capital controls, macroprudential regulation and state capitalism. Economic anxiety is changing the perception of policymakers, but also of corporations. Stakeholders have a growing awareness and willingness to act to mitigate geopolitical risks, in particular concerning China. Throughout Western societies there is a growing understanding that contemporary economic challenges cannot be solved with the previous neo-liberal approach. However, most European policymakers want to uphold the architecture of the global economic system; they still believe that an update of the basic principles of the rules-based system will suffice.

Can We Connect the Dots?

Third, one of the key characteristics that is both a push factor and a consequence of the breakdown of the liberal international order, is that the various elements of the LIO that governments attempted to keep separate in the post-1945 period—when the LIO was (re)shaped by Western countries—are increasingly interlinked. For example, while NATO used to address “just” security issues on the European continent, it now also deals with cyber-attacks allegedly originating in China on Western companies. And human rights are today increasingly considered in the trade and security realms, for example in exports of cotton from Xinjiang and in export controls of dual-use items such as surveillance cameras. In the words of Sabine Weyand, EU Director-General for Trade: “We can no longer separate international economic policy from foreign policy,” and adding “This is more difficult for the EU than for others.”³⁹

The connectivity agenda may be the clearest example of the need to break the silos between policy fields and the challenge of the EU in doing so. After all, connectivity is concerned with a variety of policy domains—including trade, transport, energy, digital and foreign affairs—and is also informed by (non-traditional) security concerns. It is therefore problematic to conceive the evolving LIO still in traditional terms, as this widens the disconnect between academic debates and the real world wherein such distinctions are blurred. In fact, doing so reinforces the challenge that many Western experts (much like policymakers) face in fundamentally rethinking the emerging existing order and appropriate policies to adapt to it in order to pursue our interests.

Some countries, including the United States and Japan, tackled this challenge of whole-of-government coordination on economic security issues by creating a National Security Council (or similar agency) already years ago. In the EU there were similar calls to “connect the dots,” but it took the Covid-19 crisis to get to greater coordination—between EU institutions and with EU member states, both in Brussels and in European operations in third countries. While the so-called “Team Europe approach” was first applied to vaccines and health policy more generally, it expanded to other policy areas also—including China policy. So-called Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) are now implemented in developing countries, especially in the European neighborhood. These offer a valuable template also for future connectivity projects in other regions.

What Are (Hidden) Differences Between Rhetorical Devices and Conceptualizations?

Fourth, it is clear from the rhetorical devices and concepts employed that countries differ in their approaches to the LIO, even within Europe. Notably, none of the official EU documents for connectivity and the Indo-Pacific include any direct reference to “liberal” or the liberal international order. But while the European approach to connectivity, including in the Indo-Pacific, is inclusive, it is not value-neutral. The EU Indo-Pacific strategy, like the Dutch Guidelines, calls for effective rules-based multilateralism and is generally inclusive in tone. But approaches and specific actions of EU member states show clear preferences for collaborating with like-minded partners. Democratic countries with free markets will be prioritized as the EU is eager to help uphold liberal values and norms in a region in which they are increasingly being contested.

Clearly, countries vary on which key rhetorical devices and conceptualizations are utilized and emphasized as they redefine their foreign policies in a changing LIO. Three distinctions stand out and will be directly addressed here.

First, some countries prefer to emphasize cooperation between “like-minded countries” over countries that share interests or concerns, and the style of cooperation may vary depending on whether the partner countries is either “like-minded” or has “shared interests.” The Dutch Indo-Pacific Guidelines for example call for closer cooperation with like-minded democracies and countries with open market economies, stating that “partnerships will take different forms in different countries depending on the extent of shared interests and the degree of like-mindedness.” The Council’s conclusions on connectivity state that this “renewed commitment to the region is inclusive of all partners wishing to cooperate with the EU,” and that the EU is to “build its cooperation according to specific policy areas where partners can find common ground based on shared principles, values or mutual interest.” This is an important distinction to consider because European policy will need to walk a fine line between maintaining ties with troubled democracies while not rewarding authoritarian behavior. On the other hand, acting too harshly towards these states may cause them to double down on authoritarianism, and move closer to China.

Second, the idea of a democratic alliance⁴⁰—whether it is referred to as the D10, summit of democracies or another name—has been floated by a number of world leaders, including President Biden and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. In the EU, while no reference to “democracy” or “democratic” is included in the 2018 connectivity strategy, the various documents released in 2021 reference “democracy” more than “rules-based.”

However, the rhetorical turn to democratic values needs to be scrutinized with a view to the fact that democracy has been under pressure also in the United States and various European countries. Moreover, creating yet another multilateral format may not be the solution. While an alliance dedicated explicitly to upholding liberal values and democracy sounds attractive, it may not be practical. The formation of such an alliance is sure to be somewhat contentious as a decision will need to be made on whether the alliance is inclusive or exclusive, meaning whether weak or seriously flawed democracies, or authoritarian states under the guise of democracy will be included. The effectiveness is also potentially difficult since democracies are themselves very diverse and have far ranging interests.

Lastly, the focus on rules-based multilateralism, which Germany has highlighted, should be contrasted with a focus on a rules-based order, the approach France has emphasized. This distinction between EU member states will explore whether the difference is just in rhetoric or a preference to use one’s state’s strong suit in practice. These differences in conceptualization are necessarily to reflect upon, as they speak volumes about each state’s approach to the LIO.

Analyzing the differing approaches to the Indo-Pacific region is a suitable case study by which an understanding of the two most influential EU member states’ foreign policy posture can be formulated. Germany has tended to prefer a “rules-based multilateralism” approach, as evidenced by the contents of the German Indo-Pacific Guidelines. This approach shies away from direct strategic partnership generally and prefers to work through existing multilateral frameworks. There are exceptions, but generally multilateralism is preferred by the German government. The guidelines put special emphasis on engaging with multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN more than pursuing greater and deeper strategic partnerships with individual countries. The document emphasizes the centrality of ASEAN in Germany’s push to be more active in security issues in the Indo-Pacific. For example, rather than unilateral or bilateral actions to ensure the South China Sea remains secure and open for maritime trade, Germany is pushing for increased dialogue between ASEAN and China to establish a sustainable code of conduct for the disputed sea. In addition, there is also a preference for using diplomatic or economic tools to secure interests in the Indo-Pacific, before resorting to other means.

France, however, has taken a different stance. Rather than multilateralism, France has tended to favor supporting the rules-based order through primarily focusing on the enforcement, through bilateral and trilateral partnerships, of central aspects of that world order. France sees itself, not only as a partner of the Indo-Pacific, but as an Indo-Pacific country in its own right due to its territories in the region. Therefore, France’s approaches to the Indo-Pacific were conceived to defend its sovereignty and control over the French Indo-Pacific possessions. For this reason, much more of the French Indo-Pacific strategy is dedicated to military preparedness and security cooperation than Germany’s. Furthermore, the French government is prioritizing strategic partnerships with countries such as Australia, India and Japan, rather than multilateral formats. However, although this preference is clearly signalled, the French document does include cooperation with ASEAN and other multilateral frameworks as necessary tools to addressing the tensions in the region.

Although the French and German approaches vary somewhat, it is clear that both states are increasingly concerned with the fracturing international order. However, a clear difference between the EU member states and the U.K. can be seen. While the U.K. is readying itself and anticipating a shift from the current international status quo to some new form of world order, France and Germany seem to have remained committed to maintaining and reinforcing the current international order. Although the international shifts, especially the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, are putting tremendous strain on the norms and values of the current international order, France and Germany remain optimistic enough to believe that the order is not beyond saving.

Conclusion

The EU connectivity Agenda, now rebranded as the Global Gateway, can be seen as the EU’s indirect response to two of the most pressing international shifts since the end of the Cold War. First, the connectivity agenda is meant to address the challenge of a rising China, especially China’s bid to increase its influence through the BRI. The Global Gateway is set to give target states of the BRI a safer bet which will still meet the infrastructure needs of states in the region. The Global Gateway is set to develop infrastructure projects, both traditional and non-traditional, which are environmentally and financially sustainable. These projects will not only have a positive economic impact for both Europe and its partners, but they will also help to reinforce democratic and liberal values within these partner countries by presenting an alternative to Chinese investment and by addressing the needs of the public, thereby winning popular support. For this latter aspect, a strong, driving narrative is essential for the EU’s success.

Therefore, while the Global Gateway indirectly contends with China’s global outreach through the BRI, it also indirectly addresses the increasingly worrying strain on the LIO. By maintaining an emphasis on sustainability and, more recently, emphasizing trusted connectivity, the EU can combine economic growth with strengthened liberal values. The inclusion of regulatory aspects in the Global Gateway will also be important in this process, as these regulations, especially in the digital domain, will have democratic values integrated within them which directly challenge the digital authoritarianism of China. Especially in the Indo-Pacific, a region where the EU increasingly wants to assert itself, this policy agenda is of vital importance to maintaining and improving the EU’s global economic competitiveness and strategic advantages.

Whether the EU can be successful in implementing this agenda in the Indo-Pacific will depend on its ability to work with partners in the region and with the United States. Clearly, it is not realistic to expect the EU to be able to do this on its own. While strategic ambiguity may at times be a valuable asset, clarity about concepts, developing potential to deliver on those—including thorough integrated approaches—as well as critical self-reflection on how domestic strategic adjustments may be perceived by others as undermining the LIO, are needed as the EU moves from strategy to implementation with its connectivity agenda in the Indo-Pacific.