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Verfasst von:Diederich, Johannes [VerfasserIn]   i
 Goeschl, Timo [VerfasserIn]   i
 Waichman, Israel [VerfasserIn]   i
Titel:Self-nudging is more ethical, but less efficient than social nudging
Verf.angabe:Johannes Diederich, Timo Goeschl, Israel Waichman
Ausgabe:This version: April 25, 2023
Verlagsort:Heidelberg
Verlag:Heidelberg University, Department of Economics
E-Jahr:2023
Jahr:05 Mai 2023
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (30, xiv Seiten)
Illustrationen:Illustrationen
Gesamttitel/Reihe:AWI discussion paper series ; no. 726 (April 2023)
Abstract:Manipulating choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') raises problems of ethicality. Giving individuals control over their default choice ('selfnudges') is a possible remedy, but the trade-offs with efficiency are poorly understood. We examine under four different information structures how subjects set own defaults in social dilemmas and whether outcomes differ between the self-nudge and two exogenous defaults, a social (full cooperation) and a selfish (perfect free-riding) nudge. Subjects recruited from the general population (n = 1,080) play a ten-round, ten-day voluntary contribution mechanism online, with defaults triggered by the absence of an active contribution on the day. We find that individuals' own choice of defaults structurally differs from full cooperation, empirically affirming the ethicality problem of social nudges. Allowing for self-nudges instead of social nudges reduces efficiency at the group level, however. When individual control over nudges is non-negotiable, self-nudges need to be made public to minimize the ethicality-efficiency trade-off.
DOI:doi:10.11588/heidok.00033230
URL:kostenfrei: Verlag: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33230/1/Diederich_et_al_2023_dp726.pdf
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 kostenfrei: Resolving-System: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00033230
 kostenfrei: Resolving-System: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-332307
 kostenfrei: Langzeitarchivierung Nationalbibliothek: https://d-nb.info/1288358369/34
 kostenfrei: Verlag: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/33230
 kostenfrei: Resolving-System: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278454
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00033230
 10419/278454
URN:urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-332307
Datenträger:Online-Ressource
Sprache:eng
Sach-SW:Choice architecture
 defaults
 public goods
 self-nudge
 online experiment
Form-SW:Graue Literatur
K10plus-PPN:1844742180
Verknüpfungen:→ Übergeordnete Aufnahme
 
 
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