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Verfasst von:Diederich, Johannes [VerfasserIn]   i
 Goeschl, Timo [VerfasserIn]   i
 Waichman, Israel [VerfasserIn]   i
Titel:Self-nudging vs. social nudging in social dilemmas
Titelzusatz:an experiment
Verf.angabe:Johannes Diederich, Timo Goeschl, Israel Waichman
Verlagsort:Heidelberg
Verlag:Heidelberg University, Department of Economics
E-Jahr:2022
Jahr:February 21, 2022
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (33, [15] Seiten)
Illustrationen:Illustrationen
Gesamttitel/Reihe:AWI discussion paper series ; no. 710 (February 2022)
Abstract:The exogenous manipulation of choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') can raise problems of effectiveness and ethicality because it favors group outcomes over individual outcomes. One answer is to give individuals control over their nudge ('self-nudge'), but the trade-offs involved are poorly understood. We examine how subjects self-nudge in a paradigmatic social dilemma setting and whether outcomes differ between the self-nudge and two exogenous nudges in line with perfect free-riding or full cooperation. Subjects recruited from the general population play a ten-round VCM online in fixed groups of four with one daily contribution decision. The nudge takes the shape of a non-participation default contribution, comparing zero, full, and self-determined levels. We find that the average self-nudge is 44% of the endowment and only 7% of subjects choose one of the two exogenous defaults. Yet, there is a hard trade-off between ethicality and effectiveness: Self-nudging groups do not better than groups under the perfect free-riding nudge. The reason is that non-defaulting subjects contribute less. Groups under the full cooperation default exhibit no reactance against the nudge and outperform both alternative choice architectures.
URL:kostenfrei: Verlag: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/31339/7/Diederich_Goeschl_Waichman_2022_dp710.pdf
 Resolving-System: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-313391
 Langzeitarchivierung Nationalbibliothek: https://d-nb.info/1253222215/34
 kostenfrei: Verlag: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/31339
 kostenfrei: Resolving-System: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/261075
 10419/261075
URN:urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-313391
Datenträger:Online-Ressource
Sprache:eng
Sach-SW:Nudging
 choice architecture
 defaults
 public goods
 behavioral economics
 experiment
Form-SW:Graue Literatur
K10plus-PPN:1796238546
Verknüpfungen:→ Übergeordnete Aufnahme
 
 
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