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Signatur: 2018 A 6544   QR-Code
Standort: Hauptbibliothek Altstadt / Freihandbereich Monograph  3D-Plan
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Verfasst von:Rickard, Stephanie J. [VerfasserIn]   i
Titel:Spending to win
Titelzusatz:political institutions, economic geography, and government subsidies
Verf.angabe:Stephanie J. Rickard
Verlagsort:Cambridge, United Kingdom
Verlag:Cambridge University Press
Jahr:2018
Umfang:xi, 248 Seiten
Illustrationen:Diagramme
Format:24 cm
Gesamttitel/Reihe:Political economy of institutions and decisions
ISBN:978-1-108-42232-1
 978-1-108-43203-0
Abstract:"Democratic institutions ostensibly serve the common good. Yet democratically elected leaders face varied incentives. Politicians must balance the public's welfare with demands from interest groups that run counter to the common good. Nowhere is this balancing act more apparent than in the area of economic policy. Many economic policies redistribute resources between groups. Governments collect taxes and redistribute the money via government programs. Governments could spend money on programs that support broad groups, such as universal health care or education. Alternatively, governments could use their fiscal resources to privilege small, select groups of citizens via programs like subsidies for business. Subsidies typically provide economic benefits selectively to small groups and accordingly can be described as "particularistic" economic policies. Particularistic economic policies often come at a cost to larger groups, including tax payers and consumers. Yet despite these characteristics, particularistic economic policies emerge in democratic contexts"--
 Who gets what and why? The politics of particularistic economic policies -- The uneven geographic dispersion of economic activity -- How institutions and geography work together to shape policy -- Explaining government spending on industrial subsidies -- The power of producers : successful demands for state aid -- Why institutional differences among proportional representation systems matter -- The policy effects of electoral competitiveness in closed-list PR -- Conclusion and Implications
DOI:doi:10.1017/9781108381475
URL:Inhaltsverzeichnis: http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/1010785532.pdf
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108381475
Schlagwörter:(s)Politische Institution   i / (s)Wirtschaftsgeografie   i / (s)Wirtschaftspolitik   i / (s)Repräsentation <Politik>   i
 (s)Politische Institution   i / (s)Wirtschaftsgeografie   i / (s)Wirtschaftspolitik   i / (s)Repräsentation <Politik>   i
Sprache:eng
Bibliogr. Hinweis:Erscheint auch als : Online-Ausgabe: Rickard, Stephanie J., 1977 - : Spending to win. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2018. - 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 248 Seiten)
 Erscheint auch als : Online-Ausgabe: Rickard, Stephanie J., 1977 - : Spending to Win. - New York : Cambridge University Press, 2018. - 1 online resource (264 pages)
RVK-Notation:RB 10660   i
 QG 000   i
K10plus-PPN:1631811991
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SignaturQRStandortStatus
2018 A 6544QR-CodeHauptbibliothek Altstadt / Freihandbereich Monographien3D-Planentliehen bis 09.08.2024 (gesamte Vormerkungen: 0)
Mediennummer: 10559802

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