

An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

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Abstract. Grover’s algorithm is a quantum searching algorithm that poses a threat to symmetric cryptography. Due to their smaller key sizes, lightweight cryptographic algorithms such as Simplified-AES face a much more immediate threat from Grover’s algorithm than traditional cryptographic algorithms. By analyzing different S-boxes, it was discovered that the S-box 946C753AE8FBD012 may be more quantum resistant than the S-box that Simplified-AES uses, 94ABD1856203CEF7. In addition to this, 16x4 S-boxes (or 4 4x4 S-boxes) showed to be significantly more quantum secure than 4x4 S-boxes. This is because the number of gates needed to model a $2^n \times 4$ S-box increases at an exponential rate. It was also found that this property extends to $2^n \times 8$ S-boxes, implying the existence of a more quantum secure 8x8 S-box that AES could use. However, an increase in quantum security does not equate to an increase in classical security, as some of the least quantum secure S-boxes analyzed displayed some of the best classical security. Finally, an alteration of Simplified-AES that used a 16x4 S-box was found that displayed better classical and quantum security than Simplified-AES and did not require an increase in key size.

Keywords: Grover’s Algorithm, 16x4 S-box, Simplified-AES, Quantum Security

1 Introduction

Grover’s algorithm is a quantum searching algorithm able to find values in \sqrt{N} steps, where N is the amount of unstructured data being searched. This differs from classical algorithms which need to make an average of $\frac{N}{2}$ checks [20]. It can be used to perform brute force attacks to determine the key used in a symmetric encryption algorithm. To do this, one must implement the encryption algorithm used on a quantum computer. As such, the quantum cost of such an implementation directly impacts the cost of Grover’s algorithm, wherein quantum cost refers to the number of gates needed to model said implementation.

This is especially true regarding lightweight cryptography. Lightweight cryptography is a branch of cryptography that aims at enabling devices with limited resources to perform cryptography. This is because many Internet of Things (IoT) devices have limited memory, power, and processing speed that can be dedicated to performing cryptographic algorithms [21]. Lightweight cryptography has become increasingly prevalent given the rise of IoT devices. In 2021 there were 11.28 billion IoT devices, and this figure is predicted to reach 29.42 billion by 2030 [22].

Given the limited resources, lightweight cryptography uses smaller keys than standard encryption algorithms. Not only does this reduce the security of lightweight cryptographic algorithms, but these algorithms will be the first algorithms that Grover’s algorithm may pose a threat to. IonQ is currently working on IonQ Forte, a quantum computer with 32 quantum bits (qubits) [19], which is enough qubits to perform an attack via Grover’s

algorithm on Simplified-AES (S-AES). It is because of this that lightweight cryptographic algorithms should be limited to ephemeral data with a short lifespan. As such, even minor increases in the security of lightweight cryptographic algorithms are greatly beneficial.

One aspect of symmetric encryption algorithms that can be modified is the construction and implementation of substitution boxes (S-boxes). These are precomputed tables that map an input value to an output value. This paper analyzes how the construction of an S-box impacts its respective quantum cost, and if the use of multiple variably assigned S-boxes provides better quantum security against Grover's algorithm.

1.1 Methodology

The original plan was to modify the S-box used in S-AES and perform a brute force attack on this modified version of S-AES via Grover's algorithm. S-AES is a lightweight cryptographic algorithm whose structure is identical to AES. It has a key and block size of 16-bits and has two rounds [13].

This would be achieved by modifying the work done by Kyung-Bae Jang, Gyeong-Ju Song, Hyun-Ji Kim, and Hwa-Jeong Seo in a paper entitled "Grover on Simplified AES". This paper managed to create an efficient quantum implementation of S-AES that only used 32 qubits for a 16-bit plaintext and 16-bit key. A tool called LIGHTER-R was used to generate the quantum circuit for the S-box that did not require the use of any ancilla qubits [5].

LIGHTER-R was originally going to be used to generate the quantum circuits for the modified S-boxes which would then replace the substitution circuit and be run through Grover's algorithm. IBM Quantum (IBMQ) would be used in conjunction with Qiskit to model these results. However, LIGHTER-R produced inconsistent results that could not be replicated. In addition to this, memory constraints prevented the modified versions of S-AES from being run in Qiskit. As such, SageMath was used to generate the algebraic normal form (ANF) of various S-boxes which was then used to create a quantum circuit for said S-box. Grover's algorithm was then used to perform a known plaintext attack on a quantum circuit that XOR-ed a key with a plaintext before running said plaintext through the S-box. A known plaintext attack was performed instead of a brute force attack because it required less resources to simulate.

Afterwards, three possible full implementations of S-AES that use 16x4 S-boxes were tested. This was proceeded by classical analysis performed through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical test suite on said algorithms and modified versions of S-AES that use different S-boxes. This process was then repeated on implementations using the three 16x4 randomly generated S-boxes that required the most quantum gates to model.

2 S-Box Construction

Four sets of four S-boxes were created. They were broken into these groups because a 16x4 S-box would also be tested that consisted of each S-box in the set. This S-box would use two bits from the provided key to determine which S-box would be used on the plaintext. The first set of S-boxes were created using the same methodology as the S-boxes from S-AES and AES. They served as the base set of S-boxes that the other sets would modify to meet various criteria.

The S-box that S-AES uses was generated by inverting values as an element of $GF(2^4)$ using the prime polynomial $x^4 + x + 1$. These values were then multiplied by a matrix and had a vector added to them. This produces the equation below, wherein b_n is the n th bit of the inverted input [13].

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

This process was used to create each of the S-boxes in the first set of S-boxes, with the prime polynomials used being $x^4 + x + 1$ (i.e., the S-box that S-AES uses), $x^4 + x^3 + 1$, and $x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$. Since there are only three prime polynomials in $\text{GF}(2^4)$, the fourth S-box was generated using a rotated matrix and the prime polynomial $x^4 + x + 1$. The 16x4 S-box formed from Set 1 can be seen in Table 2.

The second set that was created aimed at analyzing S-boxes that produced a unique output for any given input. This was achieved by progressively shifting each S-box in the first set of S-boxes to the left. Afterwards, repeat occurrences of an output for any given input were swapped with the next value in the S-box that would not cause a collision.

The third set aimed at analyzing S-boxes that had no collisions with the input, i.e., no output values are identical to the input values. This was done by taking the first set of S-boxes and swapping any values that resulted in a collision with the next value in the S-box that would not cause said collision. Finally, the fourth set of S-boxes aimed at analyzing S-boxes that had no collisions with each other or the plaintext. This was generated by repeating this process on the second set of S-boxes. The resulting set of S-boxes can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Sets 1-4

	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4
Set 1	94ABD185 6203CEF7	940756EB FD1C2A83	946C753A E8FBD012	9E518BDA 67F3C402
Set 2	94ABD185 6203CEF7	40756EBF D1C2A839	6C573AE8 FBD01294	18BDA673 CF4920E5
Set 3	94ABD185 6203ECF7	940756EB FD1C2A83	946C735A E8FDB012	9E518BDA 67F34C02
Set 4	94ABD185 6203ECF7	40756EBF D1C2A839	6C573AE8 FBD01294	18BDA673 CF4920E5

2.1 S-Box Quantum Circuit Construction

It is possible to express an S-box as a series of polynomials, or their ANF. This can be used to reduce the quantum cost needed to perform Boolean functions on a quantum computer [4]. SageMath was used to calculate the ANF of each S-box. The ANF of S-box 1 of Set 1 is depicted below, with y_n being the n th output bit and x_n being the n th input bit. The ANF of the other S-boxes can be found in Appendix A.

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \end{aligned}$$

This can be converted to a quantum circuit by using a multi-controlled X (MCX) gate whose target is the register y_n and whose controls are the registers in $\{x_0, \dots, x_n\}$. The controls for each MCX gate are dictated by which x values are being multiplied together. Doing this for the equation above results in the quantum circuit depicted in Figure 1.

Table 2: 16x4 S-box formed by Set 1

	0b000000	0b000001	0b000010	0b000011
0b000000	0x9	0x4	0xA	0xB
0b000100	0xD	0x1	0x8	0x5
0b001000	0x6	0x2	0x0	0x3
0b001100	0xC	0xE	0xF	0x7
0b010000	0x9	0x4	0x0	0x7
0b010100	0x5	0x6	0xE	0xB
0b011000	0xF	0xD	0x1	0xC
0b011100	0x2	0xA	0x8	0x3
0b100000	0x9	0x4	0x6	0xC
0b100100	0x7	0x5	0x3	0xA
0b101000	0xE	0x8	0xF	0xB
0b101100	0xD	0x0	0x1	0x2
0b110000	0x9	0xE	0x5	0x1
0b110100	0x8	0xB	0xD	0xA
0b111000	0x6	0x7	0xF	0x3
0b111100	0xC	0x4	0x0	0x2




Figure 1: Quantum circuit for S-box 1 of Set 1 (94ABD1856203CEF7)

3 Quantum Cost of S-Boxes

Quantum particles must be trapped in a low energy state to allow the performance of meaningful operations. Reducing the number of gates needed for a quantum algorithm reduces the cost of performing said algorithm, as it reduces the number of necessary quantum computations and therefore the time atoms need to stay in a specific state. This is important as it reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of decoherence. Decoherence can cause a spin flip of quantum particle and can cause trapped atoms to be excited into higher vibrational modes [16].

Table 3 depicts the resulting cost of the quantum circuit for the ANF of each S-box. It lists the number of MCX gates with n controls. An MCX gate with 0 controls is equivalent to an X gate. Table 4 depicts the cost of a 16x4 S-box generated from each set. It should be noted that the quantum circuits depicted in Table 3 require 8 qubits, while the circuits in Table 4 require 10 qubits. This is because a 16x4 S-box requires 2 additional bits to determine what S-box should be used. It should also be noted that using a rotated matrix to generate S-box 4 in Set 1 had no impact on the cost of performing said S-box.

3.1 Analyzing Quantum Cost of Random S-Boxes

This process was repeated on a set of 1,500 randomly generated 4x4 S-boxes and a set of 800 randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes. Table 5 and Table 6 list the MCX gates needed

Table 3: Cost of each S-box in Sets 1 through 4

MCX	Set 1				Set 2			
Controls	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4
0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1
1	10	9	13	10	10	6	8	10
2	12	14	19	12	12	11	13	14
3	11	7	7	11	11	6	6	7
Total Gates	35	32	41	35	35	24	29	32

MCX	Set 3				Set 4			
Controls	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4
0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1
1	10	9	13	10	10	6	8	10
2	11	14	17	11	11	11	13	14
3	10	7	7	10	10	6	6	6
Total Gates	33	32	39	33	33	24	29	31

Table 4: Cost of each 16x4 S-box formed by Sets 1 through 4

MCX Controls	Set 1	Set 2	Set 3	Set 4
0	2	2	2	2
1	10	17	10	17
2	22	26	21	25
3	48	39	45	38
4	27	32	25	33
5	10	10	8	12
Total Gates	119	126	111	127

to run the 3 most costly randomly generated 4x4 and 16x4 S-boxes respectively. The 16x4 S-boxes were created by combining 4 randomly generated 4x4 S-boxes. A list of all the S-boxes generated and their associated costs can be found in Appendix B.

The most expensive randomly generated 4x4 S-box was 7FAC98B234516D0E, which required the same number of gates as the most expensive 4x4 S-box generated by hand (946C753AE8FBD012). The most expensive 16x4 S-box that was generated by hand was formed from Set 4, requiring 127 gates. However, the randomly generated S-box CB91D538E7A20F64A217C6534D8EBF09D14A58BF792C630E58B214C790E6DFA3 required 150 gates. This is approximately 3.659 times more gates than the most expensive 4x4 S-box found, and an increase of 23 gates compared to the 16x4 S-box generated from Set 4.

It should be noted that all the 16x4 S-boxes depicted in Table 6 were more expensive than the hand generated 16x4 S-boxes depicted in Table 4. This is even though each 16x4 S-box in Table 6 had at least one collision with the input, and at least one collision between the different 4x4 S-boxes used to generate the 16x4 S-box. This implies that reducing these collisions in 16x4 S-boxes does not increase said S-box's quantum security.

Table 5: Cost of the 3 most expensive randomly generated 4x4 S-boxes

MCX Controls	S-Box		
	7FAC98B234516D0E	FD8716ABCE459320	C2BA7FD51408E396
0	3	4	2
1	8	9	12
2	19	14	15
3	11	13	11
Total Gates	41	40	40

Table 6: Cost of the 3 most expensive randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes

MCX Controls	S-Box		
	CB91D538E7A20F64 A217C6534D8EBF09 D14A58BF792C630E	70812A3B496DCEF5 89C62357BA4ED01F 841CEAB73265DF09	6A543D18EC27F09B 9ADC7F3E502816B4 FC1BE0568A423D79
58B214C790E6DFA3	0386F4127B95ECAD	309C7BA2D8F4E651	
0	2	3	2
1	10	19	13
2	42	38	38
3	48	44	52
4	36	37	34
5	12	8	8
Total Gates	150	149	147

4 Using Grover’s Algorithm to Perform a Known Plaintext Attack

A known-plaintext attack is an attack wherein the attacker has access to both the ciphertext and plaintext of an encryption algorithm. Such an attack aims at figuring out the key used to encrypt the plaintext [15]. Performing a known plaintext attack with Grover’s algorithm is cheaper than performing a brute force attack using Grover’s algorithm. This is because Grover’s algorithm will only need to search through the possible values of a key as opposed to the values for both the key and the plaintext.

Using Grover’s algorithm, a known plaintext attack was performed on an algorithm that XOR-es a 4-bit key to a 4-bit plaintext that is then ran through an S-box (Algorithm 1). This performs the add round key and substitution steps of round 1 of S-AES on a 4-bit block. The shift rows, mix columns, and second add round key steps were excluded due to memory and time constraints. Two different implementations of a 16x4 S-box were tested. The first implementation (Algorithm 2) used the first and last bit of the key to determine what S-box to use (acting as x_4 and x_5) and the second implementation (Algorithm 3) appended two bits to the key that determined what S-box to use (once again acting as x_4 and x_5).

These algorithms serve as a simplified single round version of S-AES that requires fewer resources to model and operates on a single plaintext block. Below is the pseudocode for these algorithms, wherein `BitToInt` is a function that converts a bitstream to an integer value and `sbox` is a list of values between 0x0 and 0xF that represent the S-box being used.

Algorithm 1

Input: bitstream[4] *pt*, bitstream[4] *key*, list[16] *sbox*
bitstream[4] *ct*
i = 0
while *i* < 4 **do**
 $ct[i] = pt[i] \oplus key[i]$
 i = *i* + 1
end while
ct = *sbox*[BitToInt(*ct*)]

Algorithm 2

Input: bitstream[4] *pt*, bitstream[4] *key*, list[64] *sbox*
bitstream[4] *ct*
i = 0
while *i* < 4 **do**
 $ct[i] = pt[i] \oplus key[i]$
 i = *i* + 1
end while
bitstream[2] *b*
b = [*key*[0], *key*[3]]
box = BitToInt(*b*) * 2⁴ ▷ Which 4x4 S-box to use
ct = *sbox*[*box*+BitToInt(*ct*)]

Algorithm 3

Input: bitstream[4] *pt*, bitstream[6] *key*, list[64] *sbox*
bitstream[4] *ct*
i = 0
while *i* < 4 **do**
 $ct[i] = pt[i] \oplus key[i]$
 i = *i* + 1
end while
bitstream[2] *b*
b = [*key*[4], *key*[5]]
box = BitToInt(*b*) * 2⁴ ▷ Which 4x4 S-box to use
ct = *sbox*[*box*+BitToInt(*ct*)]

5 Construction of Grover’s Algorithm

5.1 Oracle Construction

To construct Grover’s algorithm, one must create an oracle that is used to find a desired state [20]. The oracle for a known plaintext attack on a 4x4 S-box and a known ciphertext of 1100 is depicted in Figure 2 registers key, plaintext (pt), ciphertext (ct), expected, and passed. Had LIGHTER-R been used to generate the oracle, the ciphertext register would not be necessary. This is because LIGHTER-R is able to construct quantum circuits for reversible ANF representations of S-boxes that do not need an ancilla register and require fewer gates, significantly reducing the cost associated with an S-box’s quantum circuit [7]. The first thing the oracle does is XOR the key register with the plaintext register. This is done by using a series of controlled-X gates on the key and plaintext registers. An S-box is then used on the plaintext and ciphertext registers, with the plaintext register acting as x_0 through x_3 and the ciphertext register acting as y_0 through y_3 .




Figure 2: Quantum oracle for S-AES

The ciphertext register is then tested to see if it is in the randomly chosen state $|1100\rangle$. This is done using the 2-qubit expected register. The first qubit of this register is used to check the 0’s of the ciphertext and the second qubit being used to check the 1’s of the ciphertext. This is done by applying an X gate on qubits that should be in the state $|0\rangle$. A controlled-X gate is then applied, using these qubits as its control and the first qubit of the expected register as its target. It is then followed by another X gate on the ciphertext qubits in question. If the known ciphertext does not contain any zeroes, the first qubit of the expected register can either be removed or initialized to the state $|1\rangle$. Another controlled-X gate is then ran using the qubits that should be in the state $|1\rangle$ as the control, and the second qubit of the expected register being its target. If the known ciphertext does not contain any zeroes, the second qubit of the expected register can either

be removed or initialized to the state $|1\rangle$.

A controlled-X gate is then run using the expected register as its control and the passed register as its target to determine if the ciphertext register is in the desired state. The process of checking the 1's and 0's of the ciphertext, running the S-box, and XORing the key with the plaintext is then repeated. Doing this sets everything back to the state they were in originally.

This process was repeated for 16x4 S-boxes. Figure 3 depicts the oracle for Algorithm 2, while Figure 4 depicts the oracle for Algorithm 3. Once again, a known ciphertext of 1100 is being looked for. As seen in Figure 4, the two additional bits of the key in Algorithm 3 are not XORed with the plaintext.




Figure 3: Quantum oracle for Algorithm 2

5.2 Assembling Grover's Algorithm

To find the 4 to 6-bit key used to generate the known ciphertext from a known plaintext, one must perform 2 searches. The plaintext register will also need to be initialized to its known value. This is done by applying a X gate on each plaintext qubit that is meant to be a $|1\rangle$. Finally, the passed register will need to be initialized to the state $|-\rangle$. An example of this is shown in Figure 5, wherein a known plaintext of 1101 is being looked for using a single 4x4 S-box. After the oracle is run, a diffuser is applied to the key register. The diffuser rotates the key register closer to the states that satisfy oracle [20].




Figure 4: Oracle for Algorithm 3




Figure 5: An example of Grover's algorithm that is looking through a 4x4 S-box to find what produces the plaintext 1101

6 Results

Table 7 lists 3 sets of randomly generated plaintext ciphertext pairs that were used to perform a known plaintext attack. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the results of performing a known plaintext attack via Grover’s algorithm on Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 respectively with the randomly generated plaintext 0110 and randomly generated ciphertext 0100. These tests were performed using Qiskit via IBMQ. These figures only depict the results of performing the attack on Set 1. The rest of the results of each of these attacks on 16x4 S-box algorithms can be seen in Appendix C. The results of a known plaintext attack on Algorithm 1 had an average of 932.146 out of 1024 shots being correct with a standard deviation of 8.636. Comparable results were present when performing this attack on Algorithm 2, having an average of 930.5 out of 1024 shots being correct with a standard deviation of 9.987. However, instead of finding only 1 valid key, it found 4. Such a result means that Algorithm 2 is unable to provide authentication.

Table 7: Randomly generated plaintext ciphertext pairs

Plaintext	Ciphertext
0000	0110
0011	1011
0110	0100




Figure 6: Results of performing a known plaintext via Grover’s algorithm on Algorithm 1




Figure 7: Results of performing a known plaintext via Grover’s algorithm on Algorithm 2




Figure 8: Results of performing a known plaintext via Grover’s algorithm on Algorithm 3

6.1 Analyzing ALG 2

However, when Grover’s algorithm was run on Algorithm 2, results were very inconsistent. Figure 7 best demonstrates this, as the attack only found a valid key when using the S-boxes in Set 1 and 3. Furthermore, Set 1 yielded two possible keys (0111 and 1011) while Set 3 only yielded one possible key (0111). Sets 2 and 4 did not find any valid keys because no keys exist that could produce the ciphertext 0100 from the plaintext 0110. Since the value that is XORed with the plaintext also decides which S-box to use, the plaintext will only be XORed with one of 4 values before being put through a specific S-box. Table 8 depicts what key values correlate to each S-box for any particular set.

XORing a plaintext before putting it through an S-box serves to create permutations that are computationally indistinguishable from a random permutation. To do this, a function must map each n -bit input to exactly one random n -bit output, with the input being the key XORed with a 4-bit plaintext block [23]. However, ALG 2 fails at doing this. Table 9 shows the output of Algorithm 2 using Set 1 for any given key and a plaintext of 0x0. One can see that a ciphertext of 0x4, 0x7, and 0xD are produced multiple times, while a ciphertext of 0x0, 0x5, and 0xC are never produced. As such, it fails at providing a computationally random permutation.

Table 8: Keys applicable to n th S-box in Algorithm 2

S-Box	Key			
S-Box 1	0 (0000)	2 (0010)	4 (0100)	6 (0100)
S-Box 2	1 (0001)	3 (0011)	5 (0101)	7 (0111)
S-Box 3	8 (1000)	A (1010)	C (1100)	E (1110)
S-Box 4	9 (1001)	B (1011)	D (1101)	F (1111)

Table 9: Output of Algorithm 2 when using Set 1 for any given key and a plaintext of 0x0

	S-Box 1				S-Box 2				S-Box 3				S-Box 4			
Key	0	2	4	6	1	3	5	7	8	A	C	E	9	B	D	F
CT	9	A	D	8	4	7	6	B	E	F	D	1	7	3	4	2

6.2 Analyzing Algorithm 3

In contrast, Algorithm 3 supplies a computationally random permutation since each n -bit plaintext input has an equally likely chance of being mapped to any other n -bit ciphertext. However, each ciphertext generated has 4 possible keys that could be used to decrypt it. Ideally, given a key size of n -bits, an attacker should have a $\frac{1}{2^n}$ chance of guessing the correct key. However, when Algorithm 3 is implemented, an attacker has a $\frac{4}{2^4}$ or $\frac{1}{16}$ probability of guessing the key instead of a $\frac{1}{2^8}$ or $\frac{1}{64}$ chance of guessing the key. While this does not provide ideal security, it provides the same amount of security as Algorithm 1, as an attacker would also have a $\frac{1}{16}$ chance of guessing the correct key.

It is because of this that Grover’s algorithm must run the same number of times for all three algorithms evaluated. As such, the only benefit that Algorithm 3 provides is an increased cost of the oracle used to perform Grover’s algorithm. As depicted in Tables 3 and 4, if Algorithm 3 was ran using Set 4, the S-box subcircuit would require 127 gates. Whereas if Algorithm 1 was ran using S-box 3 of Set 4, the S-box subcircuit would only require 24 gates.

Since each oracle subcircuit applies two S-box subcircuits, and since the oracle had to be run twice, this meant that the S-box subcircuit had to be run a total of 4 times for each known plaintext attack performed. Therefore, given the scenario outlined above, Algorithm 3 would require 412 more gates in total than Algorithm 1. In addition to this, Algorithm 3 requires 2 more qubits to perform a known plaintext attack than an attack performed on Algorithm 1. However, this increase in gates and qubits can be circumvented by just testing on a single specific S-box, i.e., by using Algorithm 1.

7 Implementation in S-AES

It might be possible to overcome the security holes present in Algorithms 2 and 3 by implementing them in the full S-AES algorithm. To do this for Algorithm 2, the S-AES algorithm was largely unmodified. The key expansion algorithm was left unchanged, using the first S-box from the set to perform the key expansion. The only step that was changed was the substitution step, wherein the previous round key was used to determine which S-box to use (i.e., W_0W_1 was used in round 1 and W_2W_3 was used in round 2 to determine which S-box to use). Figure 9 depicts this process. The high and low bits of K_0 are used to determine which S-box to use on Block 1, while the high and low bits of K_1 are used to determine which S-box to use on Block 0. This implementation will be referred to as ALG 2. It serves to perform a version of S-AES that uses a 16x4 S-box without increasing the key size.

7.1 Implementing Algorithm 3 in S-AES

Implementing Algorithm 3 in S-AES required a lot more changes to S-AES. The first thing that had to be modified was the key expansion algorithm. Key expansion in S-AES operates by breaking the 16-bit key into 4 4-bit nibbles (K_0 through K_3) that are then used to form 6 8-bit words (W_0 through W_5). These nibbles are then rotated and put through a S-box before adding the round constant g . The first round of this process is depicted in Figure 10.

To implement Algorithm 3, the key size needed to be increased to 24 bits, with these additional bits forming the nibbles K_4 and K_5 . K_4 and K_5 are then used to form α_0 , which determines which S-box to apply on each plaintext nibble in round 1. Before performing the key expansion, $K_0(\kappa_0\kappa_1)$ and $K_2(\kappa_2\kappa_3)$ are swapped with K_4 and K_5 to form α'_0 . $\kappa_0\kappa_1$ are then used to determine which S-box to use on W_1 .

α'_0 is then expanded using a process that mirrors the original key expansion algorithm used by S-AES. 2 2-bit words (ω) are formed from α'_0 , with ω_0 being formed from $\kappa_0\kappa_1$ and ω_1 being formed from the rotated $\kappa_3\kappa_2$. The substitution step is skipped and ω_1 is XORed with the constant ρ (0b1000) before being XORed with ω_0 to form ω_2 . ω_2 is then XORed with ω_1 to form ω_3 , with $\omega_2\omega_3$ forming α_1 . α_1 is then used to determine which S-box to use on each plaintext nibble in round 2. Figure 11 depicts this process.

To calculate W_5W_6 , this process, excluding the key expansion of α_1 , is repeated. This implementation is referred to as ALG 3 Double Swap. Another implementation was tested that did not swap K_4K_5 with K_0K_2 when calculating W_5W_6 , with this implementation being referred to as ALG 3 Single Swap.




Figure 9: ALG 2




Figure 10: S-AES key expansion algorithm




Figure 11: ALG 3

8 Analyzing Full S-AES Implementations of ALG 2 and 3

Running Grover’s algorithm on these modified versions of S-AES was too resource intensive. As such, every possible key was used on 3 randomly generated plaintexts (as well as the plaintext 0x0000) to determine how many keys generated the same ciphertext given a specific plaintext. When doing this, the S-box S-AES used was always set to the first S-box of the set being tested. This was done to see how resistant each implementation was to a known plaintext attack of an unmodified version of S-AES that uses the first S-box of a 16x4 S-box.

The average results of performing this test on each set is depicted in Figures 12 and 13. Table 10 provides the average minimum, maximum, mean, median, variance, and standard deviation of these tests.

The distribution of keys that correlated to identical outputs is statistically identical between S-AES and ALG 2. They were also statistically identical between ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap. Roughly 36.76% of the possible 2^{16} 16-bit outputs (or around 24,094) could not be generated by S-AES or ALG 2. Another 36.85% of the possible outputs (or around 24,149) could only be generated with a single key. On average, each ciphertext produced by ALG 3 could be generated with 256 different keys. This is because a 24-bit key is being applied to a 16-bit plaintext block that will produce a 16-bit plaintext block.




Figure 12: Key distribution of S-AES and ALG 2

8.1 Effectiveness of ALG 3 Double Swap & Alg 3 Single Swap

ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap were designed to prevent an attacker from being able to use any possible value for the additional 8 bits when attacking the algorithm. Five random ciphertexts that could be generated from the plaintext 0xD3AE with 256 possible keys were selected from ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap. Each key that could generate the ciphertext in question was then analyzed to see how many of the possible values for K_4K_5 generated said ciphertext. If all 2^8 of these values can be used, an attacker would be able to ignore these additional 8 bits.

Doing so revealed that ALG 3 Double Swap, on average, used 62.34% of the possible K_4K_5 values. Doing this on ALG 3 Single Swap had similar results, with it using an




Figure 13: Key distribution of ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap

Table 10: Keys per ciphertext

	Average Minimum	Average Maximum	Average Mean	Average Median	Average Variance	Average Standard Deviation
S-AES	0	7.75	1	1	1	1
ALG 2	0	7.75	1	1	1	1
ALG 3 Double Swap	192.5	325.25	256	256	255.805	15.993
ALG 3 Single Swap	190	325	256	256	256.63	16.023

average of the 63.67% possible K_4K_5 values. This difference is most likely due to the small sample size. It is likely that repeating this test on all the ciphertexts that could be generated with 256 different keys would result in a near identical ratio between the two algorithms.

8.2 The Ability of S-AES, ALG 2, and ALG 3 to Provide Authentication

IoT devices are found in many settings such as the military, industrial, and healthcare fields. Many of these devices are required to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of transmitted data. Authentication is provided using shared keys that transform a plaintext into a ciphertext, wherein the same key must be used to decrypt the ciphertext to a valid plaintext value [10]. This is especially true for IoT devices in the medical field, as the security of patient data is a top priority. Due to the various applications and benefits provided by IoT devices, the healthcare industry has been quick to adopt IoT devices [8].

Due to the distribution of keys, ALG 3 could never provide authentication. Since there will always be more keys than possible ciphertexts, there will always be more than one possible valid key that could be used to authenticate data. However, ALG 2 was equally as capable of providing authentication as S-AES was. This is because their key distributions

were nearly identical.

To provide ideal authentication, each ciphertext should map to exactly one key given a specific plaintext. However, encryption algorithms can still provide authentication if they produce collisions such that it is difficult to find x values that compose of a key and plaintext that satisfy the equation $encryption(x_1) = encryption(x_n)$. This is best done with hashing algorithms but can still be performed through the use of encryption algorithms [9].

Due to the constraints of lightweight cryptographic algorithms (i.e., their limited computational costs and limited key space) any lightweight algorithm that has an x value that satisfies the above equation a collision in it would be easy to find. Seeing as there are only around 36.85% possible values of x that do not cause a collision in S-AES or ALG 2, both algorithms fail at providing adequate authentication. However, the lack of differentiation between the number of collisions amongst the two algorithms would imply that implementations of ALG 2 on algorithms such as AES would not impact their ability to provide authentication.

9 Statistical Analysis of These Implementations

One of the criteria that encryption algorithms must provide is their ability to act as random number generators [18]. NIST has provided a statistical test suite that can be used to analyze random number generators and cryptographic algorithms. It works under the null hypothesis that the sequence being analyzed is random. This test suite performs 15 tests that measure the randomness of an algorithm to produce a *P-value*. This is the probability that a test statistic will produce values that are equal to or worse than the test statistic value. A *P-value* of 1 indicates perfect randomness, while a *P-value* of 0 indicates that the sequence analyzed is completely non-random [1]. Information about each test can be seen in [1].

The implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap were analyzed using this test suite. In addition to this, versions of S-AES that used each S-box in each set of S-boxes were also analyzed. The algorithms generated 60 bitstreams of 100,000 bits each. This was done by generating 60 random 32-bit input values for the different versions of S-AES and ALG 2, as well as 60 random 40-bit input values for ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap. These values were then fed into their respective algorithms, being incremented by one until each bitstream had the necessary number of bits.

Appendix D lists the *P-value* associated with as well as the percentage of bitstreams that passed each test. Tables 11 lists the results for implementations of S-AES that use S-box 1 and 3 of Set 1. S-box 1 of Set 1 is the S-box that S-AES uses, and S-box 3 of Set 1 was the most expensive 4x4 S-box found. Table 12 lists the results of implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Single Swap, and ALG 3 Double Swap that use Set 4, as it composed the most expensive 16x4 handmade S-box.

9.1 Test Flaws

Fine tuning each test performed was infeasible, as 49 different algorithms ended up being tested. As such, several tests produced questionable results. This is most apparent in the various tests that had a *P-value* of 0 despite having a very high pass rate. Furthermore, only 3 Random Excursions and Random Excursions Variant tests could be performed on each algorithm. In addition to this, the only Discrete Fourier Transform (FFT) tests that did not result in a *P-value* of 0 were the ones ran on ALG 2. Finally, only one Muarar’s “Universal Statistical” test could be performed on each algorithm tested.

Table 11: Statistical analysis results of S-AES using its default S-box (S-box 1 of Set 1) and the most quantum expensive 4x4 S-box found (S-box 3 of Set 1)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 3	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.299	100%
Block Frequency	0.178	93.33%	0.016	98.33%
Sums 1	0	100%	0.001	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0.01	100%
Runs	0	100%	0.773	100%
Longest Run	0.324	98.33%	0.706	98.33%
Rank	0.437	100%	0.195	93.33%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	71.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.256	99.06%	0.247	98.96%
Overlapping	0.804	98.33%	0.195	98.33%
Universal	0.83	—	0.886	—
Entropy	0.407	100%	0.02	100%
Excursions	—	100%	—	96.87%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	93.05%
Serial 1	0.74	100%	0.148	100%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.773	100%
Linear Complexity	0.773	100%	0.054	100%
Average Pass Rate	94.0%		97.0%	
100% Pass Rate	11		10	

9.2 Analysis of Results

Apart from the Binary Matrix Rank and FFT tests, each algorithm passed each test more than 80% of the time. ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap tended to have low pass rates of the rank test, with ALG 3 Double Swap consistently having a significantly lower pass rate than ALG 3 Single Swap when performing this test. ALG 3 Double Swap also tended to have lower pass rates than ALG 3 Single Swap across every test performed, implying that ALG 3 Single Swap is more secure than ALG 3 Double Swap. Finally, the only algorithm that consistently passed every single test, including FFT, was ALG 2. Each test performed on this algorithm had a pass rate of 90% or more, implying that ALG 2 was the most classically secure algorithm tested.

The Binary Matrix Rank test is used to look for linear dependencies among fixed length substrings of a binary stream [1]. Failure of this test implies that the various values produced by an encryption algorithm are dependent on each other and are therefore not random. Such a dependence makes algorithms susceptible to linear cryptanalysis that can be used to perform key recovery attacks [14]. The FFT test is used to find repetitive patterns that are near each other [1]. These patterns can be exploited by cryptanalysts to recover the plaintext [3].

ALG 2 was also the algorithm that had the highest average pass rate of 99% of all tests performed passing when used in conjunction with Set 4. Despite this, the unmodified version of S-AES had the highest number of tests that had a 100% pass rate for each *P-value* generated, as 11 of the performed tests had a 100% pass rate. ALG 3 Double Swap using Set 4 performed the worst, having an average pass rate of 89% and with only 3 tests having a 100% pass rate.

Table 12: Statistical analysis results of implementations of ALG 2 and 3 using the most expensive handmade 16x4 S-box (Set 4)

	ALG 2		ALG 3 Double Swap		ALG 3 Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.378	98.33%	0.111	95.0%	0.195	100%
Block Frequency	0.001	98.33%	0.254	98.33%	0.233	98.33%
Sums 1	0.276	96.66%	0	91.66%	0.091	100%
Sums 2	0.888	100%	0	91.66%	0.025	100%
Runs	0.254	100%	0.834	98.33%	0.324	100%
Longest Run	0	96.66%	0.74	100%	0.067	98.33%
Rank	0.122	100%	0	58.33%	0.091	93.33%
FFT	0.804	96.66%	0	0.0%	0	71.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.99%	0.486	98.72%	0.498	98.96%
Overlapping	0.06	100%	0.135	98.33%	0.991	98.33%
Universal	0.461	—	0.713	—	0.621	—
Entropy	0.35	98.33%	0.028	98.33%	0.005	100%
Excursions	—	93.75%	—	98.61%	—	96.87%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	96.28%	—	93.05%
Serial 1	0.005	100%	0.534	100%	0.378	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.888	100%	0.437	100%
Linear Complexity	0.148	100%	0.35	95.0%	0.602	100%
Average Pass Rate	99.0%		89.0%		97.0%	
100% Pass Rate	8		3		8	

9.3 Avalanche Criterion

Another desirable property of encryption algorithms is their ability for small changes in an input to produce significant changes to the output. To achieve this effect, each output bit should have a 50% chance of changing when any individual bit of the input is flipped. This is known as the Strict Avalanche Criteria (SAC) [17]. While the SAC requires each bit to have an exactly 50% chance of changing, such a criterion is very hard to achieve, and it is more useful as a means of measuring a sample’s divergence from the SAC. As such, algorithms are considered to meet the generalized SAC when each bit has a probability close to 50% of changing [12].

This was tested by generating 2,500 random plaintexts and keys for each implementation. Each bit in the input was then iterated through to measure the ciphertext produced when said bit was flipped. Furthermore, this test was also applied on a version of S-AES that used each S-box from each set of generated S-boxes. Table 13 lists the average chance that each bit had of changing, and Appendix E contains charts depicting the chance of each individual bit changing for each implementation tested.

Across all four sets analyzed, the bits when running ALG 2 ranged from having a 47.76% to a 51.14% chance of changing. Results were near identical with ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap, with bits ranging from having a 48.89% to 51.17% chance of changing. Similarly, each modified version of S-AES produced results that ranged from 48.35% to 53.21%.

Overall, each bit across all the algorithms tested in Table 13 ranged from having a 49.28% to a 50.63% average chance of changing when any given input bit is changed. As such, ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, ALG 3 Single Swap, and each implementation of

S-AES tested met the generalized SAC.

Table 13: SAC test results of Sets 1 through 4

Set 1							
	ALG 2	ALG 3 Double Swap	ALG 3 Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)
Average	49.65%	49.28%	49.98%	49.76%	50.52%	49.78%	49.87%
Set 2							
	ALG 2	ALG 3 Double Swap	ALG 3 Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)
Average	49.60%	50.02%	50.04%	49.72%	50.02%	49.92%	50.23%
Set 3							
	ALG 2	ALG 3 Double Swap	ALG 3 Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)
Average	49.83%	49.94%	49.93%	49.63%	50.55%	49.90%	50.01%
Set 4							
	ALG 2	ALG 3 Double Swap	ALG 3 Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)
Average	49.65%	50.04%	49.87%	49.80%	49.89%	49.98%	50.63%

10 Analyzing Randomly Generated 16x4 S-Boxes

When analyzing the quantum cost of the ANF of the randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes, multiple S-boxes were found that were more expensive than the S-boxes analyzed in Sets 1 through 4. Table 6 lists the three most expensive randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes. The individual 4x4 S-boxes that produced the three most expensive 16x4 S-boxes were categorized into Sets 5 through 7, as depicted in Table 14. Table 15 depicts the cost of the quantum circuit for the ANF of each of these S-boxes. Appendix A lists the ANF of each of these S-boxes.

Table 14: Sets 5-7

	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4
Set 5	CB91D538 E7A20F64	A217C653 4D8EBF09	D14A58BF 792C630E	58B214C7 90E6DFA3
Set 6	70812A3B 496DCEF5	89C62357 BA4ED01F	841CEAB7 3265DF09	0386F412 7B95ECAD
Set 7	6A543D18 EC27F09B	9ADC7F3E 502816B4	FC1BE056 8A423D79	309C7BA2 D8F4E651

Table 15: Quantum costs of Sets 5 through 7

	MCX Controls						Total Gates
	0	1	2	3	4	5	
Set 5							
S-Box 1	2	7	19	9	0	0	37
S-Box 2	2	9	11	8	0	0	30
S-Box 3	3	7	10	7	0	0	27
S-Box 4	2	9	7	8	0	0	26
16x4 S-Box	2	10	42	48	36	12	150
Set 6							
S-Box 1	3	11	18	8	0	0	40
S-Box 2	1	6	10	3	0	0	20
S-Box 3	1	9	10	8	0	0	28
S-Box 4	0	10	14	9	0	0	33
16x4 S-Box	3	19	38	44	37	8	149
Set 7							
S-Box 1	2	7	13	11	0	0	33
S-Box 2	2	8	10	11	0	0	31
S-Box 3	4	9	11	8	0	0	32
S-Box 4	2	8	15	6	0	0	31
16x4 S-Box	2	13	38	52	34	8	147

11 Statistical Analysis of Randomly Generated 16x4 S-Boxes

To see if Sets 5 through 7 also provided classical security, each of these S-boxes were analyzed using the NIST statistical test suite and tested to see if they met the generalized SAC. The same procedure used when analyzing Sets 1 through 4 was once again used on Sets 5 through 7. The NIST statistical test suite was ran on versions of S-AES that use S-box 1 of each set, ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap. These algorithms (as well as versions of S-AES that use each S-box in Sets 5 through 7) were then analyzed to measure the likelihood of each bit changing in accordance to a single bit flip in the input to measure their compliance with the SAC. Table 16 and Table 17 contains the results of performing the NIST statistical test suite on Set 5, and Table 18 contains the results for the SAC tests. Appendix D lists the results of running the NIST statistical test suite on each implementation tested, and Appendix E lists charts depicting the chance of each individual bit changing for each implementation tested.

11.1 Analysis of Statistical Tests

Table 19 depicts the results of running implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap using Set 5, the most expensive 16x4 S-box analyzed in terms of quantum gates. Table 20 depicts the algorithms that performed the best and worst when running statistical tests using Sets 5 through 7. These results were generated using ALG 2 and ALG 3 Double Swap respectively, with both algorithms using Set 6.

Despite requiring the most gates, implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap that used Set 5 tended to perform worse than implementations that used Sets 6 or 7. Using Set 6 in conjunction with ALG 3 Double Swap resulted in the worst performance with an average pass rate of 86% and only 3 *P-values* that had a

Table 16: Statistical analysis results of implementations of S-AES using each S-box from Set 5.

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.074	100%	0	100%	0.378	100%	0.534	100%
Block Frequency	0.001	100%	0	100%	0.602	100%	0	96.66%
Sums 1	0.001	100%	0	100%	0.233	100%	0.672	100%
Sums 2	0.018	100%	0	100%	0.637	100%	0.637	100%
Runs	0.039	100%	0.534	100%	0.672	100%	0.233	100%
Longest Run	0.501	100%	0.672	100%	0.233	100%	0.254	100%
Rank	0.407	98.33%	0.862	96.66%	0.706	100%	0.672	98.33%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	21.66%	0	30.0%	0	8.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	99.15%	0.333	99.03%	0.314	99.14%	0.305	98.86%
Overlapping	0.74	98.33%	0.95	98.33%	0.932	100%	0.911	98.33%
Universal	0.53	—	0.3	—	0.338	—	0.898	—
Entropy	0.025	100%	0.001	100%	0.035	100%	0.501	100%
Excursions	0.361	100%	0.016	97.36%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	0.293	100%	0.009	99.7%	—	100%	—	100%
Serial 1	0.862	96.66%	0.213	100%	0.469	100%	0	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.195	100%	0.407	100%	0.862	100%
Linear Complexity	0.911	98.33%	0.991	98.33%	0.672	100%	0.602	98.33%
Average Pass Rate	94.21%		94.44%		95.57%		93.67%	
100% Pass Rate	10		9		14		10	

100% pass rate. In contrast, using Set 6 in conjunction with ALG 2 resulted in the best performance. These results had an average pass rate of 99%, with 11 *P-values* that had a 100% pass rate.

11.1.1 Analysis of S-Box 3 of Set 5

When the NIST statistical test suite was ran on implementations of S-AES that used S-boxes from Sets 5 through 7, there was a massive outlier when S-box 3 of Set 5 was tested. The results of this test are depicted in Table 21. This test produced 14 *P-values* that had a 100% pass rate. This was the highest number of *P-values* out of the 49 different algorithms tested. It also had an average *P-value* of 0.442, which is the 4th highest average *P-value*.

This could be due to a poor choice of parameters, or it could be due to an anomaly from the inputs fed into the algorithm. However, if it is not, this would imply that the S-box D14A58BF792C630E was the most classically secure 4x4 S-box tested. This is even though this S-box only required 27 gates to create its quantum oracle. The ANF of this S-box is listed below, and Figure 14 depicts what its quantum oracle would look like.

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\
 y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
 y_2 &= x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \\
 y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1
 \end{aligned}$$

Table 17: Statistical analysis results of implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap using Set 5

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.254	100%	0.009	91.66%	0.706	100%
Block Frequency	0.568	100%	0	91.66%	0.031	100%
Sums 1	0.299	100%	0	90.0%	0.437	100%
Sums 2	0.01	100%	0	86.66%	0.299	100%
Runs	0.011	100%	0.122	95.0%	0.834	98.33%
Longest Run	0.035	100%	0.254	95.0%	0.195	98.33%
Rank	0.74	98.33%	0	28.33%	0	73.33%
FFT	0.009	90.0%	0	0.0%	0	45.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.94%	0.462	98.59%	0.462	98.91%
Overlapping	0.602	96.66%	0.672	100%	0.534	98.33%
Universal	0.79	—	0.021	—	0.956	—
Entropy	0.011	100%	0.834	100%	0.888	100%
Excursions	—	94.64%	—	98.42%	—	97.91%
Excursion Variants	—	98.41%	—	100%	—	99.07%
Serial 1	0.082	100%	0.407	96.66%	0.888	100%
Serial 2	0.74	100%	0.568	100%	0.602	100%
Linear Complexity	0.163	96.66%	0.568	98.33%	0.74	100%
Average Pass Rate	98.35%		85.64%		94.32%	
100% Pass Rate	9		4		8	

Table 18: SAC test results of Sets 5 through 7


	ALG 2	Set 5					
		Double Swap	Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)
Average	49.78%	49.86%	49.88%	50.19%	49.87%	49.94%	49.55%
	ALG 2	Set 6					
		Double Swap	Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)
Average	49.48%	50.06%	50.12%	50.07%	49.48%	50.36%	50.10%
	ALG 2	Set 7					
		Double Swap	Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)
Average	49.49%	49.48%	49.95%	49.83%	49.12%	50.26%	50.04%

11.2 Analysis of SAC Tests

While each bit had an average chance of changing that is close to 50% when using Sets 5 through 7, each individual bit did not have a near 50% chance of changing. This is best shown in Figure 15. When using S-AES with S-box 2 of Set 7, bits b_7 and b_{11} only had a 44.76% and 44.93% chance of changing respectively. This is the lowest probability that a single bit had of changing across all the tests performed on implementations of S-AES with different S-boxes. When using ALG 2 with Set 6, bit b_5 only has a 46.61% chance

Table 19: Statistical analysis results of ALG 2 and ALG 3 implementations using Set 5

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.254	100%	0.009	91.66%	0.706	100%
Block Frequency	0.568	100%	0	91.66%	0.031	100%
Sums 1	0.299	100%	0	90.0%	0.437	100%
Sums 2	0.01	100%	0	86.66%	0.299	100%
Runs	0.011	100%	0.122	95.0%	0.834	98.33%
Longest Run	0.035	100%	0.254	95.0%	0.195	98.33%
Rank	0.74	98.33%	0	28.33%	0	73.33%
FFT	0.009	90.0%	0	0.0%	0	45.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.94%	0.462	98.59%	0.462	98.91%
Overlapping	0.602	96.66%	0.672	100%	0.534	98.33%
Universal	0.79	—	0.021	—	0.956	—
Entropy	0.011	100%	0.834	100%	0.888	100%
Excursions	—	94.64%	—	98.42%	—	97.91%
Excursion Variants	—	98.41%	—	100%	—	99.07%
Serial 1	0.082	100%	0.407	96.66%	0.888	100%
Serial 2	0.74	100%	0.568	100%	0.602	100%
Linear Complexity	0.163	96.66%	0.568	98.33%	0.74	100%
Average Pass Rate	98.35%		85.64%		94.32%	
100% Pass Rate	9		4		8	

**Figure 14:** Quantum oracle of the ANF of S-box 3 of Set 5

of changing. This is the lowest probability that a single bit had of changing throughout all the tests performed on ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap. The individual bits that had the highest chance of changing are not of concern, as across all 49 different algorithms analyzed the highest chance any single bit had of changing was only 51.28% (specifically bit b_1 of ALG 2 when using Set 7).

S-box 2 of Set 7 performed the worst in this test, which is not surprising as it was a randomly generated S-box. Furthermore, this S-box had the lowest quantum cost out of all 28 4x4 S-boxes analyzed, with it only needing 20 quantum gates for a quantum circuit of its ANF.

Table 20: The best and worst performing algorithms across Sets 5 through 7, both of which are from Set 6

	ALG 2		Double Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.054	100%	0.378	96.66%
Block Frequency	0.672	100%	0	100%
Sums 1	0.031	100%	0.437	95.00%
Sums 2	0.007	96.66%	0.135	95.00%
Runs	0.706	100%	0.005	93.33%
Longest Run	0.049	98.33%	0.672	98.33%
Rank	0.082	100%	0	25.00%
FFT	0.122	100%	0	0.00%
Non-Overlapping	0.271	99.21%	0.522	98.79%
Overlapping	0.054	100%	0.637	100%
Universal	0.213	—	0.076	—
Entropy	0	96.66%	0.091	98.33%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	93.05%
Serial 1	0.074	100%	0.568	95.00%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.932	96.66%
Linear Complexity	0.276	98.33%	0.932	98.33%
Average Pass Rate	99.0%		86.0%	
100% Pass Rate	11		3	




Figure 15: SAC test results of S-AES using S-box 2 of Set 7 and ALG 2 using Set 6

12 Overall Observations and the Correlation Between Quantum and Classical Security

Table 22 lists the range of average pass rates amongst the different implementations of S-AES, ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap. Based on these results, it is clear that ALG 2 performed better than any of the other algorithms tested.

The most quantum secure 4x4 S-box found (S-box 3 of Set 1, or 946C753AE8FBD012) only had an average pass rate of 94%. The 4x4 S-box that produced the highest average pass rate, S-box 4 of Set 4, or 18BDA673CF49205E, was also the 4x4 S-box that had the

Table 21: Statistical analysis results of an implementation of S-AES using S-box 3 of Set 5 (D14A58BF792C630E)

	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.378	100%
Block Frequency	0.602	100%
Sums 1	0.233	100%
Sums 2	0.637	100%
Runs	0.672	100%
Longest Run	0.233	100%
Rank	0.706	100%
FFT	0	30.00%
Non-Overlapping	0.314	99.14%
Overlapping	0.932	100%
Universal	0.338	—
Entropy	0.035	100%
Excursions	—	100%
Excursion Variants	—	100%
Serial 1	0.469	100%
Serial 2	0.407	100%
Linear Complexity	0.672	100%
Average Pass Rate	96.0%	
100% Pass Rate	14	

highest FFT pass rate of 80%. This is abnormally high, as the average FFT pass rate of S-AES was only 25.35%. S-box 3 of Set 5, or D14A58BF792C630E, had the highest number of *P-values* with a 100% pass rate. As such, these two 4x4 S-boxes were some of the most secure 4x4 S-boxes analyzed. This is even though they only required 27 to 31 gates to model their ANF. The 4x4 S-box that required the most quantum gates to model its ANF, S-box 3 of Set 1 (or 946C753AE8FBD012) only had an average pass rate of 94%.

Table 22: Range of average pass rates for each implementation of each algorithm tested

Algorithm	Range of Average Pass Rates
S-AES	93 – 97%
ALG 2	98 – 99%
ALG 3 Single Swap	94 – 97%
ALG 3 Double Swap	86 – 89%

The most quantum secure 16x4 S-box, or Set 5, had one of the worst performances when ran through the NIST statistical test suite when implemented in ALG 2. It was the only 16x4 S-box that had an average pass rate of 98%, as all the other 16x4 S-boxes had an average pass rate of 99% when implemented in ALG 2. Furthermore, Set 5 produced the worst results when implemented in ALG 3 Single Swap, but one of the best results when implemented in ALG 3 Double Swap.

This implies a lack of correlation between quantum security and classical security, i.e., better quantum security does not necessarily equate to better classical security. This is further supported by what happened to the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) algorithm. This was an algorithm that was believed to be quantum secure but was

cracked in about an hour using a nine-year-old Intel Xeon process [11].

13 Analysis of n -Length S-Boxes

13.1 Analysis of $2^n \times 4$ S-Boxes

To see how increasing the number of 4x4 S-boxes used to construct variably assigned S-boxes impacts the quantum security of an algorithm, S-boxes with the dimensions $2^n \times 4$ were tested to see how increasing n impacted the quantum security of said S-box. Doing so enabled the analysis of S-boxes with dimensions ranging from 4x4 ($n = 2$) to 1024x4 ($n = 10$). Each S-box required $n - 2$ bits to determine which 4x4 S-box to use. Figure 16 depicts the average number of gates needed to model each $2^n \times 4$ S-box and Figure 17 depicts the number of 4x4 S-boxes are needed to construct each $2^n \times 4$ S-box.




Figure 16: Number of gates needed to model the ANF of a $2^n \times 4$ S-box




Figure 17: Number of 4x4 S-boxes required for a $2^n \times 4$ S-box

As n increased, both the number of S-boxes and the number of gates required increased at an exponential rate, while the number of additional bits needed increased at a linear rate. The average number of necessary gates increased at a rate of approximately 2^{n+3} , while the number of necessary S-boxes increased at a rate of 2^{n-2} .

A regular 4x4 S-box maps a single input to one of 16 (N) values. As such, a classical device will need to perform an average of 8, or $N/2$, searches each time it runs something through an S-box during the encryption or decryption process. The value of N in a variably assigned S-box is equal to 2^{n+2} . Therefore, the average number of searches a classical device will need to make when performing said S-box will be 2^{n+1} .

13.2 Analysis of $2^n \times 8$ S-Boxes

AES uses an 8x8 S-box. As such, this test was repeated on $2^n \times 8$ S-boxes. This was performed on 3 randomly generated S-boxes. The results of doing so are depicted in Figure 18. Due to computational costs, only 3 different values of n could be analyzed. Similar to $2^n \times 4$ S-boxes, the number of gates required to model the ANF of an $2^n \times 8$ S-box also increased at an exponential rate. This rate of increase was approximately equal to 2^{n+7} .




Figure 18: Number of gates needed to model the ANF of $2^n \times 8$ S-boxes

13.2.1 AES S-Box Implications

The ANF of AES' S-box is depicted in Appendix F, and the necessary gates required to model said S-box's ANF in a quantum environment is depicted in Table 23. Based on this, the S-box that AES uses requires slightly less than 1024 gates, which is the expected average number of gates necessary to model an 8x8 S-box. This implies that there is a more quantum secure 8x8 S-box that AES could use.

14 Conclusion

Throughout this paper, an alteration to S-AES was tested that provided better classical and better quantum security. This algorithm, ALG 2, used a 16x4 S-box instead of a 4x4 S-box, using bits in the key to determine which S-box to use. While ALG 2 provided better classical and quantum security, quantum security does not necessarily result in classical security. This was demonstrated by how the most quantum secure 4x4 S-box (946C753AE8FBD012), as well as the most quantum secure 16x4 S-boxes tended to result in comparatively poor performances when analyzed with the NIST statistical test suite. The

Table 23: MCX gates needed to model the ANF of AES' S-box

MCX Controls	Amount
0	4
1	35
2	97
3	245
4	268
5	236
6	107
7	25
Total Gates	1017

two S-boxes that displayed the best classical security were the S-boxes 18BDA673CF49205E and D14A58BF792C630E. These S-boxes required 31 and 27 gates respectively to model their ANF in a quantum environment. Both values are less than the expected average of 32 gates needed to model a 4x4 S-box.

When trying to optimize the quantum security of an S-box, it is important to select the S-box whose ANF requires the most XOR operations. Doing so will maximize the cost necessary to run Grover's algorithm on said S-box. This suggests that an S-box that uses the prime polynomial $x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ (specifically the S-box 946C753AE8FBD012) is more quantum secure than the prime polynomial that S-AES currently uses ($x^4 + x + 1$). This is because an ANF implementation of said S-box requires 41 quantum gates, whereas an ANF implementation of the S-box that S-AES uses only requires 35 quantum gates. While this is only a minor increase in security, it could be very beneficial in protecting ephemeral data with a short lifespan. This is especially true of lightweight cryptography, wherein security is compromised to allow devices with limited resources to provide partial protection to data [2].

It was also demonstrated that the number of gates needed to model the ANF of variably assigned S-boxes increases at an exponential rate, as does the number of searches that need to be performed during the encryption and decryption process. Specifically, the rate of increase in the number of required quantum gates to model a $2^n \times 4$ S-box increases at a rate approximately equal to 2^{n+3} while the number of required quantum gates to model a $2^n \times 8$ S-box increases at a rate approximately equal to 2^{n+7} . This implies that AES could use a more quantum secure S-box, as the S-box that it currently uses only requires 1017 gates to model instead of the expected 1024 gates. However, the methods used to construct the quantum circuits for the S-boxes analyzed throughout this paper could be greatly improved. Tools such as LIGHTER-R can generate quantum circuits of S-boxes that do not require additional qubits and use fewer gates. It does this by generating a reversible ANF [6]. As such, this expected rate of growth in quantum cost could probably be significantly reduced.

When designing these larger S-boxes, it is important to analyze the ANF of the S-box as a whole instead of the ANF of each individual 4x4 S-box composing said larger S-box. Furthermore, reducing the collisions between an S-box and the plaintext or amongst the other S-boxes in a 16x4 S-box does not increase the quantum security of said S-box. The most quantum secure 16x4 S-box was found to be the randomly generated S-box CB91D538E7A20F64A217C6534D8EBF09D14A58BF792C630E58B214C790E6DFA3, requiring a total of 150 quantum gates to model. Since 16x4 S-boxes have an n value of 4, they are expected to require an average of 128 quantum gates to model in a quantum environment. As such, this randomly generated 16x4 S-box is in the upper bounds of the

possible 16x4 S-boxes. Despite this, there could be an even more secure 16x4 S-box, as this S-box was found from a small sample size of only 800 randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes.

15 Further Work

15.1 Improved Quantum Circuit Construction

While the ANF of an S-box was used to generate their respective quantum circuit, there are alternative and more efficient methods of doing so. Tools such as LIGHTER use a graph-based meet-in-the-middle approach to calculate the smallest implementation needed to implement an S-box. It then computes good implementations of the smaller functions to reduce the time and memory requirements of said implementation [7]. This approach has been built on through LIGHTER-R, which uses this approach to generate reversible ANF representations that do not need extra qubits and require fewer gates [6]. The S-boxes assessed throughout this paper should be analyzed to see if the strengths and weaknesses discovered still hold true when using this alternate approach. This alternate approach should also be analyzed to see how it impacts the rate of growth of the number of required gates needed to model $2^n \times 4$ and $2^n \times 8$ S-boxes in a quantum environment.

15.2 Improved & Alternate ALG 2 Implementations

It might be possible to further increase the quantum security of ALG 2 by using the 16x4 S-box in the key expansion algorithm. Alternatively, instead of just using the first 4x4 S-box in ALG 2's 16x4 S-box, one could use the most expensive 4x4 S-box that composes said S-box. Doing so should increase its quantum security without increasing the cost associated with performing encryption and decryption. Finally, an implementation of ALG 2 on AES should be tested. Since S-AES and AES share the same structure, this should require minimal alterations to ALG 2.

15.3 Analysis of Algorithms in a Quantum Environment

The full S-AES, ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap algorithms could not be implemented in a quantum environment due to computational and time constraints. Further analysis of the ALG 3 implementations is probably unnecessary as ALG 2 outperformed said algorithm and ALG 3 provided lackluster classical security. However, analyzing S-AES and ALG 2 in a quantum environment still holds merit and should be further investigated.

A ANF of Each Set and Their Corresponding 4x4 S-Boxes

Algebraic Normal Form of 4x4 S-Boxes

Set 1 S-Box 1 (94ABD1856203CEF7)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \end{aligned}$$

Set 1 S-Box 2 (940756EBFD1C2A83)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3 \end{aligned}$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1$$

Set 1 S-Box 3 (946C753AE8FBD012)

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1$$

Set 1 S-Box 4 (9E518BDA67F3C402)

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

Set 2 S-Box 1 (94ABD1856203CEF7)

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

Set 2 S-Box 2 (940756EBFD1C2A83)

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1$$

Set 2 S-Box 3 (946C753AE8FBD012)

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1$$

Set 2 S-Box 4 (9E518BDA67F3C402)

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

Set 3 S-Box 1 (94ABD1856203ECF7)

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

Set 3 S-Box 2 (940756EBFD1C2A83)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

Set 3 S-Box 3 (946C735AE8FDB012)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

Set 3 S-Box 4 (9E518BDA67F34C02)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

Set 4 S-Box 1 (94ABD1856203ECF7)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

Set 4 S-Box 2 (40756EBFD1C2A839)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_3
\end{aligned}$$

Set 4 S-Box 3 (6C573AE8FBD01294)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3
\end{aligned}$$

Set 4 S-Box 4 (18BDA673CF49205E)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3
\end{aligned}$$

Set 5 S-Box 1 (CB91D538E7A20F64)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

Set 5 S-Box 2 (A217C6534D8EBF09)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \end{aligned}$$

Set 5 S-Box 3 (D14A58BF792C630E)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_2 &= x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \end{aligned}$$

Set 5 S-Box 4 (58B214C790E6DFA3)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \end{aligned}$$

Set 6 S-Box 1 (70812A3B496DCEF5)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \end{aligned}$$

Set 6 S-Box 2 (89C62357BA4ED01F)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1 \end{aligned}$$

Set 6 S-Box 3 (841CEAB73265DF09)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \end{aligned}$$

Set 6 S-Box 4 (0386F4127B95ECAD)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \end{aligned}$$

Set 7 S-Box 1 (6A543D18EC27F09B)

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus 1 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3 \end{aligned}$$

Set 7 S-Box 2 (9ADC7F3E502816B4)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

Set 7 S-Box 3 (FC1BE0568A423D79)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

Set 7 S-Box 4 (309C7BA2D8F4E651)

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3
\end{aligned}$$

Algebraic Normal Form of 16x4 S-Boxes**Set 1**

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus \\
& x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

Set 2

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus \\
& x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3
\end{aligned}$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

Set 3

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

Set 4

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_5$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5 \oplus 1$$

Set 5

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus 1$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5$$

740815B9F6DCE23A	130	456EDC9B3A07182F	114	EF0CA7821694BD53	134	C35A41D2670EF98B	131
F46A2B5EC1D83970 B8321C4EFD9765A0 75B9306FA2D81E4C 06B47382129FD5ECA	130	D7C3E90BF518642A 12CF348590E7AB6D 93FC2D156B087A42E 12C9EB83FAD56470	120	36A80D2BE4F1597C 0A2CD651E8BF9473 F198C246D3075ABE 4C8135DBA26E70F9	126	93FA81DC0E256B74 BA3F476C95D20E81 8C324D07B96A15FE E0B274F95132AC48	117
F73821BD95CA046E CAEB3F906528D147 CBF26D31E795408A 9E04AC752B3F68D1	121	78AB0CFE514D6293 0814AE739F2CB5D6 10A2D3C5FB6948E7 C568EF3B91A047D2	137	30D1E2768ABC94F5 35248FA7EC09B1D6 B69C8E72A45FD031 C321B0E67AF5D489	118	4DF8C125A0EB9673 C6D1A39B28754F0E 04FC351D289EBA67 9CD063A5B4F27E18	123
698B1A30DF5E24C7 456BC1DE78029F3A B97485DC60EF231A C36B140DA895FE72	121	57B1A3CFE68D9402 F735A602CE14B8D9 2908A34D57BFE6C1 F4B172C889503EDA	118	F6E6D7910A8B43C52 E496CD518B32F70A A809ED621FBC3745 D1A259E847063CBF	124	6CE09F143BD78A25 AB78DC5F6914203E 97F65D81342BA0CE F01389D5A242BCE67	115
3C52904B1A7DF6E8 1CEA9DF4208753B 9FC1764EBD0A3825 582D47EC16B30AF9	110	B6485F09C12E3DA7 F2EA9D506BC78341 95067BAC3E148F2D CA69DFB3E8542017	115	6A34BE821C95F07D 2E4063B8F795A1CD 6C75DEF180293BA4 F9BE46715238ACD0	112	257F6ED4BC83A910 D386EA1C20957BF4 F9748B1DCA3E5620 C8930AF4D752B1E6	132
2BA3FDC16E708945 E93B865FD44A1C70 D1B78396054EFC82 3E96AFC871452D0B	123	AB415F0793CED862 2A9ECF70DB814356 F359EA84670C12DB F5320A17E94B8DC6	124	2CAFED0763189B45 A297F1B06E3C854D C13680F574EBA9D2 0A78E465C1D3F29B	129	CD7B2EA566F039418 30F76D5C4A2E189B B5C9F8D176023E4A EAC836742FB915D0	140
C573BF60A5E49D21 6CB9A28D0415E37F 2AE93DB85471F0C6 BA58074DF6C129E3	126	0F1725B43CDA698E 749B8FCE6A215D30 2E1C40B3ADF67859 5A1F89B42C60DE37	111	D8C15FB036274E9A 27EB3DC91645A08F 1D57389C06FB2E4A 20FE1CB44D938756	118	754A82BF93C06DE1 3C0F54DEB69A1872 ADF657280391BC4E 34F7E89B5F0C6D2A1	109
B1C28AD03F96E457 03BC24671EFD9A58 6B1E0328D759A4CF E19B3D0F45A7C286	126	906DF45231CE8B7A A4703195826BFEDC 1D06AF7359C4EB82 C83295B704DFAE16	130	4901FB635C2A8DE7 3098EC1246BDF7A5 7C26D15F8E94A0B3 56F914EAB73C820D	121	4CAB85160FED7392 371B65D08CA2E9F4 D94675F1EB0AC382 EA30F42C8967BD51	123
28DB741A936CFE05 5723A1DDBE06CF498 E8A294FDCB176350 0C6ED79F1B34A528	117	5FBC9761A280D4E3 420E7AF5986BD3C1 B31D45AF9E08C726 342018DF975ACE6B	117	0CFA3E9B2857641D 3F67EA5C8194D0B2 98F56C710EAD243B 97D8C06BF4E123A5	114	74E69DA530CB28F1 7DA059623C4E18FB C6E0FB94D73A2851 39FCB701485DE6A2	121
DB5148E69A0273FC 80C1BEA256F374D9 B49A607512FDCE83 7510C3AE498FB0D2	125	3BFA8149C6E07D52 7BDC6FEA81302945 BC52081467E3ADF9 93B5170EA48D6FC2	111	46B0F13D7E89A2C5 B4FA0351D9E86C72 910F754D8ACB62E3 40695372B1D8EAFC	118	CD13590A72684BEF 4BDEC9126A3F5708 68052C3D19B7FEA4 02DCAF1546E93B78	133
2F5A196BDDCE70384 6315A89F274DC0BE 20AC8B156E3DF947 E5724A80691BDF3C	120	3ABED05891274C6F 795E86ADC204B1F3 F7689E41235CB0AD FA8B72C03D49615E	105	2E7613B48C09AFD5 CE2F680A7934D5B1 F132D94CB68E70A5 DE629AC87B3045F1	119	94EB53D0C68A172F E832A47B0C96F15D 85FCBE7A692014D3 1543C7AFB2089E6D	129
F3750AD91E2B6C84 B03CFD6A74E89215 2974A5B3C18FD00E6 DAB19F07352C46E8	129	0D82FA1B67E5394C 32C80A7EB496D51F 83BD2A670E4F51C9 8B729D651AEC40F3	136	7C1980FD43265AEB EB02D9814A3F75C6 D5C6B0138927AFE4 8C40F165739BDA2E	119	A067DE284953CF1B B0A9D1C7E43528F6 B402D8617E5ACF39 4CD2890B17F3A56E	129
D5E9648071BC2F3A 82B76DA0E593CF14 1BE40F9C2A76385D 71E9FB52D304C86A	134	17D0FE5689AB42C3 B738A19E5D0CAF26 DA047F6B3921EC58 FC7B2054631ED9A8	109	4EDA6892C035F7B1 0B1859F4CD32AE67 9A6D483527FBE0C1 AE72D8B60C451F93	114	96E75DA80FB23C14 97FBEOC582D6483A1 DA60C512824B9E7F3 D30425B1679ECA8F	122
E93587A4D20CF6B1 0BAF1E62D84973C5 C297B08FE365D1A4 C34A718E695DB02F	124	976CD5EA38F04B12 962840BA1DDEC3F75 D59F2781E6CB4A30 EF4C3A056812D7B9	120	C514068AD3BF9E72 E05A6D6479FC8123 91CB5EDF2A603478 54E0DCA2691BF837	115	2915CD68FA47BE30 5B9C781E63A420DF FE46A1C57BD83092 65F0B3E1782CD94A	130
713D9F04A8E62BC5 4D0E8F6537A921BC 329EC15DB68704AF CEA47B3D829F5601	121	4C6FD18B597302AE 397B4DFC561208EA 4261A503E8F79DCD 1405FA23D98CB7E6	120	89C24310F7A6BD5E AEC035641FBD7928 1A39756BC4ED08F2 7CA6FEBD12439850	116	EC3B40ADF1287965 CE4B8F57962AD103 C39B74A86012FD5E B6AE9FC9138745D02	123
7039B8FA4E65D2C1 11240EC73856A9DB CE42DA81397F065B BD972E4F0513A86C	128	D64ECA235FB18097 1E6058943AB7DFC2 A3FBED1045296C87 5FC20E8BA6137D49	122	2B9045761F8A3EDC C17069D5B8FE23A4 541830D9AE67CF2B 2FCBD135A7E96840	112	7D8CA2920CB5149F F24B746380F5DE91 2A03B9CE8E6175A 714B59EF8A6C30D2	117
48E561D39CFA270B CB0E75D1463F28A9 F60C82D351BA74E9 FED43890A276B1C5	126	7FD21498EC0BA563 53C61290ADF64E87 B9023F457AC86E1D BED547921AC8063F	112	2A839E5D7140C6BF 9F085D1C37EA4B26 6054C2173EBDA9F8 046FCDBA5E713829	122	9C4DB68F0537EA21 E7D430892B61AFC5 40CD76EAF2391AB85 20B5FCA4F3D468971	127
D9364A81BCE52F70 4F1B6AD3C8E20759 856D1BA03C7429EF DA5E6B18F24079C3	120	3F1E5B4D70CA9286 AC14F52D067E38B9 C348B76A2D91EF50 34D96B5A107F2EC8	113	A21063FB4D857CE9 048A96CBED21F573 B3C219DAF7E54068 F7E862503C1DB49A	130	6EBCF0A4385179D2 E21083759C4B6DFA 047BCFE528961DA3 3201B467F9AEDC58	123
65DA032B87C1F9E4 3187AB4F965C0E2D B15F827C30DAE496 2A596147EDF838C0	114	D3C4758FB9210EA6 DC8670A4B9E123F5 BAEFDD029481653C7 08DFB96214357CEA	120	F1C532D4A86907BE 429B5A3DF60178CE 64ECD89B7A5F3021 90741EAB3C56DF82	143	73A6B415C8FD20E9 26731D9B5CA840FE C5560FBA47A2189E3 AD5FB8C407213E69	112
163F0CD542BA78E9 D98F5B74A1E20C36 9E52AF0186CD34B7 BF6E87921D0A543C	114	96C28EA07BFD1453 650A8731FBE94CD2 8A46E320B75D9CF1 2FD9B1E5874A036C	130	91F72805CB4DE3A6 0782EF195A6D34CB A729C8ED0F561B43 0DBA9CE54132687F	134	6B5DFAC12E983704 693B0C78EF254A1D 5B2F9AD9E0C637814 C0D46E9B21F358A7	103
4B607298DAF3E5C1 63AFCB5D2108E794 145E736C9D8FA20B D9A28E1F460C357B	121	41E3DAFCB5927086 5C6ED17F23A4B088 6E154B390A287DCF AD527B06913C8F4F	117	9A30DE48612FBC57 91A4675D0CF32E8E D6C57E40A29B318F 7C3206189ABAD4F5E	107	DE0561972B8C34FA B870F5469A3DC2E1 4539CDAB827106FE EC7862B135A4F9D0	128
268971AFC35E4B0D 849EF125BD8A63C07 FDAC7054BE392681 64D13AE05278FB9C	122	AC0FB7E653498D12 75862409D1ACB3FE E6BDC7F942815A03 839E5BCFA62D1740	134	8AFE3D7419B0C52 92C3B76AFE10584D 624FA987D50BC1E3 C17A64B90D8E5F32	119	2BAE734C8FD96105 FCC2960BBA781354 8BF276DC4A3E1905 6B508CEF213D479A	132
6E190F482C3DAB57		17C460AD58E3BF29		BA7F842CD39601E5		053FDB2417E9C68A	

85406FAEDB2C3197	123	65D3AE2C7498BF10	126	E42CD19B5837A6F0	126	15DAC038742EFB96	120
E10C4D2AF569B387 7CF9A103254BE86D 267A1905EFBD438C D82453A17E09C6BF	130	B7EA1863942D5CF0 FE1465DC79B8A320 E6B0A51839DFC247 217EC56BAF3894D2	116	A19863FC57ED402B D2A3481B605F7EC9 F1B75DEAC4893026 29C8D1F47306EAB5	116	4305AFD8E16CB927 C04B72FED6A18539 8021C6D83B9FE457 D9A1CF8E4B207563	120
A9D0B41C6F7E3852 A1260EF984C75B3D A51396F4BCED7802 D26AE37058CBF419	132	25A370416EC8FDB9 504B8E3F19AD76C2 8B70C1AFE362459D AB5CDE64019328F7	109	0582AB3D76FEC914 1A38C627FB509E4D 51A0B39DE8F627C4 DOE47326B19CF5A8	119	C17FA90EB6D32548 A5C8061372EDB49F 69DBC2FE7154830A F2D18AE37560B49C	120
90EC7D2F138645AB FCB92E18574D6A30 7129FA0C3856B4D 6ED1A8B720954C3F	126	94CE175D3FA8260B 5F89B13C6D0742EA 7B3FD825CA460E19 28D53E71A04BC9F6	116	C3D1869B4AE250F7 139FC8EBA26057D4 FC1957AE8460DB32 4AC01B68E2F73D59	122	41AC79B23865F0DE 39B4F805E1827DEA0 BE1F48902D67C35A 12C39F765AEB8D04	129
D9A150F42863ECB7 3B01C87529EAD46F 3F29E5DB84A6071C C214DA0E35867FB9	126	610CA872BF53D94E B71853D9F62AC4E0 13E89A0DFB576C24 2147E9F35CABD608	135	0FBEB198C634A5D72 7BA2EC140F85D369 D34B8561F0EC79A2 C8BF6904D1A3E527	113	64E07F3DBC2A5918 8241CBD5E3F097A6 297AC065F1B38E4D 51479DE2BC0D683F	116
6D19CF8E473502AB 4CB1D3502EF87A69 5A1ED8F63C497B02 F7DE8CB10452639A	106	0F9B2D8E735C164A F4C361BAE2709D58 5C12B73F864AE09D 39FAEB6548C2D701	129	CE7A6D4325890BF1 7590ED4A86F2C3B1 913FCB560A8E27D4 8B1DE706952CFA43	118	15FDECA4B6892A370 DFA4E3769815B20C 83105A896F2DE74C D5B069C78E2314FA	126
981F4B6C72A0D53E 7FBC589ED34120A6 BAE4F8156D9073C2 A739D0EC41F6825B	117	EB32D90C1A84657F 50E8F4D91C67BA23 A5674C02F931EB8D C136B2FE07459D8A	112	0D35F497B621C8AE E1AB87562CF340D9 2E0ACB165FD78349 EB5D6A12FC478093	120	74BEA60D25C839F1 98027F6DC1A45BE3 2A04C69BE17F853D 806C9D51E4A2B7F3	122
B79FD0382C1EA465 02DB695EFA4731C8 ED4BF25139860AC7 7CB5D6F931A042E8	125	15FA2B9EC047D836 692F83DA01B57C4E B1C9308F247AE56D 6E5714089C3ABD2F	118	320FD961E58A7BC4 5D94F382C176AB0E B67D03C28A5F41E9 DC3681B5AE74029F	124	7C53910B482EAD6F F8BA1E6D253479C0 F7380EDA49C21B56 3108769F4AEDC25B	117
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AF14EC3D7082B596 1AE435BF6D29C087 3174F6E90ABD528C 64705132C98BAEFD	117	8FA9D37E12CB5046 DB368A0471FCE295 7DE9F1634A208C5B 734FE5A21BC968D0	120	E8712A6F3D95C4B0 C42A9E530B8D6F71 D9F274A05B13CE68 39D6B1FE8A254C07	109	7F59461BE2830DCA 1C09A83ED7BF6542 628D71EC4A95F3B0 AED9F01C8472356B	113
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C0F195EB7A36482D 5794A2E1D8F860C3 945DFE6CA0B31278 8AF742E650A91C3B	111	6A1749D8308FC5E2 E0FCB7568A239D41 C9AE713062F854BD 05FB3D16E74A89C2	137	2A96CF3081DBE475 C2F387051ADB469E 632C19FD08E75B4A D3C9F642B80E5A17	123	BEAF07D85C419362 1653B89AEC407F2D AF27E1698D0C53B4 2A163D0F87BCE549	110
9B2658CD0314EF7A 7CB26D1AF0E53894 62D380EFC1A79B54 25CE1A7BD603F849	122	654E07829CB1D3FA C950B78FD164A3E2 2109B6E58F4A7C3D 2F41789B3560ECD4	124	C372D9B5E01F84A6 B401276F8D3C5E9A FCB546E9031A27D8 76FC2AD345B891E0	120	7208AD1F9ECB6354 C894256A137EDBF0 EFT71BC2AD5904368 0CDB782319A5E5F46	126
AB419F2ED6C58307 7F50D16E2B948CA3 2A059B437EDC8F16 B1359A04FCE86D72	121	7956102D8CFCBA4E3 F4BC159AD32687E0 8FB5619E7A0C423D A7E3F021D58B9C64	125	DC9BFE7482A63510 50DF9A82E1C6743B A25B8EC3F49701D6 2F7E5B9306CA48D1	115	005C9861DEFAB2437 B4A6EFC2D9831705 C7E1D46A2F0859B3 E9D5A14C607F2B38	111
26A4D09F7E51B3C8 18BAE426F0573DC9 2F80D19B56CAE734 752146CB93A8F0DE	113	64C5EB208D17A93F 9F8BEA6C7132D405 6E4809A7DFB3251C C3715208F9AD4B6E	125	2A58039BC14FD67E DBC5E096187A43F2 8FB91A052F3D764C 4819B72EA60C5D3F	126	60FC9AB5731E284D 3E92FCA7B5614D80 8E0BF7936C4A251D BA32CE645FD17098	125
FE16A958C4207D3B D2E0C518A3496F7 590FACB1E4863D72 18FCBD4E976520A3	126	F6572A8EC49D3B10 50AB43E82F6D7C91 364FCE278D190B5A 81E2AC9543D6BF70	110	C391B840F56ED72A FD29BC173EA56480 8946E523DC01F7EA D23869CA5B71FE40	126	A538E40C17B96F2D 1FACD29637580E4B CF19D4253E7680BA AC109B7E8D56324F	120
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9DA42F831E06B7C5 95462C73EB1A80FD 86514AB903ED2C7F 9A27DB84EF1063C5	116	E09FBA128647D5C3 8F40CDBE2576139A D2F8A6B1E73C0549 32A7684F50B1DECF	114	1AC0F9678D4BE523 3F91A84E2C6D57B0 3687E90DA1C45F2B EC37480A592BFD61	109	B5A8D276E3901CF4 9DA13C07EF25B468 CB4712A9FD865E30 A84761F35B20D9CE	117
94650E2C137ABFD8 8A41B720D5ECF396 79F342056DA81ECB B8A2103FE7965D4C	132	F750A28413BEC96D 293B54C6FD0A18E7 0A17F69C3ED85B42 CF8AB9160435D72E	117	AB5410E3F72DC689 20678E931DAFB45C D024F58AB73C6E19 6D81EC023FB479A5	120	9CD4B21A53E0F687 B3E6F2C0A871549D 48DE2F710C9563AB DE413F86BA7C9502	133
DB3FE76C2859A104 4701AE5FC63D28B9 ADF2E64B031C5897 DF95BE12087C43A6	122	C0E12B9AD378456F 28D6C9405B173EFA A8C76DB293E4F150 5EFCB0642A97813D	119	A4F20D593EC167B8 0C1FA2485D73EB69 5F287ED6A93BC041 290768BA5EDC34F1	115	CBEA826540391F7D 0DC53827A6E9FB41 CF45392B86E1AD70 49ACEF0315D672B8	121
7EC08F9A54263D1B 8F563C1AEB0274D9 BA0CE16827F4953D 895CDA0461FB23E7	119	9042DCA65F3B7E81 7EDF2516CA3409B8 F76BD98AC341E520 F165AE47C938DB02	123	C7D6A4823B01F59E 93CF586D20BEA471 1E2C93854F6BAD07 453F7B91AE280CD6	112	64BD80AC517F293E 264E5F1DC8A3B097 1BFBA658D2903C47 62BA4C715E908F3D	111
0B53E47618DAC9F2 1CD098E76A254F3B F831C7D0A24569BE 589A6BD730CE2F41	125	5E46F78193B2C0AD 85CB9367AED4F012 84156A9FE2DC70B3 E5F30C697B8241AD	123	AE489F217D60C3B5 F3710E25DA9BC846 ED2AC7385F9B0164 B168703FCEA2D954	125	3B9AEC81257604DF 50CD839146FA7B2E D7F8519EB63204CA 5E98CD016A3FB427	119
FCEDB69A47083512		128AFB094DC76E53		0B64A517C3DFE289		316E927CB58DF40A	

An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

B693A48071FD2CE5 49B7E283CA15FD06 672EB8391DFC0AA5	132	2483EDAC57916FB0 EC38179BF20564DA 8709A314DF265CEB	111	E9620F58C14A3DB7 23FDE48690C51AB7 095873ABF1EDC426	130	18AE6D23B54970C 3B96D0871AF4EC52 DE82407AF1C3B569	114
2E4530B67DF9AC81 609C5D72E4F38AB1 FBA31ED548729C06 3E0F7C4AB89D6215	122	48D52F6B9AC1E370 105E8F7B436D2AC9 79C6513DE824B0AF 6D1A39E4BC078F25	116	95D4B68A20CEF173 7FE0B291DA43658C 95C846EF1B2DA073 564B12098AF7CE3D	113	42F3E1087BD5A6C9 C41079853FAEBD26 28B0731ED4CA95F6 2CF94518ED7BA360	128
AB75FD2461930C8E B153C6D29F84E0A7 20A91EB743D8F6C5 9821B30AD5C4F6E7	127	F09814B7C25EAD63 3A8761EFC2D945B0 75CA6418DF039BE2 D026E839C1A7B5F4	135	F2BD0A398CE76145 3FE4D718CA96B025 AB2F174E95D806C3 7EDB2F45A9C80631	125	2E8CAD9615F437B0 8547FDA32B10CE69 593D2470186BEFCA 3E2164A90D85B7CF	120
9F0E65327A4D8B1C 4F732B1AEC6590D8 078E5AD2C4619F3B 978C14AB35EDF602	109	C2AD6951E08F437B A76098345CDBEF21 1D59FACE78630B42 7410ECD5F36BA298	95	FE82BA15734C69D0 012D947836F5ABEC 5BEF1AC27864903D 91A36B45F07E82CD	123	08C5712DE3F9BA64 56EC81A092F4B37D 743C8650FB9E1DA2 3CD884AE16F27590	114
74BC0F85291A63ED 681A7F5E43C9BD20 1365720BD4ECFA89 B0EC715A2683D4F9	124	1C53408AF976E2BD 0B26CF395E1A4D87 20ACEF38591D67B4 82F6E0AB143C57D9	124	BA4D6738C10F592E 8A2F4BE6305719CD C80AE174F62359BD 860CD2715AB394FE	127	7BC48AE9D20365F1 FC542E8A1BD03679 B0EASF267451C39D C5A2F1B40309E78D	115
2E5C08B739DF1A64 E386DA7F02915BC4 09D682F1C4B573AE E2183947FCDB65A0	112	53CB7098D1A46FE2 3A2EFB0156798CD4 E34C6F29A501B7D8 74E19D6FA30C852B	119	127D3BF5496CAE80 3FC186B4A0ED7592 BD52079AFE164C38 897CE46D3512AB0F	114	74D13AFBF8E259C06 04673E21ACB5D98F DA53B81FC2E67409 E357B816C29FD04A	118
D23CBA7F5098E146 61E74FA3889025DC 121EB08F6537C2A94 A1C8E4BF67D023795	112	D86AE3F924C71B05 3078BA2154F9ECD6 35179426ACDE0F8B 86C795FD2E34A1B0	122	70812A3B496DCEF5 89C62357BA4ED01F 841CEAB73265DF09 0386F4127B95ECAD	149	184F0639A7CED2B5 9D1C567F8ABE3402 26570FAE84CB193D 8D6F47D7B093A2EC51	111
46025BEDF739AC18 E3084A2D579BC61F 2EC9D430617FA588 1A53D4607CE2BF89	116	AC57E01DB649F823 0CD8456A39BE12F7 DE9583A7B06142CF 9A20FCDBE4156837	117	2C4BF0D6871EA539 2C1D5684BE7390FA CEB954213A8F7D60 7BC5923A01FDE648	111	4A160CFB527389DE 84C05372EF16DB9A 0F58C814DEA79632 23640EA9CD5B7F81	103
8A6049B5FC23ED71 C7A8123D065B9FE4 F0EBA21D86479C35 C93AB51AF2D47E80	128	4B0DC285E1A3F769 5DDBA7390248E6FC1 A13269F78D0C4B5E 6C345A70F8D2EB91	115	DA865FE402917C38 5A948B16D0CF732E DA84526E7B31C0F9 3FB08271C6AE495D	105	54CD723A9EF806B1 9F07B28C63E15DA4 13EA7D0246985CFB 8D64E7DC137AB925	106
7A54DB98F021EC36 BEDA30967FC14258 0AD43C918562BF7E A627E04F1BCD9835	130	4AC187D3E0925B6F 95C0742ED13A6B8F 182647F5B3CA9E0D 72BA51E30698DC4F	119	68F3B1D740CE259A F078E463B2C9A15D 89137CE04B5D2F6A 9085ECAB213D7F46	108	8FEA0B791253C46D E776E1B53AC4D982 0F823109A5FCD4B6 3D98140B5C67AEF2	111
39E05A6F4DC812B7 A94E60F537B1D8C2 E2F5C6741308A9DB 1D5AC9BF62038467	121	896307ED12A4C5FB E3DC6F57649821AB0 C6FE13A547892BD0 19E6435DB0AC782F	112	4D680159FACE27B3 2E954B78AF6CD301 6A584FD91E3C70B2 A7501C39BE2D648F	118	6A51239FD84ECB07 86410C359FE7A82D 6ABDEC12370F8594 04BA6E92D8C5F317	121
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94B2ED6F183A70C5 A128C4FB6E503D79 8F25A149CB7306DE 7E06F825CBD134A9	122	0748CF952EADB361 2806FA973DC1EB54 DAFB906CE5432781 AE71F3925680C4DB	111	D8C61AE35B09F427 E7F5641C30B9A28D 87D341A265BF09C 7A23CECF915B0846D	119	7F412CED903B86A5 591BEA64CD32F087 7D2C58F3091BE4A6 60958DE41AB2F73C	112
D20E379CBA615F48 25EBC346D7A80F19 1DCB65A8274E9F30 1FD6A94CE305728B	121	92FEC78430A15DB6 576B39420DC1E18FA 2CBFA0174985E3D6 084AE162D9C7FB35	118	97583FEA6DB1C204 207B83E5194CDF6A DF6AB94E50C87213 621E43FC0B57AD89	116	5A3FC4B89DE10762 7C0415369AE28DFB BA0415D638CF927E 0E34D659A1C8F27B	101
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B9845ADC103F762E 7B06281E4FA93D5C 4F236DBC8E75A901		19B367FE2C48A5D0 DC0E39F8B14576A2 3E42F7951C086ABD		3A25147E6FCD09B8 785394BEFEDC6A012 209F6BE84C513AD7		F7A3C6512D94E08B 1D27F95BEA6C8304 348BC0A12F695D7E	

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

An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and Their Implementations in Simplified-AES



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

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6D89EAB3C410572F E6FC132AB0D97584 1034E582F7D6B9AC B1963EADCF482057	121	40E78DAC15F296B3 2AFD5C791064E83B 703182A6DCE4FB95 28EA5063FC149DB7	119	6F39E874BAC52D01 EF91563BA2CD7408 B691F35A27DCE804 D4630829B5E7AFC1	113	5F769DEB83C0A124 31D746EB5CF0892A FEB289D5A016347C 856419EA7C3FB02D	129
F73CB16A40D925E8 C215E0439DB87F6A 29D784C60E51F3AB AE6940573CB1DF82	121	DAB09354FE167C82 94A257C18EFD0B36 1470F96D38ACEB52 E87A92B016FDC543	112	9768CD1AFEB30254 C7BE43A0129F56D8 1FA34DB9E28650C7 6917483EF2AB5D0C	114	4B7CDE95806A12F3 E68BC3F4A10275D9 04FA86D2C537E9B1 E8FD9542B03A176C	116
8E3C60B1F2579DA4 47508DCAE6F1B329 8A4197C0DE2653BF 61E08AD3C97F524B	113	FC81BAD02795E364 182409D57A3CF6EB 42FAC3675109BE8D B2308F4615EAD9C7	117	327DFA4058BE9C16 9280CB14AE63F57D 7A0E893546D2F1CB 127E536DAB80C49F	110	62BE3A04C978D51F 4F3D7A29B1EC5680 BE2015C8A4963D7F 61B27CD8E905F4A3	126
BF53A9E0274C6D18 402E953D6CAF178B F9E3C8165D04A72B E5C24179AF036DB8	135	EAF30781B49DC625 A96FED83B25170C4 0B7D8259F641AEC3 D7BF691A2E35408C	114	6234AE0FC5971BD8 B64D103F7EAC8592 1F2B670E8A34CD59 1AF28B634CD790E5	122	7D05B362C1FE9A84 3A5B26F7D01E9C84 6734AC92F8E8D501B 9FCD0621BE3A84517	115
EBA0F27186CD4359 1E74D85B0CA239F6 F40C5791E6A83D28 A91D780256FCBE43	124	0EB9257A4D1F6C38 12FBC5D97E96A4308 248F07C6DB3E1A59 ED74AF1836259BC0	118	B109F27E586AC3D4 46C1859B7A0E2DF3 B6EA74CF1D520398 C7316AE0B94DF852	115	A73D08145C29EB6F FD0681E425BCA973 C9D0E61F735A4278B B2F6E381CD95A074	117
8FB1260D93AE745C 61709CDE8A35F2B4 2B86AD03F15C749E BF2647E9C1D8053A	116	4F95DC2E2716A830B 69D58CA407F3BE12 C691D530E8F74B2A C98241AB506FD37E	123	B1DEC495FA320867 25B46E378CFD019A 8B532F7E046C1DA9 0B576CEFD9A24813	132	67E40CB139D5A28F 2613EFA904C875BD 820671AEB4D59C3F EA4B570CF3962D81	131
8C7FE36542DAB019 5D231F7A4096BCE8 231F609DB78A5E4C B9E305D64C8A2F17	129	129A6CD3F058EB74 4580E31672BAC9FD 78D6FE9213540ABC 237C4B91A5068DEF	120	B51E69D4A270CF38 6F7A0D9B5832C1E4 128E4B5D37FC9A06 F8AE913BD574602C	122	24810F95EADC7B36 A4E2150DF7CB6389 3B0EDF91C768452A 1EFC42358B60AD97	121
45CA1E36DF097B28 973481F6205BDECA A52DBF46E18C7309 3E2851FCBD9670A4	127	12D843AFC907BE5E E3F25BCAD1087469 8B053DC14E92A767 91DAF2405CE6B873	126	F38B5027D46AC1E9 7D340BECF5821A69 D3BA6710E85CF429 EBDC28F35471A096	122	5E6F37B8AD29140C E6B389D0A4DC1F75 1EA3CB6D508749F3 2C9D16E5734B8AF0	128
98E453B1DCFF7A620 F9472ED053CAB168 98B32145CE67AD0F AB0F849EDC617325	120	21974E0DAB3F658C 32516BD9A04C8EF7 B9E50A23CD1F6784 9A602E4D183F5CB7	115	7124BE8A6F03D59C 2B95A03D8C1E76F4 2CE743A8FD6519B0 90721FEDA4583B6C	120	02897CAEF6B4D315 48AF0EB962C1537D 034CBA2856EFD719 EC4F5B70216A98D3	120
DB1532FC490E76A8 ED98CB6A250147F3 1B69F0C3A4E2D875 149AC87E6235FBD0	124	152B076EF4D3C9A8 0AC2571EBF49D836 C0D4726AB91E9F8F DE0738C2BFA91564	105	FE18CB92057A63D4 86EF9D15307CA2B4 0EC238FAB59D1746 40736EFAC92B5D18	131	89B3F0A671245EDC 52EFOA7BC384869D 0D68514A932FCBE7 CB4F2073D96E185A	122
074B6EC9823DA15F D529FCBE0A784163 759DE4FCA0B38126 AESC9625D0134F87	133	8A9E3F470C652D1B 3AB6E19C8D5407F2 F16E3B94DA8C0572 20C1598743D6FABE	121	F91C8625A074EB3D BC82456F90E71DA3 8F9A7150C3B26DE4 AB5839DFE024C617	123	E6908AF25D31CB47 92E10F8B8D37C654A FB2CED037586941A D18A37BF46EC2095	120
25F40B93DE718C6A 86DAFC1420E35997 1DC63B20FA4798E5 DEB375C8F209164A	116	837F05CEDA42619B 176E3BF428C5DA09 7C81596AD4BF302E D2AC650FE34971B8	131	62B9F4A10DC8E537 E2CD954FB78013A6 B4C2F30D8795E16A 8539C1D72A0B6F4E	133	681B904ADCF2E357 C61E39F27BD5480A A984B57C062E9F31D BD928C13FE5A7604	121
64259F37AC8D0EB1 4670C9BA2D1E528F CF1394680BBD72A5 467E582FBD091CA3	112	F8D769A3B415E20C 5B6E0C28D79FA413 B9FE1AC78364205D 75891EDF4362BCA0	118	D1097EF24CA6B583 EFA19560D73BC428 CF0568A7BE139D42 3E8C6F94251D07BA	110	D305B2C9A8E4F617 3D0A596E27C48FB1 8F749063CA2B5E1D A5B3F026491ED7C8	131
5E4067DCB398AF12 54FE86B291D073AC 3EFA048D275C91B6 621FAC7B83E549D0	128	51D8FB2A4E76C039 4671D9583BCF0EA2 72FAB8091C34D6E5 5A2C6BF4D187E903	110	09DFBC83E651472A CF129DB43E07A856 9CD17852AFE3046B B2DC41F5A38790E6	128	C5A2B4803F716ED9 C479861BDA2F5E30 FDBE9523A68107C4 0B4C2631F7D859AE	125
2D3B974CA08E651F 74BDEF2C9A083165 7D1C8AB62F95E430 91253CFB76D8E40A	122	A1C936DB47E502F8 639FA04B5E18D7C2 04ED8C3A9F72B651 E8A7B532D91CF604	131	548F713A0B2CE69D 83FD2B1047C6A9E5 23B6E18C45A907DF CA2DB7801F4E5396	114	ABED741C03F65982 21CF73654D9A0BE8 E2FAC759B81D4036 3C897B2FEA601D54	109
473E69D0AF8BC125 13BDF2E87945C06 63B9F2017EC8A54D BD0369C42817EFA5	118	F9B6D08A7532C1E4 1293E6408B57FACD 9374A01DF2CE685E D90357E8E24CBA1F6	110	5DA7E021F96BC483 4130F5E8B97CD2A6 91EC0F7B28456D3A 7E8D195B432CF6A0	122	AB42D7C5613E8F09 F75E4962DCB138A0 3F74BC69581E2AD0 42E78C9B013A56DF	128
F4A2CBD985E10763 8A46073FB9E5D2C1 31482AEB95D76F0C C0DF9E82653147AB	131	9B8C3102E7A5F4D6 E6951247CDBA0F83 D01248EF9CB47356 EC9AF7281BD64305	106	209B84F1CD37E5A6 8015E2936ADCBF47 0B3FE9AD172468C5 1760F9E3A3B5D42C8	111	C9A15B044786D32FE 0D849E2567FB1C3A 3EADB5C72F068914 871A05BF3EDC9264	127
A16B0725C49DE38F 8ADB70EFC952341 4EAF20D7598C613 E865317A804DFC29	122	2A54D1B80E9C76F3 05FB284E61A3D7C9 381F4BC57AE9D620 8DA21C4F06539B7E	109	8341D95E02ABC7F6 C45E1603B7F8D9A2 167CB48EF5032A9D E5843B0A9FC71D62	123	170F5329B684DACE FCB503E286194A7D 92F518E0746AD3BC 092E5C1A476B38FD	105
95B0C8D83AF641E72 12F36085BEDC47A 914A5BD7F036CE82 927C18DBEF536A40	118	8A01E9536CDB247F 39F5871D460EC2BA BC2D8E653A4F1079 94258AF61DBE307C	118	6A543D18EC27F09B 9ADC7F3E502816B4 FC1BE0568A423D79 309C7BA2D8F4E651	147	065B43E791C8AFD2 45A7C3DB06F8E192 2F7B4C81D3E569A0 9A2F4E51D6B83C07	117
14703258BC9ADF6E		6D507491FAE38C2B		092BF5DAC8E43176		B5687E12F4AC39D0	

610D3FC54AE2B978 A4E829750CD31BF6 0389DF52BE14C7A6	114	5827D6E3AC4B1F09 7C54D3E9BF826A01 A901F5D78BC4E362	117	FAE194D52638B70C 2493CB687F0AD1E5 0E42AB8D7613FC59	114	F1759804EBD6CA32 78DF032C541A6EB9 125ADF83460E9C7B	117
18B74AC2D3E96F05 E7405268BF9CA3D1 7C84FBD9605123EA A1C6842BF3E9D705	108	FAC4E329BD710685 BDC23169E045AF87 4982D160F5BC3AE7 3DA8C7FB0164295E	127	83941F6CE0B5A27D A67FBE08429D3C51 1F2C8DBE34A60579 C7B69F58E203D4A1	111	B8A0C41DF567E932 72D46EA10C39F85B 40E159B8CD3F7A26 3FE6C7AD4250B891	115
249085EBF6CA31D7 8C71EF42509B3DA6 BD8172F59E360AC4 5F37A469E2D80C1B	121	31DE572CBF689A04 E249B7CA851FD603 F8CBD61E403529A7 9BA3687F5D4E2C01	111	57C834DBA10F926E 083CBA265471FE9D 587FD1690CBA34E2 073C1648DEAF5B29	116	9D7B602AFE154C83 1ADE08769B54C32F 7BDEC284A91036F5 17E9B0AC4F683D52	117

C Results of Using Grover's Algorithm to Perform a Known Plaintext Attack on Implementations of S-AES That Use a 16x4 S-Box







D Statistical Analysis Results

Set 1

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.276	100%	0	93.33%	0.254	100%
Block Frequency	0.378	98.33%	0	98.33%	0.299	100%
Sums 1	0.672	100%	0	90.0%	0.437	98.33%
Sums 2	0.111	100%	0	88.33%	0.254	100%
Runs	0.006	95.0%	0.501	96.66%	0.773	98.33%
Longest Run	0.082	100%	0.276	95.0%	0.213	98.33%
Rank	0.091	96.66%	0	35.0%	0	78.33%
FFT	0.888	100%	0	0.0%	0	70.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.304	99.32%	0.445	98.36%	0.499	98.98%
Overlapping	0.035	100%	0.74	100%	0.804	100%
Universal	0.041	—	0.054	—	0.001	—
Entropy	0.005	98.33%	0	86.66%	0.976	98.33%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	—	98.61%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	96.28%	—	98.76%
Serial 1	0.054	98.33%	0.091	98.33%	0.637	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.706	100%	0.534	100%
Linear Complexity	0.324	98.33%	0.74	100%	0.862	100%
Average	0.273	99.01%	0.237	86.01%	0.436	96.12%
100% Pass Rate		9		4		7

S-AES (Set 1)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.324	100%	0.299	100%	0.082	100%
Block Frequency	0.178	93.33%	0.276	98.33%	0.016	96.66%	0.01	98.33%
Sums 1	0	100%	0.111	100%	0.001	100%	0.091	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0.35	100%	0.01	100%	0.091	100%
Runs	0	100%	0.213	100%	0.773	100%	0.004	100%
Longest Run	0.324	98.33%	0.163	100%	0.706	100%	0.324	100%
Rank	0.437	100%	0.804	100%	0.195	98.33%	0.025	100%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	33.33%	0	20.0%	0	23.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.256	99.06%	0.342	99.06%	0.247	98.88%	0.269	99.07%
Overlapping	0.804	98.33%	0.028	91.66%	0.195	98.33%	0.135	100%
Universal	0.83	—	0.826	—	0.886	—	0.98	—
Entropy	0.407	100%	0	98.33%	0.02	100%	0.001	100%
Excursions	—	100%	—	98.21%	—	100%	0.35	98.86%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	—	97.22%	0.46	100%
Serial 1	0.74	100%	0.834	100%	0.148	100%	0.135	100%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.672	100%	0.773	100%	0	100%
Linear Complexity	0.773	100%	0.602	98.33%	0.054	100%	0.407	100%
Average	0.332	94.10%	0.37	94.82%	0.288	94.33%	0.198	94.97%
100% Pass Rate		11		9		10		12

Set 2

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.95	100%	0.067	96.66%	0.568	100%
Block Frequency	0.002	98.33%	0.437	98.33%	0.74	98.33%
Sums 1	0.031	100%	0	95.0%	0.163	100%
Sums 2	0.437	100%	0	96.66%	0.074	100%
Runs	0.378	96.66%	0.911	98.33%	0.122	100%
Longest Run	0.018	96.66%	0.568	100%	0.233	100%
Rank	0.378	100%	0	53.33%	0.044	86.66%
FFT	0.067	98.33%	0	0.0%	0	73.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.306	98.59%	0.529	98.82%	0.515	98.95%
Overlapping	0.004	98.33%	0.35	100%	0.437	96.66%
Universal	0.66	—	0.404	—	0.222	—
Entropy	0.534	100%	0.195	95.0%	0.95	98.33%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	0.382	98.86%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	0.43	98.14%
Serial 1	0.003	96.66%	0.378	100%	0.773	100%
Serial 2	0.101	100%	0.276	98.33%	0.233	100%
Linear Complexity	0.195	100%	0.378	100%	0.834	100%
Average	0.271	98.97%	0.3	89.40%	0.395	96.82%
100% Pass Rate		9		6		8

S-AES (Set 2)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.111	100%	0.013	100%	0.163	100%
Block Frequency	0.178	93.33%	0.002	98.33%	0.111	96.66%	0.001	91.66%
Sums 1	0	100%	0.002	100%	0	100%	0.06	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0.018	100%	0	100%	0.007	100%
Runs	0	100%	0.135	95.0%	0.054	100%	0.082	100%
Longest Run	0.324	98.33%	0.178	100%	0.672	98.33%	0.049	100%
Rank	0.437	100%	0.74	98.33%	0.773	98.33%	0.233	98.33%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	10.0%	0	41.66%	0	43.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.256	99.06%	0.269	99.2%	0.231	99.0%	0.251	99.03%
Overlapping	0.804	98.33%	0.602	98.33%	0.437	100%	0.049	100%
Universal	0.83	—	0.131	—	0.768	—	0.413	—
Entropy	0.407	100%	0.074	100%	0.035	100%	0.039	100%
Excursions	—	100%	0.364	98.75%	—	98.42%	0.231	99.1%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	0.398	99.44%	—	100%	0.204	100%
Serial 1	0.74	100%	0.001	98.33%	0.407	96.66%	0.031	100%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.469	100%	0.469	96.66%	0.254	100%
Linear Complexity	0.773	100%	0.148	98.33%	0.998	98.33%	0.804	98.33%
Average	0.332	94.10%	0.214	93.37%	0.331	95.25%	0.169	95.61%
100% Pass Rate		11		6		7		10

Set 3

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.437	100%	0.035	90.0%	0.637	100%
Block Frequency	0.773	100%	0	98.33%	0.637	100%
Sums 1	0.74	100%	0.067	83.33%	0.016	100%
Sums 2	0.233	100%	0.006	88.33%	0.111	100%
Runs	0.299	100%	0.637	98.33%	0.178	100%
Longest Run	0.005	96.66%	0.773	100%	0.534	100%
Rank	0.602	100%	0	38.33%	0	71.66%
FFT	0.407	96.66%	0	0.0%	0	60.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.265	99.05%	0.443	98.22%	0.531	98.87%
Overlapping	0.213	100%	0.501	100%	0.148	100%
Universal	0.074	—	0.433	—	0.584	—
Entropy	0.001	95.0%	0	90.0%	0.324	96.66%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	0.532	97.72%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	0.531	100%
Serial 1	0.049	100%	0.378	91.66%	0.276	100%
Serial 2	0.091	95.0%	0.178	95.0%	0.534	100%
Linear Complexity	0.299	95.0%	0.834	100%	0.932	96.66%
Average	0.299	98.58%	0.286	85.72%	0.383	95.09%
100% Pass Rate		10		5		10

S-AES (Set 3)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.111	100%	0.035	100%	0.254	100%
Block Frequency	0.804	93.33%	0.276	98.33%	0.054	98.33%	0	98.33%
Sums 1	0	100%	0.148	100%	0.067	100%	0.178	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0.299	100%	0.009	100%	0.163	100%
Runs	0.101	100%	0.804	100%	0.002	98.33%	0.568	100%
Longest Run	0.534	96.66%	0.233	100%	0.672	100%	0.054	98.33%
Rank	0.602	100%	0.534	100%	0.122	100%	0.135	100%
FFT	0	20.0%	0	40.0%	0	45.0%	0	13.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.296	99.02%	0.343	99.05%	0.27	99.14%	0.285	99.13%
Overlapping	0.025	100%	0.254	95.0%	0.028	100%	0	100%
Universal	0.085	—	0.118	—	0.041	—	0.222	—
Entropy	0.039	100%	0	100%	0.932	100%	0.501	100%
Excursions	—	100%	—	98.21%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	—	100%	—	99.38%
Serial 1	0.003	96.66%	0.074	96.66%	0.008	100%	0.407	100%
Serial 2	0	100%	0.049	100%	0.804	96.66%	0.407	100%
Linear Complexity	0.501	95.0%	0.911	100%	0.706	96.66%	0.862	100%
Average	0.199	93.79%	0.277	95.45%	0.25	95.88%	0.269	94.28%
100% Pass Rate		10		10		10		11

Set 4

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.378	98.33%	0.111	95.0%	0.195	100%
Block Frequency	0.001	98.33%	0.254	98.33%	0.233	98.33%
Sums 1	0.276	96.66%	0	91.66%	0.091	100%
Sums 2	0.888	100%	0	91.66%	0.025	100%
Runs	0.254	100%	0.834	98.33%	0.324	100%
Longest Run	0	96.66%	0.74	100%	0.067	98.33%
Rank	0.122	100%	0	58.33%	0.091	93.33%
FFT	0.804	96.66%	0	0.0%	0	71.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.99%	0.486	98.72%	0.498	98.96%
Overlapping	0.06	100%	0.135	98.33%	0.991	98.33%
Universal	0.461	—	0.713	—	0.621	—
Entropy	0.35	98.33%	0.028	98.33%	0.005	100%
Excursions	—	93.75%	—	98.61%	—	96.87%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	96.28%	—	93.05%
Serial 1	0.005	100%	0.534	100%	0.378	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.888	100%	0.437	100%
Linear Complexity	0.148	100%	0.35	95.0%	0.602	100%
Average	0.326	98.60%	0.338	88.66%	0.304	96.80%
100% Pass Rate		8		3		8

S-AES (Set 4)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.005	100%	0.035	100%	0.276	100%
Block Frequency	0.804	93.33%	0	98.33%	0.501	100%	0.054	95.0%
Sums 1	0	100%	0	100%	0	100%	0.888	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0	100%	0.004	100%	0.74	100%
Runs	0.101	100%	0.135	100%	0.122	100%	0.049	100%
Longest Run	0.534	96.66%	0.501	100%	0.602	98.33%	0	96.66%
Rank	0.602	100%	0.95	100%	0.028	98.33%	0.002	100%
FFT	0	20.0%	0	5.0%	0	55.00%	0	80.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.296	99.02%	0.259	99.09%	0.269	99.26%	0.32	98.92%
Overlapping	0.025	100%	0.378	100%	0.501	98.33%	0.01	100%
Universal	0.085	—	0.028	—	0.971	—	0.583	—
Entropy	0.039	100%	0.378	100%	0.932	100%	0.082	100%
Excursions	—	100%	0.546	100%	0.311	100%	—	92.85%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	0.23	100%	0.574	98.98%	—	98.41%
Serial 1	0.003	96.66%	0.023	100%	0.082	100%	0	100%
Serial 2	0	100%	0.101	100%	0.501	100%	0	100%
Linear Complexity	0.501	95.0%	0.378	95.0%	0.082	98.33%	0.469	96.66%
Average	0.199	93.79%	0.23	93.58%	0.324	96.66%	0.232	97.40%
100% Pass Rate		10		12		9		9

Set 5

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.254	100%	0.009	91.66%	0.706	100%
Block Frequency	0.568	100%	0	91.66%	0.031	100%
Sums 1	0.299	100%	0	90.0%	0.437	100%
Sums 2	0.01	100%	0	86.66%	0.299	100%
Runs	0.011	100%	0.122	95.0%	0.834	98.33%
Longest Run	0.035	100%	0.254	95.0%	0.195	98.33%
Rank	0.74	98.33%	0	28.33%	0	73.33%
FFT	0.009	90.0%	0	0.0%	0	45.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.94%	0.462	98.59%	0.462	98.91%
Overlapping	0.602	96.66%	0.672	100%	0.534	98.33%
Universal	0.79	—	0.021	—	0.956	—
Entropy	0.011	100%	0.834	100%	0.888	100%
Excursions	—	94.64%	—	98.42%	—	97.91%
Excursion Variants	—	98.41%	—	100%	—	99.07%
Serial 1	0.082	100%	0.407	96.66%	0.888	100%
Serial 2	0.74	100%	0.568	100%	0.602	100%
Linear Complexity	0.163	96.66%	0.568	98.33%	0.74	100%
Average	0.308	98.35%	0.261	85.64%	0.505	94.32%
100% Pass Rate		9		4		8

S-AES (Set 5)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.074	100%	0	100%	0.378	100%	0.534	100%
Block Frequency	0.001	100%	0	100%	0.602	100%	0	96.66%
Sums 1	0.001	100%	0	100%	0.233	100%	0.672	100%
Sums 2	0.018	100%	0	100%	0.637	100%	0.637	100%
Runs	0.039	100%	0.534	100%	0.672	100%	0.233	100%
Longest Run	0.501	100%	0.672	100%	0.233	100%	0.254	100%
Rank	0.407	98.33%	0.862	96.66%	0.706	100%	0.672	98.33%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	21.66%	0	30.0%	0	8.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	99.15%	0.333	99.03%	0.314	99.14%	0.305	98.86%
Overlapping	0.74	98.33%	0.95	98.33%	0.932	100%	0.911	98.33%
Universal	0.53	—	0.3	—	0.338	—	0.898	—
Entropy	0.025	100%	0.001	100%	0.035	100%	0.501	100%
Excursions	0.361	100%	0.016	97.36%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	0.293	100%	0.009	99.7%	—	100%	—	100%
Serial 1	0.862	96.66%	0.213	100%	0.469	100%	0	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.195	100%	0.407	100%	0.862	100%
Linear Complexity	0.911	98.33%	0.991	98.33%	0.672	100%	0.602	98.33%
Average	0.347	94.21%	0.299	94.44%	0.442	95.57%	0.472	93.67%
100% Pass Rate		10		9		14		10

Set 6

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.054	100%	0.378	96.66%	0.054	100%
Block Frequency	0.672	100%	0	100%	0.911	100%
Sums 1	0.031	100%	0.437	95.0%	0.378	100%
Sums 2	0.007	96.66%	0.135	95.0%	0.067	100%
Runs	0.706	100%	0.005	93.33%	0.862	100%
Longest Run	0.049	98.33%	0.672	98.33%	0.932	98.33%
Rank	0.082	100%	0	25.0%	0	68.33%
FFT	0.122	100%	0	0.0%	0	56.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.271	99.21%	0.522	98.79%	0.508	98.94%
Overlapping	0.054	100%	0.637	100%	0.299	100%
Universal	0.213	—	0.076	—	0.031	—
Entropy	0	96.66%	0.091	98.33%	0.074	98.33%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	—	98.21%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	93.05%	—	100%
Serial 1	0.074	100%	0.568	95.0%	0.501	100%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.932	96.66%	0.06	96.66%
Linear Complexity	0.276	98.33%	0.932	98.33%	0.324	98.33%
Average	0.19	99.32%	0.359	86.46%	0.333	94.61%
100% Pass Rate		11		3		8

S-AES (Set 6)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.031	100%	0	100%	0.025	100%	0.011	100%
Block Frequency	0.054	95.0%	0	90.0%	0.003	100%	0.091	100%
Sums 1	0	100%	0	100%	0.003	100%	0.122	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0	100%	0.005	100%	0	100%
Runs	0.06	100%	0.407	100%	0.163	100%	0.044	100%
Longest Run	0.049	95.0%	0.233	98.33%	0.091	100%	0.233	100%
Rank	0.888	100%	0.534	100%	0.773	100%	0.706	100%
FFT	0	0.0%	0	5.0%	0	25.0%	0	36.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.292	99.21%	0.295	99.03%	0.29	99.17%	0.331	99.13%
Overlapping	0.049	95.0%	0.672	100%	0.299	100%	0.195	100%
Universal	0	—	0.098	—	0.593	—	0.012	—
Entropy	0.254	100%	0.101	100%	0.049	98.33%	0.035	100%
Excursions	0.168	98.07%	—	100%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	0.247	99.2%	—	100%	—	100%	—	98.88%
Serial 1	0.049	100%	0.016	100%	0.035	96.66%	0.101	100%
Serial 2	0.111	100%	0.178	96.66%	0.005	100%	0.74	100%
Linear Complexity	0.014	100%	0.324	100%	0.082	100%	0.706	100%
Average	0.133	92.59%	0.191	93.06%	0.161	94.94%	0.222	95.91%
100% Pass Rate		9		11		12		13



Set 7



	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.74	98.33%	0.911	95.0%	0.706	98.33%
Block Frequency	0.082	100%	0	86.66%	0.195	98.33%
Sums 1	0.035	96.66%	0.008	93.33%	0.834	100%
Sums 2	0.74	96.66%	0.016	91.66%	0.602	100%
Runs	0.018	100%	0.834	98.33%	0.082	100%
Longest Run	0.178	98.33%	0.985	100%	0.602	100%
Rank	0.672	98.33%	0	31.66%	0	75.0%
FFT	0.534	98.33%	0	0.0%	0	73.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.313	99.0%	0.471	98.65%	0.469	98.98%
Overlapping	0.501	100%	0.35	96.66%	0.324	96.66%
Universal	0.279		0.937		0.224	
Entropy	0.122	100%	0.178	98.33%	0.804	100%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	—	100%
Serial 1	0.023	98.33%	0.568	100%	0.35	100%
Serial 2	0.324	100%	0.862	100%	0.324	100%
Linear Complexity	0.407	100%	0.672	98.33%	0.233	100%
Average	0.331	98.99%	0.453	86.78%	0.383	96.28%
100% Pass Rate		8		5		10



S-AES (Set 7)



	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.773	100%	0.018	100%	0.074	100%	0.082	100%
Block Frequency	0	93.33%	0.213	100%	0	98.33%	0.005	96.66%
Sums 1	0.834	100%	0	100%	0.067	100%	0.001	100%
Sums 2	0.862	100%	0.004	100%	0	100%	0.002	100%
Runs	0.007	100%	0.35	100%	0.018	100%	0.013	100%
Longest Run	0.195	100%	0.35	100%	0.534	100%	0.35	98.33%
Rank	0.213	100%	0.122	100%	0.008	100%	0.637	100%
FFT	0	11.66%	0	28.33%	0	13.33%	0	30.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.321	98.99%	0.312	98.98%	0.248	98.98%	0.297	99.22%
Overlapping	0.101	100%	0.163	100%	0.95	100%	0.378	95.0%
Universal	0.103	—	0.669	—	0.807	—	0.832	—
Entropy	0.013	100%	0	96.66%	0.002	100%	0.888	100%
Excursions	—	100%	0.337	98.86%	—	97.91%	0.558	98.95%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	0.427	100%	—	100%	0.478	99.53%
Serial 1	0	100%	0.002	100%	0.008	100%	0.35	100%
Serial 2	0.06	100%	0.568	100%	0.163	100%	0.195	100%
Linear Complexity	0.637	96.66%	0.706	100%	0.706	96.66%	0.637	100%
Average	0.275	93.78%	0.249	95.17%	0.239	94.07%	0.335	94.85%
100% Pass Rate		12		12		11		9



E Avalanche Criterion Analysis Results



















F ANF of AES

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_7 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0x_6 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_6 \oplus x_2x_7 \oplus x_2 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_6 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_6x_7 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_1 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_0 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_6 \oplus x_2x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_6 \oplus x_7 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_2 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_6 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_0 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus \\
 &x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_7 \oplus x_5x_6 \oplus x_5 \oplus \\
 &x_6x_7 \oplus x_7
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_3 = &x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_6 \oplus x_3x_7 \oplus x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_6 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_6x_7 \oplus x_6 \oplus x_7
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_4 = &x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_6 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus \\
 &x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_6 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_3x_5 \oplus x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_7 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_5 \oplus x_6x_7
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_5 = &x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus \\
 &x_0x_1x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_6 \oplus x_7 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_6 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_7 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_4x_6 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_5 \oplus x_6 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_7 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_6 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_6 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_4 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_5 \oplus x_7
\end{aligned}$$

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