

Composition with Knowledge Assumptions

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Abstract. Zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments (zk-SNARKs) rely on *knowledge assumptions* for their security. Meanwhile, as the complexity and scale of cryptographic systems continues to grow, the composition of secure protocols is of vital importance. The current gold standards of composable security, the Universal Composability and Constructive Cryptography frameworks cannot capture knowledge assumptions, as their core proofs of composition prohibit white-box extraction. In this paper, we present a formal model allowing the composition of knowledge assumptions. Despite showing impossibility for the general case, we demonstrate the model’s usefulness when limiting knowledge assumptions to few instances of protocols at a time. We finish by providing the first instance of a simultaneously succinct and composable zk-SNARK, by using existing results within our framework.

1 Introduction

Knowledge assumptions, a class of non-falsifiable assumptions, are often used in cases where both succinctness and extractability are required. Perhaps the most notable modern usage is in zk-SNARKs [30, 19, 21, 20, 27, 13, 18], which typically rely on either a knowledge-of-exponent assumption [14], the Algebraic Group Model (AGM) [17], or the even stronger Generic Group Model (GGM) [31].

The idea of utilising additional assumptions for extraction extends outside of what it traditionally considered a “knowledge assumption” to extractable functions, notably extractable one-way functions [9, 10], and extractable hash functions [3]. Arguably, one of the main benefits of the random oracle model, one of the most common “non-standard” assumptions, is to provide extractability.

The typical statement of these assumptions is that for every adversary there exists a corresponding extractor, such that when both are given the same inputs and randomness, the extractor can provide meaningful information about how the output of the adversary was created. In the Algebraic Group Model, for instance, the extractor will show how to represent the adversary’s output as powers of input group elements, and in extractable hash functions it will provide a preimage to the output hash.

This is formalised as a security game, which is then assumed to hold axiomatically. The existence of the extractor may be used in a security proof to demonstrate the existence of a preimage. At the same time, a one-wayness property can be asserted, with this differing subtly from extraction in that an adversary to

one-wayness does not have access to the input and randomness to extract from. This methodology has seen success in proving the security of various interesting primitives, such as non-malleable codes [24], and SNARKs.

Proving these primitives’ security under composition would typically involve using one of a number of off-the-shelf compositional frameworks, such as Universal Composability [8] or Constructive Cryptography [28], specifying an ideal behaviour for the primitive, and constructing a simulator which coerces the ideal behaviour to mimic that of the actual protocol. This simulator will naturally need to make use of the extraction properties, often to infer the exact ideal intent behind adversarial actions. It is in this that the conflict between extraction and compositional frameworks arises: As the extraction is white-box, the simulator requires the input of its counter-party – the environment, or distinguisher, of the simulation experiment. This cannot be allowed however, as it would give the simulator access to *all* information in the system¹, not just that of the adversary.

This conflict has been observed before in the literature, for instance in [25]. Often, the remedy is to extend the original protocol with additional components to enable the simulator to extract “black-box”, i.e. without the original inputs. For example, the Fischlin transform [16] uses multiple queries to a random oracle to bypass the inability to extract from the commitment phase of an underlying Sigma protocol, which would allow using the simpler Fiat-Shamir transform [15] instead. $\mathcal{C}\mathcal{O}\mathcal{C}\mathcal{O}$ [25] extends zk-SNARKs with an encryption of the witness, and a proof of correctness of this encryption to a public key the simulator can control.

A theme of these approaches is that succinctness is usually lost – size being limited by the information-theoretic reality of black-box extraction. Thus $\mathcal{C}\mathcal{O}\mathcal{C}\mathcal{O}$ proofs are longer than their witnesses, and UC-secure commitments [11] are longer than the message domain.

This limitation can often be bypassed by using a local random oracle, as this *does* permit extraction. Restricting the model to allow the adversary to perform only specific computations on knowledge-implying objects, could be one way to generalise this approach. Just as a random oracle functionality would abstract over extractable hash functions, a generic group functionality would abstract over knowledge of exponent type assumptions. This would constitute a far stronger assumption however, running counter to recent developments to relax assumptions, such as the Algebraic Group Model [17], which aim for a more faithful representation of knowledge assumptions.

Our contribution. Instead we follow the Algebraic Group Model approach but explore its consequences for composition. Our contributions are two-fold:

First, we define the concept of knowledge-respecting distinguishing environments, which we will call distinguishers, to be consistent with the terminology of Constructive Cryptography. We use the Constructive Cryptography framework [28] as an orientation point for this work, due to its relative simplicity

¹ Recall that the simulator *is* the ideal-world adversary, and should by definition not have access to secrets the distinguisher holds.

compared to the many moving parts of UC [8], making it easier to re-establish composition after making sweeping changes to the model, as we do in this paper.

Similar to an algebraic algorithm, distinguishers in our model need to explain how they computed each knowledge-implying object they output. We show how to extend a compositional framework by giving the simulator access to these explanations.

Our second contribution investigates under which conditions it is reasonable to assume knowledge-respecting distinguishers. To this end, we define stronger versions of knowledge assumptions that depend on auxiliary and knowledge-implying inputs. These assumptions suffice to extend a distinguisher with an extractor providing said explanations.

Within this setting we are able to establish not only an impossibility result on full general composition, but more interestingly a positive result on the composition of systems relying on different knowledge assumptions. Intuitively: You can use a knowledge assumption only once, or you need to ensure the various uses do not interfere with each other (specifically, the simulators of both invocations cannot provide any advantage due to extraction, as shown in the example in Section 5). This result has the immediate effect of enabling the usage of primitives relying on knowledge assumptions in larger protocols – provided the underlying assumption is not used in multiple composing proofs.

2 Modelling Knowledge Assumptions

We formally define knowledge assumptions over a type of *knowledge-implying objects* X . When an object of the type X is produced, the assumption states that whoever produced it must know a corresponding witness of the type W . The *knowledge of exponent* assumption is an example of this, where X corresponds to pairs of group elements, and W is an exponent. A relation $\mathcal{R} \subseteq X \times W$ defines which witnesses are valid for which knowledge-implying objects.

In the case of the knowledge of exponent assumption, it roughly states that given a generator, and a random power s of the generator, the only way to produce a pair of group elements, where one is the s th power of the other, is to exponentiate the original pair, and in so doing implying knowledge of this exponent. There is one extra item needed: The initial exponent s needs to be sampled randomly. Indeed, this is true for *any* knowledge assumption: The all-quantification over potential distinguishers implies the existence of distinguishers which “know” objects in X without knowing their corresponding witness. To avoid this pre-knowledge, we assume X itself is randomly selected at the start of the protocol. For this purpose, we will assume a distribution `init`, which given a source of public randomness (such as a global common random string), produces *public parameters* `pp`, which parameterise the knowledge assumption. In the case of knowledge of exponent, this needs to sample an exponent s , and output the pair (g, g^s) . For this particular setup, public randomness is insufficient.

Beyond this, users do not operate in isolation: If Alice produces the pair (g^x, g^{xs}) , knowing x and transmits this to Bob, he can produce (g^{xy}, g^{xys}) with-

out knowing xy . This does not mean that the knowledge assumption does not hold, however it is more complex than one might originally imagine: One party can use knowledge-implying objects from another user as (part of) their own witnesses. Crucially this needs to be limited to objects the user actually received: Bob *cannot* produce (g^{sy}, g^{s^2y}) for instance, as he never received (g^s, g^{s^2}) , and does not know s . This setting also lends itself more to some interpretations of knowledge assumptions than others. For instance, the classical knowledge-of-exponent assumption [14] does not allow linear combinations of inputs, while the t -knowledge-of-exponent assumption [22] does. When used compositably, the latter is more “natural”, in much the same way that IND-CCA definitions of encryption fit better into compositional frameworks than IND-CPA ones, due to them already accounting for part of the composable interaction.

Definition 1 (Knowledge Assumption). *A knowledge assumption \mathfrak{K} is defined by a tuple $(\text{init}, X, W, \mathcal{R})$ consisting of:*

1. *init, a private-coin distribution to sample public parameters pp from, which the others are parameterised by.*
2. *X_{pp} , the set of all objects which imply knowledge.*
3. *W_{pp} , the set of witnesses, where $\forall x \in X_{\text{pp}} : (\text{INPUT}, x) \in W_{\text{pp}}$.*
4. *$\mathcal{R}_{\text{pp}} : (I \subseteq X_{\text{pp}}) \rightarrow (Y \subseteq (X_{\text{pp}} \times W_{\text{pp}}))$, the relation new knowledge must satisfy, parameterised by input objects, where*

$$\forall x, y \in X_{\text{pp}}, I \subseteq X_{\text{pp}} : (x, (\text{INPUT}, y)) \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{pp}}(I) \iff x = y \wedge x \in I.$$

Furthermore, \mathcal{R}_{pp} must be monotonically increasing:

$$\forall I \subseteq J \subseteq X_{\text{pp}} : \mathcal{R}_{\text{pp}}(I) \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{\text{pp}}(J).$$

The inclusion of (INPUT, x) in W_{pp} and \mathcal{R}_{pp} for all $x \in X_{\text{pp}}$ ensures that parties are permitted to know objects they have received as inputs, without needing to know corresponding witnesses. Importantly, this is possible *only* for inputs, and not for other objects. For each knowledge assumption \mathfrak{K} , the assumption it describes is in a setting of computational security, with a security parameter λ . Broadly, the assumption states that, for a restricted class of “ \mathfrak{K} -respecting” adversaries, it is possible to compute witnesses for each adversarial output, given the same inputs.

Assumption 1 (\mathfrak{K} -Knowledge) *The assumption corresponding to the tuple $\mathfrak{K} = (\text{init}, X, W, \mathcal{R})$ is associated with a set of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms, $\text{Resp}_{\mathfrak{K}}$. We will say an algorithm is \mathfrak{K} -respecting if it is in $\text{Resp}_{\mathfrak{K}}$. This set should contain all adversaries and protocols of interest. The \mathfrak{K} -knowledge assumption itself is then that, for all $\mathcal{A} \in \text{Resp}_{\mathfrak{K}}$, there exists a PPT extractor \mathcal{X} , such that:*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \xleftarrow{r} \text{init}; \\ \exists I \subseteq X_{\text{pp}}, \text{aux} \in \{0, 1\}^* : \\ \text{Game 1}(\mathcal{A}_{r'}, \mathcal{X}_{r'}, \text{pp}, I, \text{aux}) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $\mathcal{A}_{r'}$ and $\mathcal{X}_{r'}$ are \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{X} supplied with the same random coins r' (as such, they behave deterministically within Game 1).

While it is trivial to construct adversaries which are not \mathfrak{K} -respecting by encoding knowledge-implying objects within the auxiliary input, these trivial cases are isomorphic to an adversary which *is* \mathfrak{K} -respecting, and which receives such encoded objects directly. We therefore limit ourselves to considering adversaries which communicate through the “proper” channel, rather than covertly. In this way, we also bypass existing impossibility results employing obfuscation [6]: We exclude by assumption adversaries which would use obfuscation.

Game 1 (Knowledge Extraction) *The adversary \mathcal{A}_r wins the knowledge extraction game if and only if it outputs a series of objects in X_{pp} , for which the extractor \mathcal{X}_r fails to output the corresponding witness:*

$$\text{let } \vec{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_r(I, \text{aux}), \vec{w} \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_r(I, \text{aux}) \text{ in } \vec{x} \in X_{\text{pp}}^* \wedge \bigvee_{i=1}^{|\vec{x}|} (x_i, w_i) \notin \mathcal{R}_{\text{pp}}(I).$$

Crucial for composition are the existential quantifications, which combined state that we assume extraction *for all* of the following:

- Algorithms in $\text{Resp}_{\mathfrak{K}}$
- Input objects I
- Auxiliary inputs aux

This makes knowledge assumptions following Assumption 1 stronger than their typical property-based definitions. It is also non-standard as a result, as it relies on quantifiers *within* a probability experiment. While the adversarial win condition is well-defined, it is not necessarily computable. Nevertheless, quantifications are required for their usage in composable proofs.

2.1 Examples of Knowledge Assumptions

To motivate this definition, we demonstrate that it can be applied to various commonly used knowledge assumptions, including the knowledge of exponent assumption, the Algebraic Group Model and variants, and even to random oracles. We detail our flavour of the AGM here, and leave the details of the others to Appendix E. Witnesses naturally seem to form a restricted expression language describing how to construct a knowledge-implying object. A more natural way to express the relation \mathcal{R} is often an evaluation function over witnesses, returning a knowledge-implying object.

The Algebraic Group Model. Assuming a distribution `groupSetup` providing a group \mathbb{G} and a generator g , we can recreate the Algebraic Group Model [17] as a knowledge assumption fitting Definition 1:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{K}_{\text{AGM}} &:= (\text{init}, X, W, \mathcal{R}) & W &:= \{ (\text{OP}, a, b) \mid a, b \in W \} \cup \\ \text{init} &:= \text{groupSetup} & & \{ (\text{INPUT}, i) \mid i \in X \} \cup \\ X &:= \mathbb{G} & & \{ \text{GENERATOR} \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{eval}(I, w) := \begin{cases} \text{eval}(g) \circ \text{eval}(h) & \text{if } w = (\text{OP}, g, h) \\ i & \text{if } w = (\text{INPUT}, i) \wedge i \in I \\ g & \text{if } w = \text{GENERATOR} \end{cases}$$

$$(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}(I) \iff x = \text{eval}(I, w)$$

3 Typed Networks of Random Systems

While it is not our goal to pioneer a new composable security framework, existing frameworks do not quite fit the needs of this paper. Notably, Universal Composability [8] has many moving parts, such as session IDs, control functions and different tapes which make the core issues harder to grasp. Constructive Cryptography [28] does not have a well-established notion of globality and fixes the number of interfaces available, which makes the transformations we will later perform more tricky.

Furthermore, the analysis of knowledge assumptions benefits from a clear type system imposed on messages being passed – knowing which parts of messages encode objects of interest to knowledge assumptions (and which do not) makes the analysis more straightforward. Due to both of these reasons, we construct a compositional framework sharing many similarities with Constructive Cryptography, however using graphs (networks) of typed random systems as the basic unit instead of random systems themselves. Crucially, when we establish composition within this framework, we do so with respect to sets of valid distinguishers. This will allow us to permit only distinguishers which respect the knowledge assumption.

Our definitions can embed existing security proofs in Constructive Cryptography, and due to the close relation between composable frameworks, likely also those in other frameworks, such as UC. In particular, our results directly imply that primitives proven using knowledge assumptions under this framework can be directly used in place of hybrids in systems proven in Constructive Cryptography.

3.1 Type Definition

We introduce a rudimentary type system for messages passed through the network. It consists of a unit type $\mathbb{1}$, empty type $\mathbb{0}$, sum and product types $\tau_1 + \tau_2 / \tau_1 \times \tau_2$, and the Kleene star τ^* . This type system was chosen to be minimal while still:

1. Allowing existing protocols to be fit within it. As most of cryptography operates on arbitrary length strings, $(\mathbb{1} + \mathbb{1})^*$, or finite mathematical objects, $\mathbb{1} + \dots + \mathbb{1}$, these can be embedded in the type system.
2. Allowing new types to be embedded in larger message spaces. The inclusion of sum types enables optional inclusion, while product types enables inclusion of multiple instances of a type alongside auxiliary information.

We stress that this type system may be (and will!) extended, and that a richer system may make sense in practice. Types follow the grammar

$$\tau \equiv \mathbb{0} \mid \mathbb{1} \mid \tau_1 + \tau_2 \mid \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \mid \tau^*,$$

and the corresponding expression language follows the grammar

$$E \equiv \top \mid \text{inj}_1(E) \mid \text{inj}_2(E) \mid (E_1, E_2) \mid \epsilon \mid E_1 :: E_2.$$

We will also use 2 to represent $\mathbb{1} + \mathbb{1}$, and 0 and 1 for $\text{inj}_1(\top)$ and $\text{inj}_2(\top)$ respectively. Formally, the typing rules are:

$$\begin{array}{c} \vdash \top : \mathbb{1} \\ \vdash x : \tau_1 \quad \vdash y : \tau_2 \\ \hline \vdash (x, y) : \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \end{array} \quad \frac{\vdash x : \tau_1}{\vdash \text{inj}_1(x) : \tau_1 + \tau_2} \quad \frac{\vdash x : \tau_2}{\vdash \text{inj}_2(x) : \tau_1 + \tau_2} \quad \frac{\vdash x : \tau \quad \vdash \vec{x} : \tau^*}{\vdash x :: \vec{x} : \tau^*}$$

Note that there is no means to construct the empty type $\mathbb{0}$.

Knowledge assumptions. We expand this basic type system by allowing objects to be annotated with a knowledge assumption. Specifically, given a knowledge assumption $\mathfrak{K} = (\text{init}, X, W, \mathcal{R})$, where init returns $\text{pp} : \tau$, and for all pp in the domain of init , both X_{pp} and W_{pp} are valid types, there are two additional types present:

1. The type of knowledge-implying objects in \mathfrak{K} : $[\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}]$ (equivalent to X_{pp})
2. The type of witnessed objects in \mathfrak{K} with respect to an input set of knowledge $I: \forall I \subseteq X_{\text{pp}} : \langle \mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}, I \rangle$ (equivalent to $X_{\text{pp}} \times W_{\text{pp}}$)

Formally then, we define \mathfrak{K} types through the grammar

$$\tau \equiv \mathbb{0} \mid \mathbb{1} \mid \tau_1 + \tau_2 \mid \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \mid \tau^* \mid [\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}] \mid \langle \mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}, I \rangle,$$

with the corresponding expression grammar being

$$E \equiv \top \mid \text{inj}_1(E) \mid \text{inj}_2(E) \mid (E_1, E_2) \mid \epsilon \mid E_1 :: E_2 \mid [E]_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}} \mid \langle E \rangle_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}^I.$$

Crucially, the types of messages may depend on prior interactions. This is particularly obvious with the set of input knowledge I , which will be defined as the set of all previously received $x : [\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}]$, however it also applies to pp itself, which may be provided from another component of the system. This allows for the secure sampling of public parameters, or delegating this to a common reference string (CRS). The typing rules are extended with the following two rules, where X_{pp} and W_{pp} are type variable:

$$\frac{\vdash x : X_{\text{pp}} \quad \vdash w : W_{\text{pp}} \quad (x, w) \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{pp}}(I)}{\vdash \langle x, w \rangle_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}^I : \langle \mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}, I \rangle} \quad \frac{\vdash x : X_{\text{pp}}}{\vdash [x]_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}} : [\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}]}$$

3.2 Random Systems

We use the same basic building-block as Constructive Cryptography [28]: Random systems [29]. We briefly recap this notion:

Definition 2. *An $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ -random system \mathbf{F} is an infinite sequence of conditional probability distributions $P_{Y_i|X^iY^{i-1}}^{\mathbf{F}}$ for $i \geq 1$, where X and Y distribute over \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} respectively.*

Specifically, random systems produce outputs in the domain \mathcal{Y} when given an input in \mathcal{X} , and are stateful – their behaviour can depend on prior inputs and outputs. [28] itself works with random systems based on an automaton with internal state; such an automaton can then also be constrained to a reasonable notion of feasibility, such as being limited to a polynomial number of execution steps with respect to some security parameter.

We will not go into depth on modelling computation security, as it is not the primary focus of this paper, however we will assume the existence of a feasibility notion of this type. We follow the approach of [26], and consider random systems as equivalence classes over probabilistic systems. We make a minor tweak to the setting of [28] as well, and use random-access machines instead of automata², to enable the use of super-polynomial parameters as laid out in Appendix E.

3.3 Typed Networks

We will consider networks of random systems (which can be considered as labelled graphs) as our basic object to define composition over.

Definition 3 (Cryptographic Networks). *A typed cryptographic network is a set of nodes N , satisfying the following conditions:*

1. *Each node $n \in N$ is a tuple $n = (I_n, O_n, \tau_n, R_n, A_n)$ representing:*
 - I_n a set of available input interfaces.
 - O_n a set of available output interfaces.
 - $\tau_n : I_n \cup O_n \rightarrow T$, a mapping from interfaces to their types.
 - R_n , a $(\sum_{i \in I_n} \tau_n(i), \sum_{o \in O_n} \tau_n(o))$ random system.
(see Appendix F for a detailed description of sums over types)
 - $A_n \subseteq I_n \cup O_n$, the subset of interfaces which behave adversarially.
2. *Both input and output interfaces are unique within the network:*

$$\forall a, b \in N : a \neq b \implies I_a \cap I_b = \emptyset \wedge O_a \cap O_b = \emptyset.$$

3. *Matching input and output interfaces define directed channels in the implied network graph. Therefore, where $a, b \in N, i \in O_a \cap I_b$:*

² Specifically, we assume each of the following to be of time complexity $\Theta(1)$: 1. receiving and sending messages of any length, 2. (de)constructing sum and product types, 3. accessing a given index in a bit string for reading or writing, 4. copying objects of any size, which is assumed to be done through copy-on-write references.

- The interface types match: $\tau_a(i) = \tau_b(i)$.
- The edges have a consistent adversariality: $i \in A_a \iff i \in A_b$.

We denote the set of all valid cryptographic networks by $*$.

This corresponds to a directed network graph whose vertices are nodes, and whose edges connect output interfaces to their corresponding input interface.

Composing multiple such networks is a straightforward operation, achieved through set union. While the resulting network is not necessarily valid, as it may lead to uniqueness of interfaces being violated, it can be used to construct any valid network out of its components. We also make use of a disjoint union, $A \uplus B$, by which we mean the union of A and B , while asserting that A and B are disjoint. Due to the frequency of its use, we will allow omitting the disjoint union operator, that is, we write AB to denote $A \uplus B$.

Definition 4 (Unbound Interfaces). *In a typed cryptographic network N , the sets of unbound input and output interfaces, written $I(N)$ and $O(N)$, respectively, are defined as the set of all tuples (i, τ) for which there exists $a \in N$ and $i \in I_a$ (resp. $i \in O_a$), where for all $b \in N$, $i \notin O_b$ (resp. $i \notin I_b$), with τ being defined as its type, $\tau_a(i)$. Furthermore, $IO_{\mathcal{H}}(N)$ is defined as the unbound honest interfaces: all $(i, \cdot) \in I(N) \cup O(N)$, where i is honest, that is, where $\forall a \in N : i \notin A_a$.*

We can define a straightforward token-passing execution mechanism over typed cryptographic networks, which demonstrates how each network behaves as a single random system³. We primarily operate with networks instead of reducing them to a single random system to preserve their structure: It allows easily applying knowledge assumptions to each part, and enables sharing components in parallel composition, a requirement for globality.

Definition 5 (Execution). *A typed cryptographic network N , together with an ordering of $I(N)$ and $O(N)$ defines a random system through token-passing execution, with the input and output domains $\sum_{(\cdot, \tau) \in I(N)} \tau / \sum_{(\cdot, \tau) \in O(N)} \tau$, respectively. Execution is defined through a stateful passing of messages – any input to N will be targeted to some $(i, \cdot) \in I(N)$. The input is provided to the random system R_a , for which $i \in I_a$. Its output will be associated with an $o \in O_a$. If there exists a $b \in N$ such that $o \in I_b$, it is forwarded to R_b , continuing in a loop until no such node exists. At this point, the output is associated with $(o, \cdot) \in O(N)$ (note that, if $O(N) = \emptyset$, the corresponding random system cannot be defined, as it has an empty output domain), and is encoded to the appropriate part of the output domain.*

Appendix A goes into more detail on the semantics, formally describing the functions $\text{exec}(N, i, x)$ and $\text{execState}(N, i, x, \Sigma)$. In order to help with preventing interface clashes, we introduce a renaming operation.

³ Termination is an issue here, in so far as the network may loop infinitely using message passing. We consider a non-terminating network to return the symbol \perp , although this might render the output uncomputable.

Definition 6 (Renaming). For a cryptographic network N , renaming interfaces a_1, \dots, a_n to b_1, \dots, b_n , is denoted by:

$$N[a_1/b_1, \dots, a_n/b_n] := \{ m \in N \mid m[a_1/b_1, \dots, a_n/b_n] \}.$$

Where, for $m = (I_m, O_m, \tau_m, \cdot, A_m)$, $m[a_1/b_1, \dots, a_n/b_n]$ is defined by replacing each occurrence of a_i in the sets I_m , O_m and A_m with the corresponding b_i , as well as changing the domain of τ_m to accept b_i instead of a_i , with the same effect.

To ensure renaming does not introduce unexpected effects, we leave it undefined when any of the output names b_i are present in the network N , and are not themselves renamed (i.e. no a_j exists such that $a_j = b_i$). Likewise, we prohibit renaming where multiple output names are equal. For a set of cryptographic networks, the same notation denotes renaming on each of its elements.

When talking about valid distinguishers, these are sets of cryptographic networks closed under internal renaming.

Definition 7 (Distinguisher Set). A set of distinguishers $\mathfrak{D} \subseteq *$ is any subset of $*$ which is closed under internal renaming: For any $D \in \mathfrak{D}$, $\vec{n} = a_1/b_1, \dots, a_n/b_n$, where no a_i or b_i are in $I(D)$ or $O(D)$, $D[\vec{n}] \in * \implies D[\vec{n}] \in \mathfrak{D}$.

Composition is also defined for distinguisher sets. Given a set of networks \mathfrak{D} and a network A , $\mathfrak{D}A$ is defined as the closure under internal renaming of $\{ DA \mid D \in \mathfrak{D} : DA \in * \}$. Observe that $*$ is closed under composition, and therefore $*A \subseteq *$ for any $A \in *$. Renaming for distinguisher sets is defined similarly, allowing distinguisher sets to give special meaning to some *external* interfaces, but not to internal ones.

3.4 Observational Indistinguishability

Now that we have established the semantics of cryptographic networks, we can reason about their observational indistinguishability, defined through the statistical distances of their induced random systems combined with arbitrary distinguishers. The indistinguishability experiment is visualised in Figure 1.

Definition 8 (Observational Indistinguishability). Two cryptographic networks A and B are observationally indistinguishable with advantage ϵ with respect to the set of valid distinguishers \mathfrak{D} , written $A \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} B$, if and only if:

- Their unbound inputs and outputs match: $I(A) = I(B) \wedge O(A) = O(B)$.
- For any network $D \in \mathfrak{D}$ for which DA and DB are both in $*$, with $I(DA) = I(DB) = (\cdot, \mathbb{1})$ and $O(DA) = O(DB) = (\cdot, \mathbb{2})$, the statistical distance $\delta^{\mathfrak{D}}(A, B)$ is at most ϵ , where

$$\delta^{\mathfrak{D}}(A, B) := \sup_{D \in \mathfrak{D}} \Delta^D(A, B)$$

$$\Delta^D(A, B) := |\Pr(DA = 1) - \Pr(DB = 1)|.$$

To simplify some corner cases, where $\forall D \in \mathfrak{D} : DA \notin * \vee DB \notin *$, we consider $\delta^{\mathfrak{D}}(A, B)$ to be 0 – in other words, we consider undefined behaviours indistinguishable.

The \mathfrak{D} term is omitted if it is clear from the context.




Fig. 1. A visual representation of an example $A \overset{\mathfrak{D}}{\approx} B$ experiment, with solid lines representing honest interfaces, and dashed representing adversarial interfaces.

Observe that observational indistinguishability claims can be weakened:

$$A \overset{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}_1}{\approx} B \wedge \mathfrak{D}_2 \subseteq \mathfrak{D}_1 \implies A \overset{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}_2}{\approx} B \quad (1)$$

Lemma 1 (Observational Renaming). *Observational indistinguishability is closed under interface renaming:*

$$\forall A, B \in *, \mathfrak{D} \subseteq *, \epsilon, \vec{n} : A[\vec{n}], B[\vec{n}] \in * \wedge A \overset{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}}{\approx} B \implies A[\vec{n}] \overset{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}[\vec{n}]}{\approx} B[\vec{n}]$$

Proof. By precondition, we know that $I(A) = I(B) \wedge O(A) = O(B)$, that $\delta^{\mathfrak{D}}(A, B) \leq \epsilon$, and that \mathfrak{D} is closed under renaming. As renaming is restricted by definition to not create any new connections, $I(A[\vec{n}]) = I(A)[\vec{n}] = I(B)[\vec{n}] = I(B[\vec{n}])$, and likewise for O . As \mathfrak{D} remains unchanged, it remains to show that $\sup_{D \in \mathfrak{D}} |\Pr(DA[\vec{n}] = 1) - \Pr(DB[\vec{n}] = 1)| \leq \epsilon$.

Consider how, for $D \in \mathfrak{D}$, $(DA)[\vec{n}]$ and $(DB)[\vec{n}]$, are related to $D'(A[\vec{n}])$ and $D'(B[\vec{n}])$. If $(DA)[\vec{n}]$ is well-defined, then for $D' = D[\vec{n}]$, then $(DA)[\vec{n}] = D'(A[\vec{n}])$. Moreover, for any $D' \in \mathfrak{D}$, there exists some internal renaming \vec{m} such that $(D'[\vec{m}]A)[\vec{n}]$ and $(D'[\vec{m}]B)[\vec{n}]$ are well-defined, as the renaming \vec{m} can remove the potential name clashes introduced by \vec{n} . As \mathfrak{D} is closed under renaming, it is therefore sufficient to show that $\sup_{D \in \mathfrak{D}} |\Pr((DA)[\vec{n}] = 1) - \Pr((DB)[\vec{n}] = 1)| \leq \epsilon$. As the execution semantics of $(DA)[\vec{n}]$ and $(DB)[\vec{n}]$ does not use interface names, this is equivalent to $\sup_{D \in \mathfrak{D}} |\Pr(DA = 1) - \Pr(DB = 1)| = \delta^{\mathfrak{D}}(A, B) \leq \epsilon$. \square

Lemma 2 (Observational Equivalence). *Observational indistinguishability is an equivalence relation: It is **transitive**⁴ (Equation 2), **reflexive** (Equation 3),*

⁴ Technically, due to the error terms, the relation is not transitive, but obeys a triangle inequality, and as a result it is also not an equivalence relation. We view this as a weak transitivity instead, as in practice, for negligible error terms, it behaves as such.

and **symmetric** (Equation 4). For all $A, B, C \in *$, $\mathfrak{D} \subseteq *$, $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 \in \mathbb{R}$:

$$A \stackrel{\epsilon_1, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} B \wedge B \stackrel{\epsilon_2, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} C \implies A \stackrel{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} C \quad (2)$$

$$A \stackrel{0, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} A \quad (3)$$

$$A \stackrel{\epsilon_1, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} B \iff B \stackrel{\epsilon_1, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} A \quad (4)$$

Proof. We prove each part independently, given the well-known fact that statistical distance forms a pseudo-metric [28].

Transitivity. The equality of the input and output interfaces can be established by the transitivity of equality. The statistical distance is established through the triangle equality. Specifically, for all $D \in \mathfrak{D}$, $\Delta^D(A, C) \leq \Delta^D(A, B) + \Delta^D(B, C) \leq \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2$. The only case where this is not immediate is if $DB \notin *$, which occurs in the case of an internal interface name collision – resolvable with renaming and use of Lemma 1. \square

Reflexivity. By the reflexivity of equality for input and output interfaces, and $\delta^{\mathfrak{D}}(A, A) = 0$ being established for pseudo-metrics. \square

Symmetry. By the symmetry of equality, and pseudo-metrics. \square

Lemma 3 (Observational Subgraph Substitution). *Observational indistinguishability is closed under subgraph substitution.*

$$\forall A, B, C \in *, \mathfrak{D} \subseteq *, \epsilon \in \mathbb{R} : A \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}C}{\sim} B \iff CA \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} CB$$

Proof. The equality of outgoing interfaces is trivially preserved under substitution, as the outgoing interfaces of A and B are the same by assumption.

We know that $\forall D \in \mathfrak{D}C : \Delta^D(A, B) \leq \epsilon$. Suppose there existed a distinguisher $D \in \mathfrak{D}$ such that $\Delta^D(CA, CB) \geq \epsilon$. Then, we can define $D' \in \mathfrak{D}C$ as DC , redrawing the boundary between distinguisher and network. By definition, $D' \in \mathfrak{D}C$, allowing us to conclude $\exists D' \in \mathfrak{D}C : \Delta^{D'}(A, B) \geq \epsilon$, arriving at a contradiction. The proof runs analogously in the opposite direction. \square

Corollary 1. *For $\mathfrak{D} = *$, observational indistinguishability has the following, simpler statement for closure under subgraph substitution:*

$$\forall A, B, C \in *, \epsilon : A \stackrel{\epsilon, *}{\sim} B \implies CA \stackrel{\epsilon, *}{\sim} CB$$

3.5 Composably Secure Construction of Networks

(Composable) simulation-based security proofs are then proofs that there exists an extension to one network connecting only on adversarial interfaces, such that it is observationally indistinguishable to another. We visualise and provide an example of construction in Figure 2.

Definition 9 (Network Construction). A network $A \in *$ constructs another network $B \in *$ with respect to a distinguisher class \mathfrak{D} with simulator $\alpha \in *$ and error $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}$, written $A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}} B$, if and only if $A \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} \alpha B$ and α and B have disjoint honest interfaces: $IO_{\mathcal{H}}(\alpha) \cap IO_{\mathcal{H}}(B) = \emptyset$. The \mathfrak{D} term may be omitted when it is clear from the context, the α term may be omitted when it is of no interest, and the ϵ term may be omitted when it is negligible.




Fig. 2. A visual representation of the $A \xrightarrow{\alpha, \mathfrak{D}} B$ experiment.

As with observational indistinguishability, network construction statements can be arbitrarily weakened. Furthermore, it is directly implied by indistinguishability:

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}_1} B \wedge \mathfrak{D}_2 \subseteq \mathfrak{D}_1 \implies A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}_2} B \quad (5)$$

$$A \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} B \implies A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \emptyset, \mathfrak{D}} B \quad (6)$$

Theorem 1 (Generalised Composition). Network construction is composable, in that it satisfies **transitivity** (Equation 7), **subgraph substitutability** (Equation 8), and **renameability** (Equation 9). For all $A, B, C, \alpha, \beta \in *$, $\mathfrak{D} \subseteq *$, $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 \in \mathbb{R}$, \vec{n} :

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}} B \wedge B \xrightarrow{\epsilon_2, \beta, \mathfrak{D}\alpha} C \wedge \alpha\beta C \in * \implies A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \alpha\beta, \mathfrak{D}} C \quad (7)$$

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}C} B \wedge IO_{\mathcal{H}}(C) \cap IO_{\mathcal{H}}(\alpha B) = \emptyset \implies CA \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}} CB \quad (8)$$

$$A[\vec{n}], \alpha[\vec{n}]B[\vec{n}] \in * \wedge A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}} B \implies A[\vec{n}] \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha[\vec{n}], \mathfrak{D}[\vec{n}]} B[\vec{n}] \quad (9)$$

Proof. We will prove each of the three properties separately.

Transitivity. By assumption, we know that $A \stackrel{\epsilon_1, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} \alpha B$ and $B \stackrel{\epsilon_2, \mathfrak{D}\alpha}{\sim} \beta C$. By Lemma 3, we can conclude that $\alpha B \stackrel{\epsilon_2, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} \alpha\beta C$. By transitivity (Lemma 2), we conclude that $A \stackrel{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} \alpha\beta C$.

Observe that β and C , as well as α and B have disjoint honest interfaces by assumption. As $B \stackrel{\epsilon_2, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} \beta C$, they have the same public-facing interfaces. As $\alpha\beta C$

is well-defined, and as α and B have disjoint honest interfaces, so does α and βC . From each of α , β , and C 's honest interfaces being disjoint, we conclude that so are $\alpha\beta$ and C 's. \square

Closure under subgraph substitution. By assumption, we know $A \stackrel{\epsilon_1, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} \alpha B$. By Lemma 3, we can conclude that $CA \stackrel{\epsilon_1, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} C\alpha B$. As composition is a disjoint union, it is commutative, and therefore $C\alpha B = \alpha CB$. The interface disjointness requirement is satisfied by the precondition. \square

Closure under renaming. By assumption, we know $A \stackrel{\epsilon_1, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} \alpha B$. By Lemma 1, we conclude that $A[\vec{n}] \stackrel{\epsilon_1, \mathfrak{D}[\vec{n}]}{\sim} (\alpha B)[\vec{n}] = \alpha[\vec{n}]B[\vec{n}]$. As $\alpha[\vec{n}]B[\vec{n}] \in *$, both $\alpha[\vec{n}]$ and $B[\vec{n}]$ are in $*$. As the honesty of edges remains unaffected by subgraph substitution, name collisions are not introduced, the disjointness requirement is also satisfied. Combined, this implies network construction in the renamed setting. \square

From the generalised composition theorem, which notably relies on modifying the distinguisher set (e.g. from \mathfrak{D} to $\mathfrak{D}\alpha$ in Equation 7), we can infer operations similar to sequential and parallel composition in Constructive Cryptography, given $\mathfrak{D} = *$. For any \mathfrak{D} , identity also holds, due to the identity of indistinguishability, and indistinguishability lifting to construction.

Corollary 2 (Traditional Composition). *For $\mathfrak{D} = *$, honest network construction has the following, simpler statements for **universal transitivity** (Equation 10) and **universal closure under subgraph substitution** (Equation 11). **Identity** (Equation 12) holds regardless of \mathfrak{D} . For all $A, B, C, \alpha, \beta \in *$, $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 \in \mathbb{R}$, $\mathfrak{D} \subseteq *$:*

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, *} B \wedge B \xrightarrow{\epsilon_2, \beta, *} C \wedge \alpha\beta C \in * \implies A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \alpha\beta, *} C \quad (10)$$

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, *} B \wedge I_{\mathcal{H}}(C) \cap I_{\mathcal{H}}(\alpha B) = \emptyset \implies CA \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, *} CB \quad (11)$$

$$A \xrightarrow{0, \emptyset, \mathfrak{D}} A \quad (12)$$

4 The Limited Composition of \mathfrak{K} -Networks

Having established a composition system which allows restricting the domain of permissible distinguishers, and having formalised the general notion of knowledge assumptions, we can now establish the main contribution of this paper: Permitting extraction from knowledge assumptions within a composable setting.

We use a similar idea to that of “algebraic adversaries” in the Algebraic Group Model [17], requiring random systems to output not only knowledge-implying objects, but also their corresponding witness. We then add new nodes to the network which gather all data extracted in this way in a central repository of knowledge for each knowledge assumption. Crucially, while the distinguisher

supplies witnesses for all knowledge-implying objects it outputs, it is not capable of retrieving witnesses from other parts of the system.

Simulators are provided with read access to this repository, allowing the simulator to extract the knowledge it requires, but not any more about the behaviour of honest parties. The composition of constructions using knowledge assumptions is proven, provided the parts being composed do not both utilise the same knowledge assumption. In such a case, Theorem 1 provides a fall-back for what needs to be proven, namely that the simulator of one system does not permit distinguishing in the other system. At a technical level, modifications to Definition 3 are needed to allow types to depend on previously transmitted values. We note these formally in Appendix C, however suggest reading this section without it first. This section serves as a detailed proof sketch, with Appendix C addressing some of the subtleties.

4.1 Knowledge Respecting Systems

The Algebraic Group Model [17] popularised the idea of “algebraic” adversaries, which must adhere to outputting group elements through a representation describing how they may be constructed from input group elements. Security proofs in the AGM assume that all adversaries are algebraic, and therefore the representation of group elements can be directly accessed in the reduction – by assumption it is provided by the adversary itself.

While this is equivalent to an extractor-based approach, for composition we will follow a similar “algebraic” approach. The premise is that for any random system R outputting (among other things) knowledge-implying objects in \mathfrak{K} , it is possible to construct an equivalent random system $\mathfrak{K}(R)$, which outputs the corresponding witnesses as well, provided each step of the random system is governed by a \mathfrak{K} -respecting algorithm.

Recall that a random system is an infinite sequence of probability distributions. As this is not in itself useful for applying Definition 1, we instead interpret them as an equivalence class over stateful, interactive, and probabilistic algorithms [26], with associated input and output types. For any such typed algorithm A and knowledge assumption \mathfrak{K}_{pp} , A can be separated into A_1 and A_2 , where A_1 outputs only a series of $[X_{pp}]$ values, and A_2 all the remaining information, such that A ’s output can be trivially reconstructed by inserting the $[X_{pp}]$ values of A_1 into the gaps in A_2 ’s outputs. Likewise, inputs can be split into the \vec{I} and aux inputs used in Game 1. Given this, we can define when a random system is \mathfrak{K} -respecting. Each such system has a corresponding “ \mathfrak{K} -lifted” system, which behaves “algebraically”, in that it also output witnesses.

Definition 10 (\mathfrak{K} -Respecting Systems). *A typed random system R is said to be \mathfrak{K} -respecting (or $R \in \text{RespSys}_{\mathfrak{K}}$), if and only if its equivalence class of stateful probabilistic algorithms contains a stateful algorithm A that when split as described in Subsection 4.1 into A_1 and A_2 , satisfies $A_1 \in \text{Resp}_{\mathfrak{K}}$. For a set $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$, $\text{RespSys}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}} := \bigcap_{\mathfrak{K} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}} \text{RespSys}_{\mathfrak{K}}$.*

Definition 11 ($\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -Lifted Systems). A typed random system R induces a set of $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -lifted random systems. This is defined by replacing, for any $\mathfrak{K} = (\cdot, X, W, \mathcal{R}) \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}$, any (part of) an output from R with type $[\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}]$ with (a part of) the output with type $\langle \mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}, I_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}} \rangle$, where $I_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}$ is constructed as the set of all prior inputs to R of type $[\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}]$. The output (part) $\langle x, w \rangle_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}^{I_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}}$ of the lifted system must be such that the equivalent output (part) on the unlifted system is $[x]_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}$, and $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}(I_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}})$ with overwhelming probability.

Theorem 2 ($\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -Lifting is Possible). For random systems $R \in \text{RespSys}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$, at least one $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -lifting of R , denoted $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(R)$, exists.

Proof. Split R into algorithms $A_{\mathfrak{K}}$ for each $\mathfrak{K} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}$, and A_* for the remaining computation, such that each $A_{\mathfrak{K}}$ outputs only $[\mathfrak{K}]$, and A_* outputs no such values, as described above. Then, by Assumption 1, there exist corresponding extractors $\mathcal{X}_{\mathfrak{K}}$ for each $\mathfrak{K} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}$, such that given the same inputs $\mathcal{X}_{\mathfrak{K}}$ outputs witnesses to the knowledge-implying objects output by $A_{\mathfrak{K}}$.

Replace $A_{\mathfrak{K}}$ with $A'_{\mathfrak{K}}$, which runs both $A_{\mathfrak{K}}$ and $\mathcal{X}_{\mathfrak{K}}$, and outputs $\langle x, w \rangle_{\mathfrak{K}}$, where $[x]_{\mathfrak{K}}$ is the output of $A_{\mathfrak{K}}$, and w is the output of $\mathcal{X}_{\mathfrak{K}}$. When reassembled into a random system, this modification satisfies Definition 11. \square

4.2 Lifting Networks for Knowledge Extraction

The set of $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -respecting random systems $\text{RespSys}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$, along with the transformation $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(R)$ for any $R \in \text{RespSys}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$, provides a means of lifting individual random systems. Applied to networks, it is clear something more is necessary – the lifting does not preserve the types of output interfaces, and to permit these to match again some additional changes need to be made to the networks. Looking forward, the lifted systems will interact with a separate, universal node REPO, which stores witnesses for the simulator to access.

We extend the notion of $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -respecting to apply to networks, a network is $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -respecting if and only if all vertices in it are also $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -respecting (we will use $\text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ as the corresponding set of $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -respecting networks⁵). In lifting networks in this set, not only is each individual node lifted, but all outgoing connections are connected to a new node, which we name CHARON, which acts as a relay; re-erasing witnesses, while also informing a central repository of knowledge (outside of this network) of any witnesses it processes. We take the name from the ferryman of the dead in ancient Greek mythology, who in our case demands his toll in knowledge rather than coins. For any $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -respecting network N , we define the lifting $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(N)$ as follows:

Definition 12 (Network Lifting). The network lifting $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(N)$ for any cryptographic network $N \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ is defined to compose as expected. In particular,

⁵ This set also forbids interface name clashes with REPO, ensuring this can be safely inserted, and is a subset of $*$.

if there exists $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}', N' : N = \vec{\mathfrak{K}}'(N')$, then $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(N)$ is defined as $(\vec{\mathfrak{K}} \cup \vec{\mathfrak{K}}')(N')$. Otherwise⁶, $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(N)$ is defined as consisting of nodes n' for each node $n \in N$, where $R_{n'} = \vec{\mathfrak{K}}(R_n)$, and each output interface is renamed to a unique⁷ new interface name. For each output interface now named x , and previously named y in N , $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(N)$ contains a new node $\text{CHARON}(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}, \text{adv})$, where adv denotes if the interface is adversarial, connected to free interfaces on the knowledge repository REPO and the public parameters for each knowledge assumption. Note that REPO is not part of the lifted network itself, which allows disjoint networks to remain disjoint when lifted.

We specify the node CHARON in full detail in Appendix B, along with the node $\text{REPO}(\vec{\mathfrak{K}})$, which collects witnesses from CHARON , and provides adversarial access to them. REPO allows for some variation. For instance, it could:

1. Return the set of all witnesses.
2. Return at most one witness.
3. Abort when no witness is available.
4. For recursive witnesses (such as those used in the AGM and KEA assumptions), consolidate the witness into a maximal one, by recursively resolving (INPUT, i) terms.

We focus on 1., as it is the simplest. The set of valid $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -distinguishers $\mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ is defined with respect to REPO , where we assume the choice of variation is made separately for each knowledge assumption. Informally, it ensures that all parts of the distinguisher are $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -lifted, and the distinguisher collects all witnesses in a central knowledge repository REPO , but does not retrieve witnesses from this, effectively only providing access to the simulator.

Definition 13 ($\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -Distinguishers). *The set of valid $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -distinguishers $\mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$, for any set of knowledge assumptions $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$, is defined as the closure under internal renaming of*

$$\left\{ \vec{\mathfrak{K}}(N) \cup \bigcup_{\mathfrak{K} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}} \text{REPO}(\mathfrak{K}) \mid N \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}} \right\}.$$

Note that as $N \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$, it cannot directly connect to any of the REPO nodes.

As the number of REPO and public parameter interfaces may differ between the real and ideal world, we must normalise them before establishing indistinguishability. To do so, we wrap both worlds to contain an additional node, which we name \perp , which consumes all remaining interfaces, depending on the number already used. Formally, this is defined in Appendix B.3.

⁶ Note that this is well-founded recursion, due to the base-case of $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} = \emptyset$, and as the order in which knowledge assumptions are added does not affect CHARON or REPO .

⁷ Where we assume uniqueness, this is assumed globally: In $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(A)\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(B)$, the uniquely selected interface names should not clash, therefore being the same as $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(AB)$.

Given these definitions, existing indistinguishability and construction results between $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -respecting networks can be lifted to equivalent results between the lifted networks, with respect to $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -distinguishers:

Lemma 4 (Indistinguishability Lifting). *If $A_1A_2 \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}}{\sim} B_1B_2$, where for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, $A_i, B_i \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2}$, $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \cap \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2 = \emptyset$, and $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} := \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \cup \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$, then:*

$$A_1A_2 \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}}{\sim} B_1B_2 \implies A_1\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2) \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}}{\sim} B_1\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B_2).$$

Lemma 5 (Construction Lifting). *For $A_{1,2}, B_{1,2}, \alpha_{1,2} \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2}$ and $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$ where $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \cap \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2 = \emptyset$, and $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} := \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \cup \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$:*

$$A_1A_2 \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha_1\alpha_2, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}} B_1B_2 \implies A_1\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2) \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha_1\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\alpha_2), \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} B_1\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B_2).$$

We visualise the construction experiment against a knowledge-respecting distinguisher set $\mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ in Figure 3. This may be contrasted with Figure 2, which does not have $\text{REPO}(\vec{\mathfrak{K}})$, and does not allow the simulator to extract.




Fig. 3. A visual representation of the $A \xrightarrow{\alpha, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} B$ experiment. The small points denote $\text{CHARON}(\vec{\mathfrak{K}})$ nodes, while $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ denotes the $\text{REPO}(\vec{\mathfrak{K}})$ node. Public parameters have been omitted. Note that outside of D CHARON nodes are permitted, but not required.

Lemma 6 ($\mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ Closure). $\mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ is closed under sequential composition with lifted (with respect to $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$) networks in $\text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$: $\forall R \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}: \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}\vec{\mathfrak{K}}(R) \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$

Proof. Follows immediately from $\text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ being closed under set union, and Definition 13 stating that any $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -lifted network has a corresponding distinguisher in $\mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$. \square

As stricter set of knowledge assumptions corresponds to a smaller set of permissible distinguishers, indistinguishability and construction results can be transferred to larger sets of knowledge assumptions. A proof without knowledge assumptions is clearly ideal – it still holds, regardless which knowledge assumptions are added.

Lemma 7 (Knowledge Weakening). *In addition to weakening with respect to a subset of distinguishers being possible, weakening is also possible for distinguishers with a greater set of knowledge assumptions. For all $A, B, C, \alpha \in *$, $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$, where $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \subseteq \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$:*

$$A \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1} C}{\sim} B \implies A \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2} C}{\sim} B \quad (13)$$

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1} C} B \implies A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2} C} B \quad (14)$$

4.3 A Restricted Composition Theorem

The rules established in Theorem 1 still hold, and it is clear why a simplification as in Corollary 2 is not possible – it assumes that the distinguisher set \mathfrak{D} is closed under sequential composition with simulators and networks, which is not the case for $\mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$.

Theorem 1 already provides a sufficient condition for what needs to be proven to enable this composition, however we can go a step further: While $\mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ is not closed under sequential composition with arbitrary networks, it *is* closed under sequential composition with knowledge-lifted networks. We can use this fact to establish a simplified composition theorem when composing with a $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -lifted proof or network component. We observe that this implies composition with proofs which do not utilise knowledge assumptions, as they are isomorphic to $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} = \emptyset$. In particular, Constructive Cryptography proofs directly imply construction in the context of this paper as well, and can therefore be composed with protocols utilising our framework freely.

Theorem 3 (Knowledge Composition). *When composing proofs against $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1$ or $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$ distinguishers, where $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \cap \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2 = \emptyset$, and $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} := \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \cup \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$, the following simplified composition rules of **transitivity** (Equation 15) and **sub-graph substitution** (Equation 16) apply. For all $A, B, \alpha \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2}$, $F \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$, $C, D, E, \beta, \gamma \in *$, $\epsilon, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$.*

$$\left[\begin{array}{c} A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}} B \\ \wedge \\ B \xrightarrow{\epsilon_2, \beta, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2}} C \end{array} \right] \wedge \alpha\beta C \in * \implies A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\alpha)\beta, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} C \quad (15)$$

$$D \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \gamma, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} E \wedge IO_{\mathcal{H}}(F) \cap IO_{\mathcal{H}}(\gamma E) = \emptyset \implies \vec{\mathfrak{K}}(F)D \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \gamma, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} \vec{\mathfrak{K}}(F)E \quad (16)$$

4.4 Reusing Knowledge Assumptions

Theorem 3 and its supporting lemmas prominently require disjoint sets of knowledge assumptions. The primary reason for this lies in the definition of $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ using the union of the knowledge assumptions $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1$ and $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$ – all statements could also be

made using a disjoint union here instead. If knowledge assumptions were not disjoint, this would place an unreasonable constraint on the distinguisher however: It would prevent it from copying information from one instance of a knowledge assumption to another instance of the same knowledge assumption, something any adversary is clearly capable of doing.

Equality for knowledge assumptions is not really well defined, and indeed knowledge assumptions may be related. The disjointness requirement is therefore more a statement of intent than an actual constraint, and we stress the importance of it for reasonably constraining the distinguisher set here: If the distinguisher is constrained with respect to two instances of knowledge assumptions which are related, it may not be permitted to copy from one to another for instance, an artificial and unreasonable constraint.

Care must be taken that knowledge stemming from one knowledge assumption does not give an advantage in another. In many – but not all – cases this is easy to establish, for instance, we conjecture that multiple instances with the AGM with independently sampled groups are sufficiently independent. If this care is not taken, the union of two knowledge assumptions may be greater than the sum of its parts, as using both together prevents the distinguisher from exploiting structural relationships between the two, something a real adversary may do.

5 zk-SNARKs with an Updateable Reference String

To demonstrate the usefulness of this framework, we will showcase an example of how it can lift existing results to composability. For brevity, we sketch the approach instead of providing it in full detail. Specifically, we sketch how Groth’s zk-SNARK [19], due to being simulation extractable [1], can be used to construct an ideal NIZK. Our methodology applies to any SNARK scheme which permits proof simulation and extraction through the AGM. Further, we sketch how, when used for a SNARK requiring an *updateable* reference string, a round-robin protocol to produce the reference string can be used to instantiate the NIZK from only the CRS providing the AGM parameters.

Our approach for NIZKs is similar to $C\emptyset C\emptyset$ [25], with the difference that no additional transformation is necessary to extract witnesses, as these are provided through $\mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}}$ -lifting and the simulator’s ability to extract from the knowledge assumption. The round-robin update follows [23] for its composable treatment updateable reference strings, simplified to a setting with fixed participants.

Once our proof sketch is complete, we also give a clear example of why universal composition is not possible with knowledge assumptions: Specifically, we construct a complementary ideal network and simulator which clearly violates the zero-knowledge properties of the NIZK, and allows distinguishing the real and ideal worlds. We stress that this is only possible due to it extracting from the same knowledge assumption.

5.1 Construction

Our construction is in two parts, each consisting of a real and ideal world. We describe and illustrate the set-up and behaviour here, leaving a more formal description of the exact behaviour to Appendix D. Throughout the construction, we assume a set of n parties, identified by an element in \mathbb{Z}_n . We assume static corruption with at least one honest party – specifically we assume a set of adversaries $\mathcal{A} \subset \mathbb{Z}_n$, and a corresponding set of honest parties $\mathcal{H} := \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}$. These sets cannot be used in the protocols themselves, but are known to the distinguisher and non-protocol nodes (that is, they can be used to define ideal behaviour).

SNARKs. The highest level ideal world consists of a proof-malleable NIZK node (NIZK, see Appendix D.2), following the design of $C\emptyset C\emptyset$ [25]. In the corresponding real-world, we use a zk-SNARK scheme $\mathcal{S} = (S, T, P, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{SimProve}, \mathcal{X}_w)$ satisfying the standard properties of correctness, soundness, and zero-knowledge in the random oracle model with SRS. Here S , T , and P , are the structure function, trapdoor domain, and permissible permutations⁸ of the structured reference strings, as given in [23]. SimProve should take as inputs only the witness x and trapdoor $\tau \in T$. In addition, \mathcal{S} should be simulation extractable with respect to the AGM – after any arbitrary interaction, \mathcal{X}_w should be able to produce the witness for any valid statement/proof pair, with the sole exception that the proof was generated with SimProve . Such white-box simulation extractability has been under-studied for zk-SNARKs, although it has been established for Groth’s zk-SNARK [1], and is plausible to hold in the AGM for most SNARKs. For this reason, we rely on Groth’s zk-SNARK to concretely instantiate this example, although we conjecture it applies to other SNARKs – and indeed part of the result *can* only apply to other SNARKs.

In the real world an adversarially biased (updateable) structured reference string (SRS, see Appendix D.3), parameterised for the SNARK’s reference string, is available. Further, for each honest party $j \in \mathcal{H}$, an instance of the SNARK protocol node ($\text{SNARK-NODE}(j)$, see Appendix D.3) is available, which connects to the corresponding party’s SRS interface, and runs the SNARK’s Prove and Verify algorithms when queried. In both worlds, the $\mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}}$ public parameters are provided by a node \mathbb{G} (see Appendix D.1). Finally, the SNARK’s Prove and Verify algorithms make use of a random oracle, which is available in the real world, providing query interfaces to all parties (we do not treat the random oracle as a knowledge assumption in this example).

The ideal-world therefore consists of $\{\text{NIZK}, \mathbb{G}\}$ (and the simulator, which will be introduced in the security analysis), and the real-world consists of $\text{SNARK} \uplus \{\text{SRS}, \text{RO}, \mathbb{G}\}$, where $\text{SNARK} := \{ \text{SNARK-NODE}(j) \mid j \in \mathcal{H} \}$. The topology of both worlds is sketched in Figure 4.

⁸ This can also capture non-updateable reference strings, when parameterised with the set of permissible permutations $P = \{\text{id}\}$. Notably this allows us to capture Groth’s zk-SNARK, while not excluding updateable zk-SNARKs such as Plonk [18] and Sonic [27].




Fig. 4. The SNARK to NIZK topologies. SNARK-NODE is represented by Π , and the public parameter node \mathbb{G} is omitted for clarity.

Round-robin SRS. If the reference string used in the SNARK scheme \mathcal{S} is also updateable in the sense of [23], we can construct the SRS itself through a round-robin update protocol. We assume therefore that \mathcal{S} is additionally parameterised by algorithms ProveUpd and VerifyUpd allowing the proving and verification of update proofs, the permutation lifting \dagger which maps permutations in P to permutations over the structure, and the algorithms \mathcal{S}_ρ and \mathcal{X}_ρ used by the simulator to simulate update proofs and extract permutations from updates respectively. A notable difference again with respect to the extraction is that it should be with respect to the AGM, rather than with respect to a NIZK as presented in [23].

The ideal world in this part matches part of the SNARK real world previously, consisting of the pair of nodes $\{\text{SRS}, \mathbb{G}\}$. The real-world consists of a node providing synchronous, authenticated broadcast (BCAST, see Appendix D.4), and for each honest party $j \in \mathcal{H}$, a round-robin protocol node ($\text{RR-NODE}(j)$, see Appendix D.4).

The SRS node requires each honest party to request initialisation, which in the round-robin node is mapped to a) reconstructing the current SRS, and b) broadcasting a randomly sampled update to it. As the real-world has no means of identifying honest parties, it requires *all* parties to broadcast a valid update before the reference string can be used. The adversary has access to the broadcast directly for corrupted parties to produce these updates.

The ideal-world therefore consists of $\{\text{SRS}, \mathbb{G}\}$ (and simulator), and the real-world consists of $\text{RR-SETUP} \uplus \{\text{BCAST}, \mathbb{G}\}$, where $\text{RR-SETUP} := \{\text{RR-NODE}(j) \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\}$. The topology of both worlds is sketched in Figure 5.




Fig. 5. The round-robin setup to SRS topologies. BCAST and RR-NODE are abbreviated to BC and RR respectively, and the public parameter node \mathbb{G} is omitted for clarity.

5.2 Security Analysis

This example is interesting for two reasons: Firstly, it provides a concrete way to realise a composable NIZK, and secondly it showcases (when the second optional stage of realising the SRS is used) special-case composition between two constructions using the same knowledge assumption, and what this requires of the corresponding simulators, as both simulators extract from $\text{REPO}(\mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}})$.

The two simulators, α for the simulator between SNARK and NIZK, and β for the simulator between RR-SETUP and SRS, are specified in full detail in Appendix D.5, although we sketch the most important aspects here. Notably, α needs to extract the witnesses from adversarial SNARK proofs, and β needs to extract the underlying trapdoor permutation from adversarial updates.

Round-robin SRS. The simulator β for the round-robin SRS setup emulates the broadcast node BCAST towards the adversary, and when notified of an honest party’s initialisation, does one of two things: For the first honest party, it queries the honest SRS part from SRS, and simulates the corresponding update proof using the simulator \mathcal{S}_ρ , as it knows the full trapdoor to use for this. For subsequent honest updates, it simply simulates the update protocol. In either case, the update is internally recorded to emulate the corresponding broadcast.

When an adversarial broadcast is received, the update is verified against the current SRS. If it succeeds, it is updated, and the corresponding permutation is extracted from the update proof (using $\mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}}$), and recorded. Specifically, the extractor \mathcal{X}_p , given oracle access to $\text{REPO}(\mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}})$, extracts the permutation from any update proof ρ . Observe that a) such a permutation exists by the nature of the verification of update proofs, and b) the only group elements which the simulator *cannot* extract from are those in the honest SRS component produced by the SRS node.

Given this, the adversary cannot create a valid update for which the permutation is not extractable, unless it reuses (part of) the honest update. This would directly require inverting its structure before re-applying (part of) it again however, or the adversary extracting the permutation itself. In either case, this amounts to breaking a discrete logarithm for SNARKs we considered, which we assume computationally infeasible.

Theorem 4 (Round-Robin uSRS). *Given the computational hardness of the structure function S , as well as computational hardness to extract a trapdoor permutation p from an update proof ρ :*

$$\mathfrak{R}(\text{RR-SETUP}) \uplus \{\mathbb{G}\} \xrightarrow{\beta, \mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{R}}} \{\text{SRS}, \mathbb{G}\}$$

Proof (sketch). The simulated broadcast network the adversary has access to behaves identically between the real protocol and the simulated one, due to identical execution, except for the first honest update. This is distributed uniformly randomly in the space of possible permutations in both cases.

As the simulator reproduces a permutation which applies precisely all updates after the first honest one, and the first honest update is distributed the

same in both worlds, the permutation the simulator applies to the honest trapdoor causes it to be distributed as in the real protocol. Further, both worlds abort if and only if the reference string is queried prior to full initialisation in both worlds. By the reasoning above and the hardness assumptions, extraction of adversarial updates always succeeds, and as a result the simulated update proof also succeeds. \square

SNARK. The SNARK simulator α both faithfully simulates the SRS node, creates simulated proofs for honest proving queries, and extracts witnesses using \mathcal{X}_w (which is given access to $\text{REPO}(\mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}})$) from adversarial proofs when requested by the NIZK node. Finally, if the simulator fails to extract a witness when asked for one for a valid proof, it requests a maul. The SNARK simulator can co-exist with the SRS simulator provided above, provided that the SRS update proofs cannot be interpreted as NIZK proofs (with the trapdoor permutation as a witness) themselves, or transformed into ones. In practice, this is not the case, as the AGM allows only for very specific transformations of group elements, and mapping update proofs to a corresponding NIZK would involve first solving DLOG before re-encoding the witness as a polynomial in most SNARKs.

Theorem 5 (SNARK Protocols Construct NIZKs). *For any secure SNARK scheme \mathcal{S} :*

$$\mathfrak{R}(\text{SNARK}) \uplus \{\text{SRS}, \mathfrak{R}(\text{RO}), \mathbb{G}\} \xrightarrow{\alpha, \mathfrak{D}_{\mathfrak{R}}} \{\text{NIZK}, \mathbb{G}\}. \quad (17)$$

Additionally, if \mathcal{S} is updateable (and therefore β is well-defined), and update proofs cannot be transformed into NIZK proofs with the trapdoor permutation as a witness:

$$\mathfrak{R}(\text{SNARK}) \uplus \{\text{SRS}, \mathfrak{R}(\text{RO}), \mathbb{G}\} \xrightarrow{\alpha, \mathfrak{D}_{\mathfrak{R}}\beta} \{\text{NIZK}, \mathbb{G}\}. \quad (18)$$

Proof (sketch). All honestly generated proofs will verify in both worlds, by definition in the ideal world, and by the correctness of the SNARK in the real world. Further, the proofs themselves are indistinguishable, by the zero-knowledge property of the SNARK.

Adversarial proofs which fail to verify will also be rejected in the ideal world, as the simulator will refuse to provide a witness, causing them to be rejected. As per the above, the extractor \mathcal{X}_w is able to (using $\text{REPO}(\mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}})$) extract the witnesses for any adversarial proof which *does* verify, except for cases of malleability. As \mathcal{S} is only (at most) proof-malleable, the simulator can, and does, account for this by attempting to create a mauled proof when extraction fails.

The simulator provides the ideal-world simulation of the SRS node, which is emulated faithfully except that the simulator has access to the trapdoor. As a result, this part of the system cannot be used to distinguish. We conclude that Equation 17 holds.

For Equation 18, it remains to be shown that α and β do not interfere: In particular, that neither prevents the other from extracting where they need to,

and that neither reveal information due to their extractions which would provide the distinguisher a non-negligible advantage. As β only interacts with the SRS, and this is not changed once all users have submitted their contribution, and α requires the SRS to be fully initialised before it is used, α will not prevent β from extracting – it does nothing while β is run.

Knowledge of the group elements exchanged during the update phase also does not assist the distinguisher in constructing a witness for any statement, as it can simulate them locally by running the honest update process. Therefore α can still fully extract in all cases.

Finally, due to the strict temporal order, β can, by definition, not assist the distinguisher in extracting any additional differences between SNARK and α (and the SRS part is emulated faithfully, preventing it there). Likewise, α cannot assist the distinguisher in extracting anything meaningful from β , as this would imply a NIZK witness containing the permutation of an honest update. As these are sampled locally, and the corresponding update proofs cannot be transformed into NIZK proofs, α cannot be leveraged to extract them. \square

Corollary 3. *For an updateable SNARK scheme \mathcal{S} whose update proofs cannot be transformed into NIZK proofs with the trapdoor permutation as a witness:*

$$\mathfrak{R}(\text{SNARK} \uplus \text{RR-SETUP}) \uplus \{\mathfrak{R}(\text{RO}), \mathbb{G}\} \xrightarrow{\beta, \mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{R}}} \{\text{NIZK}, \mathbb{G}\}$$

The topology for the composed statement arises naturally from the topologies of its parts, as shown in Figure 6.




Fig. 6. The combined full example topology, arising from the composition of prior components, again with \mathbb{G} omitted for clarity.

Proof. From Theorem 4 and Theorem 3 Equation 16, we can conclude that $\mathfrak{R}(\text{SNARK} \uplus \text{RR-SETUP}) \uplus \{\mathfrak{R}(\text{RO}), \mathbb{G}\} \xrightarrow{\beta, \mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{R}}} \mathfrak{R}(\text{SNARK}) \uplus \{\text{SRS}, \mathfrak{R}(\text{RO}), \mathbb{G}\}$. The corollary then follows from Theorem 5 and Theorem 3 Equation 18 Equation 15. \square

5.3 The Impossibility of General Composition

The two parts of Theorem 3 are limited when compared to Corollary 2 in two separate, but related ways: The closure under subgraph substitution requires the added node to be a $\vec{\mathcal{R}}$ -wrapped node, and transitivity requires the two composing proofs to use separate knowledge assumptions.

We will demonstrate that the nicer results from Corollary 2 are not achievable with respect to knowledge-respecting distinguishers, by means of a small counterexample for both situations.

Theorem 6 (Subgraph Substitution is Limited). *Subgraph substitution with knowledge assumptions does not universally preserve secure construction. $\exists A, B, C, \alpha \in *, \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}, \vec{\mathcal{R}}$:*

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathcal{R}}}} B \not\Rightarrow CA \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathcal{R}}}} CB$$

Proof (sketch). Let A be the Groth-16 real world, and B be the NIZK ideal world respectively, with α being their simulator, and $\vec{\mathcal{R}}$ being $\{\mathcal{R}_{\text{bAGM}}\}$. Let C be a node which receives elements in X_{pp} , queries $\text{REPO}(\mathcal{R}_{\text{bAGM}})$, and returns the witness to the distinguisher.

Then the following distinguisher can trivially distinguish the two worlds: a) Make any honest proving query. b) Request extraction. c) Output whether or not extraction succeeded. \square

Theorem 7 (Transitivity is Limited). *Construction with knowledge assumptions is not universally transitive. $\exists A, B, C, \alpha, \beta \in *, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 \in \mathbb{R}, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathcal{R}}}$:*

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \alpha, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathcal{R}}}} B \wedge B \xrightarrow{\epsilon_2, \beta, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathcal{R}}}} C \not\Rightarrow A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \alpha\beta, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathcal{R}}}} C$$

Proof (sketch). Let B be the Groth-16 real world, and C be the NIZK ideal world respectively, with β being their simulator, and $\vec{\mathcal{R}}$ being $\{\mathcal{R}_{\text{bAGM}}\}$. Let A be Groth-16 with additional interfaces for each party to reveal any witnesses of broadcast proofs, which are shared through an additional broadcast channel. Let α reproduce this functionality by extracting witnesses from the provided proofs.

Then a distinguisher which makes an honest proof and extracts it will receive the witness in the real and hybrid world, but not in the ideal world, where the knowledge extraction of the proof will fail, as it is simulated by β . It is therefore possible to distinguish, and transitivity does not hold. \square

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have for the first time demonstrated the composability of a white-box extractable zk-SNARK, without any transformations or modifications applied, and not compromising on succinctness. This result has immediate applications in the many systems which use zk-SNARKs and non-interactive

zero-knowledge, reducing the gap between the theory and practice of composable systems relying on SNARKs. Our results are sufficiently general to hope for similar benefits when applied to other primitives utilising knowledge assumptions.

We nonetheless leave a number of pressing issues to future work: In many cases knowledge assumptions *are* reused. For instance many different protocols rely on the same groups, with the BLS12-381 and BN-254 curves being de-facto standards for zk-SNARK computation due to their direct use in major software implementations [2, 4]. To what degree this reuse is harmful, if at all, is a question of immediate interest and concern. This is compounded by a recent interest in *recursive* zk-SNARKs, such as Halo [5] – a natural compositional definition of which would construct a zk-SNARK from itself repeatedly. We hope that this work paves the way for a proper compositional treatment of such recursive constructions.

The foundations of knowledge assumptions also require further fleshing out to match reality more fully. It is clear that some knowledge assumptions are related, for instance the knowledge of exponent assumption is implied by the AGM. More interestingly, non-interactive zero-knowledge can itself be seen as a knowledge assumption – knowledge of a valid proof implying knowledge of the witness. Exploring the formal relationship between different knowledge assumptions and expanding the model to fit these (for instance, by permitting public parameters to be adversarially influenced) may give valuable insight into the nature of these assumptions.

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A Specification of Network Execution

We define network execution formally through recursive sampling from the random systems in a cryptographic network. Formally, execution takes three inputs: A cryptographic network N , an interface i such that $\exists \tau : (i, \tau) \in I(N)$, and an input $x : \tau$. Execution returns either an interface o such that $\exists \tau' : (o, \tau') \in O(N)$, and $y : \tau'$, or the symbol \perp to indicate non-termination. Execution may be additionally made stateful by supplying a state Σ , which maps each node $n \in N$ to a pair (X_n, Y_n) , where X_n and Y_n are lists of equal length, with items corresponding to inputs and outputs of R_n , respectively. The stateless execution is defined as a special case of the stateful execution, with Σ mapping each node to a pair of empty lists.

To handle inputs and outputs during execution, it is necessary to encode inputs to the sum-types that the random systems expect, and to decode the outputs of these sum-types. Formally, forming the sum itself requires a total ordering of inputs and output interfaces. For execution we will require the existence of the following functions, which exist by virtue of this ordering: $\text{idx}(i, n)$, for $i \in I_n$ returns the index of the interface i in the sum-type of inputs in R_n , and $\text{int}(j, n)$, for $1 \leq j \leq |O_n| \wedge j \in \mathbb{N}$ returns the interface encoded to the j th position of the sum-type of outputs in R_n . Further, we use $\text{inj}_i(x)$ to mean that x is used as a value at the i th position of either sum-type. We write $f[x \mapsto y]$ to denote the function f' equal to f in all points except x , where $f'(x) = y$.

```

function  $\text{exec}(N, i, x)$ 
  let  $(o, y, \cdot) \leftarrow \text{execState}(N, i, x, \forall n \in N : n \mapsto (\epsilon, \epsilon))$ 
  return  $(o, y)$ 

function  $\text{execState}(N, i, x, \Sigma)$ 
  let  $n \in N$  be the node for which  $i \in I_n \wedge x : \tau_n(i)$ 
  let  $(X_n, Y_n) \leftarrow \Sigma(n); i \leftarrow |X_n|$ 
  let  $x' \leftarrow \text{inj}_{\text{idx}(i, n)}(x)$ 
  let  $\text{inj}_j(y) \leftarrow P_{Y_i | (X_n :: x') Y_n}^{R_n}$ 
  let  $o \leftarrow \text{int}(j, n); \Sigma' \leftarrow \Sigma[n \mapsto ((X_n :: x'), (Y_n :: \text{inj}_j(y)))]$ 
  if  $o \in O(N)$  then
    return  $(o, y, \Sigma')$ 
  else

```

return execState(N, o, y, Σ')

B CHARON and REPO Nodes

In the specification of specific nodes, we will declare the interfaces involved, which interfaces are inputs, outputs, and adversarial, and their associated types. Often to return responses or reactivate, interfaces come in pairs on input and output. In these cases we will write i/o for the input i and the output o for less verbose notation. We write $\tau_{pp, \mathfrak{R}}$ for the type of the domain of init for \mathfrak{R} .

B.1 The CHARON Node

Node CHARON ($\vec{\mathfrak{R}}, \text{adv}$)		
<p>This node intercepts an outgoing message of $\vec{\mathfrak{R}}(R)$, and maps it to the corresponding message R would have output, as well as sending the additional witnesses to REPO(\mathfrak{R}). adv indicates if this node should be adversarial or not. τ and τ' represent the arbitrary types of the interface in $\mathfrak{R}(R)$ and R respectively, differing only in that τ has instances of $[\mathfrak{R}]$ replaced with $\langle \mathfrak{R}, I \rangle$.</p>		
<i>Interfaces and their types:</i>		
a/b	Type	Description
	τ/τ'	The input and output messages
$pp_{o, \mathfrak{R}}/pp_{i, \mathfrak{R}}$	$\tau_{pp, \mathfrak{R}}/\mathbb{1}$	Public parameters read interface (for all $\mathfrak{R} \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}$)
$k_{i, \mathfrak{R}}/k_{o, \mathfrak{R}}$	$X_{pp} \times W_{pp}/\mathbb{1}$	The knowledge output interface (for all $\mathfrak{R} = (\cdot, X, W, \cdot) \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}$, pp as received on $pp_{o, \mathfrak{R}}$)
$I = \{a\} \cup \{k_{i, \mathfrak{R}} \mid \mathfrak{R} \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}\}, O = \{b\} \cup \{k_{o, \mathfrak{R}} \mid \mathfrak{R} \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}\}, A = \{a, b\}$ if adv , \emptyset otherwise		
<i>When receiving x on interface a:</i>		
Recursively replace all $\langle x, w \rangle_{\mathfrak{R}_{pp}}$ values in x with $[x]_{\mathfrak{R}_{pp}}$ where the corresponding part of τ' does not have type $\langle \mathfrak{R}_{pp}, \cdot \rangle$. Record the list of such values in $K_{\mathfrak{R}}$ for each $\mathfrak{R} \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}$.		
for $\mathfrak{R} \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}$ do		
for $\langle x, w \rangle_{\mathfrak{R}_{pp}} \in K_{\mathfrak{R}}$ do		
output (x, w) on $k_{i, \mathfrak{R}}$		
require response \top on $k_{o, \mathfrak{R}}$		
output x on b		

B.2 The REPO Node

Node REPO(\mathfrak{R})

This node stores all transmitted witnesses in the network, and permits adversarial querying of statements, returning all appropriate witnesses. Where \mathbf{pp} is used, it is as received on the public parameter read interface \mathbf{pp}_o .

State variables and initialisation values:

Variable	Description
$K : (X_{\mathbf{pp}} \times W_{\mathbf{pp}})^* := \epsilon$	List of acquired knowledge

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$k_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^j/k_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^j$	$X_{\mathbf{pp}} \times W_{\mathbf{pp}}/\mathbb{1}$	Knowledge inputs
$\mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}/\mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}$	$\tau_{\mathfrak{R},\mathbf{pp}}/\mathbb{1}$	Public parameters
$x_{\mathfrak{R}}^j/w_{\mathfrak{R}}^j$	$X_{\mathbf{pp}}/W_{\mathbf{pp}}^*$	Witness request

$$I = \{ k_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^j, x_{\mathfrak{R}}^j \mid j \in \mathbb{N} \} \cup \{ \mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}} \}$$

$$O = \{ k_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^j, w_{\mathfrak{R}}^j \mid j \in \mathbb{N} \} \cup \{ \mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}} \}$$

$$A = \{ x_{\mathfrak{R}}^j, w_{\mathfrak{R}}^j \mid j \in \mathbb{N} \}$$

When receiving (x, w) on interface k_o^j :

let $K \leftarrow (x, w), K$
output \top on k_o^j

When receiving x on interface x^j :

let $w \leftarrow \epsilon$
for (x', w') **in** K **do**
 if $x = x'$ **then let** $w \leftarrow w', w$
output w on w^j

B.3 The \perp Node

Node $\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{R}}, \mathbf{n})$

This node does nothing, except connect to dangling $k_{i,\mathfrak{R}}/k_{o,\mathfrak{R}}$, $x_{\mathfrak{R}}/w_{\mathfrak{R}}$, and $\mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}/\mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}$ interfaces. $\mathbf{n} : \vec{\mathfrak{R}} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}^3$ represents the number of each interface *not* to connect to, and we will denote $(a_{\mathfrak{R}}, b_{\mathfrak{R}}, c_{\mathfrak{R}}) := \mathbf{n}(\mathfrak{R})$.

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$k_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^j/k_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^j$	$\mathbb{1}/X_{\mathbf{pp}} \times W_{\mathbf{pp}}$	Knowledge repository inputs
$\mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}/\mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}$	$\tau_{\mathfrak{R},\mathbf{pp}}/\mathbb{1}$	Public parameters
$w_{\mathfrak{R}}^j/x_{\mathfrak{R}}^j$	$X_{\mathbf{pp}}$	Witness requests

$$I = \{ k_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^{j+a_{\mathfrak{R}}}, w_{\mathfrak{R}}^{j+b_{\mathfrak{R}}}, \mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^{j+c_{\mathfrak{R}}} \mid j \in \mathbb{N} \}$$

$$O = \{ k_{i,\mathbb{R}}^{j+a_{\mathbb{R}}}, x_{\mathbb{R}}^{j+b_{\mathbb{R}}}, \text{pp}_{i,\mathbb{R}}^{j+c_{\mathbb{R}}} \mid j \in \mathbb{N} \}$$

$$A = \{ x_{\mathbb{R}}^{j+b_{\mathbb{R}}}, w_{\mathbb{R}}^{j+b_{\mathbb{R}}} \mid j \in \mathbb{N} \}$$

When receiving any input:
abort

C Additional Details for Section 4

Section 4 simplified a number of its formal statements to be without renamings, and without explicitly including the \perp node. This aids in understanding the purpose and intuition behind the formalism, however for completeness this section provides a fully formal treatment, as well as providing the proofs of the lemmas and theorems in Section 4.

C.1 Basic Type Dependencies

Up to this point we have glossed over an inconsistency in the framework we presented: It relies on types depending on sets of input knowledge and public parameters, however types are statically defined, and set from initialisation. To circumvent this, we extend the definition of cryptographic networks with a limited support for type dependencies, just sufficient for the purposes of this paper. To reason about the origin of public parameters, we first classify which interfaces can be used as a basis for other types. We note that this definition and that of the network where public parameters arise from are mutually recursive – they are nevertheless presented separately for clarity.

Definition 14 (Public-read Interface). *A countably infinite set $A = \{(i_1, o_1), (i_2, o_2), \dots\}$ is a public-read interface in a cryptographic network N if each of the following conditions hold:*

1. *All interface names are valid: $\forall j \in \mathbb{N} : \exists n_1, n_2 \in N : i_j \in I_{n_1} \wedge o_j \in O_{n_2}$.*
2. *The types of all input interfaces are $\mathbb{1}$.*
3. *The types of all output interfaces are equal.*
4. *Passing \top to each input interface will:*
 - (a) *Cause the corresponding output interface to output a value matching all others output by this public-read interface in the past, independent of which interface is queried.*
 - (b) *Not impact any subsequent execution (that is, not change the system state).*

An example of a common public-read interface is a common reference string, provided it has an explicit setup step, that is, the CRS is not selected on the first query. We make use of public-read interfaces by allowing them to parameterise types of other interfaces in the system, for instance to be used as public parameters in knowledge assumption types. We are primarily interested in infinite

sets to ensure that arbitrarily many additional interfaces can be created, a fact exploited to ensure the uniqueness of interface names in \mathfrak{K} -lifting.

These changes cumulate in a fairly minor change in the definition of cryptographic networks and their execution, which does not affect the subsequent proofs and definitions presented in Section 3.

Definition 15 (Simply Dependently Typed Cryptographic Networks). *A simply dependently typed cryptographic network N (over a set of knowledge assumptions $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$) is defined as in Definition 3, with the following modifications:*

1. Let R be a set of public read interfaces associated with N , and I be all interfaces in N . Then there exists a partial order $\prec \subset R \times (R \uplus I)$ indicating type dependencies.
2. If $A, B \in R$, and $A \prec B$, then for all $(\cdot, o) \in B$, $A \prec o$.
3. Nodes depending on a public-read interface must have access to it: $\forall n \in N, a \in I_n \cup O_n, A : A \prec a \implies \exists (i, o) \in A : o \in I_n \wedge i \in O_n$.
4. If $(X_n, \cdot) = \Sigma(n)$ during execution, then $I_{\mathfrak{K}}^n$ is the set of all (parts of) messages of type $[\mathfrak{K}]$ in X_n (and the current input x , if applicable).
5. For all $n \in N, a \in I_n \cup O_n$, $\tau_n(a)$ returns a function taking the following inputs:
 - For each $\mathfrak{K} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}, I_{\mathfrak{K}}^n$.
 - For all $A \in R : A \prec a$, the output value of the public-read interface.

The output of this function is the type of this interface given a specific execution state ($I_{\mathfrak{K}}$ and public-read interface values).
6. Interface types match if their concrete type matches at all possible system states, where type matching is relaxed to allow the output type to be a subset⁹ of the input type. In particular, note that $I_1 \subseteq I_2 \implies \langle \mathfrak{K}, I_1 \rangle \subseteq \langle \mathfrak{K}, I_2 \rangle$.

Typically the easiest way to ensure that interfaces are matching in all possible states is to ensure they depend on the same public-read interface. The rest of Section 3 can be established analogously for simply dependently typed cryptographic networks, with the modification of using the above definition of interface matching.

Definition 16 (Public parameters). *A public-read interface A supplies the public parameters for a knowledge assumption $\mathfrak{K} = (\text{init}, \dots)$ if and only if its output type is $\mathbb{1} + O$, where O is the type of the codomain of init , with $\text{inj}_1(\top)$ indicating the public parameters are uninitialised, and the output value v satisfies the following criteria:*

1. Initially, $v = \text{inj}_1(\top)$.
2. The value v changes at most once during any execution, and if it does, it is distributed according to $\text{inj}_2(\text{init})$.

⁹ Where subsets of types are constructed by $\langle \mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}, I_1 \rangle \subseteq \langle \mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}, I_2 \rangle \iff \mathcal{R}_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}(I_1) \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{\mathfrak{K}_{\text{pp}}}(I_2)$, and for all other defined naturally over all recursive types, for instance $\tau^* \subseteq \tau'^* \iff \tau \subseteq \tau'$.

We will largely use this implicitly – for \mathbf{pp} being the value supplied by such a public-read interface, we will write $X_{\mathbf{pp}}, W_{\mathbf{pp}}, \mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{pp}}$ and $\mathfrak{R}_{\mathbf{pp}}$ as usual – for $\mathbf{pp} = \text{inj}_2(\mathbf{pp}')$, these are synonyms for $X_{\mathbf{pp}'}, \text{etc.}$, while for $\mathbf{pp} = \text{inj}_1(\top)$, the uninitialised state is captured by defining $X_{\text{inj}_1(\top)} := W_{\text{inj}_1(\top)} := \mathcal{R}_{\text{inj}_1(\top)} := \emptyset$.

C.2 Formal Restatements

We formally restate several of the definitions and lemmas from Section 4.

Definition 12 (Network Lifting). *(restated)* The network lifting $\vec{\mathfrak{R}}(N)$ for any cryptographic network $N \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{R}}}$ is defined to add additional CHARON nodes to each output interface not already connected to, or part of, a CHARON node. For each non-CHARON node $n \in N$, a corresponding node $n' \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}(N)$ exists, with $R_{n'} = \vec{\mathfrak{R}}(R_n)$, and types appropriately adjusted. For each output interface of this node, if it is not already connected to a CHARON node, a new node $\text{CHARON}(\vec{\mathfrak{R}}, \text{adv})$ is placed in $\vec{\mathfrak{R}}(N)$, with adv being the adversariality of the output interface. The old output interface, and the CHARON node's input interface is renamed to a unique name, and the CHARON node's output interface is renamed to the old output interface's name. For existing $\text{CHARON}(\vec{\mathfrak{R}}', \cdot)$ nodes, their parameter $\vec{\mathfrak{R}}'$ is replaced with $\vec{\mathfrak{R}}' \cup \vec{\mathfrak{R}}$.

For all CHARON nodes, the interfaces $k_{o,\mathfrak{R}}, k_{i,\mathfrak{R}}, \mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}},$ and $\mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}$ for all $\mathfrak{R} \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}$ are renamed, for a unique and minimal $j, l \in \mathbb{N}$, to $k_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^j, k_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^j, \mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^l,$ and $\mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^l$ respectively.

Where $(\mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^l, \mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^l)$ are part of \mathfrak{R} 's public-read interface (which is renamed to match). If this public interface is fully used, then for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, the renaming $[\mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^n / \mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^{n+1}, \mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^n / \mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^{n+1}]$ is applied to free the first of the infinite interfaces.

Definition 13 ($\vec{\mathfrak{R}}$ -Distinguishers). *(restated)* The set of valid $\vec{\mathfrak{R}}$ -distinguishers $\mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{R}}}$, for any set of knowledge assumptions $\vec{\mathfrak{R}}$, is defined as the closure under internal renaming of

$$\left\{ \vec{\mathfrak{R}}(N) \left[\vec{n} \cup \bigcup_{\mathfrak{R} \in \vec{\mathfrak{R}}} \text{REPO}(\mathfrak{R}) [\mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^{n_{\mathfrak{R}}}, \mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^{n_{\mathfrak{R}}}] \right] \mid N \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{R}}} \right\},$$

where $n_{\mathfrak{R}} \in \mathbb{N}$ is the minimally selected such that $(\mathbf{pp}_{i,\mathfrak{R}}^{n_{\mathfrak{R}}}, \mathbf{pp}_{o,\mathfrak{R}}^{n_{\mathfrak{R}}})$ is a free public-read interface for \mathfrak{R} , and \vec{n} is a minimal renaming which enables this (for instance, as given in Definition 12).

If the distinguisher consumes the first n knowledge-supplying REPO interfaces and m public-parameter interfaces, and the network A consumes the next a of the former, b of the latter, and c of the knowledge-query interfaces, then $\vec{\mathfrak{R}}^\perp(A, \mathbf{n})$, where \mathbf{n} encodes the connections used by the distinguisher, will use all countably infinite interfaces through a new \perp instance. This normalises the connections between multiple different resources.

Definition 17 (\perp -Lifting). The lifting $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}^\perp(A, \mathbf{n})$ for any network A using $a_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ knowledge-supplying interfaces (for $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$), $b_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ public-parameter interfaces (for $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$), and $c_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ knowledge-query interfaces (for $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$), and any $\mathbf{n} : \vec{\mathfrak{K}} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}^2$ is defined as $A' \cup \{\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}, \mathbf{n}')\}$, where: A' is A with all the above $a_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ interfaces renamed to fall between $a_{D, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}} + 1$ and $a_{D, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}} + a_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$, and likewise with $b_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$, and $c_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ to be between 1 and $c_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$. \mathbf{n}' is defined by $\mathbf{n}'(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}) = (a_{D, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}} + a_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}, b_{D, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}} + b_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}, c_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}})$, with $(a_{D, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}}, b_{D, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}}) = \mathbf{n}(\vec{\mathfrak{K}})$.

We formally restate Lemma 4 using \perp -lifting:

Lemma 4 (Indistinguishability Lifting). (restated) If $A_1 A_2 \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}}{\sim} B_1 B_2$, where for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, $A_i, B_i \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_i}$, $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \cap \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2 = \emptyset$, and $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} := \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \cup \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$, then for all $\mathbf{n} : \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}^2$:

$$\text{let } A' = \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2), \mathbf{n}), B' = \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B_2), \mathbf{n}) \text{ in } A_1 A' \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}}{\sim} B_1 B'$$

Similarly, \perp -lifting is applied to construction statements, however the \perp -lifting is applied also to the simulator, making it more complex. Where we wrote $A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathcal{D}} B$ in Section 4, the following is formally meant:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall(\mathbf{n} : \vec{\mathfrak{K}} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}^2) : \exists B', \alpha', \vec{n}_1, \vec{n}_2, \mathbf{n}' : \\ \alpha' B' &= \vec{\mathfrak{K}}^\perp(\alpha B, \mathbf{n}) \wedge \\ \alpha' &= \alpha[\vec{n}_1] \wedge B' = B[\vec{n}_2] \cup \{\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}, \mathbf{n}')\} \wedge \\ \vec{\mathfrak{K}}^\perp(A, \mathbf{n}) &\xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha', \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} B'. \end{aligned}$$

These modifications are necessary to ensure the renaming to use the first \mathbf{n} instances can be distributed across α and B .

Formally this requires restating Lemma 5, Lemma 7, and Theorem 3, however we instead overload the notation of $A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} B$ to mean the above when used with a $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -respecting distinguisher set, leaving the text of these statements the same.

C.3 Proofs

Proof (of Lemma 4). Recall from Definition 8 that three conditions need to be satisfied for indistinguishability: a) Unbound interfaces must match, b) $\delta^{\mathcal{D}}(A, B) \leq \epsilon$, and c) the set of distinguishers must be closed under internal renaming.

For any $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$, $\mathcal{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$ is closed under internal renaming by definition. Furthermore, as the interfaces of $A_1 A_2$ and $B_1 B_2$ match by precondition, and interfaces not related directly to the knowledge assumption are preserved (with only their types being modified equally), for this point we only need to consider the knowledge-supplying, public parameter, and knowledge-querying interfaces, which will be equal due to the definition of \perp -lifting, and $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\cdot)$ using the same types.

It remains to show

$$\begin{aligned} & \sup_{D \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} \Delta^D(A_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2), \mathbf{n}), B_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B_2), \mathbf{n})) = \\ & \sup_{D \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} |\Pr(DA_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2), \mathbf{n}) = 1) - \Pr(DB_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B_2), \mathbf{n}) = 1)| \leq \epsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Consider how the behaviour of $DA_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_1), \mathbf{n})$ and $DB_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B_2), \mathbf{n})$ differs from $D'A_1A_2$ and $D'B_1B_2$ respectively, where D' is D without $\text{REPO}(\vec{\mathfrak{K}})$ (with any internal connections being replaced with a dummy REPO with no other purpose) for $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$, not exporting public-parameter interfaces. A_2 lacks CHARON nodes which impart knowledge to D 's $\text{REPO}(\vec{\mathfrak{K}})$ nodes (for $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$). However, as in $DA_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2), \mathbf{n})$ these nodes do not reveal any information to the distinguisher (as the distinguisher cannot connect to the knowledge exporting interfaces, and as A_1 is $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$ -respecting), and neither reveals any information to the network $A_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2), \mathbf{n})$ (due to the \perp -lifting forcing these to be a no-op), this additional mechanism has no impact on the behaviour. As a result, the output of $D'A_1A_2$ equals that of $DA_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2), \mathbf{n})$. As $D' \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & |\Pr(D'A_1A_2 = 1) - \Pr(D'B_1B_2 = 1)| \leq \epsilon \implies \\ & |\Pr(DA_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2), \mathbf{n}) = 1) - \Pr(DB_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2^\perp(\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B_2), \mathbf{n}) = 1)| \leq \epsilon. \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Proof (of Lemma 5). Recall from Definition 9 that network construction $A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}} B$ has two separate conditions: α and B must have disjoint honest unbound interfaces, and $A \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}}{\sim} \alpha B$. From the precondition, we know that α' and B' (defined as above) have disjoint honest interfaces. Interface names do not get changed through the $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$ lifting, however new interfaces do get added. There is no clash in these interfaces, due to the global uniqueness requirement in the lifting. Furthermore, the \perp -lifting will be the same for all $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1$, and normalise the interfaces available for $\vec{\mathfrak{K}} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$.

It remains to show:

$$A_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A_2) \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}}{\sim} \alpha_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\alpha_2) B_1 \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B_2),$$

which by Lemma 4 follows from $A_1A_2 \stackrel{\epsilon, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}}{\sim} \alpha_1 B_1 \alpha_2 B_2$, which in turn holds as part of the precondition. \square

Proof (of Theorem 3). The proof is done in parts.

Transitivity. By Lemma 6 and Equation 5:

$$B \xrightarrow{\epsilon_2, \beta, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2}} C \implies B \xrightarrow{\epsilon_2, \beta, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2} \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\alpha)} C.$$

By Lemma 5 and preconditions, $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A) \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\alpha), \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(B)$, and by Lemma 7 Equation 14, $B \xrightarrow{\epsilon_2, \beta, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} C$. Therefore:

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\alpha), \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} B \xrightarrow{\epsilon_2, \beta, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} C,$$

and by Theorem 1 Equation 7 (and $\alpha\beta C \in *$ implying $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\alpha)\beta C \in *$)

$$A \xrightarrow{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(\alpha)\beta, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}} C. \quad \square$$

Subgraph substitution. By Lemma 6, $\mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}} \vec{\mathfrak{K}}(C) \subseteq \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}}$. Therefore, the precondition can be weakened Equation 5 to $A \xrightarrow{\epsilon, \alpha, \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}} \vec{\mathfrak{K}}(C)} B$. The rest follows by Theorem 1 Equation 8, and the honest networks intersection not being affected by the $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}$ -lifting. \square

Proof (of Lemma 7). For Equation 13, it is sufficient to show that

$$\sup_{D \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1} C} \Delta^D(A, B) \geq \sup_{D \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2} C} \Delta^D(A, B)$$

For this it is sufficient to show that every $D \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2} C$ has an equivalent $D' \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1} C$:

$$\forall D \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2} C : \exists D' \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1} C : DA = D'A \wedge DB = D'B.$$

For each distinguisher D in $\mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2} C$, it consists of: a) C itself, b) $\text{REPO}(\mathfrak{K})$ nodes for every $\mathfrak{K} \in \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$, and c) $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2(A)$ nodes for some $A \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2}$. For D' in $\mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}$ the same applies, however with fewer $\text{REPO}(\mathfrak{K})$ nodes, and a $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1(A)$ wrapping for $A \in \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}$ instead. As $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1 \subseteq \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2$, $\text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1} \supseteq \text{RespNet}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2}$, and it is therefore sufficient to show that the different wrapper, and lack of additional REPO nodes does not change the behaviour. This follows directly as the effect of the additional wrapper in $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2 \setminus \vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1$ can be emulated without changing whether a node is $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1$ -respecting, and likewise REPO nodes are trivially $\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1$ respecting, as they do not produce knowledge-implying objects themselves. It follows that for every distinguisher $D \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_2}$ we can construct a semantically identical distinguisher $D' \in \mathfrak{D}_{\vec{\mathfrak{K}}_1}$.

Equation 14 follows directly from Equation 13 and Definition 9. \square

D Full Example Specification

The full specification of the nodes introduced in Section 5. Public-parameter interfaces are omitted and should be assumed in every node except \mathbb{G} .

D.1 $\mathfrak{K}_{\text{bAGM}}$ Parameters

Node \mathbb{G}

This node provides the initialisation of $\mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}}$. We assume the domain of init is $\tau_{\text{pp}, \mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}}}$.

State variables and initialisation values:

Variable	Description
$\text{pp} : \mathbb{1} + \tau_{\text{pp}, \mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}}} := \text{inj}_1(\top)$	Public parameters

Interfaces and their types:

Interface	Type	Description
$\text{init}_i / \text{init}_o$	$\mathbb{1} / \mathbb{1}$	Initialisation
$\text{pp}_i^j / \text{pp}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1} / \mathbb{1} + \tau_{\text{pp}, \mathfrak{R}_{\text{bAGM}}}$	Public parameter queries

$I = \{\text{init}_i\} \cup \{\text{pp}_i^j \mid j \in \mathbb{N}\}$
 $O = \{\text{init}_o\} \cup \{\text{pp}_o^j \mid j \in \mathbb{N}\}$
 $A = \emptyset$

When receiving \top on interface init_i :

let $\text{pp} \stackrel{x}{\leftarrow} \text{inj}_2(\text{init})$
output \top on init_o

When receiving \top on interface pp_i^j :

output pp on pp_o^j

D.2 Ideal World

Node NIZK

A proof-malleable NIZK for a relation \mathcal{R} . Assumed are the following types: a) X for statements, W for witnesses, Π for proofs.

State variables and initialisation values:

Variable	Description
$\pi : (X \times \Pi)^* := \epsilon$	Accepted proofs
$\bar{\pi} : (X \times \Pi)^* := \epsilon$	Rejected proofs

Interfaces and their types:

Interface	Type	Description
$\text{prove}_i^j / \text{prove}_o^j$	$X \times W / \mathbb{1} + \Pi$	Proving
$\text{verify}_i^j / \text{verify}_o^j$	$X \times \Pi / 2$	Verifying
$\text{maul}_i / \text{maul}_o$	$X \times \Pi / \mathbb{1}$	Proof malleability
$\text{wit}_o / \text{wit}_i$	$\mathbb{1} + W / X \times \Pi$	Adversarial witness query
$\text{prf}_o / \text{prf}_i$	Π / X	Proof object selection

$I = \{\text{maul}_i, \text{wit}_o, \text{prf}_o\} \cup \{\text{prove}_i^j, \text{verify}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\}$

$$O = \{\text{maul}_o, \text{wit}_i, \text{prf}_i\} \cup \{\text{prove}_o^j, \text{verify}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\}$$

$$A = \{\text{maul}_i, \text{maul}_o, \text{wit}_i, \text{wit}_o, \text{prf}_o, \text{prf}_i\}$$

When receiving (x, w) on interface prove_i^j :

```

if  $(x, w) \notin \mathcal{R}$  then
  output  $\text{inj}_1(\top)$  on  $\text{prove}_o^j$ 
else
  output  $x$  on  $\text{prf}_i$ 
  require response  $\pi$  on  $\text{prf}_o$ 
  assert  $(x, \pi) \notin \bar{\pi}$ 
  let  $\pi \leftarrow (x, \pi) :: \pi$ 
  output  $\text{inj}_2(\pi)$  on  $\text{prove}_o^j$ 

```

When receiving (x, π) on interface verify_i^j :

```

if  $(x, \pi) \notin (\pi \cup \bar{\pi})$  then
  output  $(x, \pi)$  on  $\text{wit}_i$ 
  require response  $r$  on  $\text{wit}_o$ 
  if  $\exists w : r = \text{inj}_2(w) \wedge (x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$  then
    let  $\pi \leftarrow (x, \pi) :: \pi$ 
if  $(x, \pi) \in \pi$  then
  output 1 on  $\text{verify}_i^j$ 
else
  let  $\bar{\pi} \leftarrow (x, \pi) :: \bar{\pi}$ 
  output 0 on  $\text{verify}_i^j$ 

```

When receiving (x, π) on interface maul_i :

```

if  $\exists \pi' : (x, \pi') \in \pi \wedge (x, \pi) \notin \bar{\pi}$  then
  let  $\pi \leftarrow (x, \pi) :: \pi$ 

```

D.3 Hybrid World

Node SNARK-NODE(j)

The generic SNARK protocol relies on the corresponding Prove and Verify algorithms from the underlying zk-SNARK scheme, and access to the (optionally adversarially biased) SRS. Each SNARK-NODE depends on the party ID j . As \mathcal{S} is in the random oracle model, an interface to query RO is available, which both Prove and Verify have oracle access to.

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$\text{prove}_i^j / \text{prove}_o^j$	$X \times W / \mathbb{1} + \Pi$	Proving
$\text{verify}_i^j / \text{verify}_o^j$	$X \times \Pi / 2$	Verifying
$\text{srs}_o^j / \text{srs}_i^j$	$S / \mathbb{1}$	SRS query
$\text{ro}_o^j / \text{ro}_i^j$	$2^\lambda / 2^*$	Random oracle query

$$I = \{ \text{prove}_i^j, \text{verify}_i^j, \text{srs}_o^j \}$$

$$O = \{ \text{prove}_o^j, \text{verify}_i^j, \text{srs}_i^j \}$$

$$A = \emptyset$$

When receiving (x, w) on interface prove_i^j :

```

if  $(x, w) \notin \mathcal{R}$  then
  output  $\text{inj}_1(\top)$  on  $\text{prove}_o^j$ 
else
  output  $\top$  on  $\text{srs}_i^j$ 
  require response  $\text{srs}$  on  $\text{srs}_o^j$ 
  output  $\text{Prove}(\text{srs}, x, w)$  on  $\text{prove}_o^j$ 

```

When receiving (x, π) on interface verify_i^j :

```

output  $\top$  on  $\text{srs}_i^j$ 
require response  $\text{srs}$  on  $\text{srs}_o^j$ 
output  $\text{Verify}(\text{srs}, x, \pi)$  on  $\text{verify}_o^j$ 

```

Node SRS

The SRS node constructs a (adversarially biased) structured reference string. Modelled after \mathcal{F}_{SRS} from [23]. Assumed are the following types: a) T for trapdoors, b) S for reference strings, c) P for permissible permutations over T .

State variables and initialisation values:

Variable	Description
$\text{ok}^j : \mathbb{2} := 0$	Initialisation status ($j \in \mathbb{Z}_n$)
$t_{\mathcal{H}} : \mathbb{1} + T := 0$	Honest trapdoor
$t : \mathbb{1} + T := 0$	Full trapdoor

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$\text{init}_i^j / \text{init}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1} / \mathbb{1}$	SRS initialisation
$\text{ninit}_o^j / \text{ninit}_i^j$	$\mathbb{1} / \mathbb{1}$	SRS initialisation notification
$\text{srs}_i^j / \text{srs}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1} / S$	SRS query
$\text{hsrs}_i / \text{hsrs}_o$	$\mathbb{1} / S$	Honest SRS component query
$\text{perm}_o / \text{perm}_i$	$P / \mathbb{1}$	Permutation query

$$I = \{ \text{hsrs}_i, \text{perm}_o \} \cup \{ \text{init}_i^j, \text{ninit}_o^j, \text{srs}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H} \}$$

$$O = \{ \text{hsrs}_o, \text{perm}_i \} \cup \{ \text{init}_o^j, \text{ninit}_i^j, \text{srs}_o^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H} \}$$

$$A = \{ \text{hsrs}_i, \text{hsrs}_o, \text{perm}_i, \text{perm}_o \} \cup \{ \text{ninit}_o^j, \text{ninit}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H} \}$$

When receiving \top on interface init_i^j :

```

if  $\text{ok}^j = 0$  then
  let  $\text{ok}^j \leftarrow 1$ 
  output  $\top$  on  $\text{ninit}_i^j$ 
  require response  $\top$  on  $\text{ninit}_o^j$ 
output  $\top$  on  $\text{init}_o^j$ 

```

When receiving \top on interface hsrs_i :

```

if  $t_{\mathcal{H}} = 0$  then
  let  $t_{\mathcal{H}} \xleftarrow{r} \text{inj}_2(T)$ 
  assert  $\exists t' : t_{\mathcal{H}} = \text{inj}_2(t')$ 
  output  $S(t')$  on  $\text{hsrs}_o$ 

```

When receiving \top on interface srs_i^j :

```

assert  $\forall k \in \mathcal{H} : \text{ok}^k = 1$ 
if  $t_{\mathcal{H}} = 0$  then
  let  $t_{\mathcal{H}} \xleftarrow{r} \text{inj}_2(T)$ 
  assert  $\exists t' : t_{\mathcal{H}} = \text{inj}_2(t')$ 
if  $t = \text{inj}_1(\top)$  then
  output  $\top$  on  $\text{perm}_i$ 
  require response  $p$  on  $k_{o,\bar{r}}$ 
  let  $t \leftarrow \text{inj}_2(p(t'))$ 
assert  $\exists t' : t = \text{inj}_2(t')$ 
output  $S(t')$  on  $\text{srs}_o^j$ 

```

Node ro

The random oracle node records queries of arbitrary bit strings, and responds either with an already recorded response, or a value sampled uniformly at random from 2^λ .

State variables and initialisation values:

Variable	Description
$H : (2^* \times 2^\lambda)^*$	$:= \epsilon$ Recorded queries

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$\text{ro}_i^j / \text{ro}_o^j$	$2^* / 2^\lambda$	Random oracle query

$I = \{ \text{ro}_i^j \mid j \in \mathbb{Z}_n \}$
 $O = \{ \text{ro}_o^j \mid j \in \mathbb{Z}_n \}$
 $A = \emptyset$

When receiving x on interface ro_i^j :

```

let  $b \leftarrow 0$ 
for  $(x', h)$  in  $H$  do
  if  $x = x'$  then
    let  $b \leftarrow 1$ 
    output  $h$  on  $\text{ro}_o^j$ 
if  $b = 0$  then
  let  $h \xleftarrow{r} 2^\lambda$ 
  let  $H \leftarrow (x, h), H$ 
  output  $h$  on  $\text{ro}_o^j$ 

```

D.4 Real World

Node **RR-NODE**(j)

The round-robin update node will, when called with `init`, read all other parties updates from the broadcast node, apply them, and perform its own, broadcasting this in turn. When called with `srs`, it will instead ensure at least one update of each party is present, and perform all of these in sequence, returning the result. Assumes is the type S for SRS, and Π_{upd} for update proofs.

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$\text{init}_i^j / \text{init}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1} / \mathbb{1}$	Initialisation
$\text{srs}_i^j / \text{srs}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1} / S$	SRS query
$\text{bcast}_o^j / \text{bcast}_i^j$	$\mathbb{1} / S \times \Pi_{\text{upd}}$	Broadcast
$\text{read}_o^j / \text{read}_i^j$	$(\mathbb{n} \times S \times \Pi_{\text{upd}})^* / \mathbb{1}$	Retrieval

$I = \{\text{init}_i^j, \text{srs}_i^j, \text{bcast}_o^j, \text{read}_o^j\}$
 $O = \{\text{init}_o^j, \text{srs}_o^j, \text{bcast}_i^j, \text{read}_i^j\}$
 $A = \emptyset$

When receiving \top on interface init_i^j :

```

let (srs, done)  $\leftarrow$  computeSrs( $\perp$ )
if  $j \notin \text{done}$  then
  let  $p \xleftarrow{r} P$ 
  let  $\text{srs}' \leftarrow p^\dagger(\text{srs})$ 
  let  $\rho \leftarrow \text{ProveUpd}(\text{srs}, p)$ 
  output ( $\text{srs}', \rho$ ) on  $\text{bcast}_i^j$ 
  require response  $\top$  on  $\text{bcast}_o^j$ 
output  $\top$  on  $\text{init}_o^j$ 

```

When receiving \top on interface srs_i^j :

```

let (srs, done)  $\leftarrow$  computeSrs( $\top$ )
assert done =  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ 
output srs on  $\text{srs}_o^j$ 

```

Helper procedures:

```

procedure computeSrs(requireAll)
  output  $\top$  on  $\text{read}_i^j$ 
  require response  $\vec{M}$  on  $\text{read}_i^j$ 
  let  $\text{srs} \leftarrow S(\tau_0)$ 
  let done  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ 
  for ( $k, \text{srs}', \rho$ ) in  $\vec{M}$  do
    if  $k \notin \text{done} \wedge \text{VerifyUpd}(\text{srs}, \rho, \text{srs}')$  then
      let  $\text{srs} \leftarrow \text{srs}'$ ; done  $\leftarrow$  done  $\cup \{k\}$ 
  return (srs, done)

```

Node BCAST

The broadcast node allows any party to send messages to all other parties, and to retrieve all messages sent to them. The number of parties is assumed to be n . The broadcast channel is defined for any message type τ , with additional public parameter interfaces being implicit if this type depends on them.

State variables and initialisation values:

Variable	Description
$\text{msgs} : (n \times \tau)^* := \epsilon$	Message record

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$\text{bcast}_i^j / \text{bcast}_o^j$	$\tau / \mathbb{1}$	Broadcast
$\text{read}_i^j / \text{read}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1} / (n \times \tau)^*$	Retrieval

$$I = \{ \text{bcast}_i^j, \text{read}_i^j \mid j \in \mathbb{Z}_n \}$$

$$O = \{ \text{bcast}_o^j, \text{read}_o^j \mid j \in \mathbb{Z}_n \}$$

$$A = \emptyset$$

When receiving M on interface bcast_i^j :

let $\text{msgs} \leftarrow (\text{encode}(j), M), \text{msgs}$
output \top on bcast_o^j

When receiving \top on interface read_i^j :

output $\text{reverse}(\text{msgs})$ on read_o^j

D.5 Simulators

Node α

The SNARK to NIZK simulator. We make use of a simulated prover **SimProve**, which while not described in [18], is typically implied by perfect zero-knowledge, as well as the extractor \mathcal{X}_w implied by [18, Lemma 4.7], which makes use of the $\mathfrak{K}_{\text{bAGM}}$ knowledge extraction. Otherwise, the simulator mimics the SRS node, albeit retaining access to the full trapdoor. When **SimProve** and **Verify** require access to the random oracle, it simulates the behaviour of RO using H . This simulated behaviour is also exported on the corrupted parties ro interfaces.

State variables and initialisation values:

Variable	Description
$\text{ok}^j : \mathbb{2} := \text{inj}_1(\top)$	Initialisation status ($j \in \mathcal{H}$)
$t_{\mathcal{H}} : \mathbb{1} + T := \text{inj}_1(\top)$	Honest trapdoor
$t : \mathbb{1} + T := \text{inj}_1(\top)$	Full trapdoor
$H : (\mathbb{2}^* \times \mathbb{2}^\lambda)^* := \epsilon$	Recorded queries

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$\text{maul}_o/\text{maul}_i$	$\mathbb{1}/X \times \Pi$	Proof malleability
$\text{wit}_i/\text{wit}_o$	$X \times \Pi/\mathbb{1} + W$	Adversarial witness query
$\text{prf}_i/\text{prf}_o$	X/Π	Proof object selection
$\text{init}_i^j/\text{init}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1}/S$	SRS initialisation
$\text{ninit}_i^j/\text{ninit}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1}/\mathbb{1}$	SRS initialisation notification
$\text{hsrs}_i/\text{hsrs}_o$	$\mathbb{1}/S$	Honest SRS component query
$\text{perm}_o/\text{perm}_i$	$P/\mathbb{1}$	Permutation query
$w_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}/x_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}$	$W_{\text{pp}}^*/X_{\text{pp}}$	Knowledge extraction
$\text{ro}_i^j/\text{ro}_o^j$	$2^*/2^\lambda$	Random oracle query

$I = \{\text{maul}_o, \text{wit}_i, \text{prf}_i, \text{hsrs}_i, \text{perm}_o, w_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}\} \cup \{\text{init}_i^j, \text{ninit}_o^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\} \cup \{\text{ro}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{A}\}$
 $O = \{\text{maul}_i, \text{wit}_o, \text{prf}_o, \text{hsrs}_o, \text{perm}_i, x_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}\} \cup \{\text{init}_o^j, \text{ninit}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\} \cup \{\text{ro}_o^j \mid j \in \mathcal{A}\}$
 $A = \{\text{maul}_o, \text{maul}_i, \text{wit}_i, \text{wit}_o, \text{prf}_i, \text{prf}_o, \text{hsrs}_i, \text{hsrs}_o, \text{perm}_o, \text{perm}_i, w_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}, x_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}\} \cup \{\text{ninit}_o^j, \text{ninit}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\}$

When receiving (x, π) on interface wit_i :

```

let  $t' \leftarrow \text{ensureSrs}$ 
if  $\text{Verify}(S(t'), x, \pi)$  then
  let  $w \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_w(x, \pi)$ 
  if  $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{pp}}$  then
    output  $\text{inj}_2(w)$  on  $\text{wit}_o$ 
  else
    output  $(x, \pi)$  on  $\text{maul}_i$ 
    require response  $\top$  on  $\text{maul}_o$ 
    output  $\text{inj}_1(\top)$  on  $\text{wit}_o$ 
  else
    output  $\text{inj}_1(\top)$  on  $\text{wit}_o$ 

```

When receiving x on interface prf_i :

```

let  $t' \leftarrow \text{ensureSrs}$ 
assert  $\exists t' : t = \text{inj}_2(t')$ 
return  $\text{SimProve}(S(t'), t', x)$ 

```

When receiving \top on interface init_i^j :

```

let  $\text{ok}^j \leftarrow \text{inj}_2(\top)$ 
output  $\top$  on  $\text{ninit}_i^j$ 
require response  $\top$  on  $\text{ninit}_o^j$ 
output  $\top$  on  $\text{init}_o^j$ 

```

When receiving \top on interface hsrs_i :

```

if  $t_{\mathcal{H}} = \text{inj}_1(\top)$  then
  let  $t_{\mathcal{H}} \xleftarrow{r} \text{inj}_2(T)$ 
assert  $\exists t' : t_{\mathcal{H}} = \text{inj}_2(t')$ 
output  $t'$  on  $\text{hsrs}_o$ 

```

When receiving x on interface ro_i^j :

```

let  $b \leftarrow 0$ 

```

```

for  $(x', h)$  in  $H$  do
  if  $x = x'$  then
    let  $b \leftarrow 1$ 
    output  $h$  on  $\text{ro}_o^j$ 
  if  $b = 0$  then
    let  $h \xleftarrow{x} 2^\lambda$ 
    let  $H \leftarrow (x, h), H$ 
    output  $h$  on  $\text{ro}_o^j$ 

```

Helper procedures:

```

procedure ensureSrs
  assert  $\forall k \in \mathcal{H} : \text{ok}^k = \text{inj}_2(\top)$ 
  if  $t_{\mathcal{H}} = \text{inj}_1(\top)$  then
    let  $t_{\mathcal{H}} \xleftarrow{x} \text{inj}_2(T)$ 
  assert  $\exists t' : t_{\mathcal{H}} = \text{inj}_2(t')$ 
  if  $t = \text{inj}_1(\top)$  then
    output  $\top$  on  $\text{perm}_i$ 
    require response  $p$  on  $k_{o, \mathfrak{R}}$ 
    let  $t \leftarrow \text{inj}_2(p(t'))$ 
  assert  $\exists t' : t = \text{inj}_2(t')$ 
  return  $t'$ 

```

Node β

The RR-SETUP to SRS simulator. For corrupted parties, their updates' exponents are extracted from the broadcast channel, and supplied as the permutation to SRS. The first honest party writing to the broadcast channel will be a permutation of the honest SRS, the rest randomly chosen permutations. We make use of the proof simulation algorithm \mathcal{S}_ρ from [23], and additionally assume the existence of a white-box extractor algorithm \mathcal{X}_ρ , which maps update proofs ρ to their permutations, given access to $\mathfrak{R}_{\text{BAGM}}$ witness extraction.

State variables and initialisation values:

Variable	Description
$p : P := \text{id}$	The permutation to apply
$\text{srs} : S := S(\tau_0)$	The current SRS
$\text{done}^j : 2 := \text{inj}_1(\top)$	For each party $j \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, if they have initialised
$\text{msgs} : (\mathfrak{n} \times S \times \Pi_{\text{upd}})^* := \epsilon$	Message record

Interfaces and their types:

	Type	Description
$\text{bcast}_i^j / \text{bcast}_o^j$	$S \times \Pi_{\text{upd}} / \mathbb{1}$	Broadcast
$\text{read}_i^j / \text{read}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1} / (\mathbb{1} \times S \times \Pi_{\text{upd}})^*$	Retrieval
$\text{ninit}_i^j / \text{ninit}_o^j$	$\mathbb{1} / \mathbb{1}$	SRS initialisation notification
$\text{hsrs}_o / \text{hsrs}_i$	$S / \mathbb{1}$	Honest SRS component query
$\text{perm}_i / \text{perm}_o$	$\mathbb{1} / P$	Permutation query
$w_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}} / x_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}$	$W_{\text{pp}}^* / X_{\text{pp}}$	Knowledge extraction

$I = \{\text{hsrs}_o, \text{perm}_i, w_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}\} \cup \{\text{bcast}_i^j, \text{read}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{A}\} \cup \{\text{ninit}_i^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\}$
 $O = \{\text{hsrs}_i, \text{perm}_o, x_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}\} \cup \{\text{bcast}_o^j, \text{read}_o^j \mid j \in \mathcal{A}\} \cup \{\text{ninit}_o^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\}$
 $A = \{\text{hsrs}_o, \text{hsrs}_i, \text{perm}_i, \text{perm}_o, w_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}, x_{\mathbb{R}_{\text{BAGM}}}\} \cup \{\text{ninit}_i^j, \text{ninit}_o^j \mid j \in \mathcal{H}\}$

When receiving (srs', ρ) on interface bcast_i^j :

```

if  $\text{done}^j = \text{inj}_1(\top) \wedge \text{VerifyUpd}(\text{srs}, \rho, \text{srs}')$  then
  let  $\text{srs} \leftarrow \text{srs}'$ 
  let  $\text{done}^j \leftarrow \text{inj}_2(\top)$ 
  let  $p' \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_p(\rho)$ 
  let  $p \leftarrow p' \circ p$ 
let  $\text{msgs} \leftarrow (\text{encode}(j), \text{srs}, \rho)$ 
output  $\top$  on  $\text{bcast}_o^j$ 

```

When receiving \top on interface read_i^j :

```

output  $\text{reverse}(\text{msgs})$  on  $\text{read}_o^j$ 

```

When receiving \top on interface ninit_i^j :

```

if  $\text{done}^j = \text{inj}_1(\top)$  then
  let  $b \leftarrow \exists k \in \mathcal{H} : \text{done}^k = \text{v} \text{inj}_2(\top)$ 
  let  $\text{done}^j \leftarrow \text{inj}_2(\top)$ 
  let  $p' \leftarrow P$ 
  if  $\neg b$  then
    output  $\top$  on  $\text{hsrs}_i$ 
    require response  $\text{srs}'$  on  $\text{hsrs}_o$ 
    let  $\rho \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_\rho(p(\tau_0), \text{srs}'')$ 
    let  $p \leftarrow \text{id}; \text{srs} \leftarrow \text{srs}'$ 
    let  $\text{msgs} \leftarrow (\text{encode}(j), \text{srs}, \rho)$ 
  else
    let  $\text{srs}' \leftarrow p'^{\dagger}(\text{srs})$ 
    let  $\rho \leftarrow \text{ProveUpd}(\text{srs}, p)$ 
    let  $p \leftarrow p' \circ p; \text{srs} \leftarrow \text{srs}'$ 
    let  $\text{msgs} \leftarrow (\text{encode}(j), \text{srs}, \rho)$ 
output  $\top$  on  $\text{ninit}_o^j$ 

```

When receiving \top on interface perm_i :

```

assert  $\forall k \in \mathbb{Z}_n : \text{done}^k = \text{inj}_2(\top)$ 
output  $p$  on  $\text{perm}_o$ 

```

E Full Examples of Knowledge Assumptions

E.1 Knowledge of Exponent Assumption

The t -knowledge-of-exponent assumption [14, 22] depends on a (possibility pre-selected) group \mathbb{G} of order p , and generator $g \in \mathbb{G}$. It selects a random exponent s , and provides the pair (g, g^s) as public parameters. Any pair of group elements where the second is the s th power of the first must provide an exponent to match.

A curiosity of this knowledge assumption is that there is no simple membership test to apply. As a result, we permit pairs *not* related in this way to be members of X_{pp} , which do not require witnessing, capturing the possibility of transmitting unrelated group elements.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathfrak{K}_{\text{KEA}} &:= (\text{init}, X, W, \mathcal{R}) \\
 \text{init} &:= s \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{F}_p^*; (g, g^s) \\
 X &:= \mathbb{G}^2 \\
 W &:= \{\text{BASE}\} \cup \\
 &\quad \{(\text{INPUT}, i) \mid i \in X\} \cup \\
 &\quad \{(\text{EXP}, b, e) \mid b \in W, e \in \mathbb{F}_p^*\} \cup \\
 &\quad \{(\text{MUL}, b, c) \mid b, c \in W\} \cup \\
 &\quad \{(\text{FREE}, g, h) \mid g, h \in \mathbb{G}\} \\
 \text{eval}(I, w) &:= \begin{cases} (g, g^s) & \text{if } w = \text{BASE} \\ i & \text{if } w = (\text{INPUT}, i) \wedge i \in I \\ (a^e, b^e) & \text{if } w = (\text{EXP}, c, e) \wedge (a, b) = \text{eval}(I, c) \\ (a \circ c, b \circ d) & \text{if } w = (\text{MUL}, e, f) \wedge (a, b) = \text{eval}(I, e) \\ & \quad \wedge (c, d) = \text{eval}(I, f) \\ (g, h) & \text{if } w = (\text{FREE}, g, h) \wedge g^s \neq h \end{cases} \\
 (x, w) \in \mathcal{R}(I) &\iff x = \text{eval}(I, w)
 \end{aligned}$$

E.2 The Bilinear Algebraic Group Model with Random Sampling

Assuming a distribution `groupSetup` providing groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$, a bilinear pairing operation $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$, and generators $g \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $h \in \mathbb{G}_2$, we define the corresponding knowledge assumptions of a bilinear Algebraic Group Model below. Random sampling of group elements in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 is permitted by providing random permutations¹⁰ $\vec{\mathbb{G}}_1$ of \mathbb{G}_1 and $\vec{\mathbb{G}}_2$ of \mathbb{G}_2 as part of the public parameters – we assume machines have random memory access, and can therefore easily query random elements in these vectors, but cannot search for specific elements, due to the exponential size of the group. Note that this assumes public parameter selection is free from computational feasibility constraints.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathfrak{K}_{\text{bAGM}} &:= (\text{init}, X, W, \mathcal{R}) \\
 \text{init} &:= \text{let } (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, h) \xleftarrow{r} \text{groupSetup}; \vec{\mathbb{G}}_1 \xleftarrow{r} S_{\mathbb{G}_1}; \vec{\mathbb{G}}_2 \xleftarrow{r} S_{\mathbb{G}_2} \\
 &\quad \text{in } (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, h, \vec{\mathbb{G}}_1, \vec{\mathbb{G}}_2)
 \end{aligned}$$

¹⁰ We write S_X for the set of permutations of X , and the corresponding uniform distribution.

$$\begin{aligned}
X &:= \mathbb{G}_1 \uplus \mathbb{G}_2 \uplus \mathbb{G}_T \\
W &:= \{ (\text{OP}, a, b) \mid a, b \in W \} \cup \\
&\quad \{ (\text{PAIRING}, a, b) \mid a, b \in W \} \cup \\
&\quad \{ (\text{INPUT}, i) \mid i \in X \} \cup \\
&\quad \{ (\text{INDEX}, i, x) \mid x \in \{1, 2\}, i \in \mathbb{Z}_{|\mathbb{G}_i|} \} \cup \\
&\quad \{ (\text{GENERATOR}, x) \mid x \in \{1, 2\} \} \\
\text{eval}(I, w) &:= \begin{cases} \text{eval}(a) \circ \text{eval}(b) & \text{if } w = (\text{OP}, a, b) \\ e(\text{eval}(a), \text{eval}(b)) & \text{if } w = (\text{PAIRING}, a, b) \\ i & \text{if } w = (\text{INPUT}, i) \wedge i \in I \\ (\vec{\mathbb{G}}_x)_i & \text{if } w = (\text{INDEX}, i, x) \\ g & \text{if } w = (\text{GENERATOR}, 1) \\ h & \text{if } w = (\text{GENERATOR}, 2) \end{cases} \\
(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}(I) &\iff x = \text{eval}(I, w)
\end{aligned}$$

Notably \circ and e may be undefined – $g \circ h$ is not defined, for instance. In this case eval is also not defined: $\text{eval}(I, (\text{OP}, g, h))$ is undefined.

E.3 Random Oracles

Somewhat surprisingly, (global, non-programmable) random oracles can be seen as a somewhat unique knowledge assumption, using a similar technique for randomness as is used to sample random group elements above. Unlike the above, the public parameters need to encode an *infinite* sequence of random values – effectively publicly describing the entire random oracle. Again an assumption of random access to these public parameters implies a limited number of possible “queries” to this random oracle, with each query simply reading the n th random value in the sequence, where n is a numerical encoding of the query.

In practice, this assumption has similarities to that of an extractable hash function [24], and global random oracles [12, 7]. It fits the former in that for every “hash” produced by an algorithm, an extractor must be able to output its preimage, and the latter if this operation is viewed as a black-box query to a global random oracle functionality.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathfrak{R}_{\text{RO}} &:= (\text{init}, X, W, \mathcal{R}) \\
\text{init} &:= (\{0, 1\}^\lambda)^\infty \\
X &:= \{0, 1\}^\lambda \\
W &:= \{ (\text{INPUT}, i) \mid i \in X \} \cup \\
&\quad \{ (\text{INDEX}, i) \mid i \in \mathbb{N} \} \\
\text{eval}(I, w) &:= \begin{cases} i & \text{if } w = (\text{INPUT}, i) \wedge i \in I \\ \text{pp}_i & \text{if } w = (\text{INDEX}, i, x) \end{cases} \\
(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}(I) &\iff x = \text{eval}(I, w)
\end{aligned}$$

F Efficiently Indexable Sums and Products

In order to allow representing infinite randomness in public parameters, such as for the random oracle, infinite products with efficient indexing are required. We define the sum and product operator here to divide the domain into sets of increasingly large powers of two, which can be arranged as a binary tree. The final construction links these in a basic sequence, ensuring that any index i can be accessed in $\Theta(\log(i))$ operations.

$$\sum_{x \in X} f(x) := \text{effAgg}(X, f, +, 0, 0)$$

$$\prod_{x \in X} f(x) := \text{effAgg}(X, f, \times, \mathbb{1}, 0)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{effAgg}(\epsilon, \cdot, \cdot, \tau, \cdot) &:= \tau \\ \text{effAgg}(X, f, \diamond, \tau, i) &:= \text{aggTree}(\text{take}(2^i, X), f, \diamond, \tau, i) \diamond \\ &\quad \text{effAgg}(\text{drop}(2^i, X), f, \diamond, \tau, i + 1) \\ \text{aggTree}([x], f, \cdot, \cdot, 0) &:= f(x) \\ \text{aggTree}(\epsilon, \cdot, \cdot, \tau, \cdot) &:= \tau \\ \text{aggTree}(X, f, \diamond, \tau, i) &:= \text{aggTree}(\text{take}(2^{i-1}, X), f, \diamond, \tau, i - 1) \diamond \\ &\quad \text{aggTree}(\text{drop}(2^{i-1}, X), f, \diamond, \tau, i - 1), \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{take}(i, X)$ returns the sequence containing only the first i elements of X (or X itself, if $|X| \leq i$), and $\text{drop}(i, X)$ returns the sequence containing all other elements of X , such that $\text{take}(i, X) \parallel \text{drop}(i, X) = X$, and \diamond stands in for one of $+$ and \times .