Salafi jihadism

Further information: Salafism

Salafi jihadism or jihadist-Salafism is a transnational, hybrid religious-political ideology based on the Sunni sect of Islamism, seeking a global caliphate, advocacy for "physical" jihadism and Salafi concepts of returning to what adherents believe to be "true Islam". The ideological foundation of the movement was laid out by a series of prison-writings of the Egyptian Islamist theoretician Sayyid Qutb during the 1960s.

The terms "Salafist jihadist" and "jihadist-Salafism" were coined by scholar Gilles Kepel in 2002 to describe "a hybrid Islamist ideology" developed by international Islamist volunteers in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad who had become isolated from their national and social class origins. The concept was described by Martin Kramer as an academic term that "will inevitably be [simplified to] jihadism or the jihadist movement in popular usage." (emphasis supplied) Qutbism has been used as a close relative, or variety of Salafi jihadism

Practitioners are referred to as "Salafi jihadis" or "Salafi jihadists". They are sometimes described as a variety of Salafi, and sometimes as separate from "good Salafis" whose movement eschews any political and organisational allegiances as potentially divisive for the Muslim community and a distraction from the study of religion. Traditional Salafi scholarship mostly denounce Salafi-Jihadism as a hybrid ideology far-removed from Salafi orthodoxy. (Contemporary Salafi Scholars such as Albani, Ibn Uthaymeen, Ibn Baz, Saleh Al Fawzaan and Muqbil ibn Hadi condemned rebellion against the rulers as "the most corrupt of innovations" and forbade Muslims "to take it upon himself to execute a ruling" which is under the jurisdiction of the rulers.) According to Salafist jihadists, they are not dividing the Muslim community because in their view, the rulers and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack have deviated from Islam and are actually apostates.

In the 1990s, extremist jihadists of the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya were active in the attacks on police, government officials and tourists in Egypt, and Armed Islamic Group of Algeria was a principal group in the Algerian Civil War. The most infamous jihadist-Salafist attack is the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States by al-Qaeda. While Salafism had next-to-no presence in Europe in the 1980s, Salafist jihadists had by the mid-2000s acquired "a burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among E.U. countries since 2001." While many see the influence and activities of Salafi jihadists as in decline after 2000 (at least in the United States), others see the movement as growing, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the breakdown of state control in Libya and Syria.

Definitions

Salafi jihadists distinguish themselves from salafis they term "sheikist", so named because – the jihadists believe – the "sheikists" had forsaken adoration of God for adoration of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head". Principal among the sheikist scholars was Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz – "the archetypal court ulema [ulama al-balat]". These allegedly "false" salafi "had to be striven against and eliminated", but even more infuriating was the Muslim Brotherhood, who were believed by Salafi jihadists to be excessively moderate and lacking in literal interpretation of holy texts.

In the words of Madawi al Rasheed, Salafi-Jihadism is

a hybrid construction deeply rooted in the last three decades of the twentieth century that is desperate to anchor itself in an authentic Islamic tradition, yet reflecting serious borrowing from the discourse of Western modernity

According to Madawi Al Rasheed, ideology of Jihadi-Salafism is a post-modern hybridity whose sources can be found in the past and present, in both Muslim world and Western world. Thus, it is the outcome of cross-fertilisation of sources that are both transnational and local, resulting in a devastating ideology that re-invents the past to induce a "cataclysmic war between two binary oppositions." Thus contemporary Salafi-Jihadis are primarily products of modernity, rather than an extension of traditional Muslim societies. Thus, Jihadis seek to create a mimicry of the West of which they want to be part of, but reject the other leading to violence. However more than the ideology itself, it is the circumstances that explain the appeal of Jihadisn which is the real cause of violence. The traditional Mujahideen of the previous eras such as ‘Omar al-Mukhtar, ‘Abd al-Qadir, al-Jaza’iri and ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam were a different category of people, products of different social circumstances who sought to liberate occupied lands from foreign imperialist and colonial penetrations. Although they gained solidarity across the Islamic World , they were not transnational actors. Salafi-Jihadis on the other hand, die for an imagined globalised faith, shares Western modernity (despite its critique), and advocate a neo-liberal free-market rationale , in their quest for a global World Order. Thus Jihadi-Salafism has as much to do with the West as with Salafism or religion in general.

Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by Mohammed M. Hafez, is an "extreme form of Sunni Islamism that rejects democracy and Shia rule". Hafez distinguished them from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars (such as Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz and Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh), but also from the sahwa movement associated with Salman al-Ouda or Safar Al-Hawali.

According to Michael Horowitz, Salafi jihad is an ideology that identifies the "alleged source of the Muslims' conundrum" in the "persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic alliance of what it terms 'Crusaders', 'Zionists', and 'apostates'."

Tenets

According to political scientist Gilles Kepel, Salafist jihadism combined "respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, ... with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith."

According to Mohammed M. Hafez, contemporary jihadi Salafism is characterized by "five features":

• immense emphasis on the concept of tawhid (unity of God);
• God's sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah), which defines right and wrong, good and evil, and which supersedes human reasoning is applicable in all places on earth and at all times, and makes unnecessary and un-Islamic other ideologies such as liberalism or humanism;
• the rejection of all innovation (bid‘ah) in Islam;
• the permissibility and necessity of takfir (the declaring of a Muslim to be outside the creed, so that they may face execution);
• and on the centrality of jihad against infidel regimes.

Another researcher, Thomas Hegghammer, has outlined five objectives shared by jihadis:

• Changing the social and political organisation of the state (an example, being the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which fought to overthrow the Algerian state and replace it with an Islamic state).
• Establishing sovereignty on a territory perceived as occupied or dominated by non-Muslims (an example being the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (Soldiers of the Pure) in Indian-administered Kashmir and the Caucasus Emirate in the Russian Federation).
• Defending the Muslim community (ummah) from external non-Muslim perceived threats, either the "near enemy" (al-adou al-qarib, this includes jihadists Arabs who travelled to Bosnia and Chechnya to defend local Muslims against non-Muslim armies) or the "far enemy" (al-adou al-baid, often affiliates of Al-Qaeda attacking the West).
• Correcting other Muslims' moral behaviour. (In Indonesia, vigilantes first used sticks and stones to attack those they considered "deviant" in behavior before moving on to guns and bombs.)
• Intimidating and marginalising other Muslim sects (an example being Lashkar-e-Jhangvi which has carried out violent attacks on Pakistani Shia for decades, and killings in Iraq).)

Robin Wright notes the importance in Salafi jihadist groups of

• the formal process of taking an oath of allegiance (Bay'ah) to a leader. (This can be by individuals to an emir or by a local group to a transglobal group.)
• "marbling", i.e. pretending to cut ties to a less-than-popular global movement when "strategically or financially convenient". (An example is the cutting of ties to al-Qaeda by the Syrian group Al-Nusra Front with al-Qaeda's approval.)

Al Jazeera journalist Jamal Al Sharif describes Salafi jihadism as combining "the doctrinal content and approach of Salafism and organisational models from Muslim Brotherhood organisations. Their motto emerged as 'Salafism in doctrine, modernity in confrontation'".

Differences from Traditional Salafism

Although Salafi-Jihadists profess to follow Salafism, they borrow heavily from Sayyid Qutb’s concept of Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance), Hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God) and Takfir (excommunication). Prominent contemporary ideologues of Salafi Jihadism, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al Filistini, drew heavily from the works of Sayyid Qutb and adopted concepts of Al-Wala wal Bara from his writings. Maqdisi’s interpretation of Al-Wala wal Bara marked a distinct shift from traditional Salafi theology by introducing Takfiri principles to it. Adopting a binary world-view, Maqdisi condemned contemporary Muslim governments as apostates and takfired the Muslims who supported them. Salafi Jihadist doctrines advocating violent overthrow of the existing political order, is seen as heretical by traditional Salafis. Salafi Jihadists also reject democracy as it contradicts their interpretation of Hakimiyya. Mainstream Salafis, on the other hand, participate in democratic systems across the world.

Quietist Salafis criticize Al-Qaeda and Daish as Qutbists. According to them, these organizations are directly opposed to Salafiyya and its manhaj(methodology). Major doctrines of the Salafi Jihadist movement have its roots in early heterodox sects such as the Kharijites. As a result, heavy creedal disparities exist between traditional Salafis and Salafi Jihadists. Mainstream Salafism, which consists of both quietist and political Salafis, reject the violence of Jihadists. Major Salafi scholars condemn many Salafi-Jihadist organisations as Kharijites.

History

Origins

Egyptian Islamist movements of 1950s are generally considered to be the precursors of contemporary Salafi Jihadist movements. Antecedents of Salafi jihadism notably includes Egyptian Islamist author Sayyid Qutb, who developed "the intellectual underpinnings", in the 1950s, for what would later become the doctrine of most Jihadist organizations around the world, including Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Sayyid Qutb's brother, Muhammad Qutb was one of Osama bin Laden’s teachers at university. Sayyid Qutb has been described as ‘Al-Qaeda’s Philosopher’. Ayman al Zawahiri, the Egyptian who was second in command and co-founder of Al-Qaeda, calls Qutb, "the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements".

In his writings, both before and after joining the Muslim Brotherhood Qutb argued that the Muslim world had reached a crisis point and that the Islamic world has been replaced by pagan ignorance of Jahiliyyah, (which directly translates to "ignorance", a term used by Muslims to describe the "dark" ages before Muhammed's foundation of Islam). When Qutb went abroad for a two-year scholarship to the United States, it is said he came back with extremist radical beliefs. He used what's been often described by scholars as his "genuine literary excellence" to spread these views of western criticism to form the main intellectual doctrine for the Muslim Brotherhood, which later be adopted by most terrorist organizations worldwide.

Qutbism doctrine of Islam interpretation emphasizes how the secular, infidel Muslim leaders and populations have fallen to imitating the western way of life, and that before any prosperity would occur, the Muslim world must revert to the Caliphate-age Shari'ah Law instead of "Man-made laws". He issued ideological & religious debates stating that the violent means are justifiable under Islamic Law for an end as great as returning the Islamic State "days of glory", and these means are often leading a victorious violent holy war (Jihad) against the west.

A part of his writings which have influenced Islamists and terrorist organizations on the nature of The West, can be found in his book "The America that I Have Seen", which he wrote immediately after returning to Egypt from the United States. In it he complained of Western materialism, individual freedoms, economic system, racism, brutal boxing matches, "poor" haircuts, superficiality in conversations and friendships, restrictions on divorce, enthusiasm for sports, lack of artistic feeling, "animal-like" mixing of the sexes (which "went on even in churches"), and strong support for the new Israeli state.

He was appalled by what he perceived as loose sexual openness of American men and women. Qutb noted with disapproval the openly displayed sexuality of American women stating in the same influential book The America that I Have Seen:

the American girl is well acquainted with her body's seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, and in expressive eyes, and thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely thighs, sleek legs – and she shows all this and does not hide it.

On 29 August 1966, Sayyid Qutb was executed by hanging by Egyptian president's Gamal Abdel-Nasser's regime for his alleged role in the president's assassination plot. This would later paint him as an Islamic martyr or shahid (he is often called "Shahid Sayyid Qutb" or Sayyid Qutb al-Shahid by admirers) among supporters & Islamist circles, particularly as the trial was alleged to be a show trial. Qutb wrote his major Islamist works (a commentary of the Qur'an, Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an), and a manifesto of political Islam called Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), while incarcerated and allegedly tortured. This, alongside his allegedly extrajudicial execution, elevated the value of these two major writings, giving his radical, violent Islamist doctrine in his writings a stronger influence over future terrorist organizations.

Evolution of Salafi-Jihadism after Qutb

The crushing defeat of various Arab states in the 1967 Six-Day War war led to the de-legitimization of socialist and nationalist ideologies across the Arab world. Their demise provided a fertile ground for the Salafiyya movement, which spread across the Arab world as well as the wider Islamic world. The rise of oil industry in Gulf states also brought in a large-workforce. The workforce embraced Salafi doctrines and founded Salafi organisations as they returned to to their home-countries.

Beginning from 1970s, various Islamist and Jihadist factions attempted to idealize traditional Salafiyya, recasting it as a totalizing political system based on the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb. Majority of Salafis traditionally viewed Salafiyya as a scholarly movement that revived the religious faith of Muslims through teaching and devout adherence to Islamic decrees. Additionally, they advocated Salafism to remain uncontaminated from politics. However, a minority sought the establishment of an Islamic system through violent means, based on Sayyid Qutb's concepts of Hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God). They advocated a global Jihad, with clear political overtones, to fight for Muslim liberation across national boundaries. This movement came to be known as Salafi-Jihadism. Groups like Takfir wal-Hijra, who kidnapped and murdered an Egyptian ex-government minister in 1978, also inspired some of "the tactics and methods" used by Al Qaeda.

Expansion

(Data from A Persistent Threat, The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists, Seth G. Jones, 2014, Figure 3.1)

Gilles Kepel writes that the Salafis whom he encountered in Europe in the 1980s, were "totally apolitical". However, by the mid-1990s, he met some who felt jihad in the form of "violence and terrorism" was "justified to realize their political objectives". The mingling of many Salafists who were alienated from mainstream European society with violent jihadists created "a volatile mixture". "When you're in the state of such alienation you become easy prey to the jihadi guys who will feed you more savory propaganda than the old propaganda of the Salafists who tell you to pray, fast and who are not taking action".

In Afghanistan, the Taliban were of the Deobandi, not Salafi, school of Islam but "cross-fertilized" with bin Laden and other Salafist jihadis.

Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation finds in his research that Salafi-jihadist numbers and activity have increased from 2007 to 2013. According to his research:

• the number of Salafi-jihadist groups increased by over 50% from 2010 to 2013, using Libya and parts of Syria as sanctuary.
• the number of Salafi jihadist fighters "more than doubled from 2010 to 2013" using both low and high estimates. The war in Syria was the single most important attraction for Salafi-jihadist fighters.
• attacks by al-Qaeda–affiliated groups (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)
• despite al-Qaeda's traditional focus on the "far enemy" (US and Europe), approximately 99% of the attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliates in 2013 were against "near enemy" targets (in North Africa, the Middle East, and other regions outside of the West).

Leaders, groups and activities

Leaders and development

"Theoreticians" of Salafist jihadism included Afghan jihad veterans such as the Palestinian Abu Qatada, the Syrian Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the Egyptian Mustapha Kamel, known as Abu Hamza al-Masri. Osama bin Laden was its most well-known leader. The dissident Saudi preachers Salman al-Ouda and Safar Al-Hawali, were held in high esteem by this school.

Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri praising Sayyid Qutb, stated that Qutb's call formed the ideological foundation for the contemporary Salafi-Jihadist movement.

Murad al-Shishani of The Jamestown Foundation states there have been three generations of Salafi-jihadists: those waging jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq. As of the mid-2000s, Arab fighters in Iraq were "the latest and most important development of the global Salafi-jihadi movement". These fighters were usually not Iraqis, but volunteers who had come to Iraq from other countries, mainly Saudi Arabia. Unlike in earlier Salafi jihadi actions, Egyptians "are no longer the chief ethnic group". According to Bruce Livesey Salafist jihadists are currently a "burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among EU countries" from September 2001 to the beginning of 2005".

According to Mohammed M. Hafez, in Iraq jihadi salafi are pursuing a "system-collapse strategy" whose goal is to install an "Islamic emirate based on Salafi dominance, similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan." In addition to occupation/coalition personnel they target mainly Iraqi security forces and Shia civilians, but also "foreign journalists, translators and transport drivers and the economic and physical infrastructure of Iraq."

Groups

Salafist jihadist groups include Al Qaeda, the now defunct Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the Egyptian group Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which still exists.

In the Algerian Civil War 1992–1998, the GIA was one of the two major Islamist armed groups (the other being the Armee Islamique du Salut or AIS) fighting the Algerian army and security forces. The GIA included veterans of the Afghanistan jihad and unlike the more moderate AIS, fought to destabilize the Algerian government with terror attacks designed to "create an atmosphere of general insecurity". It considered jihad in Algeria fard ayn or an obligation for all (sane adult male) Muslims, and sought to "purge" Algeria of "the ungodly" and create an Islamic state. It pursued what Gilles Kepel called "wholesale massacres of civilians", targeting French-speaking intellectuals, foreigners, and Islamists deemed too moderate, and took its campaign of bombing to France, which supported the Algerian government against the Islamists. Although over 150,000 were killed in the civil war, the GIA eventually lost popular support and was crushed by the security forces. Remnants of the GIA continued on as "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat", which as of 2015 calls itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, (the Islamic Group) another Salafist-jihadi movement fought an insurgency against the Egyptian government from 1992 to 1998 during which at least 800 Egyptian policemen and soldiers, jihadists, and civilians were killed. Outside of Egypt it is best known for a November 1997 attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor where fifty-eight foreign tourists trapped inside the temple were hunted down and hacked and shot to death. The group declared a ceasefire in March 1999, although as of 2012 it is still active in jihad against the Bashar al-Assad regime Syria.

Flag of al-Qaeda

Perhaps the most famous and effective Salafist jihadist group was Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda evolved from the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded in 1984 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreign mujahideen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was established in Peshawar, Pakistan, by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. As it became apparent that the jihad had compelled the Soviet military to abandon its mission in Afghanistan, some mujahideen called for the expansion of their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, and Al Qaeda was formed by bin Laden on August 11, 1988. Members were to making a pledge (bayat) to follow one's superiors. Al-Qaeda emphasized jihad against the "far enemy", by which it meant the United States. In 1996, it announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands, and in 1998, it issued a fatwa calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies whenever and wherever they could. Among its most notable acts of violence were the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi that killed over 200 people; and the 9/11 attacks of 2001 that killed almost 3000 people and caused many billions of dollars in damage.

According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were the Mujahidin Shura Council and the Ansar al Sunna Group. There are also a number of small jihadist Salafist groups in Azerbaijan.

The group leading the Islamist insurgency in Southern Thailand in 2006 by carrying out most of the attacks and cross-border operations, BRN-Koordinasi, favours Salafi ideology. It works in a loosely organized strictly clandestine cell system dependent on hard-line religious leaders for direction.

Jund Ansar Allah is, or was, an armed Salafist jihadist organization in the Gaza Strip. On August 14, 2009, the group's spiritual leader, Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa, announced during Friday sermon the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian territories attacking the ruling authority, the Islamist group Hamas, for failing to enforce Sharia law. Hamas forces responded to his sermon by surrounding his Ibn Taymiyyah mosque complex and attacking it. In the fighting that ensued, 24 people (including Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa himself), were killed and over 130 were wounded.

In 2011, Salafist jihadists were actively involved with protests against King Abdullah II of Jordan, and the kidnapping and killing of Italian peace activist Vittorio Arrigoni in Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.

In the North Caucasus region of Russia, the Caucasus Emirate replaced the nationalism of Muslim Chechnya and Dagestan with a hard-line Salafist-takfiri jihadist ideology. They are immensely focused on upholding the concept of tawhid (purist monotheism), and fiercely reject any practice of shirk, taqlid, ijtihad and bid‘ah. They also believe in the complete separation between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, by propagating Al Wala' Wal Bara' and declaring takfir against any Muslim who (they believe) is a mushrik (polytheist) and does not return to the observance of tawhid and the strict literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah as followed by Muhammad and his companions (Sahaba).

Flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

In Syria and Iraq both Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS have been described as Salafist-jihadist. Jabhat al-Nusra has been described as possessing "a hard-line Salafi-Jihadist ideology" and being one of "the most effective" groups fighting the regime. Writing after ISIS victories in Iraq, Hassan Hassan believes ISIS is a reflection of "ideological shakeup of Sunni Islam's traditional Salafism" since the Arab Spring, where salafism, "traditionally inward-looking and loyal to the political establishment", has "steadily, if slowly", been eroded by Salafism-jihadism.

Boko Haram in Nigeria is a Salafi jihadism group that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 2.3 million from their homes,

List of groups

According to Seth G. Jones at the Rand Corporation, as of 2014, there were around 50 Salafist-jihadist groups in existence or recently in existence ("present" in the list indicates a group's continued existence as of 2014). (Jones defines Salafi-jihadist groups as those groups which emphasize the importance of returning to a "pure" form of Islam, the form of Islam which was practiced by the Salaf, the pious ancestors; and those groups which believe that violent jihad is fard ‘ayn (a personal religious duty)).

Salafist-jihadist groups as of 2014

Name of Group	Base of Operations	Years
Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Yusuf al-Uyayri Battalions)	Saudi Arabia	2009–present
Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions)	Lebanon	2009–present
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Philippines	1991–present
Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)	Yemen	1994–present
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI)	Somalia, Ethiopia	1994–2002
Al-Qaeda (core)	Pakistan	1988–present
Al-Qaeda in Aceh (a.k.a. Tanzim al Qa’ida Indonesia for Serambi Makkah)	Indonesia	2009–2011
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia)	Saudi Arabia	2002–2008
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen)	Yemen	2008–present
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC)	Algeria	1998–present
Al Takfir wal al-Hijrah	Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)	2011–present
Al-Mulathamun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar)	Mali, Libya, Algeria	2012–2013
Al-Murabitun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar)	Mali, Libya, Algeria	2013–2017
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia- Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC)	Somalia, Eritrea	2006–2009
Ansar al-Islam	Iraq	2001–present
Ansar al-Sharia (Egypt)	Egypt	2012–present
Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)	Libya	2012–2017
Ansar al-Sharia (Mali)	Mali	2012–present
Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia)	Tunisia	2011–present
Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (a.k.a. Ansar Jerusalem)	Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)	2012–present
Ansaru	Nigeria	2012–present
Osbat al-Ansar (AAA)	Lebanon	1985–present
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF, a.k.a. BIFM)	Philippines	2010–present
Boko Haram	Nigeria	2003–present
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Basayev faction)	Russia (Chechnya)	1994–2007
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM, a.k.a. Turkestan Islamic Party)	China (Xinjang)	1989–present
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)	Egypt	1978–2001
Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya	Syria	2012–present
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen	Somalia	2002–present
Harakat al-Shuada’a al Islamiyah (a.k.a. Islamic Martyr's Movement, IMM)	Libya	1996–2007
Harakat Ansar al-Din	Mali	2011–2017
Hizbul al Islam	Somalia	2009–2010
Imarat Kavkaz (IK, or Caucasus Emirate)	Russia (Chechnya)	2007–present
Indian Mujahedeen	India	2005–present
Islamic Jihad Union (a.k.a. Islamic Jihad Group)	Uzbekistan	2002–present
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan	1997–present
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	Iraq, Syria	2004–present
Jabhat al-Nusrah	Syria	2011–present
Jaish ul-Adl	Iran	2013–present
Jaish al-Islam (a.k.a. Tawhid and Jihad Brigades)	Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)	2005–present
Jaish al-Ummah (JaU)	Gaza Strip	2007–present
Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis	Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)	2011–present
Jamaat Ansarullah (JA)	Tajikistan	2010–present
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)	Indonesia	2008–present
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)	Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore	1993–present
Jondullah	Pakistan	2003–present
Jund al-Sham	Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip, Qatar, Afghanistan	1999–2008
Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM)	Philippines	2013–present
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, a.k.a. Mansoorian)	Pakistan (Kashmir)	1990–present
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)	Libya	1990–present
Liwa al-Islam	Syria	2011–present
Liwa al-Tawhid	Syria	2012–present
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)	Morocco, Western Europe	1998–present
Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)	Mali	2011–2013
Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN)	Egypt	2011–present
Mujahideen Shura Council	Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)	2011–present
Salafia Jihadia (As-Sirat al Moustaquim)	Morocco	1995–present
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Syria	2011–2015
Tawhid wal Jihad	Iraq	1999–2004
Tunisian Combat Group (TCG)	Tunisia, Western Europe	2000–2011

Ruling strategy

In several places and times, jihadis have taken control of an area and they have ruled it as an Islamic state, such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq.

Among jihadists, establishing an uncompromising form of sharia law is a core value and goal, but strategies differ over how quickly this should be done. Observers such as the journalist Robert Worth have described jihadis as being torn between wanting to build a truly Islamic order gradually from the bottom up in order to avoid alienating non-jihadi Muslims (the desire of Osama bin Laden), and not wanting to wait for the creation of an Islamic state.

In Zinjibar, Yemen, AQAP established an "emirate" which lasted from May 2011 until the summer of 2012. It emphasized (and publicized with a media campaign) "uncharacteristically gentle" good governance over its conquered territory rather than strict enforcement of sharia law—rebuilding infrastructure, quashing banditry, and resolving legal disputes. One jihadi veteran of Yemen described its approach towards the local population:

You have to take a gradual approach with them when it comes to religious practices. You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray. We have to first stop the great sins, and then move gradually to the lesser and lesser ones ... Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible unless you are forced to do so.

However AQAP's "clemency drained away under the pressure of war", and the area was taken back by the government. The failure of this model (according to New York Times correspondent Robert Worth), may have "taught" jihadis a lesson on the need to instill fear.

ISIS is believed to have used a manifesto which is titled "The Management of Savagery" as its model. The manifesto emphasizes the need to create areas of "savagery", i.e. lawlessness, in enemy territory. Once the enemy was too exhausted and weakened from the lawlessness (particularly terrorism) to continue to try to govern its territory, the nucleus of a new caliphate could be established in its place. The author of "The Management of Savagery", did not place a lot of emphasis on winning the sympathy of local Muslims, instead, he placed a lot of emphasis on the use of extreme violence, writing that: "One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening [others] and massacring – I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them." (Social-media posts from ISIS territory "suggest that individual executions happen more or less continually, and mass executions occur every few weeks", according to journalist Graeme Wood.)

Condemnations by Muslims and challenges

Thousands of Muslim leaders and scholars and dozens of Islamic councils have denounced Salafi jihadism. The Salafi-Jihadist strand of Islam is considered by many Islamic scholars as deviant strand and majority of orthodox Islamic scholars, both Salafi and non-Salafi, have written treatises comparing Salafi Jihadists with Kharijites. Some scholars, policy institutes, and political scientists have noted a growing concern that Salafi-Jihadism can be a gateway to terrorism and violent extremism. Notable challenges in countering Salafi jihadism are funding from oil-rich Gulf nations and private donations which are difficult to track, Saudi efforts to propagate Salafiyya movement throughout the Muslim world, resentment for Western hegemony, authoritarian Arab regimes, feeling defenseless against foreign aggression and that "Muslim blood is cheap," weak governance, extremist Salafi preaching that counters moderate voices, and other challenges.

Further reading

• Oliver, Haneef James. "Sacred Freedom: Western Liberalist Ideologies in the Light of Islam". TROID, 2006, ISBN 0-9776996-0-9 (Free)
• Global jihadism: theory and practice, Brachman, Jarret, Taylor & Francis, 2008, ISBN 0-415-45241-4, ISBN 978-0-415-45241-0
• Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674010901.

External links

• Robert Manne, Sayyid Qutb: Father of Salafi Jihadism. ABC Religion and Ethics