Epistemology
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Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. It studies the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge, epistemic justification, and various related issues. Debates in contemporary epistemology are generally clustered around four core areas:[1][2][3]
- The philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and the conditions required for a belief to constitute knowledge, such as truth and justification;
- Potential sources of knowledge and justified belief, such as perception, reason, memory, and testimony
- The structure of a body of knowledge or justified belief, including whether all justified beliefs must be derived from justified foundational beliefs or whether justification requires only a coherent set of beliefs; and,
- Philosophical scepticism, which questions the possibility of knowledge, and related problems, such as whether scepticism poses a threat to our ordinary knowledge claims and whether it is possible to refute sceptical arguments.
In these debates and others, epistemology aims to answer questions such as "What do people know?", "What does it mean to say that people know something?", "What makes justified beliefs justified?", and "How do people know that they know?"[4][1][5][6] Specialties in epistemology ask questions such as "How can people create formal models about issues related to knowledge?" (in formal epistemology), "What are the historical conditions of changes in different kinds of knowledge?" (in historical epistemology), "What are the methods, aims, and subject matter of epistemological inquiry?" (in metaepistemology), and "How do people know together?" (in social epistemology).
Definition
[edit]Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge. Also called theory of knowledge,[note 1] it examines what knowledge is and what types of knowledge there are. It further investigates the sources of knowledge, like perception, inference, and testimony, to determine how knowledge is created. Another topic is the extent and limits of knowledge, confronting questions about what people can and cannot know.[8] Other central concepts include belief, truth, justification, evidence, and reason.[9] Epistemology is one of the main branches of philosophy besides fields like ethics, logic, and metaphysics.[10] The term can also be used in a slightly different sense to refer not to the branch of philosophy but to a particular position within that branch, as in Plato's epistemology and Immanuel Kant's epistemology.[11]
As a normative field of inquiry, epistemology explores how people should acquire beliefs. This way, it determines which beliefs fulfill the standards or epistemic goals of knowledge and which ones fail, thereby providing an evaluation of beliefs. Descriptive fields of inquiry, like psychology and cognitive sociology, are also interested in beliefs and related cognitive processes. Unlike epistemology, they study the beliefs people have and how people acquire them instead of examining the evaluative norms of these processes.[12][note 2] Epistemology is relevant to many descriptive and normative disciplines, such as the other branches of philosophy and the sciences, by exploring the principles of how they may arrive at knowledge.[14]
The word epistemology comes from the ancient Greek terms ἐπιστήμη (episteme, meaning knowledge or understanding) and λόγος (logos, meaning study of or reason), literally, the study of knowledge. Even though ancient Greek philosophers practiced epistemology, they did not use this word. The term was only coined in the 19th century to label this field and conceive it as a distinct branch of philosophy.[15][note 3]
Central concepts
[edit]Knowledge
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The entry "Knowledge How" of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[20] mentions that introductory classes to epistemology often start their analysis of knowledge by pointing out three different senses of "knowing" something: "knowing that" (knowing the truth of propositions), "knowing how" (understanding how to perform certain actions), and "knowing by acquaintance" (directly perceiving an object, being familiar with it, or otherwise coming into contact with it). This modern teaching of epistemology is primarily concerned with the first of these forms of knowledge, propositional knowledge. All three senses of "knowing" can be seen in the ordinary use of the word. It can be known in mathematics that 2 + 2 = 4, but there is also knowing how to add two numbers. There is knowing by acquaintance a person (e.g., knowing other persons,[21][22] or knowing oneself), a place (e.g., one's hometown), a thing (e.g., cars), or activity (e.g., addition).
While these distinctions are not explicit in English, they are explicitly made in other languages, including French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, German, and Dutch (although some languages closely related to English have been said to retain these verbs, such as Scots).[note 4] In French, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, German, and Dutch 'to know (a person)' is translated using connaître, conhecer, conocer, a cunoaște, and kennen (both German and Dutch) respectively, whereas 'to know (how to do something)' is translated using savoir, saber (both Portuguese and Spanish), a şti, wissen, and weten. Modern Greek has the verbs γνωρίζω (gnorízo) and ξέρω (kséro). Italian has the verbs conoscere and sapere and the nouns for knowledge are conoscenza and sapienza. German has the verbs wissen and kennen; the former implies knowing a fact, the latter knowing in the sense of being acquainted with and having a working knowledge of. There is also a noun derived from kennen, namely Erkennen, which has been said to imply knowledge in the form of recognition or acknowledgment.[22]: esp. Section 1. The verb itself implies a process of going from one state to another, from a state of "not-erkennen" to a state of true erkennen. This verb seems the most appropriate in terms of describing the "episteme" in one of the modern European languages, hence the German name "Erkenntnistheorie [de]". The theoretical interpretation and significance of these linguistic issues remains controversial. The distinction is most pronounced in Polish, where wiedzieć means "to know", umieć means "to know how" and znać means "to be familiar with" (to "know" a person).
In his paper On Denoting and his later book Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell brought a great deal of attention to the distinction between "knowledge by description" and "knowledge by acquaintance". Gilbert Ryle is similarly credited with bringing more attention to the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in The Concept of Mind. In Personal Knowledge, Michael Polanyi argues for the epistemological relevance of knowledge how and knowledge that; using the example of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle, he suggests that the theoretical knowledge of the physics involved in maintaining a state of balance cannot substitute for the practical knowledge of how to ride, and that it is important to understand how both are established and grounded. This position is essentially Ryle's, who argued that a failure to acknowledge the distinction between "knowledge that" and "knowledge how" leads to infinite regress.
A priori and a posteriori knowledge
[edit]One of the most important distinctions in epistemology is between what can be known a priori (independently of experience) and what can be known a posteriori (through experience). The terms originate from the analytic methods of Aristotle's Organon, and may be roughly defined as follows:[23]
- A priori knowledge is knowledge that is independent of experience. This means that it can be known or justified prior to or independently of any specific empirical evidence or sensory observations. Such knowledge is obtained through reasoning, logical analysis, or introspection. Examples of a priori knowledge include mathematical truths, logical tautologies (e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried"), and certain fundamental principles of reason and logic[clarification needed]. One of the key proponents of a priori knowledge was the philosopher Immanuel Kant. He argued that certain fundamental truths about the nature of reality, such as the concepts of space, time, causality, and the categories of understanding, are not derived from experience, but are inherent in the structure of the mind itself. According to Kant, these a priori categories enable the organization and interpretation of sensory experiences, giving rise to an understanding of the world.
- A posteriori knowledge is knowledge that is derived from experience. It is based on empirical evidence, sensory perception, and observations of the external world. A posteriori knowledge is contingent upon the information gained through the senses and relies on the collection and interpretation of data. Scientific observations and experimental results are typical examples of a posteriori knowledge.
Views that emphasize the importance of a priori knowledge are generally classified as rationalist. Views that emphasize the importance of a posteriori knowledge are generally classified as empiricist.[24][25]
Belief
[edit]One of the core concepts in epistemology is belief. A belief is an attitude that a person holds regarding anything that they take to be true.[26] For instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the proposition "snow is white". Beliefs can be occurrent (e.g., a person actively thinking "snow is white"), or they can be dispositional (e.g., a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white"). While there is not universal agreement about the nature of belief, most contemporary philosophers hold the view that a disposition to express belief B qualifies as holding the belief B.[26] There are various different ways that contemporary philosophers have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be (Jerry Fodor), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true (Roderick Chisholm), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions (Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson), or as mental states that fill a particular function (Hilary Putnam).[26] Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to the notion of belief, including eliminativists about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our folk psychological concept of belief (Paul Churchland) and formal epistemologists, who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ("either I have a belief or I don't have a belief") with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ("there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief").[26][27]
While belief plays a significant role in epistemological debates surrounding knowledge and justification, it has also generated many other philosophical debates in its own right. Notable debates include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?"; "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g., if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H2O part of the content of that belief)?"; "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?"; and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?"[26]
Truth
[edit]Truth is the property or state of being in accordance with facts or reality.[28] On most views, truth is the correspondence of language or thought to a mind-independent world. This is called the correspondence theory of truth. Among philosophers who think that it is possible to analyze the conditions necessary for knowledge, virtually all of them accept that truth is such a condition. There is much less agreement about the extent to which a knower must know why something is true in order to know. On such views, something being known implies that it is true. However, this should not be confused for the more contentious view that one must know that one knows in order to know (the KK principle).[1]
Epistemologists disagree about whether belief is the only truth-bearer. Other common suggestions for things that can bear the property of being true include propositions, sentences, thoughts, utterances, and judgments. Plato, in his Gorgias, argues that belief is the most commonly invoked truth-bearer.[29][clarification needed]
Many of the debates regarding truth are at the crossroads of epistemology and logic.[28] Some contemporary debates regarding truth include: How do we define truth? Is it even possible to give an informative definition of truth? What things are truth-bearers and therefore capable of being true or false? Are truth and falsity bivalent, or are there other truth values? What are the criteria of truth that allow us to identify it and to distinguish it from falsity? What role does truth play in constituting knowledge? And is truth absolute, or is it merely relative to one's perspective?[28]
Justification
[edit]In epistemology, justification is a property of beliefs that fulfill certain norms about what a person should believe.[30] According to a common view, this means that the person has sufficient reasons for holding this belief because they have information that supports it.[31] Another view states that a belief is justified if it is formed by a reliable belief formation process, such as perception.[32] The terms rational, reasonable, warranted, and supported are closely related to the idea of justification and are sometimes used as synonyms.[33] Justification is what distinguishes justified beliefs from superstition and lucky guesses.[34] However, justification does not guarantee truth. For example, if a person has strong but misleading evidence, they may form a justified belief that is false.[35]
Epistemologists often identify justification as one component of knowledge.[36] Usually, they are not only interested in whether a person has a sufficient reason to hold a belief, known as propositional justification, but also in whether the person holds the belief because or based on[note 5] this reason, known as doxastic justification. For example, if a person has sufficient reason to believe that a neighborhood is dangerous but forms this belief based on superstition then they have propositional justification but lack doxastic justification.[38]
Sources
[edit]Sources of justification are ways or cognitive capacities through which people acquire justification. Often-discussed sources include perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony, but there is no universal agreement to what extent they all provide valid justification.[39] Perception relies on sensory organs to gain empirical information. There are various forms of perception corresponding to different physical stimuli, such as visual, auditory, haptic, olfactory, and gustatory perception.[40] Perception is not merely the reception of sense impressions but an active process that selects, organizes, and interprets sensory signals.[41] Introspection is a closely related process focused not on external physical objects but on internal mental states. For example, seeing a bus at a bus station belongs to perception while feeling tired belongs to introspection.[42]
Rationalists understand reason as a source of justification for non-empirical facts. It is often used to explain how people can know about mathematical, logical, and conceptual truths. Reason is also responsible for inferential knowledge, in which one or several beliefs are used as premises to support another belief.[43] Memory depends on information provided by other sources, which it retains and recalls, like remembering a phone number perceived earlier.[44] Justification by testimony relies on information one person communicates to another person. This can happen by talking to each other but can also occur in other forms, like a letter, a newspaper, and a blog.[45]
Defining knowledge
[edit]A central issue in epistemology is the question of what the nature of knowledge is or how to define it. Sometimes the expressions "theory of knowledge" and "analysis of knowledge" are used specifically for this form of inquiry.[46][47][48] The term "knowledge" has various meanings in natural language. It can refer to an awareness of facts, as in knowing that Mars is a planet, to a possession of skills, as in knowing how to swim, or to an experiential acquaintance, as in knowing Daniel Craig personally.[49][50][51] Factual knowledge, also referred to as propositional knowledge or descriptive knowledge, plays a special role in epistemology. On the linguistic level, it is distinguished from the other forms of knowledge since it can be expressed through a that-clause, for instance, using a formulation like "They know that..." followed by the known proposition.[52][50][4]
Some features of factual knowledge are widely accepted: it is a form of cognitive success that establishes epistemic contact with reality.[5][51] However, even though it has been studied intensely, there are still various disagreements about its exact nature. Different factors are responsible for these disagreements. Some theorists try to furnish a practically useful definition by describing its most noteworthy and easily identifiable features.[51] Others engage in an analysis of knowledge, which aims to provide a theoretically precise definition that identifies the set of essential features characteristic for all instances of knowledge and only for them.[51][48][53] Differences in the methodology may also cause disagreements. In this regard, some epistemologists use abstract and general intuitions in order to arrive at their definitions. A different approach is to start from concrete individual cases of knowledge to determine what all of them have in common.[54][55][56] Yet another method is to focus on linguistic evidence by studying how the term "knowledge" is commonly used.[4][47] Different standards of knowledge are further sources of disagreement. A few theorists set these standards very high by demanding that absolute certainty or infallibility is necessary. On such a view, knowledge is a very rare thing. Theorists more in tune with ordinary language usually demand lower standards and see knowledge as something commonly found in everyday life.[57][50][58]
As justified true belief
[edit]The historically most influential definition, discussed since ancient Greek philosophy, characterizes knowledge in relation to three essential features: as (1) a belief that is (2) true and (3) justified.[48][51][59] There is still wide acceptance that the first two features are correct, that is, that knowledge is a mental state that affirms a true proposition.[50][4][51] However, there is a lot of dispute about the third feature: justification.[60][51][48] This feature is usually included to distinguish knowledge from true beliefs that rest on superstition, lucky guesses, or faulty reasoning. This expresses the idea that knowledge is not the same as being right about something.[61][50][47] Traditionally, justification is understood as the possession of evidence: a belief is justified if the believer has good evidence supporting it. Such evidence could be a perceptual experience, a memory, or a second belief.[48][50][47]
Gettier problem and alternative definitions
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The justified-true-belief account of knowledge came under severe criticism in the second half of the 20th century, when Edmund Gettier proposed various counterexamples.[62] In a famous example of what came to be known as a Gettier case, a person is driving on a country road lined with multiple barn façades, only one of which is real barn, but it is not possible to tell the difference between them from the road. The person then stops by a fortuitous coincidence in front of the only real barn and forms the belief that it is a barn. The idea behind this thought experiment is that this is not knowledge even though the belief is both justified and true. The reason is that it is just a lucky accident since the person cannot tell the difference: They would have formed exactly the same justified belief if they had stopped at another site, in which case the belief would have been false.[63][64][65]
Various additional examples were proposed along similar lines. Most of them involve a justified true belief that apparently fails to amount to knowledge because the belief's justification is in some sense not relevant to its truth.[66][50][51] These counterexamples have provoked very diverse responses. Some theorists think that one only needs to modify one's conception of justification to avoid them. But the more common approach is to search for an additional criterion.[48][67] On this view, all cases of knowledge involve a justified true belief but some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge since they lack this additional feature. There are diverse suggestions for this fourth criterion. Some epistemologists require that no false belief is involved in the justification or that no defeater of the belief is present.[65][47] A different approach is to require that the belief tracks truth, that is, that the person would not have the belief if it was false.[50][51] Some even require that the justification has to be infallible, that is, that it necessitates the belief's truth.[50][68]
A quite different approach is to affirm that the justified-true-belief account of knowledge is deeply flawed and to seek a complete reconceptualization of knowledge. These reconceptualizations often do not require justification at all.[48] One such approach is to require that the true belief was produced by a reliable process. Naturalized epistemologists often hold that the believed fact has to cause the belief.[69][70][71] Virtue theorists are also interested in how the belief is produced. For them, the belief must be a manifestation of a cognitive virtue.[72][73][5]
The value problem
[edit]The primary value problem is to determine why knowledge should be more valuable than simply true belief. In Plato's Meno, Socrates points out to Meno that a man who knew the way to Larissa could lead others there correctly. But so, too, could a man who had true beliefs about how to get there, even if he had not gone there or had any knowledge of Larissa. Socrates says that it seems that both knowledge and true opinion can guide action. Meno then wonders why knowledge is valued more than true belief and why knowledge and true belief are different. Socrates responds that knowledge, unlike belief, must be 'tied down' to the truth, like the mythical tethered statues of Daedalus.[74][75]
More generally, the problem is to identify what (if anything) makes knowledge more valuable than a minimal conjunction of its components such as mere true belief or justified true belief. Other components considered besides belief, truth, and justification are safety, sensitivity, statistical likelihood, and any anti-Gettier condition. This is done within analyses that conceive of knowledge as divided into components. Knowledge-first epistemological theories, which posit knowledge as fundamental, are notable exceptions to these kind of analyses.[75] The value problem re-emerged in the philosophical literature on epistemology in the 21st century following the rise of virtue epistemology in the 1980s, partly because of the obvious link to the concept of value in ethics.[76]
Acquiring knowledge
[edit]Important distinctions
[edit]A priori–a posteriori distinction
[edit]As mentioned above, epistemologists draw a distinction between what can be known a priori (independently of experience) and what can only be known a posteriori (through experience). Much of what we call a priori knowledge is thought to be attained through reason alone, as featured prominently in rationalism. This might also include a non-rational faculty of intuition, as defended by proponents of innatism. In contrast, a posteriori knowledge is derived entirely through experience or as a result of experience, as emphasized in empiricism. This also includes cases where knowledge can be traced back to an earlier experience, as in memory or testimony.[23]
A way to look at the difference between the two is through an example. Bruce Russell gives two propositions in which the reader decides which one he believes more.[clarification needed] Option A: All crows are birds. Option B: All crows are black. If you believe option A, then you are a priori justified in believing it because you do not have to see a crow to know it is a bird. If you believe in option B, then you are a posteriori justified to believe it because you have seen many crows therefore knowing they are black. He goes on to say that it does not matter if the statement is true or not, only that if you believe in one or the other that matters.[23]
The idea of a priori knowledge is that it is based on intuition or rational insights. Laurence BonJour says in his article "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge",[77] that a "rational insight is an immediate, non-inferential grasp, apprehension or 'seeing' that some proposition is necessarily true" (p. 3). Going back to the crow example, by Laurence BonJour's definition the reason you would believe in option A is because you have an immediate knowledge that a crow is a bird, without ever experiencing one.
Evolutionary psychology takes a novel approach to the problem. It says that there is an innate predisposition for certain types of learning. "Only small parts of the brain resemble a tabula rasa; this is true even for human beings. The remainder is more like an exposed negative waiting to be dipped into a developer fluid".[78]
Analytic–synthetic distinction
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Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, drew a distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" propositions. He contended that some propositions are such that we can know they are true just by understanding their meaning. For example, consider, "My father's brother is my uncle." We can know it is true solely by virtue of our understanding in what its terms mean. Philosophers call such propositions "analytic". Synthetic propositions, on the other hand, have distinct subjects and predicates. An example would be, "My father's brother has black hair." Kant stated that all mathematical and scientific statements are synthetic a priori propositions because they are necessarily true, but our knowledge about the attributes of the mathematical or physical subjects we can only get by logical inference.
While this distinction is first and foremost about meaning and is therefore most relevant to the philosophy of language, the distinction has significant epistemological consequences, seen most prominently in the works of the logical positivists.[79] In particular, if the set of propositions which can only be known a posteriori is coextensive with the set of propositions which are synthetically true, and if the set of propositions which can be known a priori is coextensive with the set of propositions which are analytically true (or in other words, which are true by definition), then there can only be two kinds of successful inquiry: Logico-mathematical inquiry, which investigates what is true by definition, and empirical inquiry, which investigates what is true in the world. Most notably, this would exclude the possibility that branches of philosophy like metaphysics could ever provide informative accounts of what actually exists.[23][79]
The American philosopher W. V. O. Quine, in his paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", famously challenged the analytic-synthetic distinction, arguing that the boundary between the two is too blurry to provide a clear division between propositions that are true by definition and propositions that are not. While some contemporary philosophers take themselves to have offered more sustainable accounts of the distinction that are not vulnerable to Quine's objections, there is no consensus about whether or not these succeed.[80]
Science as knowledge acquisition
[edit]Science is often considered to be a refined, formalized, systematic, institutionalized form of the pursuit and acquisition of empirical knowledge. As such, the philosophy of science may be viewed as an application of the principles of epistemology and as a foundation for epistemological inquiry.[81]
Schools of thought
[edit]Skepticism, fallibilism, and relativism
[edit]Philosophical skepticism questions the human ability to arrive at knowledge. Some skeptics limit their criticism to certain domains of knowledge. For example, religious skeptics say that it is impossible to have certain knowledge about the existence of deities or other religious doctrines. Similarly, moral skeptics challenge the existence of moral knowledge and metaphysical skeptics say that humans cannot know ultimate reality.[82]
Global skepticism is the widest form of skepticism, asserting that there is no knowledge in any domain.[83] In ancient philosophy, this view was accepted by academic skeptics while Pyrrhonian skeptics recommended the suspension of belief to achieve a state of tranquility.[84] Overall, not many epistemologists have explicitly defended global skepticism. The influence of this position derives mainly from attempts by other philosophers to show that their theory overcomes the challenge of skepticism. For example, René Descartes used methodological doubt to find facts that cannot be doubted.[85]
One consideration in favor of global skepticism is the dream argument. It starts from the observation that, while people are dreaming, they are usually unaware of this. This inability to distinguish between dream and regular experience is used to argue that there is no certain knowledge since a person can never be sure that they are not dreaming.[86][note 6] Some critics assert that global skepticism is a self-refuting idea because denying the existence of knowledge is itself a knowledge claim. Another objection says that the abstract reasoning leading to skepticism is not convincing enough to overrule common sense.[88]
Fallibilism is another response to skepticism.[89] Fallibilists agree with skeptics that absolute certainty is impossible. Most fallibilists disagree with skeptics about the existence of knowledge, saying that there is knowledge since it does not require absolute certainty.[90] They emphasize the need to keep an open and inquisitive mind since doubt can never be fully excluded, even for well-established knowledge claims like thoroughly tested scientific theories.[91]
Epistemic relativism is a related view. It does not question the existence of knowledge in general but rejects the idea that there are universal epistemic standards or absolute principles that apply equally to everyone. This means that what a person knows depends on the subjective criteria or social conventions used to assess epistemic status.[92]
Empiricism and rationalism
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The debate between empiricism and rationalism centers on the origins of human knowledge. Empiricism emphasizes that sense experience is the primary source of all knowledge. Some empiricists express this view by stating that the mind is a blank slate that only develops ideas about the external world through the sense data it receives from the sensory organs. According to them, the mind can arrive at various additional insights by comparing impressions, combining them, generalizing to arrive at more abstract ideas, and deducing new conclusions from them. Empiricists say that all these mental operations depend on material from the senses and do not function on their own.[93]
Even though rationalists usually accept sense experience as one source of knowledge,[note 7] they also say that important forms of knowledge come directly from reason without sense experience,[95] like knowledge of mathematical and logical truths.[96] According to some rationalists, the mind possesses inborn ideas which it can access without the help of the senses. Others hold that there is an additional cognitive faculty, sometimes called rational intuition, through which people acquire nonempirical knowledge.[97] Some rationalists limit their discussion to the origin of concepts, saying that the mind relies on inborn categories to understand the world and organize experience.[98]
Foundationalism and coherentism
[edit]Foundationalists and coherentists disagree about the structure of knowledge.[99][note 8] Foundationalism distinguishes between basic and non-basic beliefs. A belief is basic if it is justified directly, meaning that its validity does not depend on the support of other beliefs. A belief is non-basic if it is justified by another belief.[101] For example, the belief that it rained last night is a non-basic belief if it is inferred from the observation that the street is wet.[102] According to foundationalism, basic beliefs are the foundation on which all other knowledge is built while non-basic beliefs constitute the superstructure resting on this foundation.[103]
Coherentists reject the distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs, saying that the justification of any belief depends on other beliefs. They assert that a belief must be in tune with other beliefs to amount to knowledge. This is the case if the beliefs are consistent and support each other. According to coherentism, justification is a holistic aspect determined by the whole system of beliefs, which resembles an interconnected web.[104]
The view of foundherentism is an intermediary position combining elements of both foundationalism and coherentism. It accepts the distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs while asserting that the justification of non-basic beliefs depends on coherence with other beliefs.[105]
Infinitism presents another approach to the structure of knowledge. It agrees with coherentism that there are no basic beliefs while rejecting the view that beliefs can support each other in a circular manner. Instead, it argues that beliefs form infinite justification chains, in which each link of the chain supports the belief following it and is supported by the belief preceding it.[106]
Internalism and externalism
[edit]The disagreement between internalism and externalism is about the sources of justification.[107][note 9] Internalists say that justification depends only on factors within the individual. Examples of such factors include perceptual experience, memories, and the possession of other beliefs. This view emphasizes the importance of the cognitive perspective of the individual in the form of their mental states. It is commonly associated with the idea that the relevant factors are accessible, meaning that the individual can become aware of their reasons for holding a justified belief through introspection and reflection.[109]
Externalism rejects this view, saying that at least some relevant factors are external to the individual. This means that the cognitive perspective of the individual is less central while other factors, specifically the relation to truth, become more important.[110] For instance, when considering the belief that a cup of coffee stands on the table, externalists are not only interested in the perceptual experience that led to this belief but also consider the quality of the person's eyesight, their ability to differentiate coffee from other beverages, and the circumstances under which they observed the cup.[111]
Evidentialism is an influential internalist view. It says that justification depends on the possession of evidence.[112] In this context, evidence for a belief is any information in the individual's mind that supports the belief. For example, the perceptual experience of rain is evidence for the belief that it is raining. Evidentialists have suggested various other forms of evidence, including memories, intuitions, and other beliefs.[113] According to evidentialism, a belief is justified if the individual's evidence supports the belief and they hold the belief on the basis of this evidence.[114]
Reliabilism is an externalist theory asserting that a reliable connection between belief and truth is required for justification.[115] Some reliabilists explain this in terms of reliable processes. According to this view, a belief is justified if it is produced by a reliable belief-formation process, like perception. A belief-formation process is reliable if most of the beliefs it causes are true. A slightly different view focuses on beliefs rather than belief-formation processes, saying that a belief is justified if it is a reliable indicator of the fact it presents. This means that the belief tracks the fact: the person believes it because it is a fact but would not believe it otherwise.[116]
Virtue epistemology is another type of externalism and is sometimes understood as a form of reliabilism. It says that a belief is justified if it manifests intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtues are capacities or traits that perform cognitive functions and help people form true beliefs. Suggested examples include faculties like vision, memory, and introspection.[117]
Others
[edit]In the epistemology of perception, direct and indirect realists disagree about the connection between the perceiver and the perceived object. Direct realists say that this connection is direct, meaning that there is no difference between the object present in perceptual experience and the physical object causing this experience. According to indirect realism, the connection is indirect since there are mental entities, like ideas or sense data, that mediate between the perceiver and the external world. The contrast between direct and indirect realism is important for explaining the nature of illusions.[118]
Constructivism in epistemology is the theory that how people view the world is not a simple reflection of external reality but an invention or a social construction. This view emphasizes the creative role of interpretation while undermining objectivity since social constructions may differ from society to society.[119]
According to contrastivism, knowledge is a comparative term, meaning that to know something involves distinguishing it from relevant alternatives. For example, if a person spots a bird in the garden, they may know that it is a sparrow rather than an eagle but they may not know that it is a sparrow rather than an indistinguishable sparrow hologram.[120]
Epistemic conservatism is a view about belief revision. It gives preference to the beliefs a person already has, asserting that a person should only change their beliefs if they have a good reason to. One motivation for adopting epistemic conservatism is that the cognitive resources of humans are limited, meaning that it is not feasible to constantly reexamine every belief.[121]
Pragmatist epistemology is a form of fallibilism that emphasizes the close relation between knowing and acting. It sees the pursuit of knowledge as an ongoing process guided by common sense and experience while always open to revision.[122]
Bayesian epistemology is a formal approach based on the idea that people have degrees of belief representing how certain they are. It uses probability theory to define norms of rationality that govern how certain people should be about their beliefs.[123]
Phenomenological epistemology emphasizes the importance of first-person experience. It distinguishes between the natural attitude focusing on objects, which is found in common sense and the natural sciences, and the phenomenological attitude focusing on the experience of objects, which aims to provide a presuppositionless description of how objects appear to the observer.[124]
Postmodern epistemology criticizes the conditions of knowledge in advanced societies. This concerns in particular the metanarrative of a constant progress of scientific knowledge leading to a universal and foundational understanding of reality.[125] Feminist epistemology critiques the effect of gender on knowledge. Among other topics, it explores how preconceptions about gender influence who has access to knowledge, how knowledge is produced, and which types of knowledge are valued in society.[126] Decolonial scholarship criticizes the global influence of Western knowledge systems, often with the aim of decolonizing knowledge to undermine Western hegemony.[127]
Various schools of epistemology are found in traditional Indian philosophy. Many of them focus on the different sources of knowledge, called pramāṇa. Perception, inference, and testimony are sources discussed by most schools. Other sources only considered by some schools are non-perception, which leads to knowledge of absences, and presumption.[128] Buddhist epistemology tends to focus on immediate experience, understood as the presentation of unique particulars without the involvement of secondary cognitive processes, like thought and desire.[129] Nyāya epistemology discusses the causal relation between the knower and the object of knowledge, which happens through reliable knowledge-formation processes. It sees perception as the primary source of knowledge, drawing a close connection between it and successful action.[130] Mīmāṃsā epistemology understands the holy scriptures known as the Vedas as a key source of knowledge while discussing the problem of their right interpretation.[131] Jain epistemology states that reality is many-sided, meaning that no single viewpoint can capture the entirety of truth.[132]
Branches
[edit]Some branches of epistemology focus on the problems of knowledge within specific academic disciplines. The epistemology of science examines how scientific knowledge is generated and what problems arise in the process of validating, justifying, and interpreting scientific claims. A key issue concerns the problem of how individual observations can support universal scientific laws. Further topics include the nature of scientific evidence and the aims of science.[133] The epistemology of mathematics studies the origin of mathematical knowledge. In exploring how mathematical theories are justified, it investigates the role of proofs and whether there are empirical sources of mathematical knowledge.[134]
Epistemological problems are found in most areas of philosophy. The epistemology of logic examines how people know that an argument is valid. For example, it explores how logicians justify that modus ponens is a correct rule of inference or that all contradictions are false.[135] Epistemologists of metaphysics investigate whether knowledge of ultimate reality is possible and what sources this knowledge could have.[136] Knowledge of moral statements, like the claim that lying is wrong, belongs to the epistemology of ethics. It studies the role of ethical intuitions, coherence among moral beliefs, and the problem of moral disagreement.[137] The ethics of belief is a closely related field covering the interrelation between epistemology and ethics. It examines the norms governing belief formation and asks whether violating them is morally wrong.[138]
Religious epistemology studies the role of knowledge and justification for religious doctrines and practices. It evaluates the weight and reliability of evidence from religious experience and holy scriptures while also asking whether the norms of reason should be applied to religious faith.[139] Social epistemology focuses on the social dimension of knowledge. While traditional epistemology is mainly interested in knowledge possessed by individuals, social epistemology covers knowledge acquisition, transmission, and evaluation within groups, with specific emphasis on how people rely on each other when seeking knowledge.[140] Historical epistemology examines how the understanding of knowledge and related concepts has changed over time. This concerns questions like whether the main issues in epistemology are perennial and to what extent past epistemological theories are relevant to contemporary debates. It is particularly concerned with scientific knowledge and practices associated with it.[141] It contrasts with the history of epistemology, which presents, reconstructs, and evaluates epistemological theories of philosophers in the past.[142][note 10]
Naturalized epistemology is closely associated with the natural sciences, relying on their methods and theories to examine knowledge. Naturalistic epistemologists focus on empirical observation to formulate their theories and are often critical of approaches to epistemology that proceed by a priori reasoning.[144] Evolutionary epistemology is a naturalistic approach that understands cognition as a product of evolution, examining knowledge and the cognitive faculties responsible for it from the perspective of natural selection.[145] Epistemologists of language explore the nature of linguistic knowledge, for example, how native speakers usually have the tacit knowledge to follow the rules of grammar even though they may be unable to explicitly articulate those rules.[146] Epistemologists of modality examine knowledge about what is possible and necessary.[147] Epistemic problems that arise when two people have diverging opinions on a topic are covered by the epistemology of disagreement.[148] Epistemologists of ignorance are interested in epistemic faults and gaps in knowledge.[149]
There are distinct areas of epistemology dedicated to specific sources of knowledge. Examples are the epistemology of perception,[150] the epistemology of memory,[151] and the epistemology of testimony.[152]
Some branches of epistemology are characterized by their research method. Formal epistemology employs formal tools found in logic and mathematics to investigate the nature of knowledge.[153][note 11] Experimental epistemologists rely in their research on empirical evidence about common knowledge practices.[155] Applied epistemology focuses on the practical application of epistemological principles to diverse real-world problems, like the reliability of knowledge claims on the internet, how to assess sexual assault allegations, and how racism may lead to epistemic injustice.[156][note 12]
Metaepistemologists examine the nature, goals, and research methods of epistemology. As a metatheory, it does not directly defend a position about which epistemological theories are correct but examines their fundamental concepts and background assumptions.[158][note 13]
Related fields
[edit]Epistemology and psychology were not defined as distinct fields until the 19th century; earlier investigations about knowledge often do not fit neatly into today's academic categories.[160] Both contemporary disciplines study beliefs and the mental processes responsible for their formation and change. One important contrast is that psychology describes what beliefs people have and how they acquire them, thereby explaining why someone has a specific belief. The focus of epistemology is on evaluating beliefs, leading to a judgment about whether a belief is justified and rational in a particular case.[161] Epistemology has a similar intimate connection to cognitive science, which understands mental events as processes that transform information.[162] Artificial intelligence relies on the insights of epistemology and cognitive science to implement concrete solutions to problems associated with knowledge representation and automatic reasoning.[163]
Logic is the study of correct reasoning. For epistemology, it is relevant to inferential knowledge, which arises when a person reasons from one known fact to another.[164] This is the case, for example, if a person does not know directly that but comes to infer it based on their knowledge that , , and .[165] Whether an inferential belief amounts to knowledge depends on the form of reasoning used, in particular, that the process does not violate the laws of logic.[166] Another overlap between the two fields is found in the epistemic approach to fallacy theory.[167] Fallacies are faulty arguments based on incorrect reasoning.[168] The epistemic approach to fallacies explains why they are faulty, stating that arguments aim to expand knowledge. According to this view, an argument is a fallacy if it fails to do so.[169]
Both decision theory and epistemology are interested in the foundations of rational thought and the role of beliefs. Unlike many approaches in epistemology, the main focus of decision theory lies less in the theoretical and more in the practical side, exploring how beliefs are translated into action.[170] Decision theorists examine the reasoning involved in decision-making and the standards of good decisions.[171] They identify beliefs as a central aspect of decision-making. One of their innovations is to distinguish between weaker and stronger beliefs. This helps them take the effect of uncertainty on decisions into consideration.[172]
Epistemology and education have a shared interest in knowledge, with one difference being that education focuses on the transmission of knowledge, exploring the roles of both learner and teacher.[173] Learning theory examines how people acquire knowledge.[174] Behavioral learning theories explain the process in terms of behavior changes, for example, by associating a certain response with a particular stimulus.[175] Cognitive learning theories study how the cognitive processes that affect knowledge acquisition transform information.[176] Pedagogy looks at the transmission of knowledge from the teacher's side, exploring the teaching methods they may employ.[177] In teacher-centered methods, the teacher takes the role of the main authority delivering knowledge and guiding the learning process. In student-centered methods, the teacher mainly supports and facilitates the learning process while the students take a more active role.[178] The beliefs students have about knowledge, called personal epistemology, affect their intellectual development and learning success.[179]
The anthropology of knowledge examines how knowledge is acquired, stored, retrieved, and communicated. It studies the social and cultural circumstances that affect how knowledge is reproduced and changes, covering the role of institutions like university departments and scientific journals as well as face-to-face discussions and online communications. It understands knowledge in a wide sense that encompasses various forms of understanding and culture, including practical skills. Unlike epistemology, it is not interested in whether a belief is true or justified but in how understanding is reproduced in society.[180] The sociology of knowledge is a closely related field with a similar conception of knowledge. It explores how physical, demographic, economic, and sociocultural factors impact knowledge. It examines in what sociohistorical contexts knowledge emerges and the effects it has on people, for example, how socioeconomic conditions are related to the dominant ideology in a society.[181]
History
[edit]Early reflections on the nature and sources of knowledge are found in ancient history. In ancient Greek philosophy, Plato (427–347 BCE) studied what knowledge is, examining how it differs from true opinion by being based on good reasons.[182] According to him, the process of learning something is a form of recollection in which the soul remembers what it already knew before.[183][note 14] Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was particularly interested in scientific knowledge, exploring the role of sensory experience and how to make inferences from general principles.[185] The Hellenistic schools began to arise in the 4th century BCE. The Epicureans defended the position that sensations are always accurate and act as the supreme standard of judgments.[186] Similarly, the Stoics said that only clear and distinct sensory impressions are true.[187] The skepticists questioned that knowledge is possible, recommending instead suspension of judgment to arrive at a state of tranquility.[188]
The Upanishads, philosophical scriptures composed in ancient India between 700 and 300 BCE, examined how people acquire knowledge, including the role of introspection, comparison, and deduction.[189] In the 6th century BCE, the school of Ajñana developed a radical skepticism questioning the possibility and usefulness of knowledge.[190] The school of Nyaya emerged in the 2nd century BCE and provided a systematic treatment of how people acquire knowledge, distinguishing between valid and invalid sources.[191] When Buddhist philosophers later became interested in epistemology, they relied on concepts developed in Nyaya and other traditions.[192] Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti (6th or 7th century CE)[193] analyzed the process of knowing as a series of causally related events.[194]
The relation between reason and faith was a central topic in the medieval period.[195] In Arabic–Persian philosophy, al-Farabi (c. 870–950) and Averroes (1126–1198) discussed how philosophy and theology interact and which is the better vehicle to truth.[196] Al-Ghazali (c. 1056–1111) criticized many of the core teachings of previous Islamic philosophers, saying that they rely on unproven assumptions.[197] In Western philosophy, Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) proposed that theological teaching and philosophical inquiry are in harmony and complement each other.[198] Peter Abelard (1079–1142) argued against unquestioned theological authorities and said that all things are open to rational doubt.[199] Influenced by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) stated that "nothing is in the intellect unless it first appeared in the senses".[200] According to William of Ockham (c. 1285–1349), the mind perceives the world directly.[201]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg/220px-Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg)
The course of modern philosophy was shaped by René Descartes (1596–1650), who claimed that philosophy must begin from a position of indubitable knowledge of first principles. Inspired by skepticism, he aimed to find absolutely certain knowledge by encountering truths that cannot be doubted. He thought that this is the case for the assertion "I think, therefore I am", from which he construct the rest of his philosophical system.[202] Descartes, together with Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), belonged to the school of rationalism, which asserts that the mind possesses innate ideas independent of experience.[203] John Locke (1632–1704) rejected this view in favor of an empiricism according to which the mind is a blank slate. This means that all ideas depend on sense experience, either as "ideas of sense", which are directly presented through the senses, or as "ideas of reflection", which the mind creates by reflecting on ideas of sense.[204] David Hume (1711–1776) used this idea to explore the limits of what people can know. He said that knowledge of facts is never certain, adding that knowledge of relations between ideas, like mathematical truths, can be certain but contains no information about the world.[205] Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) tried to find a middle position between rationalism and empiricism by identifying a type of knowledge that Hume had missed. For Kant, this is knowledge about principles that underlie all experience and structure it, such as spatial and temporal relations and fundamental categories of understanding.[206]
In the 19th-century, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) argued against empiricism, saying that sensory impressions on their own cannot amount to knowledge since all knowledge is actively structured by the knowing subject.[207] John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) defended a wide-sweeping form of empiricism and explained knowledge of general truths through inductive reasoning.[208] Charles Peirce (1839–1914) thought that all knowledge is fallible, emphasizing that knowledge seekers should always be ready to revise their beliefs if new evidence is encountered. He used this idea to argue against Cartesian foundationalism seeking absolutely certain truths.[209]
In the 20th century, fallibilism was further explored by J. L. Austin (1911–1960) and Karl Popper (1902–1994).[210] In continental philosophy, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) applied the skeptic idea of suspending judgment to the study of experience. By not judging whether an experience is accurate or not, he tried to describe the internal structure of experience instead.[211] Logical positivists, like A. J. Ayer (1910–1989), said that all knowledge is either empirical or analytic.[212] Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) developed an empiricist sense-datum theory, distinguishing between direct knowledge by acquaintance of sense data and indirect knowledge by description, which is inferred from knowledge by acquaintance.[213] Common sense had a central place in G. E. Moore's (1873–1958) epistemology. He used trivial observations, like the fact that he has two hands, to argue against abstract philosophical theories that deviate from common sense.[214] Ordinary language philosophy, as practiced by the late Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), is a similar approach that tries to extract epistemological insights from how ordinary language is used.[215]
Edmund Gettier (1927–2021) conceived counterexamples against the idea that knowledge is the same as justified true belief. These counterexamples prompted many philosophers to suggest alternative definitions of knowledge.[216] One of the alternatives considered was reliabilism, which says that knowledge requires reliable sources, shifting the focus away from justification.[217] Virtue epistemology, a closely related response, analyses belief formation in terms of the intellectual virtues or cognitive competencies involved in the process.[218] Naturalized epistemology, as conceived by Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000), employs concepts and ideas from the natural sciences to formulate its theories.[219] Other developments in late 20th-century epistemology were the emergence of social, feminist, and historical epistemology.[220]
See also
[edit]- Epistemological pluralism – term used in philosophy, economics, and virtually any field of study to refer to different ways of knowing things, different epistemological methodologies for attaining a fuller description of a particular field
- Evolutionary epistemology – Ambiguous term applied to several concepts
- Knowledge falsification – Deliberate misrepresentation of knowledge
- Knowledge-first epistemology – 2000 philosophical essay by Timothy Williamson
- Moral epistemology – Branch of ethics seeking to understand ethical properties
- Noölogy – Spanish philosopher (1898–1983)
- Personal epistemology – Cognition about knowledge and knowing
- Reformed epistemology – School of philosophical thought
- Self-evidence – Epistemologically probative proposition
- Sociology of knowledge – Field of study
- Theory of Knowledge (IB Course) – Compulsory International Baccalaureate subject
- Axiology – Philosophical study of value
- Praxiology – Theory of human action
Notes and references
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Less commonly, the term "gnoseology" is also used as a synonym.[7]
- ^ Despite this contrast, epistemologists may rely on insights from the empirical sciences in formulating their normative theories.[13]
- ^ As a label for a branch of philosophy, the term "epistemology" was first employed in 1854 by James E. Ferrier.[16] In a different context, the word was used as early as 1847 in New York's Eclectic Magazine.[17] As the term had not been coined before the 19th century, earlier philosophers did not explicitly label their theories as epistemology and often explored it in combination with psychology.[18] According to philosopher Thomas Sturm, it is an open question how relevant the epistemological problems addressed by past philosophers are to contemporary philosophy.[19]
- ^ In Scots, the distinction is between wit and ken
- ^ The relation between a belief and the reason on which it rests is called basing relation.[37]
- ^ The brain in a vat is a similar thought experiment assuming that a person does not have a body but is merely a brain receiving electrical stimuli indistinguishable from the stimuli a brain in a body would receive. This argument also leads to the conclusion of global skepticism based on the claim that it is not possible to distinguish stimuli representing the actual world from simulated stimuli.[87]
- ^ Some forms of extreme rationalism, found in ancient Greek philosophy, see reason as the sole source of knowledge.[94]
- ^ Both can be understood as responses to the regress problem.[100]
- ^ The internalist-externalist debate in epistemology is different from the internalism-externalism debate in philosophy of mind, which asks whether mental states depend only on the individual or also on their environment.[108]
- ^ The precise characterization of the contrast is disputed.[143]
- ^ It is closely related to computational epistemology, which examines the interrelation between knowledge and computational processes.[154]
- ^ Epistemic injustice happens when valid knowledge claims are dismissed or misrepresented.[157]
- ^ Nonetheless, metaepistemological insights can have various indirect effects on disputes in epistemology.[159]
- ^ To argue for this point, Plato uses the example of a slave boy, who manages to answer a series of geometry questions even though they never studied geometry.[184]
References
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- ^ Borchert, Donald M., ed. (1967). "Epistemology". Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 3. Macmillan.
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- Crumley II 2009, p. 16
- Carter & Littlejohn 2021, Introduction: 1. What Is Epistemology?
- Moser 2005, p. 3
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- Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 1.3.2 Kinds of Justification
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- Smith 2023, p. 3
- Steup & Neta 2024, § 5. Sources of Knowledge and Justification
- Hetherington, "Knowledge", § 3. Ways of Knowing
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- Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.1 Perception
- Hetherington, "Knowledge", § 3. Ways of Knowing
- ^
- Khatoon 2012, p. 104
- Martin 1998, Lead Section
- ^ Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.2 Introspection
- ^
- Hetherington, "Knowledge", § 3d. Knowing by Thinking-Plus-Observing
- Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.4 Reason
- Audi 2002, pp. 85, 90–91
- Audi 2006, p. 38
- ^
- Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.3 Memory
- Audi 2002, pp. 72–75
- Gardiner 2001, pp. 1351–1352
- Michaelian & Sutton 2017
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- Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.5 Testimony
- Leonard 2021, Lead Section, § 1. Reductionism and Non-Reductionism
- Green 2022, Lead Section
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- Pappas 2023, Lead section
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- Bernecker 2013, Note 1
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- Pappas 2023, Lead section
- Poston, Lead section
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- ^ Crumley II 2009, p. 160
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- Crumley II 2009, p. 99, 298
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- Crumley II 2009, pp. 175–176
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- Brown 1992, p. 341
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- Siderits 2021, p. 332
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- ^ Sturm 2011, pp. 303–304, 08–309
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- Wolenski 2004, pp. 14–15
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- Hamlyn 2005, p. 261
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- Wolenski 2004, pp. 17–18
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- Coventry & Merrill 2018, p. 161
- Pappas 1998, § Modern philosophy: from Hume to Peirce
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- Pappas 1998, § Modern philosophy: from Hume to Peirce
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- Pappas 1998, § Twentieth Century
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- Rockmore 2011, pp. 131–132
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- Pappas 1998, § Twentieth Century
- Hamlyn 2006, p. 315
- Wolenski 2004, pp. 48–49
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- Baldwin 2010, § 6. Common Sense and Certainty
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- ^ Hamlyn 2006, pp. 317–318
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- Hamlyn 2005, p. 262
- Beilby 2017, p. 74
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- Goldman & Beddor 2021, Lead Section, § 1. A Paradigm Shift in Analytic Epistemology
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References specific to notes
[edit]
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Further reading
[edit]- Annis, David (1978). "A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification". American Philosophical Quarterly. 15: 213–219.
- Ayer, Alfred Jules. 1936. Language, Truth, and Logic.
- BonJour, Laurence. 2002. Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bovens, Luc & Hartmann, Stephan. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Butchvarov, Panayot. 1970. The Concept of Knowledge. Evanston, Northwestern University Press.
- Cohen, Stewart (1998a). "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Skepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 76 (2): 289–306. doi:10.1080/00048409812348411.
- Cohen, Stewart. 1999. "Contextualism, Skepticism, and Reasons", in Tomberlin 1999.
- Dancy, Jonathan. 1991. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Second Edition). John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-631-13622-3
- DeRose, Keith (1992). "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 15: 213–219.
- DeRose, Keith. 1999. "Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense Archived 15 December 2017 at the Wayback Machine", in Greco and Sosa 1999.
- Descartes, Rene. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy
- Feldman, Richard. 1999. "Contextualism and Skepticism", in Tomberlin 1999, pp. 91–114.
- Gettier, Edmund. 1963. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Analysis, Vol. 23, pp. 121–123. Online text Archived 19 August 2005 at the Wayback Machine.
- Greco, J. & Sosa, E. 1999. Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell Publishing.
- Harris, Errol E. 1970. Hypothesis And Perception, George Allen and Unwin, London, Reprinted 2002 Routledge, London.
- Harwood, Sterling (1989). "Taking Skepticism Seriously – And In Context". Philosophical Investigations. 12 (3): 223–233. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9205.1989.tb00275.x.
- Hay, Clare. 2008. The Theory of Knowledge: A Coursebook, The Lutterworth Press, Cambridge. ISBN 978-0-7188-3088-5
- Hawthorne, John. 2005. "The Case for Closure", Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Peter Sosa and Matthias Steup (ed.): 26–43.
- Hendricks, Vincent F. 2006. Mainstream and Formal Epistemology, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason.
- Keeton, Morris T. 1962. "Empiricism", in Dictionary of Philosophy, Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ, pp. 89–90.
- Kirkham, Richard. 1984. "Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?" Mind, 93.
- Klein, Peter. 1981. Certainty: a Refutation of Skepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kyburg, H.E. 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Korzybski, Alfred. 1994 (1933). Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics, Fifth Edition. Ft. Worth, TX: Institute of General Semantics.
- Lennon, Kathleen; Whitford, Margaret, eds. (12 October 2012). Knowing the Difference : Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203216125. ISBN 978-1-134-87791-1.
- Lewis, David (1996). "Elusive Knowledge". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74 (4): 549–567. doi:10.1080/00048409612347521.
- Morin, Edgar. 1986. La Méthode, Tome 3, La Connaissance de la connaissance (Method, 3rd volume : The knowledge of knowledge)
- Morton, Adam. 2002. A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge (Third Edition) Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 1-4051-0012-5
- Nelson, Quee. 2007. The Slightest Philosophy, Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing, 296 pages.
- Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 2002. Critical Scientific Realism, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Plato. Meno.
- Popper, Karl R. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Preyer, G./Siebelt, F./Ulfig, A. 1994. Language, Mind and Epistemology, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1940. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Nottingham: Spokesman Books.
- Santayana, George. 1923. Scepticism and Animal Faith, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons – London: Constable and Co.
- Spir, African. 1877. Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie (Thought and Reality: Attempt at a Renewal of Critical Philosophy), (Second Edition) Leipzig: J.G. Findel.
- Schiffer, Stephen (1996). "Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 96: 317–333. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.317.
- Steup, Matthias. 2005. "Knowledge and Skepticism", Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Peter Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds.): 1–13.
- Tomberlin, James (ed.). 1999. Philosophical Perspectives 13, Epistemology, Blackwell Publishing.
- Turri, John (2016). Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. Open Book Publishers. doi:10.11647/OBP.0083. ISBN 978-1-78374-183-0. Archived from the original on 10 June 2016. Retrieved 21 April 2016.
- Wagner, Pierre (2002). "Introduction". In Pierre Wagner (ed.). Les Philosophes et la science. Folio-essais (in French). Paris: Éditions Gallimard. pp. 9–65. ISBN 9782070416257.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Frank P. Ramsey and C.K. Ogden (trns.), Dover. Online text Archived 7 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine.
External links
[edit]Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles
- "Epistemology" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Bayesian Epistemology" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Evolutionary Epistemology" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Naturalized Epistemology" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Social Epistemology" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Virtue Epistemology" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Knowledge How" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles
- "Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Coherentism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Contextualism in Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Epistemic Circularity". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Epistemic Justification". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Epistemology of Perception". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Ethnoepistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Evolutionary Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Fallibilism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Feminist Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Infinitism in Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Moral Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Naturalistic Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Virtue Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Understanding in Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Encyclopædia Britannica
- Epistemology by Avrum Stroll and A.P. Martinich
Other links
- The London Philosophy Study Guide Archived 23 September 2009 at the Wayback Machine offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Epistemology & Methodology Archived 1 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine
- Epistemology at PhilPapers
- Knowledge-How at Philpapers
- Epistemology at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
- What Is Epistemology? – a brief introduction to the topic by Keith DeRose.
- Epistemology Introduction, Part 1 and Part 2 by Paul Newall at the Galilean Library.
- Teaching Theory of Knowledge (1986) – Marjorie Clay (ed.), an electronic publication from The Council for Philosophical Studies.
- An Introduction to Epistemology by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.
- A Summary of Sunni Epistemology A concise and accessible introduction to epistemology in the Muslim world for laymen