Falklands War

Falklands War
HMS Conqueror returning victorious from the war
Date 2 April 1982 - 14 June 1982 Location Falkland Islands, South Georgia and surrounding sea and airspace Result United Kingdom victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom	Argentina
Casualties and losses
258 killed [1] 777 wounded 59 taken prisoner	649 killed 1,068 wounded 11,313 taken prisoner

The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas) was fought in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Falklands consist of two large and many small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina, whose ownership had long been disputed. (See Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands for the background to that dispute.)

The war was triggered by the occupation of South Georgia by Argentina on 19 March 1982 followed by the occupation of the Falklands, and ended with Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982. War was not declared by either side. The initial invasion was considered by Argentina as reoccupation of its own territory, and by Britain as an invasion of a British dependency. It was the last time that British territory was invaded by a foreign power.

In the period leading up to the war, Argentina was in the midst of a devastating economic crisis and large-scale civil unrest against the repressive military junta that was governing the country. The Argentine military government, headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri, decided to play off long-standing feelings of nationalism by invading the islands, although they never thought that the United Kingdom would respond. The ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands increased on 19 March when 50 Argentines landed on the British dependency of South Georgia and raised their flag, an act that is seen as the first offensive action in the war. On 2 April, Galtieri ordered the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands, triggering the Falklands War.

Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South Atlantic islands, but launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Air Force to retake the islands by amphibious assault. After combat resulting in 258 British and 649 Argentine deaths, the British eventually prevailed and the islands remained under British control, although as of 2006, Argentina shows no sign of relinquishing its claim to the Falkland Islands.

The political effects of the war were strong in both countries. The Argentine loss prompted even larger protests against the military government, which hastened its downfall, while a wave of patriotic sentiment swept through the United Kingdom, bolstering the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and ensuring its victory in the 1983 general election, which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, movies, and songs, although due to the low number of casualties on both sides it is not seen as a truly major event of either military or 20th century history. The cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of discussion. Militarily, it remains the only notable naval and amphibious operation between modern forces conducted since the Korean War.

Lead up to the conflict

Build-up

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

President Galtieri, head of the National Reorganization Process (the military government of Argentina at the time) aimed to counterbalance public concern over economic and human rights issues with a speedy victory over the Falklands which would appeal to popular nationalistic sentiment. Argentine intelligence officers had been working with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help fund the Contras in Nicaragua, and the Argentine government believed it might be rewarded for this activity by non-interference on the part of the United States if it invaded the Falklands.

Argentina exerted pressure in the United Nations by raising subtle hints of a possible reconquest, but the British either missed or ignored this threat and did not react. The Argentines interpreted the lack of British reaction as disengagement from the Falklands, and assumed that the British would not use force if the islands were invaded. This viewpoint was encouraged by the planned withdrawal as part of a general reduction of the Royal Navy in 1981 of the last of the Antarctic Supply vessels, HMS Endurance, and by the British Nationality Act of 1981, which replaced the full British citizenship of Falkland Islanders with a more limited version.

In 1977, 50 Argentine nationals occupied Southern Thule. Operation Journeyman, the despatching of a small military force to the South Atlantic by Callaghan's Labour government, may have helped avert further action and subsequent reports from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in 1977, 1979 and 1981 suggested that "as long as [Argentina] calculated that the British Government were prepared to negotiate seriously on sovereignty, it was unlikely to resort to force." However, if "...negotiations broke down, or if Argentina concluded from them that there was no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its then resorting to more forceful measures, including direct military action."

In January 1982, these diplomatic talks over sovereignty ceased. It is not known when serious plans to invade the Falklands were first considered, but following this breakdown, the plans were updated. Although it is often thought that the Falklands invasion was a long-planned action, it became clear after the war that it had been largely improvised. The isles were not fortified, sea mines were not deployed at strategic landing locations and a large part of the infantry forces sent to the Falklands consisted of young recruits. Arguments that the War was a last minute decision are bolstered by the fact that the Argentine Navy would have received, at the end of the year, additional Exocet anti-ship missiles, Super Étendards and new ships being built in West Germany.

The Argentine military knew they were hardly a match for their British counterparts, and the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had realized, in training attacks made during April after the landings against the modern Argentine Navy British-type vessels Type 42, that they could lose more than half of their units in the process of destroying only a few British warships. However, the actual course of the war surprised many observers, since Argentina's losses had been expected to be far worse, given their level of preparedness.

This lack of readiness is probably due to the invasion being a last-minute decision taken as a consequence of the South Georgia crisis. Furthermore, for several years, Argentina had been close to war with Chile. Consequently, a significant part of Argentina's limited forces and equipment were kept on the mainland, as Argentina's military strategists feared that Chile would take advantage of the Falklands Crisis and attempt to seize a portion of the Patagonia region. As a consequence, Chile deployed forces along the borders in what looked like a possible invasion; it is unclear whether this was their true intention or merely a diversion prompted by their British allies.

Argentina's original intention was to mount a quick symbolic occupation, quickly followed by a withdrawal, leaving only a small garrison to support the new military governor. All Argentine assault units were withdrawn to the mainland in the following days, but strong popular support and the rapid British reaction encouraged the Junta to change their objectives and reinforce the islands. They misjudged the political climate in Britain, believing that democracies were weak, indecisive and averse to risk and did not anticipate that the British would move their fleet halfway across the globe.

Landings on South Georgia

On 19 March, a group of Argentine scrap metal merchants established a camp on South Georgia, where they allegedly raised a flag of Argentina. It was later reported that firearm shots were also heard, but it is most likely they were only hunting. The British governor at Grytviken asked them to have their passports stamped, which they refused to do since it would acknowledge British sovereignty over the isles.

Actually, there was a diplomatic agreement between Argentina and Great Britain that let Argentine visitors stamp a "white card" instead of their passport, a sort of intermediate diplomatic solution to accommodate the sovereignty dispute.

The Royal Navy Antarctic patrol vessel HMS Endurance was dispatched to remove the camp on 25 March, but was prevented from doing so and forced to retreat by the Argentine Navy Corvette ARA Guerrico. However, despite further evidence that the Argentine Navy had begun to assemble troops in Puerto Belgrano, the UK Joint Intelligence Committee's Latin American group stated on 30 March that "invasion was not imminent."

Failed diplomacy

During the conflict, there were no formal diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina, so negotiations were carried out in a rather indirect way, and via third parties who spoke with one then with the other belligerent ("shuttle diplomacy"). The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru, announced that his efforts in favour of peace were futile. Although Peru (which represented Argentina's diplomatic interests in Britain) and Switzerland (which represented Britain's diplomatic interests in Argentina) exerted great diplomatic pressure to avoid war, they were unable to resolve the conflict, and a peace plan proposed by Peruvian president Fernando Belaúnde Terry was rejected by both sides.

Invasion

Main article: 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands

The British Government warned Rex Masterman Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Islands, of a possible Argentine invasion on 31 March. Hunt then organised a defence, and gave military command to Major Mike Norman RM, who managed to muster a small force of British Royal Marines. The Argentine Lieutenant-Commander in charge of the invasion, Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots, landed his squadron of special forces at Mullet Creek. He proceeded to attack the Moody Brook Barracks, the Government House, and Stanley, until the British Falkland Islands government located at the Government House surrendered on 4 April. One British Royal Marine was wounded, and one Argentine killed in the main invasion; a further three Argentines were killed in fighting to take control of South Georgia.

Life under the occupation

Argentina enforced several unwelcome changes to the culture of the Falkland Islands, in spite of earlier assurances that the islanders' way of life and cultural identity would be maintained. Argentina changed Port Stanley's name to Puerto Argentino, made Spanish the official language of the Islands, and commanded traffic to drive on the right by painting arrows on the road indicating the direction of traffic and changing the location of street and traffic signs. Despite these arrows, the islanders defiantly continued to drive on the left.

Task force

The British were quick to organise diplomatic pressure against Argentina. Because of the long distance to the Falklands, Britain had to rely on a naval task force for military action. The overall naval force was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, who was designated Commander Task Force 317, and had three to four subordinate task groups, depending on the point in the war. Rear Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward's Task Group 317.8 was centred around the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and the newly-commissioned HMS Invincible carrying only 20 Fleet Air Arm (FAA) Sea Harriers between them for defence against the combined Argentintian air force and naval air arm. The task force would have to be self-reliant and able to project its force across the littoral area of the Islands.

A second component was the Amphibious Group, Task Group 317.0, commanded by Commodore Michael Clapp RN. Contrary to common belief, Admiral Woodward did not command Commodore Clapp's ships. The embarked force, the Landing Group or Task Group 317.1, comprised 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, (including units attached from the British Army's Parachute Regiment and a number of units under the Royal Armoured Corps cap badge (Blues & Royals)) under the command of Brigadier Julian Thompson RM to bring it up to its wartime strength. Most of this force was aboard the hastily-commandeered cruise liner Canberra.

A third was Submarine Group (TG 324.3?) of three to four submarines under Flag Officer Submarines. The UK declared a 'total exclusion zone' of 200 nautical miles (370 km) around the Falklands before commencing operation, excluding all nations' vessels.

Throughout the operation, 43 British merchant ships (ships taken up from trade, or STUFT) served with or supplied the task force. Cargo vessels and tankers for fuel and water formed an 8000-mile logistics chain between Britain and the South Atlantic. [2]

During the journey and up to the War beginning on 1 May, the Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force. One of these flights was intercepted outside the exclusion zone by a Sea Harrier; the unarmed 707 was not attacked.

Prince Andrew, then second in line to the British throne, served as a Sea King helicopter pilot for 820 Squadron on HMS Invincible during the war, flying anti-submarine and anti-surface patrols. His helicopter also acted as an improvised airborne early warning platform, helped in casualty evacuation, transport and search and rescue.

HMS Hermes

The British called their counter-invasion Operation Corporate. When the task force sailed from Britain, the American news magazine Newsweek cover headline proclaimed The Empire Strikes Back, the name of a recent Star Wars movie, in humorous reference to the old British Empire.

The public mood in the UK was in support of an attempt to reclaim the islands. International opinion was divided. To some, Britain was a former colonial power, seeking to reclaim a colony from a local power, and this was a message that the Argentines initially used to garner support. Others supported Britain as a stable democracy invaded by a military dictatorship. Whilst remaining diplomatically neutral, most European countries and the United States supported Britain; many Latin American countries (with the notable exception of Chile) supported Argentina. It should not be overlooked that the islanders themselves spoke English and had a British cultural identity. British diplomacy centred on arguing that the Falkland Islanders were entitled to use the UN principle of self-determination and showing willingness to compromise. The UN Secretary-General said that he was amazed at the compromise that the UK had offered. Nevertheless, Argentina rejected it, basing their arguments on rights to territory based on actions before 1945 and the creation of the UN. Many UN members realised that if territorial claims this old could be resurrected, and invasions of territory allowed unchallenged, then their own borders were not safe. On 3 April, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 502, calling for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands and the cessation of hostilities. On 10 April, the European Community approved trade sanctions against Argentina. President Ronald Reagan and the United States' administration did not issue direct diplomatic condemnations, instead providing intelligence support to the British military.

Shuttle diplomacy and U.S. involvement

At first glance, it appeared that the U.S. had military treaty obligations to both parties in the war, bound to the UK as a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to Argentina by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the "Rio Pact"). However, the North Atlantic Treaty only obliges the signatories to support if the attack occurs in Europe or North America north of Tropic of Cancer, and the Rio Pact only obliges the U.S. to intervene if one of the adherents to the treaty is attacked—the UK never attacked Argentina, only Argentine forces on British territory. In March, Secretary of State Alexander Haig directed the United States Ambassador to Argentina to warn the Argentine government away from any invasion. President Reagan requested assurances from Galtieri against an invasion and offered the services of his Vice President, George H. W. Bush, as mediator, but was refused.

In fact, the Reagan Administration was sharply divided on the issue. Meeting on 5 April, Haig and Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger favoured decisive backing of Britain, concerned that equivocation would undermine the NATO alliance. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders, however, feared that supporting Britain would undermine U.S. anti-communist efforts in Latin America. He received the firm backing of U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Haig's nominal subordinate and political rival. Indeed, Kirkpatrick's support for Argentina is shown by the fact that she was guest of honour at a dinner held by the Argentine ambassador to the United States, on the day that the Argentine armed forces landed on the islands.

The White House continued its neutrality; Reagan famously declared at the time that he could not understand why two allies were arguing over "That little ice-cold bunch of land down there". But he assented to Haig and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's position. Haig briefly (8 April–30 April) headed a "shuttle diplomacy" mission between London and Buenos Aires, but at the end of the month Reagan blamed Argentina for the failure of the mediation, declared U.S. support for Britain, and announced the imposition of economic sanctions against Argentina.

In a notorious episode in June, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick cast a second veto of a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, then announced minutes later that she had received instructions to abstain. The situation was blamed on a delay in communications, but perceived by many as part of an ongoing power struggle between Haig and Kirkpatrick.

Galtieri, and a great part of his government, did not think that the UK would react. This would have astonished British people at the time, already familiar with Margaret Thatcher's uncompromising style of government. She declared that the democratic rights of the Falkland Islanders had been assaulted, and would not surrender the islands to the Argentine "jackboot." This stance was aided, at least domestically, by the staunchly loyalist British press, especially "The Sun", which ran such headlines as "GOTCHA" (following the sinking of "General Belgrano)." The Daily Mirror", on the other hand, vehemently opposed the war, attacking their tabloid rival "The Sun" and claiming that it would "damage your mind."

The Argentine dictatorship felt that the United States would, even in a worst-case scenario, remain completely neutral in the conflict (based upon the support that Argentina had given to the Reagan administration in Central America, training Contras). This assumption demonstrated a clear blindness to the reality of the US-UK special relationship.

To some extent, the Argentine military dictatorship was misled by its own opinion of democracies as being weak, inefficient talking-shops, afraid of taking risks. Indeed, in Britain there was much debate about the rights and wrongs of war. However, regardless of their own policies and opinions, opposition parties firmly backed the government in this time of crisis in order to present a single united front.

A U.S. fear of the perceived threat of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism, along with the certainty that Britain could handle the matter on its own, may have influenced the U.S. to take a position of non-interference. During the Cold War, with the performance of forces being watched closely by the Soviet Union, it was considered preferable for the UK to handle without assistance a conflict within its capabilities.

American non-interference was vital to the American-British relationship. Ascension Island, a British possession, was vital in the long term supply of the Task Force South: however, the airbase stationed on it was run and operated by the U.S. The American commander of the base was ordered to assist the British in any way, and for a brief period Ascension Air Field was one of the busiest airports in the world. The most decisive American contribution was spy satellite and intelligence information, and the rescheduled supply of AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles (which were much more efficient than older models of the Sidewinder, due to their all-aspect targeting capability), allowing the UK to ship its NATO inventory south. Margaret Thatcher stated that "without the Harrier jets and their immense manoeuvrability, equipped as they were with the latest version of the Sidewinder missile, supplied to us by U.S. Defence Minister Caspar Weinberger, we could never have got back the Falklands". Most of the Sidewinder air to air engagements, however, proved to be from the rear.

In early May, Casper Weinburger jokingly offered the use of an American aircraft carrier. This seemingly extremely generous offer was seen by some as vital, as it was noted by Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward that the loss of "Invincible" would have been a severe setback, but the loss of "Hermes" would have meant an end to the whole operation. Weinberger admits [3] that there would have been many problems if a request had ever been made; not least, it would have meant U.S. personnel becoming directly involved in the conflict, as training British forces to crew the vessel would have taken years.

Both Weinberger and Reagan were later awarded the British honour of Knight Commander of the British Empire (KBE). American critics of the U.S. role claimed that, by failing to side with Argentina, the U.S. violated its own Monroe Doctrine.

In September 2001, President of Mexico Vicente Fox cited the conflict as proof of the failure of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, since the treaty provides for mutual defence. Argentina was the aggressor, however.

French involvement

President of France François Mitterrand gave full support to the UK in the Falklands war. A large part of Argentina's military equipment was French-made, so French support was crucial. France provided aircraft, identical to the ones that it supplied to Argentina, for British pilots to train against. France provided intelligence to help sabotage the Exocet missiles that it had sold to Argentina. In her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher says of Mitterrand that "I never forgot the debt we owed him for his personal support...throughout the Falklands Crisis". Sir John Nott, who was Secretary of State for Defence during the conflict, later acknowledged: "In so many ways Mitterrand and the French were our greatest allies". [4]

As France had recently sold Super Etendard aircraft and Exocet missiles to the Argentine Navy, there was still a French team in Argentina helping to fit out the Exocets and aircraft for Argentine use at the beginning of the war. Argentina claims that the team left for France soon after the April 2 invasion, but according to Dr. James S. Corum the French team apparently continued to assist the Argentines throughout the war, in spite of the NATO embargo and official French government policy.

In 2005, a book written by President Mitterrand's psychoanalyst, Ali Magoudi, gave a different account of French co-operation, quoting him as saying: "I had a difference to settle with the Iron Lady. That Thatcher, what an impossible woman! With her four nuclear submarines in the South Atlantic, she's threatening to unleash an atomic weapon against Argentina if I don't provide her with the secret codes that will make the missiles we sold the Argentinians deaf and blind." [5]

It is not clear how the Argentines were able to launch all of their available missiles.

Latin American support

Argentina received military assistance only from Peru--despite receiving cursory support from the Organisation of American States in a resolution supporting Argentina's sovereignty and deploring European Community sanctions (with Chile, and Colombia, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States attending but abstaining), and Venezuela. Peruvian president Belaunde announced that his country was "ready to support Argentina with all the resources it needed." This came in the form of aircraft supplies such as long range air fuel (drop) tanks and spare parts. With the War over, Argentina received Mirage 5P fighter planes from the Peruvian Air Force whilst the Argentine Navy received Aermacchi MB-326 and Embraer Bandeirantes from the Brazilian Air Force.

Cuba and Bolivia offered ground troops, but their offers were seen as political posturing and not accepted.

Neighbouring Chile, under General Pinochet's regime, became the only major Latin American country to support Britain (and then only indirectly) by providing a military and naval diversion. Chile and Argentina had almost gone to war over the possession of islands south of Tierra del Fuego in 1978 (the dispute ended peacefully with the 1984 Argentina and Chile Peace and Friendship Treaty mediated by Pope John Paul II). The relationship between these two countries was still very tense. The Chilean government was possibly concerned that if Argentina succeeded in taking the Falklands, General Galtieri's government would invade or attack Chile. The Chilean Connection is described in detail by Sir Lawrence Freedman in his book The Official History of the Falklands Campaign.

In her book "Statecraft", Lady Thatcher claims that General Pinochet gave Britain "vital" support during the war, most notably in intelligence, which saved British lives. Thatcher claims that the Chilean Air Force often provided Britain with early warnings of Argentine Air Force attacks, and that the Chilean long-range radar was switched off for 24 hours because of maintenance work and was therefore unable to give Britain warnings, with the result that the Argentinian Air Force bombed the Royal Navy ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram with many casualties while the radar was inoperable.

War

By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up an airbase at Wideawake on the mid-Atlantic island of Ascension, including a sizable force of Avro Vulcan B Mk 2 bombers, Handley Page Victor K Mk 2 refuelling aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR Mk 2 fighters to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. A small force had already been sent south to re-capture South Georgia.

Recapture of South Georgia and the Santa Fe

The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquat, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines; embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill class submarine HMS Conqueror on 19 April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on 20 April. The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after several helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier.

On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine. On April 25 the Santa Fe was spotted by a Westland Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from HMS Antrim, and attacked the Argentine submarine with depth charges. HMS Plymouth launched a Westland Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and HMS Brilliant launched a Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2. The Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed it with its pintle GPMG, the Wessex also fired on the Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from HMS Endurance fired AS-12 ASM anti-ship missiles at the submarine scoring hits. Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent her from submerging. The crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia and surrendered to the British forces.

With the RFA Tidespring now far out to sea and an additional defending force of the submarine's crew now landed, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British force, the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. Prime Minister Thatcher broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!".

Black Buck raids

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An Avro Vulcan, as used for the Black Buck raids

The Black Buck raids were a series of five attacks on the Islands by RAF Avro Vulcan bombers, staged from Wideawake airbase on Ascension Island, close to the equator.

On 1 May operations against the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack on the airfield at Stanley. The Vulcan had originally been designed for medium-range stand-off nuclear missions in Europe and did not have the range to fly to the Falklands, requiring several in-flight refuellings. The RAF's tanker planes were mostly converted Handley Page Victors with similar range, so they too had to be refuelled in the air. Thus, a total of 11 tankers were required for only two Vulcans, a massive logistical effort, given that both the tankers and bombers had to use the same strip. The attack yielded only a single hit on the runway.

Only minutes after the RAF's Black Buck 1, nine FAA BAE Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1s from HMS Hermes followed up the raid by dropping BL755 cluster bombs on Stanley and the smaller grass airstrip at Goose Green. Both missions scored aircraft kills on the ground, as well as causing some damage to the airfield infrastructure. The aircraft had taken off from the deck of HMS Invincible, and although attached BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan was forbidden to divulge the number of planes involved, he came up with the memorable phrase "I counted them all out and I counted them all back."

The raids, at almost 8,000 nautical miles (13 000 km) and 16 hours for the return journey, were the longest ranged bombing raids in history at that time (surpassed in the Gulf War of 1991 by USAF Boeing B-52G Stratofortess' flying from the continental United States but using forward-positioned tankers). They are credited with the strategic success of causing the Argentine Air Force ("FAA") to withdraw all their Dassault Mirage III aircraft to protect against the possibility of similar bombing raids on Argentina. FAA Grupo 8 Mirages were deployed to Comodoro Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos in April (before the raids) where they remained until June to protect against any Chilean threat and as reserve for the strike units.

Of the five raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two anti-radar missions using AGM-45 Shrike air-to-surface ARMs (Anti-Radiation Missiles).

Escalation of the air war

Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier FA2. Its predecessor, the FRS Mk 1, performed admirably in the conflict.

The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest runway, and the only one paved, was at the capital, Port Stanley.

Stanley's runway was too short to support fast jets, so the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had to launch its major strikes from the mainland. This severely hampered Argentine efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.

The first major strike force comprised 36 aircraft (McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawks, Israel Aircraft Industries Daggers, English Electric B Mk 62 Canberras and Dassault Mirage III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences, near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This was a great stimulus for the Argentine pilots, for they now knew that they could survive an attack against a modern warship, protected by radar ground clutter from the islands and a late pop-up profile.

Meanwhile, some of the other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by BAE Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1s operating from HMS Invincible, and a Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.

Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 NAS and Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM (Air-to-Air Missile), while the other escaped but without enough fuel to return to its mainland airfield. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.

As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM (Air-to-Air Missiles)) as decoys to lure away the British Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadron Fenix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an Air Force Learjet was shot down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, who became the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the War.

Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite there being no fast jets stationed at the airfield, the Black Buck and Harrier raids and ongoing overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel and airlifted out the wounded right until the end of the conflict. Only one was intercepted by chance by RN Sea Harriers. The few British Sea Harriers were considered too valuable by day to risk in nighttime blockade operations.

Sinking of Belgrano

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"Gotcha" headline

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ARA General Belgrano sinks

Two separate British naval task forces (surface vessels and submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the neighbourhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the Second World War-vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano — formerly the USS Phoenix, a survivor of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror, captained by Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, sank Belgrano on 2 May using Mk 8 Mod 4 torpedoes of WWII-vintage design. Three hundred and twenty-three members of Belgrano's crew died in the incident, most of them from injuries sustained immediately on the torpedoes' impact; over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. Losses from Belgrano totalled just over half of Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict.

In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the ARA Alferez Sobral. At the time, the Alferez Sobral was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra light bomber shot down on May 1. Two Sea Lynxs fired four Sea Skua missiles against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later, but the Canberra's crew was never found.

Initial reports conflated the two incidents, contributing to confusion about the number of casualties and the identity of the vessel that sank. The Rupert Murdoch-owned British tabloid newspaper The Sun greeted the initial reports of the attack with the headline "GOTCHA". This first edition was published before news was known that the Belgrano had actually sunk (reporting instead, erroneously, that the gunboat had sunk) and carried no reports of actual Argentine deaths. The headline was replaced in later editions by the more tempered "Did 1,200 Argies drown?".

The loss of ARA General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government and also became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners (such as Labour MP Tam Dalyell), who declared that the ship had been sailing away from the Falklands at the time. The vessel was inarguably outside the exclusion zone, and sailing away from the area of conflict. However, during war, under international law, the heading of a belligerent naval vessel has no bearing on its status and the captain of the Belgrano, Hector Bonzo, has testified that the attack was legitimate. [6] [7] In later years it has been claimed that the information on the position of the ARA General Belgrano came from a Soviet spy satellite which was tapped by the Norwegian intelligence service station at Fauske, Norway, and then handed over to the British. article about the Fauske II station (in Norwegian) As of 2006 the ARA General Belgrano remains the only warship sunk by a nuclear-powered submarine in battle.

The sinking occurred 14 hours after Constitutional President of the Republic of Peru Fernando Belaúnde Terry had proposed a comprehensive peace plan. At the time, and in response to Chile's support of Britain, Belaúnde called for regional unity.

Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had an important strategic effect. After the loss of ARA General Belgrano, the entire Argentine fleet returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The two destroyers supporting ARA General Belgrano and the task force built around the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented. The attack on Belgrano was the second Submarine kill since the end of the Second World War, the first having been made PNS Hangor during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. It was, however,the only time that a nuclear powered submarine has done so.

British historian Sir Lawrence Freedman stated in the second volume of his Official History of the Falklands that intelligence about the Belgrano did not reach senior British commanders and politicians until it was too late [8]. Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, commanding officer of HMS Conqueror, informed the Admiralty four hours before his attack that the Argentine cruiser had changed course, but this information was not passed to the Ministry of Defence or Rear-Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward (commander of the RN task force). Thus it appears that neither Margaret Thatcher nor the cabinet were aware of the Belgrano's change of course before the cruiser was sunk.

Sinking of HMS Sheffield

A French Dassault Super Étendard similar to the aircraft which attacked Sheffield

Two days after the sinking of Belgrano, on 4 May, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Exocet missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s in order to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile "picket" far from the British carriers. After the ships were detected by an Argentine Navy P-2 Neptune patrol aircraft, two Dassault Super Étendards were launched from their base at Río Grande, each armed with a single Exocet missile. Refuelled by an Air Force KC-130H Hercules after launch, they went in at low altitude, popped up for a radar check at 50 miles and released the missiles from 20 to 30 miles (30 to 50 km) away.

Glasgow, Sheffield's sister ship and the northernmost of the three-destroyer picket, had detected the two Étendards on their first pop-up, and warned the fleet-wide anti-air warfare coordinator in Invincible. Invincible dismissed the report as one of the many false alarms already that morning. Glasgow continued to monitor that bearing and detected the second pop-up, and this time the tell-tale Exocet seeker radar via the ship's ESM equipment. Again Invincible ruled the detection as spurious, but Glasgow continued to broadcast handbrake, the codeword for Exocet radar detected.

The first missile missed HMS Yarmouth, due to her deployment of Chaff (radar countermeasure) in response to the warning, whilst Glasgow repeatedly tried, without success, to engage the other with Sea Dart. Still Invincible ruled this was a false alarm.

Sheffield was unable to directly detect the seeker radar as, in a case of bad timing, the SCOT satellite communications terminal was in use which deafened the onboard electronic warfare support measures (ESM) equipment. It is not known why she did not detect the missile on radar, or why she did not respond to Glasgow's warnings, but no chaff were fired and a shipwide warning of attack went out only seconds before impact when a watchkeeper identified rocket trails visually.

Sheffield was struck amidships, with devastating effect. Whether the warhead actually exploded is debated, but raging fires started to spread, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. Whilst alongside rendering assistance, Yarmouth repeatedly broke off to fire anti-submarine weaponry in response to SONAR reports of torpedoes in the water (later believed to have been a misdiagnosis of the outboard motor of the small inflatables helping with firefighting).

Sheffield was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on 10 May, whilst under tow from Yarmouth, becoming an official war grave. Although the loss of life was obviously regrettable, in one sense the Sheffield served its purpose as a part of the battle group—taking the missile instead of the larger, more important aircraft carrier it protected.

The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May. UN attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction of Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual shooting war.

On 14 May, the British Special Air Service carried out the Raid on Pebble Island, where the Argentinians had an airbase.

Landing at San Carlos Water

San Carlos landing sites

Context of landings in the Falklands

During the night on 21 May, the British made an amphibious landing on beaches around San Carlos Water, on the northern coast of East Falkland, putting the 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade, including 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Parachute Regiment (2 and 3 Para), ashore from the amphibious ships and the liner Canberra: 2 Para and 40 Commando landing at San Carlos beach; 45 Commando at Ajax bay; 3 Para at Port San Carlos. By dawn the next day, they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there Brigadier Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin and Goose Green before turning towards Stanley.

Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using its English Electric Canberras until the last day of the war (14 June).

At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on 21 May, HMS Antelope on 21 May, and MV Atlantic Conveyor, with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents on 25 May. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistics perspective: the sole surviving Chinook was called Bravo November. Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to HMS Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword. HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage due to the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics. In order to avoid the high concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots were forced to swoop in and launch their bombs from a low altitude at the very last moment. The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in these attacks, including several Pucarás on the ground.

While undoubtedly a brave effort of the air force, the late releasing of bombs meant that many never exploded, as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. The problem was that—like many other items never used before by the Argentine Armed Forces in such ways—there was a problem in the way the bombs were armed. Days before the war ended, the problem was solved and the iron bombs exploded regardless of the altitude from which they were dropped, as seen on the 8 June attack.

The submarine ARA San Luis had similar problems with her SST-4 torpedoes.

In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward blames the BBC World Service for the changes to the fuse system on Argentine bombs. This is due to a report on the World Service reporting the problem after receiving a briefing on the matter from an MOD official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen. Colonel H. Jones levelled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green by 2 Battalion The Parachute Regiment. Jones had threatened to lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for treason but was unable to do so since he was himself killed in action around Goose Green.

Battle of Goose Green

Main article: Battle of Goose Green

Starting early on 27 May and through 28 May, 2 Para (approximate size 500 men) approached and attacked Darwin and Goose Green, which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf Regt. After a tough struggle, which lasted all night and into the next day, 17 British and 55 Argentine soldiers had been killed, and 1,050 Argentine troops taken prisoner. Due to a gaffe by the BBC, the taking of Goose Green was announced on the BBC World Service before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lt Col H. Jones, the commanding officer of 2 Para was killed. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

East Falkland showing San Carlos bridgehead, Teal Inlet, Mt Kent and Mt Challenger

With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlos bridgehead. From 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started walking across East Falkland towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inlet.

Special Forces on Mount Kent

Meanwhile, 42 Cdo prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent. Unbeknownst to senior British officers, the Argentine generals were determined to tie down the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 and 28 May they sent transport aircraft loaded with commandos (602nd Commando Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to Port Stanley. This operation was known as Operation AUTOIMPUESTA (Self-Determination-Initiative). For the next week, the Special Air Service (SAS) and Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre of 3 Commando Brigade waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the 602nd Commando Company. Throughout 30 May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of them - Harrier XZ 963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook - in responding to a call for help from D Squadron attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes and that led to its loss through small-arms fire.

On the 31st May, the Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre defeated Argentine Special Forces at the Battle of Top Malo House. A 17-strong Argentine Army Commando detachment (Captain Jose Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house at Top Malo. The Argentine Commandos fired from windows and doorways and then took refuge in a stream bed 150 metres from the burning house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 Mountain & Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) marines under Captain Rod Boswell for forty-five minutes until, with their ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender. Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side there were five dead including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert (who were decorated for their bravery). Only five Argentines were left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo House, down from Malo Hill came Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M&AWC patrol, brandishing a large Union Flag. One Argentine wounded, Lieutenant Horacio Losito, commented that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's position.

It is estimated that 40 Argentine Commandos were involved in a battle with the SAS and the Cadre at Top Malo House and Mount Kent. A body count revealed eleven Argentine Army and National Gendarmerie Commandos dead. Seven members of the British Special Forces were wounded during these actions. One Special Boat Service (SBS) Sergeant was killed as the Mount Kent ranges were secured for the arrival of the British battalions. The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter support to position and extract patrols; the Argentinian 601st Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered causualties. At about 11.00 a.m. on 30 May, an Aerospatiale SA-330 Puma helicopter was brought down by a shoulder-launched Stinger Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) fired by the SAS in the vicinity of Mount Kent. Six National Gendarmerie Special Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the crash.

As Brigadier Julian Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views expressed by Northwood that reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine Special Forces would have caught the Commando before deplaning and, in the darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on men and helicopters."

Bluff Cove & Fitzroy

By 1 June, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the new British divisional commander, Major General JJ Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an offensive against Stanley.

During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 48. 32 of these deaths were from the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram on 8 June. Many others suffered serious burns (including, famously, Simon Weston).

The Guards were sent to support a dashing advance along the southern approach to Stanley. On 2 June, a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered the area clear of Argentines and, (exceeding their authority), commandeered the one remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry another contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy (a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove (a settlement confusingly, and perhaps ultimately fatally, on Port Fitzroy).

This uncoordinated advance caused planning nightmares for the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves with a 30-mile string of undefendable positions on their southern flank. Support could not be sent by air as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by sea. Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of 2 June, whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh were to be ferried from San Carlos Water in the landing ship (LSL) Sir Tristram and the landing platform dock (LPD) Intrepid on the night of 5 June. Intrepid was planned to stay one day and unload itself and as much of Sir Tristram as possible leaving the next evening for the relative safety of San Carlos. Escorts would be provided for this day, whilst Sir Tristram would be left to unload using an inflatable platform known as a Mexeflote for as long as it took.

Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Mike Clapp (Commander Amphibious Forces) to alter this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but without suitable beaches to land, Intrepid's landing craft would need to accompany them to unload. A complicated operation across several nights with Intrepid and Fearless (her sister ship) sailing half-way to dispatch their craft was devised. The attempted overland march by half the Welsh Guards had failed, possibly as they refused to march light and attempted to carry their equipment. They returned to San Carlos and were landed direct to Bluff Cove when Fearless dispatched her landing craft. Sir Tristram sailed on the night of 6 June and was joined by Sir Galahad at dawn on 7 June.

Anchored 1200 feet apart in Port Pleasant, the landing ships were near Fitzroy, the ordered landing point. The landing craft should have been able to unload the ships to here relatively quickly, but confusion over the ordered disembarkation point (the first half of the Guards going direct to Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior Welsh Guards infantry officer aboard insisting his troops be ferried the far longer distance direct to Port Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. The intention was for the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired Bluff Cove bridge (destroyed by retreating Argentinian combat engineers) to their destination, a journey of around seven miles.

The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops direct and the squabbling over how the landing was to be performed caused enormous delay in unloading. It had disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not yet established their air defence and still almost fully laden the two LSLs in Port Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of Argentinian-FAA A-4 Skyhawks.

The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove) would provide the world with some of the most sobering images of the war as TV news video footage showed Navy helicopters hovering in thick smoke to winch survivors from the burning landing ships.

The Fall of Port Stanley

Battle of Mount Harriet

Main article: Battle of Mount Harriet

Battle of Two Sisters

Main article: Battle of Two Sisters

Battle of Mount Longdon

Main article: Battle of Mount Longdon

Battle of Wireless Ridge

Main article: Battle of Wireless Ridge

Battle of Mount Tumbledown

Main article: Battle of Mount Tumbledown

On the night of 11 June, after several days of painstaking reconnaissance and logistic build-up, British forces launched a brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended ring of high ground surrounding Stanley. Units of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by naval gunfire from several Royal Navy ships, simultaneously assaulted in the Battle of Mount Harriet, Battle of Two Sisters, and Battle of Mount Longdon. During this battle, 13 were killed when HMS Glamorgan, which was providing naval gunfire support, was struck by an Exocet fired from the back of a truck, further displaying the vulnerability of ships to anti-ship missiles. On this day, Sgt Ian McKay of 4 Platoon, B Company, 3 Para died in a grenade attack on an Argentine bunker which was to earn him a posthumous Victoria Cross. After a night of fierce fighting, all objectives were secured.

The night of 13 June saw the start of the second phase of attacks, in which the momentum of the initial assault was maintained. 2 Para captured Wireless Ridge at the Battle of Wireless Ridge, and the 2nd battalion, Scots Guards captured Mount Tumbledown at the Battle of Mount Tumbledown.

Allegations of nuclear deployment

It has been asserted, although uncorroborated, that the French President Francois Mitterrand claimed that Margaret Thatcher threatened use of a nuclear strike against Cordoba unless the UK Government were provided destruction codes for the Exocet missile. It is reported that two years after the war Labour MPs demanded an inquiry into reports that a Resolution class submarine armed with the Polaris SLBMs had deployed to Ascension Island during the operation, to prepare for a nuclear strike. The Ministry of Defence is reported to have denied the allegations, and Freedman's Official History does the same.

British warships were routinely armed with the Type WE.177 Nuclear Depth Bomb, an anti submarine weapon. The Official History describes the contorted logistical arrangements that led to the removal of the nuclear depth bomb from the frigates, following political alarm in Whitehall. Eventually at least some of the depth bombs were brought back to the UK by an RFA vessel. In December 2003, Argentine President Nestor Kirchner demanded an apology from the British Government for this "regrettable and monstrous" act.

The end of the war

With this last natural defence line breached, the Argentine town defences began to falter. In the morning gloom, one company commander got lost and his junior officers became despondent. Private Santiago Carrizo of the 3rd Regiment described how a platoon commander ordered them to take up positions in the houses and "if a Kelper resists, shoot him" but the entire company did nothing of the kind.

On 14 June, the commander of the Argentine garrison in Stanley, Mario Menendez, surrendered to Major General Jeremy Moore Royal Marines. 9,800 Argentine troops were made prisoners of war and some 4,167 were repatriated to Argentina on the ocean liner SS Canberra alone.

Present at the signing of the letter of surrender was;

• Captain Melbourne Hussey, Argentine Navy
• General de Brigada Mario Menendez
• Vicecomodoro Carlos Blumer-Reeve, Argentine Air Force
• An Argentine legal advisor

• Captain Rod Bell, Royal Marines
• Lieutenant-Colonel Geoff Field, Royal Engineers
• Colonel Brian Pennicott, Royal Artillery
• Major General Jeremy Moore
• Colonel Reid, Special Air Service
• Colonel Tom Seccombe, Royal Marines
• A Royal Signals Corporal

The letter of surrender read;

Headquarters, Land Forces

Falkland Islands

INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER
I, the undersigned, Commander of all the Argentine land, sea and air forces in the Falkland Islands [Menendez's signature, scribbled over the crossed out word of "unconditional"] surrender to Major General J.J. MOORE CB OBE MC* as representative of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

Under the terms of this surrender all Argentine personnel in the Falkland Islands are to muster at assembly points which will be nominated by General Moore and hand over their arms, ammunition, and all other weapons and warlike equipment as directed by General Moore or appropriate British officers acting on his behalf.

Following the surrender all personnel of the Argentinian Forces will be treated with honour in accordance with the conditions set out in the Geneva Convention of 1949. They will obey any directions concerning movement and in connection with accommodation.

This surrender is to be effective from 2359 hours ZULU on 14 June (2059 hours local) and includes those Argentine Forces presently deployed in and around Port Stanley, those others on East Falkland, (Menendez's signature) West Falkland and all outlying islands.

[Menendez's signature] Commander Argentine Forces
[Moore's signature] J. J. MOORE Major General
[Pennicott's signature] Witness

2359 hours 14 June 1982

On 20 June, the British retook the South Sandwich Islands, (which involved accepting the surrender of the Southern Thule Garrison at the Corbeta Uruguay base) and declared the hostilities were at an end.

The war lasted 74 days, with 255 British and 649 Argentine soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and three civilian Falklanders killed.

The British Government decreed that all classified information would be available to the public in the year 2082.

Analysis

Political

The Argentine loss of the war led to ever-larger protests against the military regime and is credited with giving the final push to drive out the military government that had overthrown Isabel Perón in 1976 and participated in the crimes of the Dirty War. Galtieri was forced to resign and elections were held on 30 October 1983 and Raúl Alfonsín, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) party candidate, took office on 10 December 1983. Alfonsín defeated Italo Luder, the candidate for the Justicialist Party (Peronist movement).

The war cost the UK 255 men, six ships (10 others suffered varying degrees of battle damage), 34 aircraft and more than £1.6 billion, but the campaign was considered a great victory for the United Kingdom. The war provided a substantial boost to the popularity of Margaret Thatcher and doubtlessly played a role in ensuring her re-election in 1983. Several members of her government resigned, however, including the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, the last time that a UK government minister resigned openly in response to a failure of his department (in not anticipating the war).

Criticism was levelled at Ted Rowlands, a former junior foreign minister in the preceding government, who disclosed in Parliament in April 1982 that the British had broken the Argentine diplomatic codes. Because the same code machines were used by the Argentine military, this disclosure immediately served to deny British access to valuable intelligence. This, other responses to parliamentary questions and leaks of information to the BBC has been alleged by historian Hugh Bicheno to be a deliberate attempt by a variety of individuals with a vested interest in the fall of Thatcher's government.

Ultimately, the successful conclusion of the war gave a noticeable fillip to British patriotic feeling. Since the failure of the 1956 Suez campaign, the end of Empire and the economic decline of the 1970s which cumulated in the Winter of Discontent, the mood had been one of national angst. With the war successfully concluded, Thatcher was returned to power with an increased Parliamentary majority and began the painful economic readjustments of Thatcherism. A second major effect was a reaffirmation of the special relationship between the US and UK to arguably its closest level ever. Both Reagan and Weinberger (his Secretary of Defence) received honorary knighthoods for their help in the campaign, but the more obvious result was the common alignment of a more confrontational foreign policy against the Soviet bloc, sometimes known as the Second Cold War.

Military

Militarily, the Falklands War was important for a number of reasons.

File:1982FI00201.jpg

British propaganda leaflet intended for Argentine soldiers dropped during the Falkland Islands War. Titled "Islands of the Condemned," it warns Argentine naval ships and aircraft not to enter the Falkland Islands exclusion zone.

It was one of the few major naval battles so far to have occurred after the end of the Second World War. As such, this conflict illustrated the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship missiles and reaffirmed the effectiveness of aircraft in naval warfare. The viability of stealth (in the form of submarines) again proved its usefulness, much as it did during the Second World War and the Cold War.

Neither side achieved total air supremacy, but the power of air forces during a conflict like this proved invaluable, due to the isolated, rough landscape of the Falklands. Air strikes were staged against ground, sea, and air targets on both sides, and often with clear results. All of the UK losses at sea were achieved by aircraft or missile strikes (by both the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation). The French Exocet missile proved its lethality in air-to-surface operations, leading to retrofitting of most major ships with CIWS (close-in weapons systems).

Main article: Air forces in the Falklands War

It vindicated the UK decision to develop the STOVL Harrier aircraft, which showed its capability of operating from forward bases with no runways. At sea, it demonstrated the domination of airpower in major engagements and the usefulness of carriers. It also proved the small but manoeuvrable jump jet as a true fighter aircraft, able to take on adversaries with a much higher top speed. Royal Navy Sea Harriers shot down 23 fast jets with no air-to-air losses themselves. Six Sea Harriers were lost to ground fire and accidents. It should be noted that the disparity in figures, with the Argentine fighters failing to shoot down a single Sea Harrier, can arguably be attributed to a number of factors including that the Argentine planes were operating at the extent of their range with little fuel for dogfights, the inarguably superior combat air training of the British pilots, the employment by the British of the latest Sidewinder missiles, the almost unparalleled at the time Blue Fox radar, the extreme manoeuvrability of the "jump-jet," and the frequent provision of fighter control by warships in San Carlos Water.

The logistical capability of the UK armed forces was stretched to the absolute limit in order to mount an amphibious operation so far from a home-base, onto mountainous islands which have few roads. After the war, much work was done to improve both the logistical and amphibious capability of the Royal Navy.

The role of Special Forces units was reaffirmed, which destroyed many Argentine aircraft (such as those destroyed during the SAS Raid on Pebble Island) and carried out intelligence gathering operations.

The usefulness of helicopters was reaffirmed in combat, logistical, and casevac operations.

Nylon was shown to be a poor choice of fabric in uniforms, as it is more flammable than cotton and also melts with heat, sticking the incendiary fabric to the skin and causing avoidable casualties.

The importance of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) was shown. The Royal Navy had effectively zero over-the-horizon radar capability. This was to be hastily rectified later as Sea King helicopters were fitted with retractable radomes containing a variant of the Nimrod ASW aircraft Searchwater radar. The first travelled south after the war on the brand new Illustrious, sister ship to Invincible.

Weapon export controls

The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) failed to anticipate a conflict between Argentina and the UK when approving weapon exports to Argentina.

Medical

During the operations, several wounded British soldiers had to spend hours in the cold before receiving medical aid--yet no British soldier died who was evacuated to a medical aid station. Many recovered beyond what medicine of the time thought possible, and subsequent theories have suggested that this was due to the extreme cold. Britain also had medical staff familiar with high velocity gunshot wounds, due to their experiences in the Northern Ireland conflict with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA).

The trials of one British patient, Robert Lawrence, MC, were chronicled in a book co-authored by him entitled When The Fighting is Over which was later adapted into a television film. Lawrence was shot at close range by an FN rifle and lost a large percentage of brain matter, but recovered to a degree not thought possible.

Pope John Paul II visits

In May 1982, Pope John Paul II carried out a long scheduled visit to the United Kingdom. In view of the crisis it was decided that this should be balanced with an unscheduled trip to Argentina in June. It is contended that his presence and words spiritually prepared Argentines for a possible defeat, contrary to the propaganda issued by the Junta. He would return to Argentina in 1987 after democratisation.

Falklands veterans' afflictions

File:South Atlantic Medal.jpg

The South Atlantic Medal, a British military decoration for veterans of the war.

The British Ministry of Defence was accused several times of a systematic failure to prepare service personnel for the horrors of war and to provide adequate care for them afterwards.

There are allegations that the Ministry of Defence has tried to ignore the issue of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which left many sufferers emotionally scarred and unable to work, immersed in social dislocation, alcoholism, and depression. Veterans have suffered prolonged personality disorders, flashbacks, and anxiety levels, sometimes reaching pathological levels.

It was revealed that more veterans have committed suicide since the Falklands War ended than the number of servicemen killed in action [9].

The South Atlantic Medal Association (SAMA82), which represents and helps Falklands veterans, believes that some 264 veterans have now taken their own lives (2002), a number that contrasts with the 255 who died on active service.

A similar situation afflicts the veterans on the Argentine side, many of whom have similarly suffered from psychiatric disorders, drug and alcohol abuse, and social turmoil. The current Argentine suicide toll is 454, according to an Argentine movie (Iluminados por el fuego by Tristán Bauer, 2006) about the suicide of a Falklands veteran.

Cultural impact

Main article: Cultural impact of the Falklands War

There were wide-ranging influences on popular culture in both the UK and Argentina, from the immediate postwar period to the present. The words yomp and Exocet entered the British vernacular as a result of the war. The Falklands War also provided material for theatre, film and TV drama and influenced the output of musicians including English Post-Punk Band Gang of Four, Pink Floyd, Crass, and Elvis Costello amongst others. British new wave musician Joe Jackson wrote a song (Tango Atlantico) denouncing the absurdity of the war (the song was released in the 1986 'Big World' Album).

See also

• Operation Algeciras - A failed plan conceived by the Argentine military to send some Montoneros to sabotage the British military facilities in Gibraltar.
• 1833 invasion of the Falkland Islands

References

• Barnett, Anthony. IRON BRITANNIA Why Parliament waged its Falklands war. Allison & Busby, 1982. ISBN 0-85031-493-3
• Dalyell, Tam, MP. One Man's Falklands. Cecil Woolf, 1982. ISBN 0-900821-65-5.
• Dalyell, Tam, MP. Thatcher's Torpedo. Cecil Woolf, 1983. ISBN 0-900821-66-3.
• Franks et al. Falkland Islands Review, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors. HMSO, January 1983. Cmnd. 8787.
• Freedman, Sir L. Official History of the Falklands: Vol 2. Frank Cass, 2005 ISBN 0-7146-5207-5.
• Gavshon, Arthur and Rice, Desmond. The Sinking of the Belgrano. Secker & Warburg, 1984. ISBN 0-436-41332-9.
• Harris, Robert. GOTCHA! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis. Faber and Faber, 1983. ISBN 0-571-13052-6.
• Kon, Daniel. Los Chicos de la Guerra, The Argentine conscripts' own moving accounts of their Falklands War (English translation). New English Library 1983. ISBN 0-450-05611-2.
• Norton-Taylor, Richard. The Ponting Affair. Cecil Woolf, 1985. ISBN 0-900821-73-6.
• Sunday Times Insight Team. The Falklands War. Sphere Books, 1982. ISBN 0-7221-8282-1.
• Tinker, Lieut. David, R.N. A Message from the Falklands, The Life and Gallant Death of David Tinker, Lieut. R.N. from his Letters and Poems. Penguin, 1982. ISBN 0-14-006778-7.
• Thornton, Richard C. 'The Falklands Sting. Brassey's, 1998. ISBN 1-57488-155-8.
• Underwood, Geoffrey. Our Falklands War, The Men of the Task Force Tell Their Story. Maritime Books, 1983. ISBN 0-907771-08-4.
• Falklands Roundtable -- Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, Scripps Library
• The Times article on Freedman's work June 27 2005, Evans, M. and Hamilton, A.
• "How France helped us win Falklands war, by John Nott", By George Jones, Political Editor (Filed: 13/03/2002)

External links

• Falklandswar.org.uk
• Victoria Cross and other citations, London Gazette, 11 October 1982
• The Guardian: Julian Barnes
• Malvinas War Memorial (Buenos Aires)
• Template:En icon/Template:Es icon Falklands/Malvinas Forum
• Template:Es icon ex-7th Argentine Infantry Regiment veterans
• Falklands War Timeline
• Falklands War Documents
• Falklands War Articles
• Template:Es icon Escuadron Fenix
• Template:De icon Movie Iluminados por el fuego regarding Argentine veterans suicide
• MoD - 20-year anniversary
• Naval-History.Net - "Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982"
• Falkland Islands History Roll of Honor
• 25th anniversary commemorations
• MoD 25th Anniversary