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2024 Baltic Sea submarine cable disruptions

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2024 Baltic Sea submarine cable disruptions
Date17-18 November
LocationBaltic Sea
CauseUnder investigation

On 17-18 November 2024[1], two submarine telecommunication cables, the BCS East-West Interlink and C-Lion1 cables were disrupted in the Baltic Sea. The incidents involving both cables occurred in close proximity of each other and near-simultaneously which prompted accusations from European government officials and NATO member states of hybrid warfare and sabotage as the cause of the damage.

Since 19 November, authorities have monitored the Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3 regarding its involvement in the disruptions.

Background

Location of C-Lion1

The BCS East West Interlink is a 218 km (135 mi) long submarine data communication cable that runs through the Baltic Sea, built in 1997 by Alcatel and owned by Arelion. It connects Sventoji in Lithuania to Katthammarsvik on the east coast of the Swedish island of Gotland.[2] From Gotland another cable pass through the data to the Swedish mainland. The C-Lion1 is a submarine communications cable between Finland and Germany. The cable is owned and operated by the Finnish telecommunications and IT services company Cinia Oy, and is the first direct communications cable between Finland and Central Europe following its start of operations in May 2016.[3][4]

Chinese ship Newnew Polar Bear (IMO 9313204) is suspected of causing the Balticconnector incident

A year before the 2024, a similar undersea infrastructure disruption event, the Balticconnector incident, occurred when the Chinese ship Newnew Polar Bear dragged its anchor across the seabed, damaging the pipeline and submarine cables between Sweden and Estonia.[5]

In general as of 2024, about 200 undersea cables have been cut or disrupted annually,[6] due most frequently to unintentional damage from fishing equipment or the anchors of ships.[7][8]

Disruption, November 18-28, 2024

On Monday, 18 November 2024,[9] the telecommunications company Telia Lithuania announced that the BCS East-West Interlink submarine cable between Lithuania and Sweden had been "cut" on Sunday morning at around 10 a.m. local time.[10] At around the same time, the submarine cable C-Lion1 for data communication between Finland and Germany was cut in the same region of the Baltic Sea. As a result, both of their telecom services were disrupted.[11][12] The C-Lion1 fault was discovered off the coast of the Swedish island of Öland.[13] The two faults were detected about 97–105 kilometres (60–65 mi) apart from each other.[14] The BCS East-West cable is at a depth of 100–150 metres (330–490 ft) and C-Lion at 20–40 metres (66–131 ft) deep.[15]

An Arelion spokesperson described the damage to the BCS East-West Interlink cable as "...not a partial damage. It’s full damage”.[16] At the time of the incident, the cable provided about 1/3rd of the internet capacity of Lithuania.[14]

According to C-Lion1 operator Cinia Oy, the cable was severed by an outside force.[17] Cinia chief executive Ari-Jussi Knaapila stated that the company was in the process of conducting physical inspections at the site of the fault.[14][18][19]

BCS East-West Interlink and C-Lion1 were restored on 28 November 2024[20][21].

Reactions

On November 18, the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Finland issued a joint statement expressing "deep concern" over the C-Lion1 cable's disruption, and expressed suspicion over possible hybrid warfare conducted by Russia, causing the disruptions in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and elevated tension against NATO member states.[16][22] German Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius called the incident an act of sabotage.[9] He further stated that "no one" believed that the cables were cut accidentally.[16] The Lithuanian Naval Force announced increased surveillance of its waters in response to the damage and would discuss further measures with Lithuania its allies.[9] The Lithuanian Armed Forces stated that NATO members corresponded with one another to determine the cause of the disruptions.[16]

European governments accused Russia of escalating hybrid attacks on Ukraine's Western allies, but not directly accusing Russia of destroying the seacables.[23]

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected suspicions and called it "absurd", accusing Russia without evidence.[23]

On 26 November 2024, Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement of "no knowledge" regarding the incident.[24]

Suspicious ships

On 19 November 2024 the Royal Danish Navy observed the Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3 in the Baltic Sea after it was suspected to be involved in the sabotage.[25][26] The detention of the Chinese vessel was the first enforcement action under the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables since the Transatlantic cables incident of 1959.[27] Yi Peng 3 left the Russian Baltic harbour Ust-Luga on 15 November 2024. Information about the destination of the ship offered by media outlets varied, the most frequently mentioned being Port Said, Egypt, while the analysis provider MarineTraffic, said the destination was unknown upon departure.[28] On 17 November, between 1:30 a.m. (UTC) and 11:19 a.m. the ship passed the Swedish island of Gotland. Yi Peng 3 crossed BCS East-West. At around 10 a.m., the Lithuanian telecom provider Telia in Vilnius received a fault report: the connection between Šventoji, Lithuania, and Gotland, Sweden had been severed. The ship crossed several times over the position of damage of the two cables.[29][30] The Yi Peng 3 continued its journey south. After Gotland, the freighter switched off its automatic identification system (AIS) signal for 7.5 hours. At 22:41 UTC the ship switched AIS back on and was located south of the Swedish island of Öland.[29]

Three hours later, at 2 a.m. (UTC) on 18 November, the Finnish network provider Cinia reported a loss of data traffic via C-Lion1. It became clear that the cable between Gotland and Öland was damaged. In this area the Yi Peng 3 was traveling without an AIS signal.[29] The Danish public broadcaster DR sent a drone to survey the ship, showing images of how one of Yi Peng 3's anchors had become mangled – according to NZZ an indication that the freighter could have destroyed the cables.[28]

Authorities in Northern Germany searched Turkish bulk carrier Fortune Express on 19 November, as it was passing through the Kiel Canal connecting the North and Baltic Seas. After a 2.5 hour search the vessel was allowed to continue its journey. Fortune Express had also passed over the location of the cables at the time of the incident and transmitted irregular AIS signals.[citation needed]

The German Coast Guard sent the Bad Düben and the Swedish Coast Guard also sent Poseidon, one of its largest ships, joining a Danish Patrol Vessel HDMS Hvidbjørnen (F360) to monitor the Yi Peng 3 on 22 November in Kattegat.[31][32] At least up from 26. November 2024 the German Federal Police repalced Bad Düben with Bad Bramstedt (IMO 9252620).

On 22 November, a ship from the Finnish Coast Guard, the Turva, a Swedish Coast Guard vessel and the Bamberg from the German Federal Police arrived at the damaged site of the C-Lion1 undersea data cable. The damage will be examined using ROVs from the Swedish military.[33]

Since 20 November 2024, the ship is stationed at a sea position in the Kattegat off anchor and is guarded by the Royal Danish Navy.[citation needed]

Investigations

The Swedish Prosecution Authority opened an investigation into "sabotage" regarding the disruptions of both cables.[16] According to the Swedish Navy, it had an "almost 100% identification" of the ships that were in the area of the two cable breaks.[15] The navy is using a remote-controlled submarines to investigate the southern site of the two cables to support the Swedish prosecutor and police with their investigations.

Lithuania's Prosecutor General's Office launched a pre-trial investigation into terrorism.[34]

Keskusrikospoliisi (KRP), Finland's national bureau of investigation opened a criminal investigation into the rupture of the C-Lion1 cable on suspicion of "aggravated criminal mischief and aggravated interference with communications."[35]

Following the allegations of sabotage by Yi Peng 3, Sweden asked China to cooperate with the Swedish authorities on the case, according to Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson. China agreed on 29 November to cooperate in the investigation. China is ready to "work with relevant countries to find out the truth," said a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, China and Sweden in close contact on the matter, she added.[36]

On 26 November, the three nations signed an agreement to proceed with a joint investigation, coordinated through the Eurojust.[24]

See also

References

  1. ^ Mukherjee, Supantha (28 November 2024). "One of two damaged Baltic Sea cables back online, Arelion says". Reuters. Reuters. Retrieved 29 November 2024.
  2. ^ "Submarine Cable Map". www.submarinecablemap.com. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  3. ^ "Network projects | Cinia". www.cinia.fi. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  4. ^ "Submarine Data Cable to Link Germany and Finland". eco. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  5. ^ Staalesen, Atle (26 October 2023). "Runaway ship Newnew Polar Bear, suspected of sabotage in Baltic Sea, is sailing into Russian Arctic waters". www.thebarentsobserver.com. Retrieved 21 November 2024.
  6. ^ Schmalz, Alexander (18 November 2024). "C-Lion-1: Kabel in der Ostsee durchtrennt – Deutschland und Finnland "zutiefst besorgt"". Berliner Zeitung (in German). Retrieved 25 November 2024.
  7. ^ Saffo, Paul (4 April 2013). "Disrupting Undersea Cables: Cyberspace's Hidden Vulnerability". atlanticcouncil.org. Atlantic Council. Retrieved 23 November 2024. As already mentioned, the global undersea cable system experiences several hundred disruptions per year, and the consortia operating the various cable networks maintain specialized cable repair resources at the ready to respond within twenty-four hours of a failure.
  8. ^ "Nearly all data that moves around the world goes through these undersea cables". Fast Company. 2 April 2024. Retrieved 23 November 2024. Each year, an estimated 100 to 150 undersea cables are cut, primarily accidentally by fishing equipment or anchors.
  9. ^ a b c Bryant, Miranda (19 November 2024). "We assume damage to Baltic Sea cables was sabotage, German minister says". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
  10. ^ Cook, Ellie; Feng, John (19 November 2024). ""NATO lake" sabotage feared as two undersea cables damaged in 24 hours". Newsweek. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  11. ^ Bryant, Miranda (19 November 2024). "We assume damage to Baltic Sea cables was sabotage, German minister says". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  12. ^ "Germany suspects sabotage over severed undersea cables in Baltic". www.bbc.com. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  13. ^ "Germany suspects sabotage behind severed undersea cables". BBC. 19 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
  14. ^ a b c Murphy, Paul; Kottasová, Ivana; Stockwell, Billy (18 November 2024). "Two undersea cables in Baltic Sea disrupted, sparking warnings of possible 'hybrid warfare'". CNN. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  15. ^ a b Bryant, Miranda; Sauer, Pjotr (20 November 2024). "Swedish police focus on Chinese ship after suspected undersea cable sabotage". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 21 November 2024.
  16. ^ a b c d e "Germany says 'sabotage' presumed in damaged Baltic Sea telecom cables". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  17. ^ "Sabotage suspected after Baltic Sea telecoms cable C-Lion1 suddenly stops working". Sky News. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
  18. ^ "A fault in the Cinia C-Lion1 submarine cable between Finland and Germany". www.cinia.fi. 18 November 2024. Retrieved 18 November 2024.
  19. ^ Astier, Henri (18 November 2024). "'Hybrid warfare' warning after undersea cable cut between Germany and Finland". www.bbc.com. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
  20. ^ Mukherjee, Supantha (28 November 2024). "One of two damaged Baltic Sea cables back online, Arelion says". Reuters. Reuters. Retrieved 29 November 2024.
  21. ^ "Cinia's C-Lion1 Submarine Cable Has Fully Restored". www.cinia.fi. Cinia. Retrieved 29 November 2024.
  22. ^ "Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of Finland and Germany on the severed undersea cable in the Baltic Sea". German Federal Foreign Office. 18 November 2024. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  23. ^ a b Johan Ahlander (20 November 2024). "Danish military says it's staying close to Chinese ship after data cable breaches". Reuters.https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-absurd-suggest-russia-involved-baltic-sea-cable-damage-2024-11-20/
  24. ^ a b "Prokuratūra: kabelio Baltijos jūroje pažeidimą tirs trijų valstybių Jungtinė tyrimo grupė". LRT (in Lithuanian). 27 November 2024. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
  25. ^ "Ostsee-Kabel zerstört: Was haben China und das Schiff »Yi Peng 3« damit zu tun?". Der Spiegel (in German). 20 November 2024. ISSN 2195-1349. Retrieved 21 November 2024.
  26. ^ Deutschland, RedaktionsNetzwerk (20 November 2024). "Ostsee-Kabel beschädigt: Dänemark beschattet China-Frachter, Finnland ermittelt". www.rnd.de (in German). Retrieved 21 November 2024.
  27. ^ Pancevski, Bojan (20 November 2024). "Chinese-Registered Ship Is Held in Baltic Sea Sabotage Investigation". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  28. ^ a b Koponen, Linda (23 November 2024). "Datenkabel in der Ostsee beschädigt: Geheimer Auftrag von Yi Peng 3?". Neue Zürcher Zeitung (in Swiss High German). ISSN 0376-6829. Retrieved 23 November 2024.
  29. ^ a b c NDR (19 November 2024). Beschädigte Ostsee-Kabel: Frachter "Yi Peng 3" Urheber der Beschädigungen? (in German). Retrieved 21 November 2024 – via www.ndr.de.
  30. ^ NDR. "Mögliche Kabel-Sabotage in Ostsee: Bundespolizei unterstützt internationale Ermittlungen". www.ndr.de (in German). Retrieved 21 November 2024.
  31. ^ "Sabotage in der Ostsee? Deutsche und schwedische Küstenwache beschatten verdächtigen Frachter". Der Spiegel (in German). 24 November 2024. ISSN 2195-1349. Retrieved 24 November 2024.
  32. ^ "Deutsche Küstenwache taucht überraschend an verdächtigem Schiff aus China auf". t-online (in German). 23 November 2024. Retrieved 24 November 2024.
  33. ^ Deutschland, RedaktionsNetzwerk (24 November 2024). "Ostsee: Finnisches Schiff bei beschädigtem Datenkabel eingetroffen". www.rnd.de (in German). Retrieved 25 November 2024.
  34. ^ "Prokuratūra pradėjo tyrimą dėl kabelio pažeidimo Baltijos jūroje". Atvira Klaipėda. 19 November 2024. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
  35. ^ "Finnish authorities open probe into ruptured undersea cable between Finland, Germany". Voice of America. 20 November 2024. Retrieved 21 November 2024.
  36. ^ "Sabotage-Verdacht: Ostsee-Datenkabel repariert". tagesschau.de (in German). Retrieved 29 November 2024.
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