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Khanates of the Caucasus

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Political map of the eastern part of the Southern Caucasus between 1795 and 1801

The khanates of the Caucasus,[1] also known as the Azerbaijani khanates,[2] Persian khanates,[3] or Iranian Khanates,[4] were various administrative units in the South Caucasus governed by a hereditary or appointed ruler under the official rule of Iran. The title of the ruler was khan, which was identical to the Ottoman rank of pasha.[5] Following the assassination of Nader Shah (r. 1736–1747) in 1747, internal chaos erupted in Iran, particularly in the South Caucasus, where semi-autonomous khanates emerged as a result of the lack of a centralized government.[6] The khans neither had territorial or religious unity, nor an ethnic/national identity. They were mostly interested in preserving their positions and income.[7]

In Persian, the khanates were historically referred to as ulka or tuman, governed by a hakem (governor). The word "khanate" is an Anglicized form of the Russian word khanstvo and the Armenian word khanut'iun. The shah could promote a hakem's status to that of a khan, but the hakem could also adopt the title himself.[8] In terms of structure, the khanates were a miniature version of Iranian kingship.[9] The administrative and literary language in the South Caucasus until the end of the 19th century was Persian, with Arabic being used only for religious studies, despite the fact that most of the Muslims in the region spoke a Turkic dialect.[10]

The Russo-Iranian War of 1804–1813 ended with the Treaty of Gulistan, which amongst other things led to the Iranian loss of seven khanates; Ganja, Karabakh, Quba, Derbent, Baku, Shirvan, and Shaki.[11][12] The northern and central part of the Talysh Khanate, along with a part of northern Erivan (Shuregol), was also ceded to the Russian Empire.[11] Following the conclusion of the Russo-Iranian War of 1826–1828 and the signing of the Treaty of Turkmenchay, Iran also lost the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates to the Russians.[13] Politically, the loss of the khanates was devastating for the Qajar dynasty because it damaged their reputation as the guardian of the Guarded Domains of Iran.[14]

A certain amount of earlier Iranian political procedures were initially preserved by the Russian government in the Caucasus, such as using Persian documents to determine the status and property rights of distinguished Muslim figures. Thus, some of the Muslim begs, aqalars, and khans managed to fit their previous rank into the new Russian imperial structure.[15]

List

The khanates that soon emerged after the death of Nader Shah in 1747 were the following:[16]

Coinage

A number of these khanates, including Ganja, Shirvan, Shaki, Derbent, and Karabakh, produced their own coins, first in the name of Nader Shah and then in the name of the Zand ruler Karim Khan Zand. A large portion of their coinage was completely nameless by the end of the 18th-century. While a few uncommon issues of Derbent contain a vague reference to one of their khans, none of the khans ever put their names on their coins,[17] due to lacking the legitimacy of an sovereign monarch and any claims to independence.[18] These northern Iranian coins were made entirely of silver and copper.[17]

While the value of the copper coin in the khanates are unknown, the silver coins' value continued to be the same as the abbasi and its divisions. In 1770, the German scholar Johann Friedrich Gmelin made the observation that the full worth of a coin could only be understood in the region in which it was originally struck, and that relocating cost money. As had been the circumstance with copper money prior to the 1730s, this implied that silver coins were used as tokens in the khanates.[17]

See also

References

  1. ^ Cronin, Stephanie, ed. (2013). Iranian-Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions Since 1800. Routledge. p. 53. ISBN 978-0415624336. The shah's dominions, including the khanates of the Caucasus, included only about 5 to 6 million inhabitants against Russia's 500,000-strong army and estimated 40 million population.
  2. ^ *Swietochowski, Tadeusz (1993), Russia's Transcaucasian Policies and Azerbaijan: Ethnic Conflict and Regional Unity // In a collapsing empire. Feltrinelli Editore, p. 190, An Armenian oblast' (district) was created on the territory of the former Azerbaijani khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan, yet remarkably there followed no large scale manifestation of ethnic strife in the countryside.
  3. ^ David Marshall Lang. "The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658-1832", (Columbia University Press, 1957), 153; "(...) and to obtain the Persian regent Kerim Khan's recognition of Georgian suzerainty over the Persian khanates north of (...)"
  4. ^ George A. Bournoutian. "Armenia and Imperial Decline: The Yerevan Province, 1900-1914", (Routledge, 2018), 6; "(...) After establishing Tiflis as its administrative and military headquarters in the region, Russia attacked the Iranian Khanate of Ganja (Ganjeh) and began the First Russo-Iranian War (1804-1813). (...) By 1813, the restraints of these other military engagements were removed, and following a number of defeats, Iran was forced to sign the Gulistan (Golestan) agreement. The treaty, which the Iranians considered to be only an armistice, handed the former Iranian khanates of Ganja, Derbent (Darband), Kuba (Qobbeh), Shirvan, Karabagh (Qarabagh), Sheki (Shakki) and parts of Talysh (Talesh) to Russia (...)"
  5. ^ Bournoutian 1976, p. 23.
  6. ^ Bournoutian 2016a, pp. 107–108.
  7. ^ Bournoutian 2016a, p. 120.
  8. ^ Bournoutian 2016b, p. 2 (see note 7).
  9. ^ Swietochowski 1995, p. 2.
  10. ^ Bournoutian 1994, p. 1.
  11. ^ a b Behrooz 2023, p. 102.
  12. ^ Daniel 2001, pp. 86–90.
  13. ^ Behrooz 2023, p. 128.
  14. ^ Amanat 2017, p. 212.
  15. ^ Deutschmann 2015, p. 29.
  16. ^ Bournoutian 2016a, pp. 107–108; Bournoutian 2021, p. 11
  17. ^ a b c Matthee, Floor & Clawson 2013, p. 170.
  18. ^ Akopyan & Petrov 2016, pp. 1–2.

Sources