User:Homunq: Difference between revisions

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Homunq is busy and is going to be on Wikipedia in off-and-on doses, and may not respond swiftly to queries.

My first language is English, I speak Spanish fluently (though not perfectly), and I have some understanding of French, Kaqchikel, and Tzotzil. I live in Guatemala. I feel qualified to contribute to Wikipedia (though not a true expert) in high-energy physics (standard model), neurolinguistics (and related), mesoamerica (mayan) history and current events, and voting systems, as well as translating and general editing. You could find out my real name if you wanted to.

This user is a member of WikiProject Mesoamerica.

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I did a lot of work on the following table on voting system. Here's a version with SODA, for when I manage to publish in a reliable source about that method.

	Majority/ MMC	Condorcet/ Majority Condorcet	Cond. loser	Monotone	Consistency/ Participation	Reversal symmetry	IIA	Cloneproof	Polytime/ Resolvable	Summable	Equal rankings allowed	Later prefs allowed	Later-no-harm/ Later-no-help		FBC:No favorite betrayal
Approval^{[nb 1]}	3Ambiguous	4No/Strategic yes^{[nb 2]}	5No	1Yes	2Yes^{[nb 2]}	1Yes	3Ambiguous	3Ambig.^{[nb 3]}	1Yes	1O(N)	1Yes	5No		4^{[nb 4]}	1Yes
Borda count	5No	5No	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	5No	5No (teaming)	1Yes	1O(N)	5No	1Yes	5No		5No
Copeland	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	5No	1Yes	4No (but ISDA)	5No (crowding)	3Yes/No	2O(N²)	1Yes	1Yes	5No		5No
IRV (AV)	1Yes	5No	1Yes	5No	5No	5No	5No	1Yes	1Yes	5O(N!)^{[nb 5]}	5No	1Yes	1Yes		5No
Kemeny-Young	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	5No	1Yes	4No (but ISDA)	5No (teaming)	3No/Yes	2O(N²)^{[nb 6]}	1Yes	1Yes	5No		5No
Majority Judgment^{[nb 7]}	1Yes^{[nb 8]}	4No/Strategic yes^{[nb 2]}	4No^{[nb 9]}	1Yes	4No^{[nb 10]}	4No^{[nb 11]}	2Yes	1Yes	1Yes	1O(N)^{[nb 12]}	1Yes	1Yes	3No ^{[nb 13]}	1Yes	1Yes
Minimax	2Yes/No	2Yes^{[nb 14]}	5No	1Yes	5No	5No	5No	5No (spoilers)	1Yes	2O(N²)	3Some variants	1Yes	4No^{[nb 14]}		5No
Plurality	2Yes/No	5No	5No	1Yes	1Yes	5No	5No	5No (spoilers)	1Yes	1O(N)	5No	5No		^{[nb 4]}	5No
Range voting^{[nb 1]}	5No	4No/Strategic yes^{[nb 2]}	5No	1Yes	2Yes^{[nb 2]}	1Yes	2Yes^{[nb 15]}	3Ambig.^{[nb 3]}	1Yes	1O(N)	1Yes	1Yes	5No		1Yes
Ranked pairs	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	5No	1Yes	4No (but ISDA)	1Yes	1Yes	2O(N²)	1Yes	1Yes	5No		5No
Runoff voting	2Yes/No	5No	1Yes	5No	5No	5No	5No	5No (spoilers)	1Yes	2O(N)^{[nb 16]}	5No	4No^{[nb 17]}	2Yes^{[nb 18]}		5No
Schulze	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	5No	1Yes	4No (but ISDA)	1Yes	1Yes	2O(N²)	1Yes	1Yes	5No		5No
SODA voting ^{[nb 19]}	1Yes	2Strategic yes/yes	1Yes	2Ambiguous ^{[nb 20]}	2Up to 4 candidates ^{[nb 21]}	1Yes	4Up to 4 candidates ^{[nb 21]}	4Up to 4 cand. (then crowds)^{[nb 21]}	1Yes	1O(N)	1Yes	4Candidates only^{[nb 22]}		1Yes	1Yes
Random winner/ arbitrary winner^{[nb 23]}	5No	5No	5No	5NA	1No	1Yes	1Yes	5NA	3Yes/No	0O(1)	5No	5No		5	1Yes
Random ballot^{[nb 24]}	5No	5No	5No	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	1Yes	3Yes/No	1O(N)	5No	5No		5	1Yes

"Yes/No", in a column which covers two related criteria, signifies that the given system passes the first criterion and not the second one.
Cite error: There are <ref group=nb> tags on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=nb}} template (see the help page).

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@@ Line 173: / Line 173: @@
 |bgcolor=#ffbbbb colspan=2 align=center| <span style="display:none">5</span>[[Later-no-harm criterion#Noncomplying methods|No]]
 |bgcolor=#ffbbbb| <span style="display:none">5</span>No
-|-
-! [[SODA voting]] <ref group=nb name=sodabase>For the criteria compliance of SODA voting:
-*Delegated votes are considered to be equivalent to voting the candidate's predeclared preferences.
-*Ballots only are considered (In other words, voters are assumed not to have preferences that cannot be expressed by a delegated or approval vote.)
-*Since at the time of assigning approvals on delegated votes there is always enough information to find an optimum strategy, candidates are assumed to use such a strategy.</ref>
-|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
-|bgcolor=#ddffdd| <span style="display:none">2</span>Strategic yes/<span style="background-color: #bbffbb">yes</span>
-|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
-|bgcolor=#ddffdd| <span style="display:none">2</span>Ambig&shy;uous <ref group=nb name=sodamono>For up to 4 candidates, SODA is monotonic. For more than 4 candidates, it is monotonic for adding an approval, for changing from an approval to a delegation ballot, and for changes in a candidate's preferences. However, if changes in a voter's preferences are executed as changes from a delegation to an approval ballot, such changes are not necessarily monotonic with more than 4 candidates.</ref>
-|bgcolor=#ddffdd| <span style="display:none">2</span>Up to 4 candidates <ref group=nb name=soda4>For up to 4 candidates, SODA meets the Consistency, Participation, IIA, and Cloneproof criteria. It can fail these criteria in certain rare cases with more than 4 candidates. This is considered almost meeting the Consistency and Participation criteria, which does not intrinsically have to do with numerous candidates, and almost failing the IIA and Cloneproof criteria, which do.</ref>
-|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
-|bgcolor=#ffdddd| <span style="display:none">4</span>Up to 4 candidates <ref group=nb name=soda4/>
-|bgcolor=#ffdddd| <span style="display:none">4</span>Up to 4 cand. (then crowds)<ref group=nb name=soda4/>
-|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
-|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>O(N)
-|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
-|bgcolor=#ffdddd colspan=2 align=center| <span style="display:none">4</span>Candidates only<ref group=nb>Later preferences are only possible through delegation, that is, if they agree with the predeclared preferences of the favorite.</ref>
-|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
-|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
 |-
 ! [[Two-round system|Runoff voting]]
@@ Line 224: / Line 205: @@
 |bgcolor=#ffbbbb colspan=2 align=center| <span style="display:none">5</span>[[Later-no-harm criterion#Noncomplying methods|No]]
 |bgcolor=#ffbbbb| <span style="display:none">5</span>No
+|-
+! [[SODA voting]] <ref group=nb name=sodabase>For the criteria compliance of SODA voting:
+*Delegated votes are considered to be equivalent to voting the candidate's predeclared preferences.
+*Ballots only are considered (In other words, voters are assumed not to have preferences that cannot be expressed by a delegated or approval vote.)
+*Since at the time of assigning approvals on delegated votes there is always enough information to find an optimum strategy, candidates are assumed to use such a strategy.</ref>
+|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
+|bgcolor=#ddffdd| <span style="display:none">2</span>Strategic yes/<span style="background-color: #bbffbb">yes</span>
+|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
+|bgcolor=#ddffdd| <span style="display:none">2</span>Ambig&shy;uous <ref group=nb name=sodamono>For up to 4 candidates, SODA is monotonic. For more than 4 candidates, it is monotonic for adding an approval, for changing from an approval to a delegation ballot, and for changes in a candidate's preferences. However, if changes in a voter's preferences are executed as changes from a delegation to an approval ballot, such changes are not necessarily monotonic with more than 4 candidates.</ref>
+|bgcolor=#ddffdd| <span style="display:none">2</span>Up to 4 candidates <ref group=nb name=soda4>For up to 4 candidates, SODA meets the Consistency, Participation, IIA, and Cloneproof criteria. It can fail these criteria in certain rare cases with more than 4 candidates. This is considered almost meeting the Consistency and Participation criteria, which does not intrinsically have to do with numerous candidates, and almost failing the IIA and Cloneproof criteria, which do.</ref>
+|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
+|bgcolor=#ffdddd| <span style="display:none">4</span>Up to 4 candidates <ref group=nb name=soda4/>
+|bgcolor=#ffdddd| <span style="display:none">4</span>Up to 4 cand. (then crowds)<ref group=nb name=soda4/>
+|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
+|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>O(N)
+|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
+|bgcolor=#ffdddd colspan=2 align=center| <span style="display:none">4</span>Candidates only<ref group=nb>Later preferences are only possible through delegation, that is, if they agree with the predeclared preferences of the favorite.</ref>
+|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
+|bgcolor=#bbffbb| <span style="display:none">1</span>Yes
 |-
 ! [[Sortition|Random winner]]/<br>arbitrary winner<ref group=nb>Random winner: Uniformly randomly chosen candidate is winner. Arbitrary winner: some external entity, not a voter, chooses the winner. These systems are not, properly speaking, voting systems at all, but are included to show that even a horrible system can still pass some of the criteria.</ref>