Daniel Bleichenbacher: Difference between revisions
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{{Short description|Cryptographer (born 1964)}} |
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'''Daniel Bleichenbacher''' (born 1964) is a [[Switzerland|Swiss]] [[cryptographer]], previously a researcher at [[Bell Labs]], and currently employed at [[ |
'''Daniel Bleichenbacher''' (born 1964) is a [[Switzerland|Swiss]] [[cryptographer]], previously a researcher at [[Bell Labs]] and [[Google]], and currently employed at [[Cure53]]. He received his Ph.D. from [[ETH Zurich]] in 1996 for contributions to computational number theory, particularly concerning message verification in the [[ElGamal]] and [[RSA (algorithm)|RSA]] public-key cryptosystems.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://cr.yp.to/bib/1996/bleichenbacher-thesis.ps |format=PS | title=Bleichenbacher Thesis | website=cr.yp.to | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220712003045/http://cr.yp.to/bib/1996/bleichenbacher-thesis.ps | archive-date=2022-07-12 | url-status=live}}</ref> His doctoral advisor was [[Ueli Maurer (cryptographer)|Ueli Maurer]]. |
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== RSA Attacks == |
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⚫ | In 1998, Daniel Bleichenbacher demonstrated a practical attack against systems using RSA encryption in concert with the |
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Bleichenbacher is particularly notable for devising attacks against the [[RSA (algorithm)|RSA]] public-key cryptosystem, namely when used with the [[PKCS1|PKCS#1 v1]] standard published by [[RSA Laboratories]]. These attacks were able to break both RSA encryption and signatures produced using the '''PKCS #1''' standard. |
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=== BB'98 attack: chosen ciphertext attack against the RSA PKCS#1 encryption standard === |
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⚫ | In 1998, Daniel Bleichenbacher demonstrated a practical attack against systems using RSA encryption in concert with the '''PKCS #1''' encoding function, including a version of the [[Secure Sockets Layer]] (SSL) protocol used by thousands of [[web server]]s at the time.<ref>{{Cite journal| first=Daniel| last=Bleichenbacher| title=Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1| journal=Crypto '98| pages=1–12| year=1998| url=http://www.bell-labs.com/user/bleichen/papers/pkcs.ps| format=PS| accessdate=2011-12-07| url-status=dead| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20120204040056/http://www.bell-labs.com/user/bleichen/papers/pkcs.ps| archivedate=2012-02-04}}</ref> |
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This attack was the first practical reason to consider [[adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack]]s. |
This attack was the first practical reason to consider [[adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack]]s. |
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=== BB'06 attack: signature forgery attack against the RSA PKCS#1 signature standard === |
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⚫ | In 2006 at a rump session at [[CRYPTO]], Bleichenbacher described a "pencil and paper"-simple attack against RSA signature validation as implemented in common cryptographic toolkits. Both [[OpenSSL]] and the NSS security engine in [[Firefox]] were later found to be vulnerable to the attack, which would allow an attacker to forge the [[Transport Layer Security|SSL]] [[Public key certificate|certificates]] that protect sensitive websites.<ref>[ |
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⚫ | In 2006 at a rump session at [[CRYPTO]], Bleichenbacher described a "pencil and paper"-simple attack against RSA signature validation as implemented in common cryptographic toolkits. Both [[OpenSSL]] and the NSS security engine in [[Firefox]] were later found to be vulnerable to the attack, which would allow an attacker to forge the [[Transport Layer Security|SSL]] [[Public key certificate|certificates]] that protect sensitive websites.<ref>[https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg00999.html Bleichenbacher's RSA signature forgery based on implementation error]</ref><ref>[https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4159923 Analysis on Bleichenbacher's Forgery Attack]. ''IEEE''. 2007.</ref> |
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{{Reflist}} |
{{Reflist}} |
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== External links == |
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* [http://www.bell-labs.com/user/bleichen/ Daniel Bleichenbacher's home page at Bell Labs] |
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{{Persondata <!-- Metadata: see [[Wikipedia:Persondata]]. --> |
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| NAME = Bleichenbacher, Daniel |
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| SHORT DESCRIPTION = |
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| DATE OF BIRTH = August 4, 1964 |
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| PLACE OF BIRTH = |
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| DATE OF DEATH = |
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| PLACE OF DEATH = |
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}} |
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Bleichenbacher, Daniel}} |
{{DEFAULTSORT:Bleichenbacher, Daniel}} |
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{{crypto-stub}} |
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{{compu-scientist-stub}} |
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[[Category:Modern cryptographers]] |
[[Category:Modern cryptographers]] |
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[[Category:1964 births]] |
[[Category:1964 births]] |
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[[Category:Living people]] |
[[Category:Living people]] |
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[[Category:Google employees]] |
[[Category:Google employees]] |
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[[Category:Article Feedback 5]] |
Latest revision as of 10:48, 12 December 2024
Daniel Bleichenbacher (born 1964) is a Swiss cryptographer, previously a researcher at Bell Labs and Google, and currently employed at Cure53. He received his Ph.D. from ETH Zurich in 1996 for contributions to computational number theory, particularly concerning message verification in the ElGamal and RSA public-key cryptosystems.[1] His doctoral advisor was Ueli Maurer.
RSA Attacks
[edit]Bleichenbacher is particularly notable for devising attacks against the RSA public-key cryptosystem, namely when used with the PKCS#1 v1 standard published by RSA Laboratories. These attacks were able to break both RSA encryption and signatures produced using the PKCS #1 standard.
BB'98 attack: chosen ciphertext attack against the RSA PKCS#1 encryption standard
[edit]In 1998, Daniel Bleichenbacher demonstrated a practical attack against systems using RSA encryption in concert with the PKCS #1 encoding function, including a version of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol used by thousands of web servers at the time.[2] This attack was the first practical reason to consider adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks.
BB'06 attack: signature forgery attack against the RSA PKCS#1 signature standard
[edit]In 2006 at a rump session at CRYPTO, Bleichenbacher described a "pencil and paper"-simple attack against RSA signature validation as implemented in common cryptographic toolkits. Both OpenSSL and the NSS security engine in Firefox were later found to be vulnerable to the attack, which would allow an attacker to forge the SSL certificates that protect sensitive websites.[3][4]
References
[edit]- ^ "Bleichenbacher Thesis" (PS). cr.yp.to. Archived from the original on 2022-07-12.
- ^ Bleichenbacher, Daniel (1998). "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1". Crypto '98: 1–12. Archived from the original (PS) on 2012-02-04. Retrieved 2011-12-07.
- ^ Bleichenbacher's RSA signature forgery based on implementation error
- ^ Analysis on Bleichenbacher's Forgery Attack. IEEE. 2007.