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In American law, the unitary executive theory is a Constitutional law theory according to which the President of the United States has sole authority over the executive branch.^[1] It is "an expansive interpretation of presidential power that aims to centralize greater control over the government in the White House".^[2] The theory often comes up in jurisprudential disagreements about the president's ability to remove employees within the executive branch; transparency and access to information; discretion over the implementation of new laws; and the ability to influence agencies' rule-making.^[3] There is disagreement about the doctrine's strength and scope, with more expansive versions of the theory becoming the focus of modern political debate. These expansive versions are controversial for both constitutional and practical reasons.^[4]^[5]^[6] Since the Reagan administration, the Supreme Court has embraced a stronger unitary executive, which has been championed primarily by its conservative justices, the Federalist Society, and the Heritage Foundation.^[7]^[8]^[9]^[10]

The theory is largely based on Section 1 of Article Two of the United States Constitution,^[11] which vests "the executive Power" of the United States in the president.^[12]^[13] Critics debate over how much power the vesting clause gives a president,^[14]^[15] and emphasize other clauses in the Constitution that provide checks and balances on executive power. For instance, some argue that the Commander in Chief Clause would be rendered effectively redundant if the founders intended the wording to be interpreted as a unitary executive.^[16] Others argue that even the King of Great Britain at the time of the founding did not have the unitary control that some proponents argue he had when justifying an expansion of presidential power.^[17] In the 2020s, the Supreme Court has held that, regarding the powers granted by the vesting clause, "the entire 'executive Power' belongs to the President alone".^[18]^[19]

Since its inception, the President of the United States has exercised significant authority over the executive branch, with some exceptions, including independent agencies such as the Federal Reserve, and independent personnel such as special counsels.^[20]^{[verification needed]} These limits on unitary executive power can be created by the legislative branch via Congress passing legislation, or by the judicial branch via Supreme Court decisions. Since the founding of the country, positions independent of the executive have included Comptroller, Postmaster General, and the Sinking Fund Commission.^[20] The Reagan administration, including the justices it appointed to the Supreme Court, was the first presidential administration to cite unitary executive theory.^[21] It then entered public discourse with the George W. Bush administration and found a strong advocate in Donald Trump.^[22] Presidents of both parties tend to view the idea that they should have more power more favorably when in office.^[22]

Beyond disputing its constitutionality,^[23]^[24]^[25]^[16] common criticisms include the ideas that the theory could lead to poor outcomes, including more corruption and less qualified employees.^[26]^[27]^[28] Some critics point to countries where similar changes to a more unitary executive have resulted in democratic backsliding,^[29]^[30]^[31]^[32] or to the vast majority of democracies (including U.S. states and local governments) that give their executive leader less power.^[33]^[31]^[34]^[35]

Terminology

The term "unitary executive" dates back to the Reagan administration,^[2]^[36]^[37]^[38] but supporters of the unitary executive theory, sometimes referred to as "unitarians", contend the principle dates to the founding.^[39] There is no canonical interpretation of the theory, with different academics defining it differently.^[40] Some distinguish between stronger and weaker versions; most contemporary definitions focus on one of the theory's stronger versions. Broadly speaking, strong versions of the theory hold that the President has control over all officials in the executive branch; a weak version holds that Congress can significantly limit the President's authority, despite residing in a separate branch of government.^[41]

Theory

The unitary executive theory has sparked significant debate as to what the constitution says about presidential power.^[42]

Vesting Clause

The Vesting Clause of Article II, perhaps the most cited clause in favor of a stronger executive, reads, "The executive Power [of the United States] shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Some have suggested that interpreting the vesting clause is difficult and may have simply been an attempt by the founders to reject the idea of an executive council, which was widely discussed at the time, rather than advocating a strong executive.^[43] Jed Handelsman Shugerman looks at the context of how the word "vest" was used before the constitution, finding that it may signify significantly less completeness in the power it gives than it seems today.^[15] Other scholars maintain that the vesting clause is clear and that, "At a minimum, [the] Vesting Clause establishes an executive office to be occupied by an individual."^[13] In 2020, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that, under the Vesting Clause, "the entire 'executive Power' belongs to the President alone".^[44]

Take Care Clause

Proponents of unitary executive theory additionally argue that the Take Care Clause ("The President shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed") creates a "hierarchical, unified executive department under the direct control of the President".^[45] Critics point out that the clause does not specify that the president should be the one to execute the laws, but to make sure that others are faithfully executing their responsibilities. Critics also point to "faithfully executed" as meaning to follow court rulings and legislative statutes regardless of whether a president agrees with them.^[46]

Opinion Clause

Opponents of the theory point to the Opinion clause, which says only that a president may ask for the opinion in writing of a department officer about any subject related to their department, which seems superfluous if the president was supposed to have extensive power.^[47]

King of Great Britain

Proponents have made claims about the powers wielded by the King of Great Britain (often inaccurately referred to in this context as the "King of England") at the time of the founding and their relationship to the founding intent of the executive branch to justify the theory. The actual powers held by the Crown are disputed by legal historians as "conventional wisdoms", as Parliament held significant power over appointments and dismissals of some executive personnel, while others served for life and were independent of the king. Law professor Daniel Birk argues there was no evidence that the king had such powers outside specific areas like foreign policy and the military, saying the king could not direct most law enforcement, regulatory or administrative officials.^[17] Invoking the king as an argument for expanded executive power was first made by the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States (1926), a decision delivered by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, a former president of the United States.^[17] Eric Nelson argued that some Founders wanted more checks on a president because unlike a hereditary monarch, their well-being was not as intrinsically tied to the nation.^[48]

Discussion

According to law professors Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein in 1994,^{[needs update]} "No one denies that in some sense the framers created a unitary executive; the question is in what sense. Let us distinguish between a strong and a weak version."^[49]^:8-9 In either a stronger or a weaker form, the theory would limit Congress's power to divest the president of control of the executive branch. The hypothetical "strongly unitary" theory posits stricter limits on Congress than the "weakly unitary" theory.^[49]^{[page needed]} But parts of the Constitution grant Congress extensive powers. Article I of the Constitution gives it the exclusive power to make laws, which the president then must execute, provided that those laws are constitutional.^[46] Article I, Section 8, clause 18, known as the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution all Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof".^[50] The Constitution also grants Congress power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Any legitimate theory^{[original research?]} of the unitary executive must allow Congress to wield its constitutional powers while ensuring that the president can do the same.^{[citation needed]}

Most believers in the theory think that, "at a minimum, the President should be able to remove all executive-branch officers, including the heads of independent regulatory agencies, at any time and for any reason."^[51] Proponents of a strong unitary theory argue that the president possesses all the executive power and can therefore control subordinate officers and agencies of the executive branch. This implies that Congress's power to remove executive agencies or officers from presidential control is limited. Thus, under the strongly unitary executive theory, independent agencies and counsels are unconstitutional to the extent that they exercise discretionary executive power not controlled by the president.^[45] But independent regulatory commissions have existed for at least a century, and removal protections for their commissioners were upheld by the Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935). Some interpret the unitary executive theory to mean that federal courts cannot adjudicate disputes between agencies, arguing it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.^[52]

Others have pointed to the indirect selection of the president as not designed to put a strong president into office. The framers expected measured analysis by specially chosen electors who would act to choose a safe presidential candidate, and if none could be found, rely on Congress to choose one, and potentially negotiate power.^[53] More extreme forms of the theory have developed according to which the president's wishes may supersede the law. Former White House Counsel John Dean said: "In its most extreme form, unitary executive theory can mean that neither Congress nor the federal courts can tell the President what to do or how to do it, particularly regarding national security matters."^[54] In 2019, law professor Ilya Somin argued that "no serious advocate of the theory claims that anything the president does is legal"—just within the powers vested in the executive branch.^[55] There is disagreement about the doctrine's strength and scope. In 2008, Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo said the unitary executive theory ensured that "the federal government will execute the law in a consistent manner and in accordance with the president's wishes".^[56] This stands in contrast to other scholarly literature, such as MacKenzie in 2008^{[citation needed]} and Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger in 2020,^[57] that stresses that federal employees must faithfully execute the laws enacted according to the process the Constitution prescribes.

Background

Founding debate of one or multiple executives

The phrase "unitary executive" was discussed as early as the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, and referred only to having a single individual fill the office of president, as proposed in the Virginia Plan. The alternative was to have several executives or an executive council, as proposed in the New Jersey Plan and as promoted by Elbridge Gerry, Edmund Randolph, and George Mason.^[58]^[59] James Madison was a leading advocate of the unitary executive and successfully argued in favor of the president's power to remove administrative appointees under the Constitution in the Decision of 1789. Madison said in 1789, "if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws." He had reservations about removal power extending to the comptroller of the Treasury Department, as he believed that office would share both judicial and executive responsibilities. Other legislators, such as Theodore Sedgwick, Michael Jenifer Stone, and Egbert Benson argued that the role would primarily be executive and should fall under the president's power. Madison ultimately withdrew his proposal to exempt the comptroller from the president's removal power.^[60]^[61]^[62]

In 1788, the pseudonymous letters of the Federal Farmer defended the proposed unitary executive, arguing that "a single man seems to be peculiarly well circumstanced to superintend the execution of laws with discernment and decision, with promptitude and uniformity."^[63] In Federalist No. 77, Alexander Hamilton wrote with regard to the Senate and presidential appointments that "The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint". Hamilton's usage of "displace" has traditionally been thought to mean "removal", and thus a limit on presidential power. Other legal scholars have interpreted "displace" to mean replacement of an appointee with another, not removal itself.^[64]^[65]^[66]

Judicial decisions

In the 1926 case of Myers v. United States, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the president has the exclusive power to remove executive branch officials, and does not need the approval of the Senate or any other legislative body.^{[non-primary source needed]} The court also wrote:

The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power, and he may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which article 2 of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.^[67]

Subsequent cases such as Humphrey's Executor v. United States (presidential removal of certain kinds of officers), and Bowsher v. Synar (control of executive functions) have flexed the doctrine's reach back and forth. Justice Scalia in his solitary dissent in Morrison v. Olson argued for an unlimited presidential removal power of all persons exercising executive branch powers, which he argued included the independent counsel; the court disagreed, but later moved closer to Scalia's position in Edmond v. United States.^[68] Many of the proponents clerked for Justice Scalia.^[31]

In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed more support for the theory.^[69]^[70] In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Collins v. Yellen, the Court held that some attempts to curtail presidential removal power of agencies with a single director violate the separation of powers. Justice Samuel Alito went so far as to write, "The Constitution prohibits even 'modest restrictions' on the President's power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer." The Court reiterated that the only exceptions to the president's removal power were those precedents found in Humphrey's Executor and Morrison.^[71] The four justices appointed by a Democratic president dissented in Seila, arguing that the constitution makes no such claims.^[72]^[73] Collins was a very similar case taken up the next year, and the precedent of Seila was applied to Collins in a 7−2 ruling.^[74]^[75]^[76]

Growth of presidential powers

The power of the presidency has grown since the 1970s due to key events and to Congress or the Courts not being willing or able to rein in presidential power.^[77] With strong incentives to grow their own power, presidents of both parties became natural advocates for the theory^[22] and rarely gave up powers exercised by their predecessors.^[37] Republican presidents, including Trump, did not follow through on promises to use unitary executive power to shrink government, instead opting to use the administration to advance their policies.^[22]

The theory originated in conservative legal circles, most notably in the Federalist Society.^[22] The Reagan administration took the advice in the Mandate for Leadership published by the Heritage Foundation to hire 5000 enthusiastic supporters of the Reagan-Bush campaign to fill the 5000 new political appointee positions created by the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act.^[78] The administration also made use the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, signed into law by Jimmy Carter in 1980, to short-circuit any regulations the administration did not agree with.^[78] The Reagan era is cited as a major catalyst in growing presidential power,^[37]^[38] with significant growth post-9/11 as conservatives have most readily embraced the idea of a unitary executive.^[36]^[79]

Dick Cheney and the George W. Bush administration supported the theory.^[80] For example, Bush once wrote in a signing statement that he would, "construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power."^[81] Critics acknowledge that part of the president's duty is to "interpret what is, and is not constitutional, at least when overseeing the actions of executive agencies"; at the same time, they accused Bush of overstepping that duty by his perceived willingness to overrule U.S. courts.^[82] During his confirmation hearing to become an associate justice on the United States Supreme Court, Samuel Alito seemed to endorse a weaker version of the unitary executive theory.^[83] Barack Obama campaigned against the theory but embraced some aspects of it after the 2010 midterm elections.^[84]

Donald Trump exerted the greatest control over the executive during his presidency than any other modern president, often citing Article II of the Constitution. In 2019, he said, "I have an Article II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president."^[85]^[37]^[4]^[57] Bill Barr notably supported the theory before his confirmation as attorney general in a 2018 memo criticizing the Russia probe.^[86]^[87] Project 2025 proposes using the theory as justification to give Trump or the next Republican president maximum control over the executive branch.^[88] The Trump 2024 campaign platform includes an expansion of executive power grounded in this theory.^[89] The 2024 Supreme Court ruling Trump v. United States could make the president even more powerful, with some interpreting it as an endorsement of the unitary executive theory.^[90]^[91]

Criticism

Constitutional

Stephen Skowronek, John A. Dearborn, and Desmond King argue that the unitary executive theory is a constitutional nightmare that would cause disruption and consequences the founders hoped to avoid.^[92] Loyola Law School professors Karl Manheim and Allan Ides write, "the separation among the branches is not and never was intended to be airtight" and point to the president's veto power as an example of the executive exercising legislative power. They also cite other examples of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power exercised by the executive branch as necessary elements of the administrative state, but contend that ultimately all administrative power belongs to Congress, not the President, and the only true "executive" powers are those explicitly described in the Constitution.^[25] In this, Manheim and Ides follow in the footsteps of Lessig and Sunstein.^[49]^{[page needed]}

David J. Barron (now a federal judge) and Marty Lederman have criticized the unitary executive theory. They acknowledge that there is a compelling case for some form of a unitary executive within the armed forces,^[93] but argue that the Constitution does not provide for an equally strong unitary executive outside the military context, and that the Commander in Chief Clause would be superfluous if the same kind of unitary presidential authority resulted from the general constitutional provision vesting executive power in the president.^[16] The BBC has called the theory "controversial",^[5] and The Guardian called it "contested"^[94] and a "quasi legal doctrine".^[23] In 2007, Norman Ornstein wrote in The Economist that an overwhelming majority of constitutional scholars and historians find the theory "laughable".^[24]

Democracy

Graham Dodds and Christopher Kelley worry about the constitutional implications of relegating the legislative branch to secondary status as well as the implications of the theory for democracy, especially under a Trump presidency.^[29] Ian Millhiser called it a "worst-case scenario for liberal democracy".^[95] Steven Greenhut argues the theory is a prescription for abuse and authoritarianism.^[32] David Driesen argues that unitary control over the executive is a defining characteristic of autocracy.^[31] The Economist wrote that "the vain and tyrannical whims of an emperor-president would emerge from the rubble."^[28]

Unlike many other countries' modern constitutions, which specify when and how a state of emergency may be declared and which rights may be suspended, the U.S. Constitution includes no comprehensive separate regime for emergencies. Some legal scholars believe the Constitution gives the president inherent emergency powers by making him commander in chief of the armed forces, or by vesting in him a broad, undefined "executive power."^[96] Congress has delegated at least 136 distinct statutory emergency powers to the president, each available upon the declaration of an emergency. Only 13 of these require a declaration from Congress; the rest are assumed by an executive declaration with no further congressional input.^[97] Congressionally authorized emergency presidential powers are sweeping and dramatic, ranging from seizing control of the internet to declaring martial law.^[96] This led The Atlantic to write that "the misuse of emergency powers is a standard gambit among leaders attempting to consolidate power",^[96] because, in the words of Justice Robert H. Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United States, the 1944 Supreme Court decision that upheld the internment of Japanese-Americans, each emergency power "lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."^[96]

Practical

Writing in Reason, Ilya Somin argued that concentrating more power in the president would make the president less accountable and run contrary to the ideals of the founders, who were concerned about the concentration of power.^[26] Concern about the effects on the Justice Department's investigatorial independence and anti-corruption efforts is a recurring theme in criticism of the unitary executive theory.^[98]^[99]^[100]^[28]

Another concern revolves around the more practical implications of a brain drain of expertise in the federal government.^[28] Ian Millhiser critiques weaker versions of the theory as giving presidents power to manipulate elections and interfere with technocratic aspects of government typically removed from politics, such as the Federal Reserve.^[95] Some scholars oppose even the weaker theory of a unitary executive. Some favor a plural executive, such as in the many state governments that separately elect an attorney general.^[101] Others favor a system in which Congress and the president share control over the bureaucracy. Both would likely require a constitutional amendment to add these checks on the executive that are common in other democracies.

Executive power in other democracies

Governors and the states

Unitary executive theory does not exist at the state or local level in the United States. In contrast to a single elected executive officer such as the president, plural executives exist in virtually all non-national governments, with states where executive officers such as lieutenant governor, attorney general, comptroller, secretary of state, and others, are elected independently of the state's governor.^[35]^[34] The executive branches of Texas and North Carolina, for example, maintain a plural executive whereby other elected executive officers can curb the chief executive's actions. The group of North Carolina executive officers, the North Carolina Council of State, wields considerable statutory power when approving the state government's monetary and property transactions.^[102] The New York Constitution contained Take Care and Vesting Clauses "precisely mirroring the U.S. Constitution's clauses, but did not allow the Governor to either appoint or remove officers, vesting those functions in a council."^[31]

Outside the United States

David Driesen argues that similar reforms led to significant democratic backsliding in Turkey, Poland and Hungary.^[31] Susan Hennessey and Benjamin Wittes said that "the American presidency, in its unity, is profoundly dissimilar from nearly all other executives in democratic systems that have persisted over time. The founders of other democracies have, quite intentionally, decided differently from the founders of this one."^[33]

In film

In the 2018 biographical film Vice, directed by Adam McKay, the unitary executive theory is explored in some detail and dramatized.^[55] Vice President Dick Cheney, the film's subject, his lawyer David Addington, deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel John Yoo, and Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia figure prominently in the theory's development and promotion.^[55] They brought it to the foreground of modern discussions on the topic of executive power beginning in 2001, continuing throughout the Bush administration and beyond. The application of this legal doctrine has implications for the prosecution of the War on Terror, the subsequent 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques at sites such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, and mass surveillance.^[55]

References

^ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute Unitary Executive Theory (UET). [1]Web. Retrieved September 24, 2024.
^ ^a ^b "The 2024 Executive Power Survey – Unitary Executive". The New York Times. September 15, 2023. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved July 19, 2024. Lawyers in the Reagan-era Justice Department developed the so-called unitary executive theory, an expansive interpretation of presidential power that aims to centralize greater control over the government in the White House. Under stronger versions of this vision, Congress cannot fracture the president's control of federal executive power, such as by vesting the power to make certain decisions in an agency head even if the president orders the agency to make a different decision, or by limiting a president's ability to enforce his desires by removing any executive branch official – including the heads of 'independent' agencies – at will.
^ Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024), Akande, Adebowale (ed.), "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles", Leadership and Politics, Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, p. 541, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22, ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7, retrieved July 18, 2024
^ ^a ^b Dodds, Graham G. (2023). "Is the President a King? The Unitary Executive Theory and the Presidency of Donald J. Trump". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). U.S. Democracy in Danger: The American Political System Under Assault. Springer Studies on Populism, Identity Politics and Social Justice. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 487–517. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-36099-2_21. ISBN 978-3-031-36099-2. Retrieved July 12, 2024.
^ ^a ^b Wendling, Mike (July 7, 2024). "Project 2025: A wish list for a Trump presidency, explained". BBC. ...a controversial idea known as 'unitary executive theory'
^ Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. p. 547. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 18, 2024. Constitutionally, the unitary executive theory is not some long-established doctrine that is widely accepted by courts and other political actors. Far from it, the constitutional status of the theory is rather controversial.
^ Khardori, Ankush (August 12, 2024). "JD Vance's 'Constitutional Crisis' in the Making". Politico. Retrieved October 24, 2024.
^ Barrón-López, Laura (July 9, 2024). "A look at the Project 2025 plan to reshape government and Trump's links to its authors". PBS News. Retrieved August 15, 2024.
^ Savage, Charlie (July 4, 2024). "Legal Conservatives' Long Game: Amp Up Presidential Power but Kneecap Federal Agencies". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved August 15, 2024.
^ Shapiro, Ari (July 2, 2024). "Immunity ruling continues a trend of expanding presidential power, scholar says". WFAE 90.7 - Charlotte's NPR News Source. Retrieved August 15, 2024. When the Supreme Court dramatically expanded presidential power yesterday, it continued a trend that's been going in one direction for a long time.
^ Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. p. 540. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 18, 2024. Unitarians fixate on the wording of Article II's 'Vesting' clause (versus the wording in Articles I and III), arguing that the president alone has all the executive power, which means any power that is executive in nature, even if it is not directly listed in the Constitution, belongs to the president
^ Sitaraman, Ganesh (2020). "The Political Economy of the Removal Power". Harvard Law Review. 134: 380.
^ ^a ^b Prakash, Saikrishna B.; Schroeder, Christopher H. "Interpretation and Debate: The Vesting Clause". National Constitution Center. Retrieved July 29, 2024.
^ Strauss, Peter L. (1984). "The Place of Agencies in Government". Columbia Law Review. 84: 598. doi:10.2307/1122501. JSTOR 1122501. Article II speaks directly only about elected officials, chiefly the President and his powers; it describes those powers in the most summary of terms. He is vested generally with 'the executive Power,' but what that is in the domestic context does not readily appear. Putting aside foreign relations and military authority-a very large part of the Presidency, but not the focus of this essay 89-he has the following powers and/or responsibilities.
^ ^a ^b Shugerman, Jed Handelsman (June 2022). "Vesting" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 74. This Article offers a close textual reading of the word 'vesting' and an examination of its eighteenth-century usage and context, with the first survey of available dictionaries (from 1637 to 1846), colonial charters and state constitutions, the Constitutional Convention, and Ratification debates. Dictionaries defined 'vest' in terms of basic landed property rights, without reference to exclusivity or indefeasibility, and rarely with any reference to offices or powers. Other legal documents and digital collections of the Founders' papers indicate a range of usage, from 'fully vested' to 'simply vested' to 'partly vested,' so that the word 'vesting' by itself would signify less completeness. Meanwhile, words used in the Constitution or by the Framers to convey exclusivity or indefeasibility (for example, 'all,' 'exclusive,' 'sole,' 'alone,' or 'indefeasible') are missing from the Executive Vesting Clause. The ordinary meaning of 'vesting' was most likely a simple grant of powers without signifying the impermissibility of legislative conditions such as good-cause requirements for removals, undermining the unitary theory's originalist basis. On the other hand, the 'all' in the Legislative Vesting Clause may be more legally meaningful for nondelegation.
^ ^a ^b ^c Barron, David; Lederman, Martin (2008). "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History". Harvard Law Review. 121. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University: 941. Archived from the original on January 24, 2009. there are those who would argue that the 'unitary executive' must have effective control over all Article II functions, in which case the superintendence guaranteed by the Commander in Chief Clause would not appear to do any additional work with respect to superintendence.
^ ^a ^b ^c Birk, Daniel D. (January 2021). "Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 45 (6): 2177. ISSN 0038-9765. As this Article shows, however, the unitarians' claims about the original meaning of the executive power are largely unfounded. The ability to remove executive officials was not one of the prerogative powers of the British Crown. Moreover, the King neither appointed nor was able to remove all of his principal officers, many of whom held their offices for life or pursuant to other forms of tenure and who operated independent of the King's direction or control.
^ Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 2197 (2021).
^ Sitaraman, Ganesh (2020). "The Political Economy of the Removal Power". Harvard Law Review. 134: 380.
^ ^a ^b Chabot, Christine Kexel (November 13, 2020). "Is the Federal Reserve Constitutional? An Originalist Argument for Independent Agencies". Notre Dame Law Review.
^ Swan, Jonathan; Savage, Charlie; Haberman, Maggie (July 17, 2023). "Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved August 15, 2024. The Supreme Court in 1935 and 1988 upheld the power of Congress to shield some executive branch officials from being fired without cause. But after justices appointed by Republicans since Reagan took control, it has started to erode those precedents.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (New ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 34. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736.
^ ^a ^b Pilkington, Ed (June 7, 2024). "Trump plots capture of DoJ in renewed assault on US justice system". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
^ ^a ^b Ornstein, Norman (June 26, 2007). "Blog: Cheney's chutzpah". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
^ ^a ^b Manheim, Karl; Ides, Allan (September 2006). "The Unitary Executive". Los Angeles Lawyer. SSRN 943046. Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-39.
^ ^a ^b Somin, Ilya (May 3, 2018). "Rethinking the Unitary Executive". Reason.com. Retrieved July 20, 2024. UPDATE: I perhaps should have mentioned the oft-made argument that maintaining a unitary executive—even when it comes to powers beyond the scope of the original meaning of the Constitution—is desirable because it enhances political accountability. Even if true, this claim is about what is pragmatically desirable, not about the text and original meaning of the Constitution. But the claim is dubious even on its own terms. The greater the scope of executive power, the harder it is for rationally ignorant voters to keep track of more than a small fraction of it. Moreover, it becomes difficult to figure out how to weigh the president's performance in one area against what he does in others (assuming there is variation in quality, as will often be the case). It is therefore unlikely that concentrating a vast range of power in the hands of one person does much to enhance accountability.
^ Pilkington, Ed (June 7, 2024). "Trump plots capture of DoJ in renewed assault on US justice system". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved July 19, 2024. 'That's what happens in authoritarian states – there is a semblance of a legal system, but it becomes useless,' she said. 'If that happens here it would be extremely troubling. We're not there yet. But I do think a second term could cause significant damage that may or may not be permanent.'
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d "How MAGA Republicans plan to make Donald Trump's second term count". The Economist. July 13, 2023. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved July 19, 2024. One reason for the professionalisation of the bureaucracy in the 19th century was to provide the ship of state with enough ballast to keep sailing from one administration to the next ... The vain and tyrannical whims of an emperor-president would emerge from the rubble.
^ ^a ^b Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 548, 550–551. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 18, 2024. Turning devoted public servants into mere servants of their master and by privileging presidential desires over institutional expertise and independence, the theory risks turning the chief executive into an absolute monarch. Moreover, by enlarging the already considerable powers of the presidency, it threatens to upset the country's delicate inter-branch balance by relegating Congress and the judiciary to inferior status ... Trump showed us what happens when you support the use of such power with a person who appears to care little about the institution, the Constitution, or America's democracy. ... Thus the United States could see the unitary executive theory employed to significantly erode basic democratic principles.
^ Howell, William; Moe, Terry (November 1, 2021). "Analysis | Big government vastly expanded presidential power. Republicans use it to sabotage the administrative state". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved July 20, 2024. The unitary executive theory provides a veneer of legal authority for an authoritarian-inclined president to engage in a range of anti-democratic behaviors. By the time George W. Bush had shown what the unitary executive could justify – torturing prisoners, surveilling ordinary citizens, ignoring congressional statutes – constitutional scholars were already pointing to presidents as the chief threat to American democracy. With the rise of right-wing populism and the election of Trump in 2016, this threat was magnified by the accompanying transformation of the Republican Party itself, with its elites in Washington and around the country abetting Trump's authoritarian behavior in office ... The Republican Party is now an anti-democracy party, and its future presidents – empowered by the unitary executive theory – threaten the fundamentals of the U.S. democratic system ... Democrats have been complicit, but Republicans have pushed the trajectory beyond democratic bounds.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Driesen, David (November 1, 2020). "The Unitary Executive Theory in Comparative Context". UC Law Journal. 72 (1): 1. ISSN 0017-8322.
^ ^a ^b Greenhut, Steven (June 28, 2024). "Project 2025: The Heritage Foundation's plan to embrace bigger government during Trump's second term". Reason. Retrieved July 11, 2024. But implementing what critics call 'unitary executive theory'—i.e., putting all aspects of the federal government under the control of the president—is a prescription for authoritarianism and abuse.
^ ^a ^b Hennessey, Susan; Wittes, Benjamin (January 21, 2020). "The Disintegration of the American Presidency". The Atlantic. Retrieved July 20, 2024. But the American system gets sticky when you contemplate vesting the executive power in one person who cannot be easily removed when that person is as mercurial and peculiar as Trump. In such situations, the structure can start to seem downright reckless. In concentrating power so that this person directs the federal government to do things—and in making this person exceptionally difficult to depose for a protracted period of time—one has to have a certain amount of confidence in that person's intentions and abilities.
^ ^a ^b Gersen, Jacob; Berry, Christopher R. (March 2008). "The Unbundled Executive" (none). University of Chicago. pp. 10–11. SSRN 1113543. University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 214. Indeed, partial unbundling of executive authority is the norm rather than an exception in virtually all levels of non-national government units in the United States, of which there are more than 80,000. Authority that the governor or mayor would otherwise exercise is frequently given to a specific state or local officer. Often these officers are directly elected by the public. Other times they are elected by the legislature; other times still, they are appointed by another state official. These arrangements are only approximations of the unbundled executive ideal because they there is residual responsibility or authority for the policy in the general purpose executive ... The average number of elected executive offices per state was 6.7 in 2002 ...
^ ^a ^b Berry, Christopher R.; Gersen, Jacob E. (2008). "The Unbundled Executive". The University of Chicago Law Review. 75 (4): 1399–1400. ISSN 0041-9494. JSTOR 27653959.
^ ^a ^b Rosen, Jeffrey (July 2, 2024). "Immunity ruling continues a trend of expanding presidential power, scholar says". All Things Considered. NPR. Retrieved October 24, 2024.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Thunberg, Michael E. (December 1, 2021). "The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government". Political Science Quarterly. 136 (4): 770–771. doi:10.1002/polq.13274. ISSN 0032-3195.
^ ^a ^b Mosley, Tonya (December 14, 2023). "Why a second Trump administration may be more radical than the first". Fresh Air on NPR.
^ Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. p. 540. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 18, 2024. The term 'unitary executive' dates to the 1980s, but unitarians contend that the idea goes back to the founding era.
^ Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. p. 539. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 29, 2024. There is no one canonical account of the unitary executive theory, though various academics have provided their own characterizations of it. (See Calabresi and Yoo (2008), Barilleaux and Kelley (2010), Dodds (2019), Crouch et al. (2020), and Skowronek et al. (2021).)
^ Sunstein, Cass R.; Vermeule, Adrian (2021). "The Unitary Executive: Past, Present, Future". The Supreme Court Review. 2020: 83–117. doi:10.1086/714860.
^ Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (new ed.). New York City: Oxford University Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736.
^ Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (New ed.). New York City: Oxford University Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736.
^ Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 2197 (2021).
^ ^a ^b Calabresi, Steven & Rhodes, Kevin (1992). "The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary". Harvard Law Review. 105 (6): 1165. doi:10.2307/1341727. JSTOR 1341727.
^ ^a ^b Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive. New York City: Oxford University Press. p. 32. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. The conception of 'good government' is consistent with a reading of the 'take care' clause, in which presidents are charged to enforce court rulings and congressional statutes 'faithfully', regardless of their views of the substantive merits. It is reinforced by Congress's Article I authority to set rules and regulations 'necessary and proper' for the execution of its mandates.
^ Strauss, Peter L. (March 5, 2024). "Overseer or 'The Decider'? The American President in Administrative Law". Faculti (Video lecture). Retrieved July 13, 2024.
^ Nelson, Eric (July 9, 2024). "Justice Sotomayor was right for the wrong reasons". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
^ ^a ^b ^c Lessig, Lawrence & Sunstein, Cass (1994). "The President and the Administration". Columbia Law Review. 94 (1): 1–123. doi:10.2307/1123119. JSTOR 1123119.
^ Strauss, Peter L. (March 5, 2024). "Overseer or 'The Decider'? The American President in Administrative Law". Faculti. Retrieved July 13, 2024.
^ Birk, Daniel D. (January 2021). "Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 45 (6): 2177. ISSN 0038-9765. See CALABRESI & YOO , supra note 1, at 3-4; see also, e.g., Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 A LA. L. Rev. 1205, 1225 (2014) (asserting that '[f]or adequate constitutional control of execution, the President must have the possibility of directing discretionary legal duties, even those assigned to other officers,' and thus must be able to remove all executive officers, including the heads of independent agencies); John Harrison, Addition by Subtraction, 92 VA. L. Rev. 1853, 1859–62 (2006) (characterizing executive-branch officers as 'agents' of the President whom the President must be able to remove if they do not retain his trust); cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 724 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the President must have 'plenary power to remove [all] principal officers,' but that inferior officers can be made 'removable for cause' so long as their appointing officers can dismiss them for 'the failure to accept supervision' (emphasis omitted))
^ Latham, Joshua (2000). "The Military Munitions Rule and Environmental Regulation of Munitions". Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 27. Boston, Massachusetts: Boston College: 467.
^ Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive. New York City: Oxford University Press. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5.
^ Dean, John (2007). Broken Government. Viking. p. 102. ISBN 9780670018208.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Greenberg, Jon (February 8, 2019). "What Vice gets right and wrong about Dick Cheney". Politifact. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
^ Calabresi, Steven; Yoo, John (2008). The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush. Yale University Press. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-300-14538-0.
^ ^a ^b Crouch, Jeffrey; Rozell, Mark J.; Sollenberger, Mitchel A. (2020). The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government. University Press of Kansas. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1ft83xf. ISBN 978-0-7006-3004-2. JSTOR j.ctv1ft83xf.
^ Ketchum, Ralph, ed. (1986). The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates. Signet Classic. p. 67. Mr. [James] Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans [i.e. the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan] ... These were ... A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one—a plurality is held out in the other.
^ "Records of the Federal Convention, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 1". The Founder's Constitution. 1787.
^ Millhiser, Ian (February 14, 2020). "How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law". Vox. Retrieved July 20, 2024.
^ Gary, Schmitt; Roach, John (June 2022). "A Madisonian Footnote to the Unitary Executive" (PDF). AEI. Retrieved October 24, 2024.
^ Harrison, John (January 24, 2017). "The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power". The Yale Law Journal. 126.
^ Ellis, Richard (1999). Founding the American Presidency. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 39. ISBN 9780847694990.
^ Millhiser, Ian (February 14, 2020). "How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law". Vox.com. Retrieved July 20, 2024.
^ Tillman, Seth (January 1, 2010). "The puzzle of Hamilton's Federalist No. 77" (PDF). Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy.
^ Blackman, Josh (July 1, 2020). "Justice Kagan on Hamilton in Federalist No. 77". Reason. Retrieved October 24, 2024.
^ Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
^ Calabresi, Steven & Lawson, Gary (2007). "The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia" (PDF). Columbia Law Review. 107: 1002–1047. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 6, 2009.
^ "List of court cases relevant to executive appointment and removal power". Ballotpedia. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
^ Sitaraman, Ganesh (2020). "The Political Economy of the Removal Power". Harvard Law Review. 134: 380.
^ Adler, Jonathan (June 29, 2020). "With Chief in Charge, SCOTUS Strikes Down Louisiana Abortion Law and Eliminates CFPB Independence". Reason. Archived from the original on June 29, 2020. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
^ Sitaraman, Ganesh (2020). "The Political Economy of the Removal Power" (PDF). Harvard Law Review. 134: 380. Justice Kagan dissented from the constitutional analysis, along with the three other liberal Justices. In an opinion filled with sharp, cutting language, Justice Kagan protested that there was nothing neutral about the majority's reasoning or its unitary executive theory of the separation of powers. She systematically argued that 'constitutional text, history, and precedent invalidate the majority's thesis.' Justice Kagan even accused the majority of 'gerrymander[ing]' their 'made up' rule to strike down the CFPB's independent structure. For a separation of powers case, this was about as bloody a fight as it gets.
^ Millhiser, Ian (June 29, 2020). "The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained". Vox. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
^ "U.S. Supreme Court bolsters presidential power over housing finance agency". CNBC. Reuters. June 23, 2021. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
^ Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021).
^ Millhiser, Ian (June 29, 2020). "The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained". Vox. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
^ Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (New ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 200. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736.
^ ^a ^b Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024), Akande, Adebowale (ed.), "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles", Leadership and Politics, Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, p. 542, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22, ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7, retrieved July 18, 2024
^ Krotoszynski, Ronald (December 10, 2020). "The Conservative Idea That Would Let Biden Seize Control of Washington". Politico.
^ Johnsen, Dawn (April 2008). "What's a President To Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses" (PDF). Boston University Law Review. 88: 395. On 363 occasions, President Bush objected to provisions that he found might conflict with the president's constitutional authority 'to supervise the unitary executive branch.'
^ Lazarus, Edward (January 5, 2006). "How Much Authority Does the President Possess When He Is Acting as 'Commander in Chief'? Evaluating President Bush's Claims Against a Key Supreme Court Executive Power Precedent". FindLaw. That signed statement shows, in microcosm, how the President sees the separation of powers: The President, in his view of the world, can interpret away constraints on his power, such as those in the McCain Amendment, or FISA before it. And the courts can hardly question his dubious 'interpretations' even if they gut the very statutes they construe: After all, there are 'constitutional limitations on the judicial power'—though not, apparently, on the power of the executive.^{[dead link‍]}
^ Van Bergen, Jennifer (January 9, 2006). "The Unitary Executive: Is The Doctrine Behind the Bush Presidency Consistent with a Democratic State?". Findlaw. In his view, and the view of his Administration, that doctrine gives him license to overrule and bypass Congress or the courts, based on his own interpretations of the Constitution. ...
^ Liptak, Adam (2006). "Few Glimmers of How Conservative Judge Alito Is". The New York Times. p. A1. Retrieved November 2, 2017.
^ Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024), Akande, Adebowale (ed.), "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles", Leadership and Politics, Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, p. 545, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22, ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7, retrieved July 18, 2024
^ Swan, Jonathan; Savage, Charlie; Maggie, Haberman (July 17, 2023). "Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025". The New York Times. Retrieved December 6, 2023.
^ McCarthy, Tom (January 13, 2019). "Trump's attorney general pick raises fears of a president above the law". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
^ Deconstructed (May 21, 2020). "Deconstructed Podcast: Is Bill Bar the Most Dangerous Trump Official?". The Intercept. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
^ Wrona, Aleksandra; Nur, Ibrahim (July 11, 2024). "The Facts About Project 2025: The Pro-Trump Proposal To 'Reshape America'". Snopes. Retrieved July 19, 2024. Project 2025 authors built their proposals on an idea popular during former President Ronald Reagan's time: the 'unitary executive theory.'...Overall, critics including legal experts and former government employees have zeroed in on Project 2025's goal to give the executive branch more power, describing it as a precursor to authoritarianism.
^ Swan, Jonathan; Savage, Charlie; Maggie, Haberman (July 17, 2023). "Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025". The New York Times. Retrieved December 6, 2023.
^ The Project 2025 plan and Trump's links to its authors. PBS News Hour. July 9, 2024. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
^ Tucker, Eric (July 2, 2024). "Supreme Court opinion conferring broad immunity could embolden Trump as he seeks to return to power". Associated Press. 'This is a full-throated endorsement of the unitary executive theory' in a dramatic way, said Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf, referring to the theory that the U.S. Constitution gives the president expansive control over the government's executive branch.
^ Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (New ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 38. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736. ...the unitary executive becomes exactly what the founders most feared, a formula for maximum disruption. It is prone to imposing decisions at will, marginalizing dissent, and to radicalizing opposition...Power hierarchically controlled, thoroughly politicized and concentrated in the executive, is a constitutional nightmare, and a bitter denouement for a beleaguered republic.
^ Barron, David; Lederman, Martin (2008). "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing The Problem, Doctrine, And Original Understanding". Harvard Law Review. 121. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University: 689. Archived from the original on January 25, 2009. we think the text, as reinforced by historical practice, makes a strong case for at least some form of a 'unitary executive' within the armed forces, particularly as to traditional functions during armed conflicts.
^ Pengelly, Martin (September 15, 2023). "US hard-right policy group condemned for 'dehumanising' anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
^ ^a ^b Millhiser, Ian (November 21, 2023). "A Supreme Court case about stocks could help make Trump's authoritarian dreams reality". Vox. Retrieved July 20, 2024. There are weaker versions of the unitary executive theory that wouldn't allow the president to fire every FBI agent who refuses to swear personal fealty. But even these weaker versions could potentially give presidents power to manipulate elections, and to interfere with technocratic aspects of government that historically have been removed from partisan politics, such as the Federal Reserve...And, of course, looming over all of this is Trump, with his plan to replace much of the civil service with people personally loyal to him. In the worst-case scenario for liberal democracy, the Supreme Court could use the Jarkesy case to greenlight many of Trump's most authoritarian aspirations.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Goitein, Elizabeth (January–February 2019). "The Alarming Scope of the President's Emergency Powers". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on April 1, 2020. Retrieved April 1, 2020.
^ "A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use". Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. Archived from the original on April 1, 2020. Retrieved January 7, 2019.
^ Millhiser, Ian (February 14, 2020). "How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law". Vox. Retrieved July 20, 2024. The facts of Morrison also highlight why prosecutorial independence is sometimes desirable. That case involved an investigation into one of the seniormost officials within the Justice Department. A rank-and-file prosecutor would understandably fear the professional consequences of leading such an investigation — for the same reason that I would be reluctant to conduct an investigation into one of Vox Media's top executives.
^ Shugerman, Jed Handelsman (July 6, 2020). "The Imaginary Unitary Executive". Lawfare. Retrieved July 18, 2024.
^ Dorf, Michael C. (June 19, 2023). "Opinion: The Misguided Unitary Executive Theory Gains Ground". Justia. Retrieved July 18, 2024. Not only is the unitary executive theory writ large ahistorical...
^ Berry, Christopher & Gersen, Jacob (2008). "The Unbundled Executive". University of Chicago Law Review. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago. SSRN 1113543. Archived from the original on August 7, 2011. We certainly do not claim that the most sensible or even any plausible interpretation of the US Constitution establishes a plural unbundled executive; but perhaps it should
^ "North Carolina State Government - The Executive Branch - Council of State". carolana.com. Retrieved April 30, 2021.

External links

Overseer or "The Decider"? An American President In Administrative Law by Peter L. Strauss, lecture on the history of the unitary executive theory

[1] Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute Unitary Executive Theory (UET). [1]Web. Retrieved September 24, 2024.

[:10-2] "The 2024 Executive Power Survey – Unitary Executive". The New York Times. September 15, 2023. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved July 19, 2024. Lawyers in the Reagan-era Justice Department developed the so-called unitary executive theory, an expansive interpretation of presidential power that aims to centralize greater control over the government in the White House. Under stronger versions of this vision, Congress cannot fracture the president's control of federal executive power, such as by vesting the power to make certain decisions in an agency head even if the president orders the agency to make a different decision, or by limiting a president's ability to enforce his desires by removing any executive branch official – including the heads of 'independent' agencies – at will.

[3] Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024), Akande, Adebowale (ed.), "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles", Leadership and Politics, Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, p. 541, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22, ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7, retrieved July 18, 2024

[Dodds_2023_487–517-4] Dodds, Graham G. (2023). "Is the President a King? The Unitary Executive Theory and the Presidency of Donald J. Trump". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). U.S. Democracy in Danger: The American Political System Under Assault. Springer Studies on Populism, Identity Politics and Social Justice. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 487–517. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-36099-2_21. ISBN 978-3-031-36099-2. Retrieved July 12, 2024.

[:2-5] Wendling, Mike (July 7, 2024). "Project 2025: A wish list for a Trump presidency, explained". BBC. ...a controversial idea known as 'unitary executive theory'

[6] Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. p. 547. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 18, 2024. Constitutionally, the unitary executive theory is not some long-established doctrine that is widely accepted by courts and other political actors. Far from it, the constitutional status of the theory is rather controversial.

[7] Khardori, Ankush (August 12, 2024). "JD Vance's 'Constitutional Crisis' in the Making". Politico. Retrieved October 24, 2024.

[8] Barrón-López, Laura (July 9, 2024). "A look at the Project 2025 plan to reshape government and Trump's links to its authors". PBS News. Retrieved August 15, 2024.

[9] Savage, Charlie (July 4, 2024). "Legal Conservatives' Long Game: Amp Up Presidential Power but Kneecap Federal Agencies". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved August 15, 2024.

[10] Shapiro, Ari (July 2, 2024). "Immunity ruling continues a trend of expanding presidential power, scholar says". WFAE 90.7 - Charlotte's NPR News Source. Retrieved August 15, 2024. When the Supreme Court dramatically expanded presidential power yesterday, it continued a trend that's been going in one direction for a long time.

[11] Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. p. 540. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 18, 2024. Unitarians fixate on the wording of Article II's 'Vesting' clause (versus the wording in Articles I and III), arguing that the president alone has all the executive power, which means any power that is executive in nature, even if it is not directly listed in the Constitution, belongs to the president

[12] Sitaraman, Ganesh (2020). "The Political Economy of the Removal Power". Harvard Law Review. 134: 380.

[:24-13] Prakash, Saikrishna B.; Schroeder, Christopher H. "Interpretation and Debate: The Vesting Clause". National Constitution Center. Retrieved July 29, 2024.

[14] Strauss, Peter L. (1984). "The Place of Agencies in Government". Columbia Law Review. 84: 598. doi:10.2307/1122501. JSTOR 1122501. Article II speaks directly only about elected officials, chiefly the President and his powers; it describes those powers in the most summary of terms. He is vested generally with 'the executive Power,' but what that is in the domestic context does not readily appear. Putting aside foreign relations and military authority-a very large part of the Presidency, but not the focus of this essay 89-he has the following powers and/or responsibilities.

[:25-15] Shugerman, Jed Handelsman (June 2022). "Vesting" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 74. This Article offers a close textual reading of the word 'vesting' and an examination of its eighteenth-century usage and context, with the first survey of available dictionaries (from 1637 to 1846), colonial charters and state constitutions, the Constitutional Convention, and Ratification debates. Dictionaries defined 'vest' in terms of basic landed property rights, without reference to exclusivity or indefeasibility, and rarely with any reference to offices or powers. Other legal documents and digital collections of the Founders' papers indicate a range of usage, from 'fully vested' to 'simply vested' to 'partly vested,' so that the word 'vesting' by itself would signify less completeness. Meanwhile, words used in the Constitution or by the Framers to convey exclusivity or indefeasibility (for example, 'all,' 'exclusive,' 'sole,' 'alone,' or 'indefeasible') are missing from the Executive Vesting Clause. The ordinary meaning of 'vesting' was most likely a simple grant of powers without signifying the impermissibility of legislative conditions such as good-cause requirements for removals, undermining the unitary theory's originalist basis. On the other hand, the 'all' in the Legislative Vesting Clause may be more legally meaningful for nondelegation.

[:15-16] Barron, David; Lederman, Martin (2008). "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History". Harvard Law Review. 121. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University: 941. Archived from the original on January 24, 2009. there are those who would argue that the 'unitary executive' must have effective control over all Article II functions, in which case the superintendence guaranteed by the Commander in Chief Clause would not appear to do any additional work with respect to superintendence.

[:6-17] Birk, Daniel D. (January 2021). "Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 45 (6): 2177. ISSN 0038-9765. As this Article shows, however, the unitarians' claims about the original meaning of the executive power are largely unfounded. The ability to remove executive officials was not one of the prerogative powers of the British Crown. Moreover, the King neither appointed nor was able to remove all of his principal officers, many of whom held their offices for life or pursuant to other forms of tenure and who operated independent of the King's direction or control.

[18] Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 2197 (2021).

[19] Sitaraman, Ganesh (2020). "The Political Economy of the Removal Power". Harvard Law Review. 134: 380.

[:0-20] Chabot, Christine Kexel (November 13, 2020). "Is the Federal Reserve Constitutional? An Originalist Argument for Independent Agencies". Notre Dame Law Review.

[21] Swan, Jonathan; Savage, Charlie; Haberman, Maggie (July 17, 2023). "Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved August 15, 2024. The Supreme Court in 1935 and 1988 upheld the power of Congress to shield some executive branch officials from being fired without cause. But after justices appointed by Republicans since Reagan took control, it has started to erode those precedents.

[:22-22] Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (New ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 34. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736.

[:42-23] Pilkington, Ed (June 7, 2024). "Trump plots capture of DoJ in renewed assault on US justice system". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved July 11, 2024.

[:14-24] Ornstein, Norman (June 26, 2007). "Blog: Cheney's chutzpah". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved July 11, 2024.

[Manheim_Ides-25] Manheim, Karl; Ides, Allan (September 2006). "The Unitary Executive". Los Angeles Lawyer. SSRN 943046. Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-39.

[:19-26] Somin, Ilya (May 3, 2018). "Rethinking the Unitary Executive". Reason.com. Retrieved July 20, 2024. UPDATE: I perhaps should have mentioned the oft-made argument that maintaining a unitary executive—even when it comes to powers beyond the scope of the original meaning of the Constitution—is desirable because it enhances political accountability. Even if true, this claim is about what is pragmatically desirable, not about the text and original meaning of the Constitution. But the claim is dubious even on its own terms. The greater the scope of executive power, the harder it is for rationally ignorant voters to keep track of more than a small fraction of it. Moreover, it becomes difficult to figure out how to weigh the president's performance in one area against what he does in others (assuming there is variation in quality, as will often be the case). It is therefore unlikely that concentrating a vast range of power in the hands of one person does much to enhance accountability.

[27] Pilkington, Ed (June 7, 2024). "Trump plots capture of DoJ in renewed assault on US justice system". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved July 19, 2024. 'That's what happens in authoritarian states – there is a semblance of a legal system, but it becomes useless,' she said. 'If that happens here it would be extremely troubling. We're not there yet. But I do think a second term could cause significant damage that may or may not be permanent.'

[:20-28] "How MAGA Republicans plan to make Donald Trump's second term count". The Economist. July 13, 2023. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved July 19, 2024. One reason for the professionalisation of the bureaucracy in the 19th century was to provide the ship of state with enough ballast to keep sailing from one administration to the next ... The vain and tyrannical whims of an emperor-president would emerge from the rubble.

[:17-29] Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 548, 550–551. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 18, 2024. Turning devoted public servants into mere servants of their master and by privileging presidential desires over institutional expertise and independence, the theory risks turning the chief executive into an absolute monarch. Moreover, by enlarging the already considerable powers of the presidency, it threatens to upset the country's delicate inter-branch balance by relegating Congress and the judiciary to inferior status ... Trump showed us what happens when you support the use of such power with a person who appears to care little about the institution, the Constitution, or America's democracy. ... Thus the United States could see the unitary executive theory employed to significantly erode basic democratic principles.

[30] Howell, William; Moe, Terry (November 1, 2021). "Analysis | Big government vastly expanded presidential power. Republicans use it to sabotage the administrative state". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved July 20, 2024. The unitary executive theory provides a veneer of legal authority for an authoritarian-inclined president to engage in a range of anti-democratic behaviors. By the time George W. Bush had shown what the unitary executive could justify – torturing prisoners, surveilling ordinary citizens, ignoring congressional statutes – constitutional scholars were already pointing to presidents as the chief threat to American democracy. With the rise of right-wing populism and the election of Trump in 2016, this threat was magnified by the accompanying transformation of the Republican Party itself, with its elites in Washington and around the country abetting Trump's authoritarian behavior in office ... The Republican Party is now an anti-democracy party, and its future presidents – empowered by the unitary executive theory – threaten the fundamentals of the U.S. democratic system ... Democrats have been complicit, but Republicans have pushed the trajectory beyond democratic bounds.

[:13-31] ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Driesen, David (November 1, 2020). "The Unitary Executive Theory in Comparative Context". UC Law Journal. 72 (1): 1. ISSN 0017-8322.

[:16-32] Greenhut, Steven (June 28, 2024). "Project 2025: The Heritage Foundation's plan to embrace bigger government during Trump's second term". Reason. Retrieved July 11, 2024. But implementing what critics call 'unitary executive theory'—i.e., putting all aspects of the federal government under the control of the president—is a prescription for authoritarianism and abuse.

[:18-33] Hennessey, Susan; Wittes, Benjamin (January 21, 2020). "The Disintegration of the American Presidency". The Atlantic. Retrieved July 20, 2024. But the American system gets sticky when you contemplate vesting the executive power in one person who cannot be easily removed when that person is as mercurial and peculiar as Trump. In such situations, the structure can start to seem downright reckless. In concentrating power so that this person directs the federal government to do things—and in making this person exceptionally difficult to depose for a protracted period of time—one has to have a certain amount of confidence in that person's intentions and abilities.

[:8-34] Gersen, Jacob; Berry, Christopher R. (March 2008). "The Unbundled Executive" (none). University of Chicago. pp. 10–11. SSRN 1113543. University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 214. Indeed, partial unbundling of executive authority is the norm rather than an exception in virtually all levels of non-national government units in the United States, of which there are more than 80,000. Authority that the governor or mayor would otherwise exercise is frequently given to a specific state or local officer. Often these officers are directly elected by the public. Other times they are elected by the legislature; other times still, they are appointed by another state official. These arrangements are only approximations of the unbundled executive ideal because they there is residual responsibility or authority for the policy in the general purpose executive ... The average number of elected executive offices per state was 6.7 in 2002 ...

[:9-35] Berry, Christopher R.; Gersen, Jacob E. (2008). "The Unbundled Executive". The University of Chicago Law Review. 75 (4): 1399–1400. ISSN 0041-9494. JSTOR 27653959.

[:11-36] Rosen, Jeffrey (July 2, 2024). "Immunity ruling continues a trend of expanding presidential power, scholar says". All Things Considered. NPR. Retrieved October 24, 2024.

[:7-37] Thunberg, Michael E. (December 1, 2021). "The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government". Political Science Quarterly. 136 (4): 770–771. doi:10.1002/polq.13274. ISSN 0032-3195.

[:12-38] Mosley, Tonya (December 14, 2023). "Why a second Trump administration may be more radical than the first". Fresh Air on NPR.

[39] Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. p. 540. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 18, 2024. The term 'unitary executive' dates to the 1980s, but unitarians contend that the idea goes back to the founding era.

[40] Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024). "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles". In Akande, Adebowale (ed.). Leadership and Politics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. p. 539. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22. ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7. Retrieved July 29, 2024. There is no one canonical account of the unitary executive theory, though various academics have provided their own characterizations of it. (See Calabresi and Yoo (2008), Barilleaux and Kelley (2010), Dodds (2019), Crouch et al. (2020), and Skowronek et al. (2021).)

[41] Sunstein, Cass R.; Vermeule, Adrian (2021). "The Unitary Executive: Past, Present, Future". The Supreme Court Review. 2020: 83–117. doi:10.1086/714860.

[42] Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (new ed.). New York City: Oxford University Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736.

[43] Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (New ed.). New York City: Oxford University Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736.

[44] Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 2197 (2021).

[plural-45] Calabresi, Steven & Rhodes, Kevin (1992). "The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary". Harvard Law Review. 105 (6): 1165. doi:10.2307/1341727. JSTOR 1341727.

[:23-46] Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive. New York City: Oxford University Press. p. 32. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. The conception of 'good government' is consistent with a reading of the 'take care' clause, in which presidents are charged to enforce court rulings and congressional statutes 'faithfully', regardless of their views of the substantive merits. It is reinforced by Congress's Article I authority to set rules and regulations 'necessary and proper' for the execution of its mandates.

[47] Strauss, Peter L. (March 5, 2024). "Overseer or 'The Decider'? The American President in Administrative Law". Faculti (Video lecture). Retrieved July 13, 2024.

[48] Nelson, Eric (July 9, 2024). "Justice Sotomayor was right for the wrong reasons". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved July 11, 2024.

[Lessig-49] Lessig, Lawrence & Sunstein, Cass (1994). "The President and the Administration". Columbia Law Review. 94 (1): 1–123. doi:10.2307/1123119. JSTOR 1123119.

[50] Strauss, Peter L. (March 5, 2024). "Overseer or 'The Decider'? The American President in Administrative Law". Faculti. Retrieved July 13, 2024.

[:62-51] Birk, Daniel D. (January 2021). "Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 45 (6): 2177. ISSN 0038-9765. See CALABRESI & YOO , supra note 1, at 3-4; see also, e.g., Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 A LA. L. Rev. 1205, 1225 (2014) (asserting that '[f]or adequate constitutional control of execution, the President must have the possibility of directing discretionary legal duties, even those assigned to other officers,' and thus must be able to remove all executive officers, including the heads of independent agencies); John Harrison, Addition by Subtraction, 92 VA. L. Rev. 1853, 1859–62 (2006) (characterizing executive-branch officers as 'agents' of the President whom the President must be able to remove if they do not retain his trust); cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 724 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the President must have 'plenary power to remove [all] principal officers,' but that inferior officers can be made 'removable for cause' so long as their appointing officers can dismiss them for 'the failure to accept supervision' (emphasis omitted))

[52] Latham, Joshua (2000). "The Military Munitions Rule and Environmental Regulation of Munitions". Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 27. Boston, Massachusetts: Boston College: 467.

[53] Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive. New York City: Oxford University Press. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5.

[Dean-54] Dean, John (2007). Broken Government. Viking. p. 102. ISBN 9780670018208.

[:5-55] Greenberg, Jon (February 8, 2019). "What Vice gets right and wrong about Dick Cheney". Politifact. Retrieved July 11, 2024.

[56] Calabresi, Steven; Yoo, John (2008). The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush. Yale University Press. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-300-14538-0.

[:1-57] Crouch, Jeffrey; Rozell, Mark J.; Sollenberger, Mitchel A. (2020). The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government. University Press of Kansas. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1ft83xf. ISBN 978-0-7006-3004-2. JSTOR j.ctv1ft83xf.

[58] Ketchum, Ralph, ed. (1986). The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates. Signet Classic. p. 67. Mr. [James] Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans [i.e. the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan] ... These were ... A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one—a plurality is held out in the other.

[59] "Records of the Federal Convention, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 1". The Founder's Constitution. 1787.

[60] Millhiser, Ian (February 14, 2020). "How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law". Vox. Retrieved July 20, 2024.

[61] Gary, Schmitt; Roach, John (June 2022). "A Madisonian Footnote to the Unitary Executive" (PDF). AEI. Retrieved October 24, 2024.

[62] Harrison, John (January 24, 2017). "The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power". The Yale Law Journal. 126.

[63] Ellis, Richard (1999). Founding the American Presidency. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 39. ISBN 9780847694990.

[64] Millhiser, Ian (February 14, 2020). "How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law". Vox.com. Retrieved July 20, 2024.

[65] Tillman, Seth (January 1, 2010). "The puzzle of Hamilton's Federalist No. 77" (PDF). Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy.

[66] Blackman, Josh (July 1, 2020). "Justice Kagan on Hamilton in Federalist No. 77". Reason. Retrieved October 24, 2024.

[67] Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

[68] Calabresi, Steven & Lawson, Gary (2007). "The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia" (PDF). Columbia Law Review. 107: 1002–1047. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 6, 2009.

[69] "List of court cases relevant to executive appointment and removal power". Ballotpedia. Retrieved August 5, 2024.

[70] Sitaraman, Ganesh (2020). "The Political Economy of the Removal Power". Harvard Law Review. 134: 380.

[reason_decision-71] Adler, Jonathan (June 29, 2020). "With Chief in Charge, SCOTUS Strikes Down Louisiana Abortion Law and Eliminates CFPB Independence". Reason. Archived from the original on June 29, 2020. Retrieved August 5, 2024.

[:252-72] Sitaraman, Ganesh (2020). "The Political Economy of the Removal Power" (PDF). Harvard Law Review. 134: 380. Justice Kagan dissented from the constitutional analysis, along with the three other liberal Justices. In an opinion filled with sharp, cutting language, Justice Kagan protested that there was nothing neutral about the majority's reasoning or its unitary executive theory of the separation of powers. She systematically argued that 'constitutional text, history, and precedent invalidate the majority's thesis.' Justice Kagan even accused the majority of 'gerrymander[ing]' their 'made up' rule to strike down the CFPB's independent structure. For a separation of powers case, this was about as bloody a fight as it gets.

[73] Millhiser, Ian (June 29, 2020). "The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained". Vox. Retrieved August 5, 2024.

[74] "U.S. Supreme Court bolsters presidential power over housing finance agency". CNBC. Reuters. June 23, 2021. Retrieved June 23, 2021.

[75] Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021).

[76] Millhiser, Ian (June 29, 2020). "The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained". Vox. Retrieved August 6, 2024.

[77] Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (New ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 200. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736.

[:4-78] Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024), Akande, Adebowale (ed.), "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles", Leadership and Politics, Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, p. 542, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22, ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7, retrieved July 18, 2024

[79] Krotoszynski, Ronald (December 10, 2020). "The Conservative Idea That Would Let Biden Seize Control of Washington". Politico.

[Johnsen-80] Johnsen, Dawn (April 2008). "What's a President To Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses" (PDF). Boston University Law Review. 88: 395. On 363 occasions, President Bush objected to provisions that he found might conflict with the president's constitutional authority 'to supervise the unitary executive branch.'

[81] Lazarus, Edward (January 5, 2006). "How Much Authority Does the President Possess When He Is Acting as 'Commander in Chief'? Evaluating President Bush's Claims Against a Key Supreme Court Executive Power Precedent". FindLaw. That signed statement shows, in microcosm, how the President sees the separation of powers: The President, in his view of the world, can interpret away constraints on his power, such as those in the McCain Amendment, or FISA before it. And the courts can hardly question his dubious 'interpretations' even if they gut the very statutes they construe: After all, there are 'constitutional limitations on the judicial power'—though not, apparently, on the power of the executive.^{[dead link‍]}

[82] Van Bergen, Jennifer (January 9, 2006). "The Unitary Executive: Is The Doctrine Behind the Bush Presidency Consistent with a Democratic State?". Findlaw. In his view, and the view of his Administration, that doctrine gives him license to overrule and bypass Congress or the courts, based on his own interpretations of the Constitution. ...

[83] Liptak, Adam (2006). "Few Glimmers of How Conservative Judge Alito Is". The New York Times. p. A1. Retrieved November 2, 2017.

[84] Dodds, Graham G.; Kelley, Christopher S. (2024), Akande, Adebowale (ed.), "Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles", Leadership and Politics, Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, p. 545, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22, ISBN 978-3-031-56414-7, retrieved July 18, 2024

[NYT_Presidential_Power2-85] Swan, Jonathan; Savage, Charlie; Maggie, Haberman (July 17, 2023). "Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025". The New York Times. Retrieved December 6, 2023.

[86] McCarthy, Tom (January 13, 2019). "Trump's attorney general pick raises fears of a president above the law". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved July 11, 2024.

[87] Deconstructed (May 21, 2020). "Deconstructed Podcast: Is Bill Bar the Most Dangerous Trump Official?". The Intercept. Retrieved July 11, 2024.

[88] Wrona, Aleksandra; Nur, Ibrahim (July 11, 2024). "The Facts About Project 2025: The Pro-Trump Proposal To 'Reshape America'". Snopes. Retrieved July 19, 2024. Project 2025 authors built their proposals on an idea popular during former President Ronald Reagan's time: the 'unitary executive theory.'...Overall, critics including legal experts and former government employees have zeroed in on Project 2025's goal to give the executive branch more power, describing it as a precursor to authoritarianism.

[NYT_Presidential_Power-89] Swan, Jonathan; Savage, Charlie; Maggie, Haberman (July 17, 2023). "Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025". The New York Times. Retrieved December 6, 2023.

[90] The Project 2025 plan and Trump's links to its authors. PBS News Hour. July 9, 2024. Retrieved July 11, 2024.

[91] Tucker, Eric (July 2, 2024). "Supreme Court opinion conferring broad immunity could embolden Trump as he seeks to return to power". Associated Press. 'This is a full-throated endorsement of the unitary executive theory' in a dramatic way, said Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf, referring to the theory that the U.S. Constitution gives the president expansive control over the government's executive branch.

[92] Skowronek, Stephen; Dearborn, John A.; King, Desmond S. (2021). Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive (New ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 38. ISBN 978-0-19-754308-5. OCLC 1163936736. ...the unitary executive becomes exactly what the founders most feared, a formula for maximum disruption. It is prone to imposing decisions at will, marginalizing dissent, and to radicalizing opposition...Power hierarchically controlled, thoroughly politicized and concentrated in the executive, is a constitutional nightmare, and a bitter denouement for a beleaguered republic.

[Barron-Lederman-93] Barron, David; Lederman, Martin (2008). "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing The Problem, Doctrine, And Original Understanding". Harvard Law Review. 121. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University: 689. Archived from the original on January 25, 2009. we think the text, as reinforced by historical practice, makes a strong case for at least some form of a 'unitary executive' within the armed forces, particularly as to traditional functions during armed conflicts.

[:3-94] Pengelly, Martin (September 15, 2023). "US hard-right policy group condemned for 'dehumanising' anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved July 11, 2024.

[:21-95] Millhiser, Ian (November 21, 2023). "A Supreme Court case about stocks could help make Trump's authoritarian dreams reality". Vox. Retrieved July 20, 2024. There are weaker versions of the unitary executive theory that wouldn't allow the president to fire every FBI agent who refuses to swear personal fealty. But even these weaker versions could potentially give presidents power to manipulate elections, and to interfere with technocratic aspects of government that historically have been removed from partisan politics, such as the Federal Reserve...And, of course, looming over all of this is Trump, with his plan to replace much of the civil service with people personally loyal to him. In the worst-case scenario for liberal democracy, the Supreme Court could use the Jarkesy case to greenlight many of Trump's most authoritarian aspirations.

[Atlantic201901&201902-96] Goitein, Elizabeth (January–February 2019). "The Alarming Scope of the President's Emergency Powers". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on April 1, 2020. Retrieved April 1, 2020.

[97] "A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use". Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. Archived from the original on April 1, 2020. Retrieved January 7, 2019.

[98] Millhiser, Ian (February 14, 2020). "How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law". Vox. Retrieved July 20, 2024. The facts of Morrison also highlight why prosecutorial independence is sometimes desirable. That case involved an investigation into one of the seniormost officials within the Justice Department. A rank-and-file prosecutor would understandably fear the professional consequences of leading such an investigation — for the same reason that I would be reluctant to conduct an investigation into one of Vox Media's top executives.

[99] Shugerman, Jed Handelsman (July 6, 2020). "The Imaginary Unitary Executive". Lawfare. Retrieved July 18, 2024.

[100] Dorf, Michael C. (June 19, 2023). "Opinion: The Misguided Unitary Executive Theory Gains Ground". Justia. Retrieved July 18, 2024. Not only is the unitary executive theory writ large ahistorical...

[Berry-101] Berry, Christopher & Gersen, Jacob (2008). "The Unbundled Executive". University of Chicago Law Review. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago. SSRN 1113543. Archived from the original on August 7, 2011. We certainly do not claim that the most sensible or even any plausible interpretation of the US Constitution establishes a plural unbundled executive; but perhaps it should

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@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{Short description|Interpretation of the US Constitution regarding presidential power}}
+{{Use American English|date=September 2024}}
+{{Use mdy dates|date=September 2024}}
 {{US administrative law}}
+{{United States constitutional law}}
-In [[Law of the United States|American law]], '''unitary executive theory''' is "an expansive interpretation of [[Powers of the president of the United States|presidential power]] that aims to centralize greater control over the government in the White House."<ref name=":10">{{Cite news |date=2023-09-15 |title=The 2024 Executive Power Survey – Unitary Executive |url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/us/politics/unitary-executive-executive-power.html |access-date=2024-07-19 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 |quote=Lawyers in the Reagan-era Justice Department developed the so-called unitary executive theory, an expansive interpretation of presidential power that aims to centralize greater control over the government in the White House. Under stronger versions of this vision, Congress cannot fracture the president’s control of federal executive power, such as by vesting the power to make certain decisions in an agency head even if the president orders the agency to make a different decision, or by limiting a president’s ability to enforce his desires by removing any executive branch official – including the heads of 'independent' agencies – at will.}}</ref> The concept often comes up in [[Jurisprudence|jurisprudential]] disagreements about the president's ability to remove employees within the executive branch; transparency and access to information; discretion over the implementation of new laws; and the ability to influence agencies' rule-making.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |title=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |work=Leadership and Politics |pages=541 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S.}}</ref> There is disagreement about the doctrine's strength and scope, with more expansive versions of the theory becoming the focus of modern political debate. These expansive versions are controversial for both constitutional and practical reasons.<ref name="Dodds 2023 487–517">{{cite book |last=Dodds |first=Graham G. |chapter=Is the President a King? The Unitary Executive Theory and the Presidency of Donald J. Trump |date=2023 |title=U.S. Democracy in Danger: The American Political System Under Assault |pages=487–517 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36099-2_21 |access-date=2024-07-12 |series=Springer Studies on Populism, Identity Politics and Social Justice |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-36099-2_21 |isbn=978-3-031-36099-2}} </ref><ref name=":2" /><ref>{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=547 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S. |quote=Constitutionally, the unitary executive theory is not some long-established doctrine that is widely accepted by courts and other political actors. Far from it, the constitutional status of the theory is rather controversial.}}</ref> Since the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration, the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]] has embraced a stronger unitary executive, which has been championed primarily by its conservative justices, the [[Federalist Society]], and the [[The Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Khardori |first=Ankush |date=August 12, 2024 |title=JD Vance’s ‘Constitutional Crisis’ in the Making |url=https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/08/12/what-jd-vance-gets-wrong-about-the-supreme-court-00173445 |work=Politico}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-07-09 |title=A look at the Project 2025 plan to reshape government and Trump's links to its authors |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/a-look-at-the-project-2025-plan-to-reshape-government-and-trumps-links-to-its-authors |access-date=2024-08-15 |website=PBS News |language=en-us}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Savage |first=Charlie |date=2024-07-04 |title=Legal Conservatives’ Long Game: Amp Up Presidential Power but Kneecap Federal Agencies |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/04/us/politics/conservative-legal-movement-supreme-court.html |access-date=2024-08-15 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Shapiro |first=Ari |date=2024-07-02 |title=Immunity ruling continues a trend of expanding presidential power, scholar says |url=https://www.wfae.org/united-states-world/2024-07-02/immunity-ruling-continues-a-trend-of-expanding-presidential-power-scholar-says |access-date=2024-08-15 |website=WFAE 90.7 - Charlotte's NPR News Source |language=en |quote=When the Supreme Court dramatically expanded presidential power yesterday, it continued a trend that's been going in one direction for a long time.}}</ref>
+In [[American law]], the '''unitary executive theory''' is a [[Constitutional law of the United States|Constitutional law]] theory according to which the President of the United States has sole authority over the [[Executive branch of the United States government|executive branch]].<ref> Cornell Law School  ''Legal Information Institute Unitary Executive Theory (UET).'' [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/unitary_executive_theory_%28uet%29]Web. Retrieved September 24, 2024. </ref> It is "an expansive interpretation of presidential power that aims to centralize greater control over the government in the White House".<ref name=":10">{{Cite news |date=2023-09-15 |title=The 2024 Executive Power Survey – Unitary Executive |url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/us/politics/unitary-executive-executive-power.html |access-date=2024-07-19 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 |quote=Lawyers in the Reagan-era Justice Department developed the so-called unitary executive theory, an expansive interpretation of presidential power that aims to centralize greater control over the government in the White House. Under stronger versions of this vision, Congress cannot fracture the president's control of federal executive power, such as by vesting the power to make certain decisions in an agency head even if the president orders the agency to make a different decision, or by limiting a president's ability to enforce his desires by removing any executive branch official – including the heads of 'independent' agencies – at will.}}</ref> The theory often comes up in [[Jurisprudence|jurisprudential]] disagreements about the president's ability to remove employees within the executive branch; transparency and access to information; discretion over the implementation of new laws; and the ability to influence agencies' rule-making.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |title=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |work=Leadership and Politics |pages=541 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S.}}</ref> There is disagreement about the doctrine's strength and scope, with more expansive versions of the theory becoming the focus of modern political debate. These expansive versions are controversial for both constitutional and practical reasons.<ref name="Dodds 2023 487–517">{{cite book |last=Dodds |first=Graham G. |chapter=Is the President a King? The Unitary Executive Theory and the Presidency of Donald J. Trump |date=2023 |title=U.S. Democracy in Danger: The American Political System Under Assault |pages=487–517 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36099-2_21 |access-date=2024-07-12 |series=Springer Studies on Populism, Identity Politics and Social Justice |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-36099-2_21 |isbn=978-3-031-36099-2}} </ref><ref name=":2" /><ref>{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=547 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S. |quote=Constitutionally, the unitary executive theory is not some long-established doctrine that is widely accepted by courts and other political actors. Far from it, the constitutional status of the theory is rather controversial.}}</ref> Since the [[Reagan administration]], the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]] has embraced a stronger unitary executive, which has been championed primarily by its conservative justices, the [[Federalist Society]], and the [[The Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Khardori |first=Ankush |date=August 12, 2024 |title=JD Vance's 'Constitutional Crisis' in the Making |url=https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/08/12/what-jd-vance-gets-wrong-about-the-supreme-court-00173445 |work=[[Politico]] |access-date=24 October 2024 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-07-09 |title=A look at the Project 2025 plan to reshape government and Trump's links to its authors |first=Laura |last=Barrón-López  |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/a-look-at-the-project-2025-plan-to-reshape-government-and-trumps-links-to-its-authors |access-date=2024-08-15 |website=PBS News |language=en-us}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Savage |first=Charlie |date=2024-07-04 |title=Legal Conservatives' Long Game: Amp Up Presidential Power but Kneecap Federal Agencies |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/04/us/politics/conservative-legal-movement-supreme-court.html |access-date=2024-08-15 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Shapiro |first=Ari |date=2024-07-02 |title=Immunity ruling continues a trend of expanding presidential power, scholar says |url=https://www.wfae.org/united-states-world/2024-07-02/immunity-ruling-continues-a-trend-of-expanding-presidential-power-scholar-says |access-date=2024-08-15 |website=WFAE 90.7 - Charlotte's NPR News Source |language=en |quote=When the Supreme Court dramatically expanded presidential power yesterday, it continued a trend that's been going in one direction for a long time.}}</ref>
-The theory is largely based on Section 1 of [[Article Two of the United States Constitution]],<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=540 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S. |quote=Unitarians fixate on the wording of Article II's 'Vesting' clause (versus the wording in Articles I and III), arguing that the president alone has all the executive power, which means any power that is executive in nature, even if it is not directly listed in the Constitution, belongs to the president}}</ref> which "[[Vesting Clauses|vests]]" "[[Powers of the president of the United States|the executive Power]]" of the United States in the president.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sitaraman|first=Ganesh|date=2020|title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power|journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=134|pages=380}}</ref><ref name=":24" /> Critics debate over how much power the vesting clause gives a president<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Strauss |first=Peter L. |year=1984 |title=The Place of Agencies in Government |url=https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=faculty_scholarship |journal=[[Columbia Law Review]] |volume=84 |pages=598 |doi=10.2307/1122501 |jstor=1122501 |quote=Article II speaks directly only about elected officials, chiefly the President and his powers; it describes those powers in the most summary of terms. He is vested generally with 'the executive Power,'  but what that is in the domestic context does not readily appear. Putting aside foreign relations and military authority-a very large part of the Presidency, but not the focus of this essay 89-he has the following powers and/or responsibilities.}}</ref><ref name=":25">{{Cite journal |last=Shugerman |first=Jed Handelsman |date=June 2022 |title=Vesting |url=https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Shugerman-74-Stan.-L.-Rev.-1479.pdf |journal=Stanford Law Review |volume=74 |quote=This Article offers a close textual reading of the word 'vesting' and an examination of its eighteenth-century usage and context, with the first survey of available dictionaries (from 1637 to 1846), colonial charters and state constitutions, the Constitutional Convention, and Ratification debates. Dictionaries defined 'vest' in terms of basic landed property rights, without reference to exclusivity or indefeasibility, and rarely with any reference to offices or powers. Other legal documents and digital collections of the Founders' papers indicate a range of usage, from 'fully vested' to 'simply vested' to 'partly vested,' so that the word 'vesting' by itself would signify less completeness. Meanwhile, words used in the Constitution or by the Framers to convey exclusivity or indefeasibility (for example, 'all,' 'exclusive,' 'sole,' 'alone,' or 'indefeasible') are missing from the Executive Vesting Clause. The ordinary meaning of 'vesting' was most likely a simple grant of powers without signifying the impermissibility of legislative conditions such as good-cause requirements for removals, undermining the unitary theory’s originalist basis. On the other hand, the 'all' in the Legislative Vesting Clause may be more legally meaningful for nondelegation.}}</ref> and point to the other clauses in the [[Constitution of the United States|Constitution]] that provide [[checks and balances]] on executive power. For instance, some argue that the [[Article Two of the United States Constitution#Clause 1: Command of military; Opinions of cabinet secretaries; Pardons|Commander in Chief Clause]] would be rendered effectively redundant if the founders intended the wording to be interpreted as a unitary executive.<ref name=":15" /> Others argue that even the King of Great Britain<!--Not England, which no longer existed as an independent country as of 1707--> at the time of the founding did not have the unitary control that some proponents argue he had when justifying an expansion of presidential power.<ref name=":6" /> In recent years, the Supreme Court has held that, regarding the powers granted by the vesting clause, "the entire 'executive Power' belongs to the President alone."<ref>{{cite court|litigants=Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau|vol=591|reporter=U.S.|opinion=197|pinpoint=2197|court=|year=2021|url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/19-7/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sitaraman|first=Ganesh|date=2020|title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power|journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=134|pages=380}}</ref>
+The theory is largely based on Section 1 of [[Article Two of the United States Constitution]],<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=540 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S. |quote=Unitarians fixate on the wording of Article II's 'Vesting' clause (versus the wording in Articles I and III), arguing that the president alone has all the executive power, which means any power that is executive in nature, even if it is not directly listed in the Constitution, belongs to the president}}</ref> which [[Vesting Clauses|vests]] "the [[Powers of the president of the United States|executive Power]]" of the United States in the president.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sitaraman|first=Ganesh|date=2020|title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power |url=https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-134/the-political-economy-of-the-removal-power/ |journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=134|pages=380}}</ref><ref name=":24" /> Critics debate over how much power the vesting clause gives a president,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Strauss |first=Peter L. |year=1984 |title=The Place of Agencies in Government |url=https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=faculty_scholarship |journal=[[Columbia Law Review]] |volume=84 |pages=598 |doi=10.2307/1122501 |jstor=1122501 |quote=Article II speaks directly only about elected officials, chiefly the President and his powers; it describes those powers in the most summary of terms. He is vested generally with 'the executive Power,'  but what that is in the domestic context does not readily appear. Putting aside foreign relations and military authority-a very large part of the Presidency, but not the focus of this essay 89-he has the following powers and/or responsibilities.}}</ref><ref name=":25">{{Cite journal |last=Shugerman |first=Jed Handelsman |date=June 2022 |title=Vesting |url=https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Shugerman-74-Stan.-L.-Rev.-1479.pdf |journal=Stanford Law Review |volume=74 |quote=This Article offers a close textual reading of the word 'vesting' and an examination of its eighteenth-century usage and context, with the first survey of available dictionaries (from 1637 to 1846), colonial charters and state constitutions, the Constitutional Convention, and Ratification debates. Dictionaries defined 'vest' in terms of basic landed property rights, without reference to exclusivity or indefeasibility, and rarely with any reference to offices or powers. Other legal documents and digital collections of the Founders' papers indicate a range of usage, from 'fully vested' to 'simply vested' to 'partly vested,' so that the word 'vesting' by itself would signify less completeness. Meanwhile, words used in the Constitution or by the Framers to convey exclusivity or indefeasibility (for example, 'all,' 'exclusive,' 'sole,' 'alone,' or 'indefeasible') are missing from the Executive Vesting Clause. The ordinary meaning of 'vesting' was most likely a simple grant of powers without signifying the impermissibility of legislative conditions such as good-cause requirements for removals, undermining the unitary theory's originalist basis. On the other hand, the 'all' in the Legislative Vesting Clause may be more legally meaningful for nondelegation.}}</ref> and emphasize other clauses in the Constitution that provide [[checks and balances]] on executive power. For instance, some argue that the [[Article Two of the United States Constitution#Clause 1: Command of military; Opinions of cabinet secretaries; Pardons|Commander in Chief Clause]] would be rendered effectively redundant if the founders intended the wording to be interpreted as a unitary executive.<ref name=":15" /> Others argue that even the King of Great Britain<!--Not England, which no longer existed as an independent country as of 1707--> at the time of the founding did not have the unitary control that some proponents argue he had when justifying an expansion of presidential power.<ref name=":6" /> In the 2020s, the Supreme Court has held that, regarding the powers granted by the vesting clause, "the entire 'executive Power' belongs to the President alone".<ref>{{cite court|litigants=Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau|vol=591|reporter=U.S.|opinion=197|pinpoint=2197|court=|year=2021|url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/19-7/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sitaraman|first=Ganesh|date=2020|title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power|journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=134|pages=380}}</ref>
-Since its inception, the [[President of the United States]] has exercised significant authority over the executive branch, with some exceptions, including independent agencies such as the [[Federal Reserve]], and independent personnel such as [[special counsel]]s.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Chabot |first=Christine Kexel |date=2020-11-13 |title=Is the Federal Reserve Constitutional? An Originalist Argument for Independent Agencies |url=https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4925&context=ndlr |journal=[[Notre Dame Law Review]]}}</ref>{{Verify source|date=July 2024}} These limits on unitary executive power can be created by the [[Legislative branch of the United States federal government|legislative branch]] via [[United States Congress|Congress]] passing legislation, or by the [[Judicial Branch of the United States|judicial branch]] via Supreme Court decisions. Since the founding of the country, positions independent of the executive have included [[Comptroller General of the United States|Comptroller]], [[United States Postmaster General|Postmaster General]] and the [[Sinking Fund Commission]].<ref name=":0" /> The Reagan administration, including the justices it appointed to the Supreme Court, was the first presidential administration to cite unitary executive theory.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Swan |first=Jonathan |last2=Savage |first2=Charlie |last3=Haberman |first3=Maggie |date=2023-07-17 |title=Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/17/us/politics/trump-plans-2025.html |access-date=2024-08-15 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 |quote=The Supreme Court in 1935 and 1988 upheld the power of Congress to shield some executive branch officials from being fired without cause. But after justices appointed by Republicans since Reagan took control, it has started to erode those precedents.}}</ref> It then entered public discourse with the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|George W. Bush administration]] and found a strong advocate in [[Donald Trump]].<ref name=":22" /> Presidents of both parties tend to view the idea that they should have more power more favorably when in office.<ref name=":22" />
+Since its inception, the [[President of the United States]] has exercised significant authority over the executive branch, with some exceptions, including independent agencies such as the [[Federal Reserve]], and independent personnel such as [[special counsel]]s.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Chabot |first=Christine Kexel |date=2020-11-13 |title=Is the Federal Reserve Constitutional? An Originalist Argument for Independent Agencies |url=https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4925&context=ndlr |journal=[[Notre Dame Law Review]]}}</ref>{{Verify source|date=July 2024}} These limits on unitary executive power can be created by the [[Legislative branch of the United States federal government|legislative branch]] via [[United States Congress|Congress]] passing legislation, or by the [[Judicial Branch of the United States|judicial branch]] via Supreme Court decisions. Since the founding of the country, positions independent of the executive have included [[Comptroller General of the United States|Comptroller]], [[United States Postmaster General|Postmaster General]], and the [[Sinking Fund Commission]].<ref name=":0" /> The Reagan administration, including the justices it appointed to the Supreme Court, was the first presidential administration to cite unitary executive theory.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Swan |first1=Jonathan |last2=Savage |first2=Charlie |last3=Haberman |first3=Maggie |date=2023-07-17 |title=Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/17/us/politics/trump-plans-2025.html |access-date=2024-08-15 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 |quote=The Supreme Court in 1935 and 1988 upheld the power of Congress to shield some executive branch officials from being fired without cause. But after justices appointed by Republicans since Reagan took control, it has started to erode those precedents.}}</ref> It then entered public discourse with the [[George W. Bush administration]] and found a strong advocate in [[Donald Trump]].<ref name=":22" /> Presidents of both parties tend to view the idea that they should have more power more favorably when in office.<ref name=":22" />
-Beyond disputing its constitutionality,<ref name=":42" /><ref name=":14" /><ref name="Manheim Ides" /><ref name=":15" /> common criticisms include the ideas that the theory could lead to poor outcomes, including more corruption and less qualified employees.<ref name=":19">{{Cite web |last=Somin |first=Ilya |date=2018-05-03 |title=Rethinking the Unitary Executive |url=https://reason.com/volokh/2018/05/03/rethinking-the-unitary-executive/ |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Reason.com |language=en-US |quote=UPDATE: I perhaps should have mentioned the oft-made argument that maintaining a unitary executive—even when it comes to powers beyond the scope of the original meaning of the Constitution—is desirable because it enhances political accountability. Even if true, this claim is about what is pragmatically desirable, not about the text and original meaning of the Constitution. But the claim is dubious even on its own terms. The greater the scope of executive power, the harder it is for rationally ignorant voters to keep track of more than a small fraction of it. Moreover, it becomes difficult to figure out how to weigh the president's performance in one area against what he does in others (assuming there is variation in quality, as will often be the case). It is therefore unlikely that concentrating a vast range of power in the hands of one person does much to enhance accountability.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Pilkington |first=Ed |date=2024-06-07 |title=Trump plots capture of DoJ in renewed assault on US justice system |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/07/trump-justice-department |access-date=2024-07-19 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077 |quote='That's what happens in authoritarian states – there is a semblance of a legal system, but it becomes useless,' she said. 'If that happens here it would be extremely troubling. We're not there yet. But I do think a second term could cause significant damage that may or may not be permanent.'}}</ref><ref name=":20">{{Cite magazine |date=July 13, 2023 |title=How MAGA Republicans plan to make Donald Trump's second term count |url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/07/13/how-maga-republicans-plan-to-make-donald-trumps-second-term-count |access-date=2024-07-19 |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613 |quote=One reason for the professionalisation of the bureaucracy in the 19th century was to provide the ship of state with enough ballast to keep sailing from one administration to the next&nbsp;... The vain and tyrannical whims of an emperor-president would emerge from the rubble.}}</ref> Some critics point to countries where similar changes to a more unitary executive have resulted in [[democratic backsliding]],<ref name=":17">{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=548, 550–551 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S. |quote=Turning devoted public servants into mere servants of their master and by privileging presidential desires over institutional expertise and independence, the theory risks turning the chief executive into an absolute monarch. Moreover, by enlarging the already considerable powers of the presidency, it threatens to upset the country’s delicate inter-branch balance by relegating Congress and the judiciary to inferior status&nbsp;... Trump showed us what happens when you support the use of such power with a person who appears to care little about the institution, the Constitution, or America’s democracy. ... Thus the United States could see the unitary executive theory employed to significantly erode basic democratic principles.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Howell |first1=William |author-link=William G. Howell |last2=Moe |first2=Terry |author-link2=Terry M. Moe |date=2021-11-01 |title=Analysis {{!}} Big government vastly expanded presidential power. Republicans use it to sabotage the administrative state |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/01/big-government-vastly-expanded-presidential-power-republicans-use-it-sabotage-administrative-state/ |access-date=2024-07-20 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286 |quote=The unitary executive theory provides a veneer of legal authority for an authoritarian-inclined president to engage in a range of anti-democratic behaviors. By the time George W. Bush had shown what the unitary executive could justify – torturing prisoners, surveilling ordinary citizens, ignoring congressional statutes – constitutional scholars were already pointing to presidents as the chief threat to American democracy. With the rise of right-wing populism and the election of Trump in 2016, this threat was magnified by the accompanying transformation of the Republican Party itself, with its elites in Washington and around the country abetting Trump’s authoritarian behavior in office&nbsp;... The Republican Party is now an anti-democracy party, and its future presidents – empowered by the unitary executive theory – threaten the fundamentals of the U.S. democratic system&nbsp;... Democrats have been complicit, but Republicans have pushed the trajectory beyond democratic bounds.}}</ref><ref name=":13">{{Cite journal |last=Driesen |first=David |date=2020-11-01 |title=The Unitary Executive Theory in Comparative Context |url=https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol72/iss1/1 |journal=[[UC Law Journal]] |volume=72 |issue=1 |pages=1 |issn=0017-8322}}</ref><ref name=":16">{{Cite web |last=Greenhut |first=Steven |date=2024-06-28 |title=Project 2025: The Heritage Foundation's plan to embrace bigger government during Trump's second term |url=https://reason.com/2024/06/28/project-2025-the-conservative-agenda-to-embrace-bigger-government-during-trumps-second-term/ |access-date=2024-07-11 |website=[[Reason (magazine)|Reason]] |language=en-US |quote=But implementing what critics call 'unitary executive theory'—i.e., putting all aspects of the federal government under the control of the president—is a prescription for authoritarianism and abuse.}}</ref> or to the vast majority of democracies (including U.S. states and local governments) that give their executive leader less power.<ref name=":18">{{Cite web |last1=Hennessey |first1=Susan |last2=Wittes |first2=Benjamin |date=2020-01-21 |title=The Disintegration of the American Presidency |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/trump-myth-unitary-executive/605062/ |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=The Atlantic |language=en |quote=But the American system gets sticky when you contemplate vesting the executive power in one person who cannot be easily removed when that person is as mercurial and peculiar as Trump. In such situations, the structure can start to seem downright reckless. In concentrating power so that this person directs the federal government to do things—and in making this person exceptionally difficult to depose for a protracted period of time—one has to have a certain amount of confidence in that person's intentions and abilities.}}</ref><ref name=":13" /><ref name=":8">{{Cite web |last1=Gersen |first1=Jacob |last2=Berry |first2=Christopher R. |date=March 2008 |title=The Unbundled Executive |type=none |url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?httpsredir=1&article=1349&context=public_law_and_legal_theory |publisher=University of Chicago |id=University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 214 |pages=10–11 |ssrn=1113543 |quote=Indeed, partial unbundling of executive authority is the norm rather than an exception in virtually all levels of non-national government units in the United States, of which there are more than 80,000. Authority that the governor or mayor would otherwise exercise is frequently given to a specific state or local officer. Often these officers are directly elected by the public. Other times they are elected by the legislature; other times still, they are appointed by another state official. These arrangements are only approximations of the unbundled executive ideal because they there is residual responsibility or authority for the policy in the general purpose executive&nbsp;... The average number of elected executive offices per state was 6.7 in 2002&nbsp;...}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last1=Berry |first1=Christopher R. |last2=Gersen |first2=Jacob E. |date=2008 |title=The Unbundled Executive |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27653959 |journal=[[The University of Chicago Law Review]] |volume=75 |issue=4 |pages=1399–1400 |jstor=27653959 |issn=0041-9494}}</ref>
+Beyond disputing its constitutionality,<ref name=":42" /><ref name=":14" /><ref name="Manheim Ides" /><ref name=":15" /> common criticisms include the ideas that the theory could lead to poor outcomes, including more corruption and less qualified employees.<ref name=":19">{{Cite web |last=Somin |first=Ilya |date=2018-05-03 |title=Rethinking the Unitary Executive |url=https://reason.com/volokh/2018/05/03/rethinking-the-unitary-executive/ |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Reason.com |language=en-US |quote=UPDATE: I perhaps should have mentioned the oft-made argument that maintaining a unitary executive—even when it comes to powers beyond the scope of the original meaning of the Constitution—is desirable because it enhances political accountability. Even if true, this claim is about what is pragmatically desirable, not about the text and original meaning of the Constitution. But the claim is dubious even on its own terms. The greater the scope of executive power, the harder it is for rationally ignorant voters to keep track of more than a small fraction of it. Moreover, it becomes difficult to figure out how to weigh the president's performance in one area against what he does in others (assuming there is variation in quality, as will often be the case). It is therefore unlikely that concentrating a vast range of power in the hands of one person does much to enhance accountability.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Pilkington |first=Ed |date=2024-06-07 |title=Trump plots capture of DoJ in renewed assault on US justice system |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/07/trump-justice-department |access-date=2024-07-19 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077 |quote='That's what happens in authoritarian states – there is a semblance of a legal system, but it becomes useless,' she said. 'If that happens here it would be extremely troubling. We're not there yet. But I do think a second term could cause significant damage that may or may not be permanent.'}}</ref><ref name=":20">{{Cite magazine |date=July 13, 2023 |title=How MAGA Republicans plan to make Donald Trump's second term count |url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/07/13/how-maga-republicans-plan-to-make-donald-trumps-second-term-count |access-date=2024-07-19 |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613 |quote=One reason for the professionalisation of the bureaucracy in the 19th century was to provide the ship of state with enough ballast to keep sailing from one administration to the next&nbsp;... The vain and tyrannical whims of an emperor-president would emerge from the rubble.}}</ref> Some critics point to countries where similar changes to a more unitary executive have resulted in [[democratic backsliding]],<ref name=":17">{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=548, 550–551 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S. |quote=Turning devoted public servants into mere servants of their master and by privileging presidential desires over institutional expertise and independence, the theory risks turning the chief executive into an absolute monarch. Moreover, by enlarging the already considerable powers of the presidency, it threatens to upset the country's delicate inter-branch balance by relegating Congress and the judiciary to inferior status&nbsp;... Trump showed us what happens when you support the use of such power with a person who appears to care little about the institution, the Constitution, or America's democracy. ... Thus the United States could see the unitary executive theory employed to significantly erode basic democratic principles.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Howell |first1=William |author-link=William G. Howell |last2=Moe |first2=Terry |author-link2=Terry M. Moe |date=2021-11-01 |title=Analysis {{!}} Big government vastly expanded presidential power. Republicans use it to sabotage the administrative state |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/01/big-government-vastly-expanded-presidential-power-republicans-use-it-sabotage-administrative-state/ |access-date=2024-07-20 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286 |quote=The unitary executive theory provides a veneer of legal authority for an authoritarian-inclined president to engage in a range of anti-democratic behaviors. By the time George W. Bush had shown what the unitary executive could justify – torturing prisoners, surveilling ordinary citizens, ignoring congressional statutes – constitutional scholars were already pointing to presidents as the chief threat to American democracy. With the rise of right-wing populism and the election of Trump in 2016, this threat was magnified by the accompanying transformation of the Republican Party itself, with its elites in Washington and around the country abetting Trump's authoritarian behavior in office&nbsp;... The Republican Party is now an anti-democracy party, and its future presidents – empowered by the unitary executive theory – threaten the fundamentals of the U.S. democratic system&nbsp;... Democrats have been complicit, but Republicans have pushed the trajectory beyond democratic bounds.}}</ref><ref name=":13">{{Cite journal |last=Driesen |first=David |date=2020-11-01 |title=The Unitary Executive Theory in Comparative Context |url=https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol72/iss1/1 |journal=[[UC Law Journal]] |volume=72 |issue=1 |pages=1 |issn=0017-8322}}</ref><ref name=":16">{{Cite web |last=Greenhut |first=Steven |date=2024-06-28 |title=Project 2025: The Heritage Foundation's plan to embrace bigger government during Trump's second term |url=https://reason.com/2024/06/28/project-2025-the-conservative-agenda-to-embrace-bigger-government-during-trumps-second-term/ |access-date=2024-07-11 |website=[[Reason (magazine)|Reason]] |language=en-US |quote=But implementing what critics call 'unitary executive theory'—i.e., putting all aspects of the federal government under the control of the president—is a prescription for authoritarianism and abuse.}}</ref> or to the vast majority of democracies (including U.S. states and local governments) that give their executive leader less power.<ref name=":18">{{Cite web |last1=Hennessey |first1=Susan |last2=Wittes |first2=Benjamin |date=2020-01-21 |title=The Disintegration of the American Presidency |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/trump-myth-unitary-executive/605062/ |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=The Atlantic |language=en |quote=But the American system gets sticky when you contemplate vesting the executive power in one person who cannot be easily removed when that person is as mercurial and peculiar as Trump. In such situations, the structure can start to seem downright reckless. In concentrating power so that this person directs the federal government to do things—and in making this person exceptionally difficult to depose for a protracted period of time—one has to have a certain amount of confidence in that person's intentions and abilities.}}</ref><ref name=":13" /><ref name=":8">{{Cite web |last1=Gersen |first1=Jacob |last2=Berry |first2=Christopher R. |date=March 2008 |title=The Unbundled Executive |type=none |url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?httpsredir=1&article=1349&context=public_law_and_legal_theory |publisher=University of Chicago |id=University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 214 |pages=10–11 |ssrn=1113543 |quote=Indeed, partial unbundling of executive authority is the norm rather than an exception in virtually all levels of non-national government units in the United States, of which there are more than 80,000. Authority that the governor or mayor would otherwise exercise is frequently given to a specific state or local officer. Often these officers are directly elected by the public. Other times they are elected by the legislature; other times still, they are appointed by another state official. These arrangements are only approximations of the unbundled executive ideal because they there is residual responsibility or authority for the policy in the general purpose executive&nbsp;... The average number of elected executive offices per state was 6.7 in 2002&nbsp;...}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last1=Berry |first1=Christopher R. |last2=Gersen |first2=Jacob E. |date=2008 |title=The Unbundled Executive |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27653959 |journal=[[The University of Chicago Law Review]] |volume=75 |issue=4 |pages=1399–1400 |jstor=27653959 |issn=0041-9494}}</ref>
 ==Terminology==
-The term "unitary executive" dates back to the Reagan administration,<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":11" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":12" /> though supporters of the unitary executive theory, sometimes referred to as "unitarians", contend the principle goes back to the founding.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=540 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S. |quote=The term 'unitary executive' dates to the 1980s, but unitarians contend that the idea goes back to the founding era.}}</ref>
+The term "unitary executive" dates back to the Reagan administration,<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":11" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":12" /> but supporters of the unitary executive theory, sometimes referred to as "unitarians", contend the principle dates to the founding.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=540 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S. |quote=The term 'unitary executive' dates to the 1980s, but unitarians contend that the idea goes back to the founding era.}}</ref> There is no canonical interpretation of the theory, with different academics defining it differently.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=539 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-29 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |quote=There is no one canonical account of the unitary executive theory, though various academics have provided their own characterizations of it. (See Calabresi and Yoo (2008), Barilleaux and Kelley (2010), Dodds (2019), Crouch et al. (2020), and Skowronek et al. (2021).) |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S.}}</ref> Some distinguish between stronger and weaker versions; most contemporary definitions focus on one of the theory's stronger versions. Broadly speaking, strong versions of the theory hold that the President has control over all officials in the executive branch; a weak version holds that Congress can significantly limit the President's authority, despite residing in a separate branch of government.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/714860 | doi=10.1086/714860 | title=The Unitary Executive: Past, Present, Future | date=2021 | last1=Sunstein | first1=Cass R. | last2=Vermeule | first2=Adrian | journal=The Supreme Court Review | volume=2020 | pages=83–117 }}</ref>
-There is no canonical interpretation of the theory, with different definitions by different academics.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |chapter=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |title=Leadership and Politics |pages=539 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-29 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |quote=There is no one canonical account of the unitary executive theory, though various academics have provided their own characterizations of it. (See Calabresi and Yoo (2008), Barilleaux and Kelley (2010), Dodds (2019), Crouch et al. (2020), and Skowronek et al. (2021).) |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S.}}</ref> Some distinguish between stronger and weaker versions, though most contemporary definitions focus on one of the stronger versions of the theory.
 ==Theory==
@@ Line 20: / Line 20: @@
 === Vesting Clause ===
-The [[Executive Vesting Clause|Vesting Clause]] of [[Article Two of the United States Constitution|Article II]], perhaps the most cited clause in favor of a stronger executive, reads, "The executive Power [of the United States] shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Some have suggested that interpreting the vesting clause is difficult and may have simply been an attempt by the founders to reject the idea of an executive council, which was widely discussed at the time, rather than advocating a strong executive.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/on1163936736 |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |edition=New |location=New York City |pages=29 |oclc=on1163936736}}</ref> Jan Hadelsman Shugerman looks at the context of how the word "vest" was used before the constitution, finding that it may signify significantly less completeness in the power it gives than it seems today.<ref name=":25" /> Other scholars maintain that the vesting clause is clear and that, "At a minimum, [the] Vesting Clause establishes an executive office to be occupied by an individual."<ref name=":24">{{cite web |last1=Prakash |first1=Saikrishna B. |author-link=Saikrishna Prakash |last2=Schroeder |first2=Christopher H. |author-link2=Christopher H. Schroeder |title=Interpretation and Debate: The Vesting Clause |url=https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/articles/article-ii/clauses/347#:~:text=Schroeder,-Charles%20S.&text=The%20opening%20sentence%20of%20Article,laws%20of%20the%20United%20States. |access-date=July 29, 2024 |website=[[National Constitution Center]] |language=en}}</ref> In 2020, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that, under the Vesting Clause, "the entire 'executive Power' belongs to the President alone".<ref>{{cite court|litigants=Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau|vol=591|reporter=U.S.|opinion=197|pinpoint=2197|court=|year=2021|url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/19-7/}}</ref>
+The [[Executive Vesting Clause|Vesting Clause]] of [[Article Two of the United States Constitution|Article II]], perhaps the most cited clause in favor of a stronger executive, reads, "The executive Power [of the United States] shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Some have suggested that interpreting the vesting clause is difficult and may have simply been an attempt by the founders to reject the idea of an executive council, which was widely discussed at the time, rather than advocating a strong executive.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/on1163936736 |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |edition=New |location=New York City |pages=29 |oclc=on1163936736}}</ref> Jed Handelsman Shugerman looks at the context of how the word "vest" was used before the constitution, finding that it may signify significantly less completeness in the power it gives than it seems today.<ref name=":25" /> Other scholars maintain that the vesting clause is clear and that, "At a minimum, [the] Vesting Clause establishes an executive office to be occupied by an individual."<ref name=":24">{{cite web |last1=Prakash |first1=Saikrishna B. |author-link=Saikrishna Prakash |last2=Schroeder |first2=Christopher H. |author-link2=Christopher H. Schroeder |title=Interpretation and Debate: The Vesting Clause |url=https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/articles/article-ii/clauses/347 |access-date=July 29, 2024 |website=[[National Constitution Center]] |language=en}}</ref> In 2020, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that, under the Vesting Clause, "the entire 'executive Power' belongs to the President alone".<ref>{{cite court|litigants=Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau|vol=591|reporter=U.S.|opinion=197|pinpoint=2197|court=|year=2021|url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/19-7/}}</ref>
 === Take Care Clause ===
@@ Line 26: / Line 26: @@
 === Opinion Clause ===
-Opponents also point to the [[Opinion clause]], which states only that a president may ask for the opinion in writing of a department officer about any subject related to their department, which seems superfluous if the president was supposed to have extensive power.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Strauss |first=Peter L. |author-link=Peter L. Strauss |date=2024-03-05 |title=Overseer or 'The Decider'? The American President in Administrative Law |url=https://faculti.net/overseer-or-the-decider/ |access-date=2024-07-13 |website=[[Faculti]] |language=en-US |type=Video lecture}}</ref>
+Opponents of the theory point to the [[Opinion clause]], which says only that a president may ask for the opinion in writing of a department officer about any subject related to their department, which seems superfluous if the president was supposed to have extensive power.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Strauss |first=Peter L. |author-link=Peter L. Strauss |date=2024-03-05 |title=Overseer or 'The Decider'? The American President in Administrative Law |url=https://faculti.net/overseer-or-the-decider/ |access-date=2024-07-13 |website=[[Faculti]] |language=en-US |type=Video lecture}}</ref>
 === King of Great Britain ===
-Proponents have made claims about the powers wielded by the [[King of Great Britain]] (often inaccurately referred to in this context as the "King of England") at the time of the founding and their relationship to the founding intent of the executive branch to justify the theory. But the actual powers held by the Crown are disputed by legal historians as "conventional wisdoms", as parliament held significant power over appointments and dismissals of some executive personnel, while others served for life and were independent of the king. Law professor Daniel Birk argues there was no evidence that the king had such powers outside specific areas like foreign policy and the military, saying the king could not direct most law enforcement, regulatory or administrative officials.<ref name=":6" /> Invoking the king as an argument for expanded executive power was first made by the Supreme Court in ''[[Myers v. United States]]'' (1926), a decision delivered by Chief Justice [[William Howard Taft]], a former president of the United States.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal |last=Birk |first=Daniel D. |date=January 2021 |title=Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive |url=https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2021/01/Birk-73-Stan.-L.-Rev.-175.pdf |journal=[[Stanford Law Review]] |volume=45 |issue=6 |pages=2177 |doi= |issn=0038-9765 |quote=As this Article shows, however, the unitarians' claims about the original meaning of the executive power are largely unfounded. The ability to remove executive officials was not one of the prerogative powers of the British Crown. Moreover, the King neither appointed nor was able to remove all of his principal officers, many of whom held their offices for life or pursuant to other forms of tenure and who operated independent of the King's direction or control.}}</ref> Eric Nelson argued that some Founders wanted more checks on a president because unlike a hereditary monarch, their well-being was not as intrinsically tied to the nation.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Nelson |first=Eric |date=July 9, 2024 |title=Justice Sotomayor was right for the wrong reasons |url=https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2024/07/09/justice-sotomayor-was-right-for-the-wrong-reasons |access-date=2024-07-11 |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>
+Proponents have made claims about the powers wielded by the [[King of Great Britain]] (often inaccurately referred to in this context as the "King of England") at the time of the founding and their relationship to the founding intent of the executive branch to justify the theory. The actual powers held by the Crown are disputed by legal historians as "conventional wisdoms", as Parliament held significant power over appointments and dismissals of some executive personnel, while others served for life and were independent of the king. Law professor Daniel Birk argues there was no evidence that the king had such powers outside specific areas like foreign policy and the military, saying the king could not direct most law enforcement, regulatory or administrative officials.<ref name=":6" /> Invoking the king as an argument for expanded executive power was first made by the Supreme Court in ''[[Myers v. United States]]'' (1926), a decision delivered by Chief Justice [[William Howard Taft]], a former president of the United States.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal |last=Birk |first=Daniel D. |date=January 2021 |title=Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive |url=https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2021/01/Birk-73-Stan.-L.-Rev.-175.pdf |journal=[[Stanford Law Review]] |volume=45 |issue=6 |pages=2177 |doi= |issn=0038-9765 |quote=As this Article shows, however, the unitarians' claims about the original meaning of the executive power are largely unfounded. The ability to remove executive officials was not one of the prerogative powers of the British Crown. Moreover, the King neither appointed nor was able to remove all of his principal officers, many of whom held their offices for life or pursuant to other forms of tenure and who operated independent of the King's direction or control.}}</ref> Eric Nelson argued that some Founders wanted more checks on a president because unlike a hereditary monarch, their well-being was not as intrinsically tied to the nation.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Nelson |first=Eric |date=July 9, 2024 |title=Justice Sotomayor was right for the wrong reasons |url=https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2024/07/09/justice-sotomayor-was-right-for-the-wrong-reasons |access-date=2024-07-11 |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>
 === Discussion ===
@@ Line 36: / Line 36: @@
 Most believers in the theory think that, "at a minimum, the President should be able to remove all executive-branch officers, including the heads of [[Independent agencies of the United States government|independent regulatory agencies]], at any time and for any reason."<ref name=":62">{{Cite journal |last=Birk |first=Daniel D. |date=January 2021 |title=Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive |url=https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2021/01/Birk-73-Stan.-L.-Rev.-175.pdf |journal=[[Stanford Law Review]] |volume=45 |issue=6 |pages=2177 |doi= |issn=0038-9765 |quote=See CALABRESI & YOO , supra note 1, at 3-4; see also, e.g., Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 A LA. L. Rev. 1205, 1225 (2014) (asserting that '[f]or adequate constitutional control of execution, the President must have the possibility of directing discretionary legal duties, even those assigned to other officers,' and thus must be able to remove all executive officers, including the heads of independent agencies); John Harrison, Addition by Subtraction, 92 VA. L. Rev. 1853, 1859–62 (2006) (characterizing executive-branch officers as 'agents' of the President whom the President must be able to remove if they do not retain his trust); cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 724 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the President must have 'plenary power to remove [all] principal officers,' but that inferior officers can be made 'removable for cause' so long as their appointing officers can dismiss them for 'the failure to accept supervision' (emphasis omitted))}}</ref> Proponents of a strong unitary theory argue that the president possesses ''all'' the executive power and can therefore control subordinate officers and agencies of the executive branch. This implies that Congress's power to remove executive agencies or officers from presidential control is limited. Thus, under the strongly unitary executive theory, independent agencies and counsels are unconstitutional to the extent that they exercise discretionary executive power not controlled by the president.<ref name="plural" /> But independent regulatory commissions have existed for at least a century, and removal protections for their commissioners were upheld by the Supreme Court in ''[[Humphrey's Executor v. United States]]'' (1935). Some interpret the unitary executive theory to mean that [[United States federal courts|federal courts]] cannot adjudicate disputes between [[List of United States federal agencies|agencies]], arguing it would violate the doctrine of [[separation of powers]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=Latham |first=Joshua |year=2000 |title=The Military Munitions Rule and Environmental Regulation of Munitions |url=http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/bcealr/27_3/04_FMS.htm |journal=[[Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review]] |location=Boston, Massachusetts |publisher=[[Boston College]] |volume=27 |page=467}}</ref>
-Others have pointed to the indirect selection of the president as not designed to put a strong president into office. The framers expected measured analysis by specially chosen electors who would act to choose a safe presidential candidate, and if none could be found, rely on Congress to choose one, and potentially negotiate power.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |location=New York City |pages=37}}</ref>
+Others have pointed to the indirect selection of the president as not designed to put a strong president into office. The framers expected measured analysis by specially chosen electors who would act to choose a safe presidential candidate, and if none could be found, rely on Congress to choose one, and potentially negotiate power.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |location=New York City |pages=37}}</ref> More extreme forms of the theory have developed according to which the president's wishes may supersede the law. Former [[White House Counsel]] [[John Dean]] said: "In its most extreme form, unitary executive theory can mean that neither Congress nor the federal courts can tell the President what to do or how to do it, particularly regarding national security matters."<ref name="Dean">{{cite book |last= Dean |first= John |url= https://archive.org/details/brokengovernment00dean |url-access= registration |title= Broken Government |page= [https://archive.org/details/brokengovernment00dean/page/102 102] |publisher= Viking |year= 2007|isbn= 9780670018208 }}</ref> In 2019, law professor [[Ilya Somin]] argued that "no serious advocate of the theory claims that anything the president does is legal"—just within the powers vested in the executive branch.<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last=Greenberg |first=Jon |title=What Vice gets right and wrong about Dick Cheney |url=https://www.politifact.com/article/2019/feb/08/vice-what-movie-gets-right-and-wrong/ |date=8 February 2019 |access-date=2024-07-11 |website=[[Politifact]] |language=en-US}}</ref> There is disagreement about the doctrine's strength and scope. In 2008, [[Steven Calabresi]] and [[Christopher Yoo]] said the unitary executive theory ensured that "the federal government will execute the law in a consistent manner and in accordance with the president's wishes".<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Calabresi |first1=Steven |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4sJhrLROSc8C |title=The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush |last2=Yoo |first2=John |year=2008 |pages=3|publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-14538-0 }}</ref> This stands in contrast to other scholarly literature, such as MacKenzie in 2008{{Citation needed|date=July 2024}} and Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger in 2020,<ref name=":1" /> that stresses that federal employees must faithfully execute the laws enacted according to the process the Constitution prescribes.
-More extreme forms of the theory have developed in which the president’s wishes exceed the law. Former [[White House Counsel]] [[John Dean]] explains: "In its most extreme form, unitary executive theory can mean that neither Congress nor the federal courts can tell the President what to do or how to do it, particularly regarding national security matters."<ref name="Dean">{{cite book |last= Dean |first= John |url= https://archive.org/details/brokengovernment00dean |url-access= registration |title= Broken Government |page= [https://archive.org/details/brokengovernment00dean/page/102 102] |publisher= Viking |year= 2007|isbn= 9780670018208 }}</ref> Law Professor [[Ilya Somin]] argued in 2019 that "no serious advocate of the theory claims that anything the president does is legal" – just within the powers vested in the executive branch.<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last=Greenberg |first=Jon |title=What Vice gets right and wrong about Dick Cheney |url=https://www.politifact.com/article/2019/feb/08/vice-what-movie-gets-right-and-wrong/ |access-date=2024-07-11 |website=[[Politifact]] |language=en-US}}</ref>
-There is disagreement about the doctrine's strength and scope. In 2008, [[Steven Calabresi]] and [[Christopher Yoo]] described the unitary executive theory as ensuring "the federal government will execute the law in a consistent manner and in accordance with the president's wishes".<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Calabresi |first1=Steven |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4sJhrLROSc8C |title=The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush |last2=Yoo |first2=John |year=2008 |pages=3|publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-14538-0 }}</ref> This stands in contrast to other scholarly literature, such as MacKenzie in 2008{{Citation needed|date=July 2024}} and Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger in 2020,<ref name=":1" /> that stresses that federal employees have to faithfully execute the laws enacted according to the process the Constitution prescribes.
 == Background ==
 === Founding debate of one or multiple executives ===
-The phrase "unitary executive" was discussed as early as the [[Philadelphia Convention]] in 1787, and referred only to having a single individual fill the office of president, as proposed in the [[Virginia Plan]]. The alternative was to have several executives or an executive council, as proposed in the [[New Jersey Plan]] and as promoted by [[Elbridge Gerry]], [[Edmund Randolph]], and [[George Mason]].<ref>{{cite book |title=The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates |publisher=Signet Classic |year=1986 |editor-last=Ketchum |editor-first=Ralph |page=67 |quote=Mr. [James] Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans [i.e. the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan] ... These were ... A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one—a plurality is held out in the other.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |year=1787 |title=Records of the Federal Convention, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 1 |url=http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_1_1s4.html |work=The Founder's Constitution}}</ref>
+The phrase "unitary executive" was discussed as early as the [[Philadelphia Convention]] in 1787, and referred only to having a single individual fill the office of president, as proposed in the [[Virginia Plan]]. The alternative was to have several executives or an executive council, as proposed in the [[New Jersey Plan]] and as promoted by [[Elbridge Gerry]], [[Edmund Randolph]], and [[George Mason]].<ref>{{cite book |title=The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates |publisher=Signet Classic |year=1986 |editor-last=Ketchum |editor-first=Ralph |page=67 |quote=Mr. [James] Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans [i.e. the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan] ... These were ... A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one—a plurality is held out in the other.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |year=1787 |title=Records of the Federal Convention, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 1 |url=http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_1_1s4.html |work=The Founder's Constitution}}</ref> [[James Madison]] was a leading advocate of the unitary executive and successfully argued in favor of the president's power to remove administrative appointees under the Constitution in the [[Decision of 1789]]. Madison said in 1789, "if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws." He had reservations about removal power extending to the [[comptroller]] of the Treasury Department, as he believed that office would share both judicial and executive responsibilities. Other legislators, such as [[Theodore Sedgwick]], [[Michael Jenifer Stone]], and [[Egbert Benson]] argued that the role would primarily be executive and should fall under the president's power. Madison ultimately withdrew his proposal to exempt the comptroller from the president's removal power.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-02-14 |title=How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/2/14/21135083/justice-scalia-bill-barr-trump-unitary-executive-no-rule-of-law-morrison-olson |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |first1=Schmitt |last1=Gary |first2=John |last2=Roach |date=June 2022 |title=A Madisonian Footnote to the Unitary Executive |url=https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/A-Madisonian-Footnote-to-the-Unitary-Executive.pdf?x85095 |work=AEI |language=en-US |access-date=24 October 2024 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |date=January 24, 2017 |title= The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power |last=Harrison |first=John |url=https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-unitary-executive-and-the-scope-of-executive-power |journal=The Yale Law Journal |volume=126}}</ref>
-[[James Madison]] was a leading advocate of the unitary executive and successfully argued in favor of the president's power to remove administrative appointees under the Constitution in the [[Decision of 1789]]. Madison said in 1789, "if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws." He had reservations about removal power extending to the [[comptroller]] of the Treasury Department, as he believed such that office would share both judicial and executive responsibilities. Other legislators, such as [[Theodore Sedgwick]], [[Michael Jenifer Stone]], and [[Egbert Benson]] argued that the role would primarily be executive and should fall under the president's power. Madison ultimately withdrew his proposal to exempt the comptroller from the president's removal power.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-02-14 |title=How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/2/14/21135083/justice-scalia-bill-barr-trump-unitary-executive-no-rule-of-law-morrison-olson |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |first1 = Schmitt |last1 = Gary |first2 = John| last2 = Roach|date=June 2022|title=A Madisonian Footnote to the Unitary Executive |url=https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/A-Madisonian-Footnote-to-the-Unitary-Executive.pdf?x85095 |work=AEI |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |date = January 24, 2017 |title= The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power | last = Harrison |first = John |url=https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-unitary-executive-and-the-scope-of-executive-power| journal = The Yale Law Journal | volume = 126}}</ref>
-In 1788, the pseudonymous letters of the [[Federal Farmer]] defended the proposed unitary executive, arguing that "a single man seems to be peculiarly well circumstanced to superintend the execution of laws with discernment and decision, with promptitude and uniformity."<ref>{{cite book |last=Ellis |first=Richard |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ybmeEcpEvlsC&q=%22superintend+the+execution+of+laws+with+discernment+and+decision%22&pg=PA39 |title=Founding the American Presidency |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |year=1999 |isbn=9780847694990 |location=Lanham, Maryland |page=39}}</ref>
-In [[Federalist No. 77]], [[Alexander Hamilton]] wrote with regard to the [[United States Senate|Senate]] and presidential appointments that "The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint". Hamilton's usage of "displace" has traditionally been thought to mean "removal", and thus a limit on presidential power. Other legal scholars have interpreted "displace" to mean replacement of an appointee with another, not removal itself.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-02-14 |title=How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/2/14/21135083/justice-scalia-bill-barr-trump-unitary-executive-no-rule-of-law-morrison-olson |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1= Tillman |first1= Seth |date= January 1, 2010 |title= The puzzle of Hamilton's Federalist No. 77.|url= https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2010/01/tillman.pdf |journal= 	Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 1, 2020 |title=Justice Kagan on Hamilton in Federalist No. 77 |url=https://reason.com/volokh/2020/07/01/justice-kagan-on-hamilton-in-federalist-no-77/ |website=Reason |language=en-US}}</ref>
+In 1788, the pseudonymous letters of the [[Federal Farmer]] defended the proposed unitary executive, arguing that "a single man seems to be peculiarly well circumstanced to superintend the execution of laws with discernment and decision, with promptitude and uniformity."<ref>{{cite book |last=Ellis |first=Richard |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ybmeEcpEvlsC&q=%22superintend+the+execution+of+laws+with+discernment+and+decision%22&pg=PA39 |title=Founding the American Presidency |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |year=1999 |isbn=9780847694990 |location=Lanham, Maryland |page=39}}</ref> In [[Federalist No. 77]], [[Alexander Hamilton]] wrote with regard to the [[United States Senate|Senate]] and presidential appointments that "The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint". Hamilton's usage of "displace" has traditionally been thought to mean "removal", and thus a limit on presidential power. Other legal scholars have interpreted "displace" to mean replacement of an appointee with another, not removal itself.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-02-14 |title=How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/2/14/21135083/justice-scalia-bill-barr-trump-unitary-executive-no-rule-of-law-morrison-olson |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=[[Vox.com]] |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1= Tillman |first1= Seth |date= January 1, 2010 |title= The puzzle of Hamilton's Federalist No. 77.|url= https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2010/01/tillman.pdf |journal= 	Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |first=Josh |last=Blackman |access-date=24 October 2024 |date=July 1, 2020 |title=Justice Kagan on Hamilton in Federalist No. 77 |url=https://reason.com/volokh/2020/07/01/justice-kagan-on-hamilton-in-federalist-no-77/ |website=[[Reason (magazine)|Reason]] |language=en-US}}</ref>
 === Judicial decisions ===
 {{See also|Marbury v. Madison}}
-In the 1926 case of ''[[Myers v. United States]]'', the United States Supreme Court decided that the president has the exclusive power to remove executive branch officials, and does not need the approval of the Senate or any other legislative body.{{Primary source inline|date=July 2024}} The court also wrote:
+In the 1926 case of ''[[Myers v. United States]]'', the United States Supreme Court ruled that the president has the exclusive power to remove executive branch officials, and does not need the approval of the Senate or any other legislative body.{{Primary source inline|date=July 2024}} The court also wrote:
 <blockquote>The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power, and he may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which article 2 of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.<ref>{{cite court|litigants=Myers v. United States|vol=272|reporter=U.S.|opinion=52|pinpoint=|court=|year=1926|url=http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=272&page=52}}</ref></blockquote>
-Subsequent cases such as ''[[Humphrey's Executor v. United States]]'' (presidential removal of certain kinds of officers), ''[[United States v. Nixon]]'' (executive privilege), and ''[[Bowsher v. Synar]]'' (control of executive functions) have flexed the doctrine's reach back and forth. [[Antonin Scalia|Justice Scalia]] in his solitary dissent in ''[[Morrison v. Olson]]'' argued for an unlimited presidential removal power of all persons exercising executive branch powers, which he argued included the [[independent counsel]]; the court disagreed, but later moved closer to Scalia's position in ''[[Edmond v. United States]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Calabresi |first1=Steven |last2=Lawson |first2=Gary |name-list-style=amp |year=2007 |title=The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia |url=http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/107/4/Calabresi-Lawson.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=[[Columbia Law Review]] |volume=107 |pages=1002–1047 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090306120412/http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/107/4/Calabresi-Lawson.pdf |archive-date=6 March 2009}}</ref> Many of the proponents clerked for Justice Scalia.<ref name=":13" />
+Subsequent cases such as ''[[Humphrey's Executor v. United States]]'' (presidential removal of certain kinds of officers), and ''[[Bowsher v. Synar]]'' (control of executive functions) have flexed the doctrine's reach back and forth. [[Antonin Scalia|Justice Scalia]] in his solitary dissent in ''[[Morrison v. Olson]]'' argued for an unlimited presidential removal power of all persons exercising executive branch powers, which he argued included the [[independent counsel]]; the court disagreed, but later moved closer to Scalia's position in ''[[Edmond v. United States]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Calabresi |first1=Steven |last2=Lawson |first2=Gary |name-list-style=amp |year=2007 |title=The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia |url=http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/107/4/Calabresi-Lawson.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=[[Columbia Law Review]] |volume=107 |pages=1002–1047 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090306120412/http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/107/4/Calabresi-Lawson.pdf |archive-date=6 March 2009}}</ref> Many of the proponents clerked for Justice Scalia.<ref name=":13" />
-In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed more support for the theory.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=List of court cases relevant to executive appointment and removal power |url=https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_court_cases_relevant_to_executive_appointment_and_removal_power|access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Ballotpedia |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sitaraman|first=Ganesh|date=2020|title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power|journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=134|pages=380}}</ref> In ''[[Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau]]'' and ''[[Collins v. Yellen]]'', the Court held that some attempts to curtail presidential removal power of agencies with a single director violate the [[Separation of powers under the United States Constitution|separation of powers]]. Justice Samuel Alito went so far as to write, "The Constitution prohibits even 'modest restrictions' on the President's power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer." The Court reiterated that the only exceptions to the president's removal power were those precedents found in ''Humphrey's Executor'' and ''Morrison''.<ref name="reason decision">{{cite web | url = https://reason.com/2020/06/29/with-chief-in-charge-scotus-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law-and-eliminates-cfpb-independence/ | title = With Chief in Charge, SCOTUS Strikes Down Louisiana Abortion Law and Eliminates CFPB Independence | first = Jonathan | last = Adler | date = June 29, 2020 | access-date = August 5, 2024 | work = [[Reason (magazine)|Reason]] | archive-date = June 29, 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200629232919/https://reason.com/2020/06/29/with-chief-in-charge-scotus-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law-and-eliminates-cfpb-independence/ | url-status = live }}</ref> The four justices appointed by a Democratic president dissented in ''Seila'', arguing that the constitution makes no such claims.<ref name=":252">{{Cite journal |last=Sitaraman |first=Ganesh |author-link=Ganesh Sitaraman |date=2020 |title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power |url=https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/134-Harv.-L.-Rev.-352.pdf |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=134 |pages=380 |quote=Justice Kagan dissented from the constitutional analysis, along with the three other liberal Justices. In an opinion filled with sharp, cutting language, Justice Kagan protested that there was nothing neutral about the majority’s reasoning or its unitary executive theory of the separation of powers. She systematically argued that 'constitutional text, history, and precedent invalidate the majority’s thesis.' Justice Kagan even accused the majority of 'gerrymander[ing]' their 'made up' rule to strike down the CFPB’s independent structure. For a separation of powers case, this was about as bloody a fight as it gets.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-06-29 |title=The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21307083/supreme-court-cfpb-seila-law-chief-justice-john-roberts-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref> ''Collins'' was a very similar case taken up the next year, and the precedent of ''Seila'' was applied to ''Collins'' in a 7-2 ruling.<ref>{{cite web |date=June 23, 2021 |title=U.S. Supreme Court bolsters presidential power over housing finance agency |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/23/us-supreme-court-bolsters-presidential-power-over-housing-finance-agency.html |accessdate=June 23, 2021 |work=[[CNBC]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite court|litigants=Collins v. Yellen |vol=594|reporter=U.S.|opinion=220|pinpoint=|court=|year=2021|url=https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-06-29 |title=The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21307083/supreme-court-cfpb-seila-law-chief-justice-john-roberts-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-08-06 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref>
+In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed more support for the theory.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=List of court cases relevant to executive appointment and removal power |url=https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_court_cases_relevant_to_executive_appointment_and_removal_power|access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Ballotpedia |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sitaraman|first=Ganesh|date=2020|title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power|journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=134|pages=380}}</ref> In ''[[Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau]]'' and ''[[Collins v. Yellen]]'', the Court held that some attempts to curtail presidential removal power of agencies with a single director violate the [[Separation of powers under the United States Constitution|separation of powers]]. Justice Samuel Alito went so far as to write, "The Constitution prohibits even 'modest restrictions' on the President's power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer." The Court reiterated that the only exceptions to the president's removal power were those precedents found in ''Humphrey's Executor'' and ''Morrison''.<ref name="reason decision">{{cite web | url = https://reason.com/2020/06/29/with-chief-in-charge-scotus-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law-and-eliminates-cfpb-independence/ | title = With Chief in Charge, SCOTUS Strikes Down Louisiana Abortion Law and Eliminates CFPB Independence | first = Jonathan | last = Adler | date = June 29, 2020 | access-date = August 5, 2024 | work = [[Reason (magazine)|Reason]] | archive-date = June 29, 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200629232919/https://reason.com/2020/06/29/with-chief-in-charge-scotus-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law-and-eliminates-cfpb-independence/ | url-status = live }}</ref> The four justices appointed by a Democratic president dissented in ''Seila'', arguing that the constitution makes no such claims.<ref name=":252">{{Cite journal |last=Sitaraman |first=Ganesh |author-link=Ganesh Sitaraman |date=2020 |title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power |url=https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/134-Harv.-L.-Rev.-352.pdf |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=134 |pages=380 |quote=Justice Kagan dissented from the constitutional analysis, along with the three other liberal Justices. In an opinion filled with sharp, cutting language, Justice Kagan protested that there was nothing neutral about the majority’s reasoning or its unitary executive theory of the separation of powers. She systematically argued that 'constitutional text, history, and precedent invalidate the majority’s thesis.' Justice Kagan even accused the majority of 'gerrymander[ing]' their 'made up' rule to strike down the CFPB’s independent structure. For a separation of powers case, this was about as bloody a fight as it gets.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-06-29 |title=The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21307083/supreme-court-cfpb-seila-law-chief-justice-john-roberts-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref> ''Collins'' was a very similar case taken up the next year, and the precedent of ''Seila'' was applied to ''Collins'' in a 7−2 ruling.<ref>{{cite web |date=June 23, 2021 |title=U.S. Supreme Court bolsters presidential power over housing finance agency |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/23/us-supreme-court-bolsters-presidential-power-over-housing-finance-agency.html |agency=[[Reuters]] |accessdate=June 23, 2021 |work=[[CNBC]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite court|litigants=Collins v. Yellen |vol=594|reporter=U.S.|opinion=220|pinpoint=|court=|year=2021|url=https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-06-29 |title=The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21307083/supreme-court-cfpb-seila-law-chief-justice-john-roberts-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-08-06 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref>
 === Growth of presidential powers ===
-The power of the presidency has grown since the 1970s due to key events and to Congress or the Courts not being willing or able to rein in presidential power.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/on1163936736 |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |edition=New |location=New York, NY |pages=200 |oclc=on1163936736}}</ref> With strong incentives to grow their own power, presidents of both parties became natural advocates for the theory<ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/on1163936736 |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |edition=New |location=New York, NY |pages=34 |oclc=on1163936736}}</ref> and rarely gave up powers exercised by their predecessors.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last=Thunberg |first=Michael E. |date=2021-12-01 |title=The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government |url=https://academic.oup.com/psq/article/136/4/770/6835193 |journal=Political Science Quarterly |language=en |volume=136 |issue=4 |pages=770–771 |doi=10.1002/polq.13274 |issn=0032-3195}}</ref> Republican presidents, including Trump, did not follow through on promises to use unitary executive power to shrink government, instead opting to use the adminstration to advance their policies.<ref name=":22" />
+The power of the presidency has grown since the 1970s due to key events and to Congress or the Courts not being willing or able to rein in presidential power.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/on1163936736 |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |edition=New |location=New York, NY |pages=200 |oclc=on1163936736}}</ref> With strong incentives to grow their own power, presidents of both parties became natural advocates for the theory<ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/on1163936736 |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |edition=New |location=New York, NY |pages=34 |oclc=on1163936736}}</ref> and rarely gave up powers exercised by their predecessors.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last=Thunberg |first=Michael E. |date=2021-12-01 |title=The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government |url=https://academic.oup.com/psq/article/136/4/770/6835193 |journal=Political Science Quarterly |language=en |volume=136 |issue=4 |pages=770–771 |doi=10.1002/polq.13274 |issn=0032-3195}}</ref> Republican presidents, including Trump, did not follow through on promises to use unitary executive power to shrink government, instead opting to use the administration to advance their policies.<ref name=":22" />
-The theory originated in conservative legal circles, most notably in the [[Federalist Society]].<ref name=":22" /> The Reagan administration took the advice in the ''[[Mandate for Leadership]]'' published by the [[The Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]] to hire 5000 enthusiastic supporters of the Reagan-Bush campaign to fill the 5000 new political appointee positions created by the [[Civil Service Reform Act of 1978|1978 Civil Service Reform Act]].<ref name=":4">{{Citation |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |title=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |work=Leadership and Politics |pages=542 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S.}}</ref> The administration also made use the [[Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs]], signed into law by [[Jimmy Carter]] in 1980, to short-circuit any regulations the administration did not agree with.<ref name=":4" /> The Reagan era is cited as a major catalyst in growing presidential power,<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":12">{{Cite news |last=Mosley |first=Tonya |date=December 14, 2023 |title=Why a second Trump administration may be more radical than the first |url=https://www.npr.org/2023/12/14/1219313919/why-a-second-trump-administration-may-be-more-radical-than-the-first |work=Fresh Air on NPR}}</ref> with significant growth post-9/11 as conservatives have most readily embraced the idea of a unitary executive.<ref name=":11">{{Cite news |last=Rosen |first=Jeffrey |date=July 2, 2024 |title=Immunity ruling continues a trend of expanding presidential power, scholar says |url=https://www.npr.org/2024/07/02/nx-s1-5026545/new-presidential-immunity-ruling-supreme-court-constitutional-scholar |work=NPR}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Krotoszynski |first=Ronald |date=December 10, 2020 |title=The Conservative Idea That Would Let Biden Seize Control of Washington |url=https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/10/nathan-simington-christopher-waller-fcc-federal-reserve-appointments-unitary-executive-authority-444136 |work=Politico}}</ref>
+The theory originated in conservative legal circles, most notably in the [[Federalist Society]].<ref name=":22" /> The Reagan administration took the advice in the ''[[Mandate for Leadership]]'' published by the [[The Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]] to hire 5000 enthusiastic supporters of the Reagan-Bush campaign to fill the 5000 new political appointee positions created by the [[Civil Service Reform Act of 1978|1978 Civil Service Reform Act]].<ref name=":4">{{Citation |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |title=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |work=Leadership and Politics |pages=542 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S.}}</ref> The administration also made use the [[Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs]], signed into law by [[Jimmy Carter]] in 1980, to short-circuit any regulations the administration did not agree with.<ref name=":4" /> The Reagan era is cited as a major catalyst in growing presidential power,<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":12">{{Cite news |last=Mosley |first=Tonya |date=December 14, 2023 |title=Why a second Trump administration may be more radical than the first |url=https://www.npr.org/2023/12/14/1219313919/why-a-second-trump-administration-may-be-more-radical-than-the-first |work=Fresh Air on NPR}}</ref> with significant growth post-9/11 as conservatives have most readily embraced the idea of a unitary executive.<ref name=":11">{{Cite news |last=Rosen |first=Jeffrey |date=July 2, 2024 |title=Immunity ruling continues a trend of expanding presidential power, scholar says |url=https://www.npr.org/2024/07/02/nx-s1-5026545/new-presidential-immunity-ruling-supreme-court-constitutional-scholar |work=[[All Things Considered]] |publisher=NPR |access-date=24 October 2024 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Krotoszynski |first=Ronald |date=December 10, 2020 |title=The Conservative Idea That Would Let Biden Seize Control of Washington |url=https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/10/nathan-simington-christopher-waller-fcc-federal-reserve-appointments-unitary-executive-authority-444136 |work=Politico}}</ref>
-[[Dick Cheney]] and the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|George W. Bush administration]] supported the theory.<ref name="Johnsen">{{cite journal |last=Johnsen |first=Dawn |author-link=Dawn Johnsen |date=April 2008 |title=What's a President To Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses |url=http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/JOHNSEN.pdf |journal=[[Boston University Law Review]] |volume=88 |page=395 |quote=On 363 occasions, President Bush objected to provisions that he found might conflict with the president's constitutional authority 'to supervise the unitary executive branch.'}}</ref> For example, Bush once wrote in a signing statement that he would, "construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power."<ref>{{cite news |last=Lazarus |first=Edward |date=January 5, 2006 |title=How Much Authority Does the President Possess When He Is Acting as 'Commander in Chief'? Evaluating President Bush's Claims Against a Key Supreme Court Executive Power Precedent |url=http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20060105.html |work=FindLaw |quote=That signed statement shows, in microcosm, how the President sees the separation of powers: The President, in his view of the world, can interpret away constraints on his power, such as those in the McCain Amendment, or FISA before it. And the courts can hardly question his dubious 'interpretations' even if they gut the very statutes they construe: After all, there are 'constitutional limitations on the judicial power'—though not, apparently, on the power of the executive.}}</ref> Critics acknowledge that part of the president's duty is to "interpret what is, and is not constitutional, at least when overseeing the actions of executive agencies," but critics accused Bush of overstepping that duty by his perceived willingness to overrule US courts.<ref>{{cite news |last=Van Bergen |first=Jennifer |date=January 9, 2006 |title=The Unitary Executive: Is The Doctrine Behind the Bush Presidency Consistent with a Democratic State? |url=http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060109_bergen.html |work=[[Findlaw]] |quote=In his view, and the view of his Administration, that doctrine gives him license to overrule and bypass Congress or the courts, based on his own interpretations of the Constitution. ...}}</ref> During his confirmation hearing to become an associate justice on the [[United States Supreme Court]], [[Samuel Alito]] seemed to endorse a weaker version of the unitary executive theory.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Liptak |first1=Adam |date=2006 |title=Few Glimmers of How Conservative Judge Alito Is |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/13/politics/politicsspecial1/few-glimmers-of-how-conservative-judge-alito-is.html |access-date=2 November 2017 |work=[[The New York Times]] |page=A1 |authorlink=Adam Liptak}}</ref>
+[[Dick Cheney]] and the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|George W. Bush administration]] supported the theory.<ref name="Johnsen">{{cite journal |last=Johnsen |first=Dawn |author-link=Dawn Johnsen |date=April 2008 |title=What's a President To Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses |url=http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/JOHNSEN.pdf |journal=[[Boston University Law Review]] |volume=88 |page=395 |quote=On 363 occasions, President Bush objected to provisions that he found might conflict with the president's constitutional authority 'to supervise the unitary executive branch.'}}</ref> For example, Bush once wrote in a signing statement that he would, "construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power."<ref>{{cite news |last=Lazarus |first=Edward |date=January 5, 2006 |title=How Much Authority Does the President Possess When He Is Acting as 'Commander in Chief'? Evaluating President Bush's Claims Against a Key Supreme Court Executive Power Precedent |url=http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20060105.html |work=FindLaw |quote=That signed statement shows, in microcosm, how the President sees the separation of powers: The President, in his view of the world, can interpret away constraints on his power, such as those in the McCain Amendment, or FISA before it. And the courts can hardly question his dubious 'interpretations' even if they gut the very statutes they construe: After all, there are 'constitutional limitations on the judicial power'—though not, apparently, on the power of the executive.}}{{Dead link|date=November 2024}}</ref> Critics acknowledge that part of the president's duty is to "interpret what is, and is not constitutional, at least when overseeing the actions of executive agencies"; at the same time, they accused Bush of overstepping that duty by his perceived willingness to overrule U.S. courts.<ref>{{cite news |last=Van Bergen |first=Jennifer |date=January 9, 2006 |title=The Unitary Executive: Is The Doctrine Behind the Bush Presidency Consistent with a Democratic State? |url=http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060109_bergen.html |work=[[Findlaw]] |quote=In his view, and the view of his Administration, that doctrine gives him license to overrule and bypass Congress or the courts, based on his own interpretations of the Constitution. ...}}</ref> During his confirmation hearing to become an associate justice on the [[United States Supreme Court]], [[Samuel Alito]] seemed to endorse a weaker version of the unitary executive theory.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Liptak |first1=Adam |date=2006 |title=Few Glimmers of How Conservative Judge Alito Is |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/13/politics/politicsspecial1/few-glimmers-of-how-conservative-judge-alito-is.html |access-date=2 November 2017 |work=[[The New York Times]] |page=A1 |authorlink=Adam Liptak}}</ref> [[Barack Obama]] campaigned against the theory but embraced some aspects of it after the [[2010 midterm elections]].<ref>{{Citation |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |title=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |work=Leadership and Politics |pages=545 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S.}}</ref>
+[[Donald Trump]] exerted the greatest control over the executive during [[First presidency of Donald Trump|his presidency]] than any other modern president, often citing Article II of the Constitution. In 2019, he said, "I have an Article II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president."<ref name="NYT Presidential Power2">{{cite news |last1=Swan |first1=Jonathan |last2=Savage |first2=Charlie |last3=Maggie |first3=Haberman |date=July 17, 2023 |title=Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/17/us/politics/trump-plans-2025.html |access-date=December 6, 2023 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref><ref name=":7" /><ref name="Dodds 2023 487–517" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last1=Crouch |first1=Jeffrey |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1ft83xf |title=The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government |last2=Rozell |first2=Mark J. |last3=Sollenberger |first3=Mitchel A. |date=2020 |publisher=University Press of Kansas |isbn=978-0-7006-3004-2 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv1ft83xf|jstor=j.ctv1ft83xf }}</ref> [[William Barr|Bill Barr]] notably supported the theory before his confirmation as attorney general in a 2018 memo criticizing the [[Mueller special counsel investigation|Russia probe]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=McCarthy |first=Tom |date=2019-01-13 |title=Trump's attorney general pick raises fears of a president above the law |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/13/donald-trump-william-barr-attorney-general-senate-confirmation-robert-mueller |access-date=2024-07-11 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Deconstructed |date=2020-05-21 |title=Deconstructed Podcast: Is Bill Bar the Most Dangerous Trump Official? |url=https://theintercept.com/2020/05/21/is-bill-barr-the-most-dangerous-member-of-the-trump-administration/ |access-date=2024-07-11 |website=The Intercept |language=en-US}}</ref> [[Project 2025#Expansion of presidential powers|Project 2025 proposes]] using the theory as justification to give Trump or the next Republican president maximum control over the executive branch.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Wrona |first1=Aleksandra |last2=Nur |first2=Ibrahim |date=2024-07-11 |title=The Facts About Project 2025: The Pro-Trump Proposal To 'Reshape America' |url=https://www.snopes.com//news/2024/07/11/project-2025-explained/ |access-date=2024-07-19 |website=Snopes |language=en |quote=Project 2025 authors built their proposals on an idea popular during former President Ronald Reagan's time: the 'unitary executive theory.'...Overall, critics including legal experts and former government employees have zeroed in on Project 2025's goal to give the executive branch more power, describing it as a precursor to authoritarianism.}}</ref> The [[Donald Trump 2024 presidential campaign#Expansion of executive and presidential power|Trump 2024 campaign platform includes an expansion of executive power]] grounded in this theory.<ref name="NYT Presidential Power">{{cite news |last1=Swan |first1=Jonathan |last2=Savage |first2=Charlie |last3=Maggie |first3=Haberman |date=July 17, 2023 |title=Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/17/us/politics/trump-plans-2025.html |access-date=December 6, 2023 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> The 2024 Supreme Court ruling [[Trump v. United States (2024)|Trump v. United States]] could make the president even more powerful, with some interpreting it as an endorsement of the unitary executive theory.<ref>{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.pbs.org/video/trump-agenda-1720559568/ |title=The Project 2025 plan and Trump's links to its authors |date=July 9, 2024 |language=en |publisher=PBS News Hour |access-date=2024-07-11 |via=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Tucker |first=Eric |date=July 2, 2024 |title=Supreme Court opinion conferring broad immunity could embolden Trump as he seeks to return to power |url=https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/supreme-court-opinion-conferring-broad-immunity-embolden-trump-111632671 |agency=Associated Press |quote='This is a full-throated endorsement of the unitary executive theory' in a dramatic way, said Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf, referring to the theory that the U.S. Constitution gives the president expansive control over the government’s executive branch.}}</ref>
-[[Barack Obama]] campaigned loudly against the theory, but embraced some aspects of it after the [[2010 midterm elections]].<ref>{{Citation |last1=Dodds |first1=Graham G. |title=Presidential Leadership and the Unitary Executive Theory: Temptations and Troubles |date=2024 |work=Leadership and Politics |pages=545 |editor-last=Akande |editor-first=Adebowale |url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |access-date=2024-07-18 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-56415-4_22 |isbn=978-3-031-56414-7 |last2=Kelley |first2=Christopher S.}}</ref>
-[[Donald Trump]] exerted the greatest control over the executive during [[Presidency of Donald Trump|his Presidency]] than any other modern president, often citing Article II of the constitution, including in 2019 saying, "I have an Article 2, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president."<ref name="NYT Presidential Power2">{{cite news |last1=Swan |first1=Jonathan |last2=Savage |first2=Charlie |last3=Maggie |first3=Haberman |date=July 17, 2023 |title=Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/17/us/politics/trump-plans-2025.html |access-date=December 6, 2023 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref><ref name=":7" /><ref name="Dodds 2023 487–517"/><ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last1=Crouch |first1=Jeffrey |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1ft83xf |title=The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government |last2=Rozell |first2=Mark J. |last3=Sollenberger |first3=Mitchel A. |date=2020 |publisher=University Press of Kansas |isbn=978-0-7006-3004-2 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv1ft83xf|jstor=j.ctv1ft83xf }}</ref> [[William Barr|Bill Barr]] notably supported the theory before his confirmation as Attorney General in 2018 memo criticizing the [[Mueller special counsel investigation|Russia probe]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=McCarthy |first=Tom |date=2019-01-13 |title=Trump's attorney general pick raises fears of a president above the law |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/13/donald-trump-william-barr-attorney-general-senate-confirmation-robert-mueller |access-date=2024-07-11 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Deconstructed |date=2020-05-21 |title=Deconstructed Podcast: Is Bill Bar the Most Dangerous Trump Official? |url=https://theintercept.com/2020/05/21/is-bill-barr-the-most-dangerous-member-of-the-trump-administration/ |access-date=2024-07-11 |website=The Intercept |language=en-US}}</ref>
-[[Project 2025#Expansion of presidential powers|Project 2025 proposes]] using the theory as justification to give Trump or the next Republican president maximum control over the executive branch.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Wrona |first1=Aleksandra |last2=Nur |first2=Ibrahim |date=2024-07-11 |title=The Facts About Project 2025: The Pro-Trump Proposal To 'Reshape America' |url=https://www.snopes.com//news/2024/07/11/project-2025-explained/ |access-date=2024-07-19 |website=Snopes |language=en |quote=Project 2025 authors built their proposals on an idea popular during former President Ronald Reagan's time: the 'unitary executive theory.'...Overall, critics including legal experts and former government employees have zeroed in on Project 2025's goal to give the executive branch more power, describing it as a precursor to authoritarianism.}}</ref> The [[Donald Trump 2024 presidential campaign#Expansion of executive and presidential power|Trump 2024 campaign platform includes an expansion of executive power]] grounded in this theory.<ref name="NYT Presidential Power">{{cite news |last1=Swan |first1=Jonathan |last2=Savage |first2=Charlie |last3=Maggie |first3=Haberman |date=July 17, 2023 |title=Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/17/us/politics/trump-plans-2025.html |access-date=December 6, 2023 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> The 2024 Supreme Court ruling on [[Trump v. United States (2024)|Trump v. United States]] could make the president even more powerful, with some interpreting it as an endorsement of the unitary executive theory by the six conservative justices.<ref>{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.pbs.org/video/trump-agenda-1720559568/ |title=The Project 2025 plan and Trump's links to its authors |date=July 9, 2024 |language=en |publisher=PBS News Hour |access-date=2024-07-11 |via=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Tucker |first=Eric |date=July 2, 2024 |title=Supreme Court opinion conferring broad immunity could embolden Trump as he seeks to return to power |url=https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/supreme-court-opinion-conferring-broad-immunity-embolden-trump-111632671 |agency=Associated Press |quote='This is a full-throated endorsement of the unitary executive theory' in a dramatic way, said Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf, referring to the theory that the U.S. Constitution gives the president expansive control over the government’s executive branch.}}</ref>
 ==Criticism==
@@ Line 80: / Line 68: @@
 === Constitutional ===
-[[Stephen Skowronek]], John A. Dearborn and [[Desmond King (professor)|Desmond King]] argue that the unitary executive theory is a constitutional nightmare that would cause disruption and consequences that the founders hoped to avoid.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/on1163936736 |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |edition=New |location=New York, NY |pages=38 |oclc=on1163936736 |quote=...the unitary executive becomes exactly what the founders most feared, a formula for maximum disruption. It is prone to imposing decisions at will, marginalizing dissent, and to radicalizing opposition...Power hierarchically controlled, thoroughly politicized and concentrated in the executive, is a constitutional nightmare, and a bitter denouement for a beleaguered republic.}}</ref>
+[[Stephen Skowronek]], John A. Dearborn, and [[Desmond King (professor)|Desmond King]] argue that the unitary executive theory is a constitutional nightmare that would cause disruption and consequences the founders hoped to avoid.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Skowronek |first1=Stephen |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/on1163936736 |title=Phantoms of a beleaguered republic: the deep state and the unitary executive |last2=Dearborn |first2=John A. |last3=King |first3=Desmond S. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754308-5 |edition=New |location=New York, NY |pages=38 |oclc=on1163936736 |quote=...the unitary executive becomes exactly what the founders most feared, a formula for maximum disruption. It is prone to imposing decisions at will, marginalizing dissent, and to radicalizing opposition...Power hierarchically controlled, thoroughly politicized and concentrated in the executive, is a constitutional nightmare, and a bitter denouement for a beleaguered republic.}}</ref> [[Loyola Law School]] professors Karl Manheim and [[Allan Ides]] write, "the separation among the branches is not and never was intended to be airtight" and point to the president's veto power as an example of the executive exercising legislative power. They also cite other examples of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power exercised by the executive branch as necessary elements of the administrative state, but contend that ultimately all administrative power belongs to Congress, not the President, and the only true "executive" powers are those explicitly described in the Constitution.<ref name="Manheim Ides">{{cite journal |last1=Manheim |first1=Karl |last2=Ides |first2=Allan |date=September 2006 |title=The Unitary Executive |journal=[[Los Angeles Lawyer]] |ssrn=943046 |id=Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-39}}</ref> In this, Manheim and Ides follow in the footsteps of Lessig and Sunstein.<ref name="Lessig" />{{Page needed|date=July 2024}}
+[[David J. Barron]] (now a federal judge) and [[Marty Lederman]] have criticized the unitary executive theory. They acknowledge that there is a compelling case for some form of a unitary executive within the armed forces,<ref name="Barron-Lederman">{{cite journal |last1=Barron |first1=David |last2=Lederman |first2=Martin |url=http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/jan08/barron_lederman.shtml |title=The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing The Problem, Doctrine, And Original Understanding |journal=[[Harvard Law Review]] |publisher=[[Harvard University]]|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|volume=121 |page=689 |year=2008 |quote=we think the text, as reinforced by historical practice, makes a strong case for at least some form of a 'unitary executive' within the armed forces, particularly as to traditional functions during armed conflicts. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090125114946/http://harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/jan08/barron_lederman.shtml |archive-date=January 25, 2009  }}</ref> but argue that the Constitution does not provide for an equally strong unitary executive outside the military context, and that the [[Article Two of the United States Constitution#Clause 1: Command of military; Opinions of cabinet secretaries; Pardons|Commander in Chief Clause]] would be superfluous if the same kind of unitary presidential authority resulted from the general constitutional provision vesting executive power in the president.<ref name=":15">{{cite journal |last1=Barron |first1=David |last2=Lederman |first2=Martin|url=http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/feb08/barron_lederman2.shtml |title=The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History |journal=[[Harvard Law Review]] |publisher=[[Harvard University]]|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|volume=121 |page=941 |year=2008 |quote=there are those who would argue that the 'unitary executive' must have effective control over all Article II functions, in which case the superintendence guaranteed by the Commander in Chief Clause would not appear to do any additional work with respect to superintendence. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090124223310/http://harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/feb08/barron_lederman2.shtml |archive-date=January 24, 2009  }}</ref> The [[BBC]] has called the theory "controversial",<ref name=":2">{{cite news |last1=Wendling |first1=Mike |date=July 7, 2024 |title=Project 2025: A wish list for a Trump presidency, explained |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c977njnvq2do |publisher=BBC |quote=...a controversial idea known as 'unitary executive theory'}}</ref> and ''[[The Guardian]]'' called it "contested"<ref name=":3">{{Cite news |last=Pengelly |first=Martin |date=2023-09-15 |title=US hard-right policy group condemned for 'dehumanising' anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/15/project-2025-policy-manifesto-lgbtq-rights |access-date=2024-07-11 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> and a "quasi legal doctrine".<ref name=":42">{{Cite news |last=Pilkington |first=Ed |date=2024-06-07 |title=Trump plots capture of DoJ in renewed assault on US justice system |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/07/trump-justice-department |access-date=2024-07-11 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> In 2007, [[Norman Ornstein]] wrote in ''[[The Economist]]'' that an overwhelming majority of constitutional scholars and historians find the theory "laughable".<ref name=":14">{{Cite news |last=Ornstein |first=Norman |date=June 26, 2007 |title=Blog: Cheney's chutzpah |url=https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2007/06/25/cheneys-chutzpah |access-date=2024-07-11 |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>
-[[Loyola Law School]] professors Karl Manheim and [[Allan Ides]] write that "the separation among the branches is not and never was intended to be airtight," and they point to the president's veto power as an example of the executive exercising legislative power. They also cite other examples of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power being exercised by the executive branch, as necessary elements of the administrative state, but they contend that ultimately all administrative power belongs to Congress rather than the President, and the only true "executive" powers are those explicitly described in the Constitution.<ref name="Manheim Ides">{{cite journal |last1=Manheim |first1=Karl |last2=Ides |first2=Allan |date=September 2006 |title=The Unitary Executive |journal=[[Los Angeles Lawyer]] |ssrn=943046 |id=Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-39}}</ref> In this understanding, Manheim and Ides follow in the footsteps of Lessig and Sunstein.<ref name="Lessig" />{{Page needed|date=July 2024}}
-[[David J. Barron]] (now a federal judge) and [[Marty Lederman]] have also criticized the unitary executive theory. They acknowledge that there is a compelling case for some form of a unitary executive within the armed forces.<ref name="Barron-Lederman">{{cite journal |last1=Barron |first1=David |last2=Lederman |first2=Martin |url=http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/jan08/barron_lederman.shtml |title=The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing The Problem, Doctrine, And Original Understanding |journal=[[Harvard Law Review]] |publisher=[[Harvard University]]|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|volume=121 |page=689 |year=2008 |quote=we think the text, as reinforced by historical practice, makes a strong case for at least some form of a 'unitary executive' within the armed forces, particularly as to traditional functions during armed conflicts. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090125114946/http://harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/jan08/barron_lederman.shtml |archive-date=January 25, 2009  }}</ref> However, they argue that the Constitution does not provide for an equally strong unitary executive outside the military context, and they argue that the [[Article Two of the United States Constitution#Clause 1: Command of military; Opinions of cabinet secretaries; Pardons|Commander in Chief Clause]] would be superfluous if the same kind of unitary presidential authority resulted from the general constitutional provision vesting executive power in the president.<ref name=":15">{{cite journal |last1=Barron |first1=David |last2=Lederman |first2=Martin|url=http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/feb08/barron_lederman2.shtml |title=The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History |journal=[[Harvard Law Review]] |publisher=[[Harvard University]]|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|volume=121 |page=941 |year=2008 |quote=there are those who would argue that the 'unitary executive' must have effective control over all Article II functions, in which case the superintendence guaranteed by the Commander in Chief Clause would not appear to do any additional work with respect to superintendence. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090124223310/http://harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/feb08/barron_lederman2.shtml |archive-date=January 24, 2009  }}</ref>
-The ''[[BBC]]'' described the theory as "controversial,"<ref name=":2">{{cite news |last1=Wendling |first1=Mike |date=July 7, 2024 |title=Project 2025: A wish list for a Trump presidency, explained |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c977njnvq2do |publisher=BBC |quote=...a controversial idea known as 'unitary executive theory'}}</ref> while ''[[The Guardian]]'' described it as "contested"<ref name=":3">{{Cite news |last=Pengelly |first=Martin |date=2023-09-15 |title=US hard-right policy group condemned for 'dehumanising' anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/15/project-2025-policy-manifesto-lgbtq-rights |access-date=2024-07-11 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> and a "quasi legal doctrine."<ref name=":42">{{Cite news |last=Pilkington |first=Ed |date=2024-06-07 |title=Trump plots capture of DoJ in renewed assault on US justice system |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/07/trump-justice-department |access-date=2024-07-11 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> In 2007, [[Norman Ornstein]] wrote in the ''[[The Economist|Economist]]'' that an overwhelming majority of constitutional scholars and historians find the theory to be "laughable."<ref name=":14">{{Cite news |last=Ornstein |first=Norman |date=June 26, 2007 |title=Blog: Cheney's chutzpah |url=https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2007/06/25/cheneys-chutzpah |access-date=2024-07-11 |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>
 === Democracy ===
 {{See also|Democratic backsliding in the United States#Unitary Executive Theory}}
+Graham Dodds and Christopher Kelley worry about the constitutional implications of relegating the legislative branch to secondary status as well as the implications of the theory for democracy, especially under a Trump presidency.<ref name=":17" /> Ian Millhiser called it a "worst-case scenario for liberal democracy".<ref name=":21">{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2023-11-21 |title=A Supreme Court case about stocks could help make Trump's authoritarian dreams reality |url=https://www.vox.com/scotus/2023/11/21/23964561/supreme-court-sec-jarkesy-donald-trump-authoritarian-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Vox |language=en-US |quote=There are weaker versions of the unitary executive theory that wouldn’t allow the president to fire every FBI agent who refuses to swear personal fealty. But even these weaker versions could potentially give presidents power to manipulate elections, and to interfere with technocratic aspects of government that historically have been removed from partisan politics, such as the Federal Reserve...And, of course, looming over all of this is Trump, with his plan to replace much of the civil service with people personally loyal to him. In the worst-case scenario for liberal democracy, the Supreme Court could use the Jarkesy case to greenlight many of Trump’s most authoritarian aspirations.}}</ref> Steven Greenhut argues the theory is a prescription for abuse and authoritarianism.<ref name=":16" /> David Driesen argues that unitary control over the executive is a defining characteristic of autocracy.<ref name=":13" /> ''[[The Economist]]'' wrote that "the vain and tyrannical whims of an emperor-president would emerge from the rubble."<ref name=":20" />
-Graham Dodds and Christopher Kelley worry about the constitutional implications of relegating the legislative branch to secondary status as well as the implications of the theory for democracy, especially under a Trump presidency.<ref name=":17" />
-Ian Millhiser called it a 'worst-case scenario for liberal democracy.'<ref name=":21">{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2023-11-21 |title=A Supreme Court case about stocks could help make Trump's authoritarian dreams reality |url=https://www.vox.com/scotus/2023/11/21/23964561/supreme-court-sec-jarkesy-donald-trump-authoritarian-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Vox |language=en-US |quote=There are weaker versions of the unitary executive theory that wouldn’t allow the president to fire every FBI agent who refuses to swear personal fealty. But even these weaker versions could potentially give presidents power to manipulate elections, and to interfere with technocratic aspects of government that historically have been removed from partisan politics, such as the Federal Reserve...And, of course, looming over all of this is Trump, with his plan to replace much of the civil service with people personally loyal to him. In the worst-case scenario for liberal democracy, the Supreme Court could use the Jarkesy case to greenlight many of Trump’s most authoritarian aspirations.}}</ref>
-Steven Greenhut argues the theory is a prescription for abuse and authoritarianism.<ref name=":16" />
-David Driesen argues that unitary control over the executive is a defining characteristic of autocracy.<ref name=":13" />
-''[[The Economist]]'' argued that "the vain and tyrannical whims of an emperor-president would emerge from the rubble."<ref name=":20" />
-Unlike the modern constitutions of many other countries, which specify when and how a state of emergency may be declared and which rights may be suspended, the U.S. Constitution itself includes no comprehensive separate regime for emergencies. Some legal scholars believe however that the Constitution gives the president inherent emergency powers by making him commander in chief of the armed forces, or by vesting in him a broad, undefined "executive power."<ref name="Atlantic201901&201902">{{cite news |last1=Goitein |first1=Elizabeth |date=January–February 2019 |title=The Alarming Scope of the President's Emergency Powers |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergency-powers/576418/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200401071344/https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergency-powers/576418/ |archive-date=April 1, 2020 |access-date=1 April 2020 |work=[[The Atlantic]]}}</ref> Congress has delegated at least 136 distinct statutory emergency powers to the president, each available upon the declaration of an emergency. Only 13 of these require a declaration from Congress; the remaining 123 are assumed by an [[Federal government of the United States#Executive branch|executive]] declaration with no further congressional input.<ref>{{cite web |title=A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/emergency-powers |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200401070744/https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use |archive-date=April 1, 2020 |access-date=January 7, 2019 |website=Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law |language=en}}</ref> Congressionally authorized emergency presidential powers are sweeping and dramatic and range from seizing control of the internet to declaring martial law.<ref name="Atlantic201901&201902" /> This led the American magazine ''[[The Atlantic]]'' to observe that "the misuse of emergency powers is a standard gambit among leaders attempting to consolidate power",<ref name="Atlantic201901&201902" /> because, in the words of Justice [[Robert H. Jackson]]'s dissent in ''[[Korematsu v. United States]]'', the 1944 Supreme Court decision that upheld the [[internment of Japanese-Americans]], each emergency power "lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."<ref name="Atlantic201901&201902" />
+Unlike many other countries' modern constitutions, which specify when and how a state of emergency may be declared and which rights may be suspended, the U.S. Constitution includes no comprehensive separate regime for emergencies. Some legal scholars believe the Constitution gives the president inherent emergency powers by making him commander in chief of the armed forces, or by vesting in him a broad, undefined "executive power."<ref name="Atlantic201901&201902">{{cite news |last1=Goitein |first1=Elizabeth |date=January–February 2019 |title=The Alarming Scope of the President's Emergency Powers |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergency-powers/576418/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200401071344/https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergency-powers/576418/ |archive-date=April 1, 2020 |access-date=1 April 2020 |work=[[The Atlantic]]}}</ref> Congress has delegated at least 136 distinct statutory emergency powers to the president, each available upon the declaration of an emergency. Only 13 of these require a declaration from Congress; the rest are assumed by an executive declaration with no further congressional input.<ref>{{cite web |title=A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/emergency-powers |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200401070744/https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use |archive-date=April 1, 2020 |access-date=January 7, 2019 |website=Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law |language=en}}</ref> Congressionally authorized emergency presidential powers are sweeping and dramatic, ranging from seizing control of the internet to declaring martial law.<ref name="Atlantic201901&201902" /> This led ''[[The Atlantic]]'' to write that "the misuse of emergency powers is a standard gambit among leaders attempting to consolidate power",<ref name="Atlantic201901&201902" /> because, in the words of Justice [[Robert H. Jackson]]'s dissent in ''[[Korematsu v. United States]]'', the 1944 Supreme Court decision that upheld the [[internment of Japanese-Americans]], each emergency power "lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."<ref name="Atlantic201901&201902" />
 === Practical ===
+Writing in ''[[Reason (magazine)|Reason]]'', Ilya Somin argued that concentrating more power in the president would make the president less accountable and run contrary to the ideals of the founders, who were concerned about the concentration of power.<ref name=":19" /> Concern about the effects on the Justice Department's investigatorial independence and anti-corruption efforts is a recurring theme in criticism of the unitary executive theory.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |author-link=Ian Millhiser |date=2020-02-14 |title=How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/2/14/21135083/justice-scalia-bill-barr-trump-unitary-executive-no-rule-of-law-morrison-olson |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Vox |language=en-US |quote=The facts of Morrison also highlight why prosecutorial independence is sometimes desirable. That case involved an investigation into one of the seniormost officials within the Justice Department. A rank-and-file prosecutor would understandably fear the professional consequences of leading such an investigation — for the same reason that I would be reluctant to conduct an investigation into one of Vox Media's top executives.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Shugerman |first=Jed Handelsman |date=July 6, 2020 |title=The Imaginary Unitary Executive |url=https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/imaginary-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-07-18 |website=[[Lawfare]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Dorf |first=Michael C. |author-link=Michael C. Dorf |date=2023-06-19 |title=Opinion: The Misguided Unitary Executive Theory Gains Ground |url=https://verdict.justia.com/2023/06/19/the-misguided-unitary-executive-theory-gains-ground |access-date=2024-07-18 |website=[[Justia]] |language=en |quote=Not only is the unitary executive theory writ large ahistorical...}}</ref><ref name=":20" />
-Ilya Somin, also writing in ''[[Reason (magazine)|Reason]]'', argues that despite being a supporter of a textual interpretation of the theory in the past, concentrating more power in the president would make the president less accountable and run contrary to the ideals of the founders who were also concerned about the concentration of power.<ref name=":19" />
+Another concern revolves around the more practical implications of a brain drain of expertise in the federal government.<ref name=":20" /> [[Ian Millhiser]] critiques weaker versions of the theory as giving presidents power to manipulate elections and interfere with technocratic aspects of government typically removed from politics, such as the Federal Reserve.<ref name=":21" /> Some scholars oppose even the weaker theory of a unitary executive. Some favor a plural executive, such as in the many state governments that separately elect an attorney general.<ref name="Berry">{{cite journal |last1=Berry |first1=Christopher |last2=Gersen |first2=Jacob |name-list-style=amp |year=2008 |title=The Unbundled Executive |url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?httpsredir=1&article=1349&context=public_law_and_legal_theory |url-status=dead |journal=[[University of Chicago Law Review]] |location=Chicago, Illinois |publisher=[[University of Chicago]] |ssrn=1113543 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110807190941/http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=nwwps |archive-date=August 7, 2011 |quote=We certainly do not claim that the most sensible or even any plausible interpretation of the US Constitution establishes a plural unbundled executive; but perhaps it should |df=mdy-all}}</ref> Others favor a system in which Congress and the president share control over the bureaucracy. Both would likely require a constitutional amendment to add these checks on the executive that are common in other democracies.
-Concern around the impacts to investigatorial independence and anti-corruption efforts of the Justice Department is a recurring theme in criticisms of the unitary executive theory.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |author-link=Ian Millhiser |date=2020-02-14 |title=How Justice Scalia paved the way for Trump's assault on the rule of law |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/2/14/21135083/justice-scalia-bill-barr-trump-unitary-executive-no-rule-of-law-morrison-olson |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=Vox |language=en-US |quote=The facts of Morrison also highlight why prosecutorial independence is sometimes desirable. That case involved an investigation into one of the seniormost officials within the Justice Department. A rank-and-file prosecutor would understandably fear the professional consequences of leading such an investigation — for the same reason that I would be reluctant to conduct an investigation into one of Vox Media’s top executives.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Shugerman |first=Jed Handelsman |date=July 6, 2020 |title=The Imaginary Unitary Executive |url=https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/imaginary-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-07-18 |website=[[Lawfare]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Dorf |first=Michael C. |author-link=Michael C. Dorf |date=2023-06-19 |title=Opinion: The Misguided Unitary Executive Theory Gains Ground |url=https://verdict.justia.com/2023/06/19/the-misguided-unitary-executive-theory-gains-ground |access-date=2024-07-18 |website=[[Justia]] |language=en |quote=Not only is the unitary executive theory writ large ahistorical...}}</ref><ref name=":20" />
-Another concern revolves around the more practical implications of a brain drain of expertise throughout the federal government.<ref name=":20" /> [[Ian Millhiser]] also critiques weaker versions of the theory as giving presidents power to manipulate elections and interfere with technocratic aspects of government typically removed from politics like the Federal Reserve.<ref name=":21" />
-Some scholars oppose even the weaker theory of a unitary executive. Some favor a plural executive, such as in the many state governments that separately elect an attorney general.<ref name="Berry">{{cite journal |last1=Berry |first1=Christopher |last2=Gersen |first2=Jacob |name-list-style=amp |year=2008 |title=The Unbundled Executive |url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?httpsredir=1&article=1349&context=public_law_and_legal_theory |url-status=dead |journal=[[University of Chicago Law Review]] |location=Chicago, Illinois |publisher=[[University of Chicago]] |ssrn=1113543 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110807190941/http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=nwwps |archive-date=August 7, 2011 |quote=We certainly do not claim that the most sensible or even any plausible interpretation of the US Constitution establishes a plural unbundled executive; but perhaps it should |df=mdy-all}}</ref> Others favor a view in which Congress and the president share control over the bureaucracy. Both would likely require a constitutional amendment to add these checks on the executive that are common in other democracies.
 == Executive power in other democracies ==
 === Governors and the states ===
-{{anchor|Plural executive}}Unitary executive theory does not exist at the state or local level in the United States. In contrast to a single elected executive officer such as the president, '''plural executives''' exist in virtually all non-national governments, with states where executive officers such as [[Lieutenant governor (United States)|lieutenant governor]], [[State attorney general|attorney general]], [[comptroller#United States|comptroller]], [[Secretary of State (U.S. state government)|secretary of state]], and others, are elected independently of the [[Governor (United States)|state's governor]].<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":8" />
+{{anchor|Plural executive}}Unitary executive theory does not exist at the state or local level in the United States. In contrast to a single elected executive officer such as the president, '''plural executives''' exist in virtually all non-national governments, with states where executive officers such as [[Lieutenant governor (United States)|lieutenant governor]], [[State attorney general|attorney general]], [[comptroller#United States|comptroller]], [[Secretary of State (U.S. state government)|secretary of state]], and others, are elected independently of the [[Governor (United States)|state's governor]].<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":8" /> The executive branches of [[Government of Texas|Texas]] and [[North Carolina]], for example, maintain a plural executive whereby other elected executive officers can curb the chief executive's actions. The group of North Carolina executive officers, the [[North Carolina Council of State]], wields considerable statutory power when approving the state government's monetary and property transactions.<ref>{{Cite web|title=North Carolina State Government - The Executive Branch - Council of State|url=https://www.carolana.com/NC/Executive_Branch/nc_council_of_state.html|access-date=2021-04-30|website=carolana.com}}</ref> The [[Constitution of New York|New York Constitution]] contained Take Care and Vesting Clauses "precisely mirroring the U.S. Constitution's clauses, but did not allow the Governor to either appoint or remove officers, vesting those functions in a council."<ref name=":13" />
-The executive branches of [[Government of Texas|Texas]] and [[North Carolina]], for example, maintain a plural executive whereby the chief executive's actions can be curbed by other elected executive officers. The group of North Carolina executive officers is known as the [[North Carolina Council of State]] and it wields fair amounts of statutory powers when approving monetary and property transactions by the state government.<ref>{{Cite web|title=North Carolina State Government - The Executive Branch - Council of State|url=https://www.carolana.com/NC/Executive_Branch/nc_council_of_state.html|access-date=2021-04-30|website=www.carolana.com}}</ref>
-The [[Constitution of New York|New York Constitution]] contained Take Care and Vesting Clauses "precisely mirroring the U.S. Constitution’s clauses, but did not allow the Governor to either appoint or remove officers, vesting those functions in a council."<ref name=":13" />
 === Outside the United States ===
-David Driesen argues that similar reforms led to significant [[democratic backsliding]] in [[Turkey]], [[Poland]] and [[Hungary]].<ref name=":13" />
+David Driesen argues that similar reforms led to significant [[democratic backsliding]] in [[Turkey]], [[Poland]] and [[Hungary]].<ref name=":13" /> Susan Hennessey and [[Benjamin Wittes]] said that "the American presidency, in its unity, is profoundly dissimilar from nearly all other executives in democratic systems that have persisted over time. The founders of other democracies have, quite intentionally, decided differently from the founders of this one."<ref name=":18" />
-Susan Hennessey and [[Benjamin Wittes]] said that "the American presidency, in its unity, is profoundly dissimilar from nearly all other executives in democratic systems that have persisted over time. The founders of other democracies have, quite intentionally, decided differently from the founders of this one."<ref name=":18" />
 == In film ==
@@ Line 129: / Line 95: @@
 ==See also==
-* [[Democratic backsliding#Executive aggrandizement|Executive aggrandizement]]
+* [[Executive aggrandizement]]
-* [[Führerprinzip]]
+* ''[[Führerprinzip]]''
 * [[Imperial presidency]]
-* [[Independent State Legislature Theory]]
+* [[Independent state legislature theory]]
-* [[Schedule F appointment|Schedule F]]
+* [[Schedule F appointment]]
 == References ==
@@ Line 150: / Line 116: @@
 [[Category:Counterterrorism in the United States]]
+[[Category:Democratic backsliding in the United States]]
 [[Category:Executive branch of the government of the United States]]
-[[Category:George W. Bush administration controversies]]
 [[Category:Political philosophy]]
 [[Category:Presidency of the United States]]
@@ Line 158: / Line 124: @@
 [[Category:United States national security policy]]
 [[Category:Authoritarianism]]
-[[Category:Democratic backsliding in the United States]]