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China under Xi Jinping

(Redirected from Xi Jinping Administration)
"Xi Jinping administration" redirects here. Not to be confused with Xi Jinping–Li Keqiang Administration.

Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, and later in 2016 was proclaimed the CCP's 4th leadership core, following Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin.[1][2][3]

Xi Jinping Administration
以习近平同志为核心的党中央

5th generation Communist leadership of
the People's Republic of China
Incumbent
Paramount leader Xi Jinping
Date formed15 November 2012
People and organisations
Head of stateXi Jinping
Head of governmentLi Keqiang
Li Qiang
No. of ministers31
Member partyChinese Communist Party
Eight minor parties
History
ElectionsNovember 2012
October 2017
October 2022
Legislature terms12th National People's Congress
13th National People's Congress
14th National People's Congress
PredecessorHu Jintao Administration/
Xi–Li Administration
China under Xi Jinping
Simplified Chinese习近平体制
Traditional Chinese習近平體制
Literal meaningXi Jinping System
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXí Jìnpíng tǐzhì
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingzaap6 gan6ping4 tai2zai3
Alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese以习近平同志为核心的党中央
Traditional Chinese以習近平同志為核心的黨中央
Literal meaningThe Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinYǐ Xí Jìnpíng tóngzhì wéi héxīn de dǎng zhōngyāng
Second alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese以习近平同志为总书记的党中央
Traditional Chinese以習近平同志為總書記的黨中央
Literal meaningThe Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the General Secretary
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinYǐ Xí Jìnpíng tóngzhì wéi zǒngshūjì de dǎng zhōngyāng

The name Xi Jinping administration is officially called the "Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary" (以习近平同志为总书记的党中央) from 2012 to 2016, and "Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core" (以习近平同志为核心的党中央) since 2016.

Xi's political ideas and principles, known as Xi Jinping Thought, have been incorporated into the party and national constitutions. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, including new CCP committees on national security, economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the Internet. He and the CCP Central Committee passed a historical resolution in November 2021.

His rule is often described as an authoritarian leader by political and academic observers, while his tenure has included an increase of censorship and mass surveillance, deterioration in human rights, including the internment of a million Uyghurs in Xinjiang (which some observers have described as part of a genocide), a cult of personality developing around Xi, and the removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018.

In economic policy, Xi has prioritized poverty alleviation and creating common prosperity to reduce disparities in wealth. Xi's administration seeks to implement common prosperity in part through its education policy, including through drastically curtailing the tutoring industry and reducing homework burdens. Xi continues to emphasize the need for global development, including through the Belt and Road Initiative.

In foreign policy, Xi emphasizes the Community of Common Destiny. He seeks to increase China's ability to shape international norms in emerging policy areas (described as "new frontiers") like space and the internet, where China can position itself as an early entrant. Xi also seeks to increase China's discourse power, which he frames as China's "right to speak."

Economic policies

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See also: Economic history of China (1949–present) and Targeted Poverty Alleviation

Xi Jinping has set three overarching goals for China's economy.[4]: 10  First, to increase China's capacity for innovation so that it will be able to more actively shape global economic rules.[4]: 10  Second, to enhance order and security in China's domestic market.[4]: 10  Third, creating common prosperity and increasing wealth distribution to the poor.[4]: 10 

During the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese government continues to use SOEs to serve non-market objectives and CCP control of SOEs has increased[5]: 138  while taking some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs.[5]: 141  Although China has promoted its national champion companies since the Jiang Zemin administration,[6]: 158  it has done so particularly strongly since 2017, especially in the technology sector.[7]: 91 

Since 2015, the CCP has issued several industrial plans designed to emphasize high-tech innovation and digital development.[8]: 135  These industrial plans include Made in China 2025, the "Action Outline for Promoting the Development of Big Data", and the "Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry".[8]: 135  China's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Five-Year Plans have also emphasized high-tech and innovative development.[8]: 135 

During the Xi Jinping administration, China has emphasized an economic strategy of dual circulation.[9]: 170  First, it seeks to rely more on China's domestic consumers.[9]: 160  Second, it seeks to innovate more domestically developed technology and thereby reduce China's reliance on western technology.[9]: 160 

By 2020, China became the largest trading partner of more than 120 countries.[10]: 228  At the end of that year, China signed major free trade agreements with the European Union as well as fifteen different Asia-Pacific countries.[7]: 259  As of at least 2023, China is the world's largest exporter, a status it has maintained continuously since 2010.[9]: 88 

China's was the only major world economy to experience GDP growth in 2020, when its GDP increased by 2.3%.[7] In 2021, China's GDP growth reached 8.1% (its highest in a decade) and its trade surplus reached an all-time high $687.5 billion.[7]

Education reform

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See also: Education in China

Xi has implemented a number of education reforms.[4]: 155  Schools are required to adjust their opening hours to be consistent with work hours in their area so that parents can pick-up their children directly after work (in order to reduce reliance on private classes for adult supervision after school hours).[4]: 155  Schools must also promote health by requiring outdoor physical education classes daily and providing eye examinations twice per term.[4]: 155  Educational reforms have also limited the amount of homework students can be assigned.[4]: 156 

As part of Xi's 2021 directive on "double lessening" (reducing excessive off-campus tutoring and reducing homework burdens), schools may not assign homework to children to grades one and two, homework is limited to no more than 60 minutes for children in grades three to six, and no more than 90 minutes for middle school children.[4]: 156  In July 2021, China enacted a series of rules designed to shutdown the private tutoring sector.[4]: 156 

The government's rationale was that rising educational costs were antithetical to the goals of common prosperity.[10]: 67  Shutting down private tutoring was intended to narrow the education gap between rich and poor.[11]: 5  Rules issued in July 2021 prohibits new registration of private tuition tutoring centers and required existing centers to re-organize as non-profits.[4]: 156  Tuition centers are prohibited from being listed on the stock market or receiving "excessive capital."[4]: 156  They are no longer permitted to offer tutoring on the weekends or during public holidays.[4]: 156 

Since September 2021, private schools providing compulsory education can no longer be controlled by foreign entities or individuals.[4]: 57  Only Chinese nationals may serve on their boards of directors.[4]: 157 

Foreign policy

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Main articles: Foreign policy of Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, and Belt and Road Initiative

During the Xi Jinping administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant.[4]: 188  Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers," and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change.[4]: 188 

In his effort to build additional institutional capacity for foreign policy coordination, Xi Jinping created the National Security Commission (NSC), which absorbed the NSLG.[12]: 180  The NSC's focus is holistic national security and it addresses both external and internal security matters.[12]: 180  Xi introduced the holistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security, cultural security, and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security."[13]: 3 

During the Xi Jinping era, the Community of Common Destiny has become China's most important foreign relations formulation.[13]: 6  In his foreign policy discourse, Xi cites the examples of "foreign friends of China" to acknowledge other countries' sacrifices to assist in China's national liberation, particularly with regard to the Second Sino-Japanese war.[14]: 42  For example, during diplomatic visits to other countries, Xi has praised the contributions of people like Claire Lee Chennault, Norman Bethune, Dawarkanath Kotnis, and Soviet pilots.[14]: 42 

Xi emphasizes his desire to increase China's discourse power in international matters, often characterizing this in terms of China's "right to speak".[15]: 103 

During Xi's administration, China has often extended state-backed loans for energy and infrastructure-building in exchange for natural resources in regions like Central Asia and Africa.[16]: 87 

Political thought

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Main article: Xi Jinping Thought

"Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" was formally launched at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party having gradually been developed since 2012, when Xi became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.[4]: 21–26 

In his political discourse, Xi incorporates historical examples and themes.[14]: 32  He describes history as "the best teacher" and "the best textbook".[14]: 32  Especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi encourages the Chinese people to develop "historical self-confidence".[14]: 32  Xi includes ancient history in his political discourse, characterizing China as a "splendid civilization" and highlighting its five thousand years of history.[14]: 33  He often cites the Four Great Inventions as a source of national pride and China's contribution to humanity.[14]: 33  In his discourse for foreign audiences regarding China's peaceful rise, Xi quotes the Confucian saying, "If you do not want to have it yourself, you should not want to impose it on others."[14]: 64  In his discourse on the community of shared future, Xi cites the third century scholar Chen Shou's saying that "delicious soup is made by combining different ingredients."[14]: 64 

Current members

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Standing Committee

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These tables are an excerpt from 20th Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party § Composition.[edit]
Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
[17]
Rank Officeholder Hanzi 19th PSC Birth PM Birthplace Academic attainment No. of offices Ref.
1   Xi Jinping 习近平 Old 1953 1974 Beijing
Graduate
Twelve
 [18]
2   Li Qiang 李强 New 1959 1983 Zhejiang
Graduate
Fifteen
 [19]
3   Zhao Leji 赵乐际 Old 1957 1975 Qinghai
Graduate
Four
 [20]
4   Wang Huning 王沪宁 Old 1955 1984 Shanghai
Graduate
Eight
 [21]
5   Cai Qi 蔡奇 New 1955 1975 Fujian
Graduate
Fifteen
 [22]
6   Ding Xuexiang 丁薛祥 New 1962 1984 Jiangsu
Graduate
Thirteen
 [23]
7   Li Xi 李希 New 1956 1982 Gansu
Graduate
Four
 [24]

Politburo

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These tables are an excerpt from 20th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party § Composition.[edit]
Members of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
[25]
Officeholder Hanzi 19th POL PSC? Birth PM Birthplace Education No. of offices Ref.
  Cai Qi 蔡奇 Old New 1955 1975 Fujian Graduate
Three
 [26]
  Chen Jining 陈吉宁 New No 1964 1984 Liaoning Graduate
One
 [27]
  Chen Min'er 陈敏尔 Old No 1960 1982 Zhejiang Graduate
One
 [28]
  Chen Wenqing 陈文清 New No 1960 1983 Sichuan Graduate
One
 [29]
  Ding Xuexiang 丁薛祥 Old New 1962 1984 Jiangsu Graduate
One
 [30]
  He Lifeng 何立峰 New No 1955 1981 Guangdong Graduate
Two
 [31]
  He Weidong 何卫东 New No 1957 1978 Fujian Undergraduate
Two
 [32]
  Huang Kunming 黄坤明 Old No 1956 1976 Fujian Graduate
One
 [33]
  Li Ganjie 李干杰 New No 1964 1984 Hunan Graduate
One
 [34]
  Li Hongzhong 李鸿忠 Old No 1956 1976 Shenyang Graduate
One
 [35]
  Li Qiang 李强 Old New 1959 1983 Zhejiang Graduate
Eight
 [36]
Li Shulei 李书磊 New No 1964 1986 Henan Graduate
One
 [37]
  Li Xi 李希 Old New 1956 1982 Gansu Graduate
Two
 [38]
  Liu Guozhong 刘国中 New No 1962 1986 Heilongjiang Graduate
One
 [39]
  Ma Xingrui 马兴瑞 New No 1959 1988 Heilongjiang Graduate
One
 [40]
  Shi Taifeng 石泰峰 New No 1956 1982 Shanxi Graduate
Two
 [41]
  Wang Huning 王沪宁 Old Old 1955 1984 Shanghai Graduate
One
 [42]
  Wang Yi 王毅 New No 1953 1981 Beijing Graduate
Two
 [43]
  Xi Jinping 习近平 Old Old 1953 1974 Beijing Graduate
Eleven
 [44]
  Yin Li 尹力 New No 1962 1980 Shandong Graduate
One
 [45]
  Yuan Jiajun 袁家军 New No 1962 1992 Jilin Graduate
One
 [46]
  Zhang Guoqing 张国清 New No 1964 1984 Henan Graduate
One
 [47]
  Zhang Youxia 张又侠 Old No 1950 1969 Beijing Graduate
Two
 [48]
  Zhao Leji 赵乐际 Old Old 1957 1975 Shandong Graduate
One
 [49]

References

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