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School choice is a kind of a two-sided matching market, like the [[stable marriage problem]] or [[residency matching]]. The main difference is that, in school choice, one side of the market (namely, the schools) are not strategic. Their priorities do not represent subjective preferences, but are determined by legal requirements, for example: a priority for relatives of previous students, [[Minority quota system|minority quotas]], minimum income quotas, etc.
A major concern in designing a school-choice mechanism is that it should be [[strategyproof]] for the pupils (as they are considered to be strategic), so that they reveal their true preferences for schools. Therefore, the mechanism most commonly used in practice is the [[Deferred-acceptance algorithm]] with pupils as the proposers. However, this mechanism may yield outcomes that are not [[Pareto-efficient]] for the pupils. This loss of efficiency might be substantial: a recent survey showed that around 2% of the pupils could receive a school that is more preferred by them, without harming any other student. Moreover, in some cases, DA might assign each pupil to their second-worst or worst school.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=Kesten |first=Onur |date=2010 |title=School Choice with Consent |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27867511 |journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics |volume=125 |issue=3 |pages=1297–1348 |issn=0033-5533}}</ref>
Onur Kesten<ref name=":2" /> suggested to amend DA by removing "interrupters", that is, (student,school) pairs in which the student proposes to the school, causes the school to reject another student, and rejected later on. This "Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance" algorithm is Pareto-efficient. Whereas it is not stable and not strategyproof for the pupils, it satisfies weaker versions of these two properties. Interestingly, in lab experiments, more pupils report their true preferences to EADA than to DA (70% vs 35%).<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cerrone |first=Claudia |last2=Hermstrüwer |first2=Yoan |last3=Kesten |first3=Onur |date=2022-07-01 |title=School Choice with Consent: An Experiment |url=https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/mpgwpaper/2022_5f02.htm}}</ref>
== See also ==
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